יבמות סז

יבמות סז

וְשִׁחְרוּר — מַפְקִיעִין מִידֵי שִׁעְבּוּד.

and the manumission of a slave release the property from a lien. If someone placed an asset under a lien for his debt and subsequently consecrated it; or if the asset under lien is leavened bread and the festival of Passover arrived; or if the asset is a slave and he freed him, the lien is released, and the creditor must claim his debt from the debtor’s other property. In the case of the robe as well, because it was placed over the corpse, it was consecrated for the dead. Consequently, it is prohibited to derive benefit from it. Therefore, it is released to the woman from under the lien.

אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה: הִכְנִיסָה לוֹ שְׁנֵי כֵלִים בְּאֶלֶף זוּז, וְשָׁבְחוּ וְעָמְדוּ עַל שְׁנֵי אֲלָפִים. אֶחָד נוֹטַלְתּוֹ בִּכְתוּבָּתָהּ, וְאֶחָד נוֹתֶנֶת דָּמִים וְנוֹטַלְתּוֹ, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁבַח בֵּית אָבִיהָ.

Rav Yehuda said: If the wife brought with her into the marriage two belongings of guaranteed investment worth one thousand dinars, and they appreciated until they stood at two thousand, one of them she collects as payment of her marriage contract, as it is now worth her dowry of one thousand dinars. And as for the other one, she pays its monetary value and takes it from her husband because it is an asset of her paternal family.

מַאי קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן — שֶׁבַח בֵּית אָבִיהָ דִּידַהּ הָוֵי? הָא אַמְרַהּ רַב יְהוּדָה חֲדָא זִימְנָא! מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא: הָנֵי מִילֵּי הֵיכָא דְּמָטְיָא לְמִשְׁקַל בִּכְתוּבְּתַהּ, אֲבָל מִיתָּן דְּמֵי וּמִישְׁקָל — לָא, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.

The Gemara asks: What is he teaching us? Is it that assets of her paternal family are hers? Rav Yehuda already said this once, in his previous statement. The Gemara answers: The latter statement was necessary as well, lest you say that this applies only where she comes to collect her marriage contract, which is rightfully hers, but to give money and take assets that are worth beyond what her husband owes her, you might say that she may not do so, although the property in question is an asset of her paternal family. Rav Yehuda therefore teaches us that she may take all of the assets of her paternal family and pay for what they are worth beyond her husband’s debt to her.

מַתְנִי׳ בַּת יִשְׂרָאֵל שֶׁנִּיסֵּת לְכֹהֵן וּמֵת, וְהִנִּיחָהּ מְעוּבֶּרֶת — לֹא יֹאכְלוּ עֲבָדֶיהָ בִּתְרוּמָה, מִפְּנֵי חֶלְקוֹ שֶׁל עוּבָּר, שֶׁהָעוּבָּר פּוֹסֵל. וְאֵינוֹ מַאֲכִיל, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יוֹסֵי.

MISHNA: With regard to an Israelite woman who married a priest and he died and left her pregnant, her slaves of guaranteed investment may not partake of teruma during her pregnancy, due to the share of the fetus, as an inheritor of his father, in the ownership of the slaves. In the opposite case, where the Israelite husband of a priest’s daughter died and left her pregnant, the fetus disqualifies her from partaking of teruma. However, in the current case, the fetus does not enable its mother or the slaves to partake of teruma, despite the fact that it is the child of a priest. This is the statement of Rabbi Yosei.

אָמְרוּ לוֹ: מֵאַחַר שֶׁהֵעַדְתָּ לָנוּ עַל בַּת יִשְׂרָאֵל לְכֹהֵן — אַף בַּת כֹּהֵן לְכֹהֵן וּמֵת, וְהִנִּיחָה מְעוּבֶּרֶת — לֹא יֹאכְלוּ עֲבָדֶיהָ בִּתְרוּמָה, מִפְּנֵי חֶלְקוֹ שֶׁל עוּבָּר.

The Rabbis said to him: Since you testified before us about the case of an Israelite woman who was married to a priest, in the case of the daughter of a priest who was married to a priest and he died and left her pregnant, her slaves should not partake of teruma either, due to the fetus’s share. The same halakha should apply whether the woman is an Israelite or the daughter of a priest.

גְּמָ׳ אִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי מִשּׁוּם דְּקָסָבַר עוּבָּר בִּמְעֵי זָרָה — זָר הוּא, אוֹ דִלְמָא: יָלוּד — מַאֲכִיל, שֶׁאֵינוֹ יָלוּד — אֵינוֹ מַאֲכִיל?

GEMARA: A dilemma was raised before the scholars: Is the reason for the ruling of Rabbi Yosei because he holds that a fetus in the womb of a non-priest is a non-priest, as it is considered part of its mother’s body and it becomes a priest only upon birth, and therefore the slaves in which it owns a share will be allowed to eat teruma only at that stage? Or, is Rabbi Yosei perhaps of the opinion that only one who was born enables others to partake of teruma, whereas one who is not yet born does not enable others to partake, although it is considered a priest?

לְמַאי נָפְקָא מִינַּהּ — לְעוּבָּר בִּמְעֵי כֹהֶנֶת, מַאי? אָמַר רַבָּה, הַיְינוּ טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי: דְּקָסָבַר עוּבָּר בִּמְעֵי זָרָה זָר הוּא. רַב יוֹסֵף אָמַר: יָלוּד — מַאֲכִיל, שֶׁאֵין יָלוּד — אֵינוֹ מַאֲכִיל.

What is the practical difference between the two possible reasons? It is the case of a fetus in the womb of the priestess, the daughter of a priest. If Rabbi Yosei’s rationale is that the fetus in the womb of a non-priest is a non-priest, that is not the case here, and therefore the slaves should partake of teruma. What is the halakha in this case? Rabba said that this is Rabbi Yosei’s reasoning: He holds that a fetus in the womb of a non-priest is a non-priest. Rav Yosef said: His rationale is that only one who was born enables others to partake of teruma, whereas one who is not yet born does not enable others to partake.

מֵיתִיבִי, אָמְרוּ לוֹ לְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי: מֵאַחַר שֶׁהֵעַדְתָּ לָנוּ עַל בַּת יִשְׂרָאֵל לְכֹהֵן, בַּת כֹּהֵן לְכֹהֵן מַהוּ? אָמַר לָהֶם: זוֹ שָׁמַעְתִּי וְזוֹ לֹא שָׁמַעְתִּי.

The Gemara raises an objection to Rav Yosef’s opinion from a baraita that continues the last clause of the mishna: The Rabbis said to Rabbi Yosei: Since you testified before us about the case of an Israelite woman married to a priest, in the case of the daughter of a priest married to a priest, what is the halakha? He said to them: With regard to the former case, I heard from my teachers that the slaves do not partake of teruma, but with regard to this one, I did not hear such a thing.

אִי אָמְרַתְּ בִּשְׁלָמָא: עוּבָּר בִּמְעֵי זָרָה זָר הוּא — הַיְינוּ דְּקָאָמַר לְהוּ: זוֹ שָׁמַעְתִּי וְזוֹ לֹא שָׁמַעְתִּי. אֶלָּא אִי אָמְרַתְּ: יָלוּד — מַאֲכִיל, שֶׁאֵין יָלוּד — אֵין מַאֲכִיל, מַאי זוֹ שָׁמַעְתִּי וְזוֹ לֹא שָׁמַעְתִּי? אִיהִי הִיא קַשְׁיָא.

Granted, if you say that Rabbi Yosei’s reasoning is that a fetus in the womb of a non-priest is a non-priest, this is the reason that he said to them: This case I heard but this case I did not hear. There is a logical distinction between the two cases, as in the latter case the fetus is not in the womb of a non-priest. However, if you say that his rationale is that only one who was born enables others to partake of teruma, whereas one who is not yet born does not enable others to partake, what does he mean by saying: This case I heard but this case I did not hear? It is the same case with regard to this principle. The Gemara concludes: This is a difficult objection.

אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: זוֹ דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יוֹסֵי. אֲבָל חֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: יֵשׁ לוֹ בָּנִים — אוֹכְלִים מִשּׁוּם בָּנִים. אֵין לוֹ בָּנִים — אוֹכְלִים מִשּׁוּם אַחִים. אֵין לוֹ אַחִים — אוֹכְלִים מִשּׁוּם מִשְׁפָּחָה כּוּלָּהּ.

Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: This is the statement of Rabbi Yosei. However, the Rabbis say that if the dead husband has children, the slaves partake of teruma due to the children, as they inherit the slaves. If he does not have children, they partake of teruma due to his brothers, who inherit his property. If he does not have brothers either, they partake due to the entire family, which inherits his property. The fetus does not disqualify them, as it does not yet own its share of the inheritance.

״זוֹ״ וְלָא סְבִירָא לֵיהּ. הָא אֲמַר לֵיהּ שְׁמוּאֵל לְרַב חָנָא בַּגְדָּתָאָה: פּוֹק אַיְיתִי לִי בֵּי עַשְׂרָה, דְּאֵימָא לָךְ בְּאַנְפַּיְיהוּ: הַמְזַכֶּה לְעוּבָּר — קָנָה. אֶלָּא: ״זוֹ״ וּסְבִירָא לֵיהּ. מַאי קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן — דִּפְלִיגִי רַבָּנַן עֲלֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי.

The Gemara asks: By saying that this is only Rabbi Yosei’s stance, Shmuel seemingly indicates that he himself does not maintain that opinion. However, Shmuel said to Rav Ḥana of Baghdad: Go and bring me an assembly of ten men and I will say to you before them a halakha that I seek to disseminate: One who transfers ownership of an object to a fetus, the fetus acquires it. Consequently, according to Shmuel, a fetus can own property, which is the premise of Rabbi Yosei’s stance that a fetus shares the inheritance even before he is born. The Gemara answers: Rather, although Shmuel said that this is only Rabbi Yosei’s stance, he holds likewise. What is Shmuel teaching us by saying so? He is teaching us that the Rabbis disagree with Rabbi Yosei.

וּמִי פְּלִיגִי? מֵתִיב רַבִּי זַכַּאי: זוֹ עֵדוּת הֵעִיד רַבִּי יוֹסֵי מִפִּי שְׁמַעְיָה וְאַבְטַלְיוֹן, וְהוֹדוּ לוֹ! אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: מִי קָתָנֵי ״וְקִבְּלוּ״? ״וְהוֹדוּ לוֹ״ קָתָנֵי, דְּמִסְתַּבַּר טַעְמֵיהּ.

The Gemara asks: But do they really disagree? Rabbi Zakkai raised an objection to this statement from a baraita: This was a testimony that Rabbi Yosei testified that he heard from the mouths of Shemaya and Avtalyon, and the Rabbis acknowledged his testimony. Apparently, they accepted his opinion. Rav Ashi said: Does that baraita state: And the Rabbis accepted his testimony? It states: And they acknowledged his testimony, which indicates that his opinion is reasonable. However, they did not accept his ruling.

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: הִנִּיחַ בָּנִים — אֵלּוּ וָאֵלּוּ אוֹכְלִים. הִנִּיחָהּ מְעוּבֶּרֶת — אֵלּוּ וָאֵלּוּ אֵין אוֹכְלִים. הִנִּיחַ בָּנִים, וְהִנִּיחָהּ מְעוּבֶּרֶת — עַבְדֵי מְלוֹג אוֹכְלִים כְּדֶרֶךְ שֶׁהִיא אוֹכֶלֶת, עַבְדֵי צֹאן בַּרְזֶל — לֹא יֹאכְלוּ, מִפְּנֵי חֶלְקוֹ שֶׁל עוּבָּר. שֶׁהָעוּבָּר פּוֹסֵל וְאֵינוֹ מַאֲכִיל, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יוֹסֵי.

The Sages taught in a baraita: If the priest who was married to an Israelite woman and died left children, both the slaves of usufruct property and the slaves of guaranteed investment may partake of teruma. The slaves of guaranteed investment are owned by the children, who are priests, and the slaves of usufruct property are owned by the woman, who partakes of teruma due to her children. If he left his wife pregnant and did not leave children, both these slaves and those slaves may not partake of teruma. If he left children and left her pregnant, the slaves of usufruct property who belong to her partake of teruma just as she partakes due to her children. However, the slaves of guaranteed investment, who are inherited by the children, may not partake, due to the fetus’s share, as it too inherits them, as a fetus can disqualify one from partaking of teruma but it cannot not enable one to partake. This is the statement of Rabbi Yosei.

רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל בְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי אוֹמֵר מִשּׁוּם אָבִיו: הַבַּת — מַאֲכֶלֶת, הַבֵּן — אֵינוֹ מַאֲכִיל. רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן יוֹחַי אוֹמֵר: זְכָרִים יֹאכְלוּ כּוּלָּן, נְקֵבוֹת לֹא יֹאכֵלוּ, שֶׁמָּא יִמָּצֵא עוּבָּר זָכָר, וְאֵין לַבָּנוֹת בִּמְקוֹם הַבֵּן כְּלוּם.

Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, says in the name of his father: If the priest left behind a daughter, she enables the slaves to partake of teruma; however, a son does not enable them to partake. Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai says: If among the priest’s children there are males, the slaves partake of teruma. But if they are all females, they do not partake, lest the fetus be found to be a male, and daughters do not receive any of the inheritance where there is a son. The male fetus would be the sole inheritor, and it does not enable slaves to partake of teruma.

מַאי אִירְיָא שֶׁמָּא יִמָּצֵא עוּבָּר זָכָר? תִּיפּוֹק לֵיהּ דִּנְקֵבָה נָמֵי פָּסְלָה! חֲדָא וְעוֹד קָאָמַר: חֲדָא, דִּנְקֵבָה נָמֵי פָּסְלָה. וְעוֹד, שֶׁמָּא יִמָּצֵא עוּבָּר זָכָר, וְאֵין לַבָּנוֹת בִּמְקוֹם הַבֵּן כְּלוּם.

The Gemara asks: Why does Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai specifically explain that if the children are females, the slaves may not partake of teruma, lest the fetus be found to be a male? Derive the ruling that the slaves do not partake of teruma from the halakha that a female fetus also disqualifies its slaves from partaking of teruma. Since the priest has only daughters, they inherit from him, and the female fetus receives a share in the inheritance too. The Gemara answers: Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai stated one reason and another. One reason is that a female also disqualifies its slaves from partaking of teruma, and another reason is lest the fetus be found to be a male, and daughters have no share in the inheritance at all in a place where there is a son.

זְכָרִים יֹאכֵלוּ: וְהָאִיכָּא עוּבָּר! קָסָבַר:

The Gemara asks with regard to the first clause of Rabbi Shimon’s statement, that if among the priest’s children there are males, the slaves may partake of teruma: But even though sons inherit from their father, isn’t there a fetus to be accounted for, as perhaps he too is a male, and therefore has a share in the inheritance? The Gemara answers: Rabbi Shimon holds

אֵין חוֹשְׁשִׁין לְמִיעוּטָא. וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: לְעוֹלָם קָסָבַר חוֹשְׁשִׁין לְמִיעוּטָא, דְּעָבְדִינַן לֵיהּ תַּקַּנְתָּא כְּרַב נַחְמָן אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל.

that we are not concerned about the minority of cases. Only a minority of fetuses are male inheritors, as roughly half are female, and some are stillborn. Therefore, the majority of fetuses will not become male children. And if you wish, say that actually he holds that we are concerned about the minority. However, we make an arrangement for the slaves, in accordance with what Rav Naḥman said that Shmuel said.

דְּאָמַר רַב נַחְמָן אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: יְתוֹמִים שֶׁבָּאוּ לַחֲלוֹק בְּנִכְסֵי אֲבִיהֶם, בֵּית דִּין מַעֲמִידִין לָהֶם אַפּוֹטְרוֹפּוֹס, וּבוֹרֵר לָהֶם חֵלֶק יָפֶה. הִגְדִּילוּ — יְכוֹלִין לְמַחוֹת. וְרַב נַחְמָן דִּידֵיהּ אָמַר: הִגְדִּילוּ — אֵין יְכוֹלִין לְמַחוֹת, דְּאִם כֵּן מָה כֹּחַ בֵּית דִּין יָפֶה.

This is as Rav Naḥman said that Shmuel said: With regard to minor orphans who came to court to divide up their father’s property, the court appoints for each of them a steward [apotropos], and he selects for them a fine share. When the orphans have grown up, they may object to the manner in which the property was divided and redistribute it. And Rav Naḥman himself said that when they have grown up they may not object, as, if they may object, what good is the power of the court? Here too, an appointed steward selects a share of the inheritance on behalf of the fetus, and this share does not include any of the slaves. Therefore, the slaves may partake of teruma. However, if all of the children are females, this arrangement is impossible because if the fetus is a son all the property belongs to him.

לֵימָא דְּרַב נַחְמָן תַּנָּאֵי הִיא? לָא, דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא אִית לְהוּ דְּרַב נַחְמָן. וְהָכָא בְּחוֹשְׁשִׁין לְמִיעוּטָא קָמִיפַּלְגִי.

Based on the use of Rav Naḥman’s ruling to explain Rabbi Shimon’s opinion, the Gemara suggests: Let us say that Rav Naḥman’s opinion is corresponding to one side of a dispute between tanna’im, as the Rabbis disagree with Rabbi Shimon. The Gemara rejects this suggestion: No; it is possible that everyone in the dispute accepts Rav Naḥman’s ruling, and here they disagree only with regard to whether we are concerned about the minority, as previously suggested, in a case where the arrangement was not made.

רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל בְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי אוֹמֵר מִשּׁוּם אָבִיו: הַבַּת מַאֲכֶלֶת, הַבֵּן אֵינוֹ מַאֲכִיל. מַאי שְׁנָא בֵּן דְּלֹא מַאֲכִיל — מִשּׁוּם חֶלְקוֹ שֶׁל עוּבָּר? בַּת נָמֵי לֹא תַּאֲכִיל — מִפְּנֵי חֶלְקוֹ שֶׁל עוּבָּר!

It was taught in the previous clause of the baraita that Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, says in the name of his father: If the priest left behind a daughter, she enables the slaves to partake of teruma; however, a son does not enable them to partake of it. The Gemara asks: What is different about a son, who does not enable them to partake, due to the fetus’s share, as it owns a share of the property if it is a male? A daughter should not enable them to partake either, due to the fetus’s share.

אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: הָכָא בִּנְכָסִים מוּעָטִים עָסְקִינַן. וּכְגוֹן דְּאִיכָּא בֵּן בַּהֲדֵי בַּת,

Abaye said: Here we are dealing with a case of an inheritance of insufficient property that is enough only to sustain the daughters until they come of age. With regard to this case, the Sages instituted that the daughters receive their sustenance while the sons get nothing. This is also a case where there is a surviving son together with the daughter.

מָה נַפְשָׁךְ: אִי הַאי דִּמְעַבְּרָא בֵּן הוּא — לָא עֲדִיף מֵהַאי דְּקָאֵי. אִי בַּת הִיא, אַמַּאי אָכְלָה — בְּתַקַּנְתָּא דְרַבָּנַן, כַּמָּה דְּלָא נְפַק לַאֲוִיר הָעוֹלָם לָא תַּקִּינוּ רַבָּנַן.

Therefore, no matter what, the slaves do not partake of teruma. If this fetus, with which she is pregnant, is a son, it is no better than this son who already exists. Just as the existing son does not inherit the insufficient property, the same applies to the male fetus. If it is a daughter, it does not yet receive a share of the inheritance. This can be explained: Why does the daughter partake of the inheritance? It is by virtue of a rabbinic ordinance. Therefore, as long as the fetus has not emerged into the atmosphere of the world, the Sages did not establish that it should receive the inheritance. Consequently, the slaves partake of teruma by virtue of the existing daughter, as only she inherits them.

בְּמַאי אוֹקֵימְתַּאּ — בִּנְכָסִים מוּעָטִים, אֵימָא סֵיפָא: שֶׁמָּא יִמָּצֵא הָעוּבָּר זָכַר, וְאֵין לַבָּנוֹת בִּמְקוֹם בֵּן כְּלוּם. אַדְּרַבָּה, נְכָסִים מוּעָטִים דְּבָנוֹת נִינְהוּ! סֵיפָא אֲתָאן לִנְכָסִים מְרוּבִּין.

The Gemara asks: In what manner did you establish the baraita? You established it as referring to insufficient property. However, say the latter clause of the baraita: Lest the fetus be found to be a male, and daughters do not receive any of the inheritance where there is a son. Yet according to Abaye’s explanation, on the contrary, the insufficient property is the daughters’, whether or not there are any sons. The Gemara answers: In the latter clause we have come to a different case, in which there is sufficient property.

וּנְכָסִים מוּעָטִים דְּבָנוֹת נִינְהוּ? וְהָאָמַר רַבִּי אַסִּי אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: יְתוֹמִין שֶׁקָּדְמוּ וּמָכְרוּ בִּנְכָסִים מוּעָטִים — מַה שֶּׁמָּכְרוּ מָכְרוּ?!

The Gemara raises another objection to Abaye’s explanation: Does an inheritance of insufficient property belong to the daughters? Didn’t Rabbi Asi say that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: If the male orphans proceeded to sell the insufficient property, although by rabbinic ordinance it is designated for the daughters’ sustenance, what they sold was sold. Apparently, the Sages did not expropriate the properties from the male inheritors, but merely designated them for the daughters’ sustenance. How, then, can the sons’ ownership be disregarded with regard to the slaves’ partaking of teruma?

וְאֶלָּא, מַאי ״בַּת״ דְּקָתָנֵי — אֵם. אִי הָכִי, הַיְינוּ רַבִּי יוֹסֵי? כּוּלָּהּ רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל בְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי קָתָנֵי לַהּ.

Rather, what is the meaning of the word daughter in the context of the ruling that is taught by Rabbi Yishmael? It means female and is referring to the mother of the fetus. She enables her slaves of usufruct property to partake of teruma, as her husband’s heirs have no share in them, whereas the son does not enable the slaves of guaranteed investment to partake, due to the fetus’s share. The Gemara asks: If so, this is the same as Rabbi Yosei’s statement in the first clause. What was added by Rabbi Yishmael? The Gemara answers: Indeed, the entire baraita is taught by Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei. There are not conflicting versions of Rabbi Yosei’s opinion. Rather, Rabbi Yishmael is clarifying that he is the author of that baraita.

מַתְנִי׳ הָעוּבָּר, וְהַיָּבָם, וְהָאֵירוּסִין, וְהַחֵרֵשׁ, וּבֶן תֵּשַׁע שָׁנִים וְיוֹם אֶחָד — פּוֹסְלִין, וְלֹא מַאֲכִילִין.

MISHNA: With regard to the fetus of a divorcée or a widow whose husband left her pregnant; and a man whose married brother died childless [yavam]; and betrothal; and a married deaf-mute; and a nine-year-and-one-day-old boy who engaged in intercourse with a woman; if any of these men are Israelites and the woman is the daughter of a priest, they disqualify her from partaking of teruma. But if she is an Israelite and they are priests, they do not enable her to partake of teruma.

סָפֵק שֶׁהוּא בֶּן תֵּשַׁע שָׁנִים וְיוֹם אֶחָד סָפֵק שֶׁאֵינוֹ, סָפֵק הֵבִיא שְׁתֵּי שְׂעָרוֹת וְסָפֵק שֶׁלֹּא הֵבִיא,

Likewise, in the case of a boy with regard to whom there is uncertainty as to whether he is nine years and one day old and uncertainty whether he is not, who engaged in intercourse with a woman; and in the case of a boy who betrothed a woman, with regard to whom there is uncertainty as to whether he has grown two pubic hairs and is considered an adult and uncertainty whether he has not grown, they too can disqualify the woman from partaking of teruma and cannot enable her to partake, as in the previous cases.

נָפַל הַבַּיִת עָלָיו וְעַל בַּת אָחִיו, וְאֵין יָדוּעַ אֵי זֶה מֵת רִאשׁוֹן — צָרָתָהּ חוֹלֶצֶת וְלֹא מִתְיַיבֶּמֶת.

If the house fell upon a man and upon his brother’s daughter, to whom he was married, and it is unknown which of them died first, her rival wife performs ḥalitza and does not enter into levirate marriage. Entering into levirate marriage is not possible, as, if the wife died after her husband, the surviving wife would be rendered the rival wife of a forbidden relative, since the yavam is the father of the wife who died. This status prevents the creation of a levirate bond between him and the surviving wife as well. On the other hand, ḥalitza is necessary in case the wife died before her husband, thereby allowing the creation of a levirate bond between her rival wife and her father, the yavam.

גְּמָ׳ הָעוּבָּר. אִי בַּת כֹּהֵן לְיִשְׂרָאֵל הִיא — פָּסֵיל לָהּ. ״כִּנְעוּרֶיהָ״ — פְּרָט לִמְעוּבֶּרֶת. אִי בַּת יִשְׂרָאֵל לְכֹהֵן הִיא — לֹא מַאֲכִיל לָהּ, יָלוּד — מַאֲכִיל, שֶׁאֵינוֹ יָלוּד — אֵינוֹ מַאֲכִיל.

GEMARA: It is taught in the mishna that the fetus disqualifies its mother from partaking of teruma and does not enable her to do so. The Gemara explains: If she is the daughter of a priest married to an Israelite, and her husband died and left her pregnant, the fetus disqualifies her from partaking of teruma, as it is stated: “But if a priest’s daughter be a widow, or divorced, and have no child, and is returned to her father’s house, as in her youth, she may eat of her father’s bread” (Leviticus 22:13). The phrase “as in her youth” excludes a pregnant woman, whose body has changed from her youth. If she is an Israelite woman married to a priest, the fetus does not enable her to partake, as one who was born enables others to partake of teruma, whereas one who is not yet born does not enable others to partake.

הַיָּבָם. אִי בַּת כֹּהֵן לְיִשְׂרָאֵל הִיא — פָּסֵיל לָהּ. ״וְשָׁבָה אֶל בֵּית אָבִיהָ״ — פְּרָט לְשׁוֹמֶרֶת יָבָם. אִי בַּת יִשְׂרָאֵל לְכֹהֵן הִיא — לָא מַאֲכֵיל לָהּ, ״קִנְיַן כַּסְפּוֹ״ אָמַר רַחֲמָנָא, וְהָא קִנְיָן דְּאָחִיו הוּא.

It is taught in the mishna that the same principle applies to a yavam. The Gemara explains: If she is the daughter of a priest who has a levirate bond to an Israelite, he disqualifies her, as it is stated in the verse cited above: “And is returned to her father’s house,” which excludes a widow waiting for her yavam, who has not returned to her father’s house, as a levirate bond was created with her yavam. If she is an Israelite woman with a levirate bond to a priest, he does not enable her to partake of teruma, as the Merciful One states in the Torah: “The purchase of his money, he may eat of it” (Leviticus 22:11), and this woman is his brother’s acquisition. The bond with her yavam ensued from his late brother’s marriage to her, not through any action of his own.

וְהָאֵירוּסִין. אִי בַּת כֹּהֵן לְיִשְׂרָאֵל הִיא — פָּסֵיל לָהּ,

The mishna teaches that the same principle also applies to betrothal. The Gemara explains: If she is the daughter of a priest betrothed to an Israelite, he disqualifies her,