Masechet Zevachim
Masechet Zevachim is sponsored by Esther Kremer in loving memory of her father, Manny Gross on his third yahrzeit. “He exemplified a path of holiness and purity, living with kedushah in his everyday life.”
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Summary
Since Rabbi Shimon holds that one becomes impure only through direct involvement in the burning of the bulls and goats, the Gemara asks how he interprets the verse “outside the camp” in the context of the Yom Kippur offerings. He applies it to a gezeira shava linking these offerings to the para aduma, establishing that they must be burned outside all three camps and specifically east of Jerusalem. The rabbis, however, reject this comparison and distinguish between the two burning sites: the para aduma was burned to the east, whereas the sin offerings of Yom Kippur were burned to the north of Jerusalem.
The Mishna discusses the laws of slaughtering and offering sacrifices outside the Temple. The tanna kama rules that one who both slaughters and offers outside is liable for each act, while Rabbi Yosei HaGelili exempts a case in which both actions occur outside, since the offering was already invalidated by the improper slaughter and the subsequent offering does not constitute a transgression. The rabbis respond that even an offering slaughtered properly inside becomes invalid once taken outside, yet the prohibition of offering it outside still applies.
The Mishna continues with the laws of eating sacrificial meat while impure: an impure person is liable whether he eats pure or impure sacrificial meat, though Rabbi Yosei HaGelili again exempts an impure person who eats impure meat, arguing that he consumed something already disqualified. The rabbis counter that even pure meat becomes impure upon contact with the impure person before it is eaten.
The Gemara seeks the scriptural sources for both the punishment and the warning associated with slaughtering and offering outside. The punishment for both acts is explicit, and the warning for offering outside is derived from Devarim 12:13, “Beware lest you offer your burnt offerings.” The warning for slaughtering outside, however, is not clearly stated, and the Gemara explores four possible verses as its source, rejecting the first two and concluding with two possibilities.
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Masechet Zevachim
Masechet Zevachim is sponsored by Esther Kremer in loving memory of her father, Manny Gross on his third yahrzeit. “He exemplified a path of holiness and purity, living with kedushah in his everyday life.”
Zevachim 106
אַף כָּאן – לְמִזְרָחָהּ שֶׁל יְרוּשָׁלַיִם.
so too here, the bull and goat of Yom Kippur are burned east of Jerusalem.
אֶלָּא לְרַבָּנַן הֵיכָא שָׂרֵיף לְהוּ? כִּדְתַנְיָא: הֵיכָן נִשְׂרָפִין? לִצְפוֹן יְרוּשָׁלַיִם, חוּץ לְשָׁלֹשׁ מַחֲנוֹת. רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי אוֹמֵר: אַבֵּית הַדֶּשֶׁן נִשְׂרָפִין.
But according to the Rabbis, then, where outside Jerusalem do they burn them? The Gemara responds: As it is taught in a baraita: Where are the bulls and goats burned? They are burned north of Jerusalem, outside of the three camps. Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says: They are burned on the place of the ashes, where the ashes from the altar were poured.
אָמַר רָבָא: מַאן תַּנָּא דִּפְלִיג עֲלֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי? רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בֶּן יַעֲקֹב הִיא, דְּתַנְיָא: ״עַל שֶׁפֶךְ הַדֶּשֶׁן יִשָּׂרֵף״ – שֶׁיְּהֵא שָׁם דֶּשֶׁן (שֶׁיַּקְדִּים לְשָׁם דֶּשֶׁן). רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בֶּן יַעֲקֹב אוֹמֵר: שֶׁיְּהֵא מְקוֹמוֹ מְשׁוּפָּךְ.
Rava said: Who is the tanna who disagrees with Rabbi Yosei HaGelili? It is Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov, as it is taught in a baraita: The verse states with regard to bulls that are burned: “Where the ashes are poured out [shefekh hadeshen] shall it be burned” (Leviticus 4:12). This teaches that ashes must be there already when the bulls are burned. Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov says: This verse teaches that its place should slope [meshupakh] downward so that ashes from the burning will slide downhill.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי: דִּילְמָא בִּמְקוֹמוֹ מְשׁוּפָּךְ פְּלִיגִי.
Abaye said to Rava: Perhaps they disagree only about whether the place must slope, but Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov agrees that it must be the place where the ashes from the altar were deposited.
תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: הַשּׂוֹרֵף מְטַמֵּא בְּגָדִים, וְלֹא הַמַּצִּית אֶת הָאוּר מְטַמֵּא בְּגָדִים, וְלֹא הַמְסַדֵּר אֶת הַמַּעֲרָכָה מְטַמֵּא בְּגָדִים. וְאֵיזֶהוּ הַשּׂוֹרֵף? הַמְסַיֵּיעַ בִּשְׁעַת שְׂרֵיפָה.
§ The Sages taught in a baraita: The verse states with regard to the bull and goat of Yom Kippur: “And he who burns them shall wash his garments” (Leviticus 16:28). This teaches that only the one who burns them renders his garments impure, but the one who kindles the fire does not render his garments impure, and the one who sets up the arrangement of wood does not render his garments impure. And who is considered the one who burns? One who assists at the actual time of burning.
יָכוֹל אַף מִשֶּׁנַּעֲשׂוּ אֵפֶר מְטַמֵּא בְּגָדִים? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״אוֹתָם״ – אוֹתָם מְטַמְּאִין בְּגָדִים, וּמִשֶּׁנַּעֲשִׂין אֵפֶר אֵין מְטַמְּאִין בְּגָדִים. רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: אוֹתָם מְטַמְּאִין בְּגָדִים, נִיתַּךְ הַבָּשָׂר אֵין מְטַמְּאִין בְּגָדִים.
One might have thought that this priest renders his garments impure even after the bull and goat become ash. Therefore, the verse states: “And he who burns them” (Leviticus 16:28), teaching that they, the whole bull and goat, render garments impure, but they do not render garments impure once they become ash. Rabbi Shimon says: The word “them” teaches that they render garments impure, but once the flesh is incinerated they do not render garments impure.
מַאי בֵּינַיְיהוּ? אָמַר רָבָא: אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ דְּשַׁוְּיֵיהּ חָרוֹכָא.
The Gemara asks: What is the difference between the opinion of the first tanna and the opinion of Rabbi Shimon? Rava said: The difference between them is when he turned it into a charred mass, and the form of the animal has become distorted, but has not actually become ash. The first tanna holds that at this stage the offering still transmits impurity, whereas Rabbi Shimon holds that it does not.
הֲדַרַן עֲלָךְ טְבוּל יוֹם
מַתְנִי׳ הַשּׁוֹחֵט וְהַמַּעֲלֶה בַּחוּץ – חַיָּיב עַל הַשְּׁחִיטָה, וְחַיָּיב עַל הַעֲלָאָה.
MISHNA: One who slaughters an offering outside the Temple courtyard and one who offers it up outside the Temple courtyard is liable for the slaughter and liable for the offering up, as each act involves an independent prohibition. If done intentionally, he is liable to receive excision from the World-to-Come [karet] for each act, and if done unwittingly, he is liable to bring a sin offering for each act.
רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי אוֹמֵר: שָׁחַט בִּפְנִים וְהֶעֱלָה בַּחוּץ. שָׁחַט בַּחוּץ וְהֶעֱלָה בַּחוּץ – פָּטוּר, שֶׁלֹּא הֶעֱלָה אֶלָּא דָּבָר פָּסוּל. אָמְרוּ לוֹ: אַף הַשּׁוֹחֵט בִּפְנִים וּמַעֲלֶה בַּחוּץ, כֵּיוָן שֶׁהוֹצִיאוֹ – פְּסָלוֹ.
Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says: If he slaughtered an offering inside the courtyard and then offered it up outside the courtyard, he is liable. But if he slaughtered it outside, thereby rendering it unfit, and then he offered it up outside, he is exempt for the offering up, as he offered up only an item that is unfit, and one is liable only for offering up an item that is fit to be offered up inside the Temple. The Rabbis said to him: According to your reasoning, even in a case where he slaughters it inside and offers it up outside, he should be exempt, since the moment that he took it outside the courtyard, he thereby rendered it unfit. Yet, in such a case, he is certainly liable for offering it up. So too, one who slaughters an offering outside and then offers it up outside is liable.
הַטָּמֵא שֶׁאָכַל בֵּין קֹדֶשׁ טָמֵא בֵּין קֹדֶשׁ טָהוֹר – חַיָּיב. רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי אוֹמֵר: טָמֵא שֶׁאָכַל טָהוֹר – חַיָּיב, וְטָמֵא שֶׁאָכַל טָמֵא – פָּטוּר, שֶׁלֹּא אָכַל אֶלָּא דָּבָר טָמֵא. אָמְרוּ לוֹ: אַף טָמֵא שֶׁאָכַל אֶת הַטָּהוֹר, כֵּיוָן שֶׁנָּגַע בּוֹ – טִמְּאוֹהוּ.
One who is ritually impure who ate sacrificial food, whether it was ritually impure sacrificial food or ritually pure sacrificial food, is liable to receive karet if he did so intentionally and to bring a sliding-scale offering if he did so unwittingly. Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says: An impure person who ate pure sacrificial food is liable. But an impure person who ate impure sacrificial food is exempt, as he merely ate an impure item, and the prohibition against eating sacrificial food while one is impure applies only to pure sacrificial food. The Rabbis said to him: According to your logic, this halakha would apply even in a case of an impure person who ate what had been pure sacrificial food, because once he touched it, he thereby rendered it ritually impure. Yet, in such a case, he is certainly liable for eating it. So too, an impure person who ate impure sacrificial food is liable.
וְטָהוֹר שֶׁאָכַל טָמֵא – פָּטוּר, שֶׁאֵינוֹ חַיָּיב אֶלָּא עַל טוּמְאַת הַגּוּף.
And a pure person who ate impure sacrificial food is exempt, as one is liable for eating sacrificial food in impurity only due to the impurity of one’s body, but not due to the impurity of the food.
גְּמָ׳ בִּשְׁלָמָא הֶעֱלָה – כְּתִיב עוֹנֶשׁ וּכְתִיב אַזְהָרָה. עוֹנֶשׁ – דִּכְתִיב: ״וְאֶל פֶּתַח אֹהֶל מוֹעֵד לֹא הֱבִיאוֹ״. אַזְהָרָה – דִּכְתִיב: ״הִשָּׁמֶר לְךָ פֶּן תַּעֲלֶה עוֹלוֹתֶיךָ״; וְכִי הָא דְּאָמַר רַבִּי אָבִין אָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: כׇּל מָקוֹם שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר ״הִשָּׁמֶר״, ״פֶּן״ וְ״אַל״ – אֵינוֹ אֶלָּא לֹא תַעֲשֶׂה.
GEMARA: The mishna teaches that if one both slaughters and offers up an offering outside the Temple courtyard, he is liable for each act, as they are independent prohibitions. The Gemara asks: Granted that one is liable for the offering up, as the punishment for this act is written in the Torah and the prohibition concerning this act is also written in the Torah. The punishment is as it is written: “Any man…that offers up a burnt offering or sacrifice, and will not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting, to sacrifice it to the Lord, and that man shall be cut off from his people” (Leviticus 17:8–9). The prohibition is as it is written: “Take heed to yourself lest you offer up your burnt offerings in every place that you see” (Deuteronomy 12:13). And this is in accordance with that which Rabbi Avin says that Rabbi Elazar says: Wherever it is stated in the Torah: Observe, or: Lest, or: Do not, it is nothing other than a prohibition. Accordingly, the verse in Deuteronomy is understood as issuing a prohibition.
אֶלָּא שְׁחִיטָה – בִּשְׁלָמָא עוֹנֶשׁ, דִּכְתִיב: ״וְאֶל פֶּתַח אֹהֶל מוֹעֵד לֹא הֱבִיאוֹ״; אֶלָּא אַזְהָרָה מְנָלַן? אָמַר קְרָא: ״וְלֹא יִזְבְּחוּ עוֹד״.
But for the slaughtering, why is one liable? Granted that the punishment is stated in the Torah, as it is written: “Any man…that slaughters it outside the camp, and he did not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting, to sacrifice an offering to the Lord, before the Tabernacle of the Lord…that man shall be cut off from among his people” (Leviticus 17:3–4). But from where do we derive its prohibition? One is liable only in a case where the Torah specifies both the prohibition and the punishment. The Gemara answers: The verse states in the continuation of that passage: “And they shall not slaughter anymore their offerings to the se’irim after whom they go astray” (Leviticus 17:7).
הַאי מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ לְכִדְרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר! דְּאָמַר: מִנַּיִן לַזּוֹבֵחַ בְּהֵמָה לְמַרְקוּלִיס שֶׁהוּא חַיָּיב? דִּכְתִיב: ״וְלֹא יִזְבְּחוּ עוֹד אֶת זִבְחֵיהֶם״ – אִם אֵינוֹ עִנְיָן לִכְדַרְכָּהּ, דִּכְתִיב: ״אֵיכָה יַעַבְדוּ״; תְּנֵהוּ עִנְיָן לְשֶׁלֹּא כְּדַרְכָּהּ.
The Gemara questions the use of this verse as a source: But this verse is necessary for the purpose of expounding in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Elazar, as he says: From where is it derived with regard to one who slaughters an animal as an offering to Mercury, a pagan deity, that he is liable even though this is not the established manner in which that deity is worshipped? As it is written: “And they shall not slaughter anymore their offerings to the se’irim.” If the verse is not needed to teach the matter of worshipping a deity in accordance with its established manner, as it is already taught that one is liable for this, as it is written: “Take heed to yourself…lest you inquire after their gods, saying: How do these nations serve their gods, so too will I do likewise” (Deuteronomy 12:30), then apply it to the matter of worshipping a deity in a way that is not in accordance with its established manner.
אָמַר רַבָּה: קְרִי בֵּיהּ ״וְלֹא יִזְבְּחוּ״, וּקְרִי בֵּיהּ ״וְלֹא עוֹד״.
Rabba said: Both halakhot can be derived from the same verse. Read into the verse as though it stops after the phrase: “And they shall not slaughter” (Leviticus 17:7), and relates to the prohibition against slaughtering outside the Temple courtyard, which was mentioned in the previous verses. And also read into the verse as relating to the verse’s continuation: And not anymore their offerings to the se’irim, which serves as the source for the prohibition against sacrificing offerings to false deities.
אַכַּתִּי מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ לְכִדְתַנְיָא: עַד כָּאן הוּא מְדַבֵּר בְּקָדָשִׁים שֶׁהִקְדִּישָׁן בִּשְׁעַת אִיסּוּר הַבָּמוֹת וְהִקְרִיבָן בִּשְׁעַת אִיסּוּר הַבָּמוֹת –
The Gemara challenges: But the verse is still necessary for the purpose of expounding that which is taught in a baraita: The verse states: “Any man…that slaughters it outside the camp, and he did not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting, to sacrifice an offering to the Lord” (Leviticus 17:3–4). Until this point, the verse is speaking about sacrificial animals that one consecrated during a period when the prohibition against sacrificing on private altars was in effect, i.e., after the Tabernacle was erected, and then he also sacrificed them during a period when the prohibition against sacrificing on private altars was in effect.
שֶׁהֲרֵי עוֹנְשָׁן אָמוּר: ״וְאֶל פֶּתַח אֹהֶל מוֹעֵד״, אַזְהָרָה – דִּכְתִיב: ״הִשָּׁמֶר לְךָ פֶּן תַּעֲלֶה עֹלֹתֶיךָ״.
This is apparent, as the punishment for sacrificing them is stated in this verse: “And he did not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting, to sacrifice an offering to the Lord, before the Tabernacle of the Lord…that man shall be cut off from among his people.” The prohibition is also explicit, as it is written: “Take heed to yourself lest you offer up your burnt offerings in every place that you see” (Deuteronomy 12:13).
מִכָּאן וְאֵילָךְ – בִּזְבָחִים שֶׁהִקְדִּישָׁן בִּשְׁעַת הֶיתֵּר הַבָּמוֹת וְהִקְרִיבָן בִּשְׁעַת אִיסּוּר הַבָּמוֹת,
From that point onward, the verse is speaking about sacrificial animals that one consecrated during a period when there was permission to sacrifice offerings on private altars, i.e., before the Tabernacle was erected, and then he sacrificed them outside the Tabernacle during a period when the prohibition against sacrificing on private altars was in effect.
שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״לְמַעַן אֲשֶׁר יָבִיאוּ בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל אֶת זִבְחֵיהֶם אֲשֶׁר הֵם זֹבְחִים״ – זְבָחִים שֶׁהִתַּרְתִּי לְךָ כְּבָר. ״עַל פְּנֵי הַשָּׂדֶה״ – לוֹמַר לָךְ: הַזּוֹבֵחַ בִּשְׁעַת אִיסּוּר הַבָּמוֹת, מַעֲלֶה עָלָיו הַכָּתוּב כְּאִילּוּ הִקְרִיב עַל פְּנֵי הַשָּׂדֶה.
This is apparent, as it is stated: “In order that the children of Israel shall bring their sacrifices, which they slaughter upon the open field, that they shall bring them to the Lord, to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting” (Leviticus 17:5). The phrase “their sacrifices, which they slaughter” is interpreted as referring to offerings that I have previously permitted for you to slaughter on private altars. This verse teaches that those offerings may now be sacrificed only inside the Tabernacle. The phrase “upon the open field” tells you that in the case of one who slaughters an offering on a private altar during a period when the prohibition against sacrificing on private altars is in effect, even if he sacrifices the offering to God, the verse ascribes him blame as if he sacrificed it upon the open field in idolatrous worship.
״וֶהֱבִיאֻם לַה׳״ – זוֹ מִצְוַת עֲשֵׂה. לֹא תַעֲשֶׂה מִנַּיִין? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״וְלֹא יִזְבְּחוּ עוֹד״.
The verse continues: “That they shall bring them to the Lord.” This is a positive mitzva to sacrifice in the Tabernacle even offerings that were consecrated before the Tabernacle was erected. From where is it derived that there is a prohibition against sacrificing them outside the Tabernacle? The verse states: “And they shall not slaughter anymore their offerings to the se’irim after whom they go astray; this shall be to them an eternal statute, throughout their generations” (Leviticus 17:7).
יָכוֹל יְהֵא עָנוּשׁ כָּרֵת? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״חֻקַּת עוֹלָם תִּהְיֶה זֹּאת לָהֶם לְדֹרֹתָם״ – זֹאת לָהֶם וְלֹא אַחֶרֶת לָהֶם.
One might have thought that sacrificing these offerings outside the Tabernacle would be punishable by karet, as is the halakha with regard to offerings consecrated after the Tabernacle was erected. Therefore, the verse states: “This shall be to them an eternal statute, throughout their generations” (Leviticus 17:7). One can infer from this verse that this, the punishment for transgressing a positive mitzva and a prohibition, applies to them, but no other punishment applies to them. It is clear from this baraita that the verse “And they shall not slaughter anymore” is used to teach about the prohibition against sacrificing outside the Tabernacle those offerings that were consecrated while there was permission to sacrifice on private altars, and not those offerings that were consecrated while it was prohibited to sacrifice on private altars.
אֶלָּא אָמַר רַבִּי אָבִין: קַל וָחוֹמֶר; וּמָה בִּמְקוֹם שֶׁלֹּא עָנַשׁ – הִזְהִיר, מְקוֹם שֶׁעָנַשׁ – אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁהִזְהִיר?!
Rather, Rabbi Avin says: The prohibition against slaughtering an offering outside the Temple is derived through an a fortiori inference: Just as in a case in which the Torah did not prescribe punishment for a certain action, it nevertheless prohibited it, as is the case with regard to sacrificing outside the Temple an offering consecrated while there was permission to sacrifice on private altars, so too, in a case in which the Torah did prescribe punishment for a certain action, as is the case with regard to slaughtering outside the Temple an offering consecrated while it was prohibited to sacrifice on private altars, is it not logical that the Torah prohibited the action?
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבִינָא לְרַב אָשֵׁי: אִם כֵּן, לֹא יֵאָמֵר לָאו בְּחֵלֶב – וְתֵיתֵי קַל וָחוֹמֶר מִנְּבֵילָה: מָה נְבֵילָה שֶׁלֹּא עָנַשׁ – הִזְהִיר, חֵלֶב שֶׁעָנַשׁ – אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁהִזְהִיר?!
Ravina said to Rav Ashi: If so, that whenever the Torah states a punishment for a certain action, there is no need for it to state the prohibition, then let the Torah not state a prohibition with regard to eating forbidden fat of a kosher animal, and then derive the fact that it is prohibited through an a fortiori inference from the prohibition against eating an unslaughtered animal carcass: Just as with regard to a carcass, even though the Torah did not prescribe punishment for consuming it, it nevertheless prohibited consuming it, so too, with regard to animal fat, for which the Torah did prescribe punishment, is it not logical that the Torah prohibited its consumption?
אֲתָא לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרָבָא, אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מִנְּבֵלָה נָמֵי לָא אָתְיָא, דְּאִיכָּא לְמִיפְרַךְ: מָה לִנְבֵלָה שֶׁכֵּן מְטַמֵּא!
Rav Ashi came before Rava and said to him: The prohibition against eating animal fat can also not be derived from the prohibition of a carcass, as the a fortiori inference can be refuted as follows: What is notable about a carcass? It is notable in that it renders other items ritually impure through contact with it. Forbidden fat does not share this stringency. The existence of a unique stringency undermines the possibility of using an a fortiori inference.
מִשְּׁרָצִים טְמֵאִין. מָה לִשְׁרָצִים טְמֵאִין – שֶׁמְּטַמְּאִין בְּמַשֶּׁהוּ!
Rav Ashi raises the possibility of deriving the prohibition against eating forbidden fat through an a fortiori inference from various other prohibitions that, like forbidden fat, do not carry the stringency of being punishable by karet, and Rava rejects each one. Can one derive the prohibition against eating forbidden fat from the prohibition against eating carcasses of ritually impure creeping animals (see Leviticus 11:41)? One cannot, as what is notable about ritually impure creeping animals? They are notable in that they render other items ritually impure though contact with any amount of them. Forbidden fat does not share this stringency.
מִשְּׁרָצִים טְהוֹרִים. מָה לִשְׁרָצִים טְהוֹרִים – שֶׁאִיסּוּרָן בְּמַשֶּׁהוּ!
Can one derive it from the prohibition against eating the carcasses of ritually pure creeping animals (see Leviticus 11:41), which do not have the capacity to render other items ritually impure? One cannot, as what is notable about ritually pure creeping animals? They are notable in that with regard to their prohibition there is liability for consuming any amount of them. Forbidden fat does not share this stringency, as one is liable only if he eats an olive-bulk of it.
מֵעׇרְלָה וְכִלְאֵי הַכֶּרֶם. מָה לְעׇרְלָה וְכִלְאֵי הַכֶּרֶם – שֶׁכֵּן אֲסוּרִין בַּהֲנָאָה!
Can one derive it from the prohibition against eating the fruit of a tree during the first three years after its planting [orla] or from the prohibition against eating diverse kinds in a vineyard, for which one is liable only if he eats an olive-bulk of them, just like with regard to animal fat? One cannot, as what is notable about orla and diverse kinds in a vineyard? They are notable in that they are items from which deriving benefit is prohibited. Forbidden fat does not share this stringency.
מִשְּׁבִיעִית. מָה לִשְׁבִיעִית, שֶׁכֵּן תּוֹפֶסֶת דָּמֶיהָ!
Can one derive it from the prohibition against eating Sabbatical Year produce, from which benefit is permitted just like with regard to animal fat? One cannot, as what is notable about Sabbatical Year produce? It is notable in that it transfers its sanctity to the money with which it is purchased. Forbidden fat does not share this stringency.
מִתְּרוּמָה – שֶׁכֵּן לֹא הוּתַּר מִכְּלָלָהּ! מִכּוּלְּהוּ נָמֵי – שֶׁכֵּן לֹא הוּתְּרוּ מִכְּלָלָן!
Can one derive it from the prohibition of a non-priest partaking of the portion of the produce that is designated for the priest [teruma]? One cannot, as in the case of teruma there are no circumstances in which its general prohibition was permitted. The prohibition concerning teruma applies broadly, unlike in the case of forbidden fat, where the prohibition applies only to the fat of domesticated animals but not to the fat of undomesticated animals. Rava notes that the possibility of deriving the prohibition against eating forbidden fat from all of those prohibitions can also be refuted based on this claim, as in those cases, too, there are no circumstances in which their general prohibition was permitted.
אָמַר רָבָא: אִי קַשְׁיָא לִי הָא קַשְׁיָא לִי – הָא דִּתְנַן: פֶּסַח וּמִילָה מִצְוַת עֲשֵׂה,
Rava said: If there is a difficulty for me in accepting Rabbi Avin’s claim that the prohibition against slaughtering an offering outside the Temple can be derived via an a fortiori inference, this is difficult for me: That which we learned in a mishna (Karetot 2a), which enumerates the thirty-six cases for which one is liable to receive karet. The end of that mishna lists: One who neglects sacrificing the Paschal offering and one who does not undergo circumcision, which are positive mitzvot, unlike the other cases enumerated in the mishna, which are all prohibitions.
תֵּיתֵי בְּקַל וָחוֹמֶר מִמּוֹתִיר: מָה מוֹתִיר שֶׁלֹּא עָנַשׁ – הִזְהִיר, פֶּסַח וּמִילָה שֶׁעָנַשׁ – אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁהִזְהִיר?!
Rava explains his difficulty: If Rabbi Avin is correct, derive that there is a prohibition against neglecting the sacrifice of the Paschal offering and not undergoing circumcision via an a fortiori inference from the case of one who leaves over sacrificial meat beyond the allotted period for its consumption (see Leviticus 22:30): Just as in the case of one who leaves over sacrificial meat, where the Torah did not prescribe punishment but nevertheless prohibited this act, so too, with regard to neglecting the sacrifice of the Paschal offering and not undergoing circumcision, for which the Torah did prescribe punishment, is it not logical that the Torah actually prohibited neglecting them as well?
אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: אַמְרִיתַהּ לִשְׁמַעְתָּא קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב כָּהֲנָא, וְאָמַר לִי: מִמּוֹתִיר לָא אָתְיָא, דְּאִיכָּא לְמִיפְרַךְ: מָה לְמוֹתִיר – שֶׁכֵּן אֵין לוֹ תַּקָּנָה, תֹּאמַר פֶּסַח – יֵשׁ לוֹ תַּקָּנָה.
Rav Ashi said: I stated this very discussion before Rav Kahana, and he said to me: One cannot derive a prohibition against neglecting the sacrifice of the Paschal offering from the case of one who leaves over sacrificial meat via an a fortiori inference, as it can be refuted: What is notable about one who leaves over sacrificial meat? He is notable in that there is no remedy once the prohibition has been violated. Shall you say the same about the neglect of the Paschal offering, for which there is a remedy? One who fails to bring it on the first Pesaḥ must bring it on the second Pesaḥ.
וְכִי מַזְהִירִין מִן הַדִּין?! אֲפִילּוּ לְמַאן דְּאָמַר עוֹנְשִׁין מִן הַדִּין, אֵין מַזְהִירִין מִן הַדִּין!
The Gemara challenges the very premise of Rabbi Avin’s claim: But can one derive that the Torah prohibits an action via an a fortiori inference? Even the one who says that the court administers punishment based on an a fortiori inference concedes that one does not derive a prohibition from an a fortiori inference. Therefore, Rabbi Avin’s claim is refuted.
אֶלָּא כִּדְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, דְּאָמַר: אָתְיָא הֲבָאָה–הֲבָאָה;
Rather, the prohibition against slaughtering an offering outside the Temple courtyard can be derived in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan, who says: It is derived from the prohibition against offering up outside the Temple through a verbal analogy between the reference to bringing stated with regard to slaughtering outside the Temple, and the reference to bringing stated with regard to offering up outside the Temple.
מָה לְהַלָּן לֹא עָנַשׁ אֶלָּא אִם כֵּן הִזְהִיר, אַף כָּאן לֹא עָנַשׁ אֶלָּא אִם כֵּן הִזְהִיר.
With regard to slaughtering, it is stated: “Or that slaughters it outside the camp, and he did not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting” (Leviticus 17:3–4), and with regard to offering up, it is stated: “That offers up a burnt offering or sacrifice, and he will not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting” (Leviticus 17:8–9). The verbal analogy teaches that just as there, with regard to offering up, the Torah did not prescribe punishment for an action unless it also explicitly prohibited the action, so too here, with regard to slaughtering, the Torah did not prescribe punishment unless it also prohibited it. Therefore, even though the Torah does not explicitly state the prohibition, it is evident that it is prohibited.
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Zevachim 106
אַף כָּאן – לְמִזְרָחָהּ שֶׁל יְרוּשָׁלַיִם.
so too here, the bull and goat of Yom Kippur are burned east of Jerusalem.
אֶלָּא לְרַבָּנַן הֵיכָא שָׂרֵיף לְהוּ? כִּדְתַנְיָא: הֵיכָן נִשְׂרָפִין? לִצְפוֹן יְרוּשָׁלַיִם, חוּץ לְשָׁלֹשׁ מַחֲנוֹת. רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי אוֹמֵר: אַבֵּית הַדֶּשֶׁן נִשְׂרָפִין.
But according to the Rabbis, then, where outside Jerusalem do they burn them? The Gemara responds: As it is taught in a baraita: Where are the bulls and goats burned? They are burned north of Jerusalem, outside of the three camps. Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says: They are burned on the place of the ashes, where the ashes from the altar were poured.
אָמַר רָבָא: מַאן תַּנָּא דִּפְלִיג עֲלֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי? רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בֶּן יַעֲקֹב הִיא, דְּתַנְיָא: ״עַל שֶׁפֶךְ הַדֶּשֶׁן יִשָּׂרֵף״ – שֶׁיְּהֵא שָׁם דֶּשֶׁן (שֶׁיַּקְדִּים לְשָׁם דֶּשֶׁן). רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בֶּן יַעֲקֹב אוֹמֵר: שֶׁיְּהֵא מְקוֹמוֹ מְשׁוּפָּךְ.
Rava said: Who is the tanna who disagrees with Rabbi Yosei HaGelili? It is Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov, as it is taught in a baraita: The verse states with regard to bulls that are burned: “Where the ashes are poured out [shefekh hadeshen] shall it be burned” (Leviticus 4:12). This teaches that ashes must be there already when the bulls are burned. Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov says: This verse teaches that its place should slope [meshupakh] downward so that ashes from the burning will slide downhill.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי: דִּילְמָא בִּמְקוֹמוֹ מְשׁוּפָּךְ פְּלִיגִי.
Abaye said to Rava: Perhaps they disagree only about whether the place must slope, but Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov agrees that it must be the place where the ashes from the altar were deposited.
תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: הַשּׂוֹרֵף מְטַמֵּא בְּגָדִים, וְלֹא הַמַּצִּית אֶת הָאוּר מְטַמֵּא בְּגָדִים, וְלֹא הַמְסַדֵּר אֶת הַמַּעֲרָכָה מְטַמֵּא בְּגָדִים. וְאֵיזֶהוּ הַשּׂוֹרֵף? הַמְסַיֵּיעַ בִּשְׁעַת שְׂרֵיפָה.
§ The Sages taught in a baraita: The verse states with regard to the bull and goat of Yom Kippur: “And he who burns them shall wash his garments” (Leviticus 16:28). This teaches that only the one who burns them renders his garments impure, but the one who kindles the fire does not render his garments impure, and the one who sets up the arrangement of wood does not render his garments impure. And who is considered the one who burns? One who assists at the actual time of burning.
יָכוֹל אַף מִשֶּׁנַּעֲשׂוּ אֵפֶר מְטַמֵּא בְּגָדִים? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״אוֹתָם״ – אוֹתָם מְטַמְּאִין בְּגָדִים, וּמִשֶּׁנַּעֲשִׂין אֵפֶר אֵין מְטַמְּאִין בְּגָדִים. רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: אוֹתָם מְטַמְּאִין בְּגָדִים, נִיתַּךְ הַבָּשָׂר אֵין מְטַמְּאִין בְּגָדִים.
One might have thought that this priest renders his garments impure even after the bull and goat become ash. Therefore, the verse states: “And he who burns them” (Leviticus 16:28), teaching that they, the whole bull and goat, render garments impure, but they do not render garments impure once they become ash. Rabbi Shimon says: The word “them” teaches that they render garments impure, but once the flesh is incinerated they do not render garments impure.
מַאי בֵּינַיְיהוּ? אָמַר רָבָא: אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ דְּשַׁוְּיֵיהּ חָרוֹכָא.
The Gemara asks: What is the difference between the opinion of the first tanna and the opinion of Rabbi Shimon? Rava said: The difference between them is when he turned it into a charred mass, and the form of the animal has become distorted, but has not actually become ash. The first tanna holds that at this stage the offering still transmits impurity, whereas Rabbi Shimon holds that it does not.
הֲדַרַן עֲלָךְ טְבוּל יוֹם
מַתְנִי׳ הַשּׁוֹחֵט וְהַמַּעֲלֶה בַּחוּץ – חַיָּיב עַל הַשְּׁחִיטָה, וְחַיָּיב עַל הַעֲלָאָה.
MISHNA: One who slaughters an offering outside the Temple courtyard and one who offers it up outside the Temple courtyard is liable for the slaughter and liable for the offering up, as each act involves an independent prohibition. If done intentionally, he is liable to receive excision from the World-to-Come [karet] for each act, and if done unwittingly, he is liable to bring a sin offering for each act.
רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי אוֹמֵר: שָׁחַט בִּפְנִים וְהֶעֱלָה בַּחוּץ. שָׁחַט בַּחוּץ וְהֶעֱלָה בַּחוּץ – פָּטוּר, שֶׁלֹּא הֶעֱלָה אֶלָּא דָּבָר פָּסוּל. אָמְרוּ לוֹ: אַף הַשּׁוֹחֵט בִּפְנִים וּמַעֲלֶה בַּחוּץ, כֵּיוָן שֶׁהוֹצִיאוֹ – פְּסָלוֹ.
Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says: If he slaughtered an offering inside the courtyard and then offered it up outside the courtyard, he is liable. But if he slaughtered it outside, thereby rendering it unfit, and then he offered it up outside, he is exempt for the offering up, as he offered up only an item that is unfit, and one is liable only for offering up an item that is fit to be offered up inside the Temple. The Rabbis said to him: According to your reasoning, even in a case where he slaughters it inside and offers it up outside, he should be exempt, since the moment that he took it outside the courtyard, he thereby rendered it unfit. Yet, in such a case, he is certainly liable for offering it up. So too, one who slaughters an offering outside and then offers it up outside is liable.
הַטָּמֵא שֶׁאָכַל בֵּין קֹדֶשׁ טָמֵא בֵּין קֹדֶשׁ טָהוֹר – חַיָּיב. רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי אוֹמֵר: טָמֵא שֶׁאָכַל טָהוֹר – חַיָּיב, וְטָמֵא שֶׁאָכַל טָמֵא – פָּטוּר, שֶׁלֹּא אָכַל אֶלָּא דָּבָר טָמֵא. אָמְרוּ לוֹ: אַף טָמֵא שֶׁאָכַל אֶת הַטָּהוֹר, כֵּיוָן שֶׁנָּגַע בּוֹ – טִמְּאוֹהוּ.
One who is ritually impure who ate sacrificial food, whether it was ritually impure sacrificial food or ritually pure sacrificial food, is liable to receive karet if he did so intentionally and to bring a sliding-scale offering if he did so unwittingly. Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says: An impure person who ate pure sacrificial food is liable. But an impure person who ate impure sacrificial food is exempt, as he merely ate an impure item, and the prohibition against eating sacrificial food while one is impure applies only to pure sacrificial food. The Rabbis said to him: According to your logic, this halakha would apply even in a case of an impure person who ate what had been pure sacrificial food, because once he touched it, he thereby rendered it ritually impure. Yet, in such a case, he is certainly liable for eating it. So too, an impure person who ate impure sacrificial food is liable.
וְטָהוֹר שֶׁאָכַל טָמֵא – פָּטוּר, שֶׁאֵינוֹ חַיָּיב אֶלָּא עַל טוּמְאַת הַגּוּף.
And a pure person who ate impure sacrificial food is exempt, as one is liable for eating sacrificial food in impurity only due to the impurity of one’s body, but not due to the impurity of the food.
גְּמָ׳ בִּשְׁלָמָא הֶעֱלָה – כְּתִיב עוֹנֶשׁ וּכְתִיב אַזְהָרָה. עוֹנֶשׁ – דִּכְתִיב: ״וְאֶל פֶּתַח אֹהֶל מוֹעֵד לֹא הֱבִיאוֹ״. אַזְהָרָה – דִּכְתִיב: ״הִשָּׁמֶר לְךָ פֶּן תַּעֲלֶה עוֹלוֹתֶיךָ״; וְכִי הָא דְּאָמַר רַבִּי אָבִין אָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: כׇּל מָקוֹם שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר ״הִשָּׁמֶר״, ״פֶּן״ וְ״אַל״ – אֵינוֹ אֶלָּא לֹא תַעֲשֶׂה.
GEMARA: The mishna teaches that if one both slaughters and offers up an offering outside the Temple courtyard, he is liable for each act, as they are independent prohibitions. The Gemara asks: Granted that one is liable for the offering up, as the punishment for this act is written in the Torah and the prohibition concerning this act is also written in the Torah. The punishment is as it is written: “Any man…that offers up a burnt offering or sacrifice, and will not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting, to sacrifice it to the Lord, and that man shall be cut off from his people” (Leviticus 17:8–9). The prohibition is as it is written: “Take heed to yourself lest you offer up your burnt offerings in every place that you see” (Deuteronomy 12:13). And this is in accordance with that which Rabbi Avin says that Rabbi Elazar says: Wherever it is stated in the Torah: Observe, or: Lest, or: Do not, it is nothing other than a prohibition. Accordingly, the verse in Deuteronomy is understood as issuing a prohibition.
אֶלָּא שְׁחִיטָה – בִּשְׁלָמָא עוֹנֶשׁ, דִּכְתִיב: ״וְאֶל פֶּתַח אֹהֶל מוֹעֵד לֹא הֱבִיאוֹ״; אֶלָּא אַזְהָרָה מְנָלַן? אָמַר קְרָא: ״וְלֹא יִזְבְּחוּ עוֹד״.
But for the slaughtering, why is one liable? Granted that the punishment is stated in the Torah, as it is written: “Any man…that slaughters it outside the camp, and he did not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting, to sacrifice an offering to the Lord, before the Tabernacle of the Lord…that man shall be cut off from among his people” (Leviticus 17:3–4). But from where do we derive its prohibition? One is liable only in a case where the Torah specifies both the prohibition and the punishment. The Gemara answers: The verse states in the continuation of that passage: “And they shall not slaughter anymore their offerings to the se’irim after whom they go astray” (Leviticus 17:7).
הַאי מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ לְכִדְרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר! דְּאָמַר: מִנַּיִן לַזּוֹבֵחַ בְּהֵמָה לְמַרְקוּלִיס שֶׁהוּא חַיָּיב? דִּכְתִיב: ״וְלֹא יִזְבְּחוּ עוֹד אֶת זִבְחֵיהֶם״ – אִם אֵינוֹ עִנְיָן לִכְדַרְכָּהּ, דִּכְתִיב: ״אֵיכָה יַעַבְדוּ״; תְּנֵהוּ עִנְיָן לְשֶׁלֹּא כְּדַרְכָּהּ.
The Gemara questions the use of this verse as a source: But this verse is necessary for the purpose of expounding in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Elazar, as he says: From where is it derived with regard to one who slaughters an animal as an offering to Mercury, a pagan deity, that he is liable even though this is not the established manner in which that deity is worshipped? As it is written: “And they shall not slaughter anymore their offerings to the se’irim.” If the verse is not needed to teach the matter of worshipping a deity in accordance with its established manner, as it is already taught that one is liable for this, as it is written: “Take heed to yourself…lest you inquire after their gods, saying: How do these nations serve their gods, so too will I do likewise” (Deuteronomy 12:30), then apply it to the matter of worshipping a deity in a way that is not in accordance with its established manner.
אָמַר רַבָּה: קְרִי בֵּיהּ ״וְלֹא יִזְבְּחוּ״, וּקְרִי בֵּיהּ ״וְלֹא עוֹד״.
Rabba said: Both halakhot can be derived from the same verse. Read into the verse as though it stops after the phrase: “And they shall not slaughter” (Leviticus 17:7), and relates to the prohibition against slaughtering outside the Temple courtyard, which was mentioned in the previous verses. And also read into the verse as relating to the verse’s continuation: And not anymore their offerings to the se’irim, which serves as the source for the prohibition against sacrificing offerings to false deities.
אַכַּתִּי מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ לְכִדְתַנְיָא: עַד כָּאן הוּא מְדַבֵּר בְּקָדָשִׁים שֶׁהִקְדִּישָׁן בִּשְׁעַת אִיסּוּר הַבָּמוֹת וְהִקְרִיבָן בִּשְׁעַת אִיסּוּר הַבָּמוֹת –
The Gemara challenges: But the verse is still necessary for the purpose of expounding that which is taught in a baraita: The verse states: “Any man…that slaughters it outside the camp, and he did not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting, to sacrifice an offering to the Lord” (Leviticus 17:3–4). Until this point, the verse is speaking about sacrificial animals that one consecrated during a period when the prohibition against sacrificing on private altars was in effect, i.e., after the Tabernacle was erected, and then he also sacrificed them during a period when the prohibition against sacrificing on private altars was in effect.
שֶׁהֲרֵי עוֹנְשָׁן אָמוּר: ״וְאֶל פֶּתַח אֹהֶל מוֹעֵד״, אַזְהָרָה – דִּכְתִיב: ״הִשָּׁמֶר לְךָ פֶּן תַּעֲלֶה עֹלֹתֶיךָ״.
This is apparent, as the punishment for sacrificing them is stated in this verse: “And he did not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting, to sacrifice an offering to the Lord, before the Tabernacle of the Lord…that man shall be cut off from among his people.” The prohibition is also explicit, as it is written: “Take heed to yourself lest you offer up your burnt offerings in every place that you see” (Deuteronomy 12:13).
מִכָּאן וְאֵילָךְ – בִּזְבָחִים שֶׁהִקְדִּישָׁן בִּשְׁעַת הֶיתֵּר הַבָּמוֹת וְהִקְרִיבָן בִּשְׁעַת אִיסּוּר הַבָּמוֹת,
From that point onward, the verse is speaking about sacrificial animals that one consecrated during a period when there was permission to sacrifice offerings on private altars, i.e., before the Tabernacle was erected, and then he sacrificed them outside the Tabernacle during a period when the prohibition against sacrificing on private altars was in effect.
שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״לְמַעַן אֲשֶׁר יָבִיאוּ בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל אֶת זִבְחֵיהֶם אֲשֶׁר הֵם זֹבְחִים״ – זְבָחִים שֶׁהִתַּרְתִּי לְךָ כְּבָר. ״עַל פְּנֵי הַשָּׂדֶה״ – לוֹמַר לָךְ: הַזּוֹבֵחַ בִּשְׁעַת אִיסּוּר הַבָּמוֹת, מַעֲלֶה עָלָיו הַכָּתוּב כְּאִילּוּ הִקְרִיב עַל פְּנֵי הַשָּׂדֶה.
This is apparent, as it is stated: “In order that the children of Israel shall bring their sacrifices, which they slaughter upon the open field, that they shall bring them to the Lord, to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting” (Leviticus 17:5). The phrase “their sacrifices, which they slaughter” is interpreted as referring to offerings that I have previously permitted for you to slaughter on private altars. This verse teaches that those offerings may now be sacrificed only inside the Tabernacle. The phrase “upon the open field” tells you that in the case of one who slaughters an offering on a private altar during a period when the prohibition against sacrificing on private altars is in effect, even if he sacrifices the offering to God, the verse ascribes him blame as if he sacrificed it upon the open field in idolatrous worship.
״וֶהֱבִיאֻם לַה׳״ – זוֹ מִצְוַת עֲשֵׂה. לֹא תַעֲשֶׂה מִנַּיִין? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״וְלֹא יִזְבְּחוּ עוֹד״.
The verse continues: “That they shall bring them to the Lord.” This is a positive mitzva to sacrifice in the Tabernacle even offerings that were consecrated before the Tabernacle was erected. From where is it derived that there is a prohibition against sacrificing them outside the Tabernacle? The verse states: “And they shall not slaughter anymore their offerings to the se’irim after whom they go astray; this shall be to them an eternal statute, throughout their generations” (Leviticus 17:7).
יָכוֹל יְהֵא עָנוּשׁ כָּרֵת? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״חֻקַּת עוֹלָם תִּהְיֶה זֹּאת לָהֶם לְדֹרֹתָם״ – זֹאת לָהֶם וְלֹא אַחֶרֶת לָהֶם.
One might have thought that sacrificing these offerings outside the Tabernacle would be punishable by karet, as is the halakha with regard to offerings consecrated after the Tabernacle was erected. Therefore, the verse states: “This shall be to them an eternal statute, throughout their generations” (Leviticus 17:7). One can infer from this verse that this, the punishment for transgressing a positive mitzva and a prohibition, applies to them, but no other punishment applies to them. It is clear from this baraita that the verse “And they shall not slaughter anymore” is used to teach about the prohibition against sacrificing outside the Tabernacle those offerings that were consecrated while there was permission to sacrifice on private altars, and not those offerings that were consecrated while it was prohibited to sacrifice on private altars.
אֶלָּא אָמַר רַבִּי אָבִין: קַל וָחוֹמֶר; וּמָה בִּמְקוֹם שֶׁלֹּא עָנַשׁ – הִזְהִיר, מְקוֹם שֶׁעָנַשׁ – אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁהִזְהִיר?!
Rather, Rabbi Avin says: The prohibition against slaughtering an offering outside the Temple is derived through an a fortiori inference: Just as in a case in which the Torah did not prescribe punishment for a certain action, it nevertheless prohibited it, as is the case with regard to sacrificing outside the Temple an offering consecrated while there was permission to sacrifice on private altars, so too, in a case in which the Torah did prescribe punishment for a certain action, as is the case with regard to slaughtering outside the Temple an offering consecrated while it was prohibited to sacrifice on private altars, is it not logical that the Torah prohibited the action?
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבִינָא לְרַב אָשֵׁי: אִם כֵּן, לֹא יֵאָמֵר לָאו בְּחֵלֶב – וְתֵיתֵי קַל וָחוֹמֶר מִנְּבֵילָה: מָה נְבֵילָה שֶׁלֹּא עָנַשׁ – הִזְהִיר, חֵלֶב שֶׁעָנַשׁ – אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁהִזְהִיר?!
Ravina said to Rav Ashi: If so, that whenever the Torah states a punishment for a certain action, there is no need for it to state the prohibition, then let the Torah not state a prohibition with regard to eating forbidden fat of a kosher animal, and then derive the fact that it is prohibited through an a fortiori inference from the prohibition against eating an unslaughtered animal carcass: Just as with regard to a carcass, even though the Torah did not prescribe punishment for consuming it, it nevertheless prohibited consuming it, so too, with regard to animal fat, for which the Torah did prescribe punishment, is it not logical that the Torah prohibited its consumption?
אֲתָא לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרָבָא, אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מִנְּבֵלָה נָמֵי לָא אָתְיָא, דְּאִיכָּא לְמִיפְרַךְ: מָה לִנְבֵלָה שֶׁכֵּן מְטַמֵּא!
Rav Ashi came before Rava and said to him: The prohibition against eating animal fat can also not be derived from the prohibition of a carcass, as the a fortiori inference can be refuted as follows: What is notable about a carcass? It is notable in that it renders other items ritually impure through contact with it. Forbidden fat does not share this stringency. The existence of a unique stringency undermines the possibility of using an a fortiori inference.
מִשְּׁרָצִים טְמֵאִין. מָה לִשְׁרָצִים טְמֵאִין – שֶׁמְּטַמְּאִין בְּמַשֶּׁהוּ!
Rav Ashi raises the possibility of deriving the prohibition against eating forbidden fat through an a fortiori inference from various other prohibitions that, like forbidden fat, do not carry the stringency of being punishable by karet, and Rava rejects each one. Can one derive the prohibition against eating forbidden fat from the prohibition against eating carcasses of ritually impure creeping animals (see Leviticus 11:41)? One cannot, as what is notable about ritually impure creeping animals? They are notable in that they render other items ritually impure though contact with any amount of them. Forbidden fat does not share this stringency.
מִשְּׁרָצִים טְהוֹרִים. מָה לִשְׁרָצִים טְהוֹרִים – שֶׁאִיסּוּרָן בְּמַשֶּׁהוּ!
Can one derive it from the prohibition against eating the carcasses of ritually pure creeping animals (see Leviticus 11:41), which do not have the capacity to render other items ritually impure? One cannot, as what is notable about ritually pure creeping animals? They are notable in that with regard to their prohibition there is liability for consuming any amount of them. Forbidden fat does not share this stringency, as one is liable only if he eats an olive-bulk of it.
מֵעׇרְלָה וְכִלְאֵי הַכֶּרֶם. מָה לְעׇרְלָה וְכִלְאֵי הַכֶּרֶם – שֶׁכֵּן אֲסוּרִין בַּהֲנָאָה!
Can one derive it from the prohibition against eating the fruit of a tree during the first three years after its planting [orla] or from the prohibition against eating diverse kinds in a vineyard, for which one is liable only if he eats an olive-bulk of them, just like with regard to animal fat? One cannot, as what is notable about orla and diverse kinds in a vineyard? They are notable in that they are items from which deriving benefit is prohibited. Forbidden fat does not share this stringency.
מִשְּׁבִיעִית. מָה לִשְׁבִיעִית, שֶׁכֵּן תּוֹפֶסֶת דָּמֶיהָ!
Can one derive it from the prohibition against eating Sabbatical Year produce, from which benefit is permitted just like with regard to animal fat? One cannot, as what is notable about Sabbatical Year produce? It is notable in that it transfers its sanctity to the money with which it is purchased. Forbidden fat does not share this stringency.
מִתְּרוּמָה – שֶׁכֵּן לֹא הוּתַּר מִכְּלָלָהּ! מִכּוּלְּהוּ נָמֵי – שֶׁכֵּן לֹא הוּתְּרוּ מִכְּלָלָן!
Can one derive it from the prohibition of a non-priest partaking of the portion of the produce that is designated for the priest [teruma]? One cannot, as in the case of teruma there are no circumstances in which its general prohibition was permitted. The prohibition concerning teruma applies broadly, unlike in the case of forbidden fat, where the prohibition applies only to the fat of domesticated animals but not to the fat of undomesticated animals. Rava notes that the possibility of deriving the prohibition against eating forbidden fat from all of those prohibitions can also be refuted based on this claim, as in those cases, too, there are no circumstances in which their general prohibition was permitted.
אָמַר רָבָא: אִי קַשְׁיָא לִי הָא קַשְׁיָא לִי – הָא דִּתְנַן: פֶּסַח וּמִילָה מִצְוַת עֲשֵׂה,
Rava said: If there is a difficulty for me in accepting Rabbi Avin’s claim that the prohibition against slaughtering an offering outside the Temple can be derived via an a fortiori inference, this is difficult for me: That which we learned in a mishna (Karetot 2a), which enumerates the thirty-six cases for which one is liable to receive karet. The end of that mishna lists: One who neglects sacrificing the Paschal offering and one who does not undergo circumcision, which are positive mitzvot, unlike the other cases enumerated in the mishna, which are all prohibitions.
תֵּיתֵי בְּקַל וָחוֹמֶר מִמּוֹתִיר: מָה מוֹתִיר שֶׁלֹּא עָנַשׁ – הִזְהִיר, פֶּסַח וּמִילָה שֶׁעָנַשׁ – אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁהִזְהִיר?!
Rava explains his difficulty: If Rabbi Avin is correct, derive that there is a prohibition against neglecting the sacrifice of the Paschal offering and not undergoing circumcision via an a fortiori inference from the case of one who leaves over sacrificial meat beyond the allotted period for its consumption (see Leviticus 22:30): Just as in the case of one who leaves over sacrificial meat, where the Torah did not prescribe punishment but nevertheless prohibited this act, so too, with regard to neglecting the sacrifice of the Paschal offering and not undergoing circumcision, for which the Torah did prescribe punishment, is it not logical that the Torah actually prohibited neglecting them as well?
אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: אַמְרִיתַהּ לִשְׁמַעְתָּא קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב כָּהֲנָא, וְאָמַר לִי: מִמּוֹתִיר לָא אָתְיָא, דְּאִיכָּא לְמִיפְרַךְ: מָה לְמוֹתִיר – שֶׁכֵּן אֵין לוֹ תַּקָּנָה, תֹּאמַר פֶּסַח – יֵשׁ לוֹ תַּקָּנָה.
Rav Ashi said: I stated this very discussion before Rav Kahana, and he said to me: One cannot derive a prohibition against neglecting the sacrifice of the Paschal offering from the case of one who leaves over sacrificial meat via an a fortiori inference, as it can be refuted: What is notable about one who leaves over sacrificial meat? He is notable in that there is no remedy once the prohibition has been violated. Shall you say the same about the neglect of the Paschal offering, for which there is a remedy? One who fails to bring it on the first Pesaḥ must bring it on the second Pesaḥ.
וְכִי מַזְהִירִין מִן הַדִּין?! אֲפִילּוּ לְמַאן דְּאָמַר עוֹנְשִׁין מִן הַדִּין, אֵין מַזְהִירִין מִן הַדִּין!
The Gemara challenges the very premise of Rabbi Avin’s claim: But can one derive that the Torah prohibits an action via an a fortiori inference? Even the one who says that the court administers punishment based on an a fortiori inference concedes that one does not derive a prohibition from an a fortiori inference. Therefore, Rabbi Avin’s claim is refuted.
אֶלָּא כִּדְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, דְּאָמַר: אָתְיָא הֲבָאָה–הֲבָאָה;
Rather, the prohibition against slaughtering an offering outside the Temple courtyard can be derived in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan, who says: It is derived from the prohibition against offering up outside the Temple through a verbal analogy between the reference to bringing stated with regard to slaughtering outside the Temple, and the reference to bringing stated with regard to offering up outside the Temple.
מָה לְהַלָּן לֹא עָנַשׁ אֶלָּא אִם כֵּן הִזְהִיר, אַף כָּאן לֹא עָנַשׁ אֶלָּא אִם כֵּן הִזְהִיר.
With regard to slaughtering, it is stated: “Or that slaughters it outside the camp, and he did not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting” (Leviticus 17:3–4), and with regard to offering up, it is stated: “That offers up a burnt offering or sacrifice, and he will not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting” (Leviticus 17:8–9). The verbal analogy teaches that just as there, with regard to offering up, the Torah did not prescribe punishment for an action unless it also explicitly prohibited the action, so too here, with regard to slaughtering, the Torah did not prescribe punishment unless it also prohibited it. Therefore, even though the Torah does not explicitly state the prohibition, it is evident that it is prohibited.
