Bava Kamma 112
לִפְנֵי יֵאוּשׁ.
it is referring to a case where it is before the owners have despaired of retrieving their property. Consequently, the heirs have not acquired the stolen property, and it must be returned.
רַב אַדָּא בַּר אַהֲבָה מַתְנֵי לְהָא דְּרָמֵי בַּר חָמָא אַהָא: הִנִּיחַ לָהֶן אֲבִיהֶן מָעוֹת שֶׁל רִבִּית, אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁיּוֹדְעִין שֶׁהֵן שֶׁל רִבִּית – אֵין חַיָּיבִין לְהַחְזִיר. אָמַר רָמֵי בַּר חָמָא, זֹאת אוֹמֶרֶת: רְשׁוּת יוֹרֵשׁ כִּרְשׁוּת לוֹקֵחַ דָּמֵי.
Rav Adda bar Ahava teaches that statement of Rami bar Ḥama cited above with regard to this baraita: If their father left them money that he obtained by taking interest, which is prohibited, even if they are aware that the money is from interest, they are not obligated to return the money to the debtor who paid it. Rami bar Ḥama said: That is to say that the domain of an heir is comparable to the domain of a purchaser, and because the money has changed domains, the heirs have acquired it.
רָבָא אָמַר: לְעוֹלָם אֵימָא לָךְ רְשׁוּת יוֹרֵשׁ לָאו כִּרְשׁוּת לוֹקֵחַ דָּמֵי, וְשָׁאנֵי הָכָא דְּאָמַר קְרָא: ״אַל תִּקַּח מֵאִתּוֹ נֶשֶׁךְ וְתַרְבִּית״ – אַהְדַּר לֵיהּ, כִּי הֵיכִי דְּנֵחֵי בַּהֲדָךְ; לְדִידֵיהּ קָא מַזְהַר לֵיהּ רַחֲמָנָא, לִבְרֵיהּ לָא מַזְהַר לֵיהּ רַחֲמָנָא.
Rava said: Actually, I will say to you that the domain of an heir is not comparable to the domain of a purchaser. And the reason they do not have to return the money is because it is different here, as the verse states: “Take no interest of him or increase, but fear your God, that your brother may live with you” (Leviticus 25:36), which teaches that you must return the interest to him so that he may live with you. Since the interest is returned for this reason and not because it is considered stolen goods, it is apparent that the Merciful One is cautioning him, the lender, to return it, but the Merciful One is not cautioning his son to return it.
מַאן דְּמַתְנֵי לַהּ אַבָּרַיְיתָא – כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן אַמַּתְנִיתִין. מַאן דְּמַתְנֵי לַהּ אַמַּתְנִיתִין – אֲבָל אַבָּרַיְיתָא, רָמֵי בַּר חָמָא כְּרָבָא מַתְנֵי לַהּ.
The Gemara points out: The one who teaches Rami bar Ḥama’s statement with regard to the baraita, i.e., Rav Adda bar Ahava, all the more so would apply it to the mishna, since there is no other explanation for why the heirs are exempt from payment. Conversely, according to the one who teaches Rami bar Ḥama’s statement with regard to the mishna, it is limited to that case. But with regard to the baraita, he holds that Rami bar Ḥama teaches it as explained by Rava, that the heirs are not exempt from payment because the domain of an heir is comparable to the domain of a purchaser, but rather because heirs are never required to return interest.
תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: הַגּוֹזֵל וּמַאֲכִיל אֶת בָּנָיו – פְּטוּרִין מִלְּשַׁלֵּם. הִנִּיחַ לִפְנֵיהֶם – גְּדוֹלִים, חַיָּיבִין לְשַׁלֵּם; קְטַנִּים, פְּטוּרִין מִלְּשַׁלֵּם. וְאִם אָמְרוּ גְּדוֹלִים: אֵין אָנוּ יוֹדְעִין חֶשְׁבּוֹנוֹת שֶׁחִשֵּׁב אָבִינוּ עִמָּךְ – פְּטוּרִין.
§ The Sages taught in a baraita (Tosefta 10:21): With regard to one who robs another of food and feeds it to his children, the children are exempt from paying the owner. In a case where he left the stolen items to them as an inheritance, if the heirs are adults they are obligated to pay, and if they are minors they are exempt from paying. If the adult heirs said: We do not know what calculations our father made with you and whether he paid you for the stolen goods, they are exempt.
מִשּׁוּם דְּאָמְרִי: ״אֵין אָנוּ יוֹדְעִין״ – פְּטוּרִים?! אָמַר רָבָא: הָכִי קָאָמַר, גְּדוֹלִים שֶׁאָמְרוּ: יוֹדְעִים אָנוּ חֶשְׁבּוֹנוֹת שֶׁחִשֵּׁב אָבִינוּ עִמָּךְ, וְלָא פָּשׁ לָךְ גַּבֵּיהּ וְלָא מִידֵּי – פְּטוּרִין.
The Gemara expresses surprise: Because they say: We do not know, they are exempt? Since it is clear that they are in possession of stolen property, how can they be exempt due to the uncertain claim that perhaps their father repaid the owner after the theft? Rava said that the heirs are certain about their claim and that the baraita should be formulated differently, and this is what the baraita is saying: In the case of adult heirs who said to the claimant: We know the calculations our father made with you and there is nothing of yours left with him, as he paid his debt to you, they are exempt.
תַּנְיָא אִידַּךְ: הַגּוֹזֵל וּמַאֲכִיל בָּנָיו – פְּטוּרִין מִלְּשַׁלֵּם. הִנִּיחַ לִפְנֵיהֶם וַאֲכָלוּם – בֵּין גְּדוֹלִים בֵּין קְטַנִּים, חַיָּיבִין. קְטַנִּים מִי מִיחַיְּיבִי?! לֹא יְהֵא אֶלָּא דְּאַזֵּיק אַזּוֹקֵי! אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא, הָכִי קָאָמַר: הִנִּיחַ לִפְנֵיהֶם וַעֲדַיִין לֹא אֲכָלוּם – בֵּין גְּדוֹלִים בֵּין קְטַנִּים, חַיָּיבִין.
It is taught in another baraita: With regard to one who robs another of food and feeds it to his children, the children are exempt from paying. If he left stolen items to them as an inheritance and they consumed them, whether they are adults or minors, they are obligated to pay the owner. The Gemara asks: Are minors obligated to pay? Let it be only like a case where one caused damage, and a minor who causes damage is exempt. Rav Pappa said that the baraita should be formulated differently, and this is what the baraita is saying: If he left the stolen items to them as an inheritance and they did not yet consume them, whether they are adults or minors, they are obligated to return the stolen items, since the items are still extant.
אָמַר רָבָא: הִנִּיחַ לָהֶם אֲבִיהֶם פָּרָה שְׁאוּלָה – מִשְׁתַּמְּשִׁין בָּהּ כׇּל יְמֵי שְׁאֵלָתָהּ. מֵתָה – אֵין חַיָּיבִין בְּאוֹנְסֶיהָ. כִּסְבוּרִים שֶׁל אֲבִיהֶם הִיא, וּטְבָחוּהָ וַאֲכָלוּהָ – מְשַׁלְּמִין דְּמֵי בָשָׂר בְּזוֹל. הִנִּיחַ לָהֶם אֲבִיהֶם אַחְרָיוּת נְכָסִים – חַיָּיבִין לְשַׁלֵּם.
Rava says: In the case of children whose father died and left them a cow that he had borrowed, they may use it for the entire duration of its loan. Nevertheless, if it died, they are not liable to pay if its death was caused by an unavoidable accident, despite the fact that a borrower is liable for damage caused by an unavoidable accident. This is because liability for accidental damage pertains only to the actual borrower, i.e., the deceased father. If the children thought that it actually belonged to their father and they slaughtered it and ate it, they are liable to pay the owner the value of inexpensive meat. Rava adds: If their father left them guaranteed property, i.e., land, they are liable to pay.
אִיכָּא דְּמַתְנֵי לַהּ אַרֵישָׁא, וְאִיכָּא דְּמַתְנֵי לַהּ אַסֵּיפָא.
The Gemara comments: Some teach this final statement of Rava with regard to the first clause, which states that the heirs are exempt from payment for accidental damage. According to this interpretation, if the father left them land, they are obligated to pay for the cow if it dies due to unavoidable accident. And some teach it with regard to the latter clause, which states that heirs who slaughter and consume a cow must pay the owner the value of inexpensive meat. According to this interpretation, if the father left them land, they must pay for the full value of the cow.
מַאן דְּמַתְנֵי לַהּ אַרֵישָׁא – כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן אַסֵּיפָא, וּפְלִיגָא דְּרַב פָּפָּא. מַאן דְּמַתְנֵי לַהּ אַסֵּיפָא – אֲבָל אַרֵישָׁא לָא, וְהַיְינוּ דְּרַב פָּפָּא.
The one who teaches it with regard to the first clause holds it to be true all the more so with regard to the latter clause, where the heirs actually consumed the meat themselves. And, accordingly, this understanding differs with the forthcoming opinion of Rav Pappa. By contrast, the one who teaches it with regard to the latter clause holds it to be true in that clause exclusively, but with regard to the first clause, it is not true. And this is consistent with the forthcoming opinion of Rav Pappa.
דְּאָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: הָיְתָה פָּרָה גְּנוּבָה לוֹ, וּטְבָחָהּ בְּשַׁבָּת – חַיָּיב; שֶׁכְּבָר חַיָּיב בִּגְנֵיבָה, קוֹדֶם שֶׁיָּבֹא לִידֵי אִיסּוּר שַׁבָּת. הָיְתָה פָּרָה שְׁאוּלָה לוֹ, וּטְבָחָהּ בְּשַׁבָּת – פָּטוּר; שֶׁאִיסּוּר שַׁבָּת וְאִיסּוּר גְּנֵיבָה בָּאִין כְּאֶחָד.
As Rav Pappa says: If he had a stolen cow in his possession, and he slaughtered it on Shabbat, he is liable to pay because he was already rendered liable for the theft before he came to transgress the Shabbat prohibition of slaughtering an animal on Shabbat. But if he had a borrowed cow in his possession and he slaughtered it on Shabbat, he is exempt from payment, as the transgression of the Shabbat prohibition of slaughtering an animal on Shabbat and the prohibition against theft occur as one, as the act of slaughter is tantamount to the theft of the animal. This indicates that according to Rav Pappa, a borrower’s liability to pay for accidental damage is initiated only when the damage is inflicted. Accordingly, in the case discussed by Rava, since the damage was not inflicted during the father’s lifetime, the deceased’s property was never liened to the cow’s owner, and consequently the heirs are not obligated to pay for any accidental damage.
תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: ״וְהֵשִׁיב אֶת הַגְּזֵילָה אֲשֶׁר גָּזָל״; מָה תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״אֲשֶׁר גָּזָל״? יַחֲזִיר כְּעֵין שֶׁגָּזַל.
After having cited two baraitot that express different opinions with regard to the obligation of heirs to pay for property stolen by their deceased father, the Gemara cites a third baraita that presents both opinions. The Sages taught with regard to the verse: “Then it shall be, if he has sinned, and is guilty, that he shall restore the item that he robbed” (Leviticus 5:23); what is the meaning when the verse states “that he robbed”? It means that the robber must return the same item that he robbed.
מִכָּאן אָמְרוּ: הַגּוֹזֵל וּמַאֲכִיל אֶת בָּנָיו – פְּטוּרִין מִלְּשַׁלֵּם. הִנִּיחַ לִפְנֵיהֶן – בֵּין גְּדוֹלִים בֵּין קְטַנִּים, חַיָּיבִין. מִשּׁוּם סוֹמְכוֹס אָמְרוּ: גְּדוֹלִים חַיָּיבִין, קְטַנִּים פְּטוּרִין.
From here, based on this exposition, the Sages stated: In a case of one who robs another of food and feeds it to his children, the children are exempt from paying the owner. If he left stolen goods to them as an inheritance, whether they are adults or minors, they are obligated to return the stolen goods. They said in the name of Sumakhos: If the heirs are adults they are obligated, but if they are minors they are exempt.
בַּר חֲמוּהּ דְּרַבִּי יִרְמְיָה טְרַק גַּלָּא בְּאַפֵּיהּ דְּרַבִּי יִרְמְיָה. אֲתָא לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרַבִּי אָבִין,
The Gemara recounts a related incident: The son of Rabbi Yirmeya’s father-in-law, i.e., his wife’s brother, who was a minor, shut the doors of his father’s house before Rabbi Yirmeya in order to prevent Rabbi Yirmeya from establishing legal possession of the house or a chamber that he claimed belonged to him. Rabbi Yirmeya came before Rabbi Avin to file a legal claim against his brother-in-law.
אָמַר: שֶׁלּוֹ הוּא תּוֹבֵעַ. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: וְהָא מַיְיתִינָא סָהֲדִי דְּאַחְזַקִי בֵּיהּ בְּחַיֵּי דַּאֲבוּהּ! אֲמַר לֵיהּ: וְכִי מְקַבְּלִין עֵדִים
Rabbi Avin said to Rabbi Yirmeya: Your brother-in-law is claiming ownership of that which is his, since he retains the presumptive ownership of his father’s house upon his father’s death. Rabbi Yirmeya said to him: But I can bring witnesses who can testify that I took possession of it during his father’s lifetime. Rabbi Avin said to him: But does the court accept witnesses
שֶׁלֹּא בִּפְנֵי בַּעַל דִּין?! וְלָא? וְהָא קָתָנֵי: בֵּין גְּדוֹלִים בֵּין קְטַנִּים, חַיָּיבִין! אֲמַר לֵיהּ: הֲרֵי מַחְלוֹקֶת סוֹמְכוֹס בְּצִידָּךְ. אֲמַר: אִיכְּפַל כּוּלֵּי עָלְמָא וְקָאֵי כְּסוֹמְכוֹס – לְאַפְקוֹעַן לְדִידִי?
who testify in the absence of a litigant? Since the defendant is a minor his presence is not legally recognized, and the court does not accept testimony against him. Rabbi Yirmeya questioned this assertion: And is it so that the court does not accept such testimony? But isn’t it taught that if a robber leaves stolen goods to his children, whether they are adults or minors, they are obligated to pay the owner? If the court obligates minors to pay, it must accept testimony about them. Rabbi Avin said to Rabbi Yirmeya: Sumakhos’s dispute is at your side, i.e., Sumakhos disagrees with this ruling and holds that the minors are exempt from paying. Rabbi Yirmeya said to him: Did the whole world go to the effort to hold in accordance with the opinion of Sumakhos in order to seize what is mine?
אַדְּהָכִי אִיגַּלְגַּל מִילְּתָא, אֲתָא וּמְטָא לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרַבִּי אֲבָהוּ. אָמַר: לָא שְׁמִיעַ לְכוּ הָא דְּרַב יוֹסֵף בַּר חָמָא אָמַר רַבִּי אוֹשַׁעְיָא? דְּאָמַר רַב יוֹסֵף בַּר חָמָא אָמַר רַבִּי אוֹשַׁעְיָא: תִּינוֹק שֶׁתָּקַף בַּעֲבָדָיו, וְיָרַד לְתוֹךְ שָׂדֶה שֶׁל חֲבֵירוֹ וְאָמַר ״שֶׁלִּי הוּא״, אֵין אוֹמְרִים: נַמְתִּין עַד שֶׁיַּגְדִּיל; אֶלָּא מוֹצִיאִין מִיָּדוֹ מִיָּד, וְלִכְשֶׁיַּגְדִּיל יָבִיא עֵדִים וְנִרְאֶה!
In the meantime, the matter circulated and eventually came before Rabbi Abbahu, who said: Did you not hear that which Rav Yosef bar Ḥama says that Rabbi Oshaya says? As Rav Yosef bar Ḥama says that Rabbi Oshaya says: With regard to a child who took his slaves and descended into the field of another and said: It is mine, the court does not say: Let us wait until he matures before we assess his claims. Rather, the court removes it from his possession immediately, and when he matures he may bring witnesses to attest to his claim and we will see how to judge the case. Similarly, Rabbi Yirmeya should be awarded the disputed property until his minor brother-in-law may litigate in court.
מִי דָּמֵי? הָתָם הוּא דְּמַפְּקִינַן מִינֵּיהּ – דְּלָא קָיְימָא לֵיהּ אַחֲזָקָה דַּאֲבוּהּ; אֲבָל הֵיכָא דְּאִית לֵיהּ חֲזָקָה דַּאֲבוּהּ, לָא.
The Gemara rejects Rabbi Abbahu’s assertion: Is the case that Rav Yosef bar Ḥama discusses comparable to the case of Rabbi Yirmeya? It is there, in Rav Yosef bar Ḥama’s case, that we seize the property from him, because there is no presumption of ownership from his father; but where he does have a presumption of ownership from his father, no, we do not seize his property. Since Rabbi Yirmeya’s brother-in-law has a presumption of ownership due to the fact that the property belonged to his father, he retains control of the property.
אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי אָמַר רַבִּי שַׁבְּתַאי: מְקַבְּלִין עֵדִים שֶׁלֹּא בִּפְנֵי בַּעַל דִּין. תָּהֵי בַּהּ רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, וְכִי מְקַבְּלִין עֵדִים שֶׁלֹּא בִּפְנֵי בַּעַל דִּין?!
§ Having mentioned the issue of testimony in the absence of a litigant, the Gemara discusses this matter in greater detail. Rav Ashi said that Rabbi Shabbtai says: The court accepts witnesses even in the absence of a litigant. Rabbi Yoḥanan wondered at this statement of Rav Ashi, and said: Does the court in fact accept witnesses in the absence of a litigant?
קַיבְּלַהּ מִינֵּיהּ רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בַּר חֲנִינָא: כְּגוֹן שֶׁהָיָה הוּא חוֹלֶה אוֹ עֵדָיו חוֹלִים, אוֹ שֶׁהָיוּ עֵדָיו מְבַקְּשִׁין לֵילֵךְ לִמְדִינַת הַיָּם, וְשָׁלְחוּ לוֹ וְלֹא בָּא.
Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina received the following guideline from Rabbi Yoḥanan: The court accepts testimony in the absence of the defendant only in a case where the plaintiff was ill, or his witnesses were ill, or his witnesses wished to travel overseas and the judges sent for the defendant and he did not come. Since there is a concern that the plaintiff will not be able to present his claims at a later date, the testimony is accepted even in the absence of the defendant.
אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: מְקַבְּלִין עֵדִים שֶׁלֹּא בִּפְנֵי בַּעַל דִּין. אָמַר מָר עוּקְבָא, לְדִידִי מִיפָּרְשָׁא לִי מִינֵּיהּ דִּשְׁמוּאֵל: כְּגוֹן דִּפְתַחוּ לֵיהּ בְּדִינֵיהּ, וּשְׁלַחוּ לֵיהּ וְלָא אֲתָא. אֲבָל לָא פְּתַחוּ לֵיהּ בְּדִינָא, מָצֵי אָמַר לֵיהּ: אֲנָא לְבֵית דִּין הַגָּדוֹל אָזֵילְנָא.
Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: The court accepts witnesses in the absence of a litigant. Mar Ukva said: This statement was explained to me personally by Shmuel himself, and he said that it applies in a case where the court opened his case and sent for him, but he did not appear. But if it did not yet open the case for him, he may say to the plaintiff: I am going to the High Court to resolve this case and will not appear in the local court.
אִי הָכִי, כִּי פָתְחוּ לֵיהּ נָמֵי, מָצֵי אָמַר לֵיהּ: לְבֵית דִּין הַגָּדוֹל אָזֵילְנָא! אָמַר רָבִינָא: כְּגוֹן דְּנָקֵט דִּיסְקָא מִבֵּית דִּין הַגָּדוֹל.
The Gemara asks: If so, then even when the court already opened the case for him, he should also be able to say to them: I am going to the High Court to resolve this case. The Gemara answers that Ravina said: The defendant may not defer an opened case to the High Court if, for example, the local court obtained a license from the High Court authorizing it to adjudicate the case.
אָמַר רַב: מְקַיְּימִין אֶת הַשְּׁטָר שֶׁלֹּא בִּפְנֵי בַּעַל דִּין. וְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: אֵין מְקַיְּימִין אֶת הַשְּׁטָר שֶׁלֹּא בִּפְנֵי בַּעַל דִּין. אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב שֵׁשֶׁת לְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי בַּר אֲבָהוּ: אַסְבְּרַהּ לָךְ טַעְמֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן – אָמַר קְרָא: ״וְהוּעַד בִּבְעָלָיו וְלֹא יִשְׁמְרֶנּוּ״, אָמְרָה תּוֹרָה: יָבֹא בַּעַל הַשּׁוֹר, וְיַעֲמוֹד עַל שׁוֹרוֹ.
§ Having discussed testimony in the absence of a litigant, the Gemara addresses a similar matter. Rav says: The court ratifies a document in the absence of a litigant. And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The court does not ratify a document in the absence of a litigant. Rav Sheshet said to Rabbi Yosei bar Abbahu: I will explain Rabbi Yoḥanan’s reasoning to you. The verse states with regard to an ox that gored: “And warning has been given to its owner and he has not secured it” (Exodus 21:29). The Torah means to say: Let the owner of the ox come and stand by his ox when the testimony about the ox is provided. Similarly, a document may be ratified only in the presence of the individual it implicates.
אָמַר רָבָא, הִלְכְתָא: מְקַיְּימִין אֶת הַשְּׁטָר שֶׁלֹּא בִּפְנֵי בַּעַל דִּין, וַאֲפִילּוּ עוֹמֵד וְצוֹוֵחַ. וְאִי אָמַר: נְקִיטוּ לִי זִימְנָא עַד דְּמַיְיתֵינָא סָהֲדִי וּמַרַעְנָא לֵיהּ לִשְׁטָרָא – נָקְטִינַן לֵיהּ. אִי אֲתָא – אֲתָא, אִי לָא אֲתָא – נָטְרִינַן לֵיהּ שֵׁנִי וַחֲמִישִׁי וְשֵׁנִי;
Rava said: The halakha is that the court ratifies a document in the absence of a litigant, and this is the case even if the other litigant stands and screams in protest that the document is a forgery. And if he said: Give me time until I bring witnesses and disqualify the document, we give him time before forcing him to pay. If he has come with witnesses within the time allotted to him, he has come, and the court reviews the case accordingly. If he does not come within the time allotted to him, we give him an additional three days on which to bring witnesses, when the court is in session: Monday, Thursday, and Monday.
אִי לָא אֲתָא – כָּתְבִינַן פְּתִיחָא עִלָּוֵיהּ תִּשְׁעִין יוֹמִין. תְּלָתִין קַמָּאֵי לָא נָחֲתִינַן לְנִכְסֵיהּ, דְּאָמְרִינַן: קָא טָרַח בְּזוּזֵי וְנֵיזוֹף. מְצִיעָאֵי נָמֵי לָא נָחֲתִינַן לֵיהּ לְנִכְסֵיהּ, דְּאָמַר: דִּלְמָא לָא אַשְׁכַּח לְמֵיזַף, וְקָא טָרַח וּמְזַבֵּין. בָּתְרָאֵי נָמֵי לָא נָחֲתִינַן לְנִכְסֵיהּ, דְּאָמַר: לוֹקֵחַ גּוּפֵיהּ קָא טָרַח בְּזוּזֵי.
If he still has not come, we write a document of ostracism against him for ninety days. During the first thirty days we do not descend to his property to collect his debt, as the court says: Perhaps he is occupied with borrowing money to pay his debt. During the middle period of thirty days as well, we do not descend to his property, as the court says: Perhaps he did not find someone to borrow from and he is now occupied with selling his property in order to pay his debt. During the final thirty days as well, we do not descend to his property, as the court says: Perhaps the debtor has found a purchaser and the purchaser himself is occupied with obtaining the money so that he can pay the debtor for the sale, and the debtor will then pay his debt.
לָא אֲתָא – כָּתְבִינַן אַדְרַכְתָּא אַנִּיכְסֵיהּ. וְהָנֵי מִילֵּי דַּאֲמַר ״אָתֵינָא״, אֲבָל אָמַר ״לָא אָתֵינָא״ – לְאַלְתַּר כָּתְבִינַן.
If the debtor still did not come to pay his debt after ninety days, we write a document of authorization [adrakhta] allowing the creditor to collect his due from any property belonging to the debtor. And this statement applies only in a case where the debtor said: I am coming to pay and then he does not actually make an appearance. But if he said: I am not coming, we immediately write a document of authorization without waiting for ninety days to pass.
וְהָנֵי מִילֵּי בְּמִלְוֶה, אֲבָל בְּפִקָּדוֹן – לְאַלְתַּר כָּתְבִינַן.
Furthermore, this matter of a ninety-day waiting period applies only with regard to a loan, as the debtor requires time in order to obtain the money to pay it back. But with regard to a deposit that the owner demands back from a bailee, we write a document of authorization immediately. Since a bailee should have immediate access to the deposit, there is no reason to grant him an extension.
וְכִי כָּתְבִינַן – אַמְּקַרְקְעֵי, אֲבָל אַמִּטַּלְטְלִי – לָא; דִּלְמָא שָׁמֵיט וְאָכֵיל לְהוּ מַלְוֶה לְמִטַּלְטְלֵי, וְכִי אָתֵי לֹוֶה וּמַיְיתֵי סָהֲדִי וּמַרַע לֵיהּ לִשְׁטָרָא – לָא מַשְׁכַּח מִידֵּי לְמִיגְבֵּה.
The Gemara adds: When we write a document of authorization, the document applies only to the borrower’s land, but with regard to movable property, the court does not draft such a document. The reason for this is that perhaps the creditor will seize and consume the borrower’s movable property, and when the borrower later comes and brings witnesses and thereby invalidates the creditor’s document, he will not find anything to collect in order to retrieve his money.
וְאִי אִית לֵיהּ מְקַרְקְעֵי לְמַלְוֶה – כָּתְבִינַן. וְלָא הִיא; אַדְרַכְתָּא אַמִּטַּלְטְלִי לָא כָּתְבִינַן, אַף עַל גַּב דְּאִית לֵיהּ מְקַרְקְעֵי; חָיְישִׁינַן שֶׁמָּא תַּכְסִיף.
And if the creditor owns land, we write a document authorizing the creditor to collect from any property that belongs to the borrower, including movable property. Since the creditor owns land, there is no concern that if the borrower manages to overturn the ruling he will have nothing from which to collect. The Gemara comments: And that is not so. The court does not draft a document of authorization with regard to movable property even if the creditor has land. This is because we are concerned lest the creditor’s land depreciate in value and the borrower will be unable to retrieve his money.
וְכִי כָּתְבִינַן אַדְרַכְתָּא – מוֹדְעִינַן לֵיהּ. וְהָנֵי מִילֵּי דִּמְיקָרַב, אֲבָל מְרַחַק – לָא.
The Gemara teaches another halakha with regard to this matter: When we write the document of authorization, we inform the party that is liable to pay, as a final warning before authorizing a creditor to locate and take possession of his property in repayment of the debt. And this matter applies only when he is nearby, but if he is distant, the court does not notify him before authorizing the creditor.
וְאִי מְרַחַק וְאִיכָּא קְרוֹבִים, אִי נָמֵי אִיכָּא שְׁיָירָתָא דְּאָזְלִי וְאָתוּ הָתָם, מְשַׁהֵינַן לֵיהּ תְּרֵיסַר יַרְחֵי שַׁתָּא עַד דְּאָזְלָא וְאָתֵי שְׁיָירָא. כִּי הָא דְּרָבִינָא שְׁהָא לְמָר אַחָא תְּרֵיסַר יַרְחֵי שַׁתָּא, עַד דְּאָזְלָא וְאָתְיָיא שְׁיָירָא מִבֵּי חוֹזָאֵי.
And if he is distant but there are relatives of his nearby, or if there are caravans that go to the borrower’s current location and return, we delay issuing his document of authorization for the twelve months of the year, until the caravan goes and returns, so that if he wishes to make a claim, he can do so. This is like that incident where Ravina delayed for the twelve months of the year before issuing a document of authorization for Mar Aḥa, until a caravan went to and returned from Bei Ḥozai.
וְלָא הִיא; הָתָם – אִינִישׁ אַלִּימָא הֲוָה, אִי הַוְיָא מָטְיָא אַדְרַכְתָּא לִידֵיהּ לָא הֲוָה אֶפְשָׁר לְאַפּוֹקֵי מִינֵּיהּ. אֲבָל הָכָא – לָא נָטְרִינַן לֵיהּ אֶלָּא עַד דְּאָזֵיל שְׁלִיחָא בִּתְלָתָא בְּשַׁבְּתָא וְאָתֵי בְּאַרְבְּעָה בְּשַׁבְּתָא, וּלְחַמְשָׁא בְּשַׁבְּתָא קָאֵי בְּדִינֵיהּ.
The Gemara comments: And that is not so. There, Ravina delayed issuing the document because the creditor was a violent man, and if a document of authorization would come into his possession, it would not be possible to take it from him if the borrower would prove that the original document was invalid. But here, i.e., in general, we wait for the defendant to be informed only if he is close enough to be informed within a day. Consequently, if the court decided the issue on Monday, a messenger would go inform the defendant on Tuesday, and he could come from his location to the court on Wednesday and stand trial on Thursday. If a debtor is more than a day’s travel away, however, the court does not trouble itself to notify him.
אָמַר רָבִינָא: הַאי שְׁלוּחָא דְרַבָּנַן, מְהֵימְנִינַן לֵיהּ כְּבֵי תְרֵי. וְהָנֵי מִילֵּי לְשַׁמְתָּא, אֲבָל לִפְתִיחָא – כֵּיוָן דְּמָמוֹנָא קָא מְחַסַּר לֵיהּ, דְּקָא בָעֵי לֵיהּ לְמִיתַּב לֵיהּ זוּזֵי לְסָפְרָא – לָא.
§ Apropos the Gemara’s discussion of summoning an individual to court by means of a messenger, the Gemara discusses this issue in a more general manner. Ravina said: We deem the agent of the Rabbis, who was sent to summon an individual to court, as credible as two witnesses if he says that the defendant refuses to come to court. And this matter applies only with regard to excommunication, but with regard to issuing a document of ostracism, since it causes the defendant loss of money, as he must give money to the scribe for drafting the document, no, the agent is not deemed credible.
אָמַר רָבִינָא: יָהֲבִינַן זִימְנָא אַפּוּמָּא דְאִיתְּתָא וְאִפּוּמָא דְשִׁיבָבֵי. וְלָא אֲמַרַן אֶלָּא דְּלֵיתֵיהּ בְּמָתָא,
Additionally, Ravina said: We may give a defendant a particular time to appear in court by informing him of the trial by word of mouth from a woman or from his neighbors, as these people are trusted to notify the defendant of the court’s summons. The Gemara comments: And we said this only when the defendant is not in the city.
