Eruvin 99
הוּא סָבַר: מִדְּסֵיפָא רַבִּי מֵאִיר, רֵישָׁא נָמֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. וְלָא הִיא: סֵיפָא רַבִּי מֵאִיר, וְרֵישָׁא רַבָּנַן.
The Gemara explains: Rav Ḥinnana maintains that from the fact that the latter clause of the mishna, was taught in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, it can be inferred that the first clause was likewise taught in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir. But in fact that is not so: The latter clause is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, while the first clause is in accordance with that of the Rabbis.
וּבִלְבַד שֶׁלֹּא יוֹצִיא חוּץ. הָא הוֹצִיא חַיָּיב חַטָּאת. לֵימָא מְסַיַּיע לֵיהּ לְרָבָא, דְּאָמַר רָבָא: הַמַּעֲבִיר חֵפֶץ מִתְּחִילַּת אַרְבַּע לְסוֹף אַרְבַּע, וְהֶעֱבִירוֹ דֶּרֶךְ עָלָיו — חַיָּיב.
We learned in the mishna: One may move objects in a public domain when he is standing in a private domain, provided that he does not carry them beyond four cubits in the public domain. The Gemara infers: This teaching indicates that if he carried them beyond four cubits, he is liable to bring a sin-offering. The Gemara asks: Let us say that this ruling supports the opinion of Rava, as Rava said: With regard to one who carries an object in a public domain from the beginning of four cubits to the end of those four cubits, even if he carried it above his head, i.e., he lifted the object above his head so that it passed through an exempt place, he is nonetheless liable for carrying four cubits in a public domain. Here, too, although he is standing in an elevated private domain and carries the object at that elevated height, he is still liable.
מִי קָתָנֵי: אִם הוֹצִיא חַיָּיב חַטָּאת? דִּילְמָא אִם הוֹצִיא — פָּטוּר אֲבָל אָסוּר.
The Gemara rejects this contention: Is the mishna teaching that if he carried the object beyond four cubits he is liable to bring a sin-offering? Perhaps the mishna means: If he carried the object beyond four cubits, he is exempt from bringing a sin-offering, but it is nevertheless prohibited by rabbinic decree to do so.
אִיכָּא דְאָמְרִי: הָא הוֹצִיא פָּטוּר אֲבָל אָסוּר, לֵימָא תֶּיהְוֵי תְּיוּבְתֵּיהּ דְּרָבָא, דְּאָמַר רָבָא: הַמַּעֲבִיר מִתְּחִילַּת אַרְבַּע לְסוֹף אַרְבַּע וְהֶעֱבִירוֹ דֶּרֶךְ עָלָיו חַיָּיב! מִי קָתָנֵי ״הוֹצִיא פָּטוּר אֲבָל אָסוּר״? דִּילְמָא: אִם הוֹצִיא — חַיָּיב חַטָּאת.
Some say a different version of the previous discussion: The Gemara’s initial inference was actually that if he carried the object beyond four cubits he is exempt from bringing a sin-offering, but it is prohibited by rabbinic decree to do so. The Gemara asks: If so, let us say that this is a conclusive refutation of Rava’s opinion, as Rava said: With regard to one who carries an object in a public domain from the beginning of four cubits to the end of those four cubits, even if he carried it above his head, he is liable. The Gemara rejects this suggestion: Is the mishna teaching that if he took it beyond four cubits he is exempt, but it is prohibited to do so? Perhaps the tanna means that if he carried it beyond four cubits, he is liable to bring a sin-offering.
לֹא יַעֲמוֹד אָדָם בִּרְשׁוּת הַיָּחִיד וְכוּ׳. אָמַר רַב יוֹסֵף: הִשְׁתִּין וְרָק — חַיָּיב חַטָּאת.
The mishna states: A person may not stand in a private domain and urinate or spit into the public domain. Rav Yosef said: One who urinated or spat in this manner is liable to bring a sin-offering.
וְהָא בָּעִינַן עֲקִירָה וְהַנָּחָה מֵעַל גַּבֵּי מְקוֹם אַרְבָּעָה, וְלֵיכָּא!
The Gemara raises a difficulty: But for an act of carrying to be considered a prohibited Shabbat labor that entails liability, we require that the lifting and placing of the object be performed from atop an area four by four handbreadths, the minimal size of significance with regard to the halakhot of carrying on Shabbat. And that is not the case here, as one’s mouth, which produces the spittle, is not four by four handbreadths in size.
מַחְשַׁבְתּוֹ מְשַׁוְּיָא לֵיהּ מָקוֹם. דְּאִי לָא תֵּימָא הָכִי, הָא דְּאָמַר רָבָא: זָרַק וְנָח בְּפִי הַכֶּלֶב אוֹ בְּפִי הַכִּבְשָׁן חַיָּיב חַטָּאת, וְהָא בָּעִינַן הַנָּחָה עַל גַּבֵּי מְקוֹם אַרְבָּעָה, וְלֵיכָּא!
The Gemara answers: One’s intent renders it an area of significance, i.e., as one certainly considers his mouth a significant area, it is regarded as four by four handbreadths in size. As, if you do not say so, that the size of an area is not the sole criterion, but that a person’s thoughts can also establish a place as significant, there is a difficulty with that which Rava said: If a person threw an object and it landed in the mouth of a dog or in the mouth of a furnace, he is liable to bring a sin-offering. But don’t we require that the object be placed on an area of four by four handbreadths? And that is not the case here.
אֶלָּא: מַחְשַׁבְתּוֹ מְשַׁוְּיָא לֵיהּ מָקוֹם, הָכִי נָמֵי מַחְשָׁבָה מְשַׁוְּיָא לָהּ מָקוֹם.
Rather, the person’s intent to throw the object into the dog’s mouth renders it an area of significance. Here too, his intent renders his own mouth a significant area.
בָּעֵי רָבָא: הוּא בִּרְשׁוּת הַיָּחִיד וּפִי אַמָּה בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים, מַהוּ? בָּתַר עֲקִירָה אָזְלִינַן, אוֹ בָּתַר יְצִיאָה אָזְלִינַן? תֵּיקוּ.
Rava raised a dilemma: If one is standing in a private domain, and the opening of his male member is in the public domain, and he urinates, what is the halakha? How should this case be regarded? Do we follow the domain where the urine is uprooted from the body, i.e., the bladder, which is in the private domain? Or do we follow the point of the urine’s actual emission from the body, and since the urine leaves his body through the opening of his member in the public domain, no prohibition has been violated? Since this dilemma was not resolved, the Gemara concludes: Let it stand unresolved.
וְכֵן לֹא יָרוֹק. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר וְכוּ׳. אַף עַל גַּב דְּלָא הַפֵּיךְ בָּהּ?
The mishna states: And likewise, one may not spit from one domain to another. Rabbi Yehuda says: Once a person’s spittle is gathered in his mouth, he may not walk four cubits in the public domain until he removes it. The Gemara asks: Does this teaching mean that it is prohibited to do so even if he has not turned the spittle over in his mouth, i.e., after he has dredged up the saliva but before he has rolled it around in his mouth in preparation to spit it out?
וְהָתְנַן: הָיָה אוֹכֵל דְּבֵילָה בְּיָדַיִם מְסוֹאָבוֹת, וְהִכְנִיס יָדוֹ לְתוֹךְ פִּיו לִיטּוֹל צְרוֹר — רַבִּי מֵאִיר מְטַמֵּא, וְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי מְטַהֵר.
Didn’t we learn in a mishna the halakha of one who was eating a dried fig of teruma with unwashed hands? By Torah law, only food that has come into contact with a liquid is susceptible to ritual impurity, and no liquid had ever fallen on this fig. The significance of the fact that his hands are unwashed is that by rabbinic law, unwashed hands have second degree ritual impurity status and therefore invalidate teruma. If this person inserted his hand into his mouth to remove a pebble, Rabbi Meir deems the dried fig impure, as it had been rendered liable to contract impurity by the spittle in the person’s mouth, and it subsequently became impure when it was touched by his unwashed hand. And Rabbi Yosei deems the fig ritually pure, as he maintains that spittle which is still in one’s mouth is not considered liquid that renders food liable to contract impurity; the spittle does so only after it has left the mouth.
רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: הִיפֵּךְ בָּהּ — טָמֵא. לֹא הִיפֵּךְ בָּהּ — טָהוֹר!
Rabbi Yehuda says that there is a distinction between the cases: If he turned the spittle over in his mouth, it is like spittle that has been detached from its place, and therefore its legal status is that of a liquid, which means the fig is impure. However, if he had not yet turned the spittle over in his mouth, the fig is pure. This indicates that according to Rabbi Yehuda, spittle that has not yet been turned over in one’s mouth is not considered detached.
אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: מוּחְלֶפֶת הַשִּׁיטָה.
Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The attribution of the opinions is reversed, as the opinion attributed to Rabbi Yehuda is actually that of a different tanna, while Rabbi Yehuda himself maintains that the fig is ritually impure in either case.
רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ אָמַר: לְעוֹלָם לָא תַּחְלֵיף, וְהָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן? בְּכִיחוֹ.
Reish Lakish said: Actually, do not reverse the opinions, and the apparent contradiction can be reconciled in accordance with the original version of the text: With what we are dealing here in the mishna? We are dealing with his phlegm that is expelled through coughing.
וְהַתַּנְיָא, רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: כִּיחוֹ וְנִתְלַשׁ, מַאי לָאו — רוֹק וְנִתְלַשׁ! לָא, כִּיחוֹ וְנִתְלַשׁ. וְהָא תַּנְיָא, רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: כִּיחוֹ שֶׁנִּתְלַשׁ, וְכֵן רוּקּוֹ שֶׁנִּתְלַשׁ, לֹא יְהַלֵּךְ אַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת עַד שֶׁיָּרוֹק! אֶלָּא מְחַוַּורְתָּא כִדְשַׁנִּינַן מֵעִיקָּרָא.
The Gemara raises a difficulty against this resolution. Wasn’t it taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda says: If one’s phlegm was detached, he may not walk four cubits in the public domain with it in his mouth? What, is it not the case that this halakha refers to spittle that was detached? The Gemara rejects this contention: No, this ruling applies only to one’s phlegm that was detached. The Gemara raises a difficulty: Wasn’t it taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda says: If one’s phlegm was detached, and likewise, if his spittle was detached, he may not walk four cubits in the public domain before he spits it out, even if he has not yet turned it over. Rather, it is clear as we originally answered, that the opinions in the mishna with regard to spittle and ritual impurity must be reversed.
אָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: כִּיַּח בִּפְנֵי רַבּוֹ חַיָּיב מִיתָה, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר ״כׇּל מְשַׂנְאַי אָהֲבוּ מָוֶת״ — אַל תִּקְרֵי ״לִמְשַׂנְאַי״, אֶלָּא ״לְמַשְׂנִיאַי״.
Having mentioned phlegm, the Gemara cites a related teaching: Reish Lakish said: One who expelled phlegm in front of his master has acted in a disrespectful manner and is liable for the punishment of death at the hand of Heaven, as it is stated: “All they who hate Me love death” (Proverbs 8:36). Do not read it as: “They who hate [mesanai] Me”; rather, read it as: “Those who make themselves hateful [masniai] to Me,” i.e., those who make themselves hateful by such a discharge.
וְהָא מֵינָס אֲנִיס? כִּיַּח וְרָק קָאָמְרִינַן.
The Gemara expresses surprise at this ruling: But doesn’t he do so involuntarily, as no one coughs and emits phlegm by choice; why should this be considered a transgression? The Gemara answers: We are speaking here of someone who had phlegm in his mouth and spat it out, i.e., one who had the opportunity to leave his master’s presence and spit outside.
מַתְנִי׳ לֹא יַעֲמוֹד אָדָם בִּרְשׁוּת הַיָּחִיד וְיִשְׁתֶּה בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים, בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים וְיִשְׁתֶּה בִּרְשׁוּת הַיָּחִיד, אֶלָּא אִם כֵּן הִכְנִיס רֹאשׁוֹ וְרוּבּוֹ לִמְקוֹם שֶׁהוּא שׁוֹתֶה. וְכֵן בַּגַּת.
MISHNA: A person may stand in a private domain and extend his head and drink in a public domain, and he may stand in a public domain and drink in a private domain, only if he brings his head and most of his body into the domain in which he drinks. And the same applies in a winepress, as will be explained in the Gemara.
גְּמָ׳ רֵישָׁא רַבָּנַן, וְסֵיפָא רַבִּי מֵאִיר!
GEMARA: The Gemara registers surprise at the mishna: It would seem that the first clause, i.e., the previous mishna, is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who maintain that a person located in one domain is permitted to move objects in another domain, whereas the latter clause, i.e., this mishna, is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who maintains that it is prohibited for a person in one domain to move objects in a different domain.
אָמַר רַב יוֹסֵף: בַּחֲפֵיצִין שֶׁצְּרִיכִין לוֹ, וְדִבְרֵי הַכֹּל.
Rav Yosef said: This mishna is referring to objects that one needs, and the ruling is accepted by all. In this case, even the Rabbis concede that it is prohibited to move objects in another domain, lest one absent-mindedly draw the objects to him and thereby violate a Torah prohibition.
אִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: כַּרְמְלִית, מַאי? אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: הִיא הִיא. אָמַר רָבָא: הִיא גּוּפָא גְּזֵירָה, וַאֲנַן נֵיקוּם וְנִגְזוֹר גְּזֵירָה לִגְזֵירָה?!
A dilemma was raised before the Sages: If one of the domains is a karmelit, what is the halakha? Abaye said: This case is equal to that case, i.e., in this situation a karmelit is governed by the same halakha that applies to a domain defined by Torah law. Just as the Sages prohibited one in the private domain from drinking from the public domain and vice versa, so too, they prohibited one in a karmelit from drinking in the same manner. Rava said: How can you say so? The prohibition against carrying to or from a karmelit is itself a rabbinic decree. And will we then proceed to issue a decree to prevent violation of another decree?
אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: מְנָא אָמֵינָא לַהּ, מִדְּקָתָנֵי
Abaye said in explanation of his opinion: From where do I say that halakha? From the fact that it is taught in the mishna:
וְכֵן בַּגַּת.
And the same applies in a winepress. This winepress cannot be a private domain, as the first clause of the mishna already dealt with a private domain. The winepress must therefore be a karmelit, which proves that it is prohibited to drink from a karmelit while standing in a public domain.
וְרָבָא אָמַר: לְעִנְיַן מַעֲשֵׂר. וְכֵן אָמַר רַב שֵׁשֶׁת: ״וְכֵן בַּגַּת״ — לְעִנְיַן מַעֲשֵׂר.
And Rava said: This proof is not conclusive, as the words: The same applies in a winepress, do not refer to Shabbat but to the matter of the halakhot of tithes, as explained below. And similarly, Rav Sheshet said that the statement that the same applies in a winepress refers to the matter of tithes.
דִּתְנַן: שׁוֹתִין עַל הַגַּת, בֵּין בְּחַמִּין וּבֵין בְּצוֹנֵן, וּפָטוּר — דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בַּר צָדוֹק מְחַיֵּיב.
The Gemara clarifies this statement. As we learned in a mishna: One may drink grape juice directly on the winepress ab initio without tithing, whether the juice was diluted with hot water, even though he will then be unable to return the leftover wine to the press, as it would ruin all the wine in the press, or whether the juice was diluted with cold water, in which case he could return the leftover wine without ruining the rest, and he is exempt. Drinking that way is considered incidental drinking, and anything that is not a fixed meal is exempt from tithing. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Eliezer bar Tzadok deems one obligated to tithe in both cases.
וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: עַל הַחַמִּין חַיָּיב, וְעַל הַצּוֹנֵן פָּטוּר. מִפְּנֵי שֶׁמַּחֲזִיר אֶת הַמּוֹתָר.
And the Rabbis say: There is a distinction between these two cases. When the juice is diluted with hot water, since one cannot return what is left of the juice to the press, he is obligated to tithe it, as this drinking is like fixed drinking for which one is obligated to tithe. However, when the juice is diluted with cold water, he is exempt from tithing it, because he can return the leftover juice to the press. Therefore, it is considered incidental drinking, which is exempt from tithing. The teaching of the mishna: The same applies to a winepress, is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, as it teaches that that the leniency to drink without separating tithes applies only if the drinker’s head and most of his body are in the winepress.
מַתְנִי׳ קוֹלֵט אָדָם מִן הַמַּזְחֵילָה לְמַטָּה מֵעֲשָׂרָה טְפָחִים, וּמִן הַצִּינּוֹר מִכׇּל מָקוֹם שׁוֹתֶה.
MISHNA: A person standing in a public domain on Shabbat may catch water in a vessel from a gutter running along the side of a roof, if it is less than ten handbreadths off the ground, which is part of the public domain. And from a pipe that protrudes from the roof, one may drink in any manner, i.e., not only by catching the water in a vessel, but even by pressing his mouth directly against the spout.
גְּמָ׳ קוֹלֵט — אִין, אֲבָל מְצָרֵף — לָא. מַאי טַעְמָא? אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן: הָכָא בְּמַזְחֵילָה פָּחוֹת מִשְּׁלֹשָׁה סָמוּךְ לַגַּג עָסְקִינַן, דְּכׇל פָּחוֹת מִשְּׁלֹשָׁה סָמוּךְ לַגַּג, כְּגַג דָּמֵי.
GEMARA: A careful reading of the mishna indicates that to catch, yes, one may catch the water from a distance, but to press his hand or mouth to the gutter, no, that is prohibited. The Gemara asks: What is the reason for this distinction? Rav Naḥman said: Here, we are dealing with a gutter within three handbreadths of the roof, and the halakha is in accordance with the principle that anything within three handbreadths of a roof is considered like the roof itself, based on the principle of lavud, according to which two solid surfaces are considered joined if there is a gap of less than three handbreadths between them. Since the roof of the house is a private domain, one would be carrying from a private domain to a public domain, which is prohibited.
תַּנְיָא נָמֵי הָכִי: עוֹמֵד אָדָם בִּרְשׁוּת הַיָּחִיד וּמַגְבִּיהַּ יָדוֹ לְמַעְלָה מֵעֲשָׂרָה טְפָחִים לְפָחוֹת מִשְּׁלֹשָׁה סָמוּךְ לַגַּג, וְקוֹלֵט, וּבִלְבַד שֶׁלֹּא יְצָרֵף.
That ruling, that there is a distinction between catching water falling from a gutter and pressing one’s hand or mouth to it, was also taught in a baraita: A person may stand in a private domain and raise his hand above ten handbreadths, until it is within three handbreadths of the roof, and catch any water falling from his neighbor’s roof in a vessel, provided that he does not press his hand or mouth to the roof.
תַּנְיָא אִידַּךְ: לֹא יַעֲמוֹד אָדָם בִּרְשׁוּת הַיָּחִיד וְיַגְבִּיהַּ יָדוֹ לְמַעְלָה מֵעֲשָׂרָה טְפָחִים לְפָחוֹת מִשְּׁלֹשָׁה סָמוּךְ לַגַּג וִיצָרֵף, אֲבָל קוֹלֵט הוּא וְשׁוֹתֶה.
It was likewise taught in another baraita: A person may not stand in a private domain and raise his hand above ten handbreadths, to within three handbreadths of the roof, and press his hand to the gutter, but he may catch water falling from the gutter and drink.
מִן הַצִּינּוֹר מִכׇּל מָקוֹם שׁוֹתֶה. תָּנָא: אִם יֵשׁ בְּצִינּוֹר אַרְבָּעָה עַל אַרְבָּעָה — אָסוּר, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהוּא כְּמוֹצִיא מֵרְשׁוּת לִרְשׁוּת.
It was stated in the mishna: But from a pipe one may drink in any manner, as it protrudes more than three handbreadths from the roof. A Sage taught in the Tosefta: If the pipe itself is four by four handbreadths wide, it is prohibited to stand in the public domain and press one’s hand or mouth to the water, because he is like one who carries from one domain to another domain, as the pipe is considered a domain in its own right.
מַתְנִי׳ בּוֹר בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים וְחוּלְיָיתוֹ גָּבוֹהַּ עֲשָׂרָה טְפָחִים, חַלּוֹן שֶׁעַל גַּבָּיו מְמַלְּאִין הֵימֶנּוּ בְּשַׁבָּת.
MISHNA: With regard to a cistern in a public domain, with an embankment ten handbreadths high, i.e., the embankment constitutes a private domain by itself, if there is a window above the cistern, i.e., the window of an adjacent house is situated above the cistern, one may draw water from the cistern on Shabbat through the window, as it is permitted to carry from one private domain to another.
אַשְׁפָּה בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים גְּבוֹהָ עֲשָׂרָה טְפָחִים, חַלּוֹן שֶׁעַל גַּבָּיו שׁוֹפְכִין לְתוֹכָהּ מַיִם בְּשַׁבָּת.
Similarly, with regard to a garbage dump in a public domain that is ten handbreadths high, which means it has the status of a private domain, if there is a window above the pile of refuse that abuts the garbage dump, one may throw water from the window onto the dump on Shabbat, as it is permitted to carry from one private domain to another.
גְּמָ׳ בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן? אִילֵימָא בִּסְמוּכָה, לְמָה לִי חוּלְיָא עֲשָׂרָה?
GEMARA: The Gemara asks: With what are we dealing here? If you say we are dealing with a cistern that is adjacent to the wall of the house, i.e. the cistern and wall are separated by less than four handbreadths, why do I need the cistern’s embankment to be ten handbreadths high? Presumably the cistern is ten handbreadths deep, which makes it a private domain, and as it is too close to the house for the public domain to pass between them, one should be permitted to draw water from the cistern through the window, regardless of the height of the embankment.
אָמַר רַב הוּנָא: הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן? בְּמוּפְלֶגֶת מִן הַכּוֹתֶל אַרְבָּעָה.
Rav Huna said: With what are we dealing here? With a case where the cistern or garbage dump is four handbreadths removed from the wall of the house, i.e., a public domain separates the house from the cistern or heap. It is prohibited to carry from one private domain to another by way of a public domain. However, if the cistern’s embankment is ten handbreadths high, the one drawing the water transfers it by way of an area that is more than ten handbreadths above the public domain, which is an exempt domain.
וְטַעְמָא דְּאִיכָּא חוּלְיָא עֲשָׂרָה, הָא לֵיכָּא חוּלְיָא עֲשָׂרָה — קָא מְטַלְטֵל מֵרְשׁוּת הַיָּחִיד לִרְשׁוּת הַיָּחִיד דֶּרֶךְ רְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים.
And the reason that drawing the water is permitted is that there is an embankment of ten handbreadths; but if there is no embankment of ten handbreadths, it is prohibited, as this would involve moving objects from one private domain to another by way of the public domain.
וְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: אֲפִילּוּ תֵּימָא בִּסְמוּכָה — הָא קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן דְּבוֹר וְחוּלְיָיתוֹ מִצְטָרְפִין לַעֲשָׂרָה.
And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The above explanation is unnecessary. Even if you say that we are dealing with a cistern that is adjacent to the wall of the house, the mishna comes to teach us that a cistern and its embankment combine to complete the ten handbreadths required for a private domain, and it is not necessary that the embankment itself reach a height of ten handbreadths.
אַשְׁפָּה בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים וְכוּ׳. וְלָא חָיְישִׁינַן שֶׁמָּא תִּנָּטֵל אַשְׁפָּה?
The mishna states: With regard to a garbage dump in a public domain that is ten handbreadths high, if there is a window above the heap, one may throw water from the window onto the heap on Shabbat. The Gemara asks: Aren’t we concerned that the entire garbage dump or part of it might be removed, turning the area into a public domain, and people will continue to throw water onto it on Shabbat?
וְהָא רָבִין בַּר רַב אַדָּא אָמַר רַבִּי יִצְחָק: מַעֲשֶׂה בְּמָבוֹי אֶחָד שֶׁצִּידּוֹ אֶחָד כָּלֶה לַיָּם וְצִידּוֹ אֶחָד כָּלֶה לְאַשְׁפָּה, וּבָא מַעֲשֶׂה לִפְנֵי רַבִּי, וְלֹא אָמַר בּוֹ לֹא אִיסּוּר וְלֹא הֶיתֵּר.
But didn’t Ravin bar Rav Adda say that Rav Yitzḥak said: An incident occurred involving a certain alleyway, one of whose sides terminated in the sea, which closed it off on one side, and the other side of which terminated in a garbage dump. And the incident came before Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi for his ruling as to whether the alleyway has the status of an alleyway closed on both sides, and he did not say anything about it, either prohibition or permission.
הֶיתֵּר לֹא אָמַר בּוֹ — דְּחָיְישִׁינַן שֶׁמָּא תִּנָּטֵל אַשְׁפָּה, וְיַעֲלֶה הַיָּם שִׂירְטוֹן.
The Gemara clarifies: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi did not say about it that carrying in the alleyway is permitted, as we are concerned lest the garbage dump be removed from its present spot, leaving one side of the alleyway open, and we are likewise concerned that perhaps the sea will throw up sediment and recede. These sedimentary deposits will intervene between the end of the alleyway and the sea, thereby depriving the alleyway of one its partitions.
אִיסּוּר לֹא אָמַר בּוֹ — דְּהָא קָיְימִין מְחִיצוֹת.
Similarly, he did not say about it that carrying in the alleyway was prohibited, as its partitions, the sea and the garbage dump, indeed exist, and it was certainly permitted at that time to carry in the alleyway. Apparently, there is indeed a concern that a garbage dump might be removed; why, then, does the same concern not apply to the case in the mishna?
לָא קַשְׁיָא: הָא — דְּיָחִיד, הָא — דְּרַבִּים.
The Gemara answers: This is not difficult. In this case, with regard to the alleyway between the garbage dump and the sea, we are concerned, as we are dealing with a private garbage dump, whose owner might change his mind and remove it; whereas in that case, i.e., the case in the mishna, it is referring to a public heap, which will certainly remain fixed in place.
מַתְנִי׳ אִילָן שֶׁהָיָה מֵיסֵךְ עַל הָאָרֶץ, אִם אֵין גּוּפוֹ גָּבוֹהַּ מִן הָאָרֶץ שְׁלֹשָׁה טְפָחִים — מְטַלְטְלִים תַּחְתָּיו.
MISHNA: With regard to a tree that was hanging over the ground, i.e., its branches hung down on all sides like a tent so that it threw a shadow on the ground, if the tips of its branches are no higher than three handbreadths from the ground, one may carry under it. This applies even if the tree is planted in a public domain, as the branches form partitions which turn the enclosed area into a private domain.
שׇׁרָשָׁיו גְּבוֹהִים מִן הָאָרֶץ שְׁלֹשָׁה טְפָחִים — לֹא יֵשֵׁב עֲלֵיהֶן.
If its roots were three handbreadths higher than the ground, one may not sit on them, as it is prohibited to use a tree on Shabbat. Any part of a tree that is three handbreadths above the ground has the status of a tree with regard to this prohibition.
גְּמָ׳ אָמַר רַב הוּנָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב יְהוֹשֻׁעַ: אֵין מְטַלְטְלִין בּוֹ יָתֵר מִבֵּית סָאתַיִם, מַאי טַעְמָא?
GEMARA: Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said: One may not move objects in the area under the tree if it is more than two beit se’a. What is the reason for this prohibition?
