Ketubot 59
מְזוֹנוֹת תַּחַת מַעֲשֵׂה יָדֶיהָ, וּמָעָה כֶּסֶף תַּחַת מוֹתָר, וְכֵיוָן דְּלָא קָא יָהֵיב לַהּ מָעָה כֶּסֶף — מוֹתָר דִּידַהּ הָוֵי. רַב אַדָּא בַּר אַהֲבָה סָבַר: תִּקְּנוּ מְזוֹנוֹת תַּחַת מוֹתָר, וּמָעָה כֶּסֶף תַּחַת מַעֲשֵׂה יָדֶיהָ, וְכֵיוָן דְּקָא יָהֵיב לַהּ מְזוֹנֵי, מוֹתָר דִּידֵיהּ הָוֵי.
sustenance in exchange for her earnings, and the silver ma’a coin that he must give her in exchange for the surplus that she continues to make beyond her quota. And since he does not give her a silver ma’a the surplus is hers, unless some of it is left after her death, in which case the husband inherits it. Rav Adda bar Ahava maintains that they established sustenance in exchange for the surplus, and a silver ma’a in exchange for her earnings. And since he provides her with sustenance, the surplus is his, and therefore the sanctity takes effect on it immediately when she produces the surplus.
בְּמַאי קָמִיפַּלְגִי? מָר סָבַר: מִידֵּי דִּשְׁכִיחַ מִמִּידֵּי דִּשְׁכִיחַ. וּמָר סָבַר: מִידֵּי דְּקִייץ מִמִּידֵּי דְּקִייץ.
The Gemara asks: With regard to what do they disagree? The Gemara explains: One Sage, i.e., Rav and Shmuel, holds that they established something common in exchange for something common. Consequently, they established sustenance, which is common, in exchange for earnings, which are also common. And one Sage, Rav Adda bar Ahava, holds that they established something with a fixed amount in exchange for something with a fixed amount. Consequently, since a silver ma’a is a fixed amount and the quota of a woman’s earnings is also fixed, they established one in exchange for the other.
מֵיתִיבִי: תִּקְּנוּ מְזוֹנוֹת תַּחַת מַעֲשֵׂה יָדֶיהָ! אֵימָא: תַּחַת מוֹתַר מַעֲשֵׂה יָדֶיהָ.
The Gemara raises an objection to Rav Adda bar Ahava’s opinion from a baraita: They established sustenance in exchange for her earnings. Apparently, sustenance is not in exchange for the surplus. The Gemara answers by emending the text of the baraita: Say: They established sustenance in exchange for the surplus of her earnings.
תָּא שְׁמַע: אִם אֵינוֹ נוֹתֵן לָהּ מָעָה כֶּסֶף לִצְרָכֶיהָ — מַעֲשֵׂה יָדֶיהָ שֶׁלָּהּ. אֵימָא: מוֹתַר מַעֲשֵׂה יָדֶיהָ שֶׁלָּהּ. וְהָא עֲלַהּ קָתָנֵי: מָה הִיא עוֹשָׂה לוֹ — מִשְׁקַל חָמֵשׁ סְלָעִים שְׁתִי בִּיהוּדָה!
The Gemara attempts another proof from a mishna (64b): Come and hear: If he does not give her a silver ma’a for her needs, her earnings belong to her. This indicates that the earnings were established in exchange for the silver ma’a, as Rav Adda bar Ahava contended. The Gemara rejects this by emending the text of the mishna: Say: The surplus of her earnings belongs to her. The Gemara challenges the emendation: But it is taught in the continuation of this mishna: What is the fixed amount that she must earn for him? She must spin the weight of five sela of threads of the warp in Judea, which is the equivalent of ten sela according to the measurements of the Galilee. This clause implies that the mishna is not discussing the surplus but rather the quota of her required earnings.
הָכִי קָאָמַר: מַעֲשֵׂה יָדֶיהָ כַּמָּה הָוֵי, דְּלִידַּע מוֹתָר דִּידַהּ כַּמָּה — מִשְׁקַל חָמֵשׁ סְלָעִים שְׁתִי בִּיהוּדָה, שֶׁהֵן עֶשֶׂר סְלָעִים בַּגָּלִיל.
The Gemara answers: This is what it is saying: How much is the required amount of her earnings, so that one can know how much of what she produces constitutes the surplus, and to this the mishna replied: The weight of five sela of threads of the warp in Judea, which is the equivalent of ten sela according to the measurements of the Galilee.
אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן הַסַּנְדְּלָר.
§ Shmuel said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan the Cobbler. A husband may not consecrate his wife’s earnings at all, as they have not yet come into being.
וּמִי אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל הָכִי? וְהָתְנַן: ״קֻוֽנָּם שֶׁאֲנִי עוֹשָׂה לְפִיךָ״ — אֵינוֹ צָרִיךְ לְהָפֵר. רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר: יָפֵר, שֶׁמָּא תַּעֲדִיף עָלָיו יָתֵר מִן הָרָאוּי לוֹ. רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן בֶּן נוּרִי אָמַר: יָפֵר, שֶׁמָּא יְגָרְשֶׁנָּה וּתְהֵא אֲסוּרָה לַחֲזוֹר.
The Gemara asks: And did Shmuel actually say this? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (Nedarim 85a): If a woman said: What I make to feed you, i.e., what I earn for you, is forbidden like an offering [konam], the husband does not need to nullify this vow. She has a prior obligation to work for him, and therefore the konam cannot take effect on something that does not belong to her. Rabbi Akiva says: Even so, the husband should nullify the vow, lest she produce more earnings than is appropriate for him, and the konam will then take effect on the surplus amount. Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri said: He should nullify the vow for a different reason, lest he divorce her. Since she rendered her earnings forbidden to him, she will be prohibited from remarrying him after her divorce, as it would then be impossible for him to avoid benefiting from his wife’s earnings.
וְאָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן בֶּן נוּרִי. כִּי אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן בֶּן נוּרִי, לְהַעְדָּפָה.
And Shmuel said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri, who maintains that the wife can render her future earnings prohibited to her husband before these earnings have come into being, with the prohibition to go into effect after she divorces. This would imply that Shmuel holds that it is possible to consecrate an object that has not yet come into the world, contrary to what Rabbi Yoḥanan the Cobbler said. The Gemara answers: When Shmuel said that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri, he was referring only to the surplus.
וְלֵימָא: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן בֶּן נוּרִי לְהַעְדָּפָה! אִי נָמֵי: אֵין הֲלָכָה כְּתַנָּא קַמָּא! אִי נָמֵי: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא!
The Gemara asks: If so, let him say explicitly that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri with regard to the surplus, or alternatively, he should say that the halakha is not in accordance with the first tanna, or alternatively, he should simply say: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Akiva, who is concerned about the surplus amount.
אֶלָּא, אָמַר רַב יוֹסֵף: קֻוֽנָּמוֹת קָאָמְרַתְּ? שָׁאנֵי קֻוֽנָּמוֹת, מִתּוֹךְ שֶׁאָדָם אוֹסֵר פֵּירוֹת חֲבֵירוֹ עָלָיו, אָדָם מַקְדִּישׁ דָּבָר שֶׁלֹּא בָּא לָעוֹלָם.
Rather, explain it differently, as Rav Yosef said: Did you speak about konamot to prove your contention that one can consecrate objects that have not yet come into the world? Konamot are different, as they have a special status, since a person can prohibit another’s produce to himself. If one says to another: Your produce is konam to me, it is prohibited for him to eat that produce, although it does not belong to him and the prohibition will apply to it only when it reaches his domain. This indicates that a konam has unique power that enables a person to consecrate an object that has not yet come into the world, which according to Rabbi Yoḥanan the Cobbler is an exception to the principle. Consequently, Shmuel’s ruling in accordance with Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri with regard to konamot is not relevant to his opinion on the issue of a wife’s earnings.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי: בִּשְׁלָמָא אָדָם אוֹסֵר פֵּירוֹת חֲבֵירוֹ עָלָיו — שֶׁכֵּן אָדָם אוֹסֵר פֵּירוֹתָיו עַל חֲבֵירוֹ. יֶאֱסֹר דָּבָר שֶׁלֹּא בָּא לְעוֹלָם עַל חֲבֵירוֹ, שֶׁכֵּן אֵין אָדָם אוֹסֵר פֵּירוֹת חֲבֵירוֹ עַל חֲבֵירוֹ?
Abaye said to him: This analogy cannot serve as a proof. Granted, a person can prohibit another’s produce to himself, but this is possible because a person can prohibit his own produce to another. In both cases there is at least one aspect of the prohibition that is in his domain, either when he forbids another’s produce to himself, or when he forbids produce in his own possession to others. However, one cannot prohibit an object that has not yet come into the world to another, since a person cannot prohibit another’s produce to another. Just as he cannot make a konam and render prohibited to another person produce that is not in his possession, he also cannot render prohibited to another person produce that has not yet come into the world. If so, how can a woman render her earnings prohibited to her husband by a konam if those earnings have not yet come into the world?
אֶלָּא אָמַר רַב הוּנָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב יְהוֹשֻׁעַ: בְּאוֹמֶרֶת ״יִקְדְּשׁוּ יָדַי לְעוֹשֵׂיהֶם״, דְּיָדַיִם אִיתַנְהוּ בָּעוֹלָם.
Rather, the Gemara rejects that explanation and instead explains as Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said: The mishna does not refer to a case where she said: My earnings are konam to you, but rather to one when she says: My hands are consecrated to the One Who made them, and this konam can take effect because the hands do exist in the world.
וְכִי קָאָמְרָה הָכִי מִי מַקְדְּשָׁה? הָא מְשַׁעְבְּדָא לֵיהּ! דְּאָמְרָה לְכִי מִיגָּרְשָׁה.
The Gemara asks: When she says this in such terms does it become consecrated? She is subjugated to her husband with regard to her earnings, so how can she consecrate that which is not hers? The Gemara answers: She says that the consecration will take effect when she will get divorced from her husband.
וּמִי אִיכָּא מִידֵּי דְּאִילּוּ הַשְׁתָּא לָא קַדִּישׁ וּלְקַמֵּיהּ קַדִּישׁ? אָמַר רַבִּי אִלְעַאי: אַלְּמָה לָא? אִילּוּ הָאוֹמֵר לַחֲבֵירוֹ ״שָׂדֶה זוֹ שֶׁאֲנִי מוֹכֵר לְךָ לִכְשֶׁאֶקָּחֶנָּה מִמְּךָ תִּיקְדַּשׁ״, מִי לָא קָדְשָׁה?
The Gemara asks: Is there anything one would do that if done at present, the consecration could not take effect and in the future the consecration could take effect? Rabbi Elai said: Why not? If one told another: This field that I am selling to you will be consecrated when I buy it back from you, doesn’t that field become consecrated when he buys it back? It appears that one can cause an item to become consecrated in the future although at present he cannot consecrate it.
מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַבִּי יִרְמְיָה: מִי דָּמֵי? הָתָם, בְּיָדוֹ לְהַקְדִּישָׁהּ. הָכָא, אֵין בְּיָדָהּ לְגָרֵשׁ אֶת עַצְמָהּ. הָא לָא דָּמְיָא אֶלָּא לָאוֹמֵר לַחֲבֵירוֹ ״שָׂדֶה זוֹ שֶׁמָּכַרְתִּי לְךָ, לִכְשֶׁאֶקָּחֶנָּה מִמְּךָ — תִּיקְדַּשׁ״, דְּלָא קָדְשָׁה.
Rabbi Yirmeya objects to this: Are these cases comparable? There, with regard to a field, since the field that he is selling belongs to him at the time of the sale, it is in his power to consecrate it now. Therefore, he can effect sanctity on it at a later point as well. But here, it is not in her power to divorce herself. Consequently, the analogy is invalid. Rather, this is comparable only to a different case, when one says to another: This field that I already sold to you will be consecrated when I buy it back from you. In that case the field is not consecrated, as, when he said this the field was not in his possession, and one cannot consecrate an object that has not yet come into the world.
מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַב פָּפָּא: מִי דָּמֵי? הָתָם, גּוּפָא וּפֵירוֹת בִּידָא דְלוֹקֵחַ. הָכָא, גּוּפַהּ בִּידַהּ הוּא. הָא לָא דָּמְיָא אֶלָּא לָאוֹמֵר לַחֲבֵירוֹ
Rav Pappa objects to this: Is Rav Yirmeya’s analogy comparable? There, the field itself and its produce are in the possession of the buyer, and therefore the seller cannot consecrate them. Here, her body is in her possession, as she owns her hands. Rather, this is comparable only to a case where one says to another:
״שָׂדֶה זוֹ שֶׁמִּשְׁכַּנְתִּי לְךָ, לִכְשֶׁאֶפְדֶּנָּה מִמְּךָ — תִּיקְדַּשׁ״, דְּקָדְשָׁה.
This field that I mortgaged to you and from whose produce you are benefiting will be consecrated when I redeem it from you. The halakha is that it is consecrated, since the field itself was not transferred to another’s ownership.
מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַב שִׁישָׁא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב אִידִי: מִי דָּמֵי? הָתָם, בְּיָדוֹ לִפְדּוֹתָהּ. הָכָא, אֵין בְּיָדָהּ לְגָרֵשׁ עַצְמָהּ! הָא לָא דָּמְיָא אֶלָּא לָאוֹמֵר לַחֲבֵירוֹ ״שָׂדֶה זוֹ שֶׁמִּשְׁכַּנְתִּי לְךָ לְעֶשֶׂר שָׁנִים, לִכְשֶׁאֶפְדֶּנָּה מִמְּךָ — תִּיקְדַּשׁ״, דְּקָדְשָׁה.
Rav Sheisha, son of Rav Idi, objects to this: Is it comparable? There, in the case where he mortgaged the field, it is in his power to redeem it, whereas here, with regard to a woman who renders her earnings prohibited to her husband, it is not in her power to divorce herself from her husband. This is only comparable to one who says to another: This field that I have mortgaged to you for ten years will be consecrated when I redeem it from you. The halakha is that it is consecrated. Similarly, in this case, despite the fact that her earnings belong to her husband, when she will be divorced they will revert to her, and since her hands have always belonged to her, she can consecrate her earnings.
מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַב אָשֵׁי: מִי דָּמֵי? הָתָם, לְעֶשֶׂר שָׁנִים מִיהָא בְּיָדוֹ לִפְדּוֹתָהּ. הָכָא, אֵין בְּיָדָהּ לְגָרֵשׁ עַצְמָהּ לְעוֹלָם.
Rav Ashi objects to this: Is it comparable? There, after ten years in any case it will be in his power to redeem it, whereas here, with regard to a woman, it is never in her power to divorce herself from her husband. Consequently, there is no way for her to consecrate her future earnings.
אֶלָּא, אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: קוּנָּמוֹת קָא אָמְרַתְּ? שָׁאנֵי קוּנָּמוֹת, דִּקְדוּשַּׁת הַגּוּף נִינְהוּ, וְכִדְרָבָא. דְּאָמַר רָבָא: הֶקְדֵּשׁ, חָמֵץ וְשִׁחְרוּר — מַפְקִיעִין מִידֵי שִׁיעְבּוּד.
Rather, the contradiction between the two rulings of Shmuel must be resolved in a different manner. Rav Ashi said: Did you speak about konamot? Konamot are different, since they are a type of inherent sanctity, and therefore the konam can take effect on an item that is subjugated to another person, in accordance with the halakha articulated by Rava. As Rava said: Consecration, the prohibition of leavened bread on Passover, and the liberation of a slave can all abrogate a lien on property. If property was mortgaged to another person, and then the owner consecrated it, or if leavened bread was mortgaged and Passover arrived and it became prohibited to benefit from it, or if a slave was mortgaged and then liberated by his owner, the lien is abrogated. Since konam is a form of consecration, it can take effect on an item even when it is subjugated to another when the owner prohibited it, similar to the case of mortgaged property.
וְנִקְדְּשׁוּ מֵהַשְׁתָּא? אַלְּמוּהָ רַבָּנַן לְשִׁיעְבּוּדֵיהּ דְּבַעַל, כִּי הֵיכִי דְּלָא תִּיקְדַּשׁ מֵהַשְׁתָּא.
The Gemara asks: If it is so, that a konam can remove the lien on property, let her earnings become consecrated from now, even before her husband divorces her. The Gemara answers: The Sages reinforced the husband’s lien in order that it not become consecrated now. However, since in general a konam can take effect on mortgaged items, it can take effect on her earnings after she leaves her husband’s jurisdiction.
מַתְנִי׳ וְאֵלּוּ מְלָאכוֹת שֶׁהָאִשָּׁה עוֹשָׂה לְבַעְלָהּ: טוֹחֶנֶת, וְאוֹפָה, וּמְכַבֶּסֶת, מְבַשֶּׁלֶת, וּמְנִיקָה אֶת בְּנָהּ, מַצַּעַת לוֹ הַמִּטָּה, וְעוֹשָׂה בַּצֶּמֶר. הִכְנִיסָה לוֹ שִׁפְחָה אַחַת — לֹא טוֹחֶנֶת וְלֹא אוֹפָה וְלֹא מְכַבֶּסֶת. שְׁתַּיִם — אֵין מְבַשֶּׁלֶת, וְאֵין מְנִיקָה אֶת בְּנָהּ. שָׁלֹשׁ — אֵין מַצַּעַת לוֹ הַמִּטָּה, וְאֵין עוֹשָׂה בַּצֶּמֶר. אַרְבַּע — יוֹשֶׁבֶת בְּקָתֶדְרָא.
MISHNA: And these are tasks that a wife must perform for her husband: She grinds wheat into flour, and bakes, and washes clothes, cooks, and nurses her child, makes her husband’s bed, and makes thread from wool by spinning it. If she brought him one maidservant, i.e., brought the maidservant with her into the marriage, the maidservant will perform some of these tasks. Consequently, the wife does not need to grind, and does not need to bake, and does not need to wash clothes. If she brought him two maidservants, she does not need to cook and does not need to nurse her child if she does not want to, but instead may give the child to a wet nurse. If she brought him three maidservants, she does not need to make his bed and does not need to make thread from wool. If she brought him four maidservants, she may sit in a chair [katedra] like a queen and not do anything, as her maidservants do all of her work for her.
רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: אֲפִילּוּ הִכְנִיסָה לוֹ מֵאָה שְׁפָחוֹת — כּוֹפָהּ לַעֲשׂוֹת בַּצֶּמֶר, שֶׁהַבַּטָּלָה מְבִיאָה לִידֵי זִימָּה. רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר: אַף הַמַּדִּיר אֶת אִשְׁתּוֹ מִלַּעֲשׂוֹת מְלָאכָה — יוֹצִיא וְיִתֵּן כְּתוּבָּה, שֶׁהַבַּטָּלָה מְבִיאָה לִידֵי שִׁיעֲמוּם.
Rabbi Eliezer says: Even if she brought him a hundred maidservants, he can compel her to make thread from wool, since idleness leads to licentiousness. Consequently, it is better for a woman to be doing some kind of work. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Even one who vows that his wife is prohibited from doing any work must divorce her and give her the payment for her marriage contract, since idleness leads to idiocy.
גְּמָ׳ טוֹחֶנֶת סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ?! אֶלָּא אֵימָא: מַטְחֶנֶת. וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: בְּרִיחְיָא דִּידָא.
GEMARA: With regard to the mishna’s choice of terminology the Gemara asks: Could it enter your mind that she grinds the wheat into flour? Ordinarily, grinding is performed in a mill using millstones that are rotated by water or by animals, so the woman herself does not actually grind the wheat. The Gemara answers: Rather, say that she supervises the grinding by bringing wheat to the mill and ensuring that it is ground properly. Alternatively, if you wish, say instead: She can grind the wheat herself with a hand mill.
מַתְנִיתִין דְּלָא כְּרַבִּי חִיָּיא, דְּתָנֵי רַבִּי חִיָּיא: אֵין אִשָּׁה אֶלָּא לְיוֹפִי, אֵין אִשָּׁה אֶלָּא לְבָנִים. וְתָנֵי רַבִּי חִיָּיא: אֵין אִשָּׁה אֶלָּא לְתַכְשִׁיטֵי אִשָּׁה. וְתָנֵי רַבִּי חִיָּיא: הָרוֹצֶה שֶׁיְּעַדֵּן אֶת אִשְׁתּוֹ — יַלְבִּישֶׁנָּה כְּלֵי פִשְׁתָּן. הָרוֹצֶה שֶׁיַּלְבִּין אֶת בִּתּוֹ — יַאֲכִילֶנָּה אֶפְרוֹחִים וְיַשְׁקֶנָּה חָלָב סָמוּךְ לְפִירְקָהּ.
The Gemara comments: The mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ḥiyya, as Rabbi Ḥiyya teaches: A wife is only for beauty, and a wife is only for children, but not for household tasks. And Rabbi Ḥiyya teaches: A wife is only for wearing a woman’s finery. And Rabbi Ḥiyya similarly teaches: One who wishes to beautify his wife should clothe her in linen garments, and one who wishes to whiten his daughter so that she will have a fair complexion, should feed her young chickens, and should give her milk to drink toward the time of her maturity.
וּמְנִיקָה אֶת בְּנָהּ. לֵימָא מַתְנִיתִין דְּלָא כְּבֵית שַׁמַּאי. דְּתַנְיָא: נָדְרָה שֶׁלֹּא לְהָנִיק אֶת בְּנָהּ, בֵּית שַׁמַּאי אוֹמְרִים: שׁוֹמֶטֶת דַּד מִפִּיו. בֵּית הִלֵּל אוֹמְרִים: כּוֹפָהּ וּמְנִיקָתוֹ. נִתְגָּרְשָׁה — אֵינוֹ כּוֹפָהּ. וְאִם הָיָה מַכִּירָהּ — נוֹתֵן לָהּ שְׂכָרָהּ וְכוֹפָהּ, וּמְנִיקָתוֹ מִפְּנֵי הַסַּכָּנָה.
§ The mishna mentions among a wife’s obligations that she nurses her child. The Gemara suggests: Let us say that the mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai, as it is taught in a baraita: If a woman took a vow not to nurse her child, Beit Shammai say: Since she vowed, she must remove her nipple from his mouth and not nurse him. Beit Hillel say: Her husband can compel her, and she must nurse the child even against her will. However, if she was divorced and therefore had no further obligations to her husband, he cannot compel her. Nevertheless, if the baby recognized her, then even after the divorce, her husband may pay her a salary as a wet nurse and compel her to nurse due to the danger that the child will starve if he refuses to nurse from another woman. This baraita indicates that according to Beit Shammai a woman has no obligation to nurse her child. If she had a prior obligation to her husband to nurse the child, the vow would not take effect.
אֲפִילּוּ תֵּימָא בֵּית שַׁמַּאי, הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן: כְּגוֹן שֶׁנָּדְרָה הִיא, וְקִיֵּים לַהּ הוּא. וְקָסָבְרִי בֵּית שַׁמַּאי: הוּא נוֹתֵן אֶצְבַּע בֵּין שִׁינֶּיהָ, וּבֵית הִלֵּל סָבְרִי: הִיא נָתְנָה אֶצְבַּע בֵּין שִׁינֶּיהָ.
The Gemara rejects this suggestion: Even if you say that the mishna is also in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai, here we are dealing with a case where she made this vow and her husband ratified it for her by refraining from nullifying it. Beit Shammai maintain that in that case it is considered as if he had placed his finger between her teeth, i.e., he caused the vow to be in effect, meaning that in that case the responsibility lies with him. Since he declined the opportunity to nullify the vow, her obligation to nurse is canceled. Beit Hillel maintain that in that case she put her finger between her own teeth, i.e., she caused the vow to remain in effect. Consequently, although he ratified her vow, the responsibility rests on her, and for this reason her obligation is not annulled.
וְנִפְלְגוּ בִּכְתוּבָּה בְּעָלְמָא. וְעוֹד: תַּנְיָא, בֵּית שַׁמַּאי אוֹמְרִים: אֵינָהּ מְנִיקָה! אֶלָּא מְחַוַּורְתָּא מַתְנִיתִין דְּלָא כְּבֵית שַׁמַּאי.
The Gemara asks: If so, that the dispute is about who is responsible when a woman vows and her husband ratifies the vow, and it is not specifically about her obligation to nurse her child, then let them dispute about a marriage contract in general, with regard to whether or not a woman is entitled to payment for her marriage contract if she vows to prohibit her husband from deriving benefit from her. And furthermore, it is taught in a baraita that Beit Shammai explicitly say with regard to all women, not specifically in the context of vows: She does not need to nurse if she does not want to. Rather, it is clear that the mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai.
אִם הָיָה מַכִּירָהּ.
The Gemara above quotes a baraita where it is taught that if the baby recognized her, her husband can compel her to continue nursing even after she is divorced, but he must pay her for nursing.
