Zevachim 11

Zevachim 11

עוֹלָה שֶׁהִיא כָּלִיל, נִכְנַס דָּמָהּ לִפְנִים כְּשֵׁרָה; אָשָׁם שֶׁאֵינוֹ כָּלִיל, לֹא כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן?!

with regard to a burnt offering, which is totally consumed by the fire on the altar, nevertheless, even if its blood enters into the Sanctuary it is fit, with regard to a guilt offering, which is not entirely consumed on the altar, all the more so is it not clear that even if its blood enters the Sanctuary it remains fit?

מָה לְעוֹלָה, שֶׁכֵּן אֵינָהּ מְכַפֶּרֶת!

The Gemara refutes this inference: What is notable about a burnt offering? It is notable in that it does not atone for a sin. Perhaps this is why its blood is not disqualified if it enters the sanctuary.

מִנְחַת חוֹטֵא תּוֹכִיחַ.

The Gemara responds: The meal offering of a sinner can prove the point, as it is not disqualified by entering the Sanctuary, even though it atones for a sin.

וְלֵימָא: חַטַּאת הָעוֹף תּוֹכִיחַ! חַטַּאת הָעוֹף – בַּעְיָא דְּרַבִּי אָבִין הִיא.

The Gemara interjects: But let us say that a bird sin offering can prove the point, as it too atones for a sin but is not disqualified by entering the Sanctuary. This case is more similar to that of a guilt offering, as a bird has blood, unlike a meal offering. The Gemara answers: It is not certain that a bird sin offering is not disqualified by entering the Sanctuary; this is a dilemma raised by Rabbi Avin.

וְלִפְרוֹךְ: מָה לְמִנְחַת חוֹטֵא, שֶׁכֵּן אֵינָהּ מִין זֶבַח!

The Gemara asks: But let us refute the above response as follows: What is notable about a sinner’s meal offering? It is notable in that it is not a type of slaughtered offering.

עוֹלָה תּוֹכִיחַ. וְחָזַר הַדִּין; לֹא רְאִי זֶה כִרְאִי זֶה, וְלֹא רְאִי זֶה כִּרְאִי זֶה; הַצַּד הַשָּׁוֶה שֶׁבָּהֶן: שֶׁהֵן קׇדְשֵׁי קָדָשִׁים, וְנִכְנַס (דָּמָן) לִפְנִים – כְּשֵׁרִין; אַף אֲנִי אָבִיא אָשָׁם – שֶׁהוּא קוֹדֶשׁ קֳדָשִׁים, וְנִכְנַס דָּמוֹ לִפְנִים – כָּשֵׁר.

The Gemara answers: If so, a burnt offering can prove the point, since it is a slaughtered offering, and still if its blood enters the Sanctuary, it is not disqualified. And the inference has reverted to its starting point. The halakha is derived from the halakhot of a burnt offering and a sinner’s meal offering: The aspect of this case is not like the aspect of that case and the aspect of that case is not like the aspect of this case. Their common element is that they are offerings of the most sacred order, and if they enter into the Sanctuary they are still fit. So too, I shall include a guilt offering and infer that since it is also an offering of the most sacred order, if its blood enters into the Sanctuary it is still fit.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבָא מִבַּרְנִישׁ לְרַב אָשֵׁי: וְלִפְרוֹךְ, מָה לְהַצַּד הַשָּׁוֶה שֶׁבָּהֶן – שֶׁכֵּן אֵין לָהֶן קִצְבָה; תֹּאמַר בְּאָשָׁם – שֶׁיֵּשׁ לוֹ קִצְבָה?!

Rava of Barnish said to Rav Ashi: But let us refute this inference: What is notable about their common element? It is notable in that neither a burnt offering nor a sinner’s meal offering has a fixed value. Should you say the same halakhot apply to a guilt offering, which has a fixed value?

אֶלָּא הַיְינוּ טַעְמַיְיהוּ דְּרַבָּנַן, דְּאָמַר קְרָא: ״דָּמָהּ״ – דָּמָהּ שֶׁל זוֹ, וְלָא דָּמָהּ שֶׁל אַחֵר.

Rather, this is the reason for the opinion of the Rabbis: As the verse states: “And any sin offering, any of whose blood is brought into the Tent of Meeting to atone in the Sanctuary, shall not be eaten” (Leviticus 6:23). The term “whose blood” teaches that the blood of this offering, i.e., a sin offering, and not the blood of another offering, is disqualified in this manner.

וְאִידַּךְ – ״דָּמָהּ״ וְלֹא בְּשָׂרָהּ.

And how does the other tanna, Rabbi Eliezer, interpret this term? He derives from it that only its blood is disqualified by entering the Sanctuary, but not its flesh.

וְאִידָּךְ – ״דָּם״–״דָּמָהּ״.

And from where do the other Rabbis derive that the flesh of a sin offering is not disqualified by entering the Sanctuary? They maintain that both halakhot are derived from this term, as the verse could have simply stated: Blood, but stated: “Whose blood.” The redundancy excludes not only the flesh, but also other offerings.

וְאִידַּךְ – ״דָּם״–״דָּמָהּ״ לָא דָּרֵישׁ.

And the other tanna, Rabbi Eliezer, does not interpret the redundancy indicated by the change from: Blood, to: “Whose blood,” to be significant. Once the word blood is mentioned, it is grammatically necessary for the verse to state “whose blood.”

בִּשְׁלָמָא לְרַבָּנַן, דְּאָמְרִי: אָשָׁם שֶׁשְּׁחָטוֹ שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ – כָּשֵׁר; הַיְינוּ דְּאִיתַּקַּשׁ מִנְחָה לְחַטָּאת, מִנְחָה לְאָשָׁם.

§ The Gemara resumes its discussion of the dispute in the mishna between Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis. Granted, according to the Rabbis, who say that a guilt offering that one slaughtered not for its sake is fit, that is why a meal offering is juxtaposed with a sin offering, and a meal offering is also juxtaposed with a guilt offering.

דְּתַנְיָא, רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: ״קֹדֶשׁ קָדָשִׁים הִוא כַּחַטָּאת וְכָאָשָׁם״ – מִנְחַת חוֹטֵא הֲרֵי הִיא כְּחַטָּאת, לְפִיכָךְ קְמָצָהּ שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָהּ, פְּסוּלָה; מִנְחַת נְדָבָה הֲרֵי הִיא כְּאָשָׁם, לְפִיכָךְ קְמָצָהּ שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָהּ, כְּשֵׁרָה.

This is as it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Shimon says: The verse states with regard to a meal offering: “It is most sacred, as the sin offering, and as the guilt offering” (Leviticus 6:10), teaching that a meal offering of a sinner is like a sin offering. Therefore, if one removed its handful not for its sake, it is disqualified. And the verse also teaches that a voluntary meal offering is like a guilt offering. Therefore, if one removed its handful not for its sake, it is still fit. This accords with the opinion of the Rabbis, that a guilt offering slaughtered not for its sake is fit.

אֶלָּא לְרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר – לְמַאי הִלְכְתָא אִיתַּקַּשׁ מִנְחָה לְחַטָּאת וּמִנְחָה לְאָשָׁם?

But according to Rabbi Eliezer, for what halakha is a meal offering juxtaposed with a sin offering, and a meal offering juxtaposed with a guilt offering?

לְכִי אִידַּךְ דְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן, דִּתְנַן: שֶׁלֹּא בִּכְלֵי שָׁרֵת – פְּסוּלָה. וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן מַכְשִׁיר.

The Gemara answers: They are juxtaposed to teach the other halakha derived by Rabbi Shimon from this verse; as we learned in a mishna (Menaḥot 26a): If the handful of a meal offering is conveyed to the altar not in a service vessel, the offering is unfit. And Rabbi Shimon deems it fit.

וְאָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי חִיָּיא: מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן? אָמַר קְרָא: ״קֹדֶשׁ קֳדָשִׁים הִוא כַּחַטָּאת וּכְאָשָׁם״ – בָּא לְעוֹבְדָהּ בַּיָּד, עוֹבְדָהּ בַּיָּמִין כַּחַטָּאת; בִּכְלִי, עוֹבְדָהּ בִּשְׂמֹאל כָּאָשָׁם.

And Rav Yehuda, son of Rabbi Ḥiyya, says: What is the reasoning of Rabbi Shimon? The verse states with regard to a meal offering: “It is most sacred, as the sin offering, and as the guilt offering,” teaching that if a priest comes to perform its sacrificial rites by hand, he must perform them with his right hand, like one performs the rites of a sin offering. And if he performs them with a vessel, he may perform them with his left hand, like one performs the rites of a guilt offering, since Rabbi Shimon maintains this is permitted in the case of a guilt offering.

וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן – הַאי קְרָא מַפֵּיק לֵיהּ לְהָכִי וּמַפֵּיק לֵיהּ לְהָכִי?!

The Gemara asks: And as for Rabbi Shimon himself, does he expound this verse for this purpose, concerning one who if one removes its handful not for its sake, and expound it for that purpose, concerning conveying the handful with one’s hand?

עִיקָּר קְרָא – לְכִדְרַב יְהוּדָה בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי חִיָּיא הוּא דַּאֲתָא; וּמִנְחַת חוֹטֵא דִּפְסוּלָה שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָהּ [– טַעְמָא אַחֲרִינָא הוּא]: חַטָּאת טַעְמָא מַאי – דִּכְתִיב בַּהּ ״הִיא״; מִנְחַת חוֹטֵא נָמֵי כְּתִיב בַּהּ ״הִיא״.

The Gemara answers: The verse comes mainly to teach that which Rav Yehuda, son of Rabbi Ḥiyya, explained. And the halakha that a meal offering of a sinner whose handful was removed not for its sake is unfit is due to another reason: What is the reason a sin offering sacrificed not for its sake is disqualified? The reason is that the word “it” is written with regard to it in the verse: “It is a sin offering” (Leviticus 4:24). Since the word “it” is also written with regard to the meal offering of a sinner, in the verse: “For it is a sin offering” (Leviticus 5:11), the same applies in that case.

וּלְרַבָּנַן, לְמַאי הִלְכְתָא אִיתַּקַּשׁ אָשָׁם לְחַטָּאת? לוֹמַר לָךְ: מָה חַטָּאת טְעוּנָה סְמִיכָה, אַף אָשָׁם טָעוּן סְמִיכָה.

In the mishna, Rabbi Eliezer cites the verse: “As is the sin offering, so is the guilt offering” (Leviticus 7:7), as a source for his opinion. The Gemara asks: And according to the Rabbis, for what halakha is a guilt offering juxtaposed with a sin offering? The Gemara answers: They are juxtaposed to tell you that just as a sin offering requires placing hands on the head of the offering, so too, a guilt offering requires placing hands on the head of the offering.

יוֹסֵף בֶּן חוֹנִי אוֹמֵר: הַנִּשְׁחָטִין כּוּ׳. אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: יוֹסֵף בֶּן חוֹנִי וְרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר, אָמְרוּ דָּבָר אֶחָד.

§ The mishna teaches: Yosef ben Ḥoni says: Other offerings that are slaughtered for the sake of a Paschal offering or a sin offering are unfit. Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Yosef ben Ḥoni and Rabbi Eliezer said the same thing, i.e., Rabbi Eliezer agrees with Yosef ben Ḥoni.

רַבָּה אָמַר: בַּאֲחֵרִים לְשֵׁם חַטָּאת פְּלִיגִי.

Rabba says: Although they agree that other offerings slaughtered for the sake of a Paschal offering are unfit, they disagree with regard to other offerings slaughtered for the sake of a sin offering. Whereas Yosef ben Ḥoni holds that they are unfit, Rabbi Eliezer maintains that they are fit.

דְּתַנְיָא: הַפֶּסַח שֶׁעִבְּרָה שְׁנָתוֹ, וּשְׁחָטוֹ בִּזְמַנּוֹ לִשְׁמוֹ; וְכֵן הַשּׁוֹחֵט אֲחֵרִים לְשֵׁם פֶּסַח בִּזְמַנּוֹ – רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר פּוֹסֵל, וְרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ מַכְשִׁיר.

This is as it is taught in a baraita: In the case of a Paschal offering whose first year has passed, and it must therefore be sacrificed as a peace offering, and one slaughtered it at its designated time on Passover eve for its own sake as a Paschal offering, and likewise, if one slaughtered other offerings for the sake of a Paschal offering at its designated time, the tanna’im disagree as to the status of the offering. Rabbi Eliezer deems it unfit, and Rabbi Yehoshua deems it fit.

אָמַר רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ: אִם בִּשְׁאָר יְמוֹת הַשָּׁנָה, שֶׁאֵינוֹ כָּשֵׁר לִשְׁמוֹ – אֲחֵרִים כְּשֵׁרִים לִשְׁמוֹ; בִּזְמַנּוֹ שֶׁהוּא כָּשֵׁר לִשְׁמוֹ – אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁיִּכְשְׁרוּ אֲחֵרִים לִשְׁמוֹ?!

Rabbi Yehoshua said: If, during the rest of the days of the year, when a Paschal offering is not fit if it is slaughtered for its own sake, nevertheless, other offerings that are slaughtered for its sake are fit, then at its designated time, when a Paschal offering is fit if it is slaughtered for its own sake, isn’t it logical that other offerings slaughtered for its sake should be fit?

אָמַר לוֹ רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר, אוֹ חִילּוּף הַדְּבָרִים: וּמָה אִם בִּשְׁאָר יְמוֹת הַשָּׁנָה, שֶׁאֵינוֹ כָּשֵׁר לִשְׁמוֹ – כָּשֵׁר הוּא לְשֵׁם אֲחֵרִים; בִּזְמַנּוֹ, שֶׁהוּא כָּשֵׁר לִשְׁמוֹ – אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁיּוּכְשַׁר לְשֵׁם אֲחֵרִים?! וְיוּכְשַׁר פֶּסַח בְּאַרְבָּעָה עָשָׂר שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ!

Rabbi Eliezer said to him: Or conversely, just as during the rest of the days of the year, when a Paschal offering is not fit if it is slaughtered for its own sake, it is fit if slaughtered for the sake of other offerings, so too, at its designated time, when it is fit if slaughtered for its own sake, isn’t it logical that it should be fit if slaughtered for the sake of other offerings? And accordingly, a Paschal offering slaughtered not for its own sake on the fourteenth of Nisan should be deemed fit, which contradicts the halakha. Clearly, this line of reasoning leads to incorrect conclusions.

וְכָךְ אַתָּה אוֹמֵר?! מָה לִי הוּכְשְׁרוּ אֲחֵרִים בִּשְׁאָר יְמוֹת הַשָּׁנָה לִשְׁמוֹ – שֶׁכֵּן הוּא כָּשֵׁר לְשֵׁם אֲחֵרִים; וְיוּכְשְׁרוּ אֲחֵרִים בִּזְמַנּוֹ לִשְׁמוֹ – שֶׁכֵּן הוּא פָּסוּל לְשֵׁם אֲחֵרִים?!

Furthermore, Rabbi Eliezer refuted Rabbi Yehoshua’s logic as follows: And do you say this derivation? What does it matter to me that other offerings slaughtered during the rest of the days of the year for the sake of a Paschal offering are deemed fit? After all, a Paschal offering slaughtered for the sake of other offerings is also fit. But must you say that other offerings slaughtered at its designated time for its sake should be deemed fit? After all, at its designated time, a Paschal offering slaughtered for the sake of other offerings is unfit.

אָמַר לוֹ רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ: אִם כֵּן, הוֹרַעְתָּה כֹּחַ פֶּסַח, וְנָתַתָּ כֹּחַ בִּשְׁלָמִים.

Rabbi Yehoshua said to him: If, as you maintain, other offerings slaughtered on Passover eve for the sake of a Paschal offering are disqualified, you have diminished the force of the requirement that a Paschal offering be sacrificed for its own sake, and you have given more force to the requirement that a peace offering be sacrificed for its own sake. A Paschal offering sacrificed at the proper time, i.e., during the rest of the year, for the sake of a peace offering, is fit, whereas a peace offering sacrificed on Passover eve for the sake of a Paschal offering is unfit.

חָזַר רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר וְדָנוֹ דִּין אַחֵר: מָצִינוּ מוֹתַר פֶּסַח בָּא שְׁלָמִים, וְאֵין מוֹתַר שְׁלָמִים בָּא פֶּסַח.

The baraita continues: Rabbi Eliezer then presented a different logical inference: We find that a leftover Paschal offering, an animal consecrated as a Paschal offering but ultimately not sacrificed on Passover eve, is brought as a peace offering; but a leftover peace offering, one bought with money left over from funds dedicated toward the acquisition of a peace offering, is not brought as a Paschal offering. A Paschal offering is a potential peace offering, but a peace offering is not a potential Paschal offering.

וּמָה פֶּסַח, שֶׁמּוֹתָרוֹ בָּא שְׁלָמִים – שְׁחָטוֹ בִּזְמַנּוֹ לְשׁוּם שְׁלָמִים, פָּסוּל; שְׁלָמִים, שֶׁאֵין מוֹתָרָן בָּא פֶּסַח – אִם שְׁחָטָם לְשֵׁם פֶּסַח בִּזְמַנּוֹ, אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁיְּהוּ פְּסוּלִין?!

And if so, one may infer a fortiori: Just as with regard to a Paschal offering, whose leftover offering is brought as a peace offering, and nevertheless, if one slaughtered it at its designated time for the sake of a peace offering it is unfit, so too, with regard to a peace offering, whose leftover offering is not brought as a Paschal offering, if one slaughtered it for the sake of a Paschal offering at its designated time, isn’t it logical that it should be unfit?

אָמַר לוֹ רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ: מָצִינוּ מוֹתַר חַטָּאת בָּא עוֹלָה, וְאֵין מוֹתַר עוֹלָה בָּא חַטָּאת;

Rabbi Yehoshua said to him: This inference is not valid, as we find that a leftover sin offering, e.g., one bought with money left over from funds dedicated to the acquisition of a sin offering, is brought as a burnt offering, whereas a leftover burnt offering is not brought as a sin offering.

וּמָה חַטָּאת, שֶׁמּוֹתָרָהּ בָּא עוֹלָה – שְׁחָטָהּ לְשֵׁם עוֹלָה, פְּסוּלָה; עוֹלָה, שֶׁאֵין מוֹתָרָהּ בָּא חַטָּאת – שְׁחָטָהּ לְשֵׁם חַטָּאת, אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁתְּהֵא פְּסוּלָה?!

And according to Rabbi Eliezer’s logic, one should derive a fortiori: Just as with regard to a sin offering, whose leftover is brought as a burnt offering, nevertheless, if one slaughtered it for the sake of a burnt offering it is unfit, so too, with regard to a burnt offering, whose leftover is not brought as a sin offering, if one slaughtered it for the sake of a sin offering, isn’t it logical that it should be unfit? Yet, the halakha is that a burnt offering slaughtered for the sake of a sin offering is fit.

אָמַר לוֹ רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר: לֹא; אִם אָמַרְתָּ בְּחַטָּאת – שֶׁכֵּן כְּשֵׁרָה לִשְׁמָהּ כׇּל הַשָּׁנָה כּוּלָּהּ, תֹּאמַר בַּפֶּסַח – שֶׁאֵינוֹ כָּשֵׁר לִשְׁמוֹ אֶלָּא בִּזְמַנּוֹ?! הוֹאִיל וְהוּא פָּסוּל לִשְׁמוֹ, דִּין הוּא שֶׁיִּפָּסְלוּ אֲחֵרִים לִשְׁמוֹ.

Rabbi Eliezer said to him: No, if you said that this is the halakha with regard to a sin offering, that another offering sacrificed for its sake is fit, this is only because a sin offering is fit when sacrificed for its sake all year long. Shall you also say that this is the halakha with regard to a Paschal offering, which is fit when sacrificed for its sake only at its designated time? Since a Paschal offering is unfit when sacrificed for its sake during the rest of the year, it is logical that other offerings should be disqualified when sacrificed for its sake at its designated time.

שִׁמְעוֹן אֲחִי עֲזַרְיָה אוֹמֵר כּוּ׳.

§ The mishna teaches: Shimon, brother of Azarya, says that this is the distinction: With regard to all offerings, if one slaughtered them for the sake of an offering whose sanctity is greater than theirs, they are fit; if one slaughtered them for the sake of an offering whose sanctity is less than theirs, they are unfit.

רַב אָשֵׁי מַתְנֵי מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, וְרַב אַחָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרָבָא מַתְנֵי מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי יַנַּאי: מַאי טַעְמָא דְּשִׁמְעוֹן אֲחִי עֲזַרְיָה? דְּאָמַר קְרָא: ״וְלֹא יְחַלְּלוּ אֶת קׇדְשֵׁי בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל אֵת אֲשֶׁר יָרִימוּ לַה׳״ – בְּמוּרָם מֵהֶן אֵין מִתְחַלְּלִין, בְּנָמוּךְ מֵהֶם מִתְחַלְּלִין.

Rav Ashi teaches in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan, and Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, teaches the same statement in the name of Rabbi Yannai: What is the reason for the opinion of Shimon, brother of Azarya? It is derived from that which the verse states: “And they shall not profane the holy things of the children of Israel, which they will set apart [yarimu] unto the Lord” (Leviticus 22:15). The verse is interpreted not as a prohibition but as a halakhic axiom, teaching that offerings are not profaned, i.e., disqualified, by sacrifice for the sake of offerings whose sanctity is more elevated [muram] than theirs; they are profaned only by sacrifice for the sake of offerings whose sanctity is less than theirs.

וְהַאי לְהָכִי הוּא דַּאֲתָא?! וְהָא מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ לִכְדִשְׁמוּאֵל – דְּאָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: מִנַּיִן לָאוֹכֵל אֶת הַטֶּבֶל שֶׁהוּא בְּמִיתָה? שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״וְלֹא יְחַלְּלוּ אֶת קׇדְשֵׁי בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל אֵת אֲשֶׁר יָרִימוּ לַה׳״ – בַּעֲתִידִים לִתְרוֹם הַכָּתוּב מְדַבֵּר.

The Gemara asks: And does that verse come to teach this halakha? But isn’t it necessary for Shmuel’s derivation? As Shmuel says: From where is it derived that one who eats untithed produce is liable to be punished with death at the hand of Heaven? As it is stated: “And they shall not profane the holy things of the children of Israel, which they will set apart unto the Lord.” The term: “Will set apart,” indicates that the verse is speaking of holy items that are to be set apart in the future, i.e., untithed produce, which includes the portion designated for the priest [teruma].

אִם כֵּן, לִכְתּוֹב קְרָא ״אֲשֶׁר הוּרְמוּ״; מַאי ״אֲשֶׁר יָרִימוּ״? שְׁמַע מִינַּיהּ תַּרְתֵּי.

The Gemara answers: If so, if the verse taught only one halakha, the halakha of Shimon, brother of Azarya, it should have written: Which they have set apart. What is the reason the verse states: “Which they will set apart,” in the future tense? Conclude from it that the verse teaches two halakhot: An offering sacrificed for the sake of an offering of greater sanctity is fit, and consumption of untithed produce is punishable by death at the hand of Heaven.

בָּעֵי רַבִּי זֵירָא: כְּשֵׁרִין וְאֵין מְרַצִּין – וְכִי פְּלִיג בַּחֲדָא פְּלִיג, אוֹ דִלְמָא כְּשֵׁרִין וּמְרַצִּין – וּבְתַרְתֵּי פְּלִיגִי?

Rabbi Zeira raises a dilemma: According to Shimon, brother of Azaria, who says that less sacred offerings sacrificed for the sake of more sacred offerings are fit, perhaps they are fit but do not propitiate God, i.e., they do not fulfill the owner’s obligation, as the Rabbis hold. If so, when Shimon, brother of Azaria, disagrees with the first tanna in the mishna, he disagrees only with regard to one matter, i.e., that more sacred offerings sacrificed for the sake of less sacred ones are disqualified altogether. Alternatively, perhaps Shimon, brother of Azaria, holds that if less sacred offerings are sacrificed for the sake of more sacred offerings they are both fit and propitiate God, and they disagree with the Rabbis about two matters.

אָמַר אַבָּיֵי, וְאִיתֵּימָא רַבִּי זְרִיקָא, תָּא שְׁמַע: הַבְּכוֹר וְהַמַּעֲשֵׂר שֶׁשְּׁחָטָן לְשֵׁם שְׁלָמִים – כְּשֵׁרִים. שְׁלָמִים שֶׁשְּׁחָטָן לְשֵׁם בְּכוֹר אוֹ לְשֵׁם מַעֲשֵׂר – פְּסוּלִין.

Abaye, and some say Rabbi Zerika, said: Come and hear proof that they do not satisfy the owners’ obligation: Shimon, brother of Azarya, elaborated on his opinion in the mishna: A firstborn animal and the animal tithe that one slaughtered for the sake of peace offerings are fit, as the sanctity of peace offerings is greater. Peace offerings that one slaughtered for the sake of a firstborn animal or for the sake of the animal tithe are unfit.

וְאִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ כְּשֵׁרִין וּמְרַצִּין, בְּכוֹר בַּר רַיצּוֹיֵי הוּא?! אֶלָּא כְּשֵׁרִין וְאֵין מְרַצִּין! וּמִדְּסֵיפָא כְּשֵׁרִין וְאֵין מְרַצִּין, רֵישָׁא נָמֵי כְּשֵׁרִין וְאֵין מְרַצִּין!

And if it enters your mind that offerings sacrificed for the sake of offerings of greater sanctity are both fit and propitiate God, is a firstborn an offering that propitiates? Sacrificing a firstborn does not serve to propitiate God; rather, conclude that such offerings are fit but do not propitiate. And one can infer that since in the latter clause they are fit but do not propitiate, in the former clause as well, concerning all offerings of lesser sanctity slaughtered for the sake of offerings of the most sacred order, they are fit but do not propitiate.

מִידֵּי אִירְיָא?! הָא כִּדְאִיתַהּ, וְהָא כִּדְאִיתַהּ.

The Gemara responds: Are the cases comparable? This case is as it is, and that case is as it is. Perhaps Shimon, brother of Azarya, holds that offerings of lesser sanctity slaughtered for the sake of offerings of the most sacred order propitiate God, but a firstborn animal and animal tithe slaughtered for the sake of peace offerings do not propitiate God.

אֶלָּא מַאי קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן? גָּבוֹהַּ וְנָמוּךְ קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן?! תְּנֵינָא: כֵּיצַד? קׇדְשֵׁי קָדָשִׁים שֶׁשְּׁחָטָן לְשֵׁם קֳדָשִׁים קַלִּים כּוּ׳!

The Gemara asks: Rather, what is the latter clause concerning a firstborn and animal tithe teaching us, if not that no offerings of lesser sanctity propitiate God when sacrificed for the sake of offerings of greater sanctity? How is the clause not redundant? Does it teach us an example of offerings of higher sanctity and offerings of lower sanctity? We already learn such an example in the former clause, which teaches: How so? Offerings of the most sacred order that one slaughtered for the sake of offerings of lesser sanctity are unfit; offerings of lesser sanctity slaughtered for the sake of offerings of the most sacred order are fit.

מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא: קׇדְשֵׁי קָדָשִׁים וְקָדָשִׁים קַלִּים הוּא דְּאִיכָּא גָּבוֹהַּ וְנָמוּךְ, אֲבָל קַלִּים וְקַלִּים – לָא.

The Gemara answers: It is stated lest you say that the halakha of offerings of higher sanctity and offerings of lower sanctity applies only when the difference is between offerings of the most sacred order and offerings of lesser sanctity, but with regard to offerings of lesser sanctity and other offerings of lesser sanctity this halakha does not apply, as they are all considered to possess the same level of sanctity. Therefore the mishna adds the example of a firstborn animal and animal tithe slaughtered for the sake of peace offerings, to clarify that one can distinguish between different offerings of lesser sanctity as well.

הָא נָמֵי תְּנֵינָא: שְׁלָמִים קוֹדְמִים אֶת הַבְּכוֹר, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהֵן טְעוּנִין מַתַּן אַרְבַּע, וּסְמִיכָה, וּנְסָכִים, וּתְנוּפַת חָזֶה וָשׁוֹק!

The Gemara raises an objection to this answer: We already learn this as well, in another mishna (89a): The peace offering precedes sacrifice of the firstborn because the peace offering requires placement of its blood twice so as to be visible on four sides of the altar, placing hands on the head of the offering, libations, and waving of the breast and thigh by the priest and the owner, none of which is required for the firstborn.

הָא עִיקָּר, הָהִיא אַגְּרָרָא נַסְבַהּ.

The Gemara answers: The primary mention of the distinction is in this mishna; that mishna cites it incidentally, in discussing the order of precedence of offerings.

מַתְנִי׳ הַפֶּסַח שֶׁשְּׁחָטוֹ שַׁחֲרִית בְּאַרְבָּעָה עָשָׂר שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ – רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ מַכְשִׁיר, כְּאִילּוּ נִשְׁחַט בִּשְׁלֹשָׁה עָשָׂר. בֶּן בְּתִירָא פּוֹסֵל, כְּאִילּוּ נִשְׁחַט בֵּין הָעַרְבַּיִם.

MISHNA: With regard to the Paschal offering that one slaughtered on the morning of the fourteenth of Nisan, the day when the Paschal offering should be slaughtered in the afternoon, if he did so not for its sake, Rabbi Yehoshua deems it fit as though it were slaughtered on the thirteenth of Nisan. An animal consecrated as a Paschal offering that was slaughtered not at its designated time for the sake of a different offering is fit for sacrifice as a peace offering. Ben Beteira deems it unfit as though it were slaughtered in the afternoon of the fourteenth.

אָמַר שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן עַזַּאי: מְקוּבָּל אֲנִי מִפִּי שִׁבְעִים וּשְׁנַיִם זָקֵן בַּיּוֹם שֶׁהוֹשִׁיבוּ אֶת רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בִּישִׁיבָה, שֶׁכׇּל הַזְּבָחִים הַנֶּאֱכָלִין שֶׁנִּזְבְּחוּ שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָן – כְּשֵׁרִין, אֶלָּא שֶׁלֹּא עָלוּ לַבְּעָלִים מִשּׁוּם חוֹבָה; חוּץ מִן הַפֶּסַח וּמִן הַחַטָּאת. וְלֹא הוֹסִיף בֶּן עַזַּאי אֶלָּא הָעוֹלָה, וְלֹא הוֹדוּ לוֹ חֲכָמִים.

Shimon ben Azzai said: I received a tradition from seventy-two elders, as the Sanhedrin deliberated and decided on the day that they installed Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya at the head of the yeshiva and ruled that all the slaughtered offerings that are eaten that were slaughtered not for their sake are fit, but these offerings did not satisfy the obligation of the owner, except for the Paschal offering and the sin offering. Based on that version, ben Azzai added to the halakha cited in the first mishna only the burnt offering, which is not eaten, and the Rabbis disagreed and did not concede to him.

גְּמָ׳ אָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר אָמַר רַבִּי אוֹשַׁעְיָא: מַכְשִׁיר הָיָה בֶּן בְּתִירָא בְּפֶסַח שֶׁשְּׁחָטוֹ שַׁחֲרִית בְּאַרְבָּעָה עָשָׂר לִשְׁמוֹ, דְּכוּלֵּיהּ יוֹמָא זִימְנֵיהּ הוּא.

GEMARA: Rabbi Elazar says that Rabbi Oshaya says: With regard to a Paschal offering that one slaughtered on the morning of the fourteenth of Nisan for its sake, ben Beteira would deem it fit, as he held that the entire day, not only the afternoon, is its designated time.

וּמַאי ״כְּאִילּוּ״?

The Gemara asks: And what is the reason the mishna states that according to ben Beteira, a Paschal offering slaughtered on the morning of the fourteenth is considered as though it were slaughtered in the afternoon? This language seems to indicate that it does not have the same status as a Paschal offering actually slaughtered in the afternoon.

אַיְּידֵי דְּאָמַר רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ ״כְּאִילּוּ״, אָמַר אִיהוּ נָמֵי ״כְּאִילּוּ״.

The Gemara responds: Since Rabbi Yehoshua says the term: As though it were slaughtered on the thirteenth, ben Beteira also says the term: As though it were slaughtered in the afternoon. But in fact he maintains that there is no difference between a Paschal offering slaughtered on the morning of the fourteenth and one slaughtered in the afternoon.

אִי הָכִי, אַדְּמִיפַּלְגִי בְּשֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ – לִיפַּלְגוּ בְּלִשְׁמוֹ!

The Gemara asks: If so, rather than disagreeing in the mishna with regard to a Paschal offering that was slaughtered on the morning of the fourteenth not for its sake, let them disagree with regard to one slaughtered for its sake; ben Beteira holds that it is fit, and Rabbi Yehoshua holds that it is unfit.

אִי אִיפְּלִגוּ בְּלִשְׁמוֹ, הֲוָה אָמֵינָא: אֲבָל בְּשֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ – מוֹדֵי רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ לְבֶן בְּתִירָא, הוֹאִיל וּמִקְצָתוֹ רָאוּי; קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.

The Gemara answers: If the mishna were to write only that they disagree with regard to a Paschal offering slaughtered for its sake, I would say: But in a case where it was slaughtered not for its sake, Rabbi Yehoshua concedes to ben Beteira that it is disqualified, even though it was slaughtered in the morning, since at least part of the day, the afternoon, is fit for its sacrifice as a Paschal offering. Therefore, the mishna teaches us that they disagree with regard to this case as well.

וְהָכְתִיב: ״בֵּין הָעַרְבָּיִם״!

The Gemara asks: How can ben Beteira claim that a Paschal offering may be slaughtered in the morning? But isn’t it written: “And the whole assembly of the congregation of Israel shall slaughter it in the afternoon [bein ha’arbayim]” (Exodus 12:6)?

אָמַר עוּלָּא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב עִילַּאי: בֵּין שְׁנֵי עֲרָבִים.

Ulla, son of Rav Ilai, says: Ben Beteira interprets the phrase bein ha’arbayim literally: Between two evenings, i.e., between the eve of the fourteenth and the night after the fourteenth. Accordingly, the Paschal offering may be sacrificed all day long.

תָּמִיד, דִּכְתִיב בֵּיהּ: ״בֵּין הָעַרְבָּיִם״ – הָכִי נָמֵי דְּכוּלֵּי יוֹמָא כָּשֵׁר?!

The Gemara asks: If so, with regard to the daily offering, concerning which it is written: “The one lamb you shall offer in the morning, and the other lamb you shall offer bein ha’arbayim” (Numbers 28:4), is the entire day fit for sacrifice also?

הָתָם, מִדִּכְתִיב: ״אֶת הַכֶּבֶשׂ אֶחָד תַּעֲשֶׂה בַבֹּקֶר״, מִכְּלָל דְּ״בֵין הָעַרְבָּיִם״ – בֵּין הָעַרְבַּיִם מַמָּשׁ.

The Gemara answers: There, since it is written: “The one lamb you shall offer in the morning,” by inference, the term bein ha’arbayim is referring to the actual afternoon.

אֵימָא חַד בַּבֹּקֶר, אִידַּךְ כּוּלֵּיהּ יוֹמָא!

The Gemara counters: Say that one of the lambs should be sacrificed in the morning, and the other one can be sacrificed all day. Why is it evident from the requirement that one be sacrificed in the morning that the other must sacrificed in the afternoon?

״אֶחָד… בַּבֹּקֶר״ – וְלֹא שְׁנַיִם בַּבֹּקֶר.

The Gemara answers: The clause “One lamb you shall offer in the morning” indicates that two lambs are not sacrificed in the morning; the other must perforce be sacrificed in the afternoon.

נֵרוֹת, דִּכְתִיב ״בֵּין הָעַרְבַּיִם״ – הָכִי נָמֵי דְּכוּלֵּי יוֹמָא כָּשֵׁר?!

The Gemara asks: With regard to the lamps of the Candelabrum, one should say the same, as it is written: “And when Aaron lights the lamps bein ha’arbayim” (Exodus 30:8). Is the entire day fit for lighting also, according to the opinion of ben Beteira?

שָׁאנֵי הָתָם, דִּכְתִיב: ״מֵעֶרֶב וְעַד בֹּקֶר״, וְתַנְיָא: ״מֵעֶרֶב וְעַד בֹּקֶר״ – תֵּן לָהּ מִדָּתָהּ שֶׁתְּהֵא דּוֹלֶקֶת וְהוֹלֶכֶת מֵעֶרֶב וְעַד בֹּקֶר. דָּבָר אַחֵר: אֵין לְךָ עֲבוֹדָה כְּשֵׁרָה מֵעֶרֶב וְעַד בֹּקֶר, אֶלָּא זוֹ בִּלְבַד.

The Gemara answers: There it is different, as it is written: “To burn from evening to morning” (Exodus 27:21). And it is taught in a baraita: The phrase “from evening to morning” indicates that you must allocate the Candelabrum its measure of oil so that it will burn from evening until morning. Alternatively, the same verse can be interpreted as follows: Only this rite is valid from evening until morning, since all other rites must be performed during the day. Therefore, the Candelabrum is lit only at the end of the day.

קְטוֹרֶת, דִּכְתִיב בָּהּ: ״בֵּין הָעַרְבָּיִם״ – הָכִי נָמֵי דְּכוּלֵּי יוֹמָא כָּשֵׁר?!

The Gemara asks: With regard to the incense, one should say likewise, as it is written with regard to it: “Bein ha’arbayim he shall burn it” (Exodus 30:8). Is the entire day also fit for burning the incense according to the opinion of ben Beteira?

שָׁאנֵי קְטֹרֶת,

The Gemara answers: The incense is different,