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Daf Yomi

December 3, 2017 | ื˜ืดื• ื‘ื›ืกืœื• ืชืฉืขืดื—

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Shifra Tyberg and Rephael Wenger in loving memory of Zvi ben Yisrael Yitzhak Tyberg on his yahrzeit, and in honor of their daughter Ayelet's upcoming marriage to Ori Kinberg.

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Rabbi Hayim Herring with pride and love, in honor of his spouse, Terri Krivosha, who received this year's Sidney Barrows Lifetime Commitment Award from the Mpls. And St. Paul Federations in recognition of her distinguished contribution to the Twin Cities Legal and Jewish Communities.ย 

Shevuot 5

When Rabbi Yehuda Hanasiย wrote in the mishnaย “Shevuot 2 that are 4,” was it his own opinion also or was he just using Rabbi Akiva’s opinion but he actually doesn’t hold that way?ย  Rebbi holds that “v’nelam” means he knew and then forgot – does that word mean that?ย  By Sotah that word is mentioned and doesn’t mean that.ย ย The mishna states “Taking things out on Shabbat 2 that are 4” – this is different from the mishna in Shabbat that states that there are 2 that are 4 inside and 2 that are 4 outside.ย  What are the mishnayot in each place referring to?


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ืจื™ื‘ื•ื™ื™ ื•ืžื™ืขื•ื˜ื™


using the method of amplifications and restrictions.


ืื™ืŸ ื‘ืขืœืžื ื›ืœืœื™ ื•ืคืจื˜ื™ ื“ืจื™ืฉ ื•ื”ื›ื ื”ื™ื™ื ื• ื˜ืขืžื ื›ื“ืชื ื ื“ื‘ื™ ืจื‘ื™ ื™ืฉืžืขืืœ


Ameimar answers: Yes, generally Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi ex-pounds verses using the method of generalizations and details, but here, with regard to the redemption of the firstborn, this is the reason that he expounds the verses using the method of amplifications and restrictions: He holds in accordance with that which the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught.


ื“ืชื ื ื“ื‘ื™ ืจื‘ื™ ื™ืฉืžืขืืœ ื‘ืžื™ื ื‘ืžื™ื ืฉื ื™ ืคืขืžื™ื ืื™ืŸ ื–ื” ื›ืœืœ ื•ืคืจื˜ ืืœื ืจื™ื‘ื” ื•ืžื™ืขื˜


As the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: When defining which fish it is permitted to eat, the verse states: โ€œThis you may eat, from whatever is in the water, anything that has fins and scales in the water, in the seas and in the streamsโ€ (Leviticus 11:9). The verse first states the general term: โ€œIn the water,โ€ โ€œin the water,โ€ mentioning it twice, and only afterward mentions the details, i.e., โ€œin the seas and in the streams.โ€ When the general and detailed phrases are ordered in this way, they are not expounded as a generalization and a detail, but rather as an amplification and a restriction. Similarly, although Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi generally expounds verses using the method of generalizations and details, with regard to the redemption of the firstborn, since the verse mentions the two general terms first and mentions the specific detail only afterward, he expounds it using the method of amplifications and restrictions.


ื•ืจื‘ื ืŸ ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ื ื ื›ื“ืืžืจื™ ื‘ืžืขืจื‘ื ื›ืœ ืžืงื•ื ืฉืืชื” ืžื•ืฆื ืฉืชื™ ื›ืœืœื•ืช ื”ืกืžื•ื›ื•ืช ื–ื” ืœื–ื” ื”ื˜ืœ ืคืจื˜ ื‘ื™ื ื™ื”ืŸ ื•ื“ื•ื ื ื‘ื›ืœืœ ื•ืคืจื˜


The Gemara asks: And the Rabbis, why do they expound the verse about the redemption of a firstborn as a generalization and a detail? Ravina said: Like they say in the West, Eretz Yisrael: Wherever you find two generalizations juxtaposed to each other, followed by a specific detail, place the detail between the two generalizations and thereby expound them as a generalization and a detail followed by another generalization.


ื”ืฉืชื ื“ืืžืจืช ืจื‘ื™ ื›ืœืœื™ ื•ืคืจื˜ื™ ื“ืจื™ืฉ ื‘ืขืœ ื›ื•ืจื—ื™ืš ืงืฉื™ื ืฉื‘ื•ืขื•ืช ืืœื ื‘ืฉื‘ื•ืขื•ืช ื ืกื™ื‘ ืืœื™ื‘ื ื“ืจื‘ื™ ืขืงื™ื‘ื ื•ืœื™ื” ืœื ืกื‘ื™ืจื ืœื™ื”


The Gemara concludes the question it asked earlier: Now that you said that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi expounds verses using the method of generalizations and details, perforce the mishnaโ€™s ruling in the case of oaths is difficult, as it is derived by expounding the verse as an amplification and a restriction, and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi does not generally expound verses in that manner. This contradicts Rav Kahanaโ€™s explanation that the mishna expresses Rabbi Yehuda HaNasiโ€™s own opinion. Rather, one must say that with regard to oaths, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi formulated the mishna in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, but he himself does not hold accordingly.


ื’ื•ืคื ืžื ื™ืŸ ืฉืื™ื ื• ื—ื™ื™ื‘ ืืœื ืขืœ ืฉื™ืฉ ื‘ื” ื™ื“ื™ืขื” ื‘ืชื—ืœื” ื•ื™ื“ื™ืขื” ื‘ืกื•ืฃ ื•ื”ืขืœื ื‘ื™ื ืชื™ื ืชืœืžื•ื“ ืœื•ืžืจ ื•ื ืขืœื ื•ื ืขืœื ืฉื ื™ ืคืขืžื™ื ื“ื‘ืจื™ ืจื‘ื™ ืขืงื™ื‘ื


ยง Above (4a), the Gemara cited a baraita. Now the Gemara analyzes the matter itself. The baraita states: From where is it derived that one is liable to bring a sliding-scale offering only for cases in which he had awareness at the beginning and awareness at the end, but had a lapse of awareness in between, when he actually transgressed? The verse states with regard to a personโ€™s awareness of the fact that he was impure: โ€œAnd it was concealed,โ€ โ€œand it was concealed,โ€ mentioning it twice (Leviticus 5:2โ€“3). The first mention teaches that one is liable only if during the transgression he was unaware of his status, and the second mention teaches that one is liable only if he had awareness of his status before the transgression. This is the statement of Rabbi Akiva.


ืจื‘ื™ ืื•ืžืจ ืื™ื ื• ืฆืจื™ืš ื”ืจื™ ื”ื•ื ืื•ืžืจ ื•ื ืขืœื ืžื›ืœืœ ืฉื™ื“ืข ื•ื”ื•ื ื™ื“ืข ื”ืจื™ ื›ืืŸ ืฉืชื™ ื™ื“ื™ืขื•ืช ืื ื›ืŸ ืžื” ืชืœืžื•ื“ ืœื•ืžืจ ื•ื ืขืœื ืœื—ื™ื™ื‘ ืขืœ ื”ืขืœื ื˜ื•ืžืื” ื•ืขืœ ื”ืขืœื ืžืงื“ืฉ


The baraita continues: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: This proof is not necessary, as it states in the same verse: โ€œAnd it was concealed,โ€ which indicates, by inference, that initially he had been aware; and nevertheless the verse continues to state: โ€œAnd he was aware.โ€ It emerges, then, that the verse refers here to two different periods of awareness, one before the transgression and one afterward. But if so, why must the verse state: โ€œAnd it was concealed,โ€ a second time? It is in order to render one liable both for a violation due to a lapse of awareness of the fact that he was ritually impure and for a violation due to a lapse of awareness of the fact that the place he entered was actually the Temple.


ืืžืจ ืžืจ ื•ื ืขืœื ืžื›ืœืœ ืฉื™ื“ืข ืžืื™ ืžืฉืžืข ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื ืžื“ืœื ื›ืชื™ื‘ ื•ื”ื™ื ืขืœื•ืžื” ืžืžื ื•


The Master said in that baraita: The verse states: โ€œAnd it was concealed,โ€ which indicates, by inference, that initially he had been aware. The Gemara asks: From where is this inferred? Rava said: From the fact that it is not written: And it is concealed from him, which would have been the appropriate formulation had he never been aware of the matter at all. Accordingly, the phrase โ€œand it was concealedโ€ is to be understood as referring to a case in which he had been initially aware.


ืืžืจ ืœื™ื” ืื‘ื™ื™ ืืœื ืžืขืชื” ื’ื‘ื™ ืกื•ื˜ื” ื“ื›ืชื™ื‘ ื•ื ืขืœื ืžืขื™ื ื™ ืื™ืฉื” ืžื›ืœืœ ื“ื”ื•ื™ ื™ื“ืข ืžืขื™ืงืจื ืื™ ื”ื•ื” ื™ื“ืข ืžื™ ื‘ื“ืงื• ืœื” ืžื™ื


Abaye said to him: If that is so, then you should also make a similar inference with regard to a suspected adulteress [sota], as it is written that she is liable to undergo the ordeal of drinking the bitter waters when โ€œa man lay with her carnally, and it was concealed from the eyes of her husbandโ€ (Numbers 5:13). This would indicate, by inference, that initially he had been aware of the fact that his wife committed adultery. Abaye explains the difficulty: If he was actually aware that his wife had committed adultery, would the bitter waters have the power to examine her?


ื•ื”ื ืชื ื™ื ื•ื ืงื” ื”ืื™ืฉ ืžืขื•ืŸ ื•ื”ืืฉื” ื”ื”ื•ื ืชืฉื ืืช ืขื•ื ื” ื‘ื–ืžืŸ ืฉื”ืื™ืฉ ืžื ื•ืงื” ืžืขื•ืŸ ื”ืžื™ื ื‘ื•ื“ืงื™ืŸ ืืช ืืฉืชื• ืื™ืŸ ื”ืื™ืฉ ืžื ื•ืงื” ืžืขื•ืŸ ืื™ืŸ ื”ืžื™ื ื‘ื•ื“ืงื™ืŸ ืืช ืืฉืชื•


But isnโ€™t it taught in a baraita: The verse states with regard to a case in which she is found guilty: โ€œAnd the husband will be free of sin and the wife shall bear her sinโ€ (Numbers 5:31). This verse teaches that only when the husband is free of sin, the water examines his wife, but if the husband is not free of sin, the water does not examine his wife. If the husband had been aware that his wife had committed adultery, then she is forbidden to him and he is required to divorce her. The fact he did not divorce her is considered a sin; consequently, the waters cannot examine his wife.


ื•ืชื• ื’ื‘ื™ ืชื•ืจื” ื“ื›ืชื™ื‘ ื•ื ืขืœืžื” ืžืขื™ื ื™ ื›ืœ ื—ื™ ื•ืžืขื•ืฃ ื”ืฉืžื™ื ื ืกืชืจื” ืžื›ืœืœ ื“ืื™ื›ื ื“ื”ื•ื” ื™ื“ืข ื‘ื™ื” ื•ื”ื›ืชื™ื‘ ืœื ื™ื“ืข ืื ื•ืฉ ืขืจื›ื”


Abaye presents another difficulty to Rava: And furthermore, according to your understanding, you should also make a similar inference with regard to Torah, as it is written: โ€œAnd it was concealed from the eyes of all living creatures, and from those that soar in the heavens it was hiddenโ€ (Job 28:21), which would indicate, by inference, that initially there was someone who was aware of the Torah. But isnโ€™t it written: โ€œNo man knew its value, and it is not known in the land of the livingโ€ (Job 28:13)?


ืืœื ืืžืจ ืื‘ื™ื™ ืงืกื‘ืจ ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื“ื™ืขืช ื‘ื™ืช ืจื‘ื• ืฉืžื” ื™ื“ื™ืขื”


Rather, Abaye said: The formulation of the verse does not indicate that he actually realized he was impure; it indicates only that he was initially aware of the fact that he had come into contact with a source of impurity, but he failed to reach the obvious conclusion that he was thereby rendered impure. And Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that the elementary knowledge of the halakhot of ritual impurity that a person gained in his childhood from his school is sufficient, in light of his awareness of the fact he came into contact with a source of impurity, to be considered awareness of the fact that he was impure, and thereby render him liable to bring a sliding-scale offering.


ืืžืจ ืœื™ื” ืจื‘ ืคืคื ืœืื‘ื™ื™ ืืœื ื“ืงืชื ื™ ืื™ืŸ ื‘ื” ื™ื“ื™ืขื” ื‘ืชื—ืœื” ื•ื™ืฉ ื‘ื” ื™ื“ื™ืขื” ื‘ืกื•ืฃ ืžื™ ืื™ื›ื ื“ืœื™ืช ืœื™ื” ื™ื“ื™ืขืช ื‘ื™ืช ืจื‘ื• ืืžืจ ืœื™ื” ืื™ืŸ ืžืฉื›ื—ืช ืœื” ื‘ืชื™ื ื•ืง ืฉื ืฉื‘ื” ืœื‘ื™ืŸ ื”ื’ื•ื™ื


Rav Pappa said to Abaye: But how can you explain the halakha that is taught in the mishna: For cases in which he did not have awareness at the beginning but had awareness at the end? According to your explanation, is there anyone who does not have the elementary knowledge of the halakhot of ritual impurity that he gained from his school? Abaye said to him: Yes, you find it in the case of a child who was taken captive among gentiles, who never received even the most elementary level of knowledge.


ื™ืฆื™ืื•ืช ืฉื‘ืช ืฉืชื™ื ืฉื”ืŸ ืืจื‘ืข ืชื ืŸ ื”ืชื ื™ืฆื™ืื•ืช ืฉื‘ืช ืฉืชื™ื ืฉื”ืŸ ืืจื‘ืข ื‘ืคื ื™ื ื•ืฉืชื™ื ืฉื”ืŸ ืืจื‘ืข ื‘ื—ื•ืฅ ืžืื™ ืฉื ื ื”ื›ื ื“ืชื ื ืฉืชื™ื ืฉื”ืŸ ืืจื‘ืข ื•ืชื• ืœื ื•ืžืื™ ืฉื ื ื”ืชื ื“ืชื ื™ ืฉืชื™ื ืฉื”ืŸ ืืจื‘ืข ื‘ืคื ื™ื ื•ืฉืชื™ื ืฉื”ืŸ ืืจื‘ืข ื‘ื—ื•ืฅ


ยง The mishna states (2a): With regard to acts of carrying out that are prohibited on Shabbat, there are two types that are four. We learned in a mishna there (Shabbat 2a): With regard to acts of carrying out that are prohibited on Shabbat, there are primarily two basic actions that are four cases with regard to transferring an item inside, to a private domain; and two basic actions that are four cases with regard to transferring an item outside, to a public domain. The Gemara asks: What is different here that the mishna teaches: There are two types that are four, and nothing more; and what is different there, in tractate Shabbat, that the mishna teaches: There are two actions that are four cases with regard to transferring an item inside, to a private domain, and two actions that are four cases with regard to transferring an item outside, to a public domain?


ื”ืชื ื“ืขื™ืงืจ ืฉื‘ืช ื”ื•ื ืชื ื™ ืื‘ื•ืช ื•ืชื•ืœื“ื•ืช ื”ื›ื ื“ืœืื• ืขื™ืงืจ ืฉื‘ืช ื”ื•ื ืื‘ื•ืช ืชื ื™ ื•ืชื•ืœื“ื•ืช ืœื ืชื ื™


The Gemara answers: There, in tractate Shabbat, which is where the main discussion of the halakhot of Shabbat is found, the mishna teaches both the primary categories and the subcategories of labor prohibited on Shabbat. But here, in tractate Shevuot, which does not contain the main discussion of the halakhot of Shabbat, the mishna teaches the primary categories of labor prohibited on Shabbat but does not teach the subcategories of labor.


ืื‘ื•ืช ืžืื™ ื ื™ื ื”ื• ื™ืฆื™ืื•ืช ื™ืฆื™ืื•ืช ืชืจืชื™ ื”ื•ื™ื™ืŸ


The Gemara asks: What are the primary categories of transferring an item on Shabbat? They are acts of carrying out from the private domain to the public domain. The Gemara objects: But the acts of carrying out are only two in number, i.e., where the carrying out is done by someone standing in the private domain and when it is done by someone in the public domain. Why then does the mishna state that there are four cases?


ื•ื›ื™ ืชื™ืžื ืžื”ืŸ ืœื—ื™ื•ื‘ ื•ืžื”ืŸ ืœืคื˜ื•ืจ ื•ื”ื ื“ื•ืžื™ื ื“ืžืจืื•ืช ื ื’ืขื™ื ืงืชื ื™ ืžื” ื”ืชื ื›ื•ืœื”ื• ืœื—ื™ื•ื‘ื ืืฃ ื”ื›ื ื›ื•ืœื”ื• ืœื—ื™ื•ื‘ื


And if you would say that the mishna enumerates four types of carrying out, among them those for which there is liability and among them those for which there is exemption, that is not feasible, as doesnโ€™t the mishna teach this case as similar to the different shades of leprous marks? This would indicate that just as there, all four of them are types for which there is liability, so too here, with regard to carrying out on Shabbat, all four of them are types for which there is liability.


ืืœื ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ืคืคื ื”ืชื ื“ืขื™ืงืจ ืฉื‘ืช ืชื ื™ ื—ื™ื•ื‘ื™ ื•ืคื˜ื•ืจื™ ื”ื›ื ื—ื™ื•ื‘ื™ ืชื ื™ ื•ืคื˜ื•ืจื™ ืœื ืชื ื™


Rather, Rav Pappa said that the difference between the manner in which the halakha is cited in tractates Shevuot and Shabbat must be understood as follows: There, in tractate Shabbat, which contains the main discussion of the halakhot of Shabbat, the mishna teaches both cases of liability and cases of exemption. But here, in tractate Shevuot, which does not contain the main discussion of the halakhot of Shabbat, the mishna teaches only cases of liability but does not teach cases of exemption.


ื—ื™ื•ื‘ื™ ืžืื™ ื ื™ื ื”ื• ื™ืฆื™ืื•ืช ื™ืฆื™ืื•ืช ืชืจืชื™ ื”ื•ื ื“ื”ื•ื™ื™ืŸ ืฉืชื™ื ื“ื”ื•ืฆืื” ื•ืฉืชื™ื ื“ื”ื›ื ืกื”


The Gemara asks: What are the cases of liability? They are acts of carrying out from the private domain to the public domain. The Gemara objects: But the acts of carrying out are only two in number. Why then does the mishna state that there are four cases? The Gemara explains: There are two cases of carrying out an item from a private domain to a public domain and two more cases of bringing in an item from a public domain to a private domain.


ื•ื”ื ื™ืฆื™ืื•ืช ืงืชื ื™ ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ืืฉื™ ืชื ื ื”ื›ื ืกื” ื ืžื™ ื”ื•ืฆืื” ืงืจื™ ืœื” ืžืžืื™


The Gemara objects: But the mishna teaches: Acts of carrying out. It does not appear to mention acts of bringing in at all. Rav Ashi said: The tanna also refers to an act of bringing in an item as an act of carrying out an item. The Gemara asks: From where do we know this?


ื“ืชื ืŸ ื”ืžื•ืฆื™ื ืžืจืฉื•ืช ืœืจืฉื•ืช ื—ื™ื™ื‘ ืžื™ ืœื ืขืกืงื™ื ืŸ ื“ืงื ืžืขื™ื™ืœ ืขื™ื•ืœื™ ื•ืงื ืงืจื™ ืœื™ื” ื”ื•ืฆืื”


It is as we learned in a mishna (Shabbat 73a): One who carries out an item from one domain to another domain is liable. The Gemara claims: Are we not also dealing with a case where he is bringing it in from a public domain to a private domain, and nevertheless the mishna refers to it as carrying out?


ื•ื“ืœืžื ืงื ืžืคื™ืง ืžืจืฉื•ืช ื”ื™ื—ื™ื“ ืœืจืฉื•ืช ื”ืจื‘ื™ื ืื ื›ืŸ ื ื™ืชื ื™ ื”ืžื•ืฆื™ื ืžืจืฉื•ืช ื”ื™ื—ื™ื“ ืœืจืฉื•ืช ื”ืจื‘ื™ื ืžืื™ ืžืจืฉื•ืช ืœืจืฉื•ืช ื“ืืคื™ืœื• ืžืจืฉื•ืช ื”ืจื‘ื™ื ืœืจืฉื•ืช ื”ื™ื—ื™ื“


The Gemara questions this assertion: But perhaps the mishna is dealing with a case of carrying out an item from a private domain to a public domain. The Gemara defends its claim: If so, let it instead teach: One who carries out an item from a private domain to a public domain is liable. What is the reason it used the more generalized formulation: From one domain to another domain? To teach that one is liable even if one transfers an item from a public domain to a private domain.


ื•ืงื ืงืจื™ ืœื” ื”ื•ืฆืื” ื•ื˜ืขืžื ืžืื™ ืชื ื ื›ืœ ืขืงื™ืจืช ื—ืคืฅ ืžืžืงื•ืžื• ื”ื•ืฆืื” ืงืจื™ ืœื”


The Gemara explains further: Even though the mishna addresses carrying an item in from a public domain to a private domain, it refers to it as carrying out. The Gemara explains: What is the reason for this? The tanna refers to any act that involves removal of an item from its place as carrying out. Accordingly, the term can appropriately be used even when an item is brought in to a private domain from a public domain.


ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ื ื ืžืชื ื™ืชื™ืŸ ื ืžื™ ื“ื™ืงื ื“ืงืชื ื™ ื™ืฆื™ืื•ืช ืฉื‘ืช ืฉืชื™ื ืฉื”ืŸ ืืจื‘ืข ื‘ืคื ื™ื ื•ืฉืชื™ื ืฉื”ืŸ ืืจื‘ืข ื‘ื—ื•ืฅ ื•ืงื ืžืคืจืฉ ื”ื›ื ืกื” ืฉืžืข ืžื™ื ื”


Ravina said: The language of the mishna in tractate Shabbat is also precise in indicating this, as it teaches: With regard to acts of carrying out [yetziyyot] that are prohibited on Shabbat, there are primarily two basic actions that are four cases from the perspective of a person inside a private domain, and two basic actions that are four cases from the perspective of a person outside, in a public domain. And then, immediately, in the continuation of that mishna, it explicates the cases of bringing in an item. Conclude from it that the term: Carrying out, is also used to refer to bringing in an item.


ืจื‘ื ืืžืจ ืจืฉื•ื™ื•ืช ืงืชื ื™ ืจืฉื•ื™ื•ืช ืฉื‘ืช ืฉืชื™ื


Rava said: One cannot make any inference from the language of the mishna, as it is not referring to acts of carrying out. Rather, it teaches domains. In other words, it means: With regard to the domains of Shabbat there are two types, the existence of which leads to four types of prohibited transfers, two with regard to carrying out and two with regard to bringing in.


ืžืจืื•ืช ื ื’ืขื™ื ืฉื ื™ื ืฉื”ืŸ ืืจื‘ืขื” ืชื ืŸ ื”ืชื ืžืจืื•ืช ื ื’ืขื™ื ืฉื ื™ื ืฉื”ืŸ ืืจื‘ืขื” ื‘ื”ืจืช ืขื–ื” ื›ืฉืœื’ ืฉื ื™ื” ืœื” ื›ืกื™ื“ ื”ื”ื™ื›ืœ


ยง The mishna teaches: With regard to different shades of leprous marks, there are two types that are actually four. We learned in a mishna there (Negaโ€™im 1:1): With regard to different shades of leprous marks, there are two types that are actually four: The baheret, mentioned in the Torah (see Leviticus 13:2), is considered a primary mark; it is an intense white, like snow. Secondary to it, i.e., a sub-category of it, is a mark that is white like the lime plaster of the Sanctuary walls.


ืฉืืช ื›ืฆืžืจ ืœื‘ืŸ ืฉื ื™ื” ืœื” ื›ืงืจื•ื ื‘ื™ืฆื”


That mishna continues: The seโ€™et mentioned in the Torah is considered a primary mark; it is like white wool. Secondary to it is a mark that is white like the membrane of an egg. The ordering of different shades is relevant in determining which shades can be combined together. In order for a leprous mark to be halakhically significant, it must at least be the size of a split Cilician bean [geris]. If a mark is that size, but it is composed of different shades of white, none of which is alone the size of a geris, then if the different shades are compatible they can combine together and will thereby render the person ritually impure.


ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ื—ื ื™ื ื ืžืืŸ ืชื ื ืžืจืื•ืช ื ื’ืขื™ื ื“ืœื ื›ืจื‘ื™ ืขืงื™ื‘ื ื“ืื™ ืจื‘ื™ ืขืงื™ื‘ื ื›ื™ื•ืŸ ื“ืืžืจ ื–ื• ืœืžืขืœื” ืžื–ื• ื•ื–ื• ืœืžืขืœื” ืžื–ื• ืื ื›ืŸ ื˜ื™ื”ืจืช ืกื™ื“ ื”ื™ื›ืœ ืžืœืฆืจืฃ


Rabbi แธคanina said: Who is the tanna who taught this mishna, which delineates the different shades of leprous marks into two groups? It is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva. As if it were in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva one would be presented with a difficulty: Since with regard to which shades can combine together, Rabbi Akiva says: The different shades should be ordered this one above this one, and that one above that one, i.e., according to their degrees of brightness, from the most bright to the darkest shade, as follows: Snow white, i.e., baheret; wool white, i.e., seโ€™et; lime; and egg membrane; and only two adjacent shades can combine together. But if so, you have rendered pure a mark that is white like the lime plaster of the Sanctuary walls and is smaller than a geris, as it cannot be combined with any other shade of white.


ื‘ื”ื“ื™ ืžืืŸ ืœื™ืฆืจืคื™ื” ืœื™ืฆืจืคื™ื” ื‘ื”ื“ื™ ื‘ื”ืจืช ืื™ื›ื ืฉืืช ื“ืขื“ื™ืคื ืžื™ื ื™ื” ืœื™ืฆืจืคื™ื” ื‘ื”ื“ื™ ืฉืืช ืœืื• ืชื•ืœื“ื” ื“ื™ื“ื™ื” ื”ื•ื


The Gemara explains: With which other shade could we combine the lime-colored mark? We cannot say: Let us combine it together with a snow-white baheret, which is the primary mark relative to a lime-colored mark, as there is a wool-white seโ€™et, which is a more bright white than a lime-colored mark but less bright than snow white. Since baheret is not adjacent to lime it cannot combine with it. We cannot say: Let us combine it together with a seโ€™et, as a lime-colored mark is not its secondary mark and a primary mark can combine only with its secondary mark. This is difficult because the mishnaโ€™s categorization of a lime-colored mark as a secondary mark indicates that it can be combined with another shade of white. Perforce, the mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva.


ืื™ ื”ื›ื™ ืงืจื•ื ื‘ื™ืฆื” ื ืžื™ ื‘ื”ื“ื™ ืžืืŸ ืœื™ืฆืจืคื™ื” ืœื™ืฆืจืคื™ื” ื‘ื”ื“ื™ ืฉืืช ืื™ื›ื ืกื™ื“ ื“ืขื“ื™ืฃ ืžื™ื ื™ื” ืœื™ืฆืจืคื™ื” ื‘ื”ื“ื™ ืกื™ื“ ืœืื• ื‘ืจ ืžื™ื ื™ื” ื”ื•ื


The Gemara asks: If that is so, that Rabbi Akiva holds that only adjacent shades of white can combine together, why didnโ€™t Rabbi แธคanina also bring proof from a mark that is white like the membrane of an egg, as with which other shade could we combine it? We cannot say: Let us combine it together with a wool-white seโ€™et, which is the primary mark relative to an egg membraneโ€“colored mark, as there is a lime-colored mark, which is a more bright white than an egg membraneโ€“colored mark but less bright that wool white. Since seโ€™et is not adjacent to egg membrane it cannot combine with it. We cannot say: Let us combine it together with a lime-colored mark, as it is not its type, i.e., they are not of the same category, and so they cannot combine.


  • This month's learning is sponsored by Shifra Tyberg and Rephael Wenger in loving memory of Zvi ben Yisrael Yitzhak Tyberg on his yahrzeit, and in honor of their daughter Ayelet's upcoming marriage to Ori Kinberg.

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Rabbi Hayim Herring with pride and love, in honor of his spouse, Terri Krivosha, who received this year's Sidney Barrows Lifetime Commitment Award from the Mpls. And St. Paul Federations in recognition of her distinguished contribution to the Twin Cities Legal and Jewish Communities.ย 

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Shevuot 5

The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria

Shevuot 5

ืจื™ื‘ื•ื™ื™ ื•ืžื™ืขื•ื˜ื™


using the method of amplifications and restrictions.


ืื™ืŸ ื‘ืขืœืžื ื›ืœืœื™ ื•ืคืจื˜ื™ ื“ืจื™ืฉ ื•ื”ื›ื ื”ื™ื™ื ื• ื˜ืขืžื ื›ื“ืชื ื ื“ื‘ื™ ืจื‘ื™ ื™ืฉืžืขืืœ


Ameimar answers: Yes, generally Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi ex-pounds verses using the method of generalizations and details, but here, with regard to the redemption of the firstborn, this is the reason that he expounds the verses using the method of amplifications and restrictions: He holds in accordance with that which the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught.


ื“ืชื ื ื“ื‘ื™ ืจื‘ื™ ื™ืฉืžืขืืœ ื‘ืžื™ื ื‘ืžื™ื ืฉื ื™ ืคืขืžื™ื ืื™ืŸ ื–ื” ื›ืœืœ ื•ืคืจื˜ ืืœื ืจื™ื‘ื” ื•ืžื™ืขื˜


As the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: When defining which fish it is permitted to eat, the verse states: โ€œThis you may eat, from whatever is in the water, anything that has fins and scales in the water, in the seas and in the streamsโ€ (Leviticus 11:9). The verse first states the general term: โ€œIn the water,โ€ โ€œin the water,โ€ mentioning it twice, and only afterward mentions the details, i.e., โ€œin the seas and in the streams.โ€ When the general and detailed phrases are ordered in this way, they are not expounded as a generalization and a detail, but rather as an amplification and a restriction. Similarly, although Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi generally expounds verses using the method of generalizations and details, with regard to the redemption of the firstborn, since the verse mentions the two general terms first and mentions the specific detail only afterward, he expounds it using the method of amplifications and restrictions.


ื•ืจื‘ื ืŸ ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ื ื ื›ื“ืืžืจื™ ื‘ืžืขืจื‘ื ื›ืœ ืžืงื•ื ืฉืืชื” ืžื•ืฆื ืฉืชื™ ื›ืœืœื•ืช ื”ืกืžื•ื›ื•ืช ื–ื” ืœื–ื” ื”ื˜ืœ ืคืจื˜ ื‘ื™ื ื™ื”ืŸ ื•ื“ื•ื ื ื‘ื›ืœืœ ื•ืคืจื˜


The Gemara asks: And the Rabbis, why do they expound the verse about the redemption of a firstborn as a generalization and a detail? Ravina said: Like they say in the West, Eretz Yisrael: Wherever you find two generalizations juxtaposed to each other, followed by a specific detail, place the detail between the two generalizations and thereby expound them as a generalization and a detail followed by another generalization.


ื”ืฉืชื ื“ืืžืจืช ืจื‘ื™ ื›ืœืœื™ ื•ืคืจื˜ื™ ื“ืจื™ืฉ ื‘ืขืœ ื›ื•ืจื—ื™ืš ืงืฉื™ื ืฉื‘ื•ืขื•ืช ืืœื ื‘ืฉื‘ื•ืขื•ืช ื ืกื™ื‘ ืืœื™ื‘ื ื“ืจื‘ื™ ืขืงื™ื‘ื ื•ืœื™ื” ืœื ืกื‘ื™ืจื ืœื™ื”


The Gemara concludes the question it asked earlier: Now that you said that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi expounds verses using the method of generalizations and details, perforce the mishnaโ€™s ruling in the case of oaths is difficult, as it is derived by expounding the verse as an amplification and a restriction, and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi does not generally expound verses in that manner. This contradicts Rav Kahanaโ€™s explanation that the mishna expresses Rabbi Yehuda HaNasiโ€™s own opinion. Rather, one must say that with regard to oaths, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi formulated the mishna in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, but he himself does not hold accordingly.


ื’ื•ืคื ืžื ื™ืŸ ืฉืื™ื ื• ื—ื™ื™ื‘ ืืœื ืขืœ ืฉื™ืฉ ื‘ื” ื™ื“ื™ืขื” ื‘ืชื—ืœื” ื•ื™ื“ื™ืขื” ื‘ืกื•ืฃ ื•ื”ืขืœื ื‘ื™ื ืชื™ื ืชืœืžื•ื“ ืœื•ืžืจ ื•ื ืขืœื ื•ื ืขืœื ืฉื ื™ ืคืขืžื™ื ื“ื‘ืจื™ ืจื‘ื™ ืขืงื™ื‘ื


ยง Above (4a), the Gemara cited a baraita. Now the Gemara analyzes the matter itself. The baraita states: From where is it derived that one is liable to bring a sliding-scale offering only for cases in which he had awareness at the beginning and awareness at the end, but had a lapse of awareness in between, when he actually transgressed? The verse states with regard to a personโ€™s awareness of the fact that he was impure: โ€œAnd it was concealed,โ€ โ€œand it was concealed,โ€ mentioning it twice (Leviticus 5:2โ€“3). The first mention teaches that one is liable only if during the transgression he was unaware of his status, and the second mention teaches that one is liable only if he had awareness of his status before the transgression. This is the statement of Rabbi Akiva.


ืจื‘ื™ ืื•ืžืจ ืื™ื ื• ืฆืจื™ืš ื”ืจื™ ื”ื•ื ืื•ืžืจ ื•ื ืขืœื ืžื›ืœืœ ืฉื™ื“ืข ื•ื”ื•ื ื™ื“ืข ื”ืจื™ ื›ืืŸ ืฉืชื™ ื™ื“ื™ืขื•ืช ืื ื›ืŸ ืžื” ืชืœืžื•ื“ ืœื•ืžืจ ื•ื ืขืœื ืœื—ื™ื™ื‘ ืขืœ ื”ืขืœื ื˜ื•ืžืื” ื•ืขืœ ื”ืขืœื ืžืงื“ืฉ


The baraita continues: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: This proof is not necessary, as it states in the same verse: โ€œAnd it was concealed,โ€ which indicates, by inference, that initially he had been aware; and nevertheless the verse continues to state: โ€œAnd he was aware.โ€ It emerges, then, that the verse refers here to two different periods of awareness, one before the transgression and one afterward. But if so, why must the verse state: โ€œAnd it was concealed,โ€ a second time? It is in order to render one liable both for a violation due to a lapse of awareness of the fact that he was ritually impure and for a violation due to a lapse of awareness of the fact that the place he entered was actually the Temple.


ืืžืจ ืžืจ ื•ื ืขืœื ืžื›ืœืœ ืฉื™ื“ืข ืžืื™ ืžืฉืžืข ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื ืžื“ืœื ื›ืชื™ื‘ ื•ื”ื™ื ืขืœื•ืžื” ืžืžื ื•


The Master said in that baraita: The verse states: โ€œAnd it was concealed,โ€ which indicates, by inference, that initially he had been aware. The Gemara asks: From where is this inferred? Rava said: From the fact that it is not written: And it is concealed from him, which would have been the appropriate formulation had he never been aware of the matter at all. Accordingly, the phrase โ€œand it was concealedโ€ is to be understood as referring to a case in which he had been initially aware.


ืืžืจ ืœื™ื” ืื‘ื™ื™ ืืœื ืžืขืชื” ื’ื‘ื™ ืกื•ื˜ื” ื“ื›ืชื™ื‘ ื•ื ืขืœื ืžืขื™ื ื™ ืื™ืฉื” ืžื›ืœืœ ื“ื”ื•ื™ ื™ื“ืข ืžืขื™ืงืจื ืื™ ื”ื•ื” ื™ื“ืข ืžื™ ื‘ื“ืงื• ืœื” ืžื™ื


Abaye said to him: If that is so, then you should also make a similar inference with regard to a suspected adulteress [sota], as it is written that she is liable to undergo the ordeal of drinking the bitter waters when โ€œa man lay with her carnally, and it was concealed from the eyes of her husbandโ€ (Numbers 5:13). This would indicate, by inference, that initially he had been aware of the fact that his wife committed adultery. Abaye explains the difficulty: If he was actually aware that his wife had committed adultery, would the bitter waters have the power to examine her?


ื•ื”ื ืชื ื™ื ื•ื ืงื” ื”ืื™ืฉ ืžืขื•ืŸ ื•ื”ืืฉื” ื”ื”ื•ื ืชืฉื ืืช ืขื•ื ื” ื‘ื–ืžืŸ ืฉื”ืื™ืฉ ืžื ื•ืงื” ืžืขื•ืŸ ื”ืžื™ื ื‘ื•ื“ืงื™ืŸ ืืช ืืฉืชื• ืื™ืŸ ื”ืื™ืฉ ืžื ื•ืงื” ืžืขื•ืŸ ืื™ืŸ ื”ืžื™ื ื‘ื•ื“ืงื™ืŸ ืืช ืืฉืชื•


But isnโ€™t it taught in a baraita: The verse states with regard to a case in which she is found guilty: โ€œAnd the husband will be free of sin and the wife shall bear her sinโ€ (Numbers 5:31). This verse teaches that only when the husband is free of sin, the water examines his wife, but if the husband is not free of sin, the water does not examine his wife. If the husband had been aware that his wife had committed adultery, then she is forbidden to him and he is required to divorce her. The fact he did not divorce her is considered a sin; consequently, the waters cannot examine his wife.


ื•ืชื• ื’ื‘ื™ ืชื•ืจื” ื“ื›ืชื™ื‘ ื•ื ืขืœืžื” ืžืขื™ื ื™ ื›ืœ ื—ื™ ื•ืžืขื•ืฃ ื”ืฉืžื™ื ื ืกืชืจื” ืžื›ืœืœ ื“ืื™ื›ื ื“ื”ื•ื” ื™ื“ืข ื‘ื™ื” ื•ื”ื›ืชื™ื‘ ืœื ื™ื“ืข ืื ื•ืฉ ืขืจื›ื”


Abaye presents another difficulty to Rava: And furthermore, according to your understanding, you should also make a similar inference with regard to Torah, as it is written: โ€œAnd it was concealed from the eyes of all living creatures, and from those that soar in the heavens it was hiddenโ€ (Job 28:21), which would indicate, by inference, that initially there was someone who was aware of the Torah. But isnโ€™t it written: โ€œNo man knew its value, and it is not known in the land of the livingโ€ (Job 28:13)?


ืืœื ืืžืจ ืื‘ื™ื™ ืงืกื‘ืจ ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื“ื™ืขืช ื‘ื™ืช ืจื‘ื• ืฉืžื” ื™ื“ื™ืขื”


Rather, Abaye said: The formulation of the verse does not indicate that he actually realized he was impure; it indicates only that he was initially aware of the fact that he had come into contact with a source of impurity, but he failed to reach the obvious conclusion that he was thereby rendered impure. And Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that the elementary knowledge of the halakhot of ritual impurity that a person gained in his childhood from his school is sufficient, in light of his awareness of the fact he came into contact with a source of impurity, to be considered awareness of the fact that he was impure, and thereby render him liable to bring a sliding-scale offering.


ืืžืจ ืœื™ื” ืจื‘ ืคืคื ืœืื‘ื™ื™ ืืœื ื“ืงืชื ื™ ืื™ืŸ ื‘ื” ื™ื“ื™ืขื” ื‘ืชื—ืœื” ื•ื™ืฉ ื‘ื” ื™ื“ื™ืขื” ื‘ืกื•ืฃ ืžื™ ืื™ื›ื ื“ืœื™ืช ืœื™ื” ื™ื“ื™ืขืช ื‘ื™ืช ืจื‘ื• ืืžืจ ืœื™ื” ืื™ืŸ ืžืฉื›ื—ืช ืœื” ื‘ืชื™ื ื•ืง ืฉื ืฉื‘ื” ืœื‘ื™ืŸ ื”ื’ื•ื™ื


Rav Pappa said to Abaye: But how can you explain the halakha that is taught in the mishna: For cases in which he did not have awareness at the beginning but had awareness at the end? According to your explanation, is there anyone who does not have the elementary knowledge of the halakhot of ritual impurity that he gained from his school? Abaye said to him: Yes, you find it in the case of a child who was taken captive among gentiles, who never received even the most elementary level of knowledge.


ื™ืฆื™ืื•ืช ืฉื‘ืช ืฉืชื™ื ืฉื”ืŸ ืืจื‘ืข ืชื ืŸ ื”ืชื ื™ืฆื™ืื•ืช ืฉื‘ืช ืฉืชื™ื ืฉื”ืŸ ืืจื‘ืข ื‘ืคื ื™ื ื•ืฉืชื™ื ืฉื”ืŸ ืืจื‘ืข ื‘ื—ื•ืฅ ืžืื™ ืฉื ื ื”ื›ื ื“ืชื ื ืฉืชื™ื ืฉื”ืŸ ืืจื‘ืข ื•ืชื• ืœื ื•ืžืื™ ืฉื ื ื”ืชื ื“ืชื ื™ ืฉืชื™ื ืฉื”ืŸ ืืจื‘ืข ื‘ืคื ื™ื ื•ืฉืชื™ื ืฉื”ืŸ ืืจื‘ืข ื‘ื—ื•ืฅ


ยง The mishna states (2a): With regard to acts of carrying out that are prohibited on Shabbat, there are two types that are four. We learned in a mishna there (Shabbat 2a): With regard to acts of carrying out that are prohibited on Shabbat, there are primarily two basic actions that are four cases with regard to transferring an item inside, to a private domain; and two basic actions that are four cases with regard to transferring an item outside, to a public domain. The Gemara asks: What is different here that the mishna teaches: There are two types that are four, and nothing more; and what is different there, in tractate Shabbat, that the mishna teaches: There are two actions that are four cases with regard to transferring an item inside, to a private domain, and two actions that are four cases with regard to transferring an item outside, to a public domain?


ื”ืชื ื“ืขื™ืงืจ ืฉื‘ืช ื”ื•ื ืชื ื™ ืื‘ื•ืช ื•ืชื•ืœื“ื•ืช ื”ื›ื ื“ืœืื• ืขื™ืงืจ ืฉื‘ืช ื”ื•ื ืื‘ื•ืช ืชื ื™ ื•ืชื•ืœื“ื•ืช ืœื ืชื ื™


The Gemara answers: There, in tractate Shabbat, which is where the main discussion of the halakhot of Shabbat is found, the mishna teaches both the primary categories and the subcategories of labor prohibited on Shabbat. But here, in tractate Shevuot, which does not contain the main discussion of the halakhot of Shabbat, the mishna teaches the primary categories of labor prohibited on Shabbat but does not teach the subcategories of labor.


ืื‘ื•ืช ืžืื™ ื ื™ื ื”ื• ื™ืฆื™ืื•ืช ื™ืฆื™ืื•ืช ืชืจืชื™ ื”ื•ื™ื™ืŸ


The Gemara asks: What are the primary categories of transferring an item on Shabbat? They are acts of carrying out from the private domain to the public domain. The Gemara objects: But the acts of carrying out are only two in number, i.e., where the carrying out is done by someone standing in the private domain and when it is done by someone in the public domain. Why then does the mishna state that there are four cases?


ื•ื›ื™ ืชื™ืžื ืžื”ืŸ ืœื—ื™ื•ื‘ ื•ืžื”ืŸ ืœืคื˜ื•ืจ ื•ื”ื ื“ื•ืžื™ื ื“ืžืจืื•ืช ื ื’ืขื™ื ืงืชื ื™ ืžื” ื”ืชื ื›ื•ืœื”ื• ืœื—ื™ื•ื‘ื ืืฃ ื”ื›ื ื›ื•ืœื”ื• ืœื—ื™ื•ื‘ื


And if you would say that the mishna enumerates four types of carrying out, among them those for which there is liability and among them those for which there is exemption, that is not feasible, as doesnโ€™t the mishna teach this case as similar to the different shades of leprous marks? This would indicate that just as there, all four of them are types for which there is liability, so too here, with regard to carrying out on Shabbat, all four of them are types for which there is liability.


ืืœื ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ืคืคื ื”ืชื ื“ืขื™ืงืจ ืฉื‘ืช ืชื ื™ ื—ื™ื•ื‘ื™ ื•ืคื˜ื•ืจื™ ื”ื›ื ื—ื™ื•ื‘ื™ ืชื ื™ ื•ืคื˜ื•ืจื™ ืœื ืชื ื™


Rather, Rav Pappa said that the difference between the manner in which the halakha is cited in tractates Shevuot and Shabbat must be understood as follows: There, in tractate Shabbat, which contains the main discussion of the halakhot of Shabbat, the mishna teaches both cases of liability and cases of exemption. But here, in tractate Shevuot, which does not contain the main discussion of the halakhot of Shabbat, the mishna teaches only cases of liability but does not teach cases of exemption.


ื—ื™ื•ื‘ื™ ืžืื™ ื ื™ื ื”ื• ื™ืฆื™ืื•ืช ื™ืฆื™ืื•ืช ืชืจืชื™ ื”ื•ื ื“ื”ื•ื™ื™ืŸ ืฉืชื™ื ื“ื”ื•ืฆืื” ื•ืฉืชื™ื ื“ื”ื›ื ืกื”


The Gemara asks: What are the cases of liability? They are acts of carrying out from the private domain to the public domain. The Gemara objects: But the acts of carrying out are only two in number. Why then does the mishna state that there are four cases? The Gemara explains: There are two cases of carrying out an item from a private domain to a public domain and two more cases of bringing in an item from a public domain to a private domain.


ื•ื”ื ื™ืฆื™ืื•ืช ืงืชื ื™ ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ืืฉื™ ืชื ื ื”ื›ื ืกื” ื ืžื™ ื”ื•ืฆืื” ืงืจื™ ืœื” ืžืžืื™


The Gemara objects: But the mishna teaches: Acts of carrying out. It does not appear to mention acts of bringing in at all. Rav Ashi said: The tanna also refers to an act of bringing in an item as an act of carrying out an item. The Gemara asks: From where do we know this?


ื“ืชื ืŸ ื”ืžื•ืฆื™ื ืžืจืฉื•ืช ืœืจืฉื•ืช ื—ื™ื™ื‘ ืžื™ ืœื ืขืกืงื™ื ืŸ ื“ืงื ืžืขื™ื™ืœ ืขื™ื•ืœื™ ื•ืงื ืงืจื™ ืœื™ื” ื”ื•ืฆืื”


It is as we learned in a mishna (Shabbat 73a): One who carries out an item from one domain to another domain is liable. The Gemara claims: Are we not also dealing with a case where he is bringing it in from a public domain to a private domain, and nevertheless the mishna refers to it as carrying out?


ื•ื“ืœืžื ืงื ืžืคื™ืง ืžืจืฉื•ืช ื”ื™ื—ื™ื“ ืœืจืฉื•ืช ื”ืจื‘ื™ื ืื ื›ืŸ ื ื™ืชื ื™ ื”ืžื•ืฆื™ื ืžืจืฉื•ืช ื”ื™ื—ื™ื“ ืœืจืฉื•ืช ื”ืจื‘ื™ื ืžืื™ ืžืจืฉื•ืช ืœืจืฉื•ืช ื“ืืคื™ืœื• ืžืจืฉื•ืช ื”ืจื‘ื™ื ืœืจืฉื•ืช ื”ื™ื—ื™ื“


The Gemara questions this assertion: But perhaps the mishna is dealing with a case of carrying out an item from a private domain to a public domain. The Gemara defends its claim: If so, let it instead teach: One who carries out an item from a private domain to a public domain is liable. What is the reason it used the more generalized formulation: From one domain to another domain? To teach that one is liable even if one transfers an item from a public domain to a private domain.


ื•ืงื ืงืจื™ ืœื” ื”ื•ืฆืื” ื•ื˜ืขืžื ืžืื™ ืชื ื ื›ืœ ืขืงื™ืจืช ื—ืคืฅ ืžืžืงื•ืžื• ื”ื•ืฆืื” ืงืจื™ ืœื”


The Gemara explains further: Even though the mishna addresses carrying an item in from a public domain to a private domain, it refers to it as carrying out. The Gemara explains: What is the reason for this? The tanna refers to any act that involves removal of an item from its place as carrying out. Accordingly, the term can appropriately be used even when an item is brought in to a private domain from a public domain.


ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ื ื ืžืชื ื™ืชื™ืŸ ื ืžื™ ื“ื™ืงื ื“ืงืชื ื™ ื™ืฆื™ืื•ืช ืฉื‘ืช ืฉืชื™ื ืฉื”ืŸ ืืจื‘ืข ื‘ืคื ื™ื ื•ืฉืชื™ื ืฉื”ืŸ ืืจื‘ืข ื‘ื—ื•ืฅ ื•ืงื ืžืคืจืฉ ื”ื›ื ืกื” ืฉืžืข ืžื™ื ื”


Ravina said: The language of the mishna in tractate Shabbat is also precise in indicating this, as it teaches: With regard to acts of carrying out [yetziyyot] that are prohibited on Shabbat, there are primarily two basic actions that are four cases from the perspective of a person inside a private domain, and two basic actions that are four cases from the perspective of a person outside, in a public domain. And then, immediately, in the continuation of that mishna, it explicates the cases of bringing in an item. Conclude from it that the term: Carrying out, is also used to refer to bringing in an item.


ืจื‘ื ืืžืจ ืจืฉื•ื™ื•ืช ืงืชื ื™ ืจืฉื•ื™ื•ืช ืฉื‘ืช ืฉืชื™ื


Rava said: One cannot make any inference from the language of the mishna, as it is not referring to acts of carrying out. Rather, it teaches domains. In other words, it means: With regard to the domains of Shabbat there are two types, the existence of which leads to four types of prohibited transfers, two with regard to carrying out and two with regard to bringing in.


ืžืจืื•ืช ื ื’ืขื™ื ืฉื ื™ื ืฉื”ืŸ ืืจื‘ืขื” ืชื ืŸ ื”ืชื ืžืจืื•ืช ื ื’ืขื™ื ืฉื ื™ื ืฉื”ืŸ ืืจื‘ืขื” ื‘ื”ืจืช ืขื–ื” ื›ืฉืœื’ ืฉื ื™ื” ืœื” ื›ืกื™ื“ ื”ื”ื™ื›ืœ


ยง The mishna teaches: With regard to different shades of leprous marks, there are two types that are actually four. We learned in a mishna there (Negaโ€™im 1:1): With regard to different shades of leprous marks, there are two types that are actually four: The baheret, mentioned in the Torah (see Leviticus 13:2), is considered a primary mark; it is an intense white, like snow. Secondary to it, i.e., a sub-category of it, is a mark that is white like the lime plaster of the Sanctuary walls.


ืฉืืช ื›ืฆืžืจ ืœื‘ืŸ ืฉื ื™ื” ืœื” ื›ืงืจื•ื ื‘ื™ืฆื”


That mishna continues: The seโ€™et mentioned in the Torah is considered a primary mark; it is like white wool. Secondary to it is a mark that is white like the membrane of an egg. The ordering of different shades is relevant in determining which shades can be combined together. In order for a leprous mark to be halakhically significant, it must at least be the size of a split Cilician bean [geris]. If a mark is that size, but it is composed of different shades of white, none of which is alone the size of a geris, then if the different shades are compatible they can combine together and will thereby render the person ritually impure.


ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ื—ื ื™ื ื ืžืืŸ ืชื ื ืžืจืื•ืช ื ื’ืขื™ื ื“ืœื ื›ืจื‘ื™ ืขืงื™ื‘ื ื“ืื™ ืจื‘ื™ ืขืงื™ื‘ื ื›ื™ื•ืŸ ื“ืืžืจ ื–ื• ืœืžืขืœื” ืžื–ื• ื•ื–ื• ืœืžืขืœื” ืžื–ื• ืื ื›ืŸ ื˜ื™ื”ืจืช ืกื™ื“ ื”ื™ื›ืœ ืžืœืฆืจืฃ


Rabbi แธคanina said: Who is the tanna who taught this mishna, which delineates the different shades of leprous marks into two groups? It is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva. As if it were in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva one would be presented with a difficulty: Since with regard to which shades can combine together, Rabbi Akiva says: The different shades should be ordered this one above this one, and that one above that one, i.e., according to their degrees of brightness, from the most bright to the darkest shade, as follows: Snow white, i.e., baheret; wool white, i.e., seโ€™et; lime; and egg membrane; and only two adjacent shades can combine together. But if so, you have rendered pure a mark that is white like the lime plaster of the Sanctuary walls and is smaller than a geris, as it cannot be combined with any other shade of white.


ื‘ื”ื“ื™ ืžืืŸ ืœื™ืฆืจืคื™ื” ืœื™ืฆืจืคื™ื” ื‘ื”ื“ื™ ื‘ื”ืจืช ืื™ื›ื ืฉืืช ื“ืขื“ื™ืคื ืžื™ื ื™ื” ืœื™ืฆืจืคื™ื” ื‘ื”ื“ื™ ืฉืืช ืœืื• ืชื•ืœื“ื” ื“ื™ื“ื™ื” ื”ื•ื


The Gemara explains: With which other shade could we combine the lime-colored mark? We cannot say: Let us combine it together with a snow-white baheret, which is the primary mark relative to a lime-colored mark, as there is a wool-white seโ€™et, which is a more bright white than a lime-colored mark but less bright than snow white. Since baheret is not adjacent to lime it cannot combine with it. We cannot say: Let us combine it together with a seโ€™et, as a lime-colored mark is not its secondary mark and a primary mark can combine only with its secondary mark. This is difficult because the mishnaโ€™s categorization of a lime-colored mark as a secondary mark indicates that it can be combined with another shade of white. Perforce, the mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva.


ืื™ ื”ื›ื™ ืงืจื•ื ื‘ื™ืฆื” ื ืžื™ ื‘ื”ื“ื™ ืžืืŸ ืœื™ืฆืจืคื™ื” ืœื™ืฆืจืคื™ื” ื‘ื”ื“ื™ ืฉืืช ืื™ื›ื ืกื™ื“ ื“ืขื“ื™ืฃ ืžื™ื ื™ื” ืœื™ืฆืจืคื™ื” ื‘ื”ื“ื™ ืกื™ื“ ืœืื• ื‘ืจ ืžื™ื ื™ื” ื”ื•ื


The Gemara asks: If that is so, that Rabbi Akiva holds that only adjacent shades of white can combine together, why didnโ€™t Rabbi แธคanina also bring proof from a mark that is white like the membrane of an egg, as with which other shade could we combine it? We cannot say: Let us combine it together with a wool-white seโ€™et, which is the primary mark relative to an egg membraneโ€“colored mark, as there is a lime-colored mark, which is a more bright white than an egg membraneโ€“colored mark but less bright that wool white. Since seโ€™et is not adjacent to egg membrane it cannot combine with it. We cannot say: Let us combine it together with a lime-colored mark, as it is not its type, i.e., they are not of the same category, and so they cannot combine.


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