Din & Daf: Conceptual Analysis of Halakha Through Case Study with Dr. Elana Stein Hain
Lifnim Mishurat Hadin – Do we compel people to go above and beyond the law? (Bava Metsia 30b)
The Gemara introduces the concept of lifnim mi-shurat ha-din, often described as going above and beyond the letter of the law. But what does this category actually mean? Does this mean that a person can choose whether or not to do it? If so, what are the ramifications of that? And if it can be forced, who can and enforce it, and how is it still considered going beyond the letter of the law?
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Dr. Elana Stein Hain – dinanddaf@hadran.org.il (Author of “Circumventing the Law: Rabbinic Perspectives on Loopholes and Legal Integrity”, available at 50% off today with promo code FOUNDERSDAY24)
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- בבא מציעא כד:
רב יהודה הוה שקיל ואזיל בתריה דמר שמואל בשוקא דבי דיסא א”ל מצא כאן ארנקי מהו אמר ליה הרי אלו שלו בא ישראל ונתן בה סימן מהו א”ל חייב להחזיר תרתי אמר ליה לפנים משורת הדין כי הא דאבוה דשמואל אשכח הנך חמרי במדברא ואהדרינהו למרייהו לבתר תריסר ירחי שתא לפנים משורת הדין
Rav Yehuda was moving along behind Mar Shmuel in the market where pounded grain was sold. Rav Yehuda said to Shmuel: If one found a purse [arnakei] here, what is the halakha? Shmuel said to him that the halakha is as the mishna states: These belong to him. Rav Yehuda asked him: If a Jew came and provided a distinguishing mark to describe it, what is the halakha? Shmuel said to him: The finder is obligated to return it. Rav Yehuda asked: These are two contradictory rulings. Shmuel said to him: By law, it belongs to him. When I said the finder is obligated to return it if he learns the identity of the owner, that was beyond the letter of the law. This is like that incident where Shmuel’s father found these donkeys in the desert and returned them to their owner after the passage of twelve months of the year, as he acted beyond the letter of the law.
רבא הוה שקיל ואזיל בתריה דר”נ בשוקא דגלדאי ואמרי לה בשוקא דרבנן א”ל מצא כאן ארנקי מהו א”ל הרי אלו שלו בא ישראל ונתן בה סימן מהו אמר ליה הרי אלו שלו והלא עומד וצווח נעשה כצווח על ביתו שנפל ועל ספינתו שטבעה בים
Rava was moving along behind Rav Naḥman in the tanner’s market, and some say in the marketplace frequented by the Sages. Rava said to Rav Naḥman: If one found a purse here, what is the halakha? Rav Naḥman said to him that the halakha is as the mishna states: These belong to him. Rava asked him: If a Jew came and provided a distinguishing mark to describe it, what is the halakha? Rav Naḥman said to him that in this case as well, the halakha is as the mishna states: These belong to him. Rava asked: But isn’t the owner justifiably standing and screaming that the purse belongs to him? Rav Naḥman said to him: He becomes as one who screams to no avail about his house that collapsed or about his ship that sank in the sea.
- בבא מציעא ל:
רבי ישמעאל ברבי יוסי הוה קאזיל באורחא פגע ביה ההוא גברא הוה דרי פתכא דאופי אותבינהו וקא מיתפח א”ל דלי לי אמר ליה כמה שוין א”ל פלגא דזוזא יהיב ליה פלגא דזוזא ואפקרה
Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, was walking on the road. A certain man encountered him, and that man was carrying a burden that consisted of sticks of wood. He set down the wood and was resting. The man said to him: Lift them for me and place them upon me. Since it was not in keeping with the dignity of Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, to lift the wood, Rabbi Yishmael said to him: How much are they worth? The man said to him: A half-dinar. Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, gave him a half-dinar, took possession of the wood, and declared the wood ownerless.
הדר זכה בהו הדר יהיב ליה פלגא דזוזא ואפקרה חזייה דהוה קא בעי למיהדר למזכיה בהו א”ל לכולי עלמא אפקרנהו ולך לא אפקרנהו
The man then reacquired the wood and again requested that Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, lift the wood for him. Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, again gave him a half-dinar, again took possession of the wood, and again declared the wood ownerless. He then saw that the man desired to reacquire the sticks of wood. Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, said to him: I declared the sticks of wood ownerless with regard to everyone else, but I did not declare them ownerless with regard to you.
ומי הוי הפקר כי האי גוונא והתנן בש”א הפקר לעניים הפקר וב”ה אומרים אינו הפקר עד שיהא הפקר לעניים ולעשירים כשמיטה
But is property rendered ownerless in a case like this? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (Pe’a 6:1) that Beit Shammai say: Property declared ownerless for the poor is thereby rendered ownerless. And Beit Hillel say: It is not ownerless, until the property will be ownerless for the poor and for the rich, like produce during the Sabbatical Year, which is available for all.
אלא רבי ישמעאל ברבי יוסי לכולי עלמא אפקרינהו ובמלתא בעלמא הוא דאוקמיה
Rather, Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, actually declared the wood ownerless to everyone without exception, and it was with a mere statement that he prevented him from reacquiring the wood, i.e., he told the man not to reacquire the wood even though there was no legal impediment to that reacquisition.
והא רבי ישמעאל ברבי יוסי זקן ואינו לפי כבודו הוה ר’ ישמעאל ברבי יוסי לפנים משורת הדין הוא דעבד
But wasn’t Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, an elderly person and it was not in keeping with his dignity to tend to the item? Why did he purchase the wood and render it ownerless in order to absolve himself of the obligation to lift the burden if he had no obligation to do so in the first place? In the case of Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, he conducted himself beyond the letter of the law, and he could have simply refused the request for help.
דתני רב יוסף… (שמות יח, כ) והודעת להם זה בית חייהם את הדרך זו גמילות חסדים [(אשר) ילכו זה ביקור חולים בה זו קבורה ואת המעשה זה הדין אשר יעשון זו לפנים משורת הדין:…
As Rav Yosef taught in a baraita with regard to the verse: “And you shall teach them the statutes and the laws, and shall show them the path wherein they shall walk and the action that they must perform” (Exodus 18:20). “And you shall teach them,” that is referring to the structure of their livelihood, i.e., teach the Jewish people trades so that they may earn a living; “the path,” that is referring to acts of kindness; “they shall walk,” that is referring to visiting the ill; “wherein,” that is referring to burial; “and the action,” that is referring to acting in accordance with the letter of the law; “that they must perform,” that is referring to acting beyond the letter of the law.
אמר ר’ יוחנן לא חרבה ירושלים אלא על שדנו בה דין תורה אלא דיני דמגיזתא לדיינו אלא אימא שהעמידו דיניהם על דין תורה ולא עבדו לפנים משורת הדין:
…Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Jerusalem was destroyed only for the fact that they adjudicated cases on the basis of Torah law in the city. Rather, what else should they have done? Should they rather have adjudicated cases on the basis of arbitrary decisions [demagizeta]? Rather, say: That they established their rulings on the basis of Torah law and did not go beyond the letter of the law
- בבא מציעא פג.
רבה בר בר חנן תברו ליה הנהו שקולאי חביתא דחמרא שקל לגלימייהו אתו אמרו לרב אמר ליה הב להו גלימייהו. אמר ליה דינא הכי אמר ליה אין למען תלך בדרך טובים (משלי ב). יהיב להו גלימייהו אמרו ליה עניי אנן וטרחינן כולה יומא וכפינן ולית לן מידי אמר ליה זיל הב אגרייהו אמר ליה דינא הכי אמר ליה אין וארחות צדיקים תשמור (משלי ב).
Some porters [negligently (see Rashi and Maharsha)] broke a barrel of wine belonging to Rabbah Bar Bar Channah. Thereupon he seized their garments; so, they went and complained to Rav. “Return their garment” he ordered. “Is that the law,” he inquired? “Yes,” he rejoined, “that you shall walk in the way of good people” (Mishlei 2:20). Their garments having been returned, they observed, “We are poor men, have worked all day, and are hungry. Are we to get nothing?” “Go and pay them” he ordered. “Is that the law,” he asked? “Yes,” he rejoined, “and keep the path of the righteous” (Mishlei 2:21).
- בית חדש טור שולחן ערוך חושן משפט יב:ד
…איתא בסוף האומנים בעובדא דרבה בר בר חנא דתברו ליה הני שקולאי חביתא דחמרא שקל לגלימייהו אתא א”ל לרב א”ל הב להו גלימייהו א”ל דינא הכי א”ל למען תלך בדרך טובים ומייתי לה רבינו לקמן בסימן ש”ד ופירש רש”י בדרך טובים לפנים משורת הדין עכ”ל משמע דרב הוה כייף ליה לרבה בר בר חנא דאם לא כן מאי קאמר ליה דינא הכי אם לא בא לכופו…וכן במצא ארנקי בשוק בפרק אלו מציאות דקאמר חייב להחזיר משום לפנים משורת הדין לפחות משמע חייב להחזיר בבא לצאת ידי שמים כדאמר פרק הגוזל בתרא אמתני’ דהאומר לחבירו גזלתיך וכו’ דחייב בבא לצאת ידי שמים דאם לא כן מאי חייב ולכן פסק המרדכי דכייפינן ליה למיעבד לפנים משורת הדין אם יכולת בידו לעשות שהוא עשיר ושכן פסק ראב”ן ואבי העזר”י וכן כתב באגודה פרק אלו מציאות וז”ל חייב להחזיר משום לפנים משורת הדין וכן אנו נוהגים להחזיר וכן פסק ראב”ן וראבי”ה דכייפינן להחזיר היכא דהמוצא עשיר עכ”ל
…The end of perek האומנים cites the anecdote of Rabbah bar bar Hannah where the porters broke his wine barrel, and he took their clothing (as payment/collateral). They went and told Rav, and Rav to him to give them their clothes. And he asked: Is this the law? And he responded, “In order to walk in the ways of the good.” And our teacher brought this in siman 304. And Rashi explained, “in the way of the good” – within the line of the law, end quote. It sounds like rav forced Rabbah bar bar Hannah (to act within the line of the law), for if not, what did he mean by “this is the law” if he did not mean to force him…And likewise in the case of one who found a purse in the marketplace in chapter Eilu metziot, where he says that one is obligated to return the item in order to act within the line of the law: it at least sounds like the person is required to do so in order to fulfill one’s Divine requirement (even if there’s no earthly court requirement) as is said in the latter chapter Ha-gozel regarding the mishnah that One who says to another person, I’ve stolen from you, etc., who is obligated if they are trying to fulfill a Divine obligation. If not, what does being obligated mean? And therefore the Mordechai ruled that we force a person to act within the line of the law if the person has the financial means to do so; and likewise the Ra’avan and the Aviezri and the Agudah in chapter Eilu metziot, and this is is language: one is required to return it for the sake of acting within the line of the law; and such is our practice to return it; and likewise the Ra’avan and Ra’avyah ruled to force the founder to return it if the finder has means, end quote.
- רבינו חננאל בבא מציעא כד:
רב יהודה הוה אזיל בתריה דמר שמואל בשוקא דבי דיסא אמר ליה מצא כאן ארנקי מהו אמר ליה הרי הן שלו. בא ישראל ונתן סימניה מהו אמר לו אם רוצה לעשות לפנים משורת הדין מחזיר כדאבוה דשמואל אשכח חמרא במדברא ואהדרינהו בתר י”ב ירחי שתא
Rav Yehuda followed Shmuel in the marketplace. He said to him: If one found a purse here, what (should one do)? He responded, It belongs to the finder. If a Jew came and articulated distinguishing marks of the item, what (should one do)? He responded: If one wishes to act within the letter of the law, one should/may return it, like the case of the Shmuel’s father who found a donkey in the wilderness and returned it after 12 months.
- Dr. Deborah Barer, Ethics and Halakhah: Reframing the Questions Journal of Jewish Ethics, Vol. 5, No. 2 (2019), 192
Rabbinic literature often presents rule-based decision-making as the primary or standard model of reasoning…Discretionary judgment differs from rule-based decision-making in several key ways. Both types of judgment are attentive to the details of the case at hand, but while rule-based decision-making uses those details to isolate and identify the appropriate rules and precedents that provide guidance in the case, discretionary judgment considers how to balance those details in order to achieve an optimal outcome for the actors involved in the case. Such decision-makers are still constrained by existing rules; while rabbis acting lifnim mi-shurat ha-din diverge from the normative expectations established by law, they never explicitly transgress rabbinic prohibitions. Despite this awareness of legal constraints, however, their focus is not primarily on rules but on outcomes. When exercising discretion, the decision-maker does not act as an impartial judge; he is at the center of the process and is personally impacted by the outcome of the decision. As a result, various “extra-legal” factors may impact his choices, such as his relationships with the other individuals involved.
- Dr. Christine Hayes, “Legal Truth, Right Answers and Best Answers: Dworkin and the Rabbis,” Diné Israel Vol. 25, 2008, pp. 73-121
As indicated, a norm or ruling may represent ‘‘(shurat) ha-din’’ (lit., [the line of] the law), which refers to the theoretically correct position, or ‘‘lifnim mishurat ha-din’’ – within, or just short of the line of the law. The metaphor of law’s line strongly implies a ‘‘correct’’ answer – represented by the line. One who crosses over the line (avar) commits a transgression – a negative deviation from the correct law. But one who stops short of the line of the law – renouncing thefull rights and entitlements due to him in law while remaining within the area bounded by the line of the law – is acting piously and mercifully. Such behavior is idealized in rabbinic literature, so much so that on occasion, standing squarely on the strict line of the law is viewed negatively in comparison. We see this idea in b. BM 30b: ‘‘Jerusalem was destroyed because everyone insisted on the strict law of the Torah (din ha-Torah) rather than stopping short of the strict law (lifnim mishurat ha-din).’’ Here again, we see that theoretically correct law can be destructive when applied in practice. The pious individual, who prioritizes religious values such as humility, compassion, modesty, peace, or charity should at times forego his right to the theoretically correct norm or ruling (stop short of the strict law) for in so doing he upholds these other values. While not exercising the‘‘correct’’ option, the pious individual who remains lifnim mishurat ha-din chooses what is in that particular situation a superior (though not more legally correct) option.
Dr. Elana Stein Hain is the Rosh Beit Midrash and a senior research fellow at the Shalom Hartman Institute of North America. Passionate about bringing Torah into conversation with contemporary life, she teaches Talmud from the Balcony, an occasional learning seminar exposing the big ideas, questions, and issues motivating Talmudic discussions; she authored Circumventing the Law: Rabbinic Perspectives on Legal Loopholes and Integrity (available at 50% off today with promo code FOUNDERSDAY24) which uses halakhic loopholes as a lens for understanding rabbinic views on law and ethics; and she co-hosts For Heaven’s Sake, a bi-weekly podcast with Donniel Hartman and Yossi Klein Halevi, exploring contemporary issues related to Israel and the Jewish world. Elana has also started TEXTing; a podcast where she and guest scholars study Torah texts that engage issues of the moment for the Jewish world. She lives in Manhattan with her beloved family.
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