Shevuot 31
קוֹלָר תָּלוּי בְּצַוַּאר עֵדִים? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״מִדְּבַר שֶׁקֶר תִּרְחַק״.
the chain [kolar] of culpability for the miscarriage of justice be placed around the neck of the false witnesses? It is derived as the verse states: “Distance yourself from a false matter.”
(סִימָן: תְּלָתָא תַּלְמִיד, וּתְלָת בַּעֲלֵי חוֹב, סְמַרְטוּט שׁוֹמֵעַ וּמַטְעִים)
The Gemara provides a mnemonic for additional halakhot derived from the verse: “Distance yourself from a false matter.” Three relating to a student; and three relating to creditors; and three relating to a judge: Rags, hears, and explain.
מִנַּיִן לְתַלְמִיד שֶׁיּוֹשֵׁב לִפְנֵי רַבּוֹ וְרוֹאֶה זְכוּת לֶעָנִי וְחוֹב לֶעָשִׁיר – מִנַּיִן שֶׁלֹּא יִשְׁתּוֹק? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״מִדְּבַר שֶׁקֶר תִּרְחָק״.
From where is it derived with regard to a student who is sitting before his teacher and sees a claim that provides advantage for a poor person and disadvantage for a wealthy person that he shall not remain silent? It is derived as the verse states: “Distance yourself from a false matter.”
מִנַּיִן לְתַלְמִיד שֶׁרוֹאֶה אֶת רַבּוֹ שֶׁטּוֹעֶה בַּדִּין, שֶׁלֹּא יֹאמַר: אַמְתִּין לוֹ עַד שֶׁיִּגְמְרֶנּוּ; וְאֶסְתְּרֶנּוּ וְאֶבְנֶנּוּ מִשֶּׁלִּי, כְּדֵי שֶׁיִּקָּרֵא הַדִּין עַל שְׁמִי? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״מִדְּבַר שֶׁקֶר תִּרְחָק״.
From where is it derived with regard to a student who sees his teacher who is erring in judgment that he shall not say: I will wait for my teacher until he concludes the trial and then I will contradict him and construct a ruling of my own so that the verdict will be attributed to my name? It is derived as the verse states: “Distance yourself from a false matter.”
מִנַּיִן לְתַלְמִיד שֶׁאָמַר לוֹ רַבּוֹ: יוֹדֵעַ אַתָּה בִּי שֶׁאִם נוֹתְנִין לִי מֵאָה מָנֶה אֵינִי מְבַדֶּה; מָנֶה יֵשׁ לִי אֵצֶל פְּלוֹנִי, וְאֵין לִי עָלָיו אֶלָּא עֵד אֶחָד – מִנַּיִן שֶׁלֹּא יִצְטָרֵף עִמּוֹ? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״מִדְּבַר שֶׁקֶר תִּרְחָק״.
From where is it derived with regard to a student whose teacher said to him: You know concerning me that even if one were to give me one hundred times one hundred dinars, I would not fabricate a claim. Now, I have one hundred dinars in the possession of so-and-so, to whom I lent money, but I have only one witness of the two required to testify about the loan and enable me to collect payment; from where is it derived that the student shall not join with the other witness and testify? It is derived as the verse states: “Distance yourself from a false matter” (Exodus 23:7).
הַאי מִ״דְּבַר שֶׁקֶר תִּרְחָק״ נָפְקָא?! הָא וַדַּאי שַׁקּוֹרֵי קָא מְשַׁקֵּר, וְרַחֲמָנָא אָמַר: ״לֹא תַעֲנֶה בְרֵעֲךָ עֵד שָׁקֶר״! אֶלָּא כְּגוֹן דַּאֲמַר לֵיהּ: וַדַּאי חַד סָהֲדָא אִית לִי, וְתָא אַתָּה קוּם הָתָם וְלָא תֵּימָא וְלָא מִידֵּי, דְּהָא לָא מַפְּקַתְּ מִפּוּמָּךְ שִׁקְרָא – אֲפִילּוּ הָכִי אָסוּר, מִשּׁוּם שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״מִדְּבַר שֶׁקֶר תִּרְחָק״.
The Gemara asks: Is it from the verse “Distance yourself from a false matter” that this matter is derived? But isn’t he certainly lying in that case, and this is already stated, as the Merciful One states: “You shall not bear false witness against your neighbor” (Exodus 20:13)? Rather, the reference is to a case where the teacher said to him: It is certain that I have one witness, and you come and stand there beside him and do not say anything, as in that manner you do not express a lie from your mouth. Your silent presence will create the impression that I have two witnesses and lead the debtor to admit his debt. Even so, it is prohibited to do this, due to that which is stated: “Distance yourself from a false matter.”
מִנַּיִן לַנּוֹשֶׁה בַּחֲבֵירוֹ מָנֶה, שֶׁלֹּא יֹאמַר: אֶטְעָנֶנּוּ בְּמָאתַיִם – כְּדֵי שֶׁיּוֹדֶה לִי בְּמָנֶה, וְיִתְחַיֵּיב לִי שְׁבוּעָה, וַאֲגַלְגֵּל עָלָיו שְׁבוּעָה מִמָּקוֹם אַחֵר? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״מִדְּבַר שֶׁקֶר תִּרְחָק״.
There are three halakhot with regard to a creditor: From where is it derived with regard to one who is seeking repayment from another of a debt of one hundred dinars, and there are no witnesses to that effect, that he shall not say: I will claim that he owes me two hundred dinars so that he will admit that he owes me one hundred dinars, and he will become liable to take an oath to me, the oath of one who admits to part of a claim, and on that basis I will extend the oath and compel him to take an oath with regard to a debt that he owes me from another place? It is derived as the verse states: “Distance yourself from a false matter.”
מִנַּיִן לַנּוֹשֶׁה בַּחֲבֵירוֹ מָנֶה וּטְעָנוֹ מָאתַיִם, שֶׁלֹּא יֹאמַר: אֶכְפְּרֶנּוּ בְּבֵית דִּין וְאוֹדֶה לוֹ חוּץ לְבֵית דִּין, כְּדֵי שֶׁלֹּא אֶתְחַיֵּיב לוֹ שְׁבוּעָה וְלֹא יְגַלְגֵּל עָלַי שְׁבוּעָה מִמָּקוֹם אַחֵר? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״מִדְּבַר שֶׁקֶר תִּרְחָק״.
From where is it derived with regard to one who is seeking repayment from another of a debt of one hundred dinars and claims that the debtor owes him two hundred dinars, that the debtor shall not say: I will completely deny his claim in court, and I will admit to him outside court so that I will not become liable to take an oath to him and he will not extend the oath and compel me to take an oath with regard to a debt that I owe him from another place? It is derived as the verse states: “Distance yourself from a false matter.”
מִנַּיִן לִשְׁלֹשָׁה שֶׁנּוֹשִׁין מָנֶה בְּאֶחָד, שֶׁלֹּא יְהֵא אֶחָד בַּעַל דִּין וּשְׁנַיִם עֵדִים, כְּדֵי שֶׁיּוֹצִיאוּ מָנֶה וְיַחְלוֹקוּ? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״מִדְּבַר שֶׁקֶר תִּרְחָק״.
From where is it derived with regard to three who are seeking repayment from one individual for a total of one hundred dinars, that one of the three should not assume the role of a sole litigant and claim one hundred dinars, and the other two will assume the role of witnesses so that they will exact payment of one hundred dinars from the debtor and divide it among them? It is derived as the verse states: “Distance yourself from a false matter.”
מִנַּיִן לִשְׁנַיִם שֶׁבָּאוּ לַדִּין, אֶחָד לָבוּשׁ סְמַרְטוּטִין וְאֶחָד לָבוּשׁ אִיצְטְלִית בַּת מֵאָה מָנֶה, שֶׁאוֹמְרִין לוֹ: לְבוֹשׁ כְּמוֹתוֹ אוֹ הַלְבִּישֵׁהוּ כְּמוֹתְךָ? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״מִדְּבַר שֶׁקֶר תִּרְחָק״. כִּי הֲווֹ אָתוּ לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרָבָא בַּר רַב הוּנָא, אֲמַר לְהוּ: שְׁלוּפוּ פּוּזְמוּקַיְיכוּ וְחוּתוּ לְדִינָא.
There are three halakhot with regard to a judge: From where is it derived with regard to two individuals who came to judgment, one dressed in rags and one dressed in a garment worth one hundred times one hundred dinars, that the judges say to the wealthy person: Dress like the poor person or dress the poor person in a garment like yours? It is derived as the verse states: “Distance yourself from a false matter.” The Gemara relates: When individuals would come before Rava bar Rav Huna for judgment he would say to them: Remove your fine shoes [puzmukaikhu] and descend for judgment, so you will not appear more distinguished than the other litigant.
מִנַּיִן לְדַיָּין שֶׁלֹּא יִשְׁמַע דִּבְרֵי בַּעַל דִּין (חֲבֵירוֹ) קוֹדֶם שֶׁיָּבֹא בַּעַל דִּין חֲבֵירוֹ? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״מִדְּבַר שֶׁקֶר תִּרְחָק״.
From where is it derived that a judge should not hear the statement of one litigant before the other litigant comes to court? It is derived as the verse states: “Distance yourself from a false matter.”
מִנַּיִן לְבַעַל דִּין שֶׁלֹּא יַטְעִים דְּבָרָיו לַדַּיָּין קוֹדֶם שֶׁיָּבֹא בַּעַל דִּין חֲבֵירוֹ? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״מִדְּבַר שֶׁקֶר תִּרְחָק״. רַב כָּהֲנָא מַתְנֵי מִ״לֹּא תִשָּׂא״ – ״לֹא תַשִּׂיא״.
From where is it derived that a litigant shall not explain the rationale behind his statements to the judge before the other litigant comes to court? It is derived as the verse states: “Distance yourself from a false matter.” Rav Kahana teaches that this halakha is derived from that which is written: “You shall not accept [lo tissa] a false report” (Exodus 23:1), which he interprets as though it is written: You shall not cause others [lo tassi] to accept a false report.
״וַאֲשֶׁר לֹא טוֹב עָשָׂה בְּתוֹךְ עַמָּיו״ – רַב אָמַר: זֶה הַבָּא בְּהַרְשָׁאָה, וּשְׁמוּאֵל אָמַר: זֶה הַלּוֹקֵחַ שָׂדֶה שֶׁיֵּשׁ עָלֶיהָ עֲסִיקִין.
The verse states: “And did that which is not good among his people” (Ezekiel 18:18). Rav says: This is referring to one who comes to court with authorization to present claims on behalf of another. And Shmuel says: This is referring to one who purchases a field concerning which there are those who contest ownership of it, as in that way, he involves himself in the disputes of others.
אֵינָהּ נוֹהֶגֶת אֶלָּא בִּרְאוּיִן לְהָעִיד כּוּ׳. לְאַפּוֹקֵי מַאי? אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: לְאַפּוֹקֵי מֶלֶךְ. וְרַב אַחָא בַּר יַעֲקֹב אָמַר: לְאַפּוֹקֵי מְשַׂחֵק בְּקוּבְיָא.
§ The mishna teaches that the oath of testimony is practiced only with regard to those fit to testify. The Gemara asks: This statement serves to exclude what person not allowed to testify who was not mentioned explicitly in the mishna? Rav Pappa said: It serves to exclude a king who, although he is neither a relative nor otherwise disqualified from testifying, does not testify in court. And Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov said: It serves to exclude one who plays with dice, who is disqualified as a witness by rabbinic law.
מַאן דְּאָמַר מְשַׂחֵק בְּקוּבְיָא – כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן מֶלֶךְ; וּמַאן דְּאָמַר מֶלֶךְ – אֲבָל מְשַׂחֵק בְּקוּבְיָא, מִדְּאוֹרָיְיתָא מִחְזָא חֲזֵי, וְרַבָּנַן הוּא דְּפַסְלוּהוּ.
The Gemara notes: According to the one who says that the mishna excludes one who plays with dice from the oath of testimony, all the more so should a king be excluded, as he does not testify by Torah law. And according to the one who says that the mishna excludes a king from the oath of testimony, it may exclude only a king, but perhaps one who plays with dice is not excluded, as by Torah law he is fit to testify and it is the Sages who disqualified him. Therefore, he is not excluded from the oath of testimony, which is by Torah law.
בִּפְנֵי בֵּית דִּין וְשֶׁלֹּא בִּפְנֵי בֵּית דִּין כּוּ׳. בְּמַאי קָמִיפַּלְגִי?
§ The mishna teaches: The oath of testimony is practiced both in the presence of the court and not in the presence of the court, when the potential witness takes the oath on his own. And if the oath is administered by others he is liable only when he denies, in court, any knowledge of the incident in question. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: Whether the witness takes the oath on his own or whether the oath is administered by others, he is liable only when he denies, in court, any knowledge of the incident in question. The Gemara asks: With regard to what do they disagree?
אַמְרוּהָ רַבָּנַן קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב פָּפָּא: בְּדוּן מִינַּהּ וּמִינַּהּ – בְּדוּן מִינַּהּ וְאוֹקֵי בְאַתְרַהּ קָא מִיפַּלְגִי.
The Sages said the explanation before Rav Pappa: They disagree with regard to the method of derivation by means of a verbal analogy. Is the method to infer the halakha from the source of the verbal analogy and derive the details from that source as well, or is the method to infer the halakha from it but interpret the halakha according to its own place?
רַבִּי מֵאִיר סָבַר: דּוּן מִינַּהּ וּמִינַּהּ מִפִּקָּדוֹן; מָה פִּקָּדוֹן – מוּשְׁבָּע מִפִּי עַצְמוֹ חַיָּיב, אַף עֵדוּת – מוּשְׁבָּע מִפִּי עַצְמוֹ חַיָּיב, וּמִינַּהּ, מָה פִּקָּדוֹן – בֵּין בְּבֵית דִּין וּבֵין שֶׁלֹּא בְּבֵית דִּין, אַף עֵדוּת – בֵּין בְּבֵית דִּין וּבֵין שֶׁלֹּא בְּבֵית דִּין.
The Gemara elaborates: Rabbi Meir holds: Infer from it and derive the details from it. The halakha of the oath of testimony is derived from the halakha of an oath on a deposit: Just as in the case of the oath on a deposit, one who takes the oath on his own is liable, so too in the case of the oath of testimony, one who takes the oath on his own is liable. And derive the details from it: Just as in the case of the oath on a deposit one is liable whether he took the oath in court or he took the oath not in court, so too in the case of the oath of testimony, one is liable whether he took the oath in court or he took the oath not in court.
וְרַבָּנַן סָבְרִי: דּוּן מִינַּהּ וְאוֹקֵי בְּאַתְרַהּ; מָה פִּקָּדוֹן – מוּשְׁבָּע מִפִּי עַצְמוֹ חַיָּיב, אַף עֵדוּת – מוּשְׁבָּע מִפִּי עַצְמוֹ חַיָּיב. וְאוֹקֵי בְּאַתְרַהּ: מָה מוּשְׁבָּע מִפִּי אֲחֵרִים – בְּבֵית דִּין אִין, שֶׁלֹּא בְּבֵית דִּין לָא; אַף מוּשְׁבָּע מִפִּי עַצְמוֹ – בְּבֵית דִּין אִין, שֶׁלֹּא בְּבֵית דִּין לָא.
And the Rabbis hold: Infer the halakha from it but interpret the halakha according to its own place. The halakha of the oath of testimony is derived from the halakha of an oath on a deposit: Just as in the case of the oath on a deposit, one who takes the oath on his own is liable, so too in the case of the oath of testimony, one who takes the oath on his own is liable. But interpret the halakha according to its own place and derive the details of the halakha from the halakhot of the oath of testimony: Just as in the case of one who was administered an oath by others, if he denies knowledge of the matter in court, yes, he is liable, and if his denial does not take place in court, no, he is not liable; so too, one who took the oath on his own, if he did so in court, yes, he is liable, and if he did not take the oath in court, no, he is not liable.
אֲמַר לְהוּ רַב פָּפָּא: אִי מִפִּקָּדוֹן גָּמְרִי לַהּ רַבָּנַן, דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא לָא פְּלִיגִי דְּדוּן מִינַּהּ וּמִינַּהּ.
Rav Pappa said to the Rabbis: If the Rabbis derive liability for one who takes a false oath of testimony on his own by means of a verbal analogy from the oath on a deposit, then everyone agrees: Infer from it and derive the details from it, and even the Rabbis would concede that all of the halakhot of the oath of testimony are derived from the oath on a deposit; therefore, one is liable for an oath taken on one’s own even outside the court.
אֶלָּא הַיְינוּ טַעְמָא דְּרַבָּנַן – דְּמַיְיתוּ לַהּ בְּקַל וָחוֹמֶר: וּמָה מִפִּי אֲחֵרִים חַיָּיב, מִפִּי עַצְמוֹ לֹא כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן?!
Rather, this is the reason that the Rabbis hold that there is no liability for the oath of testimony taken on one’s own outside the court: They derive it by means of an a fortiori inference from the halakhot of the oath of testimony itself, as follows: And if one who was administered an oath by others is liable, when one takes the oath on his own, is he not all the more so liable?
וּמִדְּמַיְיתוּ לַהּ מִקַּל וָחוֹמֶר – דַּיּוֹ לַבָּא מִן הַדִּין לִהְיוֹת כַּנִּדּוֹן: מָה מוּשְׁבָּע מִפִּי אֲחֵרִים – בְּבֵית דִּין אִין, שֶׁלֹּא בְּבֵית דִּין לָא; אַף מוּשְׁבָּע מִפִּי עַצְמוֹ – בִּפְנֵי בֵּית דִּין אִין, שֶׁלֹּא בִּפְנֵי בֵּית דִּין לָא.
And from the fact that they derived the halakha by means of an a fortiori inference, one is bound by the limitations that restrict that derivation: It is sufficient for the conclusion that emerges from an a fortiori inference to be like its source. Therefore, just as one who is administered an oath by others, if the oath is administered in court, yes, he is liable, and if it is not administered in court, no, he is not liable, so too, one who took the oath on his own, before a court, yes, he is liable, and if it is not before a court, no, he is not liable.
אֲמַרוּ לֵיהּ רַבָּנַן לְרַב פָּפָּא: מִי מָצֵית אָמְרַתְּ דְּלָאו בְּדוּן מִינַּהּ וּמִינַּהּ פְּלִיגִי?! וְהָתְנַן גַּבֵּי פִּקָּדוֹן: שְׁבוּעַת הַפִּקָּדוֹן נוֹהֶגֶת בַּאֲנָשִׁים וּבְנָשִׁים, בִּרְחוֹקִין וּבִקְרוֹבִין, בִּכְשֵׁרִין וּבִפְסוּלִין, בִּפְנֵי בֵּית דִּין וְשֶׁלֹּא בִּפְנֵי בֵּית דִּין – מִפִּי עַצְמוֹ; וּמִפִּי אֲחֵרִים אֵינוֹ חַיָּיב עַד שֶׁיִּכְפּוֹר בּוֹ בְּבֵית דִּין. דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: בֵּין מִפִּי עַצְמוֹ וּבֵין מִפִּי אֲחֵרִים – כֵּיוָן שֶׁכָּפַר בּוֹ חַיָּיב.
The Rabbis said to Rav Pappa: How can you say that it is not with regard to the matter of: Infer from it and derive the details from it, that they disagree? But didn’t we learn in the mishna with regard to the oath on a deposit: The oath on a deposit is practiced with regard to men and with regard to women, with regard to non-relatives and with regard to relatives, with regard to those fit to testify and with regard to those unfit to testify. The oath on a deposit is practiced both in the presence of the court and not in the presence of the court, when the bailee takes the oath on his own. And if the oath is administered by others, he is not liable until he denies responsibility for the deposit in court. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: Whether the bailee takes the oath on his own or whether the oath is administered by others, once he denied the claim concerning the deposit he is liable.
מוּשְׁבָּע מִפִּי אֲחֵרִים בְּפִקָּדוֹן מְנָא לְהוּ לְרַבָּנַן דְּחַיָּיב? לָאו דְּגָמְרִי לַהּ מֵעֵדוּת – וּשְׁמַע מִינַּהּ בְּדוּן מִינַּהּ וּמִינַּהּ פְּלִיגִי?
The question arises: From where do the Rabbis derive that one who is administered an oath on a deposit by others is liable, given that an oath of that kind is not mentioned in the Torah in the context of an oath on a deposit? Is it not that they derive it from the halakhot of the oath of testimony? And conclude from it that it is with regard to the matter of: Infer from it and derive the details from it, that they disagree? The Rabbis hold: Infer the halakha from it but interpret the halakha according to its own place. The fact that one is liable for an oath on a deposit that is administered by others is derived from the oath of testimony, but one does not derive that one is liable only if that oath is administered in the presence of a court. Rather, the oath on a deposit administered by others is derived from an oath on a deposit taken on one’s own; one is liable in both cases for an oath taken not in the presence of the court.
מֵהַהִיא – אִין; מֵהָא – לֵיכָּא לְמִשְׁמַע מִינַּהּ.
Rav Pappa said to the Rabbis: From that mishna, yes, it is evident that the Rabbis and Rabbi Meir disagree with regard to the matter of: Infer from it and derive the details from it. However, no inference is to be learned from this mishna taught with regard to the oath of testimony, as perhaps the Rabbis derived their opinion by means of an a fortiori inference.
וְחַיָּיבִין עַל זְדוֹן הַשְּׁבוּעָה. מְנָהָנֵי מִילֵּי? דְּתָנוּ רַבָּנַן: בְּכוּלָּן נֶאֱמַר בָּהֶן ״וְנֶעְלַם״, וְכָאן לֹא נֶאֱמַר בָּהּ ״וְנֶעְלַם״; לְחַיֵּיב עַל הַמֵּזִיד כַּשּׁוֹגֵג.
§ The mishna teaches: And one is liable for the act of taking a false oath with intent. The Gemara asks: From where is this matter derived that one is liable to bring a sliding-scale offering for taking a false oath of testimony with intent? It is derived as the Sages taught: In all of the other cases where one is liable to bring a sliding-scale offering (see Leviticus 5:2–4), i.e., the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods, and violating an oath on an utterance, it is stated: “And it is hidden”; but here, with regard to the oath of testimony, it is not stated: And it is hidden, which serves to render one liable for taking the oath intentionally just as he is liable for taking the oath unwittingly.
וְעַל שִׁגְגָתָהּ עִם זְדוֹן הָעֵדוּת. הֵיכִי דָּמֵי שִׁגְגָתָהּ עִם זְדוֹן הָעֵדוּת? אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר רַב: בְּאוֹמֵר ״יוֹדֵעַ אֲנִי שֶׁשְּׁבוּעָה זוֹ אֲסוּרָה, אֲבָל אֵינִי יוֹדֵעַ אִם חַיָּיבִין עָלֶיהָ קׇרְבָּן אִם לֹא״.
§ The mishna teaches: And one is liable for an unwitting act of taking a false oath provided that he takes the oath with intent in terms of the testimony. The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of the case of an unwitting act of taking a false oath with intent in terms of the testimony? Rav Yehuda says that Rav says that this is in the case of one who says: I know that taking this false oath that I do not know the relevant information is prohibited, but I do not know whether or not one is liable to bring an offering for taking that oath.
וְאֵין חַיָּיבִין עַל שִׁגְגָתָהּ גְּרֵידְתָּא. לֵימָא תְּנֵינָא לִדְרַב כָּהֲנָא וּדְרַב אַסִּי?
The mishna teaches: But they are not liable for taking the oath if they were unwitting in terms of the testimony alone. If one actually forgot that he knows about the matter, he is exempt from bringing an offering. The Gemara asks: Shall we say that we learn in the mishna that which Rav said in response to the dispute of Rav Kahana and Rav Asi? The Gemara (26a) cited a dispute between Rav Kahana and Rav Asi with regard to a certain statement of Rav, and each took an oath that his version was accurate. Rav told them that although the version of one of the amora’im was not accurate, he is not liable for taking a false oath, as each amora was convinced that his oath was true. This is not an unwitting oath; rather, it is an oath taken unaware.
לָא; אַף עַל גַּב דִּתְנַן, אִיצְטְרִיךְ; סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אָמֵינָא: הָכָא הוּא דְּלָא כְּתִיב ״וְנֶעְלַם״ דְּבָעֵינַן שׁוֹגֵג דּוּמְיָא דְּמֵזִיד; אֲבָל הָתָם דִּכְתִיב ״וְנֶעְלַם״, אֲפִילּוּ שִׁגְגָתָהּ כֹּל דְּהוּ; קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.
The Gemara responds: No, even though we learned this halakha in the mishna, Rav’s statement that the one who did not cite Rav’s statement accurately is exempt was necessary. It may enter your mind to say: It is only here, with regard to the oath of testimony, that one is exempt for unwittingly taking a false oath, as: And it is hidden, is not written concerning it, indicating that in order to be liable, we require that the halakhic status of the unwitting oath is similar to that of an intentional oath, i.e., he knows that he is taking a false oath, but he does not know that he is liable to bring an offering for doing so. Therefore, one who is unaware that it is a false oath is exempt. But there, in the case of Rav Kahana and Rav Asi, where each took an oath on an utterance, where it is written: “And it is hidden,” even if it is entirely unwitting, i.e., they were totally unaware that the oath was false, one might say that he is liable. Therefore, Rav teaches us that even in the case of an oath on an utterance, one who is unwitting to that extent is exempt.
מַתְנִי׳ שְׁבוּעַת הָעֵדוּת כֵּיצַד? אָמַר לִשְׁנַיִם: ״בּוֹאוּ וְהַעִידוּנִי״; ״שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁאֵין אָנוּ יוֹדְעִין לְךָ עֵדוּת״, אוֹ שֶׁאָמְרוּ לוֹ ״אֵין אָנוּ יוֹדְעִין לְךָ עֵדוּת״; ״מַשְׁבִּיעַ אֲנִי עֲלֵיכֶם״, וְאָמְרוּ: ״אָמֵן״ – הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ חַיָּיבִין.
MISHNA: Liability to bring a sliding-scale offering for taking a false oath of testimony, how so? In a case where the plaintiff said to two individuals: Come and testify on my behalf, and they replied: On our oath we do not know any testimony on your behalf, i.e., we do not have any knowledge of the matter you speak of, or in a case where they said to him: We do not know any testimony on your behalf, and he said to them: I administer an oath to you, and they said: Amen; if it was determined that they lied, these two witnesses are liable.
הִשְׁבִּיעַ עֲלֵיהֶם חָמֵשׁ פְּעָמִים חוּץ לְבֵית דִּין, וּבָאוּ לְבֵית דִּין וְהוֹדוּ – פְּטוּרִין. כָּפְרוּ – חַיָּיבִין עַל כׇּל אַחַת וְאַחַת. הִשְׁבִּיעַ עֲלֵיהֶן חָמֵשׁ פְּעָמִים בִּפְנֵי בֵּית דִּין וְכָפְרוּ – אֵינָן חַיָּיבִין אֶלָּא אַחַת. אָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן: מָה טַעַם? הוֹאִיל וְאֵינָם יְכוֹלִין לַחְזוֹר וּלְהוֹדוֹת.
If he administered an oath to them five times outside the court, and they came to court and admitted that they had knowledge of the incident in question and testified, they are exempt. But if they denied knowledge of the incident in court as well, they are liable for each and every one of the oaths administered to them outside the court. If he administered an oath to them five times before the court, and they denied knowledge of the incident, they are liable for taking only one false oath. Rabbi Shimon said: What is the reason for this ruling? Since once they denied that they had any knowledge of the incident they can no longer retract that denial and admit that they have knowledge of the matter. Therefore, there was only one oath of testimony, and there is no liability for the remaining oaths.
כָּפְרוּ שְׁנֵיהֶן כְּאֶחָד – שְׁנֵיהֶן חַיָּיבִין. בְּזֶה אַחַר זֶה – הָרִאשׁוֹן חַיָּיב וְהַשֵּׁנִי פָּטוּר. כָּפַר אֶחָד וְהוֹדָה אֶחָד – הַכּוֹפֵר חַיָּיב.
If both of the witnesses denied knowledge of the incident together, both of them are liable. If they denied knowledge one after the other, the first who denied knowledge is liable, and the second is exempt, as once the first witness denies knowledge of the incident, the second is an individual witness, whose testimony is not decisive. If one of the two witnesses denied knowledge of the incident, and the other one admitted that he had knowledge and proceeded to testify, the one who denies knowledge of the incident is liable.
הָיוּ שְׁתֵּי כִּיתֵּי עֵדִים, כָּפְרָה הָרִאשׁוֹנָה וְאַחַר כָּךְ כָּפְרָה הַשְּׁנִיָּה – שְׁתֵּיהֶן חַיָּיבוֹת, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהָעֵדוּת יְכוֹלָה לְהִתְקַיֵּים בִּשְׁתֵּיהֶן.
If there were two sets of witnesses that took the oath of testimony, and the first set denied knowledge of the matter and then the second set denied knowledge of the matter, both of the sets are liable, because the testimony can exist with either of them, as even after the first set denies knowledge of the incident, the second remains capable of providing decisive testimony.
גְּמָ׳ אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: רָאוּהוּ שֶׁרָץ אַחֲרֵיהֶן, אָמְרוּ לוֹ: ״מָה אַתָּה רָץ אַחֲרֵינוּ? שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁאֵין אָנוּ יוֹדְעִין לָךְ עֵדוּת״ – פְּטוּרִין, עַד שֶׁיִּשְׁמְעוּ מִפִּיו. מַאי קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן? תְּנֵינָא: שִׁילַּח בְּיַד עַבְדּוֹ, אוֹ שֶׁאָמַר לָהֶן הַנִּתְבָּע: ״מַשְׁבִּיעַ אֲנִי עֲלֵיכֶם, שֶׁאִם אַתֶּם יוֹדְעִין לוֹ עֵדוּת – שֶׁתָּבוֹאוּ וּתְעִידוּהוּ״ – הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ פְּטוּרִים,
GEMARA: Shmuel says: If the witnesses saw the plaintiff pursuing them, and they said to him: For what reason are you pursuing us? On our oath we do not know any testimony on your behalf, they are exempt, until they will hear a demand to testify directly from his mouth. The Gemara asks: What is Shmuel teaching us? We learn this in a mishna (35a): If the plaintiff sent a request for testimony with his servant, or if the respondent said to the potential witnesses: I administer an oath to you that if you know any testimony on behalf of the plaintiff, i.e., my opponent in the litigation, you will come and testify on his behalf, and they took a false oath that they have no knowledge of the incident, they are exempt,
