This week’s learning is sponsored by Helen Danczak. “My dear Uncle Phil passed on August 27 with family at hand. He was the kind of uncle that the kids (of all ages) gravitated to. I am not alone in saying he was my favorite uncle. He is missed. May his neshama have an aliyah.”
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Summary
This week’s learning is sponsored by Helen Danczak. “My dear uncle Phil passed on August 27 with family at hand. He was the kind of uncle that the kids (of all ages) gravitated to. I am not alone in saying he was my favorite uncle. He is missed. May his neshama have an aliyah.”
Today’s daf is sponsored by Audrey Levant in honor of Deborah Dickson. “Happy birthday to Hadran’s newest wonderful addition to the team. I’m excited to start another (school) year of learning with you, my friend!”
The Mishna teaches that if the Beit Din teaches an erroneous ruling and an individual follows, the individual does not have to bring a sin offering. However, the Gemara will later explain that this is the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, but the rabbis disagree and obligate the individual.
If the Beit Din teaches an erroneous ruling and a judge or student who has reached a stage of one who can issue halakhic rulings realizes they have made a mistake but follows their ruling anyway, he is obligated to bring a sin offering.
If the court issues an erroneous ruling and the majority of the community follow it, there is an obligation to bring a special sacrifice called ‘the bull offering of an unwitting communal sin (par he’elem davar shel tzibur). Shmuel and Rav Dimi disagree about the language that must be used by the court for it to be considered “an erroneous ruling of the court.” Three sources are brought to support Rav Dimi’s position. In a second version of the debate, they switch positions, and the sources are raised as difficulties against Rav Dimi.
The Mishna described the actions of the individual who is exempt when sinning by following an erroneous ruling of the court using the words “shogeg al pihem, unwitting by their words.” In two different versions of Rava’s explanation of this term, it either refers to two different cases or to one. If it refers to two, it would include an exemption in an additional case – if the court ruled by mistake that a piece of forbidden fat was permitted, and the individual meant to eat a piece of permitted fat, but accidentally ate the piece that the court permitted. Even though Rava had an answer to that question (obligated or exempt, depending on the different versions of Rava’s explanation), Rami bar Hama asked the same question and did not know the answer. Again, in two different versions, Rava answers the question by explaining the term in the Mishna. However, Rami bar Hama rejects his answer as the term is ambiguous.
The Mishna lists various ways in which the individual or a judge/student can potentially follow a ruling of the court. What is the significance of the order in each case?
How is a “teacher capable of issuing halakhic rulings” defined, and why was it necessary to include this category in addition to that of a judge?
The Gemara quotes two braitot, one explaining the source for Rabbi Yehuda’s position in the Mishna, exempting an individual who follows the court, and the other explaining the source for the rabbis’ dissenting opinion obligating an individual who follows the court. The latter braita is complicated to understand, and the Gemara irons out its meaning and shows how it reflects the rabbis’ position.
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This week’s learning is sponsored by Helen Danczak. “My dear Uncle Phil passed on August 27 with family at hand. He was the kind of uncle that the kids (of all ages) gravitated to. I am not alone in saying he was my favorite uncle. He is missed. May his neshama have an aliyah.”
Horayot 2
מַתְנִי׳ הוֹרוּ בֵּית דִּין לַעֲבוֹר עַל אַחַת מִכׇּל מִצְוֹת הָאֲמוּרוֹת בַּתּוֹרָה, וְהָלַךְ הַיָּחִיד וְעָשָׂה שׁוֹגֵג עַל פִּיהֶם, בֵּין שֶׁעָשׂוּ וְעָשָׂה עִמָּהֶן, בֵּין שֶׁעָשׂוּ וְעָשָׂה אַחֲרֵיהֶן, בֵּין שֶׁלֹּא עָשׂוּ וְעָשָׂה – פָּטוּר, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁתָּלָה בְּבֵית דִּין.
MISHNA: If a court erroneously issued a ruling permitting the Jewish people to violate one of all the mitzvot that are stated in the Torah, and an individual proceeded and performed that transgression unwittingly on the basis of the court’s ruling, then whether the judges performed the transgression and he performed it with them, or whether the judges performed the transgression and he performed it after them, or whether the judges did not perform the transgression and he performed it alone, in all these cases the individual is exempt from bringing an offering. This is due to the fact that he associated his action with the ruling of the court.
הוֹרוּ בֵּית דִּין, וְיָדַע אֶחָד מֵהֶן שֶׁטָּעוּ, אוֹ תַּלְמִיד וְהוּא רָאוּי לְהוֹרָאָה, וְהָלַךְ וְעָשָׂה עַל פִּיהֶן – בֵּין שֶׁעָשׂוּ וְעָשָׂה עִמָּהֶן, בֵּין שֶׁעָשׂוּ וְעָשָׂה אַחֲרֵיהֶן, בֵּין שֶׁלֹּא עָשׂוּ וְעָשָׂה – הֲרֵי זֶה חַיָּיב, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁלֹּא תָּלָה בְּבֵית דִּין. זֶה הַכְּלָל: הַתּוֹלֶה בְּעַצְמוֹ חַיָּיב, וְהַתּוֹלֶה בְּבֵית דִּין – פָּטוּר.
If the court issued a ruling and one of the judges knew that they erred, despite the fact that the majority ruled against his opinion, or if he was a student and he was qualified to issue halakhic rulings, and that judge or student proceeded and performed that transgression on the basis of its ruling, then whether the judges performed the transgression and he performed it with them, or whether the judges performed the transgression and he performed it after them, or whether the judges did not perform the transgression and he performed it alone, in all these cases, the judge or the student is liable to bring an offering. This is due to the fact that he did not associate his action with the ruling of the court. This is the principle: One who associates his action with himself is liable, and one who associates his action with the ruling of the court is exempt.
גְּמָ׳ אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: לְעוֹלָם אֵין בֵּית דִּין חַיָּיבִין עַד שֶׁיֹּאמְרוּ לָהֶם ״מוּתָּרִין אַתֶּם״. רַב דִּימִי מִנְּהַרְדְּעָא אָמַר: עַד שֶׁיֹּאמְרוּ לָהֶם ״מוּתָּרִין אַתֶּם לַעֲשׂוֹת״. מַאי טַעְמָא? לְפִי שֶׁלֹּא נִגְמְרָה הוֹרָאָה.
GEMARA: Shmuel says: The judges of the court are never liable to bring an offering for an erroneous ruling until they say to those seeking a ruling: It is permitted for you. Rav Dimi from Neharde’a says: The judges are not liable unless they say to those seeking a ruling: It is permitted for you to perform this action. What is the reason that Rav Dimi says that there is liability only if the judges say: To perform this action? It is due to the fact that the ruling is not completed if they say only: It is permitted, as perhaps the judges were expressing a theoretical opinion and not issuing a ruling.
אָמַר אַבָּיֵי, אַף אֲנַן נָמֵי תְּנֵינָא: חָזַר לְעִירוֹ שָׁנָה וְלִימֵּד כְּדֶרֶךְ שֶׁלִּימֵּד – פָּטוּר, הוֹרָה לַעֲשׂוֹת – חַיָּיב.
Abaye said: We learn proof for Rav Dimi’s opinion in a mishna as well. The mishna teaches with regard to a rebellious elder (Sanhedrin 86b): If the Sanhedrin ruled contrary to the ruling of the elder and the elder then returned to his city, and nevertheless he taught in the manner that he was teaching previously, he is exempt from punishment. But if he instructed others to act on the basis of his ruling that stands contrary to the ruling of the Sanhedrin, he is liable to be executed.
אָמַר רַבִּי אַבָּא, אַף אֲנַן נָמֵי תְּנֵינָא: הוֹרוּ לָהּ בֵּית דִּין לְהִנָּשֵׂא, וְהָלְכָה וְקִלְקְלָה – חַיֶּיבֶת בְּקׇרְבָּן, שֶׁלֹּא הִתִּירוּ לָהּ אֶלָּא לְהִנָּשֵׂא.
Rabbi Abba said: We learn proof for Rav Dimi’s opinion in a mishna as well. The mishna teaches (Yevamot 87b): If the court instructed a woman to marry on the basis of inaccurate testimony, but she proceeded and disgraced herself and engaged in promiscuous intercourse, she is liable to bring an offering, as they permitted her only to marry, and her conduct lacked the approval of the court. This indicates that it is not sufficient for the court to issue a general ruling to the woman; rather, the court issues a ruling that includes instruction to perform a specific action.
אָמַר רָבִינָא, אַף אֲנַן נָמֵי תְּנֵינָא: ״הוֹרוּ בֵּית דִּין לַעֲבוֹר עַל אַחַת מִכׇּל מִצְוֹת הָאֲמוּרוֹת בַּתּוֹרָה״, תּוּ לָא מִידִּי.
Ravina said: We learn proof for Rav Dimi’s opinion in the mishna here, as well: If a court unwittingly issued a ruling permitting the Jewish people to violate one of all the mitzvot that are stated in the Torah, etc.; and nothing more need be said, as it is clear from the phrase: Issued a ruling to violate, that the ruling must include instruction to perform a specific action.
אִיכָּא דְאָמְרִי, אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: אֵין בֵּית דִּין חַיָּיבִין עַד שֶׁיֹּאמְרוּ לָהֶם ״מוּתָּרִים אַתֶּם לַעֲשׂוֹת״. רַב דִּימִי מִנְּהַרְדְּעָא אָמַר: אֲפִילּוּ ״מוּתָּרִים אַתֶּם״ – נִגְמְרָה הוֹרָאָה. אָמַר אַבָּיֵי, וְהָא לָא תְּנַן הָכִי: חָזַר לְעִירוֹ, וְשָׁנָה אוֹ לִימֵּד כְּדֶרֶךְ שֶׁלִּימֵּד – פָּטוּר, הוֹרָה לַעֲשׂוֹת – חַיָּיב.
Some say there is a version of this amoraic dispute with the opposite opinions. Shmuel says: The judges of the court are not liable to bring an offering for an erroneous ruling until they say to those seeking a ruling: It is permitted for you to perform this action. Rav Dimi from Neharde’a says: Even if the judges say to those seeking a ruling: It is permitted for you, the ruling is completed and they are liable. Abaye said: But isn’t it so that we did not learn in accordance with the opinion of Rav Dimi in a mishna with regard to a rebellious elder: If the Sanhedrin ruled contrary to the ruling of the elder and the elder then returned to his city, and nevertheless he taught in the manner that he was teaching previously, he is exempt from punishment. But if he instructed others to act on the basis of his ruling that stands contrary to the ruling of the Sanhedrin, he is liable to be executed.
אָמַר רַבִּי אַבָּא, וְהָא לָא תְּנַן הָכִי: הוֹרוּ לָהּ בֵּית דִּין לְהִנָּשֵׂא, וְהָלְכָה וְקִלְקְלָה – חַיֶּיבֶת בְּקׇרְבָּן, שֶׁלֹּא הִתִּירוּ לָהּ אֶלָּא לְהִנָּשֵׂא.
Rabbi Abba said: But isn’t it so that we did not learn in accordance with the opinion of Rav Dimi in a mishna: If the court instructed a woman to marry on the basis of inaccurate testimony, but she proceeded and disgraced herself and engaged in promiscuous intercourse, she is liable to bring an offering, as they permitted her only to marry, and her conduct lacked the approval of the court.
אָמַר רָבִינָא, וְהָא לָא תְּנַן הָכִי: הוֹרוּ בֵּית דִּין לַעֲבוֹר עַל אַחַת מִכׇּל מִצְוֹת הָאֲמוּרוֹת בַּתּוֹרָה, תּוּ לָא מִידִּי.
Ravina said: But isn’t it so that we did not learn in accordance with the opinion of Rav Dimi in the mishna: If a court unwittingly issued a ruling permitting the Jewish people to violate one of all the mitzvot that are stated in the Torah, etc.; and nothing more need be said.
וְהָלַךְ הַיָּחִיד וְעָשָׂה שׁוֹגֵג עַל פִּיהֶם. וְנִיתְנֵי: ״וְעָשָׂה עַל פִּיהֶם״, ״שׁוֹגֵג״ לְמָה לִי? אָמַר רָבָא: ״שׁוֹגֵג״ – לְאֵתוֹיֵי הוֹרוּ בֵּית דִּין שֶׁחֵלֶב מוּתָּר, וְנִתְחַלֵּף לוֹ חֵלֶב בְּשׁוּמָּן, וַאֲכָלוֹ – פָּטוּר. ״עַל פִּיהֶם״ – עַל פִּיהֶם מַמָּשׁ,
§ The mishna teaches: And the individual proceeded and performed that transgression unwittingly on the basis of the court’s ruling. The Gemara asks: And let us teach only: And performed that transgression on the basis of the court’s ruling; why do I need to add: Unwittingly? Obviously, it was unwitting, as he thought his action was permitted. Rava said: The term unwittingly serves to include a case where the court issued a ruling that it is permitted to eat forbidden fat, and the forbidden fat became confused for him with permitted fat, and he ate it under the impression that he was eating permitted fat. In this case he is exempt. Then, when the mishna says: On the basis of the court’s ruling, it means that he ate forbidden fat actually on the basis of the court’s ruling.
וְאִיכָּא דְּאָמְרִי, אָמַר רָבָא: ״שׁוֹגֵג״ – עַל פִּיהֶם הוּא דְּפָטוּר, אֲבָל נִתְחַלֵּף לוֹ חֵלֶב בְּשׁוּמָּן וַאֲכָלוֹ – חַיָּיב.
And some say that Rava said a different interpretation of the mishna: It is specifically in a case where the individual proceeded and performed that transgression unwittingly on the basis of the court’s ruling that he is exempt. But if the forbidden fat became confused for him with permitted fat and he ate it under the impression that he was eating permitted fat, he is liable to bring an offering, because his unwitting transgression of eating forbidden fat was not associated solely with the ruling of the court.
מִילְּתָא דִּפְשִׁיטָא לֵיהּ לְרָבָא קָמִיבַּעְיָא לֵיהּ לְרָמִי בַּר חָמָא, דִּבְעַי רָמֵי בַּר חָמָא: הוֹרוּ בֵּית דִּין שֶׁחֵלֶב מוּתָּר, וְנִתְחַלֵּף לוֹ בְּשׁוּמָּן וַאֲכָלוֹ, מַהוּ?
The Gemara comments: The matter that is obvious to Rava, that one who confuses between forbidden fat and permitted fat is either exempt, according to the first version, or liable, according to the second version, was raised as a dilemma for Rami bar Ḥama, as Rami bar Ḥama raised a dilemma: If a court ruled that forbidden fat is permitted, and the forbidden fat became confused for him with permitted fat and he ate the forbidden fat, what is the halakha?
אָמַר רָבָא, תָּא שְׁמַע: הָלַךְ יָחִיד וְעָשָׂה שׁוֹגֵג עַל פִּיהֶם כּוּ׳. שׁוֹגֵג עַל פִּיהֶם לְמָה לִי? לָאו לְאֵתוֹיֵי הוֹרוּ בֵּית דִּין שֶׁחֵלֶב מוּתָּר, וְנִתְחַלֵּף לוֹ חֵלֶב בְּשׁוּמָּן וַאֲכָלוֹ – פָּטוּר. דִּלְמָא שׁוֹגֵג עַל פִּיהֶם הוּא דְּפָטוּר, אֲבָל נִתְחַלֵּף לוֹ חֵלֶב בְּשׁוּמָּן וַאֲכָלוֹ – חַיָּיב.
Rava said: Come and hear proof from the mishna: The individual proceeded and performed that transgression unwittingly on the basis of the court’s ruling, etc. Why do I need the redundancy: Unwittingly on the basis of the court’s ruling? Is the redundancy not stated to include a case where the court issued a ruling that it is permitted to eat forbidden fat, and the forbidden fat became confused for him with permitted fat, and he ate it under the impression that he was eating permitted fat, and the mishna is teaching that he is exempt? The Gemara rejects this: Perhaps the intent of the mishna is: It is in a case where one performed that transgression unwittingly on the basis of its ruling that he is exempt; but if the forbidden fat became confused for him with permitted fat, and he ate it under the impression that he was eating permitted fat, he is liable.
אִיכָּא דְּאָמְרִי, אָמַר רָבָא, תָּא שְׁמַע: הָלַךְ יָחִיד וְעָשָׂה שׁוֹגֵג עַל פִּיהֶם. מַאי לָאו, שׁוֹגֵג עַל פִּיהֶם הוּא דְּפָטוּר, אֲבָל נִתְחַלֵּף לוֹ חֵלֶב בְּשׁוּמָּן וַאֲכָלוֹ – חַיָּיב. דִּלְמָא: אוֹ שׁוֹגֵג, אוֹ עַל פִּיהֶם.
Some say that Rava said: Come and hear a proof from the mishna: The individual proceeded and performed that transgression unwittingly on the basis of the court’s ruling. What, is it not in a case where one performed that transgression unwittingly on the basis of its ruling that he is exempt; but if the forbidden fat became confused for him with permitted fat, and he ate the forbidden fat, he is liable? The Gemara rejects this: Perhaps the mishna is saying that he is liable if he either confused forbidden fat with permitted fat and ate the forbidden fat unwittingly, or ate the forbidden fat on the basis of the court’s ruling.
בִּפְלוּגְתָּא: הוֹרוּ בֵּית דִּין שֶׁחֵלֶב מוּתָּר, וְנִתְחַלֵּף לוֹ חֵלֶב בְּשׁוּמָּן וַאֲכָלוֹ – רַב אָמַר: פָּטוּר, וְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: חַיָּיב. מֵיתִיבִי: ״מֵעַם הָאָרֶץ בַּעֲשֹׂתָהּ״, פְּרָט לִמְשׁוּמָּד.
The Gemara notes: This matter was already taught in the dispute between amora’im of earlier generations: If a court ruled that forbidden fat is permitted, and the forbidden fat became confused for him with permitted fat and he ate the forbidden fat, Rav says: He is exempt, as the court ruled that it is permitted, and Rabbi Yoḥanan says: He is liable, as he did not base his conduct on its ruling. The Gemara raises an objection to the statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan from a baraita that teaches: The verse states: “And if one soul from among the common people shall sin unwittingly in performing one of the mitzvot of the Lord that are not to be done, and he is guilty” (Leviticus 4:27). This serves to exclude an apostate. When an apostate sins unwittingly, he is exempt from liability to bring a sin-offering even if he repents, as even his unwitting action is considered intentional.
רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן יוֹסֵי אוֹמֵר מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן: אֵינוֹ צָרִיךְ, הֲרֵי הוּא אוֹמֵר: ״אֲשֶׁר לֹא תֵעָשֶׂינָה בִּשְׁגָגָה וְאָשֵׁם אוֹ הוֹדַע״ – הַשָּׁב מִידִיעָתוֹ, מֵבִיא קׇרְבָּן עַל שִׁגְגָתוֹ. לֹא שָׁב מִידִיעָתוֹ – אֵינוֹ מֵבִיא קׇרְבָּן עַל שִׁגְגָתוֹ.
Rabbi Shimon ben Yosei says in the name of Rabbi Shimon: It is unnecessary to derive this halakha from that phrase, as it says in the same verse: “Shall sin unwittingly in performing one of the mitzvot of the Lord that are not to be done, and he is guilty; or if his sin, which he has sinned, be known to him” (Leviticus 4:27–28). From the words “be known to him” it is inferred that only one who repents due to his awareness, i.e., he would not have sinned if he had known the act was prohibited, brings a sacrifice for his unwitting transgression in order to achieve atonement. But one who does not repent due to his awareness that he sinned, e.g., an apostate, who would have sinned even had he been aware that the act is prohibited, does not bring an offering for his unwitting action.
וְאִם אִיתָא, הָא לֹא שָׁב מִידִיעָתוֹ הוּא.
The Gemara asks: And if it is so that one who would not repent due to his awareness is exempt, isn’t this person who confused forbidden fat with permitted fat considered one who will not repent due to his awareness? Even if he discovers that he ate forbidden fat he will not regret his action, as he relies on the ruling of the court that forbidden fat is permitted. This contradicts the statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan, who says that one is liable in that case.
אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא, קָסָבַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: כֵּיוָן דְּכִי מִתְיְדַע לְהוּ לְבֵי דִינָא, הָדְרִי בְּהוּ, וְהוּא נָמֵי הָדַר בֵּיהּ – שָׁב מִידִיעָתוֹ קָרֵינַן בֵּיהּ, וְחַיָּיב.
Rav Pappa said that Rabbi Yoḥanan holds: Since once it becomes known to the court that it erred, the judges will retract their erroneous ruling, and this individual will also repent when he discovers that he ate forbidden fat which the court erroneously permitted, we characterize him as one who repents due to his awareness, and he is liable to bring an offering.
אָמַר רָבָא: מוֹדֶה רַב שֶׁאֵינוֹ מַשְׁלִים לְרוֹב צִבּוּר, מַאי טַעְמָא? אָמַר קְרָא: ״בִּשְׁגָגָה״ – עַד שֶׁיְּהוּ כּוּלָּן בִּשְׁגָגָה אֶחָת.
Rava says: Even though Rav says the individual is exempt, and his sin is dependent on the court, Rav concedes that in a case where one confused forbidden fats with permitted fats, he does not complete a majority of the congregation. The court is liable to bring an offering only when the majority of the congregation performs a transgression based on its ruling. This individual who thought the fat was permitted is not included in the majority of the congregation. What is the reason? It is as the verse states: “For all the people it was performed unwittingly” (Numbers 15:26), from which it is derived: There is no liability unless they are all unwitting in one and the same manner; and the action of this individual is unwitting in a different manner than the rest of the transgressors.
בֵּין שֶׁעָשׂוּ וְעָשָׂה עִמָּהֶן כּוּ׳. לְמָה לֵיהּ לְמִיתְנָא כׇּל הָנֵי? בִּשְׁלָמָא רֵישָׁא – לֹא זוֹ אַף זוֹ קָתָנֵי. אֶלָּא סֵיפָא דִּלְחִיּוּבָא, אִיפְּכָא מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ!
§ The mishna teaches: Whether the judges performed the transgression and he performed it with them, or whether the judges performed the transgression and he performed it after them, or whether the judges did not perform the transgression and he performed it alone, in all these cases the individual is exempt. The Gemara asks: Why did the tanna in the mishna need to teach all of these cases? Granted, in the first clause of the mishna, the tanna teaches the mishna employing the style: Not only this but also that, i.e., not only is he exempt if the judges performed the transgression with him, but he is exempt even if he performed the act after the judges, and even if he alone performed the transgression. But in the latter clause of the mishna, where the tanna is teaching liability, the tanna should have taught the opposite. He should have started with the case where he is most likely to be liable, the case where the judges performed no transgression and he sinned alone.
זוֹ וְאֵין צָרִיךְ לוֹמַר זוֹ קָתָנֵי.
The Gemara answers: In the latter clause, the tanna teaches the mishna employing the style: This, and it is unnecessary to say that, i.e., the cases are arranged with each case more obvious than the one that preceded it.
וְיָדַע אֶחָד מֵהֶן שֶׁטָּעוּ אוֹ תַּלְמִיד וְרָאוּי לְהוֹרָאָה. תַּרְתֵּי לְמָה לִי? אָמַר רָבָא: אִיצְטְרִיךְ, סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אָמֵינָא הָנֵי מִילֵּי גְּמִיר וּסְבִיר, אֲבָל גְּמִיר וְלָא סְבִיר – לָא.
§ The mishna teaches: And one of the judges knew that they erred, or if he was a student and he is qualified to issue halakhic rulings. The Gemara asks: Why do I need two cases? As a student qualified to issue halakhic rulings is the equivalent of one of the judges, why did the tanna mention both? Rava said: It was necessary to state both, as it may enter your mind to say that this statement that he is liable applies specifically to one who is learned and analytical, but that one who is learned but not analytical, no, he should not be liable to bring an offering. Therefore, the tanna cites both the case of a judge and the case of a student qualified to issue halakhic rulings, to teach that even one who is learned but not analytical is liable in this case.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי: לְהוֹרָאָה גְּמִיר וּסְבִיר מַשְׁמַע! אֲמַר לֵיהּ, אֲנָא הָכִי קָאָמֵינָא: אִי מֵהַהִיא – הֲוָה אָמֵינָא הָנֵי מִילֵּי גְּמִיר וּסְבִיר, אֲבָל גְּמִיר וְלָא סְבִיר – לָא, תְּנָא רָאוּי לְהוֹרָאָה, מִמִּשְׁנָה יְתֵירָה: אֲפִילּוּ גְּמִיר וְלָא סְבִיר, סְבִיר וְלָא גְּמִיר.
Abaye challenged this and said to Rava that the term: A student qualified to issue halakhic rulings, indicates that he is both learned and analytical. Rava said to Abaye: This is what I am saying: If the tanna had taught the halakha from that first halakha with regard to one of the judges, I would say that this statement applies only to one who is both learned and analytical, but if he was learned and not analytical, no, he would not be liable. Therefore, the tanna taught the additional case of a student qualified to issue halakhic rulings, and from the extraneous case in the mishna one can infer that the halakha applies even to one who is learned but not analytical or one who is analytical but not yet learned. Since he associates his action with himself, he is liable.
רָאוּי לְהוֹרָאָה וְכוּ׳. כְּגוֹן מַאן? אָמַר רָבָא: כְּגוֹן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן עַזַּאי וְשִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן זוֹמָא. אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי: כִּי הַאי גַוְונָא מֵזִיד הוּא!
§ The mishna teaches: Qualified to issue halakhic rulings. The Gemara asks: Like whom? Who is an example of one qualified to issue halakhic rulings? Rava said: It is one like Shimon ben Azzai or Shimon ben Zoma, who, although they were among the most outstanding Torah scholars of their generation, were not ordained. Abaye said to Rava: In a case like this, he is an intentional sinner, as a scholar of that caliber would certainly not err. If he ruled that a prohibited action is permitted, it is assumed that he acted with intent, and he is exempt from bringing an offering.
וּלְטַעְמָיךְ, הָא דְּתַנְיָא: ״בַּעֲשֹׂתָהּ אַחַת״, יָחִיד הָעוֹשֶׂה מִפִּי עַצְמוֹ – חַיָּיב, בְּהוֹרָאַת בֵּית דִּין – פָּטוּר. כֵּיצַד? הוֹרוּ בֵּית דִּין שֶׁחֵלֶב מוּתָּר, וְנוֹדַע לְאֶחָד מֵהֶן שֶׁטָּעוּ, אוֹ תַּלְמִיד יוֹשֵׁב לִפְנֵיהֶן וְרָאוּי לְהוֹרָאָה כְּגוֹן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן עַזַּאי, יָכוֹל יְהֵא פָּטוּר? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״בַּעֲשֹׂתָהּ אַחַת״, יָחִיד הָעוֹשֶׂה עַל פִּי עַצְמוֹ – חַיָּיב, בְּהוֹרָאַת בֵּית דִּין – פָּטוּר!
Rava said to Abaye: But according to your reasoning, that which is taught in a baraita that cites the verse: “In performing one” (Leviticus 4:27), from which it is derived that an individual who performs a transgression on his own is liable, while one who performs a transgression based on the ruling of the court is exempt; how so? When does this apply? If the court ruled that forbidden fat is permitted, and it became known to one of the judges that they erred, or if he was a student who was sitting before them and he is qualified to issue halakhic rulings, e.g., Shimon ben Azzai, might one have thought that he would be exempt? To counter this, the verse states: “In performing one,” from which it is derived that an individual who performs a transgression on his own is liable, while one who performs a transgression on the basis of the ruling of the court is exempt.
אֶלָּא הֵיכִי מַשְׁכַּחַתְּ לַהּ? כְּגוֹן דְּיָדַע דְּאָסוּר, וְקָא טָעֵי בְּמִצְוָה לִשְׁמוֹעַ דִּבְרֵי חֲכָמִים. לְדִידִי נָמֵי, דְּטָעוּ בְּמִצְוָה לִשְׁמוֹעַ דִּבְרֵי חֲכָמִים.
Rava continues: Rather, the baraita is difficult; how can you find these circumstances where a judge or a prominent Torah scholar would be considered an unwitting sinner? The Gemara answers: It is in a case where the judge or the scholar knew that the action with regard to which the court issued a ruling that it is permitted is in fact prohibited, but he erred with regard to the mitzva of heeding the statements of the Sages. He believed that there is a mitzva to heed the directives of the Sages even when he is certain that they are mistaken. If so, according to my understanding too, the reference is to one like Shimon ben Azzai or Shimon ben Zoma; it is also a case where they erred with regard to the mitzva of heeding the statements of the Sages. Due to that error, they are liable to bring an offering.
זֶה הַכְּלָל הַתּוֹלֶה בְּעַצְמוֹ – חַיָּיב. לְאֵיתוֹיֵי מַאי? לְאֵיתוֹיֵי מְבַעֵט בְּהוֹרָאָה.
§ The mishna teaches: This is the principle: One who associates his action with himself is liable. The Gemara asks: What case that was not already mentioned in the mishna does this principle serve to include? The Gemara answers: It serves to include one who disdains halakhic rulings in general, treating them with contempt and relying only on his own understanding.
תּוֹלֶה בְּבֵית דִּין – לְאֵיתוֹיֵי הוֹרוּ בֵּית דִּין וְיָדְעוּ שֶׁטָּעוּ וְחָזְרוּ בָּהֶן. הָא בְּהֶדְיָא קָתָנֵי לַהּ! תָּנֵי וַהֲדַר מְפָרֵשׁ.
The mishna teaches the second part of that principle: And one who associates his action with the ruling of the court is exempt. The Gemara explains: This principle serves to include an additional case that was not yet mentioned in the mishna, namely, where the court issued a ruling and the judges discovered that they erred and reversed their decision. If one was unaware that the court reversed their decision, and acted based on their initial ruling, he is deemed one who associates his action with the ruling of the court and is exempt. The Gemara challenges: The tanna teaches this halakha explicitly in the next mishna (3b), and consequently there is no need for an allusion in this mishna. The Gemara explains: The tanna teaches it ambiguously, and then teaches it explicitly.
אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: זוֹ דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יְהוּדָה, אֲבָל חֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: יָחִיד שֶׁעָשָׂה בְּהוֹרָאַת בֵּית דִּין – חַיָּיב. מַאי רַבִּי יְהוּדָה? דְּתַנְיָא: ״אִם נֶפֶשׁ אַחַת תֶּחֱטָא בִשְׁגָגָה בַּעֲשֹׂתָהּ״ – הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ שְׁלֹשָׁה מִעוּטִין: הָעוֹשֶׂה מִפִּי עַצְמוֹ – חַיָּיב, בְּהוֹרָאַת בֵּית דִּין – פָּטוּר.
§ Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: This halakha in the mishna, which states that an individual who performs a transgression on the basis of a ruling issued by the court is exempt from liability to bring an offering, is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. But the Rabbis say: An individual who performs a transgression on the basis of the ruling of the court is liable. The Gemara asks: What is the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda to which Shmuel refers? It is as it is taught in a baraita: The verse states: “And if one soul from among the common people shall sin unwittingly in performing one of the mitzvot of the Lord” (Leviticus 4:27). These are three exclusionary terms: “One,” “unwittingly,” and “in performing,” and one of these exclusions serves to teach that one who performs a transgression on his own is liable, while one who performs a transgression on the basis of the ruling of the court is exempt.
מַאי רַבָּנַן? דְּתַנְיָא, עֲדַיִין אֲנִי אוֹמֵר: מִיעוּט קָהָל שֶׁחָטְאוּ – חַיָּיבִין, שֶׁאֵין בֵּית דִּין מְבִיאִין עַל יְדֵיהֶן פַּר. רוֹב קָהָל שֶׁחָטְאוּ – יְהוּ פְּטוּרִין, שֶׁהֲרֵי בֵּית דִּין מְבִיאִין עַל יְדֵיהֶם פַּר. תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״מֵעַם הָאָרֶץ״ – אֲפִילּוּ רוּבָּהּ, וַאֲפִילּוּ כּוּלָּהּ.
The Gemara asks: What is the opinion of the Rabbis? It is as it is taught in a baraita: Still I say: Each member of a minority of the congregation that sinned based on the ruling of a court is liable to bring an offering for his unwitting transgression, as the court does not bring a bull for an unwitting communal sin on the basis of the minority’s transgression. One might have thought that each member of a majority of the congregation that sinned based on the ruling of a court would be exempt from liability to bring an offering for his unwitting transgression, as the court brings a bull for an unwitting communal sin on the basis of the majority’s transgression. To counter this, the verse states with regard to a sin-offering brought for an unwitting transgression: “From among the common people,” from which it is derived that even members of the majority of the congregation, and even members of the entire congregation, are not exempt because of the ruling of the court.
בְּמַאי? אִילֵּימָא בְּשִׁגְגַת מַעֲשֶׂה [בֵּית דִּין שֶׁלֹּא בְּהוֹרָאָה], בֵּית דִּין מַאי עֲבִידְתַּיְיהוּ? שֶׁלֹּא בְּהוֹרָאַת בֵּית דִּין, בֵּית דִּין מִי מַיְיתוּ שֶׁלֹּא בְּהוֹרָאָה? אֶלָּא בְּהוֹרָאָה. וְהָא כִּי כְּתִיב ״מֵעַם הָאָרֶץ״ – בְּשִׁגְגַת מַעֲשֶׂה הוּא דִּכְתִיב!
The Gemara asks: In what circumstances did the majority of the congregation sin? If we say that the reference is to a transgression with unwitting performance of an action unrelated to a ruling of the court, why does the tanna say: As the court brings a bull for an unwitting communal sin on the basis of the majority’s transgression? Given that this is a case where a court did not issue a ruling, what action did the court perform? Since it was not on the basis of the ruling of the court, does the court bring a bull for an unwitting communal sin that was performed not on the basis of its ruling? Rather, the reference in the baraita must be to a case where the majority of the congregation performed a transgression on the basis of the ruling of the court. If so, the question arises: But when it is written with regard to a sin-offering brought for an unwitting transgression: “From among the common people,” it is with regard to a transgression with unwitting performance of an action that it is written.
אֶלָּא לָאו הָכִי קָאָמַר: מִיעוּט קָהָל שֶׁחָטְאוּ בְּשִׁגְגַת מַעֲשֶׂה חַיָּיבִין, שֶׁאֵין בֵּית דִּין מְבִיאִין עַל יְדֵיהֶן פַּר בְּהוֹרָאָה. הָא הֵן חַיָּיבִין.
Rather, is it not that this is what the tanna is saying: The baraita is incomplete and must be taught in this manner: Each member of a minority of the congregation that sinned with unwitting performance of an action is liable to bring an offering for his unwitting transgression, as the court does not bring a bull for an unwitting communal sin on the basis of the minority’s transgression in a case where the court issued an erroneous ruling. But a minority of the congregation that sinned unwittingly on the basis of the ruling of the court is also liable.
יָכוֹל רוֹב צִבּוּר שֶׁעָשׂוּ בְּשִׁגְגַת מַעֲשֶׂה יְהוּ פְּטוּרִין, שֶׁהֲרֵי בֵּית דִּין מְבִיאִין עֲלֵיהֶם פַּר [בְּהוֹרָאָה]? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״מֵעַם הָאָרֶץ״, אֲפִילּוּ רוּבּוֹ.
The baraita continues: One might have thought that a majority of the congregation that sinned with unwitting performance of an action would be exempt, as the court brings a bull for an unwitting communal sin on the basis of the majority’s transgression in a case where the court issued an erroneous ruling. Therefore, the verse states: “From among the common people,” from which it is derived that even members of the majority of the congregation are liable. If the unwitting transgression was performed not on the basis of the ruling of the court, there is no difference between a minority and a majority of the people. This is proof that according to the Rabbis both an individual and a minority of the congregation who performed a transgression on the basis of the ruling of the court are liable.
אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: מִמַּאי? דִּלְמָא לֹא הֵן וְלֹא בֵּית דִּין!
Rav Pappa said: From where do you draw this conclusion? Perhaps in the case where a minority of the congregation performs a transgression on the basis of the ruling of the court, neither do those individuals bring an offering, because they associated their action with the court, nor does the court bring an offering, because it was only a minority of the congregation that performed a transgression on the basis of the ruling of the court.
אִי הָכִי, מַאי אִירְיָא דְּקָמְהַדַּר עַל רוּבָּא לְחִיּוּבָא? לָאו מִכְּלָל דְּמִיעוּט בְּהוֹרָאָה קַיְימָא לֵיהּ דְּמִיחַיְּיבוּ בְּהוֹרָאָה?! וּנְהַדַּר בְּרֵישָׁא עַל מִיעוּטָא דְּמִיחַיַּיב בְּשִׁגְגַת מַעֲשֶׂה, וּלְבַסּוֹף נִיהַדַּר עַל רוּבָּא לְחִיּוּבָא בְּשִׁגְגַת מַעֲשֶׂה!
The Gemara rejects this: If so, why does the tanna specifically seek a source with regard to the majority for liability? Why did the tanna seek to introduce the halakha that even if a majority of the congregation sinned they would be liable to bring an offering? Can one not, by inference, conclude with regard to a minority that acts on the basis of the ruling of the court, that he holds that they are liable even though they acted on the basis of the ruling of the court? According to Rav Pappa’s opinion, let the tanna first seek to cite proof about a minority that each of its members is liable to bring a sin-offering for unwitting performance of an action, and ultimately seek to cite proof about a majority to establish liability for each of its members to bring a sin-offering for unwitting performance of an action, as it has not yet been established with regard to a minority that each of its members is liable to bring a sin-offering for unwitting performance of an action.
אֶלָּא לָאו מִדְּלָא מְהַדַּר עַל מִיעוּט דְּמִיחַיְּיבִין בְּשִׁגְגַת מַעֲשֶׂה, וּבְסוֹף מְהַדַּר עַל רוּבָּא לְחִיּוּבָא בְּשִׁגְגַת מַעֲשֶׂה. שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ: מִיעוּט בְּהוֹרָאָה חַיָּיבִין – הֵן כִּשְׂבָּה וּשְׂעִירָה, וְשֶׁלֹּא בְּהוֹרָאָה – בְּשִׁגְגַת מַעֲשֶׂה חַיָּיבִין.
Rather, can one not make an inference from the fact that the tanna did not first seek to cite proof about a minority that each of its members is liable to bring a sin-offering for unwitting performance of an action and then seek to cite proof about a majority to establish liability for each of its members to bring a sin-offering for unwitting performance of an action? Accordingly, one can conclude from it that it was clear to the tanna that in a case of a minority that acts on the basis of the ruling of the court, each member of the minority is liable to bring a female lamb or a female goat as a sin-offering, and for unwitting performance of an action not on the basis of the ruling of the court, each member of the minority is similarly liable.
מִכְּדֵי תַּרְוַיְיהוּ סְתָמֵי תְּנַן, מִמַּאי דְּקַמַּיְיתָא רַבִּי יְהוּדָה וּבָתְרָיְיתָא רַבָּנַן? אֵימָא אִיפְּכָא! מַאן שָׁמְעַתְּ לֵיהּ דְּדָרֵישׁ מִיעוּטֵי כִּי הַאי גַוְונָא? רַבִּי יְהוּדָה הִיא, דְּתַנְיָא, רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר:
The Gemara asks: Now, we learned both of the baraitot unattributed. From where may it be ascertained that the tanna of the first baraita is Rabbi Yehuda and the tanna of the latter baraita is the Rabbis? Say the opposite. The Gemara answers: Whom did you hear that interprets exclusionary terms in this way? It is Rabbi Yehuda, as it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda says:
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Horayot 2
מַתְנִי׳ הוֹרוּ בֵּית דִּין לַעֲבוֹר עַל אַחַת מִכׇּל מִצְוֹת הָאֲמוּרוֹת בַּתּוֹרָה, וְהָלַךְ הַיָּחִיד וְעָשָׂה שׁוֹגֵג עַל פִּיהֶם, בֵּין שֶׁעָשׂוּ וְעָשָׂה עִמָּהֶן, בֵּין שֶׁעָשׂוּ וְעָשָׂה אַחֲרֵיהֶן, בֵּין שֶׁלֹּא עָשׂוּ וְעָשָׂה – פָּטוּר, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁתָּלָה בְּבֵית דִּין.
MISHNA: If a court erroneously issued a ruling permitting the Jewish people to violate one of all the mitzvot that are stated in the Torah, and an individual proceeded and performed that transgression unwittingly on the basis of the court’s ruling, then whether the judges performed the transgression and he performed it with them, or whether the judges performed the transgression and he performed it after them, or whether the judges did not perform the transgression and he performed it alone, in all these cases the individual is exempt from bringing an offering. This is due to the fact that he associated his action with the ruling of the court.
הוֹרוּ בֵּית דִּין, וְיָדַע אֶחָד מֵהֶן שֶׁטָּעוּ, אוֹ תַּלְמִיד וְהוּא רָאוּי לְהוֹרָאָה, וְהָלַךְ וְעָשָׂה עַל פִּיהֶן – בֵּין שֶׁעָשׂוּ וְעָשָׂה עִמָּהֶן, בֵּין שֶׁעָשׂוּ וְעָשָׂה אַחֲרֵיהֶן, בֵּין שֶׁלֹּא עָשׂוּ וְעָשָׂה – הֲרֵי זֶה חַיָּיב, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁלֹּא תָּלָה בְּבֵית דִּין. זֶה הַכְּלָל: הַתּוֹלֶה בְּעַצְמוֹ חַיָּיב, וְהַתּוֹלֶה בְּבֵית דִּין – פָּטוּר.
If the court issued a ruling and one of the judges knew that they erred, despite the fact that the majority ruled against his opinion, or if he was a student and he was qualified to issue halakhic rulings, and that judge or student proceeded and performed that transgression on the basis of its ruling, then whether the judges performed the transgression and he performed it with them, or whether the judges performed the transgression and he performed it after them, or whether the judges did not perform the transgression and he performed it alone, in all these cases, the judge or the student is liable to bring an offering. This is due to the fact that he did not associate his action with the ruling of the court. This is the principle: One who associates his action with himself is liable, and one who associates his action with the ruling of the court is exempt.
גְּמָ׳ אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: לְעוֹלָם אֵין בֵּית דִּין חַיָּיבִין עַד שֶׁיֹּאמְרוּ לָהֶם ״מוּתָּרִין אַתֶּם״. רַב דִּימִי מִנְּהַרְדְּעָא אָמַר: עַד שֶׁיֹּאמְרוּ לָהֶם ״מוּתָּרִין אַתֶּם לַעֲשׂוֹת״. מַאי טַעְמָא? לְפִי שֶׁלֹּא נִגְמְרָה הוֹרָאָה.
GEMARA: Shmuel says: The judges of the court are never liable to bring an offering for an erroneous ruling until they say to those seeking a ruling: It is permitted for you. Rav Dimi from Neharde’a says: The judges are not liable unless they say to those seeking a ruling: It is permitted for you to perform this action. What is the reason that Rav Dimi says that there is liability only if the judges say: To perform this action? It is due to the fact that the ruling is not completed if they say only: It is permitted, as perhaps the judges were expressing a theoretical opinion and not issuing a ruling.
אָמַר אַבָּיֵי, אַף אֲנַן נָמֵי תְּנֵינָא: חָזַר לְעִירוֹ שָׁנָה וְלִימֵּד כְּדֶרֶךְ שֶׁלִּימֵּד – פָּטוּר, הוֹרָה לַעֲשׂוֹת – חַיָּיב.
Abaye said: We learn proof for Rav Dimi’s opinion in a mishna as well. The mishna teaches with regard to a rebellious elder (Sanhedrin 86b): If the Sanhedrin ruled contrary to the ruling of the elder and the elder then returned to his city, and nevertheless he taught in the manner that he was teaching previously, he is exempt from punishment. But if he instructed others to act on the basis of his ruling that stands contrary to the ruling of the Sanhedrin, he is liable to be executed.
אָמַר רַבִּי אַבָּא, אַף אֲנַן נָמֵי תְּנֵינָא: הוֹרוּ לָהּ בֵּית דִּין לְהִנָּשֵׂא, וְהָלְכָה וְקִלְקְלָה – חַיֶּיבֶת בְּקׇרְבָּן, שֶׁלֹּא הִתִּירוּ לָהּ אֶלָּא לְהִנָּשֵׂא.
Rabbi Abba said: We learn proof for Rav Dimi’s opinion in a mishna as well. The mishna teaches (Yevamot 87b): If the court instructed a woman to marry on the basis of inaccurate testimony, but she proceeded and disgraced herself and engaged in promiscuous intercourse, she is liable to bring an offering, as they permitted her only to marry, and her conduct lacked the approval of the court. This indicates that it is not sufficient for the court to issue a general ruling to the woman; rather, the court issues a ruling that includes instruction to perform a specific action.
אָמַר רָבִינָא, אַף אֲנַן נָמֵי תְּנֵינָא: ״הוֹרוּ בֵּית דִּין לַעֲבוֹר עַל אַחַת מִכׇּל מִצְוֹת הָאֲמוּרוֹת בַּתּוֹרָה״, תּוּ לָא מִידִּי.
Ravina said: We learn proof for Rav Dimi’s opinion in the mishna here, as well: If a court unwittingly issued a ruling permitting the Jewish people to violate one of all the mitzvot that are stated in the Torah, etc.; and nothing more need be said, as it is clear from the phrase: Issued a ruling to violate, that the ruling must include instruction to perform a specific action.
אִיכָּא דְאָמְרִי, אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: אֵין בֵּית דִּין חַיָּיבִין עַד שֶׁיֹּאמְרוּ לָהֶם ״מוּתָּרִים אַתֶּם לַעֲשׂוֹת״. רַב דִּימִי מִנְּהַרְדְּעָא אָמַר: אֲפִילּוּ ״מוּתָּרִים אַתֶּם״ – נִגְמְרָה הוֹרָאָה. אָמַר אַבָּיֵי, וְהָא לָא תְּנַן הָכִי: חָזַר לְעִירוֹ, וְשָׁנָה אוֹ לִימֵּד כְּדֶרֶךְ שֶׁלִּימֵּד – פָּטוּר, הוֹרָה לַעֲשׂוֹת – חַיָּיב.
Some say there is a version of this amoraic dispute with the opposite opinions. Shmuel says: The judges of the court are not liable to bring an offering for an erroneous ruling until they say to those seeking a ruling: It is permitted for you to perform this action. Rav Dimi from Neharde’a says: Even if the judges say to those seeking a ruling: It is permitted for you, the ruling is completed and they are liable. Abaye said: But isn’t it so that we did not learn in accordance with the opinion of Rav Dimi in a mishna with regard to a rebellious elder: If the Sanhedrin ruled contrary to the ruling of the elder and the elder then returned to his city, and nevertheless he taught in the manner that he was teaching previously, he is exempt from punishment. But if he instructed others to act on the basis of his ruling that stands contrary to the ruling of the Sanhedrin, he is liable to be executed.
אָמַר רַבִּי אַבָּא, וְהָא לָא תְּנַן הָכִי: הוֹרוּ לָהּ בֵּית דִּין לְהִנָּשֵׂא, וְהָלְכָה וְקִלְקְלָה – חַיֶּיבֶת בְּקׇרְבָּן, שֶׁלֹּא הִתִּירוּ לָהּ אֶלָּא לְהִנָּשֵׂא.
Rabbi Abba said: But isn’t it so that we did not learn in accordance with the opinion of Rav Dimi in a mishna: If the court instructed a woman to marry on the basis of inaccurate testimony, but she proceeded and disgraced herself and engaged in promiscuous intercourse, she is liable to bring an offering, as they permitted her only to marry, and her conduct lacked the approval of the court.
אָמַר רָבִינָא, וְהָא לָא תְּנַן הָכִי: הוֹרוּ בֵּית דִּין לַעֲבוֹר עַל אַחַת מִכׇּל מִצְוֹת הָאֲמוּרוֹת בַּתּוֹרָה, תּוּ לָא מִידִּי.
Ravina said: But isn’t it so that we did not learn in accordance with the opinion of Rav Dimi in the mishna: If a court unwittingly issued a ruling permitting the Jewish people to violate one of all the mitzvot that are stated in the Torah, etc.; and nothing more need be said.
וְהָלַךְ הַיָּחִיד וְעָשָׂה שׁוֹגֵג עַל פִּיהֶם. וְנִיתְנֵי: ״וְעָשָׂה עַל פִּיהֶם״, ״שׁוֹגֵג״ לְמָה לִי? אָמַר רָבָא: ״שׁוֹגֵג״ – לְאֵתוֹיֵי הוֹרוּ בֵּית דִּין שֶׁחֵלֶב מוּתָּר, וְנִתְחַלֵּף לוֹ חֵלֶב בְּשׁוּמָּן, וַאֲכָלוֹ – פָּטוּר. ״עַל פִּיהֶם״ – עַל פִּיהֶם מַמָּשׁ,
§ The mishna teaches: And the individual proceeded and performed that transgression unwittingly on the basis of the court’s ruling. The Gemara asks: And let us teach only: And performed that transgression on the basis of the court’s ruling; why do I need to add: Unwittingly? Obviously, it was unwitting, as he thought his action was permitted. Rava said: The term unwittingly serves to include a case where the court issued a ruling that it is permitted to eat forbidden fat, and the forbidden fat became confused for him with permitted fat, and he ate it under the impression that he was eating permitted fat. In this case he is exempt. Then, when the mishna says: On the basis of the court’s ruling, it means that he ate forbidden fat actually on the basis of the court’s ruling.
וְאִיכָּא דְּאָמְרִי, אָמַר רָבָא: ״שׁוֹגֵג״ – עַל פִּיהֶם הוּא דְּפָטוּר, אֲבָל נִתְחַלֵּף לוֹ חֵלֶב בְּשׁוּמָּן וַאֲכָלוֹ – חַיָּיב.
And some say that Rava said a different interpretation of the mishna: It is specifically in a case where the individual proceeded and performed that transgression unwittingly on the basis of the court’s ruling that he is exempt. But if the forbidden fat became confused for him with permitted fat and he ate it under the impression that he was eating permitted fat, he is liable to bring an offering, because his unwitting transgression of eating forbidden fat was not associated solely with the ruling of the court.
מִילְּתָא דִּפְשִׁיטָא לֵיהּ לְרָבָא קָמִיבַּעְיָא לֵיהּ לְרָמִי בַּר חָמָא, דִּבְעַי רָמֵי בַּר חָמָא: הוֹרוּ בֵּית דִּין שֶׁחֵלֶב מוּתָּר, וְנִתְחַלֵּף לוֹ בְּשׁוּמָּן וַאֲכָלוֹ, מַהוּ?
The Gemara comments: The matter that is obvious to Rava, that one who confuses between forbidden fat and permitted fat is either exempt, according to the first version, or liable, according to the second version, was raised as a dilemma for Rami bar Ḥama, as Rami bar Ḥama raised a dilemma: If a court ruled that forbidden fat is permitted, and the forbidden fat became confused for him with permitted fat and he ate the forbidden fat, what is the halakha?
אָמַר רָבָא, תָּא שְׁמַע: הָלַךְ יָחִיד וְעָשָׂה שׁוֹגֵג עַל פִּיהֶם כּוּ׳. שׁוֹגֵג עַל פִּיהֶם לְמָה לִי? לָאו לְאֵתוֹיֵי הוֹרוּ בֵּית דִּין שֶׁחֵלֶב מוּתָּר, וְנִתְחַלֵּף לוֹ חֵלֶב בְּשׁוּמָּן וַאֲכָלוֹ – פָּטוּר. דִּלְמָא שׁוֹגֵג עַל פִּיהֶם הוּא דְּפָטוּר, אֲבָל נִתְחַלֵּף לוֹ חֵלֶב בְּשׁוּמָּן וַאֲכָלוֹ – חַיָּיב.
Rava said: Come and hear proof from the mishna: The individual proceeded and performed that transgression unwittingly on the basis of the court’s ruling, etc. Why do I need the redundancy: Unwittingly on the basis of the court’s ruling? Is the redundancy not stated to include a case where the court issued a ruling that it is permitted to eat forbidden fat, and the forbidden fat became confused for him with permitted fat, and he ate it under the impression that he was eating permitted fat, and the mishna is teaching that he is exempt? The Gemara rejects this: Perhaps the intent of the mishna is: It is in a case where one performed that transgression unwittingly on the basis of its ruling that he is exempt; but if the forbidden fat became confused for him with permitted fat, and he ate it under the impression that he was eating permitted fat, he is liable.
אִיכָּא דְּאָמְרִי, אָמַר רָבָא, תָּא שְׁמַע: הָלַךְ יָחִיד וְעָשָׂה שׁוֹגֵג עַל פִּיהֶם. מַאי לָאו, שׁוֹגֵג עַל פִּיהֶם הוּא דְּפָטוּר, אֲבָל נִתְחַלֵּף לוֹ חֵלֶב בְּשׁוּמָּן וַאֲכָלוֹ – חַיָּיב. דִּלְמָא: אוֹ שׁוֹגֵג, אוֹ עַל פִּיהֶם.
Some say that Rava said: Come and hear a proof from the mishna: The individual proceeded and performed that transgression unwittingly on the basis of the court’s ruling. What, is it not in a case where one performed that transgression unwittingly on the basis of its ruling that he is exempt; but if the forbidden fat became confused for him with permitted fat, and he ate the forbidden fat, he is liable? The Gemara rejects this: Perhaps the mishna is saying that he is liable if he either confused forbidden fat with permitted fat and ate the forbidden fat unwittingly, or ate the forbidden fat on the basis of the court’s ruling.
בִּפְלוּגְתָּא: הוֹרוּ בֵּית דִּין שֶׁחֵלֶב מוּתָּר, וְנִתְחַלֵּף לוֹ חֵלֶב בְּשׁוּמָּן וַאֲכָלוֹ – רַב אָמַר: פָּטוּר, וְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: חַיָּיב. מֵיתִיבִי: ״מֵעַם הָאָרֶץ בַּעֲשֹׂתָהּ״, פְּרָט לִמְשׁוּמָּד.
The Gemara notes: This matter was already taught in the dispute between amora’im of earlier generations: If a court ruled that forbidden fat is permitted, and the forbidden fat became confused for him with permitted fat and he ate the forbidden fat, Rav says: He is exempt, as the court ruled that it is permitted, and Rabbi Yoḥanan says: He is liable, as he did not base his conduct on its ruling. The Gemara raises an objection to the statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan from a baraita that teaches: The verse states: “And if one soul from among the common people shall sin unwittingly in performing one of the mitzvot of the Lord that are not to be done, and he is guilty” (Leviticus 4:27). This serves to exclude an apostate. When an apostate sins unwittingly, he is exempt from liability to bring a sin-offering even if he repents, as even his unwitting action is considered intentional.
רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן יוֹסֵי אוֹמֵר מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן: אֵינוֹ צָרִיךְ, הֲרֵי הוּא אוֹמֵר: ״אֲשֶׁר לֹא תֵעָשֶׂינָה בִּשְׁגָגָה וְאָשֵׁם אוֹ הוֹדַע״ – הַשָּׁב מִידִיעָתוֹ, מֵבִיא קׇרְבָּן עַל שִׁגְגָתוֹ. לֹא שָׁב מִידִיעָתוֹ – אֵינוֹ מֵבִיא קׇרְבָּן עַל שִׁגְגָתוֹ.
Rabbi Shimon ben Yosei says in the name of Rabbi Shimon: It is unnecessary to derive this halakha from that phrase, as it says in the same verse: “Shall sin unwittingly in performing one of the mitzvot of the Lord that are not to be done, and he is guilty; or if his sin, which he has sinned, be known to him” (Leviticus 4:27–28). From the words “be known to him” it is inferred that only one who repents due to his awareness, i.e., he would not have sinned if he had known the act was prohibited, brings a sacrifice for his unwitting transgression in order to achieve atonement. But one who does not repent due to his awareness that he sinned, e.g., an apostate, who would have sinned even had he been aware that the act is prohibited, does not bring an offering for his unwitting action.
וְאִם אִיתָא, הָא לֹא שָׁב מִידִיעָתוֹ הוּא.
The Gemara asks: And if it is so that one who would not repent due to his awareness is exempt, isn’t this person who confused forbidden fat with permitted fat considered one who will not repent due to his awareness? Even if he discovers that he ate forbidden fat he will not regret his action, as he relies on the ruling of the court that forbidden fat is permitted. This contradicts the statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan, who says that one is liable in that case.
אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא, קָסָבַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: כֵּיוָן דְּכִי מִתְיְדַע לְהוּ לְבֵי דִינָא, הָדְרִי בְּהוּ, וְהוּא נָמֵי הָדַר בֵּיהּ – שָׁב מִידִיעָתוֹ קָרֵינַן בֵּיהּ, וְחַיָּיב.
Rav Pappa said that Rabbi Yoḥanan holds: Since once it becomes known to the court that it erred, the judges will retract their erroneous ruling, and this individual will also repent when he discovers that he ate forbidden fat which the court erroneously permitted, we characterize him as one who repents due to his awareness, and he is liable to bring an offering.
אָמַר רָבָא: מוֹדֶה רַב שֶׁאֵינוֹ מַשְׁלִים לְרוֹב צִבּוּר, מַאי טַעְמָא? אָמַר קְרָא: ״בִּשְׁגָגָה״ – עַד שֶׁיְּהוּ כּוּלָּן בִּשְׁגָגָה אֶחָת.
Rava says: Even though Rav says the individual is exempt, and his sin is dependent on the court, Rav concedes that in a case where one confused forbidden fats with permitted fats, he does not complete a majority of the congregation. The court is liable to bring an offering only when the majority of the congregation performs a transgression based on its ruling. This individual who thought the fat was permitted is not included in the majority of the congregation. What is the reason? It is as the verse states: “For all the people it was performed unwittingly” (Numbers 15:26), from which it is derived: There is no liability unless they are all unwitting in one and the same manner; and the action of this individual is unwitting in a different manner than the rest of the transgressors.
בֵּין שֶׁעָשׂוּ וְעָשָׂה עִמָּהֶן כּוּ׳. לְמָה לֵיהּ לְמִיתְנָא כׇּל הָנֵי? בִּשְׁלָמָא רֵישָׁא – לֹא זוֹ אַף זוֹ קָתָנֵי. אֶלָּא סֵיפָא דִּלְחִיּוּבָא, אִיפְּכָא מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ!
§ The mishna teaches: Whether the judges performed the transgression and he performed it with them, or whether the judges performed the transgression and he performed it after them, or whether the judges did not perform the transgression and he performed it alone, in all these cases the individual is exempt. The Gemara asks: Why did the tanna in the mishna need to teach all of these cases? Granted, in the first clause of the mishna, the tanna teaches the mishna employing the style: Not only this but also that, i.e., not only is he exempt if the judges performed the transgression with him, but he is exempt even if he performed the act after the judges, and even if he alone performed the transgression. But in the latter clause of the mishna, where the tanna is teaching liability, the tanna should have taught the opposite. He should have started with the case where he is most likely to be liable, the case where the judges performed no transgression and he sinned alone.
זוֹ וְאֵין צָרִיךְ לוֹמַר זוֹ קָתָנֵי.
The Gemara answers: In the latter clause, the tanna teaches the mishna employing the style: This, and it is unnecessary to say that, i.e., the cases are arranged with each case more obvious than the one that preceded it.
וְיָדַע אֶחָד מֵהֶן שֶׁטָּעוּ אוֹ תַּלְמִיד וְרָאוּי לְהוֹרָאָה. תַּרְתֵּי לְמָה לִי? אָמַר רָבָא: אִיצְטְרִיךְ, סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אָמֵינָא הָנֵי מִילֵּי גְּמִיר וּסְבִיר, אֲבָל גְּמִיר וְלָא סְבִיר – לָא.
§ The mishna teaches: And one of the judges knew that they erred, or if he was a student and he is qualified to issue halakhic rulings. The Gemara asks: Why do I need two cases? As a student qualified to issue halakhic rulings is the equivalent of one of the judges, why did the tanna mention both? Rava said: It was necessary to state both, as it may enter your mind to say that this statement that he is liable applies specifically to one who is learned and analytical, but that one who is learned but not analytical, no, he should not be liable to bring an offering. Therefore, the tanna cites both the case of a judge and the case of a student qualified to issue halakhic rulings, to teach that even one who is learned but not analytical is liable in this case.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי: לְהוֹרָאָה גְּמִיר וּסְבִיר מַשְׁמַע! אֲמַר לֵיהּ, אֲנָא הָכִי קָאָמֵינָא: אִי מֵהַהִיא – הֲוָה אָמֵינָא הָנֵי מִילֵּי גְּמִיר וּסְבִיר, אֲבָל גְּמִיר וְלָא סְבִיר – לָא, תְּנָא רָאוּי לְהוֹרָאָה, מִמִּשְׁנָה יְתֵירָה: אֲפִילּוּ גְּמִיר וְלָא סְבִיר, סְבִיר וְלָא גְּמִיר.
Abaye challenged this and said to Rava that the term: A student qualified to issue halakhic rulings, indicates that he is both learned and analytical. Rava said to Abaye: This is what I am saying: If the tanna had taught the halakha from that first halakha with regard to one of the judges, I would say that this statement applies only to one who is both learned and analytical, but if he was learned and not analytical, no, he would not be liable. Therefore, the tanna taught the additional case of a student qualified to issue halakhic rulings, and from the extraneous case in the mishna one can infer that the halakha applies even to one who is learned but not analytical or one who is analytical but not yet learned. Since he associates his action with himself, he is liable.
רָאוּי לְהוֹרָאָה וְכוּ׳. כְּגוֹן מַאן? אָמַר רָבָא: כְּגוֹן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן עַזַּאי וְשִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן זוֹמָא. אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי: כִּי הַאי גַוְונָא מֵזִיד הוּא!
§ The mishna teaches: Qualified to issue halakhic rulings. The Gemara asks: Like whom? Who is an example of one qualified to issue halakhic rulings? Rava said: It is one like Shimon ben Azzai or Shimon ben Zoma, who, although they were among the most outstanding Torah scholars of their generation, were not ordained. Abaye said to Rava: In a case like this, he is an intentional sinner, as a scholar of that caliber would certainly not err. If he ruled that a prohibited action is permitted, it is assumed that he acted with intent, and he is exempt from bringing an offering.
וּלְטַעְמָיךְ, הָא דְּתַנְיָא: ״בַּעֲשֹׂתָהּ אַחַת״, יָחִיד הָעוֹשֶׂה מִפִּי עַצְמוֹ – חַיָּיב, בְּהוֹרָאַת בֵּית דִּין – פָּטוּר. כֵּיצַד? הוֹרוּ בֵּית דִּין שֶׁחֵלֶב מוּתָּר, וְנוֹדַע לְאֶחָד מֵהֶן שֶׁטָּעוּ, אוֹ תַּלְמִיד יוֹשֵׁב לִפְנֵיהֶן וְרָאוּי לְהוֹרָאָה כְּגוֹן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן עַזַּאי, יָכוֹל יְהֵא פָּטוּר? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״בַּעֲשֹׂתָהּ אַחַת״, יָחִיד הָעוֹשֶׂה עַל פִּי עַצְמוֹ – חַיָּיב, בְּהוֹרָאַת בֵּית דִּין – פָּטוּר!
Rava said to Abaye: But according to your reasoning, that which is taught in a baraita that cites the verse: “In performing one” (Leviticus 4:27), from which it is derived that an individual who performs a transgression on his own is liable, while one who performs a transgression based on the ruling of the court is exempt; how so? When does this apply? If the court ruled that forbidden fat is permitted, and it became known to one of the judges that they erred, or if he was a student who was sitting before them and he is qualified to issue halakhic rulings, e.g., Shimon ben Azzai, might one have thought that he would be exempt? To counter this, the verse states: “In performing one,” from which it is derived that an individual who performs a transgression on his own is liable, while one who performs a transgression on the basis of the ruling of the court is exempt.
אֶלָּא הֵיכִי מַשְׁכַּחַתְּ לַהּ? כְּגוֹן דְּיָדַע דְּאָסוּר, וְקָא טָעֵי בְּמִצְוָה לִשְׁמוֹעַ דִּבְרֵי חֲכָמִים. לְדִידִי נָמֵי, דְּטָעוּ בְּמִצְוָה לִשְׁמוֹעַ דִּבְרֵי חֲכָמִים.
Rava continues: Rather, the baraita is difficult; how can you find these circumstances where a judge or a prominent Torah scholar would be considered an unwitting sinner? The Gemara answers: It is in a case where the judge or the scholar knew that the action with regard to which the court issued a ruling that it is permitted is in fact prohibited, but he erred with regard to the mitzva of heeding the statements of the Sages. He believed that there is a mitzva to heed the directives of the Sages even when he is certain that they are mistaken. If so, according to my understanding too, the reference is to one like Shimon ben Azzai or Shimon ben Zoma; it is also a case where they erred with regard to the mitzva of heeding the statements of the Sages. Due to that error, they are liable to bring an offering.
זֶה הַכְּלָל הַתּוֹלֶה בְּעַצְמוֹ – חַיָּיב. לְאֵיתוֹיֵי מַאי? לְאֵיתוֹיֵי מְבַעֵט בְּהוֹרָאָה.
§ The mishna teaches: This is the principle: One who associates his action with himself is liable. The Gemara asks: What case that was not already mentioned in the mishna does this principle serve to include? The Gemara answers: It serves to include one who disdains halakhic rulings in general, treating them with contempt and relying only on his own understanding.
תּוֹלֶה בְּבֵית דִּין – לְאֵיתוֹיֵי הוֹרוּ בֵּית דִּין וְיָדְעוּ שֶׁטָּעוּ וְחָזְרוּ בָּהֶן. הָא בְּהֶדְיָא קָתָנֵי לַהּ! תָּנֵי וַהֲדַר מְפָרֵשׁ.
The mishna teaches the second part of that principle: And one who associates his action with the ruling of the court is exempt. The Gemara explains: This principle serves to include an additional case that was not yet mentioned in the mishna, namely, where the court issued a ruling and the judges discovered that they erred and reversed their decision. If one was unaware that the court reversed their decision, and acted based on their initial ruling, he is deemed one who associates his action with the ruling of the court and is exempt. The Gemara challenges: The tanna teaches this halakha explicitly in the next mishna (3b), and consequently there is no need for an allusion in this mishna. The Gemara explains: The tanna teaches it ambiguously, and then teaches it explicitly.
אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: זוֹ דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יְהוּדָה, אֲבָל חֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: יָחִיד שֶׁעָשָׂה בְּהוֹרָאַת בֵּית דִּין – חַיָּיב. מַאי רַבִּי יְהוּדָה? דְּתַנְיָא: ״אִם נֶפֶשׁ אַחַת תֶּחֱטָא בִשְׁגָגָה בַּעֲשֹׂתָהּ״ – הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ שְׁלֹשָׁה מִעוּטִין: הָעוֹשֶׂה מִפִּי עַצְמוֹ – חַיָּיב, בְּהוֹרָאַת בֵּית דִּין – פָּטוּר.
§ Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: This halakha in the mishna, which states that an individual who performs a transgression on the basis of a ruling issued by the court is exempt from liability to bring an offering, is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. But the Rabbis say: An individual who performs a transgression on the basis of the ruling of the court is liable. The Gemara asks: What is the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda to which Shmuel refers? It is as it is taught in a baraita: The verse states: “And if one soul from among the common people shall sin unwittingly in performing one of the mitzvot of the Lord” (Leviticus 4:27). These are three exclusionary terms: “One,” “unwittingly,” and “in performing,” and one of these exclusions serves to teach that one who performs a transgression on his own is liable, while one who performs a transgression on the basis of the ruling of the court is exempt.
מַאי רַבָּנַן? דְּתַנְיָא, עֲדַיִין אֲנִי אוֹמֵר: מִיעוּט קָהָל שֶׁחָטְאוּ – חַיָּיבִין, שֶׁאֵין בֵּית דִּין מְבִיאִין עַל יְדֵיהֶן פַּר. רוֹב קָהָל שֶׁחָטְאוּ – יְהוּ פְּטוּרִין, שֶׁהֲרֵי בֵּית דִּין מְבִיאִין עַל יְדֵיהֶם פַּר. תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״מֵעַם הָאָרֶץ״ – אֲפִילּוּ רוּבָּהּ, וַאֲפִילּוּ כּוּלָּהּ.
The Gemara asks: What is the opinion of the Rabbis? It is as it is taught in a baraita: Still I say: Each member of a minority of the congregation that sinned based on the ruling of a court is liable to bring an offering for his unwitting transgression, as the court does not bring a bull for an unwitting communal sin on the basis of the minority’s transgression. One might have thought that each member of a majority of the congregation that sinned based on the ruling of a court would be exempt from liability to bring an offering for his unwitting transgression, as the court brings a bull for an unwitting communal sin on the basis of the majority’s transgression. To counter this, the verse states with regard to a sin-offering brought for an unwitting transgression: “From among the common people,” from which it is derived that even members of the majority of the congregation, and even members of the entire congregation, are not exempt because of the ruling of the court.
בְּמַאי? אִילֵּימָא בְּשִׁגְגַת מַעֲשֶׂה [בֵּית דִּין שֶׁלֹּא בְּהוֹרָאָה], בֵּית דִּין מַאי עֲבִידְתַּיְיהוּ? שֶׁלֹּא בְּהוֹרָאַת בֵּית דִּין, בֵּית דִּין מִי מַיְיתוּ שֶׁלֹּא בְּהוֹרָאָה? אֶלָּא בְּהוֹרָאָה. וְהָא כִּי כְּתִיב ״מֵעַם הָאָרֶץ״ – בְּשִׁגְגַת מַעֲשֶׂה הוּא דִּכְתִיב!
The Gemara asks: In what circumstances did the majority of the congregation sin? If we say that the reference is to a transgression with unwitting performance of an action unrelated to a ruling of the court, why does the tanna say: As the court brings a bull for an unwitting communal sin on the basis of the majority’s transgression? Given that this is a case where a court did not issue a ruling, what action did the court perform? Since it was not on the basis of the ruling of the court, does the court bring a bull for an unwitting communal sin that was performed not on the basis of its ruling? Rather, the reference in the baraita must be to a case where the majority of the congregation performed a transgression on the basis of the ruling of the court. If so, the question arises: But when it is written with regard to a sin-offering brought for an unwitting transgression: “From among the common people,” it is with regard to a transgression with unwitting performance of an action that it is written.
אֶלָּא לָאו הָכִי קָאָמַר: מִיעוּט קָהָל שֶׁחָטְאוּ בְּשִׁגְגַת מַעֲשֶׂה חַיָּיבִין, שֶׁאֵין בֵּית דִּין מְבִיאִין עַל יְדֵיהֶן פַּר בְּהוֹרָאָה. הָא הֵן חַיָּיבִין.
Rather, is it not that this is what the tanna is saying: The baraita is incomplete and must be taught in this manner: Each member of a minority of the congregation that sinned with unwitting performance of an action is liable to bring an offering for his unwitting transgression, as the court does not bring a bull for an unwitting communal sin on the basis of the minority’s transgression in a case where the court issued an erroneous ruling. But a minority of the congregation that sinned unwittingly on the basis of the ruling of the court is also liable.
יָכוֹל רוֹב צִבּוּר שֶׁעָשׂוּ בְּשִׁגְגַת מַעֲשֶׂה יְהוּ פְּטוּרִין, שֶׁהֲרֵי בֵּית דִּין מְבִיאִין עֲלֵיהֶם פַּר [בְּהוֹרָאָה]? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״מֵעַם הָאָרֶץ״, אֲפִילּוּ רוּבּוֹ.
The baraita continues: One might have thought that a majority of the congregation that sinned with unwitting performance of an action would be exempt, as the court brings a bull for an unwitting communal sin on the basis of the majority’s transgression in a case where the court issued an erroneous ruling. Therefore, the verse states: “From among the common people,” from which it is derived that even members of the majority of the congregation are liable. If the unwitting transgression was performed not on the basis of the ruling of the court, there is no difference between a minority and a majority of the people. This is proof that according to the Rabbis both an individual and a minority of the congregation who performed a transgression on the basis of the ruling of the court are liable.
אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: מִמַּאי? דִּלְמָא לֹא הֵן וְלֹא בֵּית דִּין!
Rav Pappa said: From where do you draw this conclusion? Perhaps in the case where a minority of the congregation performs a transgression on the basis of the ruling of the court, neither do those individuals bring an offering, because they associated their action with the court, nor does the court bring an offering, because it was only a minority of the congregation that performed a transgression on the basis of the ruling of the court.
אִי הָכִי, מַאי אִירְיָא דְּקָמְהַדַּר עַל רוּבָּא לְחִיּוּבָא? לָאו מִכְּלָל דְּמִיעוּט בְּהוֹרָאָה קַיְימָא לֵיהּ דְּמִיחַיְּיבוּ בְּהוֹרָאָה?! וּנְהַדַּר בְּרֵישָׁא עַל מִיעוּטָא דְּמִיחַיַּיב בְּשִׁגְגַת מַעֲשֶׂה, וּלְבַסּוֹף נִיהַדַּר עַל רוּבָּא לְחִיּוּבָא בְּשִׁגְגַת מַעֲשֶׂה!
The Gemara rejects this: If so, why does the tanna specifically seek a source with regard to the majority for liability? Why did the tanna seek to introduce the halakha that even if a majority of the congregation sinned they would be liable to bring an offering? Can one not, by inference, conclude with regard to a minority that acts on the basis of the ruling of the court, that he holds that they are liable even though they acted on the basis of the ruling of the court? According to Rav Pappa’s opinion, let the tanna first seek to cite proof about a minority that each of its members is liable to bring a sin-offering for unwitting performance of an action, and ultimately seek to cite proof about a majority to establish liability for each of its members to bring a sin-offering for unwitting performance of an action, as it has not yet been established with regard to a minority that each of its members is liable to bring a sin-offering for unwitting performance of an action.
אֶלָּא לָאו מִדְּלָא מְהַדַּר עַל מִיעוּט דְּמִיחַיְּיבִין בְּשִׁגְגַת מַעֲשֶׂה, וּבְסוֹף מְהַדַּר עַל רוּבָּא לְחִיּוּבָא בְּשִׁגְגַת מַעֲשֶׂה. שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ: מִיעוּט בְּהוֹרָאָה חַיָּיבִין – הֵן כִּשְׂבָּה וּשְׂעִירָה, וְשֶׁלֹּא בְּהוֹרָאָה – בְּשִׁגְגַת מַעֲשֶׂה חַיָּיבִין.
Rather, can one not make an inference from the fact that the tanna did not first seek to cite proof about a minority that each of its members is liable to bring a sin-offering for unwitting performance of an action and then seek to cite proof about a majority to establish liability for each of its members to bring a sin-offering for unwitting performance of an action? Accordingly, one can conclude from it that it was clear to the tanna that in a case of a minority that acts on the basis of the ruling of the court, each member of the minority is liable to bring a female lamb or a female goat as a sin-offering, and for unwitting performance of an action not on the basis of the ruling of the court, each member of the minority is similarly liable.
מִכְּדֵי תַּרְוַיְיהוּ סְתָמֵי תְּנַן, מִמַּאי דְּקַמַּיְיתָא רַבִּי יְהוּדָה וּבָתְרָיְיתָא רַבָּנַן? אֵימָא אִיפְּכָא! מַאן שָׁמְעַתְּ לֵיהּ דְּדָרֵישׁ מִיעוּטֵי כִּי הַאי גַוְונָא? רַבִּי יְהוּדָה הִיא, דְּתַנְיָא, רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר:
The Gemara asks: Now, we learned both of the baraitot unattributed. From where may it be ascertained that the tanna of the first baraita is Rabbi Yehuda and the tanna of the latter baraita is the Rabbis? Say the opposite. The Gemara answers: Whom did you hear that interprets exclusionary terms in this way? It is Rabbi Yehuda, as it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda says:
