יבמות טו

יבמות טו

שֶׁיְּהוּ חוֹלְצוֹת וְלֹא מִתְיַיבְּמוֹת. לֹא הִסְפִּיקוּ לִגְמוֹר אֶת הַדָּבָר עַד שֶׁנִּטְרְפָה הַשָּׁעָה.

that they should perform ḥalitza and not enter into levirate marriage. If they act in this manner, they will be permitted to marry others and the problem will be solved according to all opinions. They were unable to finalize the matter according to the proposition raised by Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri before times of trouble arrived. Due to the outbreak of war they were unable to gather together to vote and establish an accepted halakhic ruling.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל: מָה נַעֲשֶׂה לָהֶם לַצָּרוֹת הָרִאשׁוֹנוֹת מֵעַתָּה?

Sometime later, when they returned to discuss the issue, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said to the other Sages: What shall we do with those earlier rival wives from now onward? Since in the meantime some rival wives had entered into levirate marriage, if we issue a collective ruling that rival wives may not do so, their children will be declared mamzerim. Therefore, it is better not to establish this halakha at all.

אִי אָמְרַתְּ בִּשְׁלָמָא עָשׂוּ — הַיְינוּ דְּקָאָמַר מָה נַעֲשֶׂה. אֶלָּא אִי אָמְרַתְּ לֹא עָשׂוּ, מַאי מָה נַעֲשֶׂה?

The Gemara analyzes this episode in relation to the matter at hand. Granted, if you say that Beit Shammai did act in accordance with their own opinion, this is the meaning of what Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: What shall we do? Since these rival wives had already entered into levirate marriage, it was impossible to change the status of their children retroactively. However, if you say that they did not act in accordance with their opinion, what is the meaning of: What shall we do? If Beit Shammai did not act upon their ruling, they never actually permitted a yavam to take a rival wife in levirate marriage.

אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק: לֹא נִצְרְכָה אֶלָּא לְצָרָה עַצְמָהּ, ״וּמָה נַעֲשֶׂה״ הָכִי קָאָמַר: הָנָךְ צָרוֹת דְּבֵית הִלֵּל, לְבֵית שַׁמַּאי הֵיכִי נַעֲבֵיד לְהוּ?

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: This amendment was necessary, not for the benefit of the children of rival wives, as Beit Shammai never in fact acted on their ruling; rather, it was necessary only for the rival wife herself. If these rival wives married others, in the opinion of Beit Shammai their marriages were flawed, as they did not perform ḥalitza. And as for the question: What shall we do, this is what Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel is saying: With regard to those rival wives who were entirely exempt according to Beit Hillel, what should we do with them according to Beit Shammai, as these rival wives had already married others without performing ḥalitza?

לִיחְלְצוּ — מִימַּאֲסִי אַגַּבְרַיְיהוּ. וְכִי תֵּימָא לִימַּאֲסָן — ״דְּרָכֶיהָ דַרְכֵי נוֹעַם וְכׇל נְתִיבוֹתֶיהָ שָׁלוֹם״.

The Gemara elaborates: If you say let them perform ḥalitza, they will be repulsive to their husbands, as it will seem to the husband that the woman he has been living with for some time suddenly requires a permit for marriage. And if you would say, let them be repulsive to their husbands, as that is not our concern, this is not the case, as the Torah says: “Her ways are ways of pleasantness, and all her paths are peace” (Proverbs 3:17).

תָּא שְׁמַע, דְּאָמַר רַבִּי טַרְפוֹן: תְּאֵבַנִי, מָתַי תָּבֹא צָרַת הַבַּת לְיָדִי וְאֶשָּׂאֶנָּה! אֵימָא וְאַשִּׂיאֶנָּה.

§ The Gemara suggests further: Come and hear another source, as Rabbi Tarfon said: I yearn for the following scenario: When shall my daughter’s rival wife come before me and I will marry her? In other words, in this hypothetical case I would act in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai and take her in levirate marriage. This statement indicates that those who held by the traditions of Beit Shammai did indeed act upon their opinion. The Gemara amends this statement. Say: And I will marry her off, i.e., I shall act in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel and marry her off to others.

וְהָא תְּאֵבַנִי קָאָמַר! לְאַפּוֹקֵי מִדְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן בֶּן נוּרִי.

The Gemara asks: But he said: I yearn, and if he meant that he would follow the ruling of Beit Hillel, which is the common practice, what is the novelty of Rabbi Tarfon’s statement? The Gemara responds: Rabbi Tarfon comes to exclude the statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri, who maintains that all rival wives perform ḥalitza. Rabbi Tarfon yearned for an opportunity to demonstrate that the halakha is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri.

תָּא שְׁמַע: מַעֲשֶׂה בְּבִתּוֹ שֶׁל רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל שֶׁהָיְתָה נְשׂוּאָה לְאַבָּא אָחִיו, וּמֵת בְּלֹא בָּנִים, וְיִיבֵּם רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אֶת צָרָתָהּ. וְתִסְבְּרָא, רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל מִתַּלְמִידֵי בֵּית שַׁמַּאי הוּא?

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear an incident involving Rabban Gamliel’s daughter, who was married to Abba, his brother, and Abba died childless, and Rabban Gamliel entered into levirate marriage with her rival wife. This is apparently conclusive proof that the rival wife of a daughter may enter into levirate marriage. The Gemara asks: And how can you understand it that way? Was Rabban Gamliel among the disciples of Beit Shammai? In fact, Rabban Gamliel, who was a descendant of Hillel himself, certainly followed the opinion of Beit Hillel.

אֶלָּא שָׁאנֵי בִּתּוֹ שֶׁל רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל, דְּאַיְלוֹנִית הֲוַאי. הָא מִדְּקָתָנֵי סֵיפָא: אֲחֵרִים אוֹמְרִים בִּתּוֹ שֶׁל רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אַיְלוֹנִית הָיְתָה, מִכְּלָל דְּתַנָּא קַמָּא סָבַר לָאו אַיְלוֹנִית הָיְתָה!

Rather, the case of Rabban Gamliel’s daughter is different, as she was a sexually underdeveloped woman [aylonit], and therefore the prohibition against marrying her rival wife does not apply, as explicitly stated in the mishna. The Gemara asks: But from the fact that it is taught in the latter clause of the same baraita: Others say that Rabban Gamliel’s daughter was an aylonit, it can be derived by inference that the first tanna holds that she was not an aylonit.

הִכִּיר בָּהּ וְלֹא הִכִּיר בָּהּ, אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ.

The Gemara answers: The dispute between the tanna’im was not about whether or not she was an aylonit, as she certainly was. Rather, the practical difference between them is whether he knew that she was an aylonit at the time of marriage and decided to marry her regardless. Some maintain in general that if the husband was aware of her condition prior to marriage, her rival wife is forbidden, but if he did not know about her status, the rival wife is permitted.

וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: כָּנַס וּלְבַסּוֹף גֵּירַשׁ אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ.

And if you wish, say that the practical difference between them concerns a different case, that of one who married and ultimately divorced. This is referring to an issue discussed above of whether a woman is considered the rival wife of a forbidden relation simply by virtue of her marriage to the specific man or whether she must be married to him at the time when the mitzva of levirate obligation takes effect, i.e., at the time of the brother’s death.

אִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: יֵשׁ תְּנַאי בְּבִיאָה אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ.

And if you wish, say that the practical difference between them concerns a case where there is a condition in sexual relations. In other words, the first tanna holds that Rabban Gamliel’s daughter was married only conditionally, and since the condition was never fulfilled the marriage was nullified. Consequently, Rabban Gamliel could marry the other wife regardless of his daughter’s status as an aylonit, as she was never married to his brother at all. However, according to the other tanna, even if the marriage was dependent upon a condition that was not fulfilled, because the man engaged in sexual relations with her the act of intercourse itself serves to nullify the condition. Accordingly, he maintains that the only reason Rabban Gamliel could enter into levirate marriage with his daughter’s rival wife was not because of the condition, but due to the fact that his daughter was an aylonit. Whichever explanation is accepted, this case provides no proof with regard to the issue of whether or not Beit Shammai acted in accordance with their ruling.

מֵתִיב רַב מְשַׁרְשְׁיָא: מַעֲשֶׂה בְּרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא שֶׁלִּיקֵּט אֶתְרוֹג בְּאֶחָד בִּשְׁבָט, וְנָהַג בּוֹ שְׁנֵי עִשּׂוּרִין.

§ Rav Mesharshiyya raised an objection against those who claim that Beit Shammai did not act in accordance with their opinion. It is taught in a mishna: There was an incident involving Rabbi Akiva, who collected an etrog on the first of the month of Shevat and performed with it two tenths. In other words, he separated two tithes from the fruit, as though it belonged to two different tithing years. He removed both the second tithe and the poor man’s tithe at the same time, two tithes that should not be separated in the same year.

אֶחָד כְּדִבְרֵי בֵּית שַׁמַּאי, וְאֶחָד כְּדִבְרֵי בֵּית הִלֵּל. שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ עָשׂוּ!

The mishna explains: One tithe he removed in accordance with the statement of Beit Shammai, who hold that the new year for trees occurs on the first of Shevat, which means that the etrog required tithing according to the regulations of the upcoming year. And one tithe was in accordance with the statement of Beit Hillel, who hold the new year for trees is on the fifteenth of Shevat, and therefore the etrog required tithing in accordance with the previous year. The Gemara infers: Conclude from here that Beit Shammai did act in accordance with their opinion, as Rabbi Akiva took care to act in accordance with the ruling of Beit Shammai.

רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא גְּמָרֵיהּ אִסְתַּפַּק לֵיהּ, וְלָא יְדַע אִי בֵּית הִלֵּל בְּאֶחָד בִּשְׁבָט אֲמוּר, אוֹ בַּחֲמִשָּׁה עָשָׂר בִּשְׁבָט אֲמוּר.

The Gemara answers: Rabbi Akiva was uncertain as to his tradition, and he did not know if Beit Hillel said that the New Year for trees occurs on the first of Shevat or if they said it is on the fifteenth of Shevat. He did not act in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai at all; rather, he sought to act in accordance with the ruling of Beit Hillel but was uncertain about their opinion on this matter.

מֵתִיב מָר זוּטְרָא: מַעֲשֶׂה וְיָלְדָה כַּלָּתוֹ שֶׁל שַׁמַּאי הַזָּקֵן, וּפִיחֵת אֶת הַמַּעֲזִיבָה, וְסִיכֵּךְ עַל גַּבֵּי מִטָּה בִּשְׁבִיל קָטָן. שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ עָשׂוּ! הָתָם, הָרוֹאֶה אוֹמֵר לְאַפּוֹשֵׁי אֲוִיר קָעָבֵיד.

§ Mar Zutra raised an objection to this issue from a different source: There was an incident in which the daughter-in-law of Shammai the Elder gave birth to a son. In Shammai’s opinion this newborn baby is immediately obligated in the mitzva to sit in a sukka, and he therefore removed the mortar [ma’aziva] covering the ceiling and he placed sukka covering over the bed for the minor. Conclude from here that Beit Shammai did act in accordance with their opinions. The Gemara answers: There is no proof from there, as anyone watching would say that he did it merely to increase the air. Since people would not necessarily think that he removed the mortar as a ruling of halakha, this behavior is not considered the formation of a faction.

מֵתִיב מָר זוּטְרָא: מַעֲשֵׂה בְּשׁוֹקֶת יֵהוּא שֶׁהָיְתָה בִּירוּשָׁלַיִם, וְהָיְתָה נְקוּבָה לַמִּקְוֶה, וְכׇל טְהָרוֹת שֶׁהָיוּ בִּירוּשָׁלַיִם נַעֲשִׂים עַל גַּבָּהּ. וְשָׁלְחוּ בֵּית שַׁמַּאי וְהִרְחִיבוּהָ, שֶׁבֵּית שַׁמַּאי אוֹמְרִים: עַד שֶׁתִּיפָּחֵת בְּרוּבָּהּ,

Mar Zutra raised a further objection: There was an incident involving the Yehu water trough in Jerusalem, which had a hole that connected it to a ritual bath, and all the ritual purifications in Jerusalem were performed in it, i.e., people immersed their utensils in this trough. And Beit Shammai sent messengers and they widened the opening in the water trough, as in the opinion of Beit Shammai the hole was not large enough for the trough to be considered connected to the adjacent ritual bath as Beit Shammai say: The two areas are not connected unless the majority of it is opened. In other words, they require the major portion of the barrier between the ritual bath and the nearby trough to be open.

וּתְנַן: עֵירוּב מִקְוָאוֹת, כִּשְׁפוֹפֶרֶת הַנּוֹד בְּעוֹבְיָיהּ וּבַחֲלָלָהּ, כִּשְׁתֵּי אֶצְבָּעוֹת חוֹזְרוֹת לִמְקוֹמָן. שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ עָשׂוּ! הָתָם

And we learned in a mishna: Beit Hillel hold that a joining of ritual baths is effective if the hole has the width of the tube used to pour water in and out of a wineskin, and in its open space there is enough room for about two fingers that can return to their place. In other words, if it is possible to insert into the hole two fingers that can move around on all sides, the cavity is sufficiently large to be considered a connection. According to Beit Shammai, however, the hole must open up the majority of the barrier between the two areas. If so, conclude from this that Beit Shammai did act in accordance with their opinions. The Gemara rejects this contention: There,

הָרוֹאֶה אוֹמֵר: לְאַפּוֹשֵׁי מַיָּא הוּא דְּקָא עָבֵיד.

anyone watching would say that he did it to increase the water flow, and he did not intend to change the halakha. Rather, they would think that he widened the water trough only because there was not enough water flow.

תָּא שְׁמַע, דְּאָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר בַּר צָדוֹק: כְּשֶׁהָיִיתִי לוֹמֵד תּוֹרָה אֵצֶל רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן הַחוֹרָנִי, רָאִיתִי שֶׁהָיָה אוֹכֵל פַּת חֲרֵיבָה בְּמֶלַח בִּשְׁנֵי בַצּוֹרֶת. בָּאתִי וְהוֹדַעְתִּי אֶת אַבָּא, אָמַר לִי: הוֹלֵךְ לוֹ זֵיתִים, וְהוֹלַכְתִּי לוֹ. רָאָה אוֹתָן שֶׁהֵן לַחִין, אָמַר לִי: אֵין אֲנִי אוֹכֵל זֵיתִים.

§ The Gemara cites another relevant source. Come and hear, as Rabbi Elazar bar Tzadok said: When I studied Torah with Rabbi Yoḥanan the Ḥorani, who was a disciple of Beit Shammai, I saw that he would eat dry bread in salt in years of drought. I went and informed my father of his meager meal, and he said to me: Take olives for him, and I took for him some olives. Rabbi Yoḥanan saw that they were moist with the liquid that oozes from olives, which renders them susceptible to ritual impurity. Concerned that they had already become ritually impure, he said to me: I do not eat olives. He spoke politely and stated that he did not eat olives because he did not wish to embarrass his benefactor by disclosing that he feared they had become ritually impure.

בָּאתִי וְהוֹדַעְתִּי אֶת אַבָּא. אָמַר לִי: לֵךְ וֶאֱמוֹר לוֹ, חָבִית נְקוּבָה הָיְתָה אֶלָּא שֶׁסְּתָמוּהָ שְׁמָרִים. וּתְנַן: חָבִית שֶׁל זֵיתִים מְגוּלְגָּלִים, בֵּית שַׁמַּאי אוֹמְרִים: אֵין צְרִיכָה לִנָּקֵב.

Rabbi Elazar bar Tzadok continued his account. I went and informed my father. He said to me: Go and say to him that the barrel containing the olives was perforated, but it was clogged by sediments in the oil and therefore some moisture remained inside. However, due to the presence of the hole, the olives were not rendered susceptible to ritual impurity. And we learned this in a mishna: With regard to a barrel of preserved olives, Beit Shammai say it does not need to be perforated, as the juice issuing from the olives does not render them susceptible to ritual impurity.

וּבֵית הִלֵּל אוֹמְרִים: צְרִיכָה לִנָּקֵב. וּמוֹדִים שֶׁאִם נִיקְּבָה וּסְתָמוּהָ שְׁמָרִים — שֶׁהִיא טְהוֹרָה.

And Beit Hillel say that it does need to be perforated, as they maintain that the juice of olives is considered oil and it therefore renders the olives susceptible to ritual impurity. And Beit Hillel concede that if the barrel was perforated and subsequently clogged by sediments it is ritually pure, despite the moisture on the olives. Since liquids render food susceptible to ritual impurity only if they were placed on them intentionally, the hole in the barrel clearly shows that one did not intend for the juice to be there. By boring a hole in the barrel he has rendered it obvious that he did not desire the presence of the olive juices, and therefore it does not matter that the hole became blocked.

וְאַף עַל פִּי שֶׁתַּלְמִיד שַׁמַּאי הָיָה, כׇּל מַעֲשָׂיו לֹא עָשָׂה אֶלָּא כְּדִבְרֵי בֵּית הִלֵּל. אִי אָמְרַתְּ בִּשְׁלָמָא עָשׂוּ — הַיְינוּ רְבוּתֵיהּ. אֶלָּא אִי אָמְרַתְּ לֹא עָשׂוּ — מַאי רְבוּתֵיהּ?!

The baraita adds: And although Rabbi Yoḥanan the Ḥorani was a disciple of Shammai, he always acted only in accordance with the statements of Beit Hillel. The Gemara infers: Granted, if you say that Beit Shammai acted in accordance with their opinions, this is Rabbi Yoḥanan the Ḥorani’s greatness, i.e., he is praised for acting in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel. However, if you say that Beit Shammai did not act in accordance with their own rulings, what is the greatness and uniqueness of Rabbi Yoḥanan the Ḥorani? From here it can be inferred that Beit Shammai generally did act in accordance with their opinions.

תָּא שְׁמַע: שָׁאֲלוּ אֶת רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ, צָרַת הַבַּת מַהוּ? אָמַר לָהֶם: מַחְלוֹקֶת בֵּית שַׁמַּאי וּבֵית הִלֵּל. וַהֲלָכָה כְּדִבְרֵי מִי? אָמַר לָהֶם: מִפְּנֵי מָה אַתֶּם מַכְנִיסִין רֹאשִׁי בֵּין שְׁנֵי הָרִים גְּדוֹלִים, בֵּין שְׁתֵּי מַחְלוֹקוֹת גְּדוֹלוֹת, בֵּין בֵּית שַׁמַּאי וּבֵין בֵּית הִלֵּל. מִתְיָירֵא אֲנִי שֶׁמָּא יָרוֹצּוּ גֻּלְגׇּלְתִּי.

§ The Gemara adds: Come and hear a different proof. They asked Rabbi Yehoshua: What is the halakha with regard to the rival wife of a daughter? He said to them: It is a matter of dispute between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel. They continued to ask him: And in accordance with whose statement is the halakha? He said to them: Why are you inserting my head between two great mountains, i.e., between two great disputing opinions, between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel? I fear lest these two mountains break my skull.

אֲבָל אֲנִי מֵעִיד לָכֶם עַל שְׁתֵּי מִשְׁפָּחוֹת גְּדוֹלוֹת שֶׁהָיוּ בִּירוּשָׁלַיִם, מִשְׁפַּחַת בֵּית צְבוֹעִים מִבֶּן עַכְמַאי, וּמִשְׁפַּחַת בֵּית קוֹפַאי מִבֶּן מְקוֹשֵׁשׁ, שֶׁהֵם בְּנֵי צָרוֹת, וּמֵהֶם כֹּהֲנִים גְּדוֹלִים, וְשִׁמְּשׁוּ עַל גַּבֵּי הַמִּזְבֵּחַ.

However, I shall testify to you about two great families that were in Jerusalem, the Beit Tzevo’im family who came from the town of Ben Akhmai, and the Beit Kofai family from the town of Ben Mekoshesh: They were the descendants of rival wives who married others, in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel, and from them came High Priests who served on the altar. Accordingly, I can testify that this was the accepted halakhic practice throughout the generations.

אִי אָמְרַתְּ בִּשְׁלָמָא עָשׂוּ — הַיְינוּ דְּקָאָמַר מִתְיָירֵא אֲנִי. אֶלָּא אִי אָמְרַתְּ לֹא עָשׂוּ, אַמַּאי קָאָמַר מִתְיָירֵא אֲנִי? וּנְהִי נָמֵי דְּעָשׂוּ, מַאי מִתְיָירֵא אֲנִי?

The Gemara infers from this statement: Granted, if you say that Beit Shammai acted in accordance with their opinions, this is why Rabbi Yehoshua said: I fear, since a conclusive halakhic ruling would mean that certain children are mamzerim, and the descendants of that family might take vengeance upon him. However, if you say that they did not act in accordance with their opinions, why did he say: I fear? The Gemara retorts: And even if Beit Shammai did act in accordance with their rulings, what is the reason that he said: I fear?

הָא אָמַר רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ: אֵין מַמְזֵר אֶלָּא מֵחַיָּיבֵי מִיתוֹת בֵּית דִּין! נְהִי נָמֵי דְּמַמְזֵר לָא הָוֵי, פָּגוּם מִיהָא הָוֵי.

Didn’t Rabbi Yehoshua say that in his opinion a mamzer is only someone born from a union of those liable to receive the court-imposed capital punishments, not from those liable to receive karet. If so, in the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua, the children of rival wives who entered into levirate marriage would not be mamzerim at all, and therefore he had no reason to fear reprisals. The Gemara answers: Even if this is the case, nevertheless, he had something to fear, as, although the child of a rival wife would not be a mamzer, he would nevertheless be of flawed lineage and disqualified from the priesthood.

מִקַּל וָחוֹמֶר מֵאַלְמָנָה: מָה אַלְמָנָה, שֶׁאֵין אִיסּוּרָהּ נוֹהֵג בַּכֹּל — בְּנָהּ פָּגוּם, זוֹ, שֶׁאִיסּוּרָהּ שָׁוֶה בַּכֹּל כּוּ׳.

The Gemara adds that this can be derived by an a fortiori inference from the case of a widow: Just as in the case of a widow, whose prohibition does not apply to all, as she is forbidden in marriage only to a High Priest and not to any other man, and yet the lineage of her son is flawed, as he is disqualified from the priesthood, the son of this rival wife should certainly be disqualified from the priesthood, as her prohibition applies equally to all, even regular Israelites.

קָבְעוּ מִינֵּיהּ צָרוֹת, וְקָפָשֵׁיט לֵיהּ בְּנֵי צָרוֹת! תַּרְתֵּי קָא בָּעֵי מִינֵּיהּ: צָרוֹת מַאי? וְאִם תִּמְצֵי לוֹמַר צָרוֹת כְּבֵית הִלֵּל, בְּנֵי צָרוֹת דְּבֵית הִלֵּל — לְבֵית שַׁמַּאי מַהוּ?

§ Incidentally, the Gemara notes a problem with the above discussion: They asked Rabbi Yehoshua about rival wives, and he answered them about the children of rival wives. He did not refer to the rival wives themselves. The Gemara explains: They asked him questions on two matters: First, what is the halakha with regard to rival wives? And if you say that the halakha in the case of rival wives is in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel and they are exempt, what is the halakha according to Beit Shammai in the case of the children of rival wives who, following Beit Hillel, married others without ḥalitza?

לְמַאי נָפְקָא מִינַּהּ? לְמִיפְשַׁט וְלַד מַחֲזִיר גְּרוּשָׁתוֹ לְבֵית הִלֵּל.

The Gemara asks: What difference does this question make? Since Rabbi Yehoshua maintains that the halakha is in accordance with the ruling of Beit Hillel, why even discuss Beit Shammai’s opinion on this matter? The Gemara explains: His answer enables one to resolve a different issue, the case of a child of one who remarries his divorcée according to the opinion of Beit Hillel. Is the child of a divorcée who remarried her previous husband after she had been married to another man fit or disqualified from the priesthood?

מִי קָאָמְרִינַן קַל וָחוֹמֶר: וּמָה אַלְמָנָה לְכֹהֵן גָּדוֹל שֶׁאֵין אִיסּוּרָהּ שָׁוֶה בַּכֹּל — בְּנָהּ פָּגוּם. זוֹ, שֶׁאִיסּוּרָהּ שָׁוֶה בַּכֹּל — אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁבְּנָהּ פָּגוּם?

The Gemara elaborates: Do we say the following an a fortiori inference: And just as with regard to a widow married to a High Priest, whose prohibition does not apply to all, as she is prohibited in marriage only to a High Priest, and yet the lineage of her son is flawed as he is disqualified from the priesthood, so too, in the case of this rival wife, whose prohibition applies equally to all men, is it not right that her son should be of flawed lineage?

אוֹ דִלְמָא אִיכָּא לְמִיפְרַךְ: מָה לְאַלְמָנָה שֶׁהִיא עַצְמָהּ מִתְחַלֶּלֶת. וַאֲמַר לְהוּ: צָרוֹת מִתְיָירֵא אֲנִי,

Or perhaps this comparison can be refuted: What about the fact that a widow is different, as she herself is disqualified from marrying a priest, i.e., if a High Priest has intercourse with her she is disqualified from marrying any member of the entire priesthood, including common priests, whereas a remarried divorcée herself is not disqualified from marrying into the priesthood? And Rabbi Yehoshua said to them: I fear that if I issue a decisive ruling concerning rival wives this might lead to a conflict,