Masechet Zevachim
Masechet Zevachim is sponsored by Esther Kremer in loving memory of her father, Manny Gross on his third yahrzeit. “He exemplified a path of holiness and purity, living with kedushah in his everyday life.”
This month’s learning is sponsored by Beth Balkany in honor of their granddaughter, Devorah Chana Serach Eichel. “May she grow up to be a lifelong learner.”
This month’s learning is dedicated in memory of Rabbi Dr. Raymond Harari z”l, on his 1st yahrzeit. As an educator, principal of Yeshiva of Flatbush, and community rabbi, he inspired thousands with his wisdom, warmth, and unwavering commitment to Torah.
This week’s learning is sponsored by Ruth and David Kahan in honor of Dr. Jody Dushay and Prof. Paul Gompers. “In gratitude for the ongoing and incredibly gracious hospitality!”
Want to dedicate learning? Get started here:
Summary
From where do we derive that the law regarding slaughtering of the burnt offering must be in the North, and that if not, it is disqualified? Since the sin offering is invalid if not slaughtered and its blood received in the North, and this requirement is derived from the burnt offering, a logical argument is made that the same requirement must apply to the burnt offering itself: how can a secondary prohibition be more strict than the primary prohibition? Three halakhot are brought to challenge this logic, but all difficulties are resolved. The Gemara then presents a second derivation for the requirement of the North for a burnt offering, based on the repetition of this requirement in Vayikra 4:29, following its initial mention in verse 24.
The guilt offering must also be slaughtered and its blood collected in the North, and if not, it is disqualified. This is derived from two verses: Vayikra 7:2 and 14:13. A difficulty is raised regarding the use of the second verse, which relates to the sacrifices brought by the leper during the purification process, as that verse is needed for a different drasha. However, this challenge is resolved.
The verse concerning the leper’s sacrifices juxtaposes the guilt offering with both the burnt offering and the sin offering. If the law of the North for a guilt offering is derived from the burnt offering, why is the sin offering mentioned in that verse as well? Ravina explains that its inclusion teaches the principle that a law derived through juxtaposition cannot be used to teach that same law in another case through juxtaposition. Rava derives this principle from a different source: the bull sin offering of the kohen gadol, Vayikra 4:9–10.
Can a law derived by juxtaposition be used to teach something through a gezeira shava? Initially, a proof is brought from the law regarding leprous clothing, which is derived from the law concerning a person with leprosy—originally derived through a gezeira shava. Rabbi Yochanan rejects this proof, arguing that the rules for deriving laws related to sacrificial items differ from those governing other laws. This distinction is demonstrated by the requirement of the North in the case of a guilt offering, which could have been derived from a gezeira shava from the sin offering, but was not – precisely for this reason.
Masechet Zevachim
Masechet Zevachim is sponsored by Esther Kremer in loving memory of her father, Manny Gross on his third yahrzeit. “He exemplified a path of holiness and purity, living with kedushah in his everyday life.”
This month’s learning is sponsored by Beth Balkany in honor of their granddaughter, Devorah Chana Serach Eichel. “May she grow up to be a lifelong learner.”
This month’s learning is dedicated in memory of Rabbi Dr. Raymond Harari z”l, on his 1st yahrzeit. As an educator, principal of Yeshiva of Flatbush, and community rabbi, he inspired thousands with his wisdom, warmth, and unwavering commitment to Torah.
This week’s learning is sponsored by Ruth and David Kahan in honor of Dr. Jody Dushay and Prof. Paul Gompers. “In gratitude for the ongoing and incredibly gracious hospitality!”
Zevachim 49
וַהֲרֵי מַעֲשֵׂר – דְּהוּא נִפְדֶּה, וְאִילּוּ לָקוּחַ בְּכֶסֶף מַעֲשֵׂר אֵינוֹ נִפְדֶּה – דִּתְנַן: הַלָּקוּחַ בְּכֶסֶף מַעֲשֵׂר שֶׁנִּטְמָא – יִפָּדֶה. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: יִקָּבֵר. נִטְמָא אִין, לֹא נִטְמָא לָא!
But there is the case of the second tithe, which may be redeemed, whereas food that is purchased with second-tithe redemption money may not be redeemed. As we learned in a mishna (Ma’aser Sheni 10:10): With regard to food that was purchased with second-tithe money and that then became ritually impure, this ritually impure food must be redeemed with money, with which one must purchase other food. Rabbi Yehuda says: The food must be buried. The Gemara infers from the mishna: If the food purchased with the second-tithe money became impure, yes, it may be redeemed, but if it did not become impure, it may not be redeemed. If so, according to Rabbi Yehuda, the halakha that food purchased with second-tithe money must be buried if it becomes impure is more stringent than the halakha for second-tithe produce itself, which may be redeemed if it becomes impure.
הָתָם לָא אַלִּימָא קְדוּשָּׁתֵיהּ לְמִיתְפַּס פִּדְיוֹנֵיהּ.
The Gemara answers: There, the reason one may not redeem food that was purchased with second-tithe money and that then became ritually impure is not that the halakha is more stringent. Rather, there is a different reason. Since this food was merely purchased with second-tithe money, its sanctity is not as strong as the tithe itself and is unable to grasp its redemption money. Its status as second tithe is weak, and cannot be transferred to a third item. Consequently, if it becomes impure, according to Rabbi Yehuda it cannot be redeemed for money but must be buried, as an item that one is prohibited to derive benefit from.
וַהֲרֵי תְּמוּרָה – דְּאִילּוּ קֳדָשִׁים לָא חָיְילִי עַל בַּעַל מוּם קָבוּעַ, וְאִילּוּ אִיהִי חָיְילָא!
Mar Zutra asks: But there is the case of a substitution, as the status of an offering does not take effect with regard to a permanently blemished animal, while consecration performed via substitution does take effect with regard to an animal with a permanent blemish. Although the animal cannot be sacrificed as an offering and must be redeemed, even after its redemption it may not be used for labor and its wool may not be used.
תְּמוּרָה מִכֹּחַ קָדָשִׁים קָא אָתְיָא, וְקָדָשִׁים מִכֹּחַ חוּלִּין (קָאָתֵי) [קָאָתוּ].
The Gemara answers: The sanctity of a substitution comes by virtue of a consecrated animal; therefore it has a stronger sanctity. But the sanctity of a consecrated animal itself comes by virtue of a non-sacred animal, as there was no consecrated animal by which the owner extended the sanctity to this animal.
הֲרֵי פֶּסַח – דְּהוּא אֵינוֹ טָעוּן סְמִיכָה וּנְסָכִים וּתְנוּפַת חָזֶה וָשׁוֹק, וְאִילּוּ מוֹתָר דִּידֵיהּ טָעוּן סְמִיכָה וּנְסָכִים וּתְנוּפַת חָזֶה וָשׁוֹק!
Mar Zutra asks: But there is the case of a Paschal offering, as it does not require the placing of hands on its head, or wine libations to accompany the offering, or waving of the breast and thigh. While its remainder, an animal that was designated as a Paschal offering but was not sacrificed at the right time, which is then sacrificed as a peace offering, has more stringent halakhot, because it requires the placing of hands on its head, and wine libations to accompany the offering, and waving of the breast and thigh.
פֶּסַח בִּשְׁאָר יְמוֹת הַשָּׁנָה – שְׁלָמִים הוּא.
The Gemara answers: A Paschal offering on the rest of the days of the year is the same as a peace offering, and the animal is no longer considered to be a Paschal offering. Since it is a peace offering, all the halakhot of a peace offering apply to it, and the fact that it was once designated as a Paschal offering is irrelevant. The conclusion of the Gemara is that there are no cases where a secondary status is more stringent than the corresponding primary status. Therefore, the derivation from the halakha of a sin offering to the halakha of a burnt offering, that the latter should be disqualified if it was not slaughtered in the north or if its blood was not collected in the north, remains.
וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא, אָמַר קְרָא: ״הָעוֹלָה״ – בִּמְקוֹמָהּ תְּהֵא.
And if you wish, say there is a different proof that even after the fact a burnt offering that was not slaughtered in the north is disqualified. The verse states: “And slaughter the sin offering in the place of the burnt offering” (Leviticus 4:29). Since the earlier verse (Leviticus 4:24) already stated: “In the place of the burnt offering,” the repetition in this verse stresses that it shall be in its place, meaning that the offering is disqualified if it is slaughtered anywhere else.
אָשָׁם מְנָלַן דְּבָעֵי צָפוֹן? דִּכְתִיב: ״בִּמְקוֹם אֲשֶׁר יִשְׁחֲטוּ אֶת הָעֹלָה יִשְׁחֲטוּ אֶת הָאָשָׁם״.
§ The Gemara asks: From where do we derive that a guilt offering, which is an offering of the most sacred order, requires slaughter in the north? The Gemara answers: As it is written: “In the place where they slaughter the burnt offering they shall slaughter the guilt offering, and its blood shall be sprinkled around the altar” (Leviticus 7:2). Since the burnt offering must be slaughtered in the north, the guilt offering must also be slaughtered in the north.
אַשְׁכְּחַן שְׁחִיטָה, קַבָּלָה מְנָא לַן? ״וְאֶת דָּמוֹ יִזְרוֹק״ – קִבּוּל דָּמוֹ נָמֵי בַּצָּפוֹן.
The Gemara asks: We have found a source that the slaughter must be in the north. From where do we derive that the collection of the blood must also be in the north? The Gemara answers that the second half of the verse states: “And its blood shall be sprinkled around the altar.” Since the blood must be collected immediately after the slaughter and before the sprinkling, just as the slaughter must be in the north, so the collection of its blood must also be in the north.
מְקַבֵּל עַצְמוֹ מְנָא לַן? ״דָּמוֹ״–״וְאֶת דָּמוֹ״.
The Gemara asks: From where do we derive that the one who collects the blood must himself stand in the north? The Gemara answers: It is derived from the fact that the verse does not only state: “Its blood shall be sprinkled,” but states: “And its blood shall be sprinkled” (Leviticus 7:2). The conjunction “and [ve’et]” serves to include the one who collects the blood.
אַשְׁכְּחַן לְמִצְוָה, לְעַכֵּב מְנָא לַן? קְרָא אַחֲרִינָא כְּתִיב: ״וְשָׁחַט אֶת הַכֶּבֶשׂ״.
The Gemara asks: We have found a verse teaching that in order to perform the mitzva in the optimal manner, the slaughtering of the guilt offering is in the north. From where do we derive to disqualify after the fact an offering slaughtered elsewhere, not in the north? The Gemara answers: Another verse is written, referring to a guilt offering, which states: “And he shall slaughter the sheep in the place where they slaughter the sin offering and the burnt offering, in the place of the Sanctuary; for as the sin offering, so is the guilt offering; to the priest, it is most holy” (Leviticus 14:13). This teaches that all guilt offerings are disqualified if they are not slaughtered in the north.
וְהַאי לְהָכִי הוּא דַּאֲתָא?! הַאי מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ לְכִדְתַנְיָא: דָּבָר שֶׁהָיָה בַּכְּלָל וְיָצָא לִידּוֹן בְּדָבָר הֶחָדָשׁ, אִי אַתָּה רַשַּׁאי לְהַחְזִירוֹ לִכְלָלוֹ עַד שֶׁיַּחְזִירֶנּוּ הַכָּתוּב לִכְלָלוֹ בְּפֵירוּשׁ.
The Gemara asks: But does this verse come to teach this halakha? This verse is necessary for that which is taught in a baraita: With regard to a matter that was included in a general category but left to discuss a new matter, i.e., if a novel aspect or special ruling is taught with regard to a specific case within a broader general category, you may not return it to its general category even for other matters, and this case is understood to have been entirely removed from the general category, until the verse explicitly returns it to its general category.
כֵּיצַד? ״וְשָׁחַט אֶת הַכֶּבֶשׂ בִּמְקוֹם אֲשֶׁר יִשְׁחַט אֶת הַחַטָּאת וְאֶת הָעוֹלָה בִּמְקוֹם הַקֹּדֶשׁ, כִּי כַּחַטָּאת הָאָשָׁם הוּא וְגוֹ׳״ – שֶׁאֵין תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״כַּחַטָּאת הָאָשָׁם״; מָה תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״כַּחַטָּאת הָאָשָׁם״?
The Gemara explains: How so? The verse states: “And he shall slaughter the sheep in the place where they slaughter the sin offering and the burnt offering, in the place of the Sanctuary; for as the sin offering, so is the guilt offering; to the priest, it is most holy” (Leviticus 14:13). As there is no need for the verse to state: “As the sin offering, so is the guilt offering,” since the verse had already equated the guilt offering with the sin offering, why does the verse state: “As the sin offering, so is the guilt offering”? What does it serve to teach?
לְפִי שֶׁיָּצָא אֲשַׁם מְצוֹרָע לִידּוֹן בְּדָבָר הֶחָדָשׁ – בְּבוֹהֶן יָד וּבוֹהֶן רֶגֶל וְאֹזֶן יְמָנִית; יָכוֹל לֹא יְהֵא טָעוּן מַתַּן דָּמִים וְאֵימוּרִין לְגַבֵּי מִזְבֵּחַ?
Since the guilt offering of a leper left the general category of guilt offerings to teach a new matter, as there is a halakha unique to the guilt offering of a leper in that blood of the offering is placed on the right thumb of the hand and the right big toe of the foot and the right ear of the leper, one might have thought that this guilt offering does not require placement of blood or the burning of sacrificial portions on the altar, as the halakhot of this guilt offering are unique.
תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״כַּחַטָּאת הָאָשָׁם הוּא״ – מָה חַטָּאת טְעוּנָה מַתַּן דָּמִים וְאֵימוּרִין לְגַבֵּי מִזְבֵּחַ, אַף אֲשַׁם מְצוֹרָע טָעוּן מַתַּן דָּמִים וְאֵימוּרִין לְגַבֵּי מִזְבֵּחַ.
To counter this reasoning, the verse states: “As the sin offering, so is the guilt offering.” Just as the sin offering requires the placement of the blood and the burning of sacrificial portions on the altar, so too, the guilt offering of a leper requires placement of the blood and the burning of sacrificial portions on the altar. Similarly, just as the verse had to teach these two halakhot, so too, the verse had to state: “And he shall slaughter the sheep in the place where they slaughter the sin offering and the burnt offering,” to teach that it requires slaughter in the north. It cannot serve as a source for the general halakha that a guilt offering slaughtered in a place other than in the north is disqualified.
אִם כֵּן, נִכְתּוֹב בְּהַאי וְלָא נִכְתּוֹב בְּהַאי.
The Gemara explains: If so, that the optimal manner to perform the mitzva is to slaughter a guilt offering in the north but failure to do so does not disqualify the offering, let the Torah write the requirement to slaughter in the north in this context, i.e., in the context of the guilt offering of a leper, and not write it in that context, i.e., that of the standard guilt offering. The requirement for slaughter in the north for all other guilt offerings could be derived from the guilt offering of the leper. The repetition of the requirement to slaughter in the north serves to disqualify a guilt offering whose slaughter is not in the north.
הָנִיחָא אִי סְבִירָא לַן יָצָא לִידּוֹן בְּדָבָר הֶחָדָשׁ – אִיהוּ הוּא דְּלָא גָּמַר מִכְּלָלוֹ,
The Gemara comments: This works out well if we hold that with regard to a matter that left its category to teach a new matter, the following principle applies: That matter itself does not learn halakhot from its general category until the Torah explicitly returns it to that category,
אֲבָל כְּלָלוֹ גָּמַר מִינֵּיהּ (לְצָפוֹן) שַׁפִּיר. אֶלָּא אִי סְבִירָא לַן דְּלָא הוּא גָּמַר מִכְּלָלוֹ וְלָא כְּלָלוֹ גָּמַר מִינֵּיהּ – הַאי לְגוּפֵיהּ אִיצְטְרִיךְ!
but other matters in its general category learn halakhot from it; in this case with regard to the halakha of slaughtering a guilt offering in the north, it is well. Although some of the halakhot of the guilt offering of a leper do not apply to the category of guilt offerings in general, it can still serve as the source for the halakha that any guilt offering is disqualified if slaughtered not in the north. But if we hold that in the case of a matter that left its category to teach a new matter, it, the original matter, does not learn halakhot from its general category and its general category does not learn halakhot from it, then this verse is necessary to teach its own halakha.
כֵּיוָן דְּאַהְדְּרֵיהּ, אַהְדְּרֵיהּ.
The Gemara answers: Once the verse returned the halakha of the guilt offering of a leper to the general category by stating “as the sin offering, so is the guilt offering,” it returned it completely. Therefore, when the verse states that it requires slaughter in the north of the Temple courtyard, the phrase is not needed to teach the halakha about the guilt offering of a leper, and it can be used to teach the halakha about guilt offerings in general.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ מָר זוּטְרָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב מָרִי לְרָבִינָא: אֵימָא כִּי אַהְדְּרֵיהּ קְרָא – לְגַבֵּי מַתַּן דָּמִים וְאֵימוּרִין, דְּבָעֵי כְּהוּנָּה; אֲבָל שְׁחִיטָה, דְּלָא בָּעֲיָא כְּהוּנָּה – לָא מִיבְּעֵי צָפוֹן!
Mar Zutra, son of Rav Mari, said to Ravina: Say that when the verse returned the guilt offering of a leper to the class of standard guilt offerings, that is only with regard to placement of blood on the altar and burning the sacrificial portions, which require priesthood, i.e., only a priest may perform those rites. As the verse states: “For as the sin offering, so is the guilt offering; to the priest” (Leviticus 14:13). But say that slaughter, which does not require priesthood, as even a non-priest may slaughter an offering, does not require that it be done in the north of the Temple courtyard.
אִם כֵּן, נֵימָא קְרָא ״כִּי כְּחַטָּאת הוּא״; מַאי ״כְּחַטָּאת הָאָשָׁם״? כִּשְׁאָר אֲשָׁמוֹת יִהְיֶה.
Ravina answered him: If so, let the verse state: For as the sin offering, so is it. What is added by the expanded phrase: “For as the sin offering, so is the guilt offering”? It teaches that the guilt offering of a leper will be like the rest of the guilt offerings.
לְמָה לִי לְאַקְשׁוֹיֵי לְחַטָּאת, לְמָה לִי לְאַקְשׁוֹיֵי לְעוֹלָה?
§ The Gemara asks: Why do I need to juxtapose the guilt offering of a leper to a sin offering to teach the halakha that it must be slaughtered in the north, and why do I need to juxtapose it to a burnt offering to teach the same halakha? The verse states: “And he shall slaughter the sheep in the place where they slaughter the sin offering and the burnt offering, in the place of the Sanctuary” (Leviticus 14:13).
אָמַר רָבִינָא: אִיצְטְרִיךְ; אִי אַקְּשֵׁיהּ לְחַטָּאת וְלָא אַקְּשֵׁיהּ לְעוֹלָה – הֲוָה אָמֵינָא: חַטָּאת מֵהֵיכָן לָמְדָה – מֵעוֹלָה; דָּבָר הַלָּמֵד בְּהֶיקֵּשׁ חוֹזֵר וּמְלַמֵּד בְּהֶיקֵּשׁ.
Ravina said: It was necessary to juxtapose the guilt offering to both of them, as, if the verse had juxtaposed it only to a sin offering but had not juxtaposed it to a burnt offering, I would say: From where is the requirement to slaughter a sin offering in the north derived? It is from the halakha of a burnt offering, as explained on 48a. I would then assume that a matter derived via a juxtaposition, i.e., the halakha of a sin offering, which was derived via a juxtaposition to the halakha of a burnt offering, then teaches that halakha to another case via a juxtaposition. But there is a principle that with regard to matters of consecration the halakha may not be derived via a juxtaposition from another halakha that was itself derived via a juxtaposition. To prevent this incorrect assumption, the verse had to specifically teach the juxtaposition to a burnt offering.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ מָר זוּטְרָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב מָרִי לְרָבִינָא: וְנַיקְּשֵׁיה לְעוֹלָה, וְלָא נַיקְּשֵׁיה לְחַטָּאת!
Mar Zutra, son of Rav Mari, said to Ravina: But let the verse juxtapose the guilt offering of a leper only to a burnt offering and not juxtapose it to a sin offering. The juxtaposition to a sin offering appears superfluous.
הֲוָה אָמֵינָא: דָּבָר הַלָּמֵד בְּהֶיקֵּשׁ – חוֹזֵר וּמְלַמֵּד בְּהֶיקֵּשׁ; וְכִי תֵּימָא: (ניקשי) [נַיקְּשֵׁיהּ] אַקּוֹשֵׁי לְחַטָּאת, נִיחָא לֵיהּ דְּמַקֵּישׁ לֵיהּ לְעִיקָּר וְלָא נַקֵּישׁ לֵיהּ לְטָפֵל; לְהָכִי אַקְּשֵׁיהּ לְחַטָּאת וְאַקְּשֵׁיהּ לְעוֹלָה – לְמֵימַר דָּבָר הַלָּמֵד בְּהֶיקֵּשׁ שֶׁאֵינוֹ חוֹזֵר וּמְלַמֵּד בְּהֶיקֵּשׁ.
Ravina answered: If that had been so, I would still say that a matter derived via a juxtaposition then teaches its halakha via a juxtaposition. And if you would say that if that were to be so, let the verse juxtapose the guilt offering of a leper only to a sin offering, one could answer that it is preferable for the Torah that it juxtaposes the guilt offering to the primary offering about which it states that it must be slaughtered in the north, i.e., the burnt offering, and not juxtapose it to the secondary offering, the sin offering. For this reason, i.e., to prevent the incorrect assumption that a matter derived via a juxtaposition then teaches its halakha via a juxtaposition, the verse juxtaposed it to a sin offering and also juxtaposed it to a burnt offering, to say that a matter derived via a juxtaposition does not then teach its halakha via a juxtaposition.
רָבָא אָמַר מֵהָכָא, דִּכְתִיב: ״כַּאֲשֶׁר יוּרַם מִשּׁוֹר זֶבַח הַשְּׁלָמִים״ – לְמַאי הִלְכְתָא? אִי לְיוֹתֶרֶת הַכָּבֵד וּשְׁתֵּי הַכְּלָיוֹת – בְּגוּפֵיהּ כְּתִיב!
Rava says: The principle that a matter derived via a juxtaposition cannot then teach its halakha via a juxtaposition is derived from here, as it is written with regard to the sin offering brought by the High Priest: “And the two kidneys, and the fat that is upon them, which is by the loins, and the diaphragm with the liver, which he shall take away by the kidneys. As it is taken off from the ox of the sacrifice of peace offerings; and the priest shall make them smoke upon the altar of burnt offering” (Leviticus 4:9–10). One can ask: For what halakha is this offering juxtaposed to that of a peace offering? If it is to teach that the priest must sacrifice the diaphragm with the liver and the two kidneys from the offering, that is written with regard to the offering itself, in the previous verse. This does not need to be derived via a juxtaposition.
מִשּׁוּם דְּבָעֵי אַגְמוֹרֵי יוֹתֶרֶת הַכָּבֵד וּשְׁתֵּי הַכְּלָיוֹת מִפַּר הֶעְלֵם דָּבָר שֶׁל צִבּוּר לִשְׂעִירֵי עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה; בְּגוּפֵיהּ לָא כְּתִיב, וּמִפַּר כֹּהֵן מָשִׁיחַ הוּא דְּגָמַר;
It is written due to the fact that the verse wants to teach the halakha of the diaphragm with the liver and the two kidneys, deriving it from the halakha of the offering of the bull for an unwitting communal sin, then teaching it to apply it to the halakha of the goats brought as sin offerings for communal idol worship. It is not written explicitly in the passage discussing the bull for an unwitting communal sin itself, and it is derived from the halakha of the bull for an unwitting sin of an anointed priest, i.e., the High Priest. The offering for an unwitting communal sin is juxtaposed to the sin offering brought by the High Priest in the verse: “So shall he do with the bull; as he did with the bull of the sin offering, so shall he do with this” (Leviticus 4:20).
לְהָכִי אִיצְטְרִיךְ ״כַּאֲשֶׁר יוּרַם״ – דְּנֶיהְוֵי כְּמַאן דִּכְתִב בְּגוּפֵיהּ, וְלָא נִיהְוֵי דָּבָר הַלָּמֵד בְּהֶיקֵּשׁ חוֹזֵר וּמְלַמֵּד בְּהֶיקֵּשׁ.
For this reason it was necessary for the verse to state: “As it is taken off from the ox” (Leviticus 4:10), so that it is as though it wrote explicitly in the passage discussing the bull for an unwitting communal sin itself. One of the hermeneutical principles applied to understanding verses in the Torah is: If the halakha stated is not required for the matter in which it is written, apply it to another matter. When this principle is employed, the halakha written in one context is viewed as if it were written elsewhere. In this case, as it was not necessary for the verse to write the juxtaposition to a peace offering in the context of the sin offering brought by the High Priest, it is applied to the case of the bull for an unwitting communal sin. And therefore it will not be a case of a matter derived via a juxtaposition that then teaches its halakha via a juxtaposition.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב פָּפָּא לְרָבָא: וְלִיכְתְּבֵיהּ בְּגוּפֵיהּ, וְלָא נַקֵּישׁ!
Rav Pappa said to Rava: But why not let the Torah write explicitly in the passage discussing the bull for an unwitting communal sin itself that the diaphragm with the liver and two kidneys must be removed from the ox, and not juxtapose it to a peace offering in this convoluted manner?
אִי כְּתַב בְּגוּפֵיהּ וְלָא אַקֵּישׁ – הֲוָה אָמֵינָא דָּבָר הַלָּמֵד בְּהֶיקֵּשׁ חוֹזֵר וּמְלַמֵּד בְּהֶיקֵּשׁ; וְכִי תֵּימָא (נקשי) [נַקְּשֵׁיהּ] אַקּוֹשֵׁי – נִיחָא לֵיהּ דְּכַתְבֵיהּ בְּגוּפֵיהּ מִדְּאַקֵּישׁ לֵיהּ אַקּוֹשֵׁי; לְהָכִי כַּתְבֵיהּ וְאַקְּשֵׁיהּ, לְמֵימְרָא דָּבָר הַלָּמֵד בְּהֶיקֵּשׁ אֵין חוֹזֵר וּמְלַמֵּד בְּהֶיקֵּשׁ.
Rava answered: If the Torah had written it in that passage itself, and not juxtaposed it, I would say that in general a matter derived via a juxtaposition then teaches via a juxtaposition, as one would not have this instance to serve as a counterexample to that principle. And if you would say: If so, why not simply juxtapose the case of the bull for an unwitting communal sin to the case of the bull of the anointed priest, I would answer: It is preferable for the verse that it writes it in the passage itself rather than to juxtapose it alone. It is for this reason that it wrote it and juxtaposed it, to say that a matter derived via a juxtaposition cannot then teach its halakha via a juxtaposition.
(הֶיקֵּשׁ, גְּזֵירָה שָׁוָה, קַל וָחוֹמֶר – סִימָן)
§ Before beginning a lengthy discussion concerning derivations via compounded methodologies of the hermeneutical principles, the Gemara presents a mnemonic for its forthcoming discussion: Juxtaposition, verbal analogy, an a fortiori inference.
דָּבָר הַלָּמֵד בְּהֶיקֵּשׁ, אֵין חוֹזֵר וּמְלַמֵּד מֵהֶיקֵּשׁ – אִי מִדְּרָבָא, אִי מִדְּרָבִינָא. דָּבָר הַלָּמֵד בְּהֶיקֵּשׁ, מַהוּ שֶׁיְּלַמֵּד בִּגְזֵירָה שָׁוָה?
The principle that a matter derived via a juxtaposition cannot then teach its halakha via a juxtaposition is indicated either from the proof of Rava or from the proof of Ravina, both cited earlier. The Gemara asks: What is the halakha with regard to whether a matter derived via a juxtaposition can then teach its halakha to another matter via a verbal analogy?
תָּא שְׁמַע, רַבִּי נָתָן בֶּן אַבְטוּלְמוֹס אוֹמֵר: מִנַּיִן לִפְרִיחָה בִּבְגָדִים שֶׁהִיא טְהוֹרָה? נֶאֱמַר קָרַחַת וְגַבַּחַת בַּבְּגָדִים, וְנֶאֱמַר קָרַחַת וְגַבַּחַת בָּאָדָם;
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from a baraita: Rabbi Natan ben Avtolemos says: From where is it derived that if leprosy of garments spreads throughout an entire garment that it is pure? It is derived via a verbal analogy: A bareness within [karaḥat] and a bareness without [gabbaḥat] are stated with regard to leprosy of garments: “And the priest shall look, after that the mark is washed; and behold, if the mark has not changed its color, and the mark has not spread, it is impure; you shall burn it in the fire; it is a fret, whether the bareness be within or without” (Leviticus 13:55); and a bald head [karaḥat] and a bald forehead [gabbaḥat] are stated with regard to leprosy of a person: “But if there be in the bald head, or the bald forehead, a reddish-white plague, it is leprosy breaking out in his bald head, or his bald forehead” (Leviticus 13:42).
מָה לְהַלָּן – פָּרַח בְּכוּלּוֹ טָהוֹר, אַף כָּאן – פָּרַח בְּכוּלּוֹ טָהוֹר.
Just as there, with regard to a person, if the leprosy spread throughout him entirely he is pure, as the verse states: “Then the priest shall look; and behold, if the leprosy has covered all of his flesh, he shall pronounce the one who has the mark pure; it is all turned white: He is pure” (Leviticus 13:13), so too here with regard to garments, if the leprosy spread throughout the entire garment it is pure.
וְהָתָם מְנָא לַן? דִּכְתִיב: ״מֵרֹאשׁוֹ וְעַד רַגְלָיו״ – וְאִיתַּקַּשׁ רֹאשׁוֹ (לרגל) [לְרַגְלָיו]; מָה לְהַלָּן, כּוּלּוֹ הָפַךְ לָבָן פֶּרַח בְּכוּלּוֹ – טָהוֹר; אַף כָּאן, כּוּלּוֹ הָפַךְ לָבָן פָּרַח בְּכוּלּוֹ – טָהוֹר.
The Gemara continues its proof: But there, with regard to the head, which serves as the source for this verbal analogy, from where do we derive that if the leprosy spreads throughout the head he is pure? As it is written: “And if the leprosy breaks out on the skin, and the leprosy covers all the skin of the one who has the mark, from his head to his feet, as far as it appears to the priest” (Leviticus 13:12). And the verse thereby juxtaposes leprosy on his head to leprosy on his foot, teaching the following halakha: Just as there, with regard to leprosy of the body and foot, if its entirety turned white, and it spread all over him, he is pure, so too here, in the case of leprosy of the head, if its entirety turned white and it spread over all his head, he is pure. Evidently, a matter derived via a juxtaposition can then teach its halakha to another matter via a verbal analogy.
אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: בְּכׇל הַתּוֹרָה כּוּלָּהּ לְמֵידִין לָמֵד מִלָּמֵד, חוּץ מִן הַקֳּדָשִׁים – שֶׁאֵין דָּנִין לָמֵד מִלָּמֵד.
Rabbi Yoḥanan says: This cannot serve as a proof with regard to the halakhot of consecrated matters. With regard to the entire Torah, one derives a halakha derived via a verbal analogy from a halakha derived via a juxtaposition, apart from with regard to consecrated matters, where one does not derive a halakha derived via a verbal analogy from a halakha derived via a juxtaposition.
דְּאִם כֵּן – לֹא יֵאָמֵר צָפוֹנָה בְּאָשָׁם, וְתֵיתֵי בִּגְזֵירָה שָׁוָה דְּ״קׇדְשֵׁי קָדָשִׁים״ מֵחַטָּאוֹת;
Rabbi Yoḥanan explains: As if it were to be so that one could derive a halakha in this manner even concerning consecrated matters, the verse should not state the requirement for slaughter in the north with regard to a guilt offering, as stated from the explicit juxtaposition of a burnt offering and a sin offering, and instead derive it through a verbal analogy. The verse describes a guilt offering as an offering of the most sacred order (see Leviticus 7:1), and its halakha can be derived via a verbal analogy from that of a sin offering, which is described in the same manner (see Leviticus 6:18).
לָאו לְמֵימְרָא דְּדָבָר הַלָּמֵד בְּהֶיקֵּשׁ אֵין חוֹזֵר וּמְלַמֵּד בִּגְזֵירָה שָׁוָה?
Rabbi Yoḥanan continues: Is this not to say, at least with regard to consecrated matters, that a matter derived via a juxtaposition cannot then teach its halakha to another matter via a verbal analogy?
וְדִלְמָא מִשּׁוּם דְּאִיכָּא לְמִיפְרַךְ: מָה לְחַטָּאת, שֶׁכֵּן מְכַפֶּרֶת עַל חַיָּיבֵי כָרֵיתוֹת!
The Gemara rejects Rabbi Yoḥanan’s proof: But perhaps the requirement to slaughter a guilt offering in the north must be written explicitly because the verbal analogy can be refuted as follows: What is notable about a sin offering? It is notable in that it atones for those sins liable for punishment by karet, which is not so with regard to a guilt offering.
״קׇדְשֵׁי קָדָשִׁים״ יַתִּירֵי כְּתִיבִי.
The Gemara rejects this claim: There are additional descriptions of a guilt offering and a sin offering as offerings of the most sacred order written in the verses: “This shall be yours of the most sacred items, reserved from the fire: Every offering of theirs, every meal offering of theirs, and every sin offering of theirs, and every guilt offering of theirs, which they may offer to Me, shall be most holy for you and for your sons” (Numbers 18:9). A verbal analogy derived from extra phrases in the verse cannot be refuted with a logical claim. Therefore, Rabbi Yoḥanan’s claim stands, and, at least with regard to consecrated matters, a matter derived via a juxtaposition cannot then teach its halakha to another matter via a verbal analogy.
דָּבָר הַלָּמֵד מֵהֶיקֵּשׁ, חוֹזֵר וּמְלַמֵּד בְּקַל וָחוֹמֶר –
The Gemara states: That a matter derived via a juxtaposition then teaches its halakha via an a fortiori inference
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Mamaroneck, NY, United States
Zevachim 49
וַהֲרֵי מַעֲשֵׂר – דְּהוּא נִפְדֶּה, וְאִילּוּ לָקוּחַ בְּכֶסֶף מַעֲשֵׂר אֵינוֹ נִפְדֶּה – דִּתְנַן: הַלָּקוּחַ בְּכֶסֶף מַעֲשֵׂר שֶׁנִּטְמָא – יִפָּדֶה. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: יִקָּבֵר. נִטְמָא אִין, לֹא נִטְמָא לָא!
But there is the case of the second tithe, which may be redeemed, whereas food that is purchased with second-tithe redemption money may not be redeemed. As we learned in a mishna (Ma’aser Sheni 10:10): With regard to food that was purchased with second-tithe money and that then became ritually impure, this ritually impure food must be redeemed with money, with which one must purchase other food. Rabbi Yehuda says: The food must be buried. The Gemara infers from the mishna: If the food purchased with the second-tithe money became impure, yes, it may be redeemed, but if it did not become impure, it may not be redeemed. If so, according to Rabbi Yehuda, the halakha that food purchased with second-tithe money must be buried if it becomes impure is more stringent than the halakha for second-tithe produce itself, which may be redeemed if it becomes impure.
הָתָם לָא אַלִּימָא קְדוּשָּׁתֵיהּ לְמִיתְפַּס פִּדְיוֹנֵיהּ.
The Gemara answers: There, the reason one may not redeem food that was purchased with second-tithe money and that then became ritually impure is not that the halakha is more stringent. Rather, there is a different reason. Since this food was merely purchased with second-tithe money, its sanctity is not as strong as the tithe itself and is unable to grasp its redemption money. Its status as second tithe is weak, and cannot be transferred to a third item. Consequently, if it becomes impure, according to Rabbi Yehuda it cannot be redeemed for money but must be buried, as an item that one is prohibited to derive benefit from.
וַהֲרֵי תְּמוּרָה – דְּאִילּוּ קֳדָשִׁים לָא חָיְילִי עַל בַּעַל מוּם קָבוּעַ, וְאִילּוּ אִיהִי חָיְילָא!
Mar Zutra asks: But there is the case of a substitution, as the status of an offering does not take effect with regard to a permanently blemished animal, while consecration performed via substitution does take effect with regard to an animal with a permanent blemish. Although the animal cannot be sacrificed as an offering and must be redeemed, even after its redemption it may not be used for labor and its wool may not be used.
תְּמוּרָה מִכֹּחַ קָדָשִׁים קָא אָתְיָא, וְקָדָשִׁים מִכֹּחַ חוּלִּין (קָאָתֵי) [קָאָתוּ].
The Gemara answers: The sanctity of a substitution comes by virtue of a consecrated animal; therefore it has a stronger sanctity. But the sanctity of a consecrated animal itself comes by virtue of a non-sacred animal, as there was no consecrated animal by which the owner extended the sanctity to this animal.
הֲרֵי פֶּסַח – דְּהוּא אֵינוֹ טָעוּן סְמִיכָה וּנְסָכִים וּתְנוּפַת חָזֶה וָשׁוֹק, וְאִילּוּ מוֹתָר דִּידֵיהּ טָעוּן סְמִיכָה וּנְסָכִים וּתְנוּפַת חָזֶה וָשׁוֹק!
Mar Zutra asks: But there is the case of a Paschal offering, as it does not require the placing of hands on its head, or wine libations to accompany the offering, or waving of the breast and thigh. While its remainder, an animal that was designated as a Paschal offering but was not sacrificed at the right time, which is then sacrificed as a peace offering, has more stringent halakhot, because it requires the placing of hands on its head, and wine libations to accompany the offering, and waving of the breast and thigh.
פֶּסַח בִּשְׁאָר יְמוֹת הַשָּׁנָה – שְׁלָמִים הוּא.
The Gemara answers: A Paschal offering on the rest of the days of the year is the same as a peace offering, and the animal is no longer considered to be a Paschal offering. Since it is a peace offering, all the halakhot of a peace offering apply to it, and the fact that it was once designated as a Paschal offering is irrelevant. The conclusion of the Gemara is that there are no cases where a secondary status is more stringent than the corresponding primary status. Therefore, the derivation from the halakha of a sin offering to the halakha of a burnt offering, that the latter should be disqualified if it was not slaughtered in the north or if its blood was not collected in the north, remains.
וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא, אָמַר קְרָא: ״הָעוֹלָה״ – בִּמְקוֹמָהּ תְּהֵא.
And if you wish, say there is a different proof that even after the fact a burnt offering that was not slaughtered in the north is disqualified. The verse states: “And slaughter the sin offering in the place of the burnt offering” (Leviticus 4:29). Since the earlier verse (Leviticus 4:24) already stated: “In the place of the burnt offering,” the repetition in this verse stresses that it shall be in its place, meaning that the offering is disqualified if it is slaughtered anywhere else.
אָשָׁם מְנָלַן דְּבָעֵי צָפוֹן? דִּכְתִיב: ״בִּמְקוֹם אֲשֶׁר יִשְׁחֲטוּ אֶת הָעֹלָה יִשְׁחֲטוּ אֶת הָאָשָׁם״.
§ The Gemara asks: From where do we derive that a guilt offering, which is an offering of the most sacred order, requires slaughter in the north? The Gemara answers: As it is written: “In the place where they slaughter the burnt offering they shall slaughter the guilt offering, and its blood shall be sprinkled around the altar” (Leviticus 7:2). Since the burnt offering must be slaughtered in the north, the guilt offering must also be slaughtered in the north.
אַשְׁכְּחַן שְׁחִיטָה, קַבָּלָה מְנָא לַן? ״וְאֶת דָּמוֹ יִזְרוֹק״ – קִבּוּל דָּמוֹ נָמֵי בַּצָּפוֹן.
The Gemara asks: We have found a source that the slaughter must be in the north. From where do we derive that the collection of the blood must also be in the north? The Gemara answers that the second half of the verse states: “And its blood shall be sprinkled around the altar.” Since the blood must be collected immediately after the slaughter and before the sprinkling, just as the slaughter must be in the north, so the collection of its blood must also be in the north.
מְקַבֵּל עַצְמוֹ מְנָא לַן? ״דָּמוֹ״–״וְאֶת דָּמוֹ״.
The Gemara asks: From where do we derive that the one who collects the blood must himself stand in the north? The Gemara answers: It is derived from the fact that the verse does not only state: “Its blood shall be sprinkled,” but states: “And its blood shall be sprinkled” (Leviticus 7:2). The conjunction “and [ve’et]” serves to include the one who collects the blood.
אַשְׁכְּחַן לְמִצְוָה, לְעַכֵּב מְנָא לַן? קְרָא אַחֲרִינָא כְּתִיב: ״וְשָׁחַט אֶת הַכֶּבֶשׂ״.
The Gemara asks: We have found a verse teaching that in order to perform the mitzva in the optimal manner, the slaughtering of the guilt offering is in the north. From where do we derive to disqualify after the fact an offering slaughtered elsewhere, not in the north? The Gemara answers: Another verse is written, referring to a guilt offering, which states: “And he shall slaughter the sheep in the place where they slaughter the sin offering and the burnt offering, in the place of the Sanctuary; for as the sin offering, so is the guilt offering; to the priest, it is most holy” (Leviticus 14:13). This teaches that all guilt offerings are disqualified if they are not slaughtered in the north.
וְהַאי לְהָכִי הוּא דַּאֲתָא?! הַאי מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ לְכִדְתַנְיָא: דָּבָר שֶׁהָיָה בַּכְּלָל וְיָצָא לִידּוֹן בְּדָבָר הֶחָדָשׁ, אִי אַתָּה רַשַּׁאי לְהַחְזִירוֹ לִכְלָלוֹ עַד שֶׁיַּחְזִירֶנּוּ הַכָּתוּב לִכְלָלוֹ בְּפֵירוּשׁ.
The Gemara asks: But does this verse come to teach this halakha? This verse is necessary for that which is taught in a baraita: With regard to a matter that was included in a general category but left to discuss a new matter, i.e., if a novel aspect or special ruling is taught with regard to a specific case within a broader general category, you may not return it to its general category even for other matters, and this case is understood to have been entirely removed from the general category, until the verse explicitly returns it to its general category.
כֵּיצַד? ״וְשָׁחַט אֶת הַכֶּבֶשׂ בִּמְקוֹם אֲשֶׁר יִשְׁחַט אֶת הַחַטָּאת וְאֶת הָעוֹלָה בִּמְקוֹם הַקֹּדֶשׁ, כִּי כַּחַטָּאת הָאָשָׁם הוּא וְגוֹ׳״ – שֶׁאֵין תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״כַּחַטָּאת הָאָשָׁם״; מָה תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״כַּחַטָּאת הָאָשָׁם״?
The Gemara explains: How so? The verse states: “And he shall slaughter the sheep in the place where they slaughter the sin offering and the burnt offering, in the place of the Sanctuary; for as the sin offering, so is the guilt offering; to the priest, it is most holy” (Leviticus 14:13). As there is no need for the verse to state: “As the sin offering, so is the guilt offering,” since the verse had already equated the guilt offering with the sin offering, why does the verse state: “As the sin offering, so is the guilt offering”? What does it serve to teach?
לְפִי שֶׁיָּצָא אֲשַׁם מְצוֹרָע לִידּוֹן בְּדָבָר הֶחָדָשׁ – בְּבוֹהֶן יָד וּבוֹהֶן רֶגֶל וְאֹזֶן יְמָנִית; יָכוֹל לֹא יְהֵא טָעוּן מַתַּן דָּמִים וְאֵימוּרִין לְגַבֵּי מִזְבֵּחַ?
Since the guilt offering of a leper left the general category of guilt offerings to teach a new matter, as there is a halakha unique to the guilt offering of a leper in that blood of the offering is placed on the right thumb of the hand and the right big toe of the foot and the right ear of the leper, one might have thought that this guilt offering does not require placement of blood or the burning of sacrificial portions on the altar, as the halakhot of this guilt offering are unique.
תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״כַּחַטָּאת הָאָשָׁם הוּא״ – מָה חַטָּאת טְעוּנָה מַתַּן דָּמִים וְאֵימוּרִין לְגַבֵּי מִזְבֵּחַ, אַף אֲשַׁם מְצוֹרָע טָעוּן מַתַּן דָּמִים וְאֵימוּרִין לְגַבֵּי מִזְבֵּחַ.
To counter this reasoning, the verse states: “As the sin offering, so is the guilt offering.” Just as the sin offering requires the placement of the blood and the burning of sacrificial portions on the altar, so too, the guilt offering of a leper requires placement of the blood and the burning of sacrificial portions on the altar. Similarly, just as the verse had to teach these two halakhot, so too, the verse had to state: “And he shall slaughter the sheep in the place where they slaughter the sin offering and the burnt offering,” to teach that it requires slaughter in the north. It cannot serve as a source for the general halakha that a guilt offering slaughtered in a place other than in the north is disqualified.
אִם כֵּן, נִכְתּוֹב בְּהַאי וְלָא נִכְתּוֹב בְּהַאי.
The Gemara explains: If so, that the optimal manner to perform the mitzva is to slaughter a guilt offering in the north but failure to do so does not disqualify the offering, let the Torah write the requirement to slaughter in the north in this context, i.e., in the context of the guilt offering of a leper, and not write it in that context, i.e., that of the standard guilt offering. The requirement for slaughter in the north for all other guilt offerings could be derived from the guilt offering of the leper. The repetition of the requirement to slaughter in the north serves to disqualify a guilt offering whose slaughter is not in the north.
הָנִיחָא אִי סְבִירָא לַן יָצָא לִידּוֹן בְּדָבָר הֶחָדָשׁ – אִיהוּ הוּא דְּלָא גָּמַר מִכְּלָלוֹ,
The Gemara comments: This works out well if we hold that with regard to a matter that left its category to teach a new matter, the following principle applies: That matter itself does not learn halakhot from its general category until the Torah explicitly returns it to that category,
אֲבָל כְּלָלוֹ גָּמַר מִינֵּיהּ (לְצָפוֹן) שַׁפִּיר. אֶלָּא אִי סְבִירָא לַן דְּלָא הוּא גָּמַר מִכְּלָלוֹ וְלָא כְּלָלוֹ גָּמַר מִינֵּיהּ – הַאי לְגוּפֵיהּ אִיצְטְרִיךְ!
but other matters in its general category learn halakhot from it; in this case with regard to the halakha of slaughtering a guilt offering in the north, it is well. Although some of the halakhot of the guilt offering of a leper do not apply to the category of guilt offerings in general, it can still serve as the source for the halakha that any guilt offering is disqualified if slaughtered not in the north. But if we hold that in the case of a matter that left its category to teach a new matter, it, the original matter, does not learn halakhot from its general category and its general category does not learn halakhot from it, then this verse is necessary to teach its own halakha.
כֵּיוָן דְּאַהְדְּרֵיהּ, אַהְדְּרֵיהּ.
The Gemara answers: Once the verse returned the halakha of the guilt offering of a leper to the general category by stating “as the sin offering, so is the guilt offering,” it returned it completely. Therefore, when the verse states that it requires slaughter in the north of the Temple courtyard, the phrase is not needed to teach the halakha about the guilt offering of a leper, and it can be used to teach the halakha about guilt offerings in general.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ מָר זוּטְרָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב מָרִי לְרָבִינָא: אֵימָא כִּי אַהְדְּרֵיהּ קְרָא – לְגַבֵּי מַתַּן דָּמִים וְאֵימוּרִין, דְּבָעֵי כְּהוּנָּה; אֲבָל שְׁחִיטָה, דְּלָא בָּעֲיָא כְּהוּנָּה – לָא מִיבְּעֵי צָפוֹן!
Mar Zutra, son of Rav Mari, said to Ravina: Say that when the verse returned the guilt offering of a leper to the class of standard guilt offerings, that is only with regard to placement of blood on the altar and burning the sacrificial portions, which require priesthood, i.e., only a priest may perform those rites. As the verse states: “For as the sin offering, so is the guilt offering; to the priest” (Leviticus 14:13). But say that slaughter, which does not require priesthood, as even a non-priest may slaughter an offering, does not require that it be done in the north of the Temple courtyard.
אִם כֵּן, נֵימָא קְרָא ״כִּי כְּחַטָּאת הוּא״; מַאי ״כְּחַטָּאת הָאָשָׁם״? כִּשְׁאָר אֲשָׁמוֹת יִהְיֶה.
Ravina answered him: If so, let the verse state: For as the sin offering, so is it. What is added by the expanded phrase: “For as the sin offering, so is the guilt offering”? It teaches that the guilt offering of a leper will be like the rest of the guilt offerings.
לְמָה לִי לְאַקְשׁוֹיֵי לְחַטָּאת, לְמָה לִי לְאַקְשׁוֹיֵי לְעוֹלָה?
§ The Gemara asks: Why do I need to juxtapose the guilt offering of a leper to a sin offering to teach the halakha that it must be slaughtered in the north, and why do I need to juxtapose it to a burnt offering to teach the same halakha? The verse states: “And he shall slaughter the sheep in the place where they slaughter the sin offering and the burnt offering, in the place of the Sanctuary” (Leviticus 14:13).
אָמַר רָבִינָא: אִיצְטְרִיךְ; אִי אַקְּשֵׁיהּ לְחַטָּאת וְלָא אַקְּשֵׁיהּ לְעוֹלָה – הֲוָה אָמֵינָא: חַטָּאת מֵהֵיכָן לָמְדָה – מֵעוֹלָה; דָּבָר הַלָּמֵד בְּהֶיקֵּשׁ חוֹזֵר וּמְלַמֵּד בְּהֶיקֵּשׁ.
Ravina said: It was necessary to juxtapose the guilt offering to both of them, as, if the verse had juxtaposed it only to a sin offering but had not juxtaposed it to a burnt offering, I would say: From where is the requirement to slaughter a sin offering in the north derived? It is from the halakha of a burnt offering, as explained on 48a. I would then assume that a matter derived via a juxtaposition, i.e., the halakha of a sin offering, which was derived via a juxtaposition to the halakha of a burnt offering, then teaches that halakha to another case via a juxtaposition. But there is a principle that with regard to matters of consecration the halakha may not be derived via a juxtaposition from another halakha that was itself derived via a juxtaposition. To prevent this incorrect assumption, the verse had to specifically teach the juxtaposition to a burnt offering.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ מָר זוּטְרָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב מָרִי לְרָבִינָא: וְנַיקְּשֵׁיה לְעוֹלָה, וְלָא נַיקְּשֵׁיה לְחַטָּאת!
Mar Zutra, son of Rav Mari, said to Ravina: But let the verse juxtapose the guilt offering of a leper only to a burnt offering and not juxtapose it to a sin offering. The juxtaposition to a sin offering appears superfluous.
הֲוָה אָמֵינָא: דָּבָר הַלָּמֵד בְּהֶיקֵּשׁ – חוֹזֵר וּמְלַמֵּד בְּהֶיקֵּשׁ; וְכִי תֵּימָא: (ניקשי) [נַיקְּשֵׁיהּ] אַקּוֹשֵׁי לְחַטָּאת, נִיחָא לֵיהּ דְּמַקֵּישׁ לֵיהּ לְעִיקָּר וְלָא נַקֵּישׁ לֵיהּ לְטָפֵל; לְהָכִי אַקְּשֵׁיהּ לְחַטָּאת וְאַקְּשֵׁיהּ לְעוֹלָה – לְמֵימַר דָּבָר הַלָּמֵד בְּהֶיקֵּשׁ שֶׁאֵינוֹ חוֹזֵר וּמְלַמֵּד בְּהֶיקֵּשׁ.
Ravina answered: If that had been so, I would still say that a matter derived via a juxtaposition then teaches its halakha via a juxtaposition. And if you would say that if that were to be so, let the verse juxtapose the guilt offering of a leper only to a sin offering, one could answer that it is preferable for the Torah that it juxtaposes the guilt offering to the primary offering about which it states that it must be slaughtered in the north, i.e., the burnt offering, and not juxtapose it to the secondary offering, the sin offering. For this reason, i.e., to prevent the incorrect assumption that a matter derived via a juxtaposition then teaches its halakha via a juxtaposition, the verse juxtaposed it to a sin offering and also juxtaposed it to a burnt offering, to say that a matter derived via a juxtaposition does not then teach its halakha via a juxtaposition.
רָבָא אָמַר מֵהָכָא, דִּכְתִיב: ״כַּאֲשֶׁר יוּרַם מִשּׁוֹר זֶבַח הַשְּׁלָמִים״ – לְמַאי הִלְכְתָא? אִי לְיוֹתֶרֶת הַכָּבֵד וּשְׁתֵּי הַכְּלָיוֹת – בְּגוּפֵיהּ כְּתִיב!
Rava says: The principle that a matter derived via a juxtaposition cannot then teach its halakha via a juxtaposition is derived from here, as it is written with regard to the sin offering brought by the High Priest: “And the two kidneys, and the fat that is upon them, which is by the loins, and the diaphragm with the liver, which he shall take away by the kidneys. As it is taken off from the ox of the sacrifice of peace offerings; and the priest shall make them smoke upon the altar of burnt offering” (Leviticus 4:9–10). One can ask: For what halakha is this offering juxtaposed to that of a peace offering? If it is to teach that the priest must sacrifice the diaphragm with the liver and the two kidneys from the offering, that is written with regard to the offering itself, in the previous verse. This does not need to be derived via a juxtaposition.
מִשּׁוּם דְּבָעֵי אַגְמוֹרֵי יוֹתֶרֶת הַכָּבֵד וּשְׁתֵּי הַכְּלָיוֹת מִפַּר הֶעְלֵם דָּבָר שֶׁל צִבּוּר לִשְׂעִירֵי עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה; בְּגוּפֵיהּ לָא כְּתִיב, וּמִפַּר כֹּהֵן מָשִׁיחַ הוּא דְּגָמַר;
It is written due to the fact that the verse wants to teach the halakha of the diaphragm with the liver and the two kidneys, deriving it from the halakha of the offering of the bull for an unwitting communal sin, then teaching it to apply it to the halakha of the goats brought as sin offerings for communal idol worship. It is not written explicitly in the passage discussing the bull for an unwitting communal sin itself, and it is derived from the halakha of the bull for an unwitting sin of an anointed priest, i.e., the High Priest. The offering for an unwitting communal sin is juxtaposed to the sin offering brought by the High Priest in the verse: “So shall he do with the bull; as he did with the bull of the sin offering, so shall he do with this” (Leviticus 4:20).
לְהָכִי אִיצְטְרִיךְ ״כַּאֲשֶׁר יוּרַם״ – דְּנֶיהְוֵי כְּמַאן דִּכְתִב בְּגוּפֵיהּ, וְלָא נִיהְוֵי דָּבָר הַלָּמֵד בְּהֶיקֵּשׁ חוֹזֵר וּמְלַמֵּד בְּהֶיקֵּשׁ.
For this reason it was necessary for the verse to state: “As it is taken off from the ox” (Leviticus 4:10), so that it is as though it wrote explicitly in the passage discussing the bull for an unwitting communal sin itself. One of the hermeneutical principles applied to understanding verses in the Torah is: If the halakha stated is not required for the matter in which it is written, apply it to another matter. When this principle is employed, the halakha written in one context is viewed as if it were written elsewhere. In this case, as it was not necessary for the verse to write the juxtaposition to a peace offering in the context of the sin offering brought by the High Priest, it is applied to the case of the bull for an unwitting communal sin. And therefore it will not be a case of a matter derived via a juxtaposition that then teaches its halakha via a juxtaposition.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב פָּפָּא לְרָבָא: וְלִיכְתְּבֵיהּ בְּגוּפֵיהּ, וְלָא נַקֵּישׁ!
Rav Pappa said to Rava: But why not let the Torah write explicitly in the passage discussing the bull for an unwitting communal sin itself that the diaphragm with the liver and two kidneys must be removed from the ox, and not juxtapose it to a peace offering in this convoluted manner?
אִי כְּתַב בְּגוּפֵיהּ וְלָא אַקֵּישׁ – הֲוָה אָמֵינָא דָּבָר הַלָּמֵד בְּהֶיקֵּשׁ חוֹזֵר וּמְלַמֵּד בְּהֶיקֵּשׁ; וְכִי תֵּימָא (נקשי) [נַקְּשֵׁיהּ] אַקּוֹשֵׁי – נִיחָא לֵיהּ דְּכַתְבֵיהּ בְּגוּפֵיהּ מִדְּאַקֵּישׁ לֵיהּ אַקּוֹשֵׁי; לְהָכִי כַּתְבֵיהּ וְאַקְּשֵׁיהּ, לְמֵימְרָא דָּבָר הַלָּמֵד בְּהֶיקֵּשׁ אֵין חוֹזֵר וּמְלַמֵּד בְּהֶיקֵּשׁ.
Rava answered: If the Torah had written it in that passage itself, and not juxtaposed it, I would say that in general a matter derived via a juxtaposition then teaches via a juxtaposition, as one would not have this instance to serve as a counterexample to that principle. And if you would say: If so, why not simply juxtapose the case of the bull for an unwitting communal sin to the case of the bull of the anointed priest, I would answer: It is preferable for the verse that it writes it in the passage itself rather than to juxtapose it alone. It is for this reason that it wrote it and juxtaposed it, to say that a matter derived via a juxtaposition cannot then teach its halakha via a juxtaposition.
(הֶיקֵּשׁ, גְּזֵירָה שָׁוָה, קַל וָחוֹמֶר – סִימָן)
§ Before beginning a lengthy discussion concerning derivations via compounded methodologies of the hermeneutical principles, the Gemara presents a mnemonic for its forthcoming discussion: Juxtaposition, verbal analogy, an a fortiori inference.
דָּבָר הַלָּמֵד בְּהֶיקֵּשׁ, אֵין חוֹזֵר וּמְלַמֵּד מֵהֶיקֵּשׁ – אִי מִדְּרָבָא, אִי מִדְּרָבִינָא. דָּבָר הַלָּמֵד בְּהֶיקֵּשׁ, מַהוּ שֶׁיְּלַמֵּד בִּגְזֵירָה שָׁוָה?
The principle that a matter derived via a juxtaposition cannot then teach its halakha via a juxtaposition is indicated either from the proof of Rava or from the proof of Ravina, both cited earlier. The Gemara asks: What is the halakha with regard to whether a matter derived via a juxtaposition can then teach its halakha to another matter via a verbal analogy?
תָּא שְׁמַע, רַבִּי נָתָן בֶּן אַבְטוּלְמוֹס אוֹמֵר: מִנַּיִן לִפְרִיחָה בִּבְגָדִים שֶׁהִיא טְהוֹרָה? נֶאֱמַר קָרַחַת וְגַבַּחַת בַּבְּגָדִים, וְנֶאֱמַר קָרַחַת וְגַבַּחַת בָּאָדָם;
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from a baraita: Rabbi Natan ben Avtolemos says: From where is it derived that if leprosy of garments spreads throughout an entire garment that it is pure? It is derived via a verbal analogy: A bareness within [karaḥat] and a bareness without [gabbaḥat] are stated with regard to leprosy of garments: “And the priest shall look, after that the mark is washed; and behold, if the mark has not changed its color, and the mark has not spread, it is impure; you shall burn it in the fire; it is a fret, whether the bareness be within or without” (Leviticus 13:55); and a bald head [karaḥat] and a bald forehead [gabbaḥat] are stated with regard to leprosy of a person: “But if there be in the bald head, or the bald forehead, a reddish-white plague, it is leprosy breaking out in his bald head, or his bald forehead” (Leviticus 13:42).
מָה לְהַלָּן – פָּרַח בְּכוּלּוֹ טָהוֹר, אַף כָּאן – פָּרַח בְּכוּלּוֹ טָהוֹר.
Just as there, with regard to a person, if the leprosy spread throughout him entirely he is pure, as the verse states: “Then the priest shall look; and behold, if the leprosy has covered all of his flesh, he shall pronounce the one who has the mark pure; it is all turned white: He is pure” (Leviticus 13:13), so too here with regard to garments, if the leprosy spread throughout the entire garment it is pure.
וְהָתָם מְנָא לַן? דִּכְתִיב: ״מֵרֹאשׁוֹ וְעַד רַגְלָיו״ – וְאִיתַּקַּשׁ רֹאשׁוֹ (לרגל) [לְרַגְלָיו]; מָה לְהַלָּן, כּוּלּוֹ הָפַךְ לָבָן פֶּרַח בְּכוּלּוֹ – טָהוֹר; אַף כָּאן, כּוּלּוֹ הָפַךְ לָבָן פָּרַח בְּכוּלּוֹ – טָהוֹר.
The Gemara continues its proof: But there, with regard to the head, which serves as the source for this verbal analogy, from where do we derive that if the leprosy spreads throughout the head he is pure? As it is written: “And if the leprosy breaks out on the skin, and the leprosy covers all the skin of the one who has the mark, from his head to his feet, as far as it appears to the priest” (Leviticus 13:12). And the verse thereby juxtaposes leprosy on his head to leprosy on his foot, teaching the following halakha: Just as there, with regard to leprosy of the body and foot, if its entirety turned white, and it spread all over him, he is pure, so too here, in the case of leprosy of the head, if its entirety turned white and it spread over all his head, he is pure. Evidently, a matter derived via a juxtaposition can then teach its halakha to another matter via a verbal analogy.
אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: בְּכׇל הַתּוֹרָה כּוּלָּהּ לְמֵידִין לָמֵד מִלָּמֵד, חוּץ מִן הַקֳּדָשִׁים – שֶׁאֵין דָּנִין לָמֵד מִלָּמֵד.
Rabbi Yoḥanan says: This cannot serve as a proof with regard to the halakhot of consecrated matters. With regard to the entire Torah, one derives a halakha derived via a verbal analogy from a halakha derived via a juxtaposition, apart from with regard to consecrated matters, where one does not derive a halakha derived via a verbal analogy from a halakha derived via a juxtaposition.
דְּאִם כֵּן – לֹא יֵאָמֵר צָפוֹנָה בְּאָשָׁם, וְתֵיתֵי בִּגְזֵירָה שָׁוָה דְּ״קׇדְשֵׁי קָדָשִׁים״ מֵחַטָּאוֹת;
Rabbi Yoḥanan explains: As if it were to be so that one could derive a halakha in this manner even concerning consecrated matters, the verse should not state the requirement for slaughter in the north with regard to a guilt offering, as stated from the explicit juxtaposition of a burnt offering and a sin offering, and instead derive it through a verbal analogy. The verse describes a guilt offering as an offering of the most sacred order (see Leviticus 7:1), and its halakha can be derived via a verbal analogy from that of a sin offering, which is described in the same manner (see Leviticus 6:18).
לָאו לְמֵימְרָא דְּדָבָר הַלָּמֵד בְּהֶיקֵּשׁ אֵין חוֹזֵר וּמְלַמֵּד בִּגְזֵירָה שָׁוָה?
Rabbi Yoḥanan continues: Is this not to say, at least with regard to consecrated matters, that a matter derived via a juxtaposition cannot then teach its halakha to another matter via a verbal analogy?
וְדִלְמָא מִשּׁוּם דְּאִיכָּא לְמִיפְרַךְ: מָה לְחַטָּאת, שֶׁכֵּן מְכַפֶּרֶת עַל חַיָּיבֵי כָרֵיתוֹת!
The Gemara rejects Rabbi Yoḥanan’s proof: But perhaps the requirement to slaughter a guilt offering in the north must be written explicitly because the verbal analogy can be refuted as follows: What is notable about a sin offering? It is notable in that it atones for those sins liable for punishment by karet, which is not so with regard to a guilt offering.
״קׇדְשֵׁי קָדָשִׁים״ יַתִּירֵי כְּתִיבִי.
The Gemara rejects this claim: There are additional descriptions of a guilt offering and a sin offering as offerings of the most sacred order written in the verses: “This shall be yours of the most sacred items, reserved from the fire: Every offering of theirs, every meal offering of theirs, and every sin offering of theirs, and every guilt offering of theirs, which they may offer to Me, shall be most holy for you and for your sons” (Numbers 18:9). A verbal analogy derived from extra phrases in the verse cannot be refuted with a logical claim. Therefore, Rabbi Yoḥanan’s claim stands, and, at least with regard to consecrated matters, a matter derived via a juxtaposition cannot then teach its halakha to another matter via a verbal analogy.
דָּבָר הַלָּמֵד מֵהֶיקֵּשׁ, חוֹזֵר וּמְלַמֵּד בְּקַל וָחוֹמֶר –
The Gemara states: That a matter derived via a juxtaposition then teaches its halakha via an a fortiori inference
