Shevuot 46

Shevuot 46

רֵישָׁא וְסֵיפָא בִּרְאָיָה; רְאָיָה דִּלְשַׁלֵּם קָתָנֵי, רְאָיָה דִּשְׁבוּעָה לָא קָתָנֵי.

Both the first clause and the latter clause address cases in which proof is required, as even in the first clause the worker must have witnesses testifying that he was actually hired. The baraita does not mention it because it teaches only with regard to proof that requires the employer to pay, but it does not teach with regard to proof that makes it possible for the worker to take an oath and receive payment.

אָמַר רַבִּי יִרְמְיָה בַּר אַבָּא, שְׁלַחוּ לֵיהּ מִבֵּי רַב לִשְׁמוּאֵל: יְלַמְּדֵנוּ רַבֵּינוּ, אוּמָּן אוֹמֵר: ״שְׁתַּיִם קָצַצְתָּ לִי״, וְהַלָּה אוֹמֵר: ״לֹא קָצַצְתִּי לְךָ אֶלָּא אֶחָת״ – מִי נִשְׁבָּע? אָמַר לָהֶן: בְּזוֹ יִשָּׁבַע בַּעַל הַבַּיִת, וְיַפְסִיד אוּמָּן; קְצִיצָה וַדַּאי מִידְכָּר דְּכִירִי אִינָשֵׁי.

§ Rabbi Yirmeya bar Abba said: After Rav’s death the Sages sent the following message to Shmuel from the study hall of Rav: Our teacher, instruct us with regard to the case where the craftsman says: You fixed two coins as my payment; and the other, the employer, says: I fixed only one coin as your payment. Who takes an oath? Shmuel told them: In that case, the employer shall take an oath to support his claim and the craftsman shall lose the difference. With regard to the fixing of wages, people certainly remember. The Sages instituted the oath taken by the worker where he claims he has not been paid in a situation where it is reasonable to presume that the employer is distracted and apt to forget.

אִינִי?! וְהָא תָּנֵי רַבָּה בַּר שְׁמוּאֵל: קָצַץ – הַמּוֹצִיא מֵחֲבֵרוֹ עָלָיו הָרְאָיָה, וְאִי לָא מַיְיתֵי רְאָיָה – פָּקַע. אַמַּאי? יִשָּׁבַע בַּעַל הַבַּיִת, וְיַפְסִיד אוּמָּן! אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן: לִצְדָדִין קָתָנֵי – אוֹ מֵבִיא רְאָיָה וְיִטּוֹל, אוֹ יִשָּׁבַע בַּעַל הַבַּיִת וְיַפְסִיד אוּמָּן.

The Gemara asks: Is that so? But doesn’t Rabba bar Shmuel teach in a baraita: If there is a dispute with regard to the sum fixed as wages, the burden of proof rests upon the claimant, i.e., the craftsman, and if he does not bring proof, his claim is dismissed. The Gemara clarifies the difficulty: Why? Have the employer take an oath, and only then shall the craftsman lose the difference, in accordance with Shmuel’s ruling. Rav Naḥman said: Shmuel teaches the baraita disjunctively: Either the craftsman brings proof and receives the amount he claims, or the employer takes an oath, and the craftsman loses the difference.

מֵיתִיבִי: הַנּוֹתֵן טַלִּיתוֹ לְאוּמָּן, אוּמָּן אוֹמֵר: ״קָצַצְתָּ לִי שְׁתַּיִם״, וְהַלָּה אוֹמֵר: ״לֹא קָצַצְתִּי לְךָ אֶלָּא אֶחָת״; כׇּל זְמַן שֶׁטַּלִּית בְּיַד אוּמָּן – עַל בַּעַל הַבַּיִת לְהָבִיא רְאָיָה. נְתָנָהּ לוֹ בִּזְמַנּוֹ – נִשְׁבָּע וְנוֹטֵל. עָבַר זְמַנּוֹ – הַמּוֹצִיא מֵחֲבֵרוֹ עָלָיו הָרְאָיָה.

The Gemara raises an objection to Shmuel’s ruling from a baraita: With regard to one who gives his cloak to a craftsman for mending, and then the craftsman says: You fixed two dinars as my payment, and that one, the owner, says: I fixed only one dinar as your payment, then so long as it is so that the cloak is in the possession of the craftsman, it is incumbent upon the owner to bring proof that the fee was one dinar. If the craftsman gave the cloak back to him, then there are two scenarios: If the claim is lodged in its proper time, i.e., on the day of the cloak’s return, then the craftsman takes an oath and receives the two dinars. But if its proper time passed, then the burden of proof rests upon the claimant, and the craftsman would need to bring proof that the fee was two dinars.

בִּזְמַנּוֹ מִיהָא נִשְׁבָּע וְנוֹטֵל; אַמַּאי? יִשָּׁבַע בַּעַל הַבַּיִת וְיַפְסִיד אוּמָּן!

The Gemara states the objection: In any event, the baraita states that if the claim is lodged in its proper time, the craftsman takes an oath and receives his payment. According to Shmuel’s ruling why should this be so? The employer should take an oath, and the craftsman should lose the difference.

אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק: הָא מַנִּי – רַבִּי יְהוּדָה הִיא, דְּאָמַר: כׇּל זְמַן שֶׁשְּׁבוּעָה נוֹטָה אֵצֶל בַּעַל הַבַּיִת – שָׂכִיר נִשְׁבָּע וְנוֹטֵל.

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said in response: In accordance with whose opinion is this baraita? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who says: Any time that the basic obligation to take an oath is directed at the employer, as in this case, as he admits to part of the claim, the Sages instituted that the obligation to take the oath is transferred, and the hired worker takes an oath and receives his payment. But according to the opinion of the Rabbis, the employer takes an oath and is exempted, as Shmuel ruled.

הֵי רַבִּי יְהוּדָה? אִילֵימָא רַבִּי יְהוּדָה דְּמַתְנִיתִין, אַחְמוֹרֵי קָא מַחְמַר – דִּתְנַן: רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: עַד שֶׁתְּהֵא שָׁם מִקְצָת הוֹדָאָה!

The Gemara asks: To which statement of Rabbi Yehuda is Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak referring? If we say he is referring to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda in the mishna (44b), how can that be? There, he is being stringent, and restricts the cases where the worker takes an oath and receives payment, more so than the Rabbis, as we learned in the mishna: Rabbi Yehuda says: The worker does not take an oath and receive payment without any other proof unless there is partial admission on the part of the employer with regard to payment of the wages.

אֶלָּא רַבִּי יְהוּדָה דְּבָרַיְיתָא – דְּתַנְיָא: שָׂכִיר, כׇּל זְמַן שֶׁלֹּא עָבַר עָלָיו זְמַנּוֹ – הֲרֵי זֶה נִשְׁבָּע וְנוֹטֵל, וְאִם לָאו – אֵינוֹ נִשְׁבָּע וְנוֹטֵל. וְאָמַר רַבִּי יְהוּדָה: אֵימָתַי – בִּזְמַן שֶׁאָמַר לוֹ: ״תֵּן לִי שְׂכָרִי חֲמִשִּׁים דִּינָר שֶׁיֵּשׁ לִי בְּיָדֶךָ״; וְהוּא אוֹמֵר: ״הִתְקַבַּלְתְּ מֵהֶן דִּינַר זָהָב״, אוֹ שֶׁאָמַר לוֹ: ״שְׁתַּיִם קָצַצְתָּ״, וְהַלָּה אוֹמֵר: ״לֹא קָצַצְתִּי לְךָ אֶלָּא אֶחָת״;

Rather, he is referring to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda in a baraita; as it is taught: A hired worker, as long as the time allotted for him to receive his wages has not passed, takes an oath and receives payment of his claim, and if not, i.e., the time has passed, he does not take an oath and receive payment. And Rabbi Yehuda said: When does the worker take such an oath? It is in a situation when he said to his employer: Give me my wages of fifty silver dinars, which are still in your possession. And the employer says: You have already received a golden dinar, equal to twenty-five silver dinars, from them. Alternatively, the worker said to him: You fixed two coins as my payment; and the other, the employer, says: I fixed only one coin as your payment.

אֲבָל אָמַר לוֹ: ״לֹא שְׂכַרְתִּיךָ מֵעוֹלָם״, אוֹ שֶׁאָמַר לוֹ: ״שְׂכַרְתִּיךָ וְנָתַתִּי לְךָ שְׂכָרֶךָ״ – הַמּוֹצִיא מֵחֲבֵירוֹ עָלָיו הָרְאָיָה.

The baraita continues: But if the employer said to him: I never hired you, or he said to him: I hired you but gave you your wages, the burden of proof rests upon the claimant, i.e., the worker. Rabbi Yehuda rules that it is only when they disagree about the amount of the wages owed to the worker that the worker takes an oath and is paid his claim by his employer.

מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַב שִׁישָׁא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב אִידִי: אֶלָּא קָצַץ – רַבִּי יְהוּדָה הִיא וְלָא רַבָּנַן?! הַשְׁתָּא הֵיכִי דְּמַחְמִיר רַבִּי יְהוּדָה – מְקִילִּי רַבָּנַן, הֵיכָא דְּמֵקֵיל רַבִּי יְהוּדָה – מַחְמְרִי רַבָּנַן?!

Rav Sheisha, son of Rav Idi, objects to this: But is this baraita, which says that the craftsman can take an oath about the sum fixed as the price, the opinion of only Rabbi Yehuda, and not that of the Rabbis? Now, where Rabbi Yehuda is stringent and restricts the opportunities of the worker to take an oath and receive payment in the mishna, the Rabbis are lenient, granting the worker the right to take an oath as proof that he has not been paid, then in a case where Rabbi Yehuda is lenient in the dispute described in the baraita concerning the amount fixed as wages, granting the worker the right to take an oath as proof of his claim, would the Rabbis be stringent with regard to the worker and grant the employer the right to take an oath and be exempt?

וְאֶלָּא מַאי – רַבָּנַן? וְאֶלָּא הָא דְּתָנֵי רַבָּה בַּר שְׁמוּאֵל: קָצַץ – הַמּוֹצִיא מֵחֲבֵירוֹ עָלָיו הָרְאָיָה, מַנִּי? לָא רַבִּי יְהוּדָה וְלָא רַבָּנַן!

The Gemara wonders: Rather, what can be said, that the baraita is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis? But if so, then with regard to that baraita that Rabba bar Shmuel teaches, that in a dispute about the sum fixed for the craftsman’s wages the burden of proof rests upon the claimant, whose opinion is it? It is not the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, and not that of the Rabbis. According to Rabbi Yehuda the craftsman takes an oath to prove his claim about the wage, and according to the Rabbis, it is the employer who must take an oath to exempt himself from paying the higher wage.

אֶלָּא אָמַר רָבָא: בְּהָא קָמִיפַּלְגִי – רַבִּי יְהוּדָה סָבַר: בִּדְאוֹרָיְיתָא – עֲבַדוּ לֵיהּ תַּקַּנְתָּא לְשָׂכִיר; וּבִדְרַבָּנַן – הֲוַאי תַּקַּנְתָּא, וְתַקַּנְתָּא לְתַקַּנְתָּא לָא עָבְדִינַן.

Rather, Rava said that they disagree about this: Rabbi Yehuda holds that only in the case of an oath mandated by Torah law did the Sages institute an ordinance for the benefit of the hired worker that he can take an oath to support his claim. When the employer’s claim contains an admission to part of the claim of the worker, the employer is required by Torah law to take an oath to support his claim. But with regard to an oath mandated by rabbinic law, such as where the employer denies owing any money, where according to Shmuel he still must take an oath, the original oath is already an ordinance, and we do not institute an ordinance to adjust an already-instituted ordinance.

וְרַבָּנַן סָבְרִי: בִּדְרַבָּנַן נָמֵי עָבְדִינַן תַּקַּנְתָּא לְשָׂכִיר, וּקְצִיצָה מִידְכָּר דְּכִיר.

And the Rabbis hold that with regard to an oath mandated by rabbinic law, we also institute an ordinance for the benefit of the hired worker; but with regard to a dispute about the amount fixed as wages, they maintain that the employer will remember the amount, and therefore he takes the oath and is exempt, as Shmuel ruled. According to Rabbi Yehuda, the worker takes the oath in that case, as the employer admits to part of the claim, and the Sages transferred the oath to the worker as the means by which he can prove his claim. Rav Sheisha’s objection is therefore not valid. The difference between Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis is not that Rabbi Yehuda is more stringent; rather, it relates to the circumstances under which they see fit to have the worker take the oath.

נִגְזָל כֵּיצַד? הָיוּ מְעִידִין אוֹתוֹ שֶׁנִּכְנַס לְבֵיתוֹ לְמַשְׁכְּנוֹ כּוּ׳. וְדִלְמָא לֹא מִשְׁכְּנוֹ? מִי לָא אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן: הַאי מַאן דִּנְקִיט נַרְגָּא בִּידֵיהּ, וְאָמַר: ״אֵיזִיל וְאֶקְטְלֵיהּ לְדִקְלָא דִּפְלָנְיָא״, וְאִשְׁתְּכַח דִּקְטִיל וּשְׁדֵי – לָא אָמְרִינַן דְּהוּא קַטְלֵיהּ?

§ The mishna teaches: How does the halakha of the worker taking an oath and receiving payment apply to one who was robbed? The case is where witnesses testified about the defendant that he entered the claimant’s house to seize collateral from him without the authority to do so. The claimant said: You took items that belong to me; and the defendant said: I did not take them. The claimant takes an oath and receives payment of his claim. The Gemara challenges: Perhaps he did not seize anything as collateral from him? The witnesses testify only to the fact that he entered the house for that purpose. Doesn’t Rav Naḥman say: With regard to one who takes an ax in his hand and says: I will go and chop down so-and-so’s palm tree, and the palm tree is found chopped down and tossed on the ground, we do not say that he chopped it down, but rather we search for evidence?

אַלְמָא עֲבִיד אִינִישׁ דְּגָזֵים וְלָא עָבֵיד, הָכָא נָמֵי – דְּגָזֵים וְלָא עָבֵיד! אֵימָא ״וּמִשְׁכְּנוֹ״. וְלִיחְזֵי מַאי מִשְׁכְּנוֹ? אָמַר רַבָּה בַּר בַּר חָנָה, אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: בְּטוֹעֲנוֹ כֵּלִים הַנִּיטָּלִין תַּחַת כְּנָפָיו.

Evidently, a person is prone to bluster without acting on his threat. Here, also, it could be that he was blustering about seizing collateral, but did not act on it. The Gemara answers: Say that the case in the mishna is where the witnesses testify that he entered the house and seized collateral from him. The Gemara asks: If so, let us ask the witnesses and see what items he seized as collateral from him, and there will be no need for an oath. Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: This is a case where one claims that the defendant took items that can be carried beneath his garments, and the witnesses could not see what they were.

אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה: רָאוּהוּ שֶׁהִטְמִין כֵּלִים תַּחַת כְּנָפָיו וְיָצָא,

§ Rav Yehuda says, concerning a similar topic: If witnesses saw a person who entered another’s house, concealed items beneath his garments, and left,

וְאָמַר ״לְקוּחִין הֵן בְּיָדִי״ – אֵינוֹ נֶאֱמָן. וְלָא אֲמַרַן אֶלָּא בַּעַל הַבַּיִת שֶׁאֵינוֹ עָשׂוּי לִמְכּוֹר כֵּלָיו, אֲבָל בַּעַל הַבַּיִת הֶעָשׂוּי לִמְכּוֹר אֶת כֵּלָיו – נֶאֱמָן. וְשֶׁאֵין עָשׂוּי לִמְכּוֹר אֶת כֵּלָיו נָמֵי – לָא אֲמַרַן אֶלָּא דְּבָרִים שֶׁאֵין דַּרְכָּן לְהַטְמִין, אֲבָל דְּבָרִים שֶׁדַּרְכָּן לְהַטְמִין – נֶאֱמָן.

and then that person says: They were purchased and that is why they are in my possession, he is not deemed credible. And we said this only with regard to items taken from a homeowner who is not apt to sell his items; but with regard to a homeowner who is apt to sell his items, the one taking the items is deemed credible. And even with regard to a homeowner who is not apt to sell his items, we said that the one carrying the items is not deemed credible only with regard to items that are not typically concealed; but with regard to items that are typically concealed, he is deemed credible.

וְשֶׁאֵין דַּרְכָּן לְהַטְמִין נָמֵי – לָא אֲמַרַן אֶלָּא אִינִישׁ דְּלָא צְנִיעַ, אֲבָל אִינִישׁ דִּצְנִיעַ – הַיְינוּ אוֹרְחֵיהּ. וְלָא אֲמַרַן אֶלָּא זֶה אוֹמֵר ״שְׁאוּלִין״ וְזֶה אוֹמֵר ״לְקוּחִין״, אֲבָל בִּגְנוּבִין – לָאו כֹּל כְּמִינֵּיהּ; לְאַחְזוֹקֵי אִינִישׁ בְּגַנָּבֵי לָא מַחְזְקִינַן.

And even with regard to items that are not typically concealed, we said that he is not deemed credible only with regard to a person who is not generally secretive, but with regard to a person who is generally secretive, that is his manner, i.e., he would be likely to conceal items beneath his clothing, and he is deemed credible. And we said this only when this one, the homeowner, says: The items are borrowed, and that one who took the items, says: They are purchased, but in a case where the homeowner claims that the items are stolen, it is not in his power to have his accusation accepted, as we do not presume a person to be a thief.

וְלָא אֲמַרַן אֶלָּא בִּדְבָרִים הָעֲשׂוּיִן לְהַשְׁאִיל וּלְהַשְׂכִּיר, אֲבָל דְּבָרִים שֶׁאֵין עֲשׂוּיִן לְהַשְׁאִיל וּלְהַשְׂכִּיר – נֶאֱמָן. דִּשְׁלַח רַב הוּנָא בַּר אָבִין: דְּבָרִים הָעֲשׂוּיִן לְהַשְׁאִיל וּלְהַשְׂכִּיר, וְאָמַר ״לְקוּחִין הֵן בְּיָדִי״ – אֵינוֹ נֶאֱמָן. כִּי הָא דְּרָבָא אַפֵּיק זוּגָא דְּסַרְבָּלָא וְסִפְרָא דְּאַגַּדְתָּא מִיַּתְמֵי, בִּדְבָרִים הָעֲשׂוּיִן לְהַשְׁאִיל וּלְהַשְׂכִּיר.

Furthermore, we said that the one who claims he purchased the items is not deemed credible only with regard to items that are typically lent or rented, where the homeowner’s claim that they must now be returned is more reasonable; but for items that are not typically lent or rented, the person who took them is deemed credible. As Rav Huna bar Avin sent a ruling to the Sages: With regard to items that are typically lent or rented that someone took and said: They were purchased and that is why they are in my possession, he is not deemed credible. This is like that incident where Rava ruled to expropriate fabric scissors and a book of aggada from orphans whose father had taken them, as they were items that are typically lent or rented.

אָמַר רָבָא: אֲפִילּוּ שׁוֹמֵר נִשְׁבָּע, אֲפִילּוּ אִשְׁתּוֹ שֶׁל שׁוֹמֵר נִשְׁבַּעַת. בָּעֵי רַב פָּפָּא: שְׂכִירוֹ וּלְקִיטוֹ מַאי? תֵּיקוּ.

The oath of one who was robbed can be taken by others as well. Rava says: Even a watchman at the house can take the oath, and even the wife of the watchman can take the oath. Rav Pappa asks: With regard to the employer’s regular hired worker or his regular harvester, who are not appointed to safeguard the employer’s property, what is the halakha? The Gemara responds: The question shall stand unresolved.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב יֵימַר לְרַב אָשֵׁי: טְעָנוֹ בְּכָסָא דְּכַסְפָּא, מַאי? חֲזֵינָא: אִי אִינִישׁ דַּאֲמִיד הוּא, אוֹ אִינִישׁ דִּמְהֵימַן הוּא דְּמַפְקְדִי אִינָשֵׁי גַּבֵּיהּ – מִשְׁתְּבַע וְשָׁקֵיל. וְאִי לָא – לָא.

Rav Yeimar said to Rav Ashi: If one states a claim against another that he left his house with a silver cup and is liable to return it, what is the halakha? Rav Ashi replied: We see if the owner of the house is an affluent person, or if he is a trustworthy person with whom people deposit their valuables, as those are people who would typically have a silver cup. If the homeowner is in these categories he takes an oath and receives payment of his claim; but if he is not, he does not receive the benefit of taking an oath in order to prove his claim.

נֶחְבָּל כֵּיצַד. אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא בִּמְקוֹם שֶׁיָּכוֹל לְחַבֵּל בְּעַצְמוֹ, אֲבָל בִּמְקוֹם שֶׁאֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לְחַבֵּל בְּעַצְמוֹ – נוֹטֵל שֶׁלֹּא בִּשְׁבוּעָה.

§ The mishna teaches: How does this halakha apply to one who was injured? If witnesses testified about the injured person that he entered into the domain of the defendant whole, but left injured, the injured party may take an oath and receive compensation. Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: The Sages taught that he needs to take an oath in order to receive compensation only if he was injured in a place where he is able to injure himself, but if he was injured in a place where he is unable to injure himself, he receives compensation without taking an oath.

וְנֵיחוּשׁ דִּלְמָא בְּכוֹתֶל נִתְחַכֵּךְ! תָּנֵי רַבִּי חִיָּיא: שֶׁעָלְתָה לוֹ נְשִׁיכָה בְּגַבּוֹ וּבֵין אַצִּילֵי יָדָיו. וְדִלְמָא אַחֵר עָבֵיד לֵיהּ? דְּלֵיכָּא אַחֵר.

The Gemara challenges: And let us be concerned that perhaps he scraped against a wall and caused the injury himself. The Gemara explains: Rabbi Ḥiyya teaches that the mishna is referring to a case where, for example, he has a bite on his back or on his elbows, which must have been caused by someone else. The Gemara challenges: And perhaps a different person did it to him, and not the defendant. The Gemara explains: This is a case where there is no other person with him besides the defendant.

וּכְשֶׁנֶּגְדּוֹ חָשׁוּד [וְכוּ׳], וַאֲפִילּוּ שְׁבוּעַת שָׁוְא. מַאי ״אֲפִילּוּ שְׁבוּעַת שָׁוְא״?

§ The mishna teaches: How does this halakha apply to one whose opposing litigant is suspect with regard to the taking of an oath and therefore is not permitted to take the oath? One is suspected if he had been found to have taken a false oath, whether it was an oath of testimony or an oath on a deposit, which are prescribed by Torah law, or even an oath taken in vain. The Gemara asks: For what reason does the mishna emphasize: Even an oath taken in vain?

לָא מִיבַּעְיָא קָאָמַר: לָא מִיבַּעְיָא הָנָךְ, דְּאִית בְּהוּ כְּפִירַת מָמוֹן; אֶלָּא אֲפִילּוּ הָא נָמֵי, דִּכְפִירַת דְּבָרִים בְּעָלְמָא הוּא – לָא מְהֵימַן.

The Gemara explains: The mishna is speaking utilizing the style of: It is not necessary. It is not necessary to state that one who is suspected of falsifying these oaths is disqualified from taking oaths, as they entail the denial of a monetary claim, i.e., due to the false oath someone incurs financial loss, but it is necessary to state that even that oath, an oath taken in vain, which involves merely the repudiation of one’s verbal commitment, nevertheless grants one the status of a person who is not credible and who is disqualified from taking oaths.

וְלִיתְנֵי נָמֵי שְׁבוּעַת בִּטּוּי! כִּי קָתָנֵי, שְׁבוּעָה דְּכִי קָא מִשְׁתְּבַע – בְּשִׁקְרָא קָא מִשְׁתְּבַע; אֲבָל שְׁבוּעַת בִּטּוּי, דְּאִיכָּא לְמֵימַר דִּבְקוּשְׁטָא קָא מִשְׁתְּבַע – לָא קָתָנֵי.

The Gemara suggests: And let the tanna also teach that falsifying an oath on an utterance, which is also an oath without monetary consequences, disqualifies one from taking oaths. The Gemara responds: When the tanna teaches which types of false oaths disqualify a person, it includes only oaths with regard to which when one takes the oath, he is at that time falsely taking the oath. But with regard to an oath on an utterance, such as an oath that he will eat a specific fruit that day, where it can be said that he took the oath with true intention and intended to eat that fruit, but ultimately failed to do so, the tanna does not teach, as one who does not fulfill such an oath retains his credibility to take oaths, since he did not consciously lie.

תִּינַח ״אוֹכַל״ וְ״לֹא אוֹכַל״; ״אָכַלְתִּי״ וְ״לֹא אָכַלְתִּי״ מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר? תָּנָא שְׁבוּעַת שָׁוְא

The Gemara raises a difficulty: It works out well to make this distinction for one who is liable for an oath on an utterance like: I will eat, or: I will not eat, where it is possible that he was not lying when he took the oath. But with regard to oaths about the past like: I ate, or: I did not eat, what can be said, since he certainly took a false oath? The Gemara answers: Teach the mishna, i.e., understand it to mean: An oath taken in vain