Why didn’t the Mishna mention a case of one who claimed that they borrowed money from another, but already paid it back? Why didn’t it mention the case of one who said “Your father lent me money but I paid him back half.” Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov and the rabbis disagree regarding that case – what does each hold and why? Why is it different than a standard case of modeh b’miktzat, one who admits to part of the claim, who is obligated to swear regarding the half in question? The Mishna brings another case where one is believed as we only know of the claim at all from what the person told us and therefore, they are believed about the rest. The case is regarding verification of signature on a document. When the witnesses verified their signatures, they claimed they were forced into it or were too young to testify or were disqualified witnesses. Rami bar Chama limits one of the cases of the Mishna but there are two versions as to which one he is limiting. How does the Mishna work with the principle that once one has testified, one can no longer change their testimony? How does it work with the principle that a person does not come to court and self-incriminate themselves? A braita brings a debate between Rabbi Meir and the rabbis regarding the law in our Mishna. The Gemara raises a difficulty with Rabbi Meir’s opinion.
This month’s learning is sponsored by Beth Balkany in honor of their granddaughter, Devorah Chana Serach Eichel. “May she grow up to be a lifelong learner.”
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This month’s learning is sponsored by Beth Balkany in honor of their granddaughter, Devorah Chana Serach Eichel. “May she grow up to be a lifelong learner.”
Ketubot 18
דִּסְתַם יְהוּדָה וּגְלִיל כִּשְׁעַת חֵירוּם דָּמוּ.
The Gemara answers: The reason that the tanna cited specifically a case where each is located in a different land is that the standard situation with regard to travel between Judea and the Galilee is tantamount to a crisis period, as war was commonplace, and there was a strip of Samaritan territory between Judea and the Galilee.
וְלִיתְנֵי: מוֹדֶה רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בְּאוֹמֵר לַחֲבֵירוֹ ״מָנֶה לָוִיתִי מִמְּךָ וּפְרַעְתִּיו לָךְ״, שֶׁהוּא נֶאֱמָן! מִשּׁוּם דְּקָא בָּעֵי לְמִיתְנֵי סֵיפָא: אִם יֵשׁ עֵדִים שֶׁהוּא לָוָה מִמֶּנּוּ, וְהוּא אוֹמֵר: פְּרַעְתִּיו — אֵינוֹ נֶאֱמָן, וְהָא קַיְימָא לַן הַמַּלְוֶה אֶת חֲבֵירוֹ בְּעֵדִים — אֵינוֹ צָרִיךְ לְפׇרְעוֹ בְּעֵדִים.
The Gemara asks: And let the tanna teach in the mishna: And Rabbi Yehoshua concedes in a case where one says to another: I borrowed one hundred dinars from you and repaid the loan to you, that he is deemed credible. The Gemara answers: The tanna chose not to teach that case of the mouth that prohibited is the mouth that permitted due to the fact that the tanna wanted to teach in the latter clause: If there are witnesses that he borrowed money from another, and he says: I repaid the loan, he is not deemed credible. However, the tanna would not be able to distinguish between a case where witnesses testify and a case where there are no witnesses, as don’t we hold that in the case of one who lends money to another in the presence of witnesses, the borrower need not repay the loan in the presence of witnesses? Therefore, even if witnesses testify that he took the loan, his claim that he repaid the loan is accepted.
וְלִיתְנֵי: מוֹדֶה רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בְּאוֹמֵר לַחֲבֵירוֹ: מָנֶה לְאָבִיךְ בְּיָדִי, וְהֶאֱכַלְתִּיו פְּרָס — שֶׁהוּא נֶאֱמָן!
The Gemara asks: And let the tanna teach in the mishna: And Rabbi Yehoshua concedes in a case where one says to another: Your father has one hundred dinars in my possession in the form of a loan, but I provided him with repayment of half that amount, that his claim is deemed credible.
אַלִּיבָּא דְמַאן? אִי אַלִּיבָּא דְרַבָּנַן — הָא אָמְרִי מֵשִׁיב אֲבֵידָה הָוֵי. אִי אַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בֶּן יַעֲקֹב — הָא אָמַר שְׁבוּעָה בָּעֵי.
The Gemara answers: There is a tannaitic dispute with regard to that case and the case that the Gemara suggested does not correspond to either opinion. In accordance with whose opinion would the mishna be taught? If it is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, didn’t they say that in that case he is the equivalent of one returning a lost article? Since the son is unaware that the borrower owes his father money, and the borrower takes the initiative and admits that he owes part of the sum that he borrowed, it is as if he returned a lost article, and clearly his claim is accepted and no oath is required. And if it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov, didn’t he say that in that case the borrower is required to take an oath, and only then is his claim accepted?
דְּתַנְיָא, רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בֶּן יַעֲקֹב אוֹמֵר: פְּעָמִים שֶׁאָדָם נִשְׁבָּע עַל טַעֲנַת עַצְמוֹ. כֵּיצַד? ״מָנֶה לְאָבִיךְ בְּיָדִי וְהֶאֱכַלְתִּיו פְּרָס״ — הֲרֵי זֶה נִשְׁבָּע, וְזֶהוּ שֶׁנִּשְׁבָּע עַל טַעֲנַת עַצְמוֹ. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: אֵינוֹ אֶלָּא כְּמֵשִׁיב אֲבֵידָה, וּפָטוּר.
This dispute is as it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says: There are times when although no one claimed that another owes him money, a person takes an oath on the basis of his own claim. How so? If one says to another: Your father has one hundred dinars in my possession, but I provided him with repayment of half that amount, he is required to take an oath that he repaid half, and that is the case of one who takes an oath on the basis of his own claim. And the Rabbis say: In that case he is merely the equivalent of one returning a lost article, and is exempt from taking an oath.
וְרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בֶּן יַעֲקֹב לֵית לֵיהּ מֵשִׁיב אֲבֵידָה פָּטוּר? אָמַר רַב: בְּטוֹעֲנוֹ קָטָן. וְהָאָמַר מָר: אֵין נִשְׁבָּעִין עַל טַעֲנַת חֵרֵשׁ שׁוֹטֶה וְקָטָן!
The Gemara asks: And is Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov not of the opinion that one who returns a lost article is exempt from taking an oath that he did not take part of the sum? He returns what he admitted taking without an oath. Rav says: The baraita is referring to a case where a minor makes a claim against him. The lender’s minor son claims that the borrower did not repay any part of the loan to his father. The borrower’s claim comes in response to that claim. Therefore, his admission is not at all comparable to returning a lost article. The Gemara asks: But didn’t the Master say: One does not take an oath on the basis of the claim of a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor? Due to their lack of cognition, they are not deemed halakhically competent to require another to take an oath based on their claim.
מַאי קָטָן — גָּדוֹל. וְאַמַּאי קָרֵי לֵיהּ קָטָן — דִּלְגַבֵּי מִילֵּי דְאָבִיו, קָטָן הוּא. אִי הָכִי: טַעֲנַת עַצְמוֹ? טַעֲנַת אֲחֵרִים הִיא! טַעֲנַת אֲחֵרִים, וְהוֹדָאַת עַצְמוֹ.
The Gemara answers: In Rav’s statement, what is the meaning of minor? It means one who reached majority, and is therefore halakhically competent. And why does Rav call him a minor? It is due to the fact that with regard to his father’s matters, he is the equivalent of a minor, as he is uncertain about the particulars of his father’s dealings. If so, i.e., that the son making the claim has already reached majority, the language of the baraita is imprecise. Why does the tanna refer to this case as one taking an oath on the basis of his own claim? This is not his own claim; it is the claim of others. The Gemara answers: The baraita employed that language for the following reason: It is the claim of others, but he is taking an oath on the basis of his own partial admission.
כּוּלְּהִי טַעֲנָתָא, טַעֲנַת אֲחֵרִים וְהוֹדָאַת עַצְמוֹ נִינְהוּ!
The Gemara asks: All claims where an oath is required are cases of a claim of others and his own admission. However, in the baraita, Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov introduces his opinion with the phrase: There are times, indicating that the case to which he is referring, that of one taking an oath on the basis of his own claim, is not the standard case of taking an oath.
אֶלָּא הָכָא בִּדְרַבָּה קָמִיפַּלְגִי. דְּאָמַר רַבָּה: מִפְּנֵי מָה אָמְרָה תּוֹרָה מוֹדֶה מִקְצָת הַטַּעֲנָה יִשָּׁבַע — חֲזָקָה אֵין אָדָם מֵעִיז פָּנָיו בִּפְנֵי בַּעַל חוֹבוֹ. וְהַאי בְּכוּלַּהּ בָּעֵי דְּלִכְפְּרֵיהּ, וְהַאי דְּלָא כְּפַר לֵיהּ — מִשּׁוּם דְּאֵין אָדָם מֵעִיז פָּנָיו הוּא.
Rather, the Gemara suggests an alternative explanation of the tannaitic dispute. Here, Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov and the Rabbis disagree with regard to the statement of Rabba, as Rabba said: Why did the Torah say that one who makes a partial admission in response to the claim is required to take an oath? It is because there is a presumption that a person would not be so insolent in the presence of his creditor as to deny his debt. Presumably, this borrower who made a partial admission would have liked to deny the entire loan, and the fact that he did not deny the entire loan is due to the fact that a person would not be so insolent in the presence of his creditor.
וּבְכוּלַּהּ בָּעֵי דְּלוֹדֵי לֵיהּ. וְהַאי דְּלָא אוֹדִי לֵיהּ — כִּי הֵיכִי דְּלִישְׁתְּמִיט לֵיהּ, וְסָבַר: עַד דְּהָוֵה לִי זוּזֵי וּפָרַעְנָא לֵיהּ. וְרַחֲמָנָא אָמַר: רְמִי שְׁבוּעָה עֲלֵיהּ, כִּי הֵיכִי דְּלוֹדֵי לֵיהּ בְּכוּלֵּיהּ.
And, as a result, he would have liked to admit to him that he owes him the entire loan. And the reason that he did not admit to him that he owes him the entire loan is so that he may temporarily avoid paying him. And he rationalizes doing so, saying to himself: I am avoiding him only until the time that I have money, and then I will repay him. Due to the concern that the partial admission is motivated by that rationalization and the claim of the lender is true, the Merciful One says: Impose an oath upon him so that he will admit that he owes him the entire loan.
רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בֶּן יַעֲקֹב סָבַר: לָא שְׁנָא בּוֹ וְלָא שְׁנָא בִּבְנוֹ, אֵינוֹ מֵעִיז, וְהִלְכָּךְ לָאו מֵשִׁיב אֲבֵידָה הָוֵי. וְרַבָּנַן סָבְרִי: בּוֹ הוּא דְּאֵינוֹ מֵעִיז, אֲבָל בִּבְנוֹ — מֵעִיז. וּמִדְּלֹא הֵעִיז — מֵשִׁיב אֲבֵידָה הָוֵי.
Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov maintains: It is no different with regard to the creditor himself, and it is no different with regard to his son. The debtor would not be so insolent as to deny the debt. And therefore, he is not considered as one returning a lost article on his own initiative. Rather, he is considered as one who partially admits his debt in response to a claim, and is therefore required to take an oath. However, the Rabbis maintain: In the presence of the creditor one would not be insolent, but in the presence of his son, who did not lend him the money, he would be insolent and deny the claim entirely. Since he had the option of completely denying the loan and opted to admit to part of the claim, he is considered as one returning a lost article and his claim is accepted without an oath.
מַתְנִי׳ הָעֵדִים שֶׁאָמְרוּ: כְּתַב יָדֵינוּ הוּא זֶה, אֲבָל אֲנוּסִים הָיִינוּ, קְטַנִּים הָיִינוּ, פְּסוּלֵי עֵדוּת הָיִינוּ — הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ נֶאֱמָנִים. וְאִם יֵשׁ עֵדִים שֶׁהוּא כְּתַב יָדָם, אוֹ שֶׁהָיָה כְּתַב יָדָם יוֹצֵא מִמָּקוֹם אַחֵר — אֵינָן נֶאֱמָנִין.
MISHNA: With regard to the witnesses who said in their testimony to ratify their signatures in a document: We signed the document and this is our handwriting; however, we were compelled to sign, or we were minors when we signed, or we were disqualified witnesses, e.g., we are relatives of one of the parties, they are deemed credible. Since the document is ratified on the basis of their testimony, it is likewise invalidated on the basis of their testimony. However, if there are other witnesses who testify that it is their handwriting, or if their handwriting emerges on a document from another place, enabling confirmation of their signatures by comparing the two documents, then the witnesses who signed the document are not deemed credible. The document is not invalidated based on their testimony, because ratification of the document is not dependent on their testimony, as their signatures can be authenticated independently.
גְּמָ׳ אָמַר רָמֵי בַּר חָמָא: לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא שֶׁאָמְרוּ ״אֲנוּסִים הָיִינוּ מֵחֲמַת מָמוֹן״. אֲבָל ״אֲנוּסִים הָיִינוּ מֵחֲמַת נְפָשׁוֹת״ — הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ נֶאֱמָנִין.
GEMARA: With regard to the latter clause in the mishna, in which it is stated that if there is independent corroboration of the signatures of the witnesses the document is not invalidated based on their testimony, Rami bar Ḥama says: The Sages taught this halakha only in a case where they said: We were compelled to sign the document due to a monetary threat. Their testimony incriminates them, as they testified falsely for money, and the principle is: The testimony of one who incriminates himself is not accepted. However, if the witnesses said: We were compelled to sign the document due to a threat to our lives, they are deemed credible, as that testimony is not self-incriminating, since in that case it is permitted to testify falsely.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבָא: כֹּל כְּמִינֵּיהּ?! כֵּיוָן שֶׁהִגִּיד — שׁוּב אֵינוֹ חוֹזֵר וּמַגִּיד. וְכִי תֵּימָא: הָנֵי מִילֵּי עַל פֶּה, אֲבָל בִּשְׁטָר — לָא, וְהָא אָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: עֵדִים הַחֲתוּמִים עַל הַשְּׁטָר — נַעֲשָׂה כְּמִי שֶׁנֶּחְקְרָה עֵדוּתָן בְּבֵית דִּין!
Rava said to Rami bar Ḥama: Is it within their power to retract their testimony? There is a principle: Once a witness stated his testimony in court, he cannot again state testimony that contradicts his previous testimony. And if you say that this principle applies specifically to oral testimony, but with regard to testimony in a document, no, the principle does not apply and one may retract that testimony, didn’t Reish Lakish say: The legal status of witnesses who are signatories on the document becomes like those whose testimony was cross-examined in court. Therefore, just as one may not retract oral testimony, neither may he retract written testimony.
אֶלָּא, כִּי אִתְּמַר — אַרֵישָׁא אִתְּמַר: הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ נֶאֱמָנִין, אָמַר רָמֵי בַּר חָמָא: לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא שֶׁאָמְרוּ: אֲנוּסִין הָיִינוּ מֵחֲמַת נְפָשׁוֹת, אֲבָל אָמְרוּ: אֲנוּסִין הָיִינוּ מֵחֲמַת מָמוֹן — אֵין נֶאֱמָנִין. מַאי טַעְמָא: אֵין אָדָם מֵשִׂים עַצְמוֹ רָשָׁע.
Rather, when the statement of Rami bar Ḥama is stated, it is stated with regard to the first clause of the mishna, that if there is no independent corroboration of their signatures they are deemed credible. Rami bar Ḥama said: The Sages taught this halakha only in a case where the witnesses said: We were compelled to sign the document due to a threat to our lives, as in that case they do not incriminate themselves. However, if the witnesses said: We were compelled to sign the document due to a monetary threat, they are not deemed credible. What is the reason that they are not deemed credible? It is based on the principle: One does not render himself wicked, and self-incriminating testimony is not accepted.
תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: אֵין נֶאֱמָנִים לְפוֹסְלוֹ, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: נֶאֱמָנִים. בִּשְׁלָמָא לְרַבָּנַן כִּי טַעְמַיְיהוּ, שֶׁהַפֶּה שֶׁאָסַר הוּא הַפֶּה שֶׁהִתִּיר. אֶלָּא לְרַבִּי מֵאִיר, מַאי טַעְמָא? בִּשְׁלָמָא פְּסוּלֵי עֵדוּת, מַלְוֶה גּוּפֵיהּ מֵעִיקָּרָא מִידָּק דָּיֵיק וּמַחְתֵּם. קְטַנִּים נָמֵי, כִּדְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ. דְּאָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ:
§ The Sages taught: Witnesses who testify to invalidate their signatures on a document are not deemed credible to invalidate the document; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: They are deemed credible. The Gemara asks: Granted, according to the Rabbis, their opinion corresponds to their reasoning stated previously: The mouth that prohibited it, i.e., ratified the document, is the mouth that permitted it, i.e., invalidated the promissory note. However, according to Rabbi Meir, what is the reason that their testimony to invalidate the document is not accepted? Granted, their testimony that they were disqualified witnesses is not accepted, as the lender himself initially ascertains that the witnesses are fit to testify and only then signs them on the document. Similarly, according to Rabbi Meir, their testimony that they were minors is also not accepted, in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish, as Reish Lakish said:
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I am a Reform rabbi and took Talmud courses in rabbinical school, but I knew there was so much more to learn. It felt inauthentic to serve as a rabbi without having read the entire Talmud, so when the opportunity arose to start Daf Yomi in 2020, I dove in! Thanks to Hadran, Daf Yomi has enriched my understanding of rabbinic Judaism and deepened my love of Jewish text & tradition. Todah rabbah!
California, United States
Raanana, Israel
In January 2020, my chevruta suggested that we “up our game. Let’s do Daf Yomi” – and she sent me the Hadran link. I lost my job (and went freelance), there was a pandemic, and I am still opening the podcast with my breakfast coffee, or after Shabbat with popcorn. My Aramaic is improving. I will need a new bookcase, though.
Atlanta, Georgia, United States
I learned daf more off than on 40 years ago. At the beginning of the current cycle, I decided to commit to learning daf regularly. Having Rabanit Michelle available as a learning partner has been amazing. Sometimes I learn with Hadran, sometimes with my husband, and sometimes on my own. It’s been fun to be part of an extended learning community.
Honolulu, Hawaii, United States
Jerusalem, Israel
Michelle has been an inspiration for years, but I only really started this cycle after the moving and uplifting siyum in Jerusalem. It’s been an wonderful to learn and relearn the tenets of our religion and to understand how the extraordinary efforts of a band of people to preserve Judaism after the fall of the beit hamikdash is still bearing fruits today. I’m proud to be part of the chain!
Raanana, Israel
I started learning at the beginning of the cycle after a friend persuaded me that it would be right up my alley. I was lucky enough to learn at Rabbanit Michelle’s house before it started on zoom and it was quickly part of my daily routine. I find it so important to see for myself where halachot were derived, where stories were told and to get more insight into how the Rabbis interacted.
Ra’anana, Israel
I started learning at the beginning of this Daf Yomi cycle because I heard a lot about the previous cycle coming to an end and thought it would be a good thing to start doing. My husband had already bought several of the Koren Talmud Bavli books and they were just sitting on the shelf, not being used, so here was an opportunity to start using them and find out exactly what was in them. Loving it!
Borehamwood, United Kingdom
I’ve been wanting to do Daf Yomi for years, but always wanted to start at the beginning and not in the middle of things. When the opportunity came in 2020, I decided: “this is now the time!” I’ve been posting my journey daily on social media, tracking my progress (#DafYomi); now it’s fully integrated into my daily routines. I’ve also inspired my partner to join, too!
Teaneck, United States
In July, 2012 I wrote for Tablet about the first all women’s siyum at Matan in Jerusalem, with 100 women. At the time, I thought, I would like to start with the next cycle – listening to a podcast at different times of day makes it possible. It is incredible that after 10 years, so many women are so engaged!
Pittsburgh, United States
I was inspired to start learning after attending the 2020 siyum in Binyanei Hauma. It has been a great experience for me. It’s amazing to see the origins of stories I’ve heard and rituals I’ve participated in my whole life. Even when I don’t understand the daf itself, I believe that the commitment to learning every day is valuable and has multiple benefits. And there will be another daf tomorrow!
Jerusalem, Israel
Ive been learning Gmara since 5th grade and always loved it. Have always wanted to do Daf Yomi and now with Michelle Farber’s online classes it made it much easier to do! Really enjoying the experience thank you!!
Neve Daniel, Israel
I had no formal learning in Talmud until I began my studies in the Joint Program where in 1976 I was one of the few, if not the only, woman talmud major. It was superior training for law school and enabled me to approach my legal studies with a foundation . In 2018, I began daf yomi listening to Rabbanit MIchelle’s pod cast and my daily talmud studies are one of the highlights of my life.
Minneapolis, United States
When I began the previous cycle, I promised myself that if I stuck with it, I would reward myself with a trip to Israel. Little did I know that the trip would involve attending the first ever women’s siyum and being inspired by so many learners. I am now over 2 years into my second cycle and being part of this large, diverse, fascinating learning family has enhanced my learning exponentially.
Minnesota, United States
I started at the beginning of this cycle. No 1 reason, but here’s 5.
In 2019 I read about the upcoming siyum hashas.
There was a sermon at shul about how anyone can learn Talmud.
Talmud references come up when I am studying. I wanted to know more.
Yentl was on telly. Not a great movie but it’s about studying Talmud.
I went to the Hadran website: A new cycle is starting. I’m gonna do this
Cambridge, United Kingdom
New York, United States
Ketubot 18
דִּסְתַם יְהוּדָה וּגְלִיל כִּשְׁעַת חֵירוּם דָּמוּ.
The Gemara answers: The reason that the tanna cited specifically a case where each is located in a different land is that the standard situation with regard to travel between Judea and the Galilee is tantamount to a crisis period, as war was commonplace, and there was a strip of Samaritan territory between Judea and the Galilee.
וְלִיתְנֵי: מוֹדֶה רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בְּאוֹמֵר לַחֲבֵירוֹ ״מָנֶה לָוִיתִי מִמְּךָ וּפְרַעְתִּיו לָךְ״, שֶׁהוּא נֶאֱמָן! מִשּׁוּם דְּקָא בָּעֵי לְמִיתְנֵי סֵיפָא: אִם יֵשׁ עֵדִים שֶׁהוּא לָוָה מִמֶּנּוּ, וְהוּא אוֹמֵר: פְּרַעְתִּיו — אֵינוֹ נֶאֱמָן, וְהָא קַיְימָא לַן הַמַּלְוֶה אֶת חֲבֵירוֹ בְּעֵדִים — אֵינוֹ צָרִיךְ לְפׇרְעוֹ בְּעֵדִים.
The Gemara asks: And let the tanna teach in the mishna: And Rabbi Yehoshua concedes in a case where one says to another: I borrowed one hundred dinars from you and repaid the loan to you, that he is deemed credible. The Gemara answers: The tanna chose not to teach that case of the mouth that prohibited is the mouth that permitted due to the fact that the tanna wanted to teach in the latter clause: If there are witnesses that he borrowed money from another, and he says: I repaid the loan, he is not deemed credible. However, the tanna would not be able to distinguish between a case where witnesses testify and a case where there are no witnesses, as don’t we hold that in the case of one who lends money to another in the presence of witnesses, the borrower need not repay the loan in the presence of witnesses? Therefore, even if witnesses testify that he took the loan, his claim that he repaid the loan is accepted.
וְלִיתְנֵי: מוֹדֶה רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בְּאוֹמֵר לַחֲבֵירוֹ: מָנֶה לְאָבִיךְ בְּיָדִי, וְהֶאֱכַלְתִּיו פְּרָס — שֶׁהוּא נֶאֱמָן!
The Gemara asks: And let the tanna teach in the mishna: And Rabbi Yehoshua concedes in a case where one says to another: Your father has one hundred dinars in my possession in the form of a loan, but I provided him with repayment of half that amount, that his claim is deemed credible.
אַלִּיבָּא דְמַאן? אִי אַלִּיבָּא דְרַבָּנַן — הָא אָמְרִי מֵשִׁיב אֲבֵידָה הָוֵי. אִי אַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בֶּן יַעֲקֹב — הָא אָמַר שְׁבוּעָה בָּעֵי.
The Gemara answers: There is a tannaitic dispute with regard to that case and the case that the Gemara suggested does not correspond to either opinion. In accordance with whose opinion would the mishna be taught? If it is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, didn’t they say that in that case he is the equivalent of one returning a lost article? Since the son is unaware that the borrower owes his father money, and the borrower takes the initiative and admits that he owes part of the sum that he borrowed, it is as if he returned a lost article, and clearly his claim is accepted and no oath is required. And if it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov, didn’t he say that in that case the borrower is required to take an oath, and only then is his claim accepted?
דְּתַנְיָא, רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בֶּן יַעֲקֹב אוֹמֵר: פְּעָמִים שֶׁאָדָם נִשְׁבָּע עַל טַעֲנַת עַצְמוֹ. כֵּיצַד? ״מָנֶה לְאָבִיךְ בְּיָדִי וְהֶאֱכַלְתִּיו פְּרָס״ — הֲרֵי זֶה נִשְׁבָּע, וְזֶהוּ שֶׁנִּשְׁבָּע עַל טַעֲנַת עַצְמוֹ. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: אֵינוֹ אֶלָּא כְּמֵשִׁיב אֲבֵידָה, וּפָטוּר.
This dispute is as it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says: There are times when although no one claimed that another owes him money, a person takes an oath on the basis of his own claim. How so? If one says to another: Your father has one hundred dinars in my possession, but I provided him with repayment of half that amount, he is required to take an oath that he repaid half, and that is the case of one who takes an oath on the basis of his own claim. And the Rabbis say: In that case he is merely the equivalent of one returning a lost article, and is exempt from taking an oath.
וְרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בֶּן יַעֲקֹב לֵית לֵיהּ מֵשִׁיב אֲבֵידָה פָּטוּר? אָמַר רַב: בְּטוֹעֲנוֹ קָטָן. וְהָאָמַר מָר: אֵין נִשְׁבָּעִין עַל טַעֲנַת חֵרֵשׁ שׁוֹטֶה וְקָטָן!
The Gemara asks: And is Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov not of the opinion that one who returns a lost article is exempt from taking an oath that he did not take part of the sum? He returns what he admitted taking without an oath. Rav says: The baraita is referring to a case where a minor makes a claim against him. The lender’s minor son claims that the borrower did not repay any part of the loan to his father. The borrower’s claim comes in response to that claim. Therefore, his admission is not at all comparable to returning a lost article. The Gemara asks: But didn’t the Master say: One does not take an oath on the basis of the claim of a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor? Due to their lack of cognition, they are not deemed halakhically competent to require another to take an oath based on their claim.
מַאי קָטָן — גָּדוֹל. וְאַמַּאי קָרֵי לֵיהּ קָטָן — דִּלְגַבֵּי מִילֵּי דְאָבִיו, קָטָן הוּא. אִי הָכִי: טַעֲנַת עַצְמוֹ? טַעֲנַת אֲחֵרִים הִיא! טַעֲנַת אֲחֵרִים, וְהוֹדָאַת עַצְמוֹ.
The Gemara answers: In Rav’s statement, what is the meaning of minor? It means one who reached majority, and is therefore halakhically competent. And why does Rav call him a minor? It is due to the fact that with regard to his father’s matters, he is the equivalent of a minor, as he is uncertain about the particulars of his father’s dealings. If so, i.e., that the son making the claim has already reached majority, the language of the baraita is imprecise. Why does the tanna refer to this case as one taking an oath on the basis of his own claim? This is not his own claim; it is the claim of others. The Gemara answers: The baraita employed that language for the following reason: It is the claim of others, but he is taking an oath on the basis of his own partial admission.
כּוּלְּהִי טַעֲנָתָא, טַעֲנַת אֲחֵרִים וְהוֹדָאַת עַצְמוֹ נִינְהוּ!
The Gemara asks: All claims where an oath is required are cases of a claim of others and his own admission. However, in the baraita, Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov introduces his opinion with the phrase: There are times, indicating that the case to which he is referring, that of one taking an oath on the basis of his own claim, is not the standard case of taking an oath.
אֶלָּא הָכָא בִּדְרַבָּה קָמִיפַּלְגִי. דְּאָמַר רַבָּה: מִפְּנֵי מָה אָמְרָה תּוֹרָה מוֹדֶה מִקְצָת הַטַּעֲנָה יִשָּׁבַע — חֲזָקָה אֵין אָדָם מֵעִיז פָּנָיו בִּפְנֵי בַּעַל חוֹבוֹ. וְהַאי בְּכוּלַּהּ בָּעֵי דְּלִכְפְּרֵיהּ, וְהַאי דְּלָא כְּפַר לֵיהּ — מִשּׁוּם דְּאֵין אָדָם מֵעִיז פָּנָיו הוּא.
Rather, the Gemara suggests an alternative explanation of the tannaitic dispute. Here, Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov and the Rabbis disagree with regard to the statement of Rabba, as Rabba said: Why did the Torah say that one who makes a partial admission in response to the claim is required to take an oath? It is because there is a presumption that a person would not be so insolent in the presence of his creditor as to deny his debt. Presumably, this borrower who made a partial admission would have liked to deny the entire loan, and the fact that he did not deny the entire loan is due to the fact that a person would not be so insolent in the presence of his creditor.
וּבְכוּלַּהּ בָּעֵי דְּלוֹדֵי לֵיהּ. וְהַאי דְּלָא אוֹדִי לֵיהּ — כִּי הֵיכִי דְּלִישְׁתְּמִיט לֵיהּ, וְסָבַר: עַד דְּהָוֵה לִי זוּזֵי וּפָרַעְנָא לֵיהּ. וְרַחֲמָנָא אָמַר: רְמִי שְׁבוּעָה עֲלֵיהּ, כִּי הֵיכִי דְּלוֹדֵי לֵיהּ בְּכוּלֵּיהּ.
And, as a result, he would have liked to admit to him that he owes him the entire loan. And the reason that he did not admit to him that he owes him the entire loan is so that he may temporarily avoid paying him. And he rationalizes doing so, saying to himself: I am avoiding him only until the time that I have money, and then I will repay him. Due to the concern that the partial admission is motivated by that rationalization and the claim of the lender is true, the Merciful One says: Impose an oath upon him so that he will admit that he owes him the entire loan.
רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בֶּן יַעֲקֹב סָבַר: לָא שְׁנָא בּוֹ וְלָא שְׁנָא בִּבְנוֹ, אֵינוֹ מֵעִיז, וְהִלְכָּךְ לָאו מֵשִׁיב אֲבֵידָה הָוֵי. וְרַבָּנַן סָבְרִי: בּוֹ הוּא דְּאֵינוֹ מֵעִיז, אֲבָל בִּבְנוֹ — מֵעִיז. וּמִדְּלֹא הֵעִיז — מֵשִׁיב אֲבֵידָה הָוֵי.
Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov maintains: It is no different with regard to the creditor himself, and it is no different with regard to his son. The debtor would not be so insolent as to deny the debt. And therefore, he is not considered as one returning a lost article on his own initiative. Rather, he is considered as one who partially admits his debt in response to a claim, and is therefore required to take an oath. However, the Rabbis maintain: In the presence of the creditor one would not be insolent, but in the presence of his son, who did not lend him the money, he would be insolent and deny the claim entirely. Since he had the option of completely denying the loan and opted to admit to part of the claim, he is considered as one returning a lost article and his claim is accepted without an oath.
מַתְנִי׳ הָעֵדִים שֶׁאָמְרוּ: כְּתַב יָדֵינוּ הוּא זֶה, אֲבָל אֲנוּסִים הָיִינוּ, קְטַנִּים הָיִינוּ, פְּסוּלֵי עֵדוּת הָיִינוּ — הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ נֶאֱמָנִים. וְאִם יֵשׁ עֵדִים שֶׁהוּא כְּתַב יָדָם, אוֹ שֶׁהָיָה כְּתַב יָדָם יוֹצֵא מִמָּקוֹם אַחֵר — אֵינָן נֶאֱמָנִין.
MISHNA: With regard to the witnesses who said in their testimony to ratify their signatures in a document: We signed the document and this is our handwriting; however, we were compelled to sign, or we were minors when we signed, or we were disqualified witnesses, e.g., we are relatives of one of the parties, they are deemed credible. Since the document is ratified on the basis of their testimony, it is likewise invalidated on the basis of their testimony. However, if there are other witnesses who testify that it is their handwriting, or if their handwriting emerges on a document from another place, enabling confirmation of their signatures by comparing the two documents, then the witnesses who signed the document are not deemed credible. The document is not invalidated based on their testimony, because ratification of the document is not dependent on their testimony, as their signatures can be authenticated independently.
גְּמָ׳ אָמַר רָמֵי בַּר חָמָא: לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא שֶׁאָמְרוּ ״אֲנוּסִים הָיִינוּ מֵחֲמַת מָמוֹן״. אֲבָל ״אֲנוּסִים הָיִינוּ מֵחֲמַת נְפָשׁוֹת״ — הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ נֶאֱמָנִין.
GEMARA: With regard to the latter clause in the mishna, in which it is stated that if there is independent corroboration of the signatures of the witnesses the document is not invalidated based on their testimony, Rami bar Ḥama says: The Sages taught this halakha only in a case where they said: We were compelled to sign the document due to a monetary threat. Their testimony incriminates them, as they testified falsely for money, and the principle is: The testimony of one who incriminates himself is not accepted. However, if the witnesses said: We were compelled to sign the document due to a threat to our lives, they are deemed credible, as that testimony is not self-incriminating, since in that case it is permitted to testify falsely.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבָא: כֹּל כְּמִינֵּיהּ?! כֵּיוָן שֶׁהִגִּיד — שׁוּב אֵינוֹ חוֹזֵר וּמַגִּיד. וְכִי תֵּימָא: הָנֵי מִילֵּי עַל פֶּה, אֲבָל בִּשְׁטָר — לָא, וְהָא אָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: עֵדִים הַחֲתוּמִים עַל הַשְּׁטָר — נַעֲשָׂה כְּמִי שֶׁנֶּחְקְרָה עֵדוּתָן בְּבֵית דִּין!
Rava said to Rami bar Ḥama: Is it within their power to retract their testimony? There is a principle: Once a witness stated his testimony in court, he cannot again state testimony that contradicts his previous testimony. And if you say that this principle applies specifically to oral testimony, but with regard to testimony in a document, no, the principle does not apply and one may retract that testimony, didn’t Reish Lakish say: The legal status of witnesses who are signatories on the document becomes like those whose testimony was cross-examined in court. Therefore, just as one may not retract oral testimony, neither may he retract written testimony.
אֶלָּא, כִּי אִתְּמַר — אַרֵישָׁא אִתְּמַר: הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ נֶאֱמָנִין, אָמַר רָמֵי בַּר חָמָא: לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא שֶׁאָמְרוּ: אֲנוּסִין הָיִינוּ מֵחֲמַת נְפָשׁוֹת, אֲבָל אָמְרוּ: אֲנוּסִין הָיִינוּ מֵחֲמַת מָמוֹן — אֵין נֶאֱמָנִין. מַאי טַעְמָא: אֵין אָדָם מֵשִׂים עַצְמוֹ רָשָׁע.
Rather, when the statement of Rami bar Ḥama is stated, it is stated with regard to the first clause of the mishna, that if there is no independent corroboration of their signatures they are deemed credible. Rami bar Ḥama said: The Sages taught this halakha only in a case where the witnesses said: We were compelled to sign the document due to a threat to our lives, as in that case they do not incriminate themselves. However, if the witnesses said: We were compelled to sign the document due to a monetary threat, they are not deemed credible. What is the reason that they are not deemed credible? It is based on the principle: One does not render himself wicked, and self-incriminating testimony is not accepted.
תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: אֵין נֶאֱמָנִים לְפוֹסְלוֹ, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: נֶאֱמָנִים. בִּשְׁלָמָא לְרַבָּנַן כִּי טַעְמַיְיהוּ, שֶׁהַפֶּה שֶׁאָסַר הוּא הַפֶּה שֶׁהִתִּיר. אֶלָּא לְרַבִּי מֵאִיר, מַאי טַעְמָא? בִּשְׁלָמָא פְּסוּלֵי עֵדוּת, מַלְוֶה גּוּפֵיהּ מֵעִיקָּרָא מִידָּק דָּיֵיק וּמַחְתֵּם. קְטַנִּים נָמֵי, כִּדְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ. דְּאָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ:
§ The Sages taught: Witnesses who testify to invalidate their signatures on a document are not deemed credible to invalidate the document; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: They are deemed credible. The Gemara asks: Granted, according to the Rabbis, their opinion corresponds to their reasoning stated previously: The mouth that prohibited it, i.e., ratified the document, is the mouth that permitted it, i.e., invalidated the promissory note. However, according to Rabbi Meir, what is the reason that their testimony to invalidate the document is not accepted? Granted, their testimony that they were disqualified witnesses is not accepted, as the lender himself initially ascertains that the witnesses are fit to testify and only then signs them on the document. Similarly, according to Rabbi Meir, their testimony that they were minors is also not accepted, in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish, as Reish Lakish said:
