גיטין נד

גיטין נד

וְאֵין מוֹנִין לְשַׁבָּתוֹת.

But they do not count from Shabbat, as there is no significance to the day of the week on which the tree was planted, and consequently no one remembers that the tree was planted on Shabbat.

דָּבָר אַחֵר: נֶחְשְׁדוּ יִשְׂרָאֵל עַל הַשְּׁבִיעִית, וְלֹא נֶחְשְׁדוּ עַל הַשַּׁבָּתוֹת.

Alternatively, the difference between Shabbat and the Sabbatical Year can be explained as follows: Jews are suspected of desecrating the Sabbatical Year, but they are not suspected of desecrating Shabbat. Therefore, Rabbi Meir imposes a penalty for the unintentional desecration of the Sabbatical Year, but he imposes no such penalty for the unintentional desecration of Shabbat.

מַאי ״דָּבָר אַחֵר״? הָכִי קָאָמַר: וְכִי תֵּימָא שַׁבָּת נָמֵי, זִימְנִין דְּמִיקְּלַע יוֹם שְׁלֹשִׁים – בְּשַׁבָּת, דְּאִי נָטַע הַהוּא יוֹמָא הוּא דְּסָלְקָא לֵיהּ שַׁתָּא, וְאִי לָא – לָא סָלְקָא לֵיהּ שַׁתָּא,

The Gemara asks: What is the point of Rabbi Meir adding the second reason, introduced with the term alternatively? The Gemara answers: This is what Rabbi Meir is saying: And if you would say to contest the first reason: Jews also count from Shabbat, and unless the tree is uprooted, people will remember that it was planted on Shabbat, as at times the thirtieth day before Rosh HaShana falls on Shabbat. As, if he planted the tree on that day, the time from when he planted it counts for him as a full year with regard to the prohibition of fruit that grows during the first three years after the tree was planted. And if he did not plant it on that Shabbat, but rather on the next day, the twenty-ninth day before Rosh HaShana, it does not count for him as a full year. In such a case people will remember that the tree was planted on Shabbat, and they might come to think that planting a tree on Shabbat is permitted.

תָּא שְׁמַע דָּבָר אַחֵר: נֶחְשְׁדוּ יִשְׂרָאֵל עַל הַשְּׁבִיעִית, וְלֹא נֶחְשְׁדוּ עַל הַשַּׁבָּתוֹת.

Consequently, Rabbi Meir adds: Come and hear that alternatively, the difference between Shabbat and the Sabbatical Year can be explained as follows: Jews are suspected of desecrating the Sabbatical Year, but they are not suspected of desecrating Shabbat. Therefore, Rabbi Meir imposes a penalty for the unintentional desecration of the Sabbatical Year, but not for the unintentional desecration of Shabbat.

דְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה אַדְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה לָא קַשְׁיָא – בְּאַתְרֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה חֲמִירָא לְהוּ שְׁבִיעִית.

The Gemara continues: And there is also no contradiction between one statement of Rabbi Yehuda with regard to the Sabbatical Year and the other statement of Rabbi Yehuda with regard to Shabbat. This is because in Rabbi Yehuda’s place the prohibition against desecrating the Sabbatical Year was regarded by them as a most serious one, and therefore there was no need to impose a penalty for its unintentional desecration, although it is a Torah law.

דְּהָהוּא דַּאֲמַר לֵיהּ לַחֲבֵירוֹ: דַּיָּיר בַּר דַּיָּירְתָּא! אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אֲנָא לָא אָכְלִי פֵּירֵי דִשְׁבִיעִית כְּווֹתָךְ.

The Gemara adduces proof that this is true: It once happened that there was a certain person who said to another to insult him: Convert [dayyar], son of a convert. In anger the second person said to the first in response: At least I don’t eat produce of the Sabbatical Year as you do. This indicates that the Sabbatical Year was treated in that place as a very serious prohibition; therefore, Rabbi Yehuda deemed it unnecessary to impose a penalty for its unintentional desecration.

תָּא שְׁמַע: אָכַל תְּרוּמָה טְמֵאָה – מְשַׁלֵּם חוּלִּין טְהוֹרִין. שִׁילֵּם חוּלִּין טְמֵאִים, מַהוּ? אָמַר סוֹמְכוֹס מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי מֵאִיר: בְּשׁוֹגֵג – תַּשְׁלוּמָיו תַּשְׁלוּמִין, בְּמֵזִיד – אֵין תַּשְׁלוּמָיו תַּשְׁלוּמִין. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: אֶחָד זֶה וְאֶחָד זֶה תַּשְׁלוּמָיו תַּשְׁלוּמִין, וְחוֹזֵר וּמְשַׁלֵּם חוּלִּין טְהוֹרִים.

The Gemara proceeds to discuss another apparent contradiction between rulings of Rabbi Meir with regard to penalties imposed for the unintentional transgression of a rabbinic law: Come and hear what was taught in a baraita (Tosefta, Terumot 7:7): If one partook of teruma,which is the property of a priest, and it was ritually impure, he pays restitution with ritually pure, non-sacred produce. What is the halakha if he paid restitution with ritually impure, non-sacred produce? Sumakhos said in the name of Rabbi Meir: If he paid restitution with ritually impure, non-sacred produce unintentionally, his payment is valid. But if he did so intentionally, his payment is not valid. And the Rabbis say: Although both in this case and in that case his payment is valid, the Sages imposed a penalty and said that he returns and pays restitution a second time with ritually pure, non-sacred produce.

וְהָוֵינַן בַּהּ: בְּמֵזִיד – אַמַּאי אֵין תַּשְׁלוּמָיו תַּשְׁלוּמִין? תָּבֹא עָלָיו בְּרָכָה – דְּאָכֵיל מִינֵּיהּ מִידֵּי דְּלָא חֲזֵי לֵיהּ בִּימֵי טוּמְאָתוֹ, וְקָא מְשַׁלֵּם לֵיהּ מִידֵּי דַּחֲזֵי לֵיהּ בִּימֵי טוּמְאָתוֹ!

And we discussed the following question concerning the opinion of Rabbi Meir: In the case where he paid restitution with ritually impure, non-sacred produce intentionally, why is his payment not valid? On the contrary, blessing should come upon him, as he partook of something that is not fit for the priest to partake of even during the days of his impurity, since it is prohibited for a priest to partake of impure teruma, whether he himself is pure or impure, and he pays restitution to him with something, i.e., impure, non-sacred produce, which is at least fit for him to partake of during the days of his impurity.

וְאָמַר רָבָא, וְאָמְרִי לַהּ כְּדִי: חַסּוֹרֵי מְחַסְּרָא, וְהָכִי קָתָנֵי: אָכַל תְּרוּמָה טְמֵאָה – מְשַׁלֵּם כָּל דְּהוּ. אָכַל תְּרוּמָה טְהוֹרָה – מְשַׁלֵּם חוּלִּין טְהוֹרִים. שִׁילֵּם חוּלִּין טְמֵאִין, מַהוּ? סוֹמְכוֹס אוֹמֵר מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי מֵאִיר: בְּשׁוֹגֵג – תַּשְׁלוּמָיו תַּשְׁלוּמִין, בְּמֵזִיד – אֵין תַּשְׁלוּמָיו תַּשְׁלוּמִין. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: אֶחָד זֶה וְאֶחָד זֶה – תַּשְׁלוּמָיו תַּשְׁלוּמִין, וְחוֹזֵר וּמְשַׁלֵּם חוּלִּין טְהוֹרִין.

And Rava said, and some say it is unattributed: The baraita is incomplete and this is what it is teaching: If one partook of ritually impure teruma, he can pay restitution with anything, even impure, non-sacred produce. If he partook of ritually pure teruma, he pays restitution with ritually pure, non-sacred produce. The baraita continues: What is the halakha if he paid restitution for ritually pure teruma with ritually impure, non-sacred produce? There is a tannaitic dispute about this. Sumakhos said in the name of Rabbi Meir: If he paid restitution with ritually impure, non-sacred produce unintentionally, his payment is valid. But if he did so intentionally, his payment is not valid. And the Rabbis say: Both in this case and in that case, his payment is valid, but the Sages imposed a penalty and said that he returns and pays restitution a second time with ritually pure, non-sacred produce.

וְאָמַר רַב אַחָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב אִיקָא: הָכָא בְּקָנְסוּ שׁוֹגֵג אַטּוּ מֵזִיד אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ (דְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר סָבַר: לֹא קָנְסוּ שׁוֹגֵג אַטּוּ מֵזִיד, וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: קָנְסוּ)!

And Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ika, said: Here, the practical difference between Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis relates to the question of whether or not the Sages penalized an unintentional offender due to an intentional offender. Rabbi Meir holds that they did not penalize an unintentional offender due to an intentional offender, and the Rabbis say that they penalized him. Consequently, Rabbi Meir does not impose a penalty for an unintentional transgression of a rabbinic law, as by Torah law one can pay restitution to a priest with anything if he partakes of teruma. This contradicts what was stated previously, that in the case of a violation of rabbinic law, Rabbi Meir imposes a penalty even for an unintentional offense.

הָכִי הַשְׁתָּא?! הָתָם – גַּבְרָא לְשַׁלּוֹמֵי קָא מִיכַּוֵּין, אֲנַן נֵיקוּם וְלִיקְנְסֵיהּ?!

The Gemara answers: How can these cases be compared? There, the man intends to pay; should we arise and penalize him? It is specifically with regard to this case that Rabbi Meir holds that no penalty is imposed, as his mistake was made in the course of performing a laudatory action. By contrast, in cases where one rendered another’s produce impure and the like, there is a penalty, as the mistake was made while performing an action he should not have been performing.

תָּא שְׁמַע: דָּם שֶׁנִּטְמָא, וּזְרָקוֹ; בְּשׁוֹגֵג – הוּרְצָה, בְּמֵזִיד – לֹא הוּרְצָה.

The Gemara tries to bring proof concerning the previously stated opinion of Rabbi Meir that a penalty is imposed in a case of an unintentional transgression of a rabbinical law: Come and hear what was taught in a baraita: In the case of blood of an offering that became impure and a priest sprinkled it on the altar, if he did so unintentionally, the offering is accepted and achieves atonement for the owner of the offering. If he sprinkled the blood intentionally, the offering is not accepted. In any event, the tanna of this baraita did not penalize the unintentional offender due to an intentional offender, and this sprinkling of blood is prohibited by rabbinic law.

אָמַר לָךְ רַבִּי מֵאִיר: הָכִי הַשְׁתָּא?! הָתָם – גַּבְרָא לְכַפּוֹרֵי קָא מְכַוֵּין, אֲנַן נֵיקוּם וְנִקְנְסֵיהּ?!

The Gemara answers: Rabbi Meir could have said to you: How can these cases be compared? There, the person intends to do a mitzva and atone; should we arise and penalize him? Here too, the mistake was made while performing a laudatory act. In such a case, even Rabbi Meir agrees that an unintentional offender is not penalized due to an intentional offender.

תָּא שְׁמַע: הַמְעַשֵּׂר בַּשַּׁבָּת; בְּשׁוֹגֵג – יֹאכַל, בְּמֵזִיד – לֹא יֹאכַל. הָכִי הַשְׁתָּא?! הָתָם – גַּבְרָא לְתַקּוֹנֵי קָא מִיכַּוֵּין, אֲנַן לֵיקוּם וְלִיקְנְסֵיהּ?!

The Gemara attempts to adduce further proof: Come and hear what was taught in a mishna (Terumot 2:3): With regard to one who tithes produce on Shabbat, which is prohibited by rabbinic law because it appears as though he were repairing an article that requires repair, if he did this unintentionally, he may consume the produce, as it has been tithed and rendered fit for consumption. But if he did this intentionally, he may not consume it. Apparently, the Sages did not penalize the unintentional offender due to an intentional offender, although tithing produce on Shabbat is prohibited by rabbinic law. The Gemara answers: How can these cases be compared? There, the man intends to do a worthy deed and repair the produce by tithing it; should we arise and penalize him? As above, Rabbi Meir would agree that in such a case the unintentional offender is not penalized.

תָּא שְׁמַע: הַמַּטְבִּיל כֵּלִים בַּשַּׁבָּת; בְּשׁוֹגֵג – יִשְׁתַּמֵּשׁ בָּהֶן, בְּמֵזִיד – לֹא יִשְׁתַּמֵּשׁ בָּהֶן! הָכִי הַשְׁתָּא?! הָתָם – גַּבְרָא לְטַהוֹרֵי מָאנֵי קָא מִיכַּוֵּין, אֲנַן לֵיקוּם וְלִיקְנְסֵיהּ?!

The Gemara brings yet another proof: Come and hear what was taught in that same mishna (Terumot 2:3): With regard to one who immerses utensils in a ritual bath on Shabbat, which is also prohibited by the Sages because it appears as if he were repairing an article that requires repair, if he immerses them unintentionally, he may use them. But if he immerses them intentionally, he may not use them. Here too the Sages did not penalize the unintentional offender due to an intentional offender. The Gemara answers as before: How can these cases be compared? There, the man intends to do a praiseworthy act and purify the utensils; should we arise and penalize him? The same distinction stated previously applies in this mishna as well.

וְרָמֵי דְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה אַדְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה – בִּדְרַבָּנַן, דְּתַנְיָא:

The Gemara discusses the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda: And they raised a contradiction between one statement of Rabbi Yehuda and another statement of Rabbi Yehuda with regard to matters that are prohibited only by rabbinic law. As it is taught in a baraita:

נָפְלוּ וְנִתְפַּצְּעוּ; אֶחָד שׁוֹגֵג, וְאֶחָד מֵזִיד – לֹא יַעֲלוּ, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר וְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה. רַבִּי יוֹסֵי וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמְרִים: בְּשׁוֹגֵג – יַעֲלוּ, בְּמֵזִיד – לֹא יַעֲלוּ.

If there are nuts from Perekh that are orla, and they fell into other nuts and became intermingled with them, the entire mixture is forbidden, even if the nuts that are orla are few in number. This is because they are deemed significant when they are whole and they are not nullified in a mixture. If the nuts were broken afterward, whether they were broken unintentionally or they were broken intentionally, they are not nullified in the mixture, despite the fact that they are no longer regarded as significant and should therefore be subject to nullification; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Shimon disagree and say: If they were broken unintentionally, they are nullified, but if they were broken intentionally, they are not nullified.

וְהָא הָכָא, דְּמִדְּאוֹרָיְיתָא חַד בִּתְרֵי בָּטֵל, וְרַבָּנַן הוּא דִּגְזוּר, וְקָא קָנֵיס רַבִּי יְהוּדָה! הָתָם הַיְינוּ טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה, מִשּׁוּם דְּאָתֵי לְאִיעָרוֹמֵי.

The Gemara asks: But here, by Torah law the forbidden substance is nullified if its ratio in the mixture is not more than one in two, i.e., when the majority of the mixture is permitted, and it was the Sages who decreed that significant items are not subject to nullification. And nevertheless, Rabbi Yehuda penalizes an unintentional offender due to an intentional offender. This seems to contradict what was stated previously, that Rabbi Yehuda does not impose a penalty for an unintentional offense if the transgression involves the violation of a rabbinic law. The Gemara answers: There, this is the reasoning of Rabbi Yehuda, that a penalty was imposed in the case where he unintentionally broke the nuts due to the concern that without a penalty he will come to employ artifice and intentionally break the nuts in order to effect nullification of the Perekh nuts.

וְרָמֵי דְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי אַדְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי – דִּתְנַן: נְטִיעָה שֶׁל עׇרְלָה וְשֶׁל כִּלְאֵי הַכֶּרֶם שֶׁנִּתְעָרְבוּ בִּנְטִיעוֹת אֲחֵרוֹת, הֲרֵי זֶה לֹא יְלַקֵּט. וְאִם לִיקֵּט – יַעֲלוּ בְּאֶחָד וּמָאתַיִם, וּבִלְבַד שֶׁלֹּא יִתְכַּוֵּין לְלַקֵּט.

The Gemara discusses the previous baraita: And they raised a contradiction between one statement of Rabbi Yosei and another statement of Rabbi Yosei, as we learned in a mishna (Orla 1:6): If a sapling that has the status of orla or a grapevine sapling has the status of diverse kinds in a vineyard, e.g., one vine in a vineyard had grain planted near it and become prohibited, and the grain was then uprooted, became intermingled with other saplings, and one does not know which is the forbidden sapling, he may not gather the produce of any of the saplings. And if he gathered the produce, the forbidden produce is nullified if its ratio in the mixture is not more than one part forbidden produce in two hundred parts permitted produce, provided that he did not intend to gather the produce in order that the forbidden produce will become nullified.

רַבִּי יוֹסֵי אוֹמֵר: אַף הַמִּתְכַּוֵּין לְלַקֵּט – יַעֲלוּ בְּאֶחָד וּמָאתַיִם!

Rabbi Yosei says: Even if he intentionally gathered the produce in order that the forbidden produce would become nullified, the forbidden produce is nullified if its ratio in the mixture is not more than one part forbidden produce in two hundred parts permitted produce. This seems to contradict what Rabbi Yosei said in the baraita cited previously with regard to nuts, that if the nuts were broken intentionally, they are not nullified.

הָא אִתְּמַר עֲלַהּ, אָמַר רָבָא: חֲזָקָה אֵין אָדָם אוֹסֵר אֶת כַּרְמוֹ בִּנְטִיעָה אַחַת. וְכֵן כִּי אֲתָא רָבִין אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: חֲזָקָה אֵין אָדָם אוֹסֵר אֶת כַּרְמוֹ בִּנְטִיעָה אַחַת.

The Gemara answers: Wasn’t it already stated with regard to that mishna in explanation of Rabbi Yosei’s opinion that Rava says: There is a presumption that a person does not render his entire vineyard forbidden for the sake of one sapling. Therefore, it can be assumed that one does not intentionally plant a sapling that has the status of orla or of diverse kinds in a vineyard among other saplings without properly marking it. If he did so, it is uncommon, and the Sages did not impose a penalty in an uncommon case. And similarly, when Ravin came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: There is a presumption that a person does not render his vineyard forbidden for the sake of one sapling, and therefore the Sages did not impose a penalty.

מַתְנִי׳ הַכֹּהֲנִים שֶׁפִּגְּלוּ בַּמִּקְדָּשׁ, מְזִידִין – חַיָּיבִין.

MISHNA: If priests disqualified an offering with improper intention in the Temple, by expressing, while sacrificing the offering, the intention of sprinkling the blood of the offering, burning its fats on the altar, or consuming it, after its appointed time, and they did so intentionally, they are liable to pay the value of the offering to its owner, who must now bring another offering.

גְּמָ׳ תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: הָיָה עוֹשֶׂה עִמּוֹ בִּטְהָרוֹת, וְאָמַר לוֹ: טְהָרוֹת שֶׁעָשִׂיתִי עִמְּךָ, נִטְמְאוּ; הָיָה עוֹשֶׂה עִמּוֹ בִּזְבָחִים, וְאָמַר לוֹ: זְבָחִים שֶׁעָשִׂיתִי עִמְּךָ, נִתְפַּגְּלוּ – נֶאֱמָן. אֲבָל אָמַר לוֹ: טְהָרוֹת שֶׁעָשִׂיתִי עִמְּךָ בְּיוֹם פְּלוֹנִי נִטְמְאוּ, וּזְבָחִים שֶׁעָשִׂיתִי עִמְּךָ בְּיוֹם פְּלוֹנִי נִתְפַּגְּלוּ – אֵינוֹ נֶאֱמָן.

GEMARA: The Sages taught in a baraita (Tosefta, Terumot 2:2): If one was preparing ritually pure food with another, and he said to him: The ritually pure food that I prepared with you became ritually impure, or if he was preparing sacrifices with another person, and he said to him: The sacrifices that I prepared with you became disqualified due to improper intention, he is deemed credible with regard to these claims. But if he said to the other: The ritually pure food that I prepared with you on such and such a day became ritually impure, or the sacrifices that I prepared with you on such and such a day became disqualified due to improper intention, he is not deemed credible.

מַאי שְׁנָא רֵישָׁא, וּמַאי שְׁנָא סֵיפָא? אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: כֹּל שֶׁבְּיָדוֹ – נֶאֱמָן.

The Gemara asks: What is different in the first clause of the baraita and what is different in the latter clause, that in the first clause he is deemed credible, whereas in the latter clause he is not? Abaye says that the principle is as follows: As long as it is still in his power to do what he said he had done, he is deemed credible. Therefore, while he is involved in the preparation of the ritually pure food or the sacrifices, and consequently he is still able to disqualify them, he is deemed credible when he says that they already became disqualified. But once he makes a statement about actions he performed in the past and he is no longer able to disqualify the objects of those actions, he is not deemed credible.

רָבָא אָמַר: כְּגוֹן דְּאַשְׁכְּחֵיהּ וְלָא אֲמַר לֵיהּ וְלָא מִידֵּי, וּלְבָתַר הָכִי אַשְׁכְּחֵיהּ וַאֲמַר לֵיהּ.

Rava said: Both the first clause and the latter clause deal with testimony about the past. The difference is that the latter clause is referring to a case where he found him a first time and told him nothing about disqualification, and then afterward he found him a second time and told him what had purportedly happened. In such a case he is suspected of lying, as, if it were true that the pure food had become impure or the offering had become disqualified, he would have imparted that information earlier. Since he had said nothing at the time, and he spoke up only later, it is assumed that he was lying and that his intention was merely to annoy the other.

הָהוּא דַּאֲמַר לֵיהּ לְחַבְרֵיהּ: טְהָרוֹת שֶׁעָשִׂיתִי עִמְּךָ בְּיוֹם פְּלוֹנִי – נִטְמְאוּ, אֲתָא לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרַבִּי אַמֵּי, אֲמַר לֵיהּ: שׁוּרַת הַדִּין אֵינוֹ נֶאֱמָן. אָמַר לְפָנָיו רַבִּי אַסִּי: רַבִּי, אַתָּה אוֹמֵר כֵּן? הָכִי אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי יוֹסֵי: מָה אֶעֱשֶׂה שֶׁהַתּוֹרָה הֶאֱמִינַתּוּ.

§ It is related that there was a certain person who said to another: The ritually pure food that I prepared with you on such and such a day became ritually impure. The owner of the food came before Rabbi Ami, asking him what to do. Rabbi Ami said to him: You may continue to treat the food as ritually pure, as in principle, the other person is not deemed credible. Rabbi Asi said before him: My teacher, do you say this? So said Rabbi Yoḥanan in the name of Rabbi Yosei: What can I do when I see that the Torah deemed him credible in such a case?

הֵיכָן הֶאֱמִינַתּוּ? אָמַר רַבִּי יִצְחָק בַּר בִּיסְנָא: כֹּהֵן גָּדוֹל בְּיוֹם הַכִּפּוּרִים יוֹכִיחַ, דְּכִי אָמַר פִּגּוּל – מְהֵימַן; וּמְנָא יָדְעִינַן? וְהָכְתִיב: ״וְכׇל אָדָם לֹא יִהְיֶה בְּאֹהֶל מוֹעֵד״! אֶלָּא לָאו מִשּׁוּם דִּמְהֵימַן?

The Gemara asks: Where does it deem him credible? Rabbi Yitzḥak bar Bisna says: The High Priest on Yom Kippur will prove this point, as when he says that he had improper intent, he is deemed credible. And from where do we know that he had improper intent? But isn’t it written: “And no man shall be in the Tent of Meeting when he goes in to make atonement for the holy place” (Leviticus 16:17)? Rather, is it not because he is deemed credible in his testimony even after he performed the service, and it is no longer in his power to disqualify the offering?

וְדִלְמָא דִּשְׁמַעְנֵיהּ דְּפַגֵּיל! אִי לָאו דִּמְהֵימַן, אַף עַל גַּב דִּשְׁמַעְנֵיהּ נָמֵי לָא מְהֵימַן, דְּדִלְמָא לְבָתַר הָכִי קָאָמַר.

The Gemara rejects this argument: But perhaps we heard that he disqualified the offering with improper intention, i.e., maybe he stated his intention out loud while performing the service and it was heard outside. The Gemara answers: Were he not deemed credible about the matter, then even if we heard him voice his intention, he would also not be deemed credible. Why? The reason is that perhaps he actually sprinkled the blood with the proper intention, and it was only afterward that he said what he said, and at that time he could no longer disqualify the offering. Rather, he is certainly deemed credible when he says that he disqualified the offering with improper intention.

וְדִלְמָא דַּחֲזֵינֵיהּ בְּפִישְׁפָּשׁ? קַשְׁיָא.

The Gemara raises another objection: But perhaps we saw what the High Priest was doing through a small door, through which it was possible to monitor his actions, and we saw that he sprinkled the blood with improper intention. The Gemara says: This is difficult for Rabbi Yitzḥak bar Bisna, as his proof can be refuted.

הַהוּא דַּאֲתָא לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרַבִּי אַמֵּי, אֲמַר לֵיהּ: סֵפֶר תּוֹרָה שֶׁכָּתַבְתִּי לִפְלוֹנִי, אַזְכָּרוֹת שֶׁלּוֹ לֹא כְּתַבְתִּים לִשְׁמָן. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: סֵפֶר תּוֹרָה בְּיַד מִי? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: בְּיַד לוֹקֵחַ. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: נֶאֱמָן אַתָּה לְהַפְסִיד שְׂכָרְךָ, וְאִי אַתָּה נֶאֱמָן לְהַפְסִיד סֵפֶר תּוֹרָה.

§ It is similarly related that there was a certain person who came before Rabbi Ami and said to him: In the Torah scroll that I wrote for so-and-so, I did not write the mentions of God’s name with the proper intention that is required when writing a holy name, and therefore the scroll is not valid. Rabbi Ami said to him: This Torah scroll is currently in whose possession? The scribe said to him: It is now in the buyer’s possession. Rabbi Ami said to him: You are deemed credible to cause the loss of your wage, as you admit that you wrote the Torah scroll in a faulty manner, and therefore the buyer can refuse to pay you. But you are not deemed credible to cause a loss to, i.e., to invalidate, the Torah scroll.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַבִּי יִרְמְיָה: נְהִי דְּהִפְסִיד שְׂכַר אַזְכָּרוֹת, שְׂכַר דְּסֵפֶר תּוֹרָה כּוּלֵּיהּ מִי הִפְסִיד?! אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אִין, שֶׁכׇּל סֵפֶר תּוֹרָה שֶׁאֵין אַזְכָּרוֹת שֶׁלּוֹ כְּתוּבוֹת לִשְׁמָן – אֵינוֹ שָׁוֶה כְּלוּם.

Rabbi Yirmeya said to him: Although he lost his wage with regard to the mentions of God’s name that he wrote in a faulty manner, did he lose his wage with regard to the entire Torah scroll, which he wrote correctly? Rabbi Ami said to him: Yes, he lost his wage for the entire Torah scroll, as any Torah scroll in which the mentions of God’s name have not been written with the proper intention is not worth anything.

וְלִיעַבַּר עֲלַיְיהוּ קוּלְמוֹס, וְלִיקַדְּשֵׁיהּ! כְּמַאן – נֵימָא דְּלָא כְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה?

The Gemara asks: But let the scribe pass a reed pen [kulemos] with additional ink over instances of God’s name and sanctify them, going over the names with the proper intention. And since there is no option to correct the Torah scroll in this manner, in accordance with whose opinion was this ruling issued? Shall we say that it is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda?

דִּתְנַן: הֲרֵי שֶׁהָיָה צָרִיךְ לִכְתּוֹב אֶת הַשֵּׁם; וְנִתְכַּוֵּון לִכְתּוֹב ״יְהוּדָה״, וְטָעָה וְלֹא הֵטִיל בּוֹ דָּלֶת; מַעֲבִיר עָלָיו קוּלְמוֹס, וּמְקַדְּשׁוֹ, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יְהוּדָה. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: אֵין הַשֵּׁם מִן הַמּוּבְחָר.

This is as we learned in a baraita: If a scribe writing a Torah scroll was at a point in the text that he needed to write the name of God, spelled yod, heh, vav, heh; and he erred and intended to write Yehuda, spelled yod, heh, vav, dalet, heh, but he made a mistake when writing Yehuda and did not place a dalet in the word, thereby unintentionally writing the name of God in the correct place, then he should pass over it with a reed pen. He writes over what was written and sanctifies it with the intention that he is writing the name of God. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. And the Rabbis say: Even if he adds a second layer of ink, the name has not been written in the optimal manner. The fact that Rabbi Ami did not offer the option to rewrite the mentions of God’s name to correct the scroll indicates that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, and not in accordance with that of Rabbi Yehuda.

אֲפִילּוּ תֵּימָא רַבִּי יְהוּדָה – עַד כָּאן לָא קָאָמַר רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אֶלָּא בַּחֲדָא אַזְכָּרָה, אֲבָל דְּכוּלֵּי סֵפֶר תּוֹרָה – לָא, מִשּׁוּם דְּמִיחֲזֵי כִּמְנוּמָּר.

The Gemara rejects this argument: You can even say that in general the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, but there is a distinction between the cases. Rabbi Yehuda states his opinion only with regard to a single mention of God’s name that was initially written without the proper intention. In such a case, it is possible to pass over the name with additional ink and thereby sanctify it. But passing over all of the holy names found in an entire Torah scroll is not possible. Why not? Because if the scribe would pass his pen over all the names of God found in a Torah scroll, it would look speckled, as the instances of the Divine Name would be written with a thicker layer of ink and stand out.

הַהוּא דַּאֲתָא לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרַבִּי אֲבָהוּ, אֲמַר לֵיהּ: סֵפֶר תּוֹרָה שֶׁכָּתַבְתִּי לִפְלוֹנִי, גְּוִילִין שֶׁלּוֹ לֹא עִיבַּדְתִּים לִשְׁמָן. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: סֵפֶר תּוֹרָה בְּיַד מִי? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: בְּיַד לוֹקֵחַ. אָמַר לוֹ: מִתּוֹךְ שֶׁאַתָּה נֶאֱמָן לְהַפְסִיד שְׂכָרְךָ, אַתָּה נֶאֱמָן לְהַפְסִיד סֵפֶר תּוֹרָה.

It is further related that there was a certain person who came before Rabbi Abbahu and said to him: With regard to the Torah scroll that I wrote for so-and-so, I did not process its parchment with the proper intention. Rabbi Abbahu said to him: The Torah scroll is currently in whose possession? The scribe said to him: It is in the possession of the buyer. Rabbi Abbahu said to him: Since you are deemed credible to cause the loss of your wage, as you have admitted that the parchment upon which the Torah scroll was written is invalid, you are deemed credible to cause a loss to, i.e., disqualify, the Torah scroll.