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Today's Daf Yomi

June 21, 2019 | 讬状讞 讘住讬讜谉 转砖注状讟

  • This month's learning is sponsored by the Hadran Women of Silver Spring in memory of Nicki Toys, Nechama bat Shmuel Tzadok.

  • This month鈥檚 learning is sponsored by Shlomo and Amalia Klapper in honor of the birth of Chiyenna Yochana, named after her great-great-grandmother, Chiyenna Kossovsky.

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Elaine Hochberg in honor of her husband, Arie Hochberg, who continues to journey through Daf Yomi with her. 鈥淎nd with thanks to Rabbanit Farber and Hadran who have made our learning possible.鈥

Arakhin 5

The law regarding arakhin – if someone says “the value of my head upon me” it is valid and one needs to give the value of one’s entire body (since the person’s life is dependent upon it) – is also applicable to vows of valuation. If so, how does one reconcile this with a braita that says if one gives the head of a cow to hekdesh, only the head is sanctified (and other similar cases). One who says “the value of a newborn infant upon me” – since under 30 days there is no laws of arakhin, does one assume the person meant it as a vow and is obligated to pay their value or not? Is a non Jew included in the world of arakhin – both regarding the issue of if they say “the value of someone is upon me” or if a Jew says “the value of this non- Jew is upon me”?


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专讙诇讛 砖诇 讝讜 注讜诇讛 讬讻讜诇 转讛讗 讻讜诇讛 注讜诇讛 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讻诇 讗砖专 讬转谉 诪诪谞讜 诇讛壮 讬讛讬讛 拽讚砖 诪诪谞讜 拽讜讚砖 讜诇讗 讻讜诇讛 拽讜讚砖

The leg of this animal is a burnt offering, one might have thought that all of the animal will be a burnt offering. Therefore, the verse states: 鈥淎nd if it is an animal of those that they bring as an offering to the Lord, anything of it that one gives to the Lord, it shall be sacred鈥 (Leviticus 27:9). The verse indicates that the part of it that one gives will be sacred, but not all of the animal will be sacred.

讬讻讜诇 转爪讗 诇讞讜诇讬谉 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讬讛讬讛 讘讛讜讬讬转讛 转讛讗 讛讗 讻讬爪讚 转诪讻专 诇爪讜专讻讬 注讜诇讜转 讜讚诪讬讛 讞讜诇讬谉 讞讜抓 诪讚诪讬 讗讜转讜 讗讘专 砖讘讛 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 诪讗讬专

A non-sacred animal with a consecrated limb may not be sacrificed. Accordingly, one might have thought that the consecrated limb may be redeemed and thereby transferred to non-sacred status. Therefore the verse states: 鈥淪hall be,鈥 meaning: It shall be as it is, i.e., the limb remains consecrated. How is this possible, i.e., what should one do in this case? The animal should be sold for the needs of burnt offerings, i.e., to an individual who will sacrifice the entire animal as a burnt offering, and the payment received for the animal will be non-sacred, except for the payment received in exchange for that limb of it that was consecrated. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir.

专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讜专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讜专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讗讜诪专讬诐 诪谞讬谉 诇讗讜诪专 专讙诇讛 砖诇 讝讜 注讜诇讛 砖讻讜诇讛 注讜诇讛 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讻诇 讗砖专 讬转谉 诪诪谞讜 诇讛壮 讬讛讬讛 拽讚砖 诇专讘讜转 讗转 讻讜诇讛

Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Shimon say: From where is it derived that in the case of one who says: The leg of this animal is a burnt offering, all of the animal becomes a burnt offering? The verse states: 鈥淎ll that any man give of such to the Lord shall be holy鈥 (Leviticus 27:9). The term 鈥渟hall be鈥 serves to include all of the animal, indicating that it all becomes sacred.

讜讗驻讬诇讜 诇诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 讗讬谉 讻讜诇讛 注讜诇讛 讛谞讬 诪讬诇讬 讚讗拽讚讬砖 讚讘专 砖讗讬谉 讛谞砖诪讛 转诇讜讬讛 讘讜 讗讘诇 讚讘专 砖讛谞砖诪讛 转诇讜讬讛 讘讜 拽讚砖讛 讻讜诇讛

And even according to the one, Rabbi Meir, who says that if one states: The leg of this animal is a burnt offering, not all of the animal is a burnt offering, that statement applies only if one consecrated an item that its life does not depend on, e.g., its leg. But if he consecrated an item that its life depends on, such as its head, the entire animal is consecrated. This presents a difficulty for Rava, who holds that the baraita that discusses consecration of the head is referring to items consecrated in order to purchase offerings for the altar. Why, then, isn鈥檛 the entire animal consecrated?

讗诇讗 诇讗 拽砖讬讗 讛讗 讘拽讚讜砖转 讛讙讜祝 讛讗 讘拽讚讜砖转 讚诪讬诐

Rava responds: Rather, both baraitot are referring to items consecrated for the altar, and even so it is not difficult. This baraita, which indicates that if one consecrated the head the entire animal is consecrated, is referring to inherent sanctity, i.e., where he consecrated the head for the purpose of sacrificing it on the altar. That baraita, which teaches that if he consecrated the head it alone is consecrated, is referring to sanctity that inheres in its value, that is, where he consecrated the head for the sake of purchasing offerings.

讜讛讗 诪专 讛讜讗 讚讗诪专 诪拽讚讬砖 讝讻专 诇讚诪讬讜 拽讚讜砖 拽讚讜砖转 讛讙讜祝

Abaye responded: But wasn鈥檛 it you, Master, who said that if one consecrated a male animal for its value, it is sanctified with inherent sanctity and it is itself sacrificed? This undermines the distinction that Rava is attempting to draw between inherent sanctity and sanctity that inheres in value.

诇讗 拽砖讬讗 讛讗 讚讗拽讚讬砖 讻讜诇讛 讛讗 讚讗拽讚讬砖 讞讚 讗讘专

Rava responds: It is not difficult. This statement, that an animal that was consecrated for its value attains inherent sanctity, applies only in a case where he consecrated the entire animal. There, in the baraita discussing the consecration of the head, it is referring to a situation where he consecrated only one limb. In such a case, the animal does not attain inherent sanctity.

讞讚 讗讘专 谞诪讬 讗讬讘注讜讬讬 讗讬讘注讬讗 诇谉 讚讘注讬 专讘讛 讛拽讚讬砖 讗讘专 诇讚诪讬讜 诪讛讜

Abaye replied: Actually, we also raised a dilemma with regard to a case where one consecrated only one limb. As Rabba raised a dilemma: If one consecrated a limb for its value in order to bring an offering with the proceeds, what is the halakha as to whether or not the entire animal is consecrated? If your interpretation of the baraita is correct, Rabba can resolve his question based on the baraita and conclude definitively that the entire animal is not sanctified for the altar.

讻讬 讗讬讘注讬 诇谉 讘转诐 讛讻讗 讘讘注诇 诪讜诐 讚讜诪讬讗 讚讞诪讜专

Rava responded: We raised this dilemma and entertained the possibility that the entire animal might be sanctified to the altar only in a case where the animal is unblemished, and is therefore fit to be used as an offering. But here, the baraita is referring to a blemished animal, similar to the parallel case of the donkey, which is unfit to be sacrificed. Since the animal in question is unfit for the altar, it is clear that the entire animal is not sanctified.

讘注诇 诪讜诐 谞诪讬 讗讬讘注讜讬讬 讗讬讘注讬讗 诇谉 讚讘注讬 专讘讛 讚诪讬 专讗砖讬 诇讙讘讬 诪讝讘讞 诪讛讜 讻讬 讗讘注讬讗 诇谉 诪拽诪讬 讚讗砖诪注讛 诇讛讗 诪转谞讬转讗 讛砖转讗 讚砖诪注讛 讛讗 诪转谞讬转讗 诇讗 诪讬讘注讬讗 诇谉

Abaye responded: In fact, we also raised a dilemma with regard to a case where the animal is blemished and unfit to be sacrificed. As Rabba raised a dilemma: If one said: It is incumbent upon me to donate the value of my head to purchase offerings to be sacrificed on the altar, what is the halakha? Is he obligated in his entire value or not? A person is certainly not fit to be an offering, and yet Rabba does not resolve his question based on the baraita. Rava answered: We only raised this dilemma before hearing this baraita. Now that we have heard this baraita, we no longer raise this dilemma, as we concluded from the baraita that the entirety of the animal is not consecrated.

讙讜驻讗 讘注讬 专讘讛 讚诪讬 专讗砖讬 诇讙讘讬 诪讝讘讞 诪讛讜 谞讬讚讜谉 讘讻讘讜讚讜 讗讜 讗讬谞讜 谞讬讚讜谉 讘讻讘讜讚讜

搂 The Gemara returns to the aforementioned matter itself. Rabba raised a dilemma: If one said: It is incumbent upon me to donate the value of my head to purchase offerings to be sacrificed on the altar, what is the halakha? Is it assessed by the significance of the body part in question, and since he consecrated a vital organ he is obligated in his entire value? Or perhaps it is not assessed by the significance of the body part in question, and only the head is consecrated.

诇讗 讗砖讻讞谉 讘讚诪讬诐 讚讗讬谞讜 谞讬讚讜谉 讘讻讘讜讚讜 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 诇讗 讗砖讻讞谉 诇讙讘讬 诪讝讘讞 讚谞讬讚讜谉 讘讻讘讜讚讜 转讬拽讜

The Gemara explains the underlying issue: It can be argued that we have not found a case of assessments that is not assessed by the significance of the body part that was specified. Therefore, if one obligated himself in the value of a vital organ he should have to pay the entity鈥檚 entire value. Or perhaps he should be obligated only in the value of the head, as we have not found a case of an animal that is sacrificed on the altar that is assessed by the significance of the body part in question, i.e., that if one consecrates the value of one vital organ the entire animal is consecrated. The Gemara concludes: The dilemma shall stand [teiku] unresolved.

讘注讬 专讘讗 注专讻讬 注诇讬 诇讙讘讬 诪讝讘讞 诪讛讜 谞讬讚讜谉 讘讛砖讙 讬讚 讗讜 讗讬谉 谞讬讚讜谉 讘讛砖讙 讬讚

Rava raised a further dilemma: If one said: It is incumbent upon me to donate my valuation for the altar, rather than for Temple maintenance, as is usually the case, what is the halakha? Is this case determined based on affordability if he is poor, like regular valuations? Or perhaps it is not determined based on affordability, and he is obligated in the full valuation even if he is poor.

诇讗 讗砖讻讞谉 讘注专讻讬谉 讚讗讬谉 谞讬讚讜谉 讘讛砖讙 讬讚 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 诇讗 讗砖讻讞谉 诇讙讘讬 诪讝讘讞 讚诪讬驻专讬拽 讗诇讗 讘砖讜讬讜 转讬拽讜

The Gemara explains the sides of the dilemma: One can argue that we have not found a case of valuations that is not determined based on affordability. Therefore, the principle of affordability should apply even when one vows for the purpose of sacrificing offerings on the altar. Or perhaps this case should not be determined based on affordability, as we have not found an item that is consecrated for the purpose of sacrificing offerings on the altar that is redeemed in a manner other than according to its value. The Gemara again concludes: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.

讘注讬 专讘 讗砖讬 讛拽讚讬砖 砖讚讛 讗讞讜讝讛 诇讙讘讬 诪讝讘讞 诪讛讜 诪讬 讗诪专讬谞谉 诇讗 讗砖讻讞谉 砖讚讛 讗讞讜讝讛 讚诪讬驻专拽讗 讗诇讗 讘讬转 讝专注 讞讜诪专 砖注讜专讬诐 讘讞诪砖讬诐 砖拽诇 讻住祝 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 诇讗 讗砖讻讞谉 诇讙讘讬 诪讝讘讞 讚诪讬驻专讬拽 讗诇讗 讘砖讜讬讜 转讬拽讜

Rav Ashi raised a similar dilemma: If a person consecrated an ancestral field for the purpose of sacrificing offerings on the altar, rather than for Temple maintenance, as is usually the case, what is the halakha? Do we say that we have not found a case of an ancestral field that is redeemed other than by the standard rate established by the Torah, which is that an area fit for the sowing of a 岣mer, a kor, of barley seed is redeemed for fifty silver shekels? Or perhaps it should be redeemed according to its market value, as we have not found a case of an item that is consecrated for the purpose of sacrificing offerings on the altar that is redeemed in a manner other than according to its value. Once again, the Gemara states: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.

诪转谞讬壮 驻讞讜转 诪讘谉 讞讚砖 谞讬讚专 讗讘诇 诇讗 谞注专讱

MISHNA: A child less than one month old is the object of a vow if others vowed to donate his assessment, but is not valuated if one vowed to donate his fixed value, as the Torah did not establish a value for anyone less than a month old.

讙诪壮 转谞讜 专讘谞谉 讛诪注专讬讱 驻讞讜转 诪讘谉 讞讚砖 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讗讜诪专 谞讜转谉 讚诪讬讜 讜讞讻诪讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 诇讗 讗诪专 讻诇讜诐

GEMARA: The Sages taught in a baraita: With regard to a case of one who takes a vow of valuation concerning a child less than one month old, Rabbi Meir says: The person who valuated is obligated to give the child鈥檚 assessment. The Rabbis say: He has said nothing, i.e., he is not obligated to give anything.

讘诪讗讬 拽诪讬驻诇讙讬 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 住讘专 讗讬谉 讗讚诐 诪讜爪讬讗 讚讘专讬讜 诇讘讟诇讛 讬讜讚注 砖讗讬谉 注专讻讬谉 诇驻讞讜转 诪讘谉 讞讚砖 讜讙诪专 讜讗诪专 诇砖诐 讚诪讬诐 讜专讘谞谉 住讘专讬 讗讚诐 诪讜爪讬讗 讚讘专讬讜 诇讘讟诇讛

The Gemara asks: With regard to what principle do they disagree? Rabbi Meir holds: A person does not issue his statement of consecration for naught. The assumption is that a person knows that there are no valuations for a child less than one month old, and therefore he intended and said his statement for the sake of assessments, i.e., he meant to vow to give the child鈥檚 market value. And the Rabbis hold that a person does make his statement of consecration for naught. Therefore, his statement is taken at face value, and he is not obligated to give anything.

讻诪讗谉 讗讝诇讗 讛讗 讚讗诪专 专讘 讙讬讚诇 讗诪专 专讘 讛讗讜诪专 注专讱 讻诇讬 注诇讬 谞讜转谉 讚诪讬诐 讻专讘讬 诪讗讬专 驻砖讬讟讗 讚讻专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讗转讬讗

The Gemara asks: In accordance with whose opinion is that which Rav Giddel says that Rav says: One who says: It is incumbent upon me to donate the valuation of this utensil, is obligated to give its assessment? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who holds that a person does not issue a statement of consecration for naught. Since utensils are not subject to valuation, he presumably intended to obligate himself in its assessment. The Gemara asks: Isn鈥檛 it obvious that Rav鈥檚 statement is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir? Why was it necessary for the Gemara to state this?

诪讛讜 讚转讬诪讗 讗驻讬诇讜 讻专讘谞谉 讛转诐 讛讜讗 讚讟注讬 住讘专 讻讬 讛讬讻讬 讚讗讬讻讗 注专讻讬谉 诇讘谉 讞讜讚砖 讗讬讻讗 谞诪讬 诇驻讞讜转 诪讘谉 讞讜讚砖

The Gemara explains that it was necessary to state that Rav鈥檚 statement is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, lest you say that it is even in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who exempt one who valuates a child under a month old. The Gemara elaborates: One could say that it is only there, in the case of the child, that one errs and thinks that just as there are valuations for a child who is one month old, there are also valuations for a child less than one month old. Since his vow was based on an error, he is not obligated to pay anything.

讗讘诇 讛讻讗 讚诇讬讻讗 诇诪讬讟注讬 讜讚讗讬 讗讚诐 讬讜讚注 砖讗讬谉 注专讱 诇讻诇讬 讜讙诪专 讜讗诪专 诇砖诐 讚诪讬诐 拽诪砖诪注 诇谉

But here, in the case of one who valuates a utensil, where there is no possibility of erring, it can be argued that a person certainly knows that there is no valuation for a utensil, and he therefore intended and said his statement for the sake of assessments, i.e., he meant to vow to donate the utensil鈥檚 value. Therefore, the Gemara teaches us that Rav鈥檚 statement is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir only, and not with that of the Rabbis. The Rabbis hold that a person does issue a statement of consecration for naught even in such a case, and therefore his declaration is taken at face value.

讜诇专讘讬 诪讗讬专 诇诪讗讬 讗讬爪讟专讬讱

The Gemara asks: And as Rav stated his halakha in accordance with Rabbi Meir, who says that one who valuates a child less than a month old must pay his assessment, for what reason was it necessary for Rav to state his ruling? Isn鈥檛 this obvious?

诪讛讜 讚转讬诪讗 讟注诪讗 讚专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讛转诐 讚讙讝专 驻讞讜转 诪讘谉 讞讜讚砖 讗讟讜 讘谉 讞讜讚砖 讗讘诇 讛讻讗 讚诇讬讻讗 诇诪讬讙讝专 讗讬诪讗 诇讗 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 讟注诪讗 讚专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讚讗讬谉 讗讚诐 诪讜爪讬讗 讚讘专讬讜 诇讘讟诇讛 诇讗 砖谞讗 讛讻讗 讜诇讗 砖谞讗 讛讻讗

The Gemara answers: It was necessary for him to state this halakha, lest you say that the reason that Rabbi Meir obligates him to pay the assessment there, in the case of the child, is that he decrees one must pay if the child is less than a month old, due to concern that otherwise people might mistakenly refrain from paying the valuation of a child who is a month old. But here, in the case of one who valuates a utensil, where there is no cause for such an error and therefore no need to decree, one might say that Rabbi Meir would not obligate him to pay. Therefore, Rav teaches us that since the reason of Rabbi Meir is that a person does not make his statement of consecration for naught, there is no difference between here, the case of a child, and there, with regard to a utensil. Rather, the halakha is the same in both cases.

讻诪讗谉 讗讝诇讗 讛讗 讚讗诪专 专讘讛 讘专 讬讜住祝 讗诪专 专讘 讜讗诪专讬 诇讛 讗诪专 专讘 讬讬讘讗 讘专 讬讜住讬 讗诪专 专讘 讛诪拽讚讬砖 讘讛诪转 讞讘讬专讜 谞讜转谉 讚诪讬讛 讻诪讗谉 讻专讘讬 诪讗讬专

The Gemara asks: In accordance with whose opinion is that which Rabba bar Yosef says that Rav says, and some say that Rav Yeiva bar Yosei says that Rav says: One who consecrates the animal of another must give its assessment. In accordance with whom? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, that one does not issue a statement of consecration for naught. Since he knows that he cannot consecrate that which is not his, he meant to obligate himself in the animal鈥檚 assessment.

讛讗 讗诪专讛 专讘 讞讚讗 讝讬诪谞讗 讚讗诪专 专讘 讙讬讚诇 讗诪专 专讘 讛讗讜诪专 注专讱 讻诇讬 注诇讬 谞讜转谉 讚诪讬讜 诪讛讜 讚转讬诪讗 讛转诐 讛讜讗 讚讬讜讚注 砖讗讬谉 注专讱 诇讻诇讬 讜讙诪专 讜讗诪专 诇砖诐 讚诪讬诐

The Gemara asks: But didn鈥檛 Rav already say it once? As Rav Giddel says that Rav says: One who says: It is incumbent upon me to donate the valuation of a utensil, must give its assessment. The Gemara answers: Rav found it necessary to issue both statements, lest you say that this halakha applies only there, with regard to a utensil, as a person knows that a utensil has no valuation, i.e., that the term: Valuation, is not relevant to a utensil, and therefore it must be that he decided to donate money and says this expression as a reference to its monetary value, using the term: Valuation, imprecisely.

讗讘诇 讘讛诪讛 讚讘转 诪讬拽讚砖 讛讬讗 讗讬讻讗 诇诪讬诪专 讚讛讻讬 拽讗诪专 讗讬 讗诪讬谞讗 诇讛 诇诪专讛 诪讝讘讬谉 诇讛 谞讬讛诇讬 转讬拽讚讜砖 诇讛 诪讛砖转讗 讜讗拽专讘讛 讗讘诇 讚诪讬 诇讗 拽讗诪专 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉

But in the case where one obligated himself in the valuation of another鈥檚 animal, which is subject to consecration, albeit not by him, there is room to say that this is what he is saying to himself: Were I to say to the owner that I want to buy it, he would sell it to me. Therefore, let it be consecrated from now, and I will sacrifice it once I purchase it from him. His intent is to consecrate the animal itself in order to sacrifice it. But since he did not say to himself that he would give its assessment, his statement is meaningless, as one cannot consecrate property that does not belong to him. Therefore, Rav teaches us that this is not the case. Rather, his statement should be interpreted in such a manner that he is obligated to give the assessment of the animal to the Temple treasury.

讗诪专 专讘 讗砖讬 讜讛讜讗 讚讗诪专 注诇讬 讗讘诇 讗诪专 讛专讬 讝讜 诇讗

Rav Ashi says: And Rav鈥檚 ruling applies only in a case where one says: It is incumbent upon me to donate to the Temple treasury. But if he says: This animal is consecrated, he is not obligated to pay its assessment. This formulation clearly indicates that he intended to consecrate this animal, which he cannot do, as it does not yet belong to him.

诪转谞讬壮 谞讻专讬 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讗讜诪专 谞注专讱 讗讘诇 诇讗 诪注专讬讱 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讜诪专 诪注专讬讱 讗讘诇 诇讗 谞注专讱 讜讝讛 讜讝讛 诪讜讚讬诐 砖谞讜讚专讬谉 讜谞讬讚专讬谉

MISHNA: With regard to a gentile, Rabbi Meir says: He is valuated in a case where a Jew says: It is incumbent upon me to donate the fixed value of this gentile. But a gentile does not take a vow of valuation to donate his fixed value or the value of others. Rabbi Yehuda says: He takes a vow of valuation, but is not valuated. And both this tanna, Rabbi Meir, and that tanna, Rabbi Yehuda, agree that gentiles vow to donate the assessment of another and are the object of vows, whereby one donates the assessment of a gentile.

讙诪壮 转谞讜 专讘谞谉 讘谞讬 讬砖专讗诇 诪注专讬讻讬谉 讜讗讬谉 讛讙讜讬诐 诪注专讬讻讬谉

GEMARA: The Sages taught the following in a baraita that deals with the reasoning for the rulings of Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda. It is written in the beginning of the passage in the Torah delineating valuations: 鈥淪peak to the children of Israel鈥 (Leviticus 27:2). This teaches that 鈥渢he children of Israel鈥 can take a vow of valuation, but gentiles cannot take a vow of valuation.

讬讻讜诇 诇讗 讬讛讜 谞注专讻讬谉 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讗讬砖 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 诪讗讬专

One might have thought that this means that gentiles cannot be the object of a valuation either. Therefore, the verse states the inclusive expression: 鈥淲hen a man shall clearly utter a vow of persons to the Lord, according to your valuation鈥 (Leviticus 27:2), to teach that in this regard, every 鈥渕an,鈥 even a gentile, is included in halakhot of valuations. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir.

讗诪专 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讜讻讬 诪讗讞专 砖诪拽专讗 讗讞讚 诪专讘讛 讜诪拽专讗 讗讞讚 诪诪注讟 诪驻谞讬 诪讛 讗谞讬 讗讜诪专 谞注专讱 讜诇讗 诪注专讬讱

Rabbi Meir says in explanation of his opinion: Since one verse, 鈥渁 man,鈥 includes gentiles, and another verse, 鈥渢he children of Israel,鈥 excludes gentiles, for what reason do I say that a gentile can be the object of a valuation but cannot take a vow of valuation, rather than the reverse?

诪驻谞讬 砖专讬讘讛 讛讻转讜讘 讘谞注专讻讬谉 讬讜转专 诪讘诪注专讬讻讬谉 砖讛专讬 讞专砖 砖讜讟讛 讜拽讟谉 谞注专讱 讗讘诇 诇讗 诪注专讬讻讬谉

It is due to the fact that the verse included more people in the category of those who are the object of a valuation than in the category of those who take a vow of valuation. As the mishna teaches (2a): A deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor are the object of a vow and are valuated, but they can neither vow to donate the assessment of a person nor take a vow of valuation.

专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讜诪专 讘谞讬 讬砖专讗诇 谞注专讻讬谉 讜讗讬谉 讛讙讜讬诐 谞注专讻讬谉 讬讻讜诇 诇讗 讬讛讜 诪注专讬讻讬谉 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讗讬砖

Rabbi Yehuda says that the verses should be interpreted in the reverse manner: 鈥淭he children of Israel,鈥 can be the object of a valuation but gentiles cannot be the object of a valuation. One might have thought that gentiles cannot take a vow of valuation either. Therefore, the verse states the inclusive expression: 鈥淎 man鈥 (Leviticus 27:2), to teach that in this regard, every 鈥渕an,鈥 even a gentile, is included in the halakha of valuations.

讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讜讻讬 诪讗讞专 砖诪拽专讗 讗讞讚 诪专讘讛 讜诪拽专讗 讗讞讚 诪诪注讟 诪驻谞讬 诪讛 讗谞讬 讗讜诪专 谞讻专讬 诪注专讬讱 讜诇讗 谞注专讱 诪驻谞讬 砖专讬讘讛 讛讻转讜讘 讘诪注专讬讻讬谉 讬讜转专 诪讘谞注专讻讬谉 砖讛专讬 讟讜诪讟讜诐 讜讗谞讚专讜讙讬谞讜住 诪注专讬讻讬谉 讗讘诇 诇讗 谞注专讻讬谉

Rabbi Yehuda says: Since one verse, 鈥渁 man,鈥 includes gentiles, and another verse, 鈥渢he children of Israel,鈥 excludes gentiles, for what reason do I say that a gentile can take a vow of a valuation but cannot be the object of a valuation? It is due to the fact that the verse included more people in the category of those who take a vow of valuation than in the category of those who are the object of a valuation. As the mishna teaches (2a): A tumtum and a hermaphrodite vow, are the object of a vow, and take vows of valuation, but they are not valuated.

讗诪专 专讘讗 讛诇讻转讬讛 讚专讘讬 诪讗讬专 诪住转讘专讗 讟注诪讬讛 诇讗 诪住转讘专讗 讟注诪讗 讚专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 诪住转讘专讗 讛诇讻转讬讛 诇讗 诪住转讘专讗

Rava says: Rabbi Meir鈥檚 halakha is reasonable, but his explanation is not reasonable. Conversely, Rabbi Yehuda鈥檚 explanation is reasonable, but his halakha is not reasonable.

讛诇讻转讬讛 讚专讘讬 诪讗讬专 诪住转讘专讗 讚讻转讬讘 诇讗 诇讻诐 讜诇谞讜 诇讘谞讜转 讗转 讘讬转 讗诇讛讬谞讜 讟注诪讬讛 诇讗 诪住转讘专讗 讚拽讗 诪讬讬转讬 诇讬讛 诪讞专砖 砖讜讟讛 讜拽讟谉 砖讗谞讬 讞专砖 砖讜讟讛 讜拽讟谉 讚诇讗讜 讘谞讬 讚注讛 谞讬谞讛讜

Rava elaborates: Rabbi Meir鈥檚 halakha that gentiles cannot take a valuation vow is reasonable, as it is written that the Jews who returned to Eretz Yisrael from Babylonia rejected the Samaritans鈥 request to assist them in the construction of the Second Temple, saying: 鈥淵ou have nothing to do with us to build a house to our God鈥 (Ezra 4:3). This supports Rabbi Meir鈥檚 contention that gentiles may not take vows of valuation, which are used for Temple maintenance. But his explanation is not reasonable, as he adduces proof for his halakha from the fact that a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor cannot take a vow of valuation. This proof is unconvincing, since a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor are different, as unlike gentiles, they lack the presumed mental competence to make a commitment.

讟注诪讗 讚专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 诪住转讘专讗 讚拽讗 诪讬讬转讬 诇讬讛 诪讟讜诪讟讜诐 讜讗谞讚专讜讙讬谞讜住 讚讗祝 注诇 讙讘 讚讘谞讬 讚注讛 谞讬谞讛讜 诪注讟讬谞讛讜 专讞诪谞讗 讛诇讻转讬讛 诇讗 诪住转讘专讗 讚讻转讬讘 诇讗 诇讻诐 讜诇谞讜 诇讘谞讜转 讗转 讘讬转 讗诇讛讬谞讜

By contrast, Rabbi Yehuda鈥檚 explanation is reasonable, in that he adduces proof for his halakha from the case of a tumtum and a hermaphrodite, as even though they possess the presumed mental competence to make a commitment, nevertheless the Merciful One excludes them from being valuated. Since they are comparable to gentiles, they can serve as a precedent. But his halakha that gentiles can take a valuation vow is not reasonable, as it is written: 鈥淵ou have nothing to do with us to build a house to our God,鈥 which indicates that they may not contribute anything to Temple maintenance.

讜专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讛讗讬 诇讗 诇讻诐 讜诇谞讜 诪讗讬 注讘讬讚 诇讬讛 讗诪专 专讘 讞住讚讗 讗诪专 讗讘讬诪讬 讜注专讻讜 谞讙谞讝

The Gemara asks: And Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that gentiles can take valuation vows and that the funds go to Temple maintenance, what does he do with this verse: 鈥淵ou have nothing to do with us鈥? Rav 岣sda said that Avimi said: He derives from it that if a gentile takes a vow of valuation and he brings the money to the Temple, his valuation money is not utilized but rather is interred.

讗诇讗 诪注转讛 诇讗 讬诪注诇讜 讘讜 讚转谞谉 讞诪砖 讞讟讗讜转 讛诪转讜转 讜诪注讜转 讛讛讜诇讻讜转 诇讬诐 讛诪诇讞 诇讗 谞讛谞讬谉 讜诇讗 诪讜注诇讬谉

The Gemara asks: If that is so, that the valuation is not utilized for the Temple, one who uses it should not be considered to have violated the prohibition of misuse. One who unwittingly derived benefit from the valuation should not be obligated to bring a guilt offering for misuse of consecrated property, as the Temple treasury does not derive benefit from it. As we learned in a baraita: With regard to the five sin offerings that may not be sacrificed and are left to die, and similarly, with regard to consecrated money that is taken and cast into the Dead Sea, as it is not fit for any purpose, one may not derive benefit from them ab initio. But after the fact, if one derived benefit from them he is not liable for misuse, as the Temple treasury has no use for them.

讗诇诪讛 转谞讬讗 讙讘讬 拽讚砖讬 讙讜讬诐 讘诪讛 讚讘专讬诐 讗诪讜专讬诐 讘拽讚砖讬 诪讝讘讞 讗讘诇 讘拽讚砖讬 讘讚拽 讛讘讬转 诪讜注诇讬谉 讘讛谉

Why then is it taught in a baraita with regard to the consecrations of gentiles: In what case is this statement, that consecrations of gentiles are not subject to the halakhot of misuse, said? It is specifically with regard to consecrations for the altar. But with regard to consecrations for Temple maintenance, one who derives benefit from them is liable for misuse of consecrated property. Why is this the halakha, given the fact that the consecrations of a gentile are interred?

讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘讗 诪砖讜诐 专驻讬讜谉 讬讚讬诐 讛讜讗 讚讻转讬讘 讜讬讛讬 注诐 讛讗专抓 诪专驻讬谉 讬讚讬 注诐 讬讛讜讚讛 讜诪讘讛诇讬诐 讗讜转诐 诇讘谞讜转

Rather, Rava said that actually Rabbi Yehuda maintains that the valuation of a gentile is given to Temple maintenance and is not interred. And as for that which the Jews said to the gentiles in the time of the Second Temple: 鈥淵ou have nothing to do with us,鈥 that refusal was not for halakhic reasons. Rather, it was due to the gentiles鈥 attempt to foster weakening of the hands of those rebuilding the Temple. As it is written: 鈥淭hen the people of the land weakened the hands of the people of Judah, and harried them while they were building鈥 (Ezra 4:4).

  • This month's learning is sponsored by the Hadran Women of Silver Spring in memory of Nicki Toys, Nechama bat Shmuel Tzadok.

  • This month鈥檚 learning is sponsored by Shlomo and Amalia Klapper in honor of the birth of Chiyenna Yochana, named after her great-great-grandmother, Chiyenna Kossovsky.

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Elaine Hochberg in honor of her husband, Arie Hochberg, who continues to journey through Daf Yomi with her. 鈥淎nd with thanks to Rabbanit Farber and Hadran who have made our learning possible.鈥

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Arakhin 5

The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria

Arakhin 5

专讙诇讛 砖诇 讝讜 注讜诇讛 讬讻讜诇 转讛讗 讻讜诇讛 注讜诇讛 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讻诇 讗砖专 讬转谉 诪诪谞讜 诇讛壮 讬讛讬讛 拽讚砖 诪诪谞讜 拽讜讚砖 讜诇讗 讻讜诇讛 拽讜讚砖

The leg of this animal is a burnt offering, one might have thought that all of the animal will be a burnt offering. Therefore, the verse states: 鈥淎nd if it is an animal of those that they bring as an offering to the Lord, anything of it that one gives to the Lord, it shall be sacred鈥 (Leviticus 27:9). The verse indicates that the part of it that one gives will be sacred, but not all of the animal will be sacred.

讬讻讜诇 转爪讗 诇讞讜诇讬谉 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讬讛讬讛 讘讛讜讬讬转讛 转讛讗 讛讗 讻讬爪讚 转诪讻专 诇爪讜专讻讬 注讜诇讜转 讜讚诪讬讛 讞讜诇讬谉 讞讜抓 诪讚诪讬 讗讜转讜 讗讘专 砖讘讛 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 诪讗讬专

A non-sacred animal with a consecrated limb may not be sacrificed. Accordingly, one might have thought that the consecrated limb may be redeemed and thereby transferred to non-sacred status. Therefore the verse states: 鈥淪hall be,鈥 meaning: It shall be as it is, i.e., the limb remains consecrated. How is this possible, i.e., what should one do in this case? The animal should be sold for the needs of burnt offerings, i.e., to an individual who will sacrifice the entire animal as a burnt offering, and the payment received for the animal will be non-sacred, except for the payment received in exchange for that limb of it that was consecrated. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir.

专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讜专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讜专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讗讜诪专讬诐 诪谞讬谉 诇讗讜诪专 专讙诇讛 砖诇 讝讜 注讜诇讛 砖讻讜诇讛 注讜诇讛 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讻诇 讗砖专 讬转谉 诪诪谞讜 诇讛壮 讬讛讬讛 拽讚砖 诇专讘讜转 讗转 讻讜诇讛

Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Shimon say: From where is it derived that in the case of one who says: The leg of this animal is a burnt offering, all of the animal becomes a burnt offering? The verse states: 鈥淎ll that any man give of such to the Lord shall be holy鈥 (Leviticus 27:9). The term 鈥渟hall be鈥 serves to include all of the animal, indicating that it all becomes sacred.

讜讗驻讬诇讜 诇诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 讗讬谉 讻讜诇讛 注讜诇讛 讛谞讬 诪讬诇讬 讚讗拽讚讬砖 讚讘专 砖讗讬谉 讛谞砖诪讛 转诇讜讬讛 讘讜 讗讘诇 讚讘专 砖讛谞砖诪讛 转诇讜讬讛 讘讜 拽讚砖讛 讻讜诇讛

And even according to the one, Rabbi Meir, who says that if one states: The leg of this animal is a burnt offering, not all of the animal is a burnt offering, that statement applies only if one consecrated an item that its life does not depend on, e.g., its leg. But if he consecrated an item that its life depends on, such as its head, the entire animal is consecrated. This presents a difficulty for Rava, who holds that the baraita that discusses consecration of the head is referring to items consecrated in order to purchase offerings for the altar. Why, then, isn鈥檛 the entire animal consecrated?

讗诇讗 诇讗 拽砖讬讗 讛讗 讘拽讚讜砖转 讛讙讜祝 讛讗 讘拽讚讜砖转 讚诪讬诐

Rava responds: Rather, both baraitot are referring to items consecrated for the altar, and even so it is not difficult. This baraita, which indicates that if one consecrated the head the entire animal is consecrated, is referring to inherent sanctity, i.e., where he consecrated the head for the purpose of sacrificing it on the altar. That baraita, which teaches that if he consecrated the head it alone is consecrated, is referring to sanctity that inheres in its value, that is, where he consecrated the head for the sake of purchasing offerings.

讜讛讗 诪专 讛讜讗 讚讗诪专 诪拽讚讬砖 讝讻专 诇讚诪讬讜 拽讚讜砖 拽讚讜砖转 讛讙讜祝

Abaye responded: But wasn鈥檛 it you, Master, who said that if one consecrated a male animal for its value, it is sanctified with inherent sanctity and it is itself sacrificed? This undermines the distinction that Rava is attempting to draw between inherent sanctity and sanctity that inheres in value.

诇讗 拽砖讬讗 讛讗 讚讗拽讚讬砖 讻讜诇讛 讛讗 讚讗拽讚讬砖 讞讚 讗讘专

Rava responds: It is not difficult. This statement, that an animal that was consecrated for its value attains inherent sanctity, applies only in a case where he consecrated the entire animal. There, in the baraita discussing the consecration of the head, it is referring to a situation where he consecrated only one limb. In such a case, the animal does not attain inherent sanctity.

讞讚 讗讘专 谞诪讬 讗讬讘注讜讬讬 讗讬讘注讬讗 诇谉 讚讘注讬 专讘讛 讛拽讚讬砖 讗讘专 诇讚诪讬讜 诪讛讜

Abaye replied: Actually, we also raised a dilemma with regard to a case where one consecrated only one limb. As Rabba raised a dilemma: If one consecrated a limb for its value in order to bring an offering with the proceeds, what is the halakha as to whether or not the entire animal is consecrated? If your interpretation of the baraita is correct, Rabba can resolve his question based on the baraita and conclude definitively that the entire animal is not sanctified for the altar.

讻讬 讗讬讘注讬 诇谉 讘转诐 讛讻讗 讘讘注诇 诪讜诐 讚讜诪讬讗 讚讞诪讜专

Rava responded: We raised this dilemma and entertained the possibility that the entire animal might be sanctified to the altar only in a case where the animal is unblemished, and is therefore fit to be used as an offering. But here, the baraita is referring to a blemished animal, similar to the parallel case of the donkey, which is unfit to be sacrificed. Since the animal in question is unfit for the altar, it is clear that the entire animal is not sanctified.

讘注诇 诪讜诐 谞诪讬 讗讬讘注讜讬讬 讗讬讘注讬讗 诇谉 讚讘注讬 专讘讛 讚诪讬 专讗砖讬 诇讙讘讬 诪讝讘讞 诪讛讜 讻讬 讗讘注讬讗 诇谉 诪拽诪讬 讚讗砖诪注讛 诇讛讗 诪转谞讬转讗 讛砖转讗 讚砖诪注讛 讛讗 诪转谞讬转讗 诇讗 诪讬讘注讬讗 诇谉

Abaye responded: In fact, we also raised a dilemma with regard to a case where the animal is blemished and unfit to be sacrificed. As Rabba raised a dilemma: If one said: It is incumbent upon me to donate the value of my head to purchase offerings to be sacrificed on the altar, what is the halakha? Is he obligated in his entire value or not? A person is certainly not fit to be an offering, and yet Rabba does not resolve his question based on the baraita. Rava answered: We only raised this dilemma before hearing this baraita. Now that we have heard this baraita, we no longer raise this dilemma, as we concluded from the baraita that the entirety of the animal is not consecrated.

讙讜驻讗 讘注讬 专讘讛 讚诪讬 专讗砖讬 诇讙讘讬 诪讝讘讞 诪讛讜 谞讬讚讜谉 讘讻讘讜讚讜 讗讜 讗讬谞讜 谞讬讚讜谉 讘讻讘讜讚讜

搂 The Gemara returns to the aforementioned matter itself. Rabba raised a dilemma: If one said: It is incumbent upon me to donate the value of my head to purchase offerings to be sacrificed on the altar, what is the halakha? Is it assessed by the significance of the body part in question, and since he consecrated a vital organ he is obligated in his entire value? Or perhaps it is not assessed by the significance of the body part in question, and only the head is consecrated.

诇讗 讗砖讻讞谉 讘讚诪讬诐 讚讗讬谞讜 谞讬讚讜谉 讘讻讘讜讚讜 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 诇讗 讗砖讻讞谉 诇讙讘讬 诪讝讘讞 讚谞讬讚讜谉 讘讻讘讜讚讜 转讬拽讜

The Gemara explains the underlying issue: It can be argued that we have not found a case of assessments that is not assessed by the significance of the body part that was specified. Therefore, if one obligated himself in the value of a vital organ he should have to pay the entity鈥檚 entire value. Or perhaps he should be obligated only in the value of the head, as we have not found a case of an animal that is sacrificed on the altar that is assessed by the significance of the body part in question, i.e., that if one consecrates the value of one vital organ the entire animal is consecrated. The Gemara concludes: The dilemma shall stand [teiku] unresolved.

讘注讬 专讘讗 注专讻讬 注诇讬 诇讙讘讬 诪讝讘讞 诪讛讜 谞讬讚讜谉 讘讛砖讙 讬讚 讗讜 讗讬谉 谞讬讚讜谉 讘讛砖讙 讬讚

Rava raised a further dilemma: If one said: It is incumbent upon me to donate my valuation for the altar, rather than for Temple maintenance, as is usually the case, what is the halakha? Is this case determined based on affordability if he is poor, like regular valuations? Or perhaps it is not determined based on affordability, and he is obligated in the full valuation even if he is poor.

诇讗 讗砖讻讞谉 讘注专讻讬谉 讚讗讬谉 谞讬讚讜谉 讘讛砖讙 讬讚 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 诇讗 讗砖讻讞谉 诇讙讘讬 诪讝讘讞 讚诪讬驻专讬拽 讗诇讗 讘砖讜讬讜 转讬拽讜

The Gemara explains the sides of the dilemma: One can argue that we have not found a case of valuations that is not determined based on affordability. Therefore, the principle of affordability should apply even when one vows for the purpose of sacrificing offerings on the altar. Or perhaps this case should not be determined based on affordability, as we have not found an item that is consecrated for the purpose of sacrificing offerings on the altar that is redeemed in a manner other than according to its value. The Gemara again concludes: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.

讘注讬 专讘 讗砖讬 讛拽讚讬砖 砖讚讛 讗讞讜讝讛 诇讙讘讬 诪讝讘讞 诪讛讜 诪讬 讗诪专讬谞谉 诇讗 讗砖讻讞谉 砖讚讛 讗讞讜讝讛 讚诪讬驻专拽讗 讗诇讗 讘讬转 讝专注 讞讜诪专 砖注讜专讬诐 讘讞诪砖讬诐 砖拽诇 讻住祝 讗讜 讚诇诪讗 诇讗 讗砖讻讞谉 诇讙讘讬 诪讝讘讞 讚诪讬驻专讬拽 讗诇讗 讘砖讜讬讜 转讬拽讜

Rav Ashi raised a similar dilemma: If a person consecrated an ancestral field for the purpose of sacrificing offerings on the altar, rather than for Temple maintenance, as is usually the case, what is the halakha? Do we say that we have not found a case of an ancestral field that is redeemed other than by the standard rate established by the Torah, which is that an area fit for the sowing of a 岣mer, a kor, of barley seed is redeemed for fifty silver shekels? Or perhaps it should be redeemed according to its market value, as we have not found a case of an item that is consecrated for the purpose of sacrificing offerings on the altar that is redeemed in a manner other than according to its value. Once again, the Gemara states: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.

诪转谞讬壮 驻讞讜转 诪讘谉 讞讚砖 谞讬讚专 讗讘诇 诇讗 谞注专讱

MISHNA: A child less than one month old is the object of a vow if others vowed to donate his assessment, but is not valuated if one vowed to donate his fixed value, as the Torah did not establish a value for anyone less than a month old.

讙诪壮 转谞讜 专讘谞谉 讛诪注专讬讱 驻讞讜转 诪讘谉 讞讚砖 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讗讜诪专 谞讜转谉 讚诪讬讜 讜讞讻诪讬诐 讗讜诪专讬诐 诇讗 讗诪专 讻诇讜诐

GEMARA: The Sages taught in a baraita: With regard to a case of one who takes a vow of valuation concerning a child less than one month old, Rabbi Meir says: The person who valuated is obligated to give the child鈥檚 assessment. The Rabbis say: He has said nothing, i.e., he is not obligated to give anything.

讘诪讗讬 拽诪讬驻诇讙讬 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 住讘专 讗讬谉 讗讚诐 诪讜爪讬讗 讚讘专讬讜 诇讘讟诇讛 讬讜讚注 砖讗讬谉 注专讻讬谉 诇驻讞讜转 诪讘谉 讞讚砖 讜讙诪专 讜讗诪专 诇砖诐 讚诪讬诐 讜专讘谞谉 住讘专讬 讗讚诐 诪讜爪讬讗 讚讘专讬讜 诇讘讟诇讛

The Gemara asks: With regard to what principle do they disagree? Rabbi Meir holds: A person does not issue his statement of consecration for naught. The assumption is that a person knows that there are no valuations for a child less than one month old, and therefore he intended and said his statement for the sake of assessments, i.e., he meant to vow to give the child鈥檚 market value. And the Rabbis hold that a person does make his statement of consecration for naught. Therefore, his statement is taken at face value, and he is not obligated to give anything.

讻诪讗谉 讗讝诇讗 讛讗 讚讗诪专 专讘 讙讬讚诇 讗诪专 专讘 讛讗讜诪专 注专讱 讻诇讬 注诇讬 谞讜转谉 讚诪讬诐 讻专讘讬 诪讗讬专 驻砖讬讟讗 讚讻专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讗转讬讗

The Gemara asks: In accordance with whose opinion is that which Rav Giddel says that Rav says: One who says: It is incumbent upon me to donate the valuation of this utensil, is obligated to give its assessment? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who holds that a person does not issue a statement of consecration for naught. Since utensils are not subject to valuation, he presumably intended to obligate himself in its assessment. The Gemara asks: Isn鈥檛 it obvious that Rav鈥檚 statement is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir? Why was it necessary for the Gemara to state this?

诪讛讜 讚转讬诪讗 讗驻讬诇讜 讻专讘谞谉 讛转诐 讛讜讗 讚讟注讬 住讘专 讻讬 讛讬讻讬 讚讗讬讻讗 注专讻讬谉 诇讘谉 讞讜讚砖 讗讬讻讗 谞诪讬 诇驻讞讜转 诪讘谉 讞讜讚砖

The Gemara explains that it was necessary to state that Rav鈥檚 statement is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, lest you say that it is even in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who exempt one who valuates a child under a month old. The Gemara elaborates: One could say that it is only there, in the case of the child, that one errs and thinks that just as there are valuations for a child who is one month old, there are also valuations for a child less than one month old. Since his vow was based on an error, he is not obligated to pay anything.

讗讘诇 讛讻讗 讚诇讬讻讗 诇诪讬讟注讬 讜讚讗讬 讗讚诐 讬讜讚注 砖讗讬谉 注专讱 诇讻诇讬 讜讙诪专 讜讗诪专 诇砖诐 讚诪讬诐 拽诪砖诪注 诇谉

But here, in the case of one who valuates a utensil, where there is no possibility of erring, it can be argued that a person certainly knows that there is no valuation for a utensil, and he therefore intended and said his statement for the sake of assessments, i.e., he meant to vow to donate the utensil鈥檚 value. Therefore, the Gemara teaches us that Rav鈥檚 statement is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir only, and not with that of the Rabbis. The Rabbis hold that a person does issue a statement of consecration for naught even in such a case, and therefore his declaration is taken at face value.

讜诇专讘讬 诪讗讬专 诇诪讗讬 讗讬爪讟专讬讱

The Gemara asks: And as Rav stated his halakha in accordance with Rabbi Meir, who says that one who valuates a child less than a month old must pay his assessment, for what reason was it necessary for Rav to state his ruling? Isn鈥檛 this obvious?

诪讛讜 讚转讬诪讗 讟注诪讗 讚专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讛转诐 讚讙讝专 驻讞讜转 诪讘谉 讞讜讚砖 讗讟讜 讘谉 讞讜讚砖 讗讘诇 讛讻讗 讚诇讬讻讗 诇诪讬讙讝专 讗讬诪讗 诇讗 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 讟注诪讗 讚专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讚讗讬谉 讗讚诐 诪讜爪讬讗 讚讘专讬讜 诇讘讟诇讛 诇讗 砖谞讗 讛讻讗 讜诇讗 砖谞讗 讛讻讗

The Gemara answers: It was necessary for him to state this halakha, lest you say that the reason that Rabbi Meir obligates him to pay the assessment there, in the case of the child, is that he decrees one must pay if the child is less than a month old, due to concern that otherwise people might mistakenly refrain from paying the valuation of a child who is a month old. But here, in the case of one who valuates a utensil, where there is no cause for such an error and therefore no need to decree, one might say that Rabbi Meir would not obligate him to pay. Therefore, Rav teaches us that since the reason of Rabbi Meir is that a person does not make his statement of consecration for naught, there is no difference between here, the case of a child, and there, with regard to a utensil. Rather, the halakha is the same in both cases.

讻诪讗谉 讗讝诇讗 讛讗 讚讗诪专 专讘讛 讘专 讬讜住祝 讗诪专 专讘 讜讗诪专讬 诇讛 讗诪专 专讘 讬讬讘讗 讘专 讬讜住讬 讗诪专 专讘 讛诪拽讚讬砖 讘讛诪转 讞讘讬专讜 谞讜转谉 讚诪讬讛 讻诪讗谉 讻专讘讬 诪讗讬专

The Gemara asks: In accordance with whose opinion is that which Rabba bar Yosef says that Rav says, and some say that Rav Yeiva bar Yosei says that Rav says: One who consecrates the animal of another must give its assessment. In accordance with whom? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, that one does not issue a statement of consecration for naught. Since he knows that he cannot consecrate that which is not his, he meant to obligate himself in the animal鈥檚 assessment.

讛讗 讗诪专讛 专讘 讞讚讗 讝讬诪谞讗 讚讗诪专 专讘 讙讬讚诇 讗诪专 专讘 讛讗讜诪专 注专讱 讻诇讬 注诇讬 谞讜转谉 讚诪讬讜 诪讛讜 讚转讬诪讗 讛转诐 讛讜讗 讚讬讜讚注 砖讗讬谉 注专讱 诇讻诇讬 讜讙诪专 讜讗诪专 诇砖诐 讚诪讬诐

The Gemara asks: But didn鈥檛 Rav already say it once? As Rav Giddel says that Rav says: One who says: It is incumbent upon me to donate the valuation of a utensil, must give its assessment. The Gemara answers: Rav found it necessary to issue both statements, lest you say that this halakha applies only there, with regard to a utensil, as a person knows that a utensil has no valuation, i.e., that the term: Valuation, is not relevant to a utensil, and therefore it must be that he decided to donate money and says this expression as a reference to its monetary value, using the term: Valuation, imprecisely.

讗讘诇 讘讛诪讛 讚讘转 诪讬拽讚砖 讛讬讗 讗讬讻讗 诇诪讬诪专 讚讛讻讬 拽讗诪专 讗讬 讗诪讬谞讗 诇讛 诇诪专讛 诪讝讘讬谉 诇讛 谞讬讛诇讬 转讬拽讚讜砖 诇讛 诪讛砖转讗 讜讗拽专讘讛 讗讘诇 讚诪讬 诇讗 拽讗诪专 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉

But in the case where one obligated himself in the valuation of another鈥檚 animal, which is subject to consecration, albeit not by him, there is room to say that this is what he is saying to himself: Were I to say to the owner that I want to buy it, he would sell it to me. Therefore, let it be consecrated from now, and I will sacrifice it once I purchase it from him. His intent is to consecrate the animal itself in order to sacrifice it. But since he did not say to himself that he would give its assessment, his statement is meaningless, as one cannot consecrate property that does not belong to him. Therefore, Rav teaches us that this is not the case. Rather, his statement should be interpreted in such a manner that he is obligated to give the assessment of the animal to the Temple treasury.

讗诪专 专讘 讗砖讬 讜讛讜讗 讚讗诪专 注诇讬 讗讘诇 讗诪专 讛专讬 讝讜 诇讗

Rav Ashi says: And Rav鈥檚 ruling applies only in a case where one says: It is incumbent upon me to donate to the Temple treasury. But if he says: This animal is consecrated, he is not obligated to pay its assessment. This formulation clearly indicates that he intended to consecrate this animal, which he cannot do, as it does not yet belong to him.

诪转谞讬壮 谞讻专讬 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讗讜诪专 谞注专讱 讗讘诇 诇讗 诪注专讬讱 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讜诪专 诪注专讬讱 讗讘诇 诇讗 谞注专讱 讜讝讛 讜讝讛 诪讜讚讬诐 砖谞讜讚专讬谉 讜谞讬讚专讬谉

MISHNA: With regard to a gentile, Rabbi Meir says: He is valuated in a case where a Jew says: It is incumbent upon me to donate the fixed value of this gentile. But a gentile does not take a vow of valuation to donate his fixed value or the value of others. Rabbi Yehuda says: He takes a vow of valuation, but is not valuated. And both this tanna, Rabbi Meir, and that tanna, Rabbi Yehuda, agree that gentiles vow to donate the assessment of another and are the object of vows, whereby one donates the assessment of a gentile.

讙诪壮 转谞讜 专讘谞谉 讘谞讬 讬砖专讗诇 诪注专讬讻讬谉 讜讗讬谉 讛讙讜讬诐 诪注专讬讻讬谉

GEMARA: The Sages taught the following in a baraita that deals with the reasoning for the rulings of Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda. It is written in the beginning of the passage in the Torah delineating valuations: 鈥淪peak to the children of Israel鈥 (Leviticus 27:2). This teaches that 鈥渢he children of Israel鈥 can take a vow of valuation, but gentiles cannot take a vow of valuation.

讬讻讜诇 诇讗 讬讛讜 谞注专讻讬谉 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讗讬砖 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 诪讗讬专

One might have thought that this means that gentiles cannot be the object of a valuation either. Therefore, the verse states the inclusive expression: 鈥淲hen a man shall clearly utter a vow of persons to the Lord, according to your valuation鈥 (Leviticus 27:2), to teach that in this regard, every 鈥渕an,鈥 even a gentile, is included in halakhot of valuations. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir.

讗诪专 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讜讻讬 诪讗讞专 砖诪拽专讗 讗讞讚 诪专讘讛 讜诪拽专讗 讗讞讚 诪诪注讟 诪驻谞讬 诪讛 讗谞讬 讗讜诪专 谞注专讱 讜诇讗 诪注专讬讱

Rabbi Meir says in explanation of his opinion: Since one verse, 鈥渁 man,鈥 includes gentiles, and another verse, 鈥渢he children of Israel,鈥 excludes gentiles, for what reason do I say that a gentile can be the object of a valuation but cannot take a vow of valuation, rather than the reverse?

诪驻谞讬 砖专讬讘讛 讛讻转讜讘 讘谞注专讻讬谉 讬讜转专 诪讘诪注专讬讻讬谉 砖讛专讬 讞专砖 砖讜讟讛 讜拽讟谉 谞注专讱 讗讘诇 诇讗 诪注专讬讻讬谉

It is due to the fact that the verse included more people in the category of those who are the object of a valuation than in the category of those who take a vow of valuation. As the mishna teaches (2a): A deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor are the object of a vow and are valuated, but they can neither vow to donate the assessment of a person nor take a vow of valuation.

专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讜诪专 讘谞讬 讬砖专讗诇 谞注专讻讬谉 讜讗讬谉 讛讙讜讬诐 谞注专讻讬谉 讬讻讜诇 诇讗 讬讛讜 诪注专讬讻讬谉 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讗讬砖

Rabbi Yehuda says that the verses should be interpreted in the reverse manner: 鈥淭he children of Israel,鈥 can be the object of a valuation but gentiles cannot be the object of a valuation. One might have thought that gentiles cannot take a vow of valuation either. Therefore, the verse states the inclusive expression: 鈥淎 man鈥 (Leviticus 27:2), to teach that in this regard, every 鈥渕an,鈥 even a gentile, is included in the halakha of valuations.

讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讜讻讬 诪讗讞专 砖诪拽专讗 讗讞讚 诪专讘讛 讜诪拽专讗 讗讞讚 诪诪注讟 诪驻谞讬 诪讛 讗谞讬 讗讜诪专 谞讻专讬 诪注专讬讱 讜诇讗 谞注专讱 诪驻谞讬 砖专讬讘讛 讛讻转讜讘 讘诪注专讬讻讬谉 讬讜转专 诪讘谞注专讻讬谉 砖讛专讬 讟讜诪讟讜诐 讜讗谞讚专讜讙讬谞讜住 诪注专讬讻讬谉 讗讘诇 诇讗 谞注专讻讬谉

Rabbi Yehuda says: Since one verse, 鈥渁 man,鈥 includes gentiles, and another verse, 鈥渢he children of Israel,鈥 excludes gentiles, for what reason do I say that a gentile can take a vow of a valuation but cannot be the object of a valuation? It is due to the fact that the verse included more people in the category of those who take a vow of valuation than in the category of those who are the object of a valuation. As the mishna teaches (2a): A tumtum and a hermaphrodite vow, are the object of a vow, and take vows of valuation, but they are not valuated.

讗诪专 专讘讗 讛诇讻转讬讛 讚专讘讬 诪讗讬专 诪住转讘专讗 讟注诪讬讛 诇讗 诪住转讘专讗 讟注诪讗 讚专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 诪住转讘专讗 讛诇讻转讬讛 诇讗 诪住转讘专讗

Rava says: Rabbi Meir鈥檚 halakha is reasonable, but his explanation is not reasonable. Conversely, Rabbi Yehuda鈥檚 explanation is reasonable, but his halakha is not reasonable.

讛诇讻转讬讛 讚专讘讬 诪讗讬专 诪住转讘专讗 讚讻转讬讘 诇讗 诇讻诐 讜诇谞讜 诇讘谞讜转 讗转 讘讬转 讗诇讛讬谞讜 讟注诪讬讛 诇讗 诪住转讘专讗 讚拽讗 诪讬讬转讬 诇讬讛 诪讞专砖 砖讜讟讛 讜拽讟谉 砖讗谞讬 讞专砖 砖讜讟讛 讜拽讟谉 讚诇讗讜 讘谞讬 讚注讛 谞讬谞讛讜

Rava elaborates: Rabbi Meir鈥檚 halakha that gentiles cannot take a valuation vow is reasonable, as it is written that the Jews who returned to Eretz Yisrael from Babylonia rejected the Samaritans鈥 request to assist them in the construction of the Second Temple, saying: 鈥淵ou have nothing to do with us to build a house to our God鈥 (Ezra 4:3). This supports Rabbi Meir鈥檚 contention that gentiles may not take vows of valuation, which are used for Temple maintenance. But his explanation is not reasonable, as he adduces proof for his halakha from the fact that a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor cannot take a vow of valuation. This proof is unconvincing, since a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor are different, as unlike gentiles, they lack the presumed mental competence to make a commitment.

讟注诪讗 讚专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 诪住转讘专讗 讚拽讗 诪讬讬转讬 诇讬讛 诪讟讜诪讟讜诐 讜讗谞讚专讜讙讬谞讜住 讚讗祝 注诇 讙讘 讚讘谞讬 讚注讛 谞讬谞讛讜 诪注讟讬谞讛讜 专讞诪谞讗 讛诇讻转讬讛 诇讗 诪住转讘专讗 讚讻转讬讘 诇讗 诇讻诐 讜诇谞讜 诇讘谞讜转 讗转 讘讬转 讗诇讛讬谞讜

By contrast, Rabbi Yehuda鈥檚 explanation is reasonable, in that he adduces proof for his halakha from the case of a tumtum and a hermaphrodite, as even though they possess the presumed mental competence to make a commitment, nevertheless the Merciful One excludes them from being valuated. Since they are comparable to gentiles, they can serve as a precedent. But his halakha that gentiles can take a valuation vow is not reasonable, as it is written: 鈥淵ou have nothing to do with us to build a house to our God,鈥 which indicates that they may not contribute anything to Temple maintenance.

讜专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讛讗讬 诇讗 诇讻诐 讜诇谞讜 诪讗讬 注讘讬讚 诇讬讛 讗诪专 专讘 讞住讚讗 讗诪专 讗讘讬诪讬 讜注专讻讜 谞讙谞讝

The Gemara asks: And Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that gentiles can take valuation vows and that the funds go to Temple maintenance, what does he do with this verse: 鈥淵ou have nothing to do with us鈥? Rav 岣sda said that Avimi said: He derives from it that if a gentile takes a vow of valuation and he brings the money to the Temple, his valuation money is not utilized but rather is interred.

讗诇讗 诪注转讛 诇讗 讬诪注诇讜 讘讜 讚转谞谉 讞诪砖 讞讟讗讜转 讛诪转讜转 讜诪注讜转 讛讛讜诇讻讜转 诇讬诐 讛诪诇讞 诇讗 谞讛谞讬谉 讜诇讗 诪讜注诇讬谉

The Gemara asks: If that is so, that the valuation is not utilized for the Temple, one who uses it should not be considered to have violated the prohibition of misuse. One who unwittingly derived benefit from the valuation should not be obligated to bring a guilt offering for misuse of consecrated property, as the Temple treasury does not derive benefit from it. As we learned in a baraita: With regard to the five sin offerings that may not be sacrificed and are left to die, and similarly, with regard to consecrated money that is taken and cast into the Dead Sea, as it is not fit for any purpose, one may not derive benefit from them ab initio. But after the fact, if one derived benefit from them he is not liable for misuse, as the Temple treasury has no use for them.

讗诇诪讛 转谞讬讗 讙讘讬 拽讚砖讬 讙讜讬诐 讘诪讛 讚讘专讬诐 讗诪讜专讬诐 讘拽讚砖讬 诪讝讘讞 讗讘诇 讘拽讚砖讬 讘讚拽 讛讘讬转 诪讜注诇讬谉 讘讛谉

Why then is it taught in a baraita with regard to the consecrations of gentiles: In what case is this statement, that consecrations of gentiles are not subject to the halakhot of misuse, said? It is specifically with regard to consecrations for the altar. But with regard to consecrations for Temple maintenance, one who derives benefit from them is liable for misuse of consecrated property. Why is this the halakha, given the fact that the consecrations of a gentile are interred?

讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘讗 诪砖讜诐 专驻讬讜谉 讬讚讬诐 讛讜讗 讚讻转讬讘 讜讬讛讬 注诐 讛讗专抓 诪专驻讬谉 讬讚讬 注诐 讬讛讜讚讛 讜诪讘讛诇讬诐 讗讜转诐 诇讘谞讜转

Rather, Rava said that actually Rabbi Yehuda maintains that the valuation of a gentile is given to Temple maintenance and is not interred. And as for that which the Jews said to the gentiles in the time of the Second Temple: 鈥淵ou have nothing to do with us,鈥 that refusal was not for halakhic reasons. Rather, it was due to the gentiles鈥 attempt to foster weakening of the hands of those rebuilding the Temple. As it is written: 鈥淭hen the people of the land weakened the hands of the people of Judah, and harried them while they were building鈥 (Ezra 4:4).

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