יבמות נב

יבמות נב

הַאי גֵּט אַחַר גֵּט הוּא! אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה, הָכִי קָאָמַר: גֵּט אַחַר הַגֵּט, וּמַאֲמָר אַחַר מַאֲמָר — כְּדַאֲמַרַן, יָבָם אֶחָד וִיבָמָה אַחַת כֵּיצַד הַתָּרָתָן? עָשָׂה מַאֲמָר בִּיבִמְתּוֹ וְנָתַן לָהּ גֵּט — צְרִיכָה הֵימֶנּוּ חֲלִיצָה.

The Gemara is puzzled: Is this case upon which the mishna elaborates the case of a bill of divorce after a bill of divorce that is mentioned first in the mishna? The mishna first is referring to a bill of divorce after a bill of divorce, but when it comes to the specifics, it mentions a bill of divorce after levirate betrothal. Rav Yehuda said: This is what the tanna is saying: With regard to a bill of divorce after a bill of divorce, and levirate betrothal after levirate betrothal, it is as we said and these cases were explained in the baraita, but with regard to one yavam and one yevama, how is their complex bond released? He then proceeds to delineate: If he performed levirate betrothal with his yevama and gave her a bill of divorce, she requires ḥalitza from him.

עָשָׂה מַאֲמָר וּבָעַל — הֲרֵי זוֹ כְּמִצְוָתָהּ. לֵימָא מְסַיַּיע לֵיהּ לְרַב הוּנָא, דְּאָמַר רַב הוּנָא: מִצְוַת יְבָמָה — מְקַדֵּשׁ וְאַחַר כָּךְ בּוֹעֵל. אֵימָא: אַף זֶה כְּמִצְוָתָהּ.

§ The mishna teaches: If the yavam performed levirate betrothal and engaged in intercourse, this is done in accordance with its mitzva. The Gemara suggests: Let us say that this mishna supports the statement of Rav Huna. As Rav Huna said: The mitzva of a yevama is properly performed when the yavam betroths the yevama and only afterward engages in intercourse. This statement indicates that the levirate betrothal is a necessary component of the mitzva, and the mishna seems to imply the same. The Gemara refutes this claim: This is not necessarily the case, as you can read the mishna as stating that this also is in accordance with its mitzva. If he performed levirate betrothal and then engaged in intercourse, this too is a proper manner to proceed, but we do not have to interpret the mishna as indicating that this is the only way to fulfill the mitzva.

פְּשִׁיטָא! סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אָמֵינָא: כֵּיוָן דְּאָמַר מָר הָעוֹשֶׂה מַאֲמָר בִּיבִמְתּוֹ — פָּרְחָה הֵימֶנּוּ זִיקַּת יְבָמִין, וְחָלָה עָלָיו זִיקַּת אֵרוּסִין וְנִשּׂוּאִין, אֵימָא לָאו מִצְוָה קָעָבֵיד, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.

The Gemara asks: Isn’t this obvious? If one can fulfill the mitzva without performing levirate betrothal, why would one think that levirate betrothal is detrimental? The Gemara answers: It was indeed necessary for the mishna to teach us this, for it might enter your mind to say that since the Master said above (29b): One who performs levirate betrothal with his yevama causes the levirate bond to dissipate from himself, and a standard bond of betrothal and marriage takes effect on him, you might say that he no longer performs a mitzva when he carries out levirate marriage, as the levirate bond is no longer in place. The tanna therefore teaches us that we consider the levirate betrothal and the subsequent intercourse as part of the same process, which constitutes a mitzva.

גּוּפָא, אָמַר רַב הוּנָא: מִצְוַת יְבָמִין — מְקַדֵּשׁ וְאַחַר כָּךְ בּוֹעֵל, וְאִם בָּעַל וְעָשָׂה מַאֲמָר — קָנָה. אִם בָּעַל וְעָשָׂה מַאֲמָר — פְּשִׁיטָא, דְּהָא קַנְיַהּ בְּבִיאָה! אֶלָּא אֵימָא: אִם בָּעַל בְּלֹא מַאֲמָר — קָנָה.

The Gemara continues: With regard to the matter itself, Rav Huna said: The mitzva of levirate marriage is properly performed when the yavam betroths the yevama and afterward engages in intercourse, and if he engaged in intercourse and later performed levirate betrothal, he has acquired the yevama. The Gemara is puzzled: If he engaged in intercourse and then performed levirate betrothal it is obvious that he has acquired her, as he has already acquired her by intercourse. The levirate betrothal does not affect the issue one way or another. Rather, say as follows: If he engaged in intercourse without prior levirate betrothal, even in that case he has acquired her.

וְהָתַנְיָא לוֹקֶה! מַכַּת מַרְדּוּת מִדְּרַבָּנַן.

The Gemara challenges this: But isn’t it taught in a baraita that a yavam who has intercourse without levirate betrothal is flogged? The Gemara answers: The lashes are not because he transgressed by not performing levirate betrothal, but rather they are lashes for rebelliousness given for transgressing a rabbinic law, namely for acting in an immodest manner.

דְּרַב מְנַגֵּיד מַאן דִּמְקַדֵּשׁ בְּבִיאָה, וּמַאן דִּמְקַדֵּשׁ בְּשׁוּקָא, וּמַאן דִּמְקַדֵּשׁ בְּלָא שִׁדּוּכֵי.

The Gemara cites other instances where the Sages administered lashes for immodest behavior. As Rav would flog one who betroths a woman by intercourse, despite the fact that betrothal is effective by this method, because he acted in a promiscuous manner. And he would likewise flog one who betroths a woman in the marketplace, rather than at home, as this too is loose behavior, and he would also administer lashes to one who betroths a woman without a prior marriage agreement [shiddukhei], as this too is an act of permissiveness.

וּמַאן דִּמְבַטֵּל גִּיטָּא, וּמַאן דְּמָסַר מוֹדָעָא אַגִּיטָּא.

And he would further lash one who nullifies a bill of divorce he had earlier sent by declaring in the presence of witnesses that the bill of divorce is nullified. This action is effective, but by doing so he transgresses the rabbinic ordinance of the Sages that bans such an action as it might lead his wife to unlawfully wed another. And he would also flog one who delivers a declaration preemptively invalidating a bill of divorce, by informing three people before giving a bill of divorce that he is not doing so of his own free will and he wants to cancel it ahead of time. Here too he will mislead his wife, who will assume it is a valid bill of divorce.

[דְּמִתְפַּקַּר בִּשְׁלוּחָא] דְרַבָּנַן, וּמַאן דִּ[מְ]שַׁהֵי שַׁמְתָּא דְרַבָּנַן עֲלֵיהּ תְּלָתִין יוֹמִין, וְלָא אָתֵי לְבֵי דִינָא וְתָבַע לְשַׁמְתֵּיהּ.

And he would lash one who behaves irreverently toward a messenger of the Sages, even if the messenger is not a scholar, as he thereby shows disrespect to the Sages themselves. And he would administer lashes to one who remained under an excommunication of the Sages for thirty days and did not go to the court and petition for the removal of his excommunication after correcting the sin that led to the excommunication in the first place. This behavior demonstrates that he does not care about the excommunication, and is therefore deserving of lashes.

וְעַל חַתְנָא דְּדָאֵיר בְּבֵי חֲמוּהִי. דְּדָאֵיר — אִין, דְּחָלֵיף — לָא? וְהָא הָהוּא דַּחֲלֵיף אַבָּבָא דְּבֵי חֲמוּהִי, וְנַגְּדֵיהּ רַב שֵׁשֶׁת! הָהוּא מֵידָם הֲוָה דַּיִים מֵחֲמָתֵיהּ.

And he would also lash a son-in-law who lives in his father-in-law’s house, as this is likely to lead to temptation between the younger couple and older couple who share the same house. The Gemara asks: With regard to one who lives in his father-in-law’s house, yes, he would lash him, but with regard to one who only passed through his father-in-law’s house at regular intervals, no, he would not lash him? But an incident occurred involving a certain man who passed by the entrance to his father-in-law’s house and Rav Sheshet lashed him. The Gemara explains: There was a special set of circumstances in that case, as that man was suspected with regard to his mother-in-law, and therefore he was lashed merely for passing near her house, as he thereby gave credence to the rumors.

נְהַרְדָּעֵי אָמְרִי: בְּכוּלְּהוּ לָא מְנַגֵּיד רַב, אֶלָּא לִמְקַדֵּשׁ בְּבִיאָה וּבְלָא שִׁדּוּכֵי. וְאִיכָּא דְּאָמְרִי: אֲפִילּוּ בְּשִׁדּוּכֵי נָמֵי מִשּׁוּם פְּרִיצוּתָא.

The Sages of Neharde’a would say: In all these cases Rav would not flog, apart from the case of one who betrothed by intercourse and without a prior marriage agreement. And there are those who say he would flog a man who betrothed by intercourse even if he did so with a prior marriage agreement, due to the immorality involved, as he must invite witnesses to observe the act.

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: כֵּיצַד מַאֲמָר? נָתַן לָהּ כֶּסֶף אוֹ שָׁוֶה כֶּסֶף. וּבִשְׁטָר כֵּיצַד? בִּשְׁטָר כֵּיצַד?! כְּדַאֲמַרַן: כָּתַב לָהּ עַל הַנְּיָיר אוֹ עַל הַחֶרֶס, אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵין בּוֹ שָׁוֶה פְּרוּטָה: ״הֲרֵי אַתְּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת לִי״! אָמַר אַבָּיֵי, הָכִי קָאָמַר: שְׁטַר כְּתוּבַּת יְבָמִין כֵּיצַד?

§ The Sages taught: How is levirate betrothal performed? He gives her money or the equivalent value of money and declares: You are hereby betrothed to me. The Gemara asks: And with a document, how does he betroth her? The Gemara is puzzled by this question: With a document, how does he betroth her? It is as we have said by the halakhot of a regular document of betrothal: If he wrote to her on paper or on earthenware, even though it is not worth a peruta, the words: You are hereby betrothed to me, it is effective. As a document is not effective as a means of betrothal due to its monetary value but rather due to the words it contains, there is no requirement that it be of a minimum value. However, because the halakhot of betrothal by a document were already taught, the Gemara is puzzled as to the nature of this question. Abaye said that this is what the baraita is saying: With regard to the document of a marriage contract for levirate marriage, how is it written? Abaye understands that the question did not refer to the document of betrothal but rather to the marriage contract of a levirate marriage.

כָּתַב לַהּ: ״אֲנָא פְּלוֹנִי בַּר פְּלוֹנִי קַבֵּילִית יָת פְּלוֹנִית יְבִמְתִּי עֲלַי, לָזוּן וּלְפַרְנְסָהּ כָּרָאוּי, וּבִלְבַד שֶׁתְּהֵא כְּתוּבָּתָהּ עַל נִכְסֵי בַּעְלָהּ הָרִאשׁוֹן״. וְאִי לֵית לַהּ מֵרִאשׁוֹן — תַּקִּינוּ לַהּ רַבָּנַן מִשֵּׁנִי, כְּדֵי שֶׁלֹּא תְּהֵא קַלָּה בְּעֵינָיו לְהוֹצִיאָהּ.

The Gemara explains that he writes to her: I, so-and-so, son of so-and-so, have accepted so-and-so, my yevama upon me, to feed and maintain her in a fitting manner, provided that her marriage contract will still be payable from the property of her first husband and not from the property of the yavam. The Gemara adds: But if the first husband does not have property, the Sages instituted for her that she should receive her marriage contract from the second husband, i.e., the yavam, for the same reason that they instituted the marriage contract in the first place: So that she will not be demeaned in his eyes such that he will easily divorce her. If he will suffer no financial penalty, he is likely to divorce over the smallest argument.

בְּעָא מִינֵּיהּ אַבָּיֵי מֵרַבָּה: נָתַן לָהּ גֵּט, וְאָמַר: ״הֲרֵי אַתְּ מְגוֹרֶשֶׁת הֵימֶנִּי, וְאִי אַתְּ מוּתֶּרֶת לְכׇל אָדָם״. מַהוּ? גֵּט יְבָמָה דְּרַבָּנַן הוּא, גֵּט דְּמַהֲנֵי בְּאֵשֶׁת אִישׁ — מַהֲנֵי בִּיבָמָה, גֵּט דְּלָא מַהֲנֵי בְּאֵשֶׁת אִישׁ — לָא מַהֲנֵי בִּיבָמָה, אוֹ דִלְמָא אָתֵי לְאִחַלּוֹפֵי בְּגִיטָּא.

§ Abaye inquired of Rabba: If a yavam gave his yevama a bill of divorce, and said the following formula: You are hereby divorced from me but you are not permitted to any other man, what is the status of such a bill of divorce? Is the bill of divorce of a yevama a bill of divorce based on rabbinic law and therefore subject to the halakhot of a regular bill of divorce; and consequently, a bill of divorce that is effective for a married woman is also effective for a yevama, and a bill of divorce that is not effective for a married woman is not effective for a yevama? Since this type of a divorce is invalid in the case of a married woman, it is similarly ineffective in the case of a yevama. Or perhaps the Sages were concerned that perhaps people will come to confuse this bill of divorce with an unqualified bill of divorce given by a yavam and they therefore decreed that it should affect the levirate bond, preventing the yavam from marrying the yevama.

[אֲמַר לֵיהּ: חָיְישִׁינַן דִּלְמָא אָתֵי לְאִחַלּוֹפֵי בְּגִיטָּא.] מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַבָּה בַּר חָנָן: אֶלָּא מֵעַתָּה, יָהֵיב לַהּ נְיָירָא בְּעָלְמָא — הָכִי נָמֵי דְּפַסְלַהּ? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: הָתָם לָא פָּסֵיל בִּכְהוּנָּה, הָכָא קָפָסֵיל בִּכְהוּנָּה,

Rabba said to him: We are concerned that perhaps they will come to confuse this bill of divorce with a regular bill of divorce, and it therefore disqualifies a yevama. Rabba bar Ḥanan strongly objects to this: However, if that is so, that we are stringent with the bill of divorce of a yevama out of concern that people might confuse the two types of bills of divorce, if he gives her a mere piece of paper, which does not mention divorce, so too will it disqualify her? He said to him: There it is different, as a mere piece of paper has no effect on any other woman, for it does not disqualify her for marrying into the priesthood. If a husband gives his wife a piece of paper that contains nothing about divorce, even if he says: This is a bill of divorce, his action is of no consequence, not even to forbid her to a priest. Here, however, a bill of divorce of this kind at least disqualifies a woman from marrying into the priesthood.

דְּתַנְיָא: ״וְאִשָּׁה גְּרוּשָׁה מֵאִישָׁהּ לֹא יִקָּחוּ״, אֲפִילּוּ לֹא נִתְגָּרְשָׁה אֶלָּא מֵאִישָׁהּ — ״לֹא יִקָּחוּ״, וְהַיְינוּ רֵיחַ הַגֵּט שֶׁפּוֹסֵל בִּכְהוּנָּה.

As it is taught in a baraita: “They shall not take a woman that is a harlot, or profaned; and a woman divorced from her husband they shall not take, as he is holy to his God” (Leviticus 21:7). This verse lists the women whom a priest is prohibited from marrying. From this verse it can be inferred: Even if she was only divorced from her husband who said when giving her a bill of divorce: You are divorced from me, but did not permit her to other men, even such a woman they may not take in marriage. Although a bill of divorce of this kind does not permit the woman to others, it does suffice to prohibit her from marrying a priest. And this is what is referred to as the trace of a bill of divorce, which disqualifies a woman from marrying into the priesthood. Since this bill of divorce is valid to a certain extent, it also disqualifies a yevama.

אָמַר רָמֵי בַּר חָמָא: הֲרֵי אָמְרוּ, אָמַר אֶחָד לְלַבְלָר: כְּתוֹב גֵּט לַאֲרוּסָתִי, לִכְשֶׁאֶכְנְסֶנָּה אֲגָרְשֶׁנָּה — הֲרֵי זֶה גֵּט, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁבְּיָדוֹ לְגָרְשָׁהּ.

Rami bar Ḥama said: They said that if one said to a scribe [lavlar]: Write a bill of divorce for my betrothed now, such that when I marry her I will divorce her with the bill of divorce, if he indeed gave her this bill of divorce after their marriage it is a valid bill of divorce. Why? Because it is already in his power to divorce her while she is betrothed to him, and therefore the bill of divorce written during their betrothal is valid.

וּלְאִשָּׁה בְּעָלְמָא — אֵין גֵּט, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁאֵין בְּיָדוֹ לְגָרְשָׁהּ. בָּעֵי רָמֵי בַּר חָמָא: לִיבִמְתּוֹ, מַהוּ? כֵּיוָן דַּאֲגִידָא בֵּיהּ — כַּאֲרוּסָתוֹ דָּמְיָא, אוֹ דִלְמָא: כֵּיוָן דְּלָא עֲבַד בַּהּ מַאֲמָר — לָא? תֵּיקוּ.

But if he wrote a bill of divorce for a regular woman who has no connection to him, even if he later married her, it is not a valid bill of divorce. This is because at the time of the writing of the bill of divorce, it is not in his power to divorce her, and therefore the bill of divorce is of no consequence. All this is evident, but in light of the above halakhot Rami bar Ḥama inquires: If he wrote a bill of divorce for his yevama and did not give it to her immediately, but only after they were married, what is the halakha? Is it a valid bill of divorce or not? The Gemara clarifies the options: On the one hand, since she is tied to him she is considered like his betrothed; or perhaps, since he has not yet performed levirate betrothal with her, she is not even considered the equivalent of his betrothed, and the bill of divorce is not effective? The Gemara does not have a resolution for this and states that the question shall stand unresolved.

בָּעֵי רַב חֲנַנְיָה: כָּתַב גֵּט לְזִיקָּתוֹ וְלֹא לְמַאֲמָרוֹ, לְמַאֲמָרוֹ וְלֹא לְזִיקָּתוֹ, מַהוּ? מַאֲמָר עִילָּוֵי זִיקָה קָא רְמֵי, וְהָוֵה לֵיהּ כִּמְגָרֵשׁ חֲצִי אִשָּׁה, וְהַמְגָרֵשׁ חֲצִי אִשָּׁה לֹא עָשָׂה וְלֹא כְלוּם, אוֹ דִּלְמָא: הַאי לְחוֹדֵיהּ קָאֵי וְהַאי לְחוֹדֵיהּ קָאֵי.

Rav Ḥananya inquires: If he wrote a bill of divorce for his levirate bond, by specifying in the bill of divorce that he is thereby severing the levirate bond between them, but not for his levirate betrothal, or if he wrote a bill of divorce for his levirate betrothal and stated that it is not for his levirate bond, what is the halakha? Is the levirate betrothal superimposed upon the levirate bond, so that they are considered a single, continuous link, and he is like one who divorces half a woman, and one who divorces half a woman has done nothing; or perhaps this stands on its own and that stands on its own, and he can therefore cancel either the levirate bond or the levirate betrothal separately.

וְתִפְשׁוֹט לֵיהּ מִדְּרָבָא, דְּאָמַר רָבָא: נָתַן גֵּט לְמַאֲמָרוֹ — הוּתְּרָה צָרָתָהּ! לְרָבָא פְּשִׁיטָא לֵיהּ, לְרַב חֲנַנְיָה מִיבַּעְיָא לֵיהּ, מַאי — תֵּיקוּ.

The Gemara asks: And why do you not resolve the dilemma from a teaching of Rava? For Rava said: If a yavam gave a bill of divorce for his levirate betrothal, her rival wife is permitted. The levirate betrothal he had previously performed is thereby canceled, which leaves the bond intact, and the rival wife of this yevama remains available for levirate marriage. This indicates that levirate betrothal and the levirate bond are not connected. The Gemara answers: To Rava it is obvious, but to Rav Ḥananya it is a dilemma. What, then, is the halakha? Since no other proof is forthcoming, and Rav Ḥananya does not accept the teaching of Rava, the question remains undecided. The Gemara states that the dilemma shall stand unresolved.

חָלַץ וְעָשָׂה מַאֲמָר. אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר רַב: זוֹ דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא, דְּאָמַר: אֵין קִדּוּשִׁין תּוֹפְסִין בְּחַיָּיבֵי לָאוִין. אֲבָל חֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: יֵשׁ אַחַר חֲלִיצָה כְּלוּם.

§ It was taught in the mishna: If the yavam performed ḥalitza and then performed levirate betrothal, nothing is effective after ḥalitza and this levirate betrothal is not valid. Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: This is the statement of Rabbi Akiva, who says that betrothal does not take effect on those who are forbidden as they are liable for violating a prohibition. Once he has performed ḥalitza, the woman is forbidden to him due to the prohibition derived from the verse “So shall it be done to the man who does not build his brother’s house” (Deuteronomy 25:9), and betrothal is ineffective. But the Rabbis say something is effective after ḥalitza. Although the woman who performed ḥalitza is forbidden to him, if he does betroth her, his betrothal is effective, as with any regular prohibition.

וּמִי מָצֵית מוֹקְמַתְּ לַהּ כְּרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא, וְהָא קָתָנֵי רֵישָׁא: נָתַן גֵּט וְעָשָׂה מַאֲמָר — צְרִיכָה גֵּט וַחֲלִיצָה. וְאִי רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא, כֵּיוָן דִּיהַב לָהּ גֵּט, מִי מַהֲנֵי בַּהּ מַאֲמָר?

The Gemara asks: And can you establish that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva? But doesn’t the first clause of the mishna teach: If he gave a bill of divorce and performed levirate betrothal, she requires a bill of divorce and ḥalitza. Now if this is in accordance with Rabbi Akiva’s opinion, once he gave her a bill of divorce, is levirate betrothal effective for her?

וְהָתַנְיָא, רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר: מִנַּיִן לְנוֹתֵן גֵּט לִיבִמְתּוֹ שֶׁנֶּאֶסְרָה עָלָיו עוֹלָמִית — שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״לֹא יוּכַל בַּעְלָהּ הָרִאשׁוֹן אֲשֶׁר שִׁלְּחָהּ״ — אַחַר שִׁילּוּחַ.

But isn’t it taught in a baraita that Rabbi Akiva says: From where is it derived that if one gives a bill of divorce to his yevama, she is forbidden to him forever and he no longer has the option of marrying her? As it is stated with regard to a woman who was divorced and married another man who subsequently died or divorced her: “Her former husband, who sent her away, may not take her again to be his wife” (Deuteronomy 24:4). Rabbi Akiva emphasizes the words “who sent her away,” implying that he may not remarry her after sending her away. This indicates that there is an instance where a husband may not remarry his wife even if she has not married another, merely because he has given her a bill of divorce. This applies to the case of a yevama where the bill of divorce she receives renders her permanently prohibited to him. According to Rabbi Akiva, once she is rendered prohibited to him, no further action performed by the yavam is effective, so why does the levirate betrothal performed require a bill of divorce?

אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: גֵּט יְבָמִין מִדְּרַבָּנַן, וּקְרָא אַסְמַכְתָּא בְּעָלְמָא.

Rav Ashi said: This is not difficult because the bill of divorce for levirate marriage was established by the Sages and only has the force of rabbinic law, and the aforementioned verse is not a Torah prohibition, but rather a mere support. Therefore there is no Torah prohibition against marrying a yevama who received a bill of divorce, and the levirate betrothal performed afterward is effective according to Rabbi Akiva as well.

תַּנְיָא נָמֵי הָכִי, אָמַר רַבִּי: אֵין הַדְּבָרִים הַלָּלוּ אֲמוּרִים אֶלָּא לְדִבְרֵי רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא, שֶׁהָיָה עוֹשֶׂה חֲלוּצָה כְּעֶרְוָה. אֲבָל חֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: יֵשׁ אַחַר חֲלִיצָה כְּלוּם. וַאֲנִי אוֹמֵר: אֵימָתַי — בִּזְמַן שֶׁקִּדְּשָׁהּ לְשׁוּם אִישׁוּת, אֲבָל קִדְּשָׁהּ לְשׁוּם יַבְמוּת — אֵין אַחַר חֲלִיצָה כְּלוּם.

With regard to the halakha of betrothal after ḥalitza, the Gemara notes: This halakha is also taught in a baraita as Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said: These matters were only stated in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Akiva, who considers a yevama who underwent ḥalitza to be prohibited like a forbidden relation. Therefore, any further betrothal is not effective with her, as is the case with forbidden relations. But the Rabbis say something is effective after ḥalitza. And I say: When is betrothal effective after ḥalitza? It is effective when he betrothed for the purpose of marriage, like the regular betrothal of any ordinary woman. But if he betrothed her after ḥalitza and specified that he is doing so for the purpose of levirate marriage, in that case nothing is effective after ḥalitza.

תַּנְיָא אִידַּךְ: הַחוֹלֵץ לִיבִמְתּוֹ וְחָזַר וְקִדְּשָׁהּ, רַבִּי אוֹמֵר: אִם קִדְּשָׁהּ לְשׁוּם אִישׁוּת — צְרִיכָה הֵימֶנּוּ גֵּט, לְשׁוּם יַבְמוּת — אֵין צְרִיכָה הֵימֶנּוּ גֵּט. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: בֵּין שֶׁקִּדְּשָׁהּ לְשׁוּם אִישׁוּת, בִּין שֶׁקִּדְּשָׁהּ לְשׁוּם יַבְמוּת — צְרִיכָה הֵימֶנּוּ גֵּט.

It is taught in another baraita: With regard to one who performs ḥalitza with his yevama and then betroths her, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: If he betrothed her for the purpose of regular marriage she requires a bill of divorce from him; if he betrothed her for the purpose of levirate marriage she does not require a bill of divorce from him. And the Rabbis say: Whether he betrothed her for the purpose of regular marriage, or whether he betrothed her for the purpose of levirate marriage, she requires a bill of divorce from him, as this betrothal is effective.

אָמַר רַב יוֹסֵף: מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי — עֲשָׂאוּהָ כְּעוֹדֵר בְּנִכְסֵי הַגֵּר וּכְסָבוּר שֶׁלּוֹ הֵן, דְּלָא קָנֵי.

Rav Yosef said: What is the reason for Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi’s distinction between one who betroths his ḥalutza for the purpose of levirate marriage and one who does so for the purpose of regular marriage? It is because the Sages considered him like one who hoes the property of a convert who died without leaving heirs. The property of such a convert is ownerless, and whoever takes possession of it acquires its title. As one of the methods of taking possession of land is hoeing, if one hoed the property of this convert with the intention of acquiring it, it belongs to him. However, if he hoed the convert’s property while mistakenly thinking that the land was his own, even though he performed an act of acquisition, since he lacked the requisite intention he has not acquired the land. Here too, since the yavam intended to betroth her for the purpose of levirate marriage, and the levirate bond no longer exists, his action is not effective.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי: מִי דָּמֵי? הָתָם לָא קָא מְכַוֵּין לְמִיקְנֵי, הָכָא קָא מְכַוֵּין לְמִיקְנֵי! הָא לָא דָּמְיָא אֶלָּא לְעוֹדֵר בְּנִכְסֵי גֵּר זֶה וּכְסָבוּר שֶׁל גֵּר אַחֵר הוּא, דְּקָנֵי.

Abaye said to him: Are the two situations comparable? There, in the case of hoeing, he does not intend to acquire the land as he works, as he thinks that it is already his, whereas here he does intend to acquire the woman. This case is similar only to the one who hoes the property of this deceased convert while thinking it is that of a different convert. The halakha in that case is that he acquires the land, despite his imprecise knowledge of what he is acquiring. Here too the betrothal should take effect regardless of his error.

אֶלָּא אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן, כְּגוֹן דַּאֲמַר לַהּ: הִתְקַדְּשִׁי לִי בְּמַאֲמָר יְבָמִין. רַבִּי סָבַר: מַאֲמָר עִילָּוֵי זִיקָה קָא רָמֵי, וַאֲתַאי חֲלִיצָה אַפְקַעְתַּהּ לְזִיקָּהּ. וְרַבָּנַן סָבְרִי: הַאי לְחוֹדֵיהּ קָאֵי וְהַאי לְחוֹדֵיהּ קָאֵי. מֵעִיקָּרָא אִילּוּ אֲמַר לַהּ ״הִתְקַדְּשִׁי לִי בְּמַאֲמַר יְבָמִין״, מִי לָא מַהֲנֵי? הַשְׁתָּא נָמֵי מַהֲנֵי.

Rather, Abaye said that the dispute between Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and the Rabbis cannot be explained in the above manner. Instead, he suggests: With what are we dealing here? It is a case where he said to his ḥalutza: Be betrothed to me with levirate betrothal. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that levirate betrothal is superimposed upon the levirate bond, and is therefore only possible when the bond exists, and since ḥalitza comes and releases the levirate bond, levirate betrothal is not effective for her. And the Rabbis hold: This, the levirate bond, stands on its own, and that, levirate betrothal, stands on its own. Although the bond has been canceled, the formula of: Be betrothed to me with levirate betrothal, is effective. At the outset, before ḥalitza, if he had said to her: Be betrothed to me with levirate betrothal, would this not be an effective betrothal despite the lack of connection between the levirate betrothal and the levirate bond? Now too it should be effective, even though she performed ḥalitza.

רָבָא אָמַר: אִי דְּאָמַר לַהּ ״בְּמַאֲמַר יְבָמִין״, כּוּלֵּי עָלְמָא לָא פְּלִיגִי דְּמַהְנְיָא. וְהָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן — כְּגוֹן דְּאָמַר לַהּ ״הִתְקַדְּשִׁי לִי בְּזִיקַּת יְבָמִין״. רַבִּי סָבַר:

Rava said: If he said to her: Be betrothed to me with levirate betrothal, everyone agrees that it is effective, and she is acquired. And with what are we dealing here? It is a case where he said to her: Be betrothed to me with the levirate bond, and the dispute is as follows: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds