Avodah Zarah 37

הואיל וראוי לביאה מטמא נמי בזיבה אמר רבינא הלכך הא תינוקת גויה בת שלש שנים ויום אחד הואיל וראויה לביאה מטמאה נמי בזיבה

The Gemara explains the reason for this opinion: Since a nine-year-old boy is fit to engage in intercourse, he also imparts ritual impurity as one who experienced ziva. Ravina said: Therefore, with regard to a female gentile child who is three years and one day old, since she is fit to engage in intercourse at that age, she also imparts impurity as one who experienced ziva.

פשיטא מהו דתימא האי ידע לארגולי והא לא ידעה לארגולי קא משמע לן

The Gemara asks: Isn’t that obvious? The Gemara explains: It was necessary to state this ruling, lest you say that the halakha that a gentile who is suited for intercourse imparts impurity does not apply to a female. The possible difference between a male and female child is based on the fact that whereas that child, a nine-year-old male gentile, knows how to accustom others to sin by employing persuasion, this child, a three-year-old female gentile, does not know how to accustom others to sin until she matures. Therefore, Ravina teaches us that the halakha nevertheless applies to both male and female children.

מיסתמיך ואזיל רבי יהודה נשיאה אכתפיה דרבי שמלאי שמעיה אמר לו שמלאי לא היית אמש בבית המדרש כשהתרנו את השמן אמר לו בימינו תתיר אף את הפת אמר לו אם כן קרו לן בית דינא שריא דתנן העיד רבי יוסי בן יועזר איש צרידה על אייל קמצא דכן ועל משקה בית מטבחיא דכן ועל דיקרב למיתא מסאב וקרו ליה יוסף שריא

The Gemara relates a relevant incident: Rabbi Yehuda Nesia was traveling while leaning upon the shoulder of Rabbi Simlai, his attendant. Rabbi Yehuda Nesia said to him: Simlai, you were not in the study hall last night when we permitted the oil of gentiles. Rabbi Simlai said to him: In our days, you will permit bread of gentiles as well. Rabbi Yehuda Nesia said to him: If so, people will call us a permissive court. As we learned in a mishna (Eduyyot 8:4): Rabbi Yosei ben Yo’ezer of Tzereida testified with regard to the eil kamtza, a type of locust, that it is kosher, and with regard to the liquids of the slaughterhouse in the Temple that they are ritually pure, and with regard to one who touches a corpse that he is impure, as soon explained by the Gemara. And as a result, they called him: Yosef the Permissive.

אמר ליה התם שרא תלת ומר שרא חדא ואי שרי מר חדא אחריתי אכתי תרתין הוא דהויין אמר ליה אנא שראי אחריתי מאי היא

Rabbi Simlai said to him: There, Yosei ben Yo’ezer permitted three matters, but the Master has permitted only one, and even if the Master permits one other matter, these will still constitute only two permissive rulings. Rabbi Yehuda Nesia said to him: I have already permitted another matter. The Gemara asks: What is the other matter that he permitted?

דתנן זה גיטך אם לא באתי מכאן עד שנים עשר חודש ומת בתוך שנים עשר חודש אינו גט ותני עלה ורבותינו התירוה לינשא ואמרינן מאן רבותינו אמר רב יהודה אמר שמואל בית דינא דשרו משחא

The Gemara explains that this is as we learned in a mishna (Gittin 76b) that if one says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce if I do not arrive from now until twelve months’ time, and he died within twelve months, then it is not a valid bill of divorce because it would not take effect until after the husband’s death. And it is taught with regard to that mishna that our Rabbis nevertheless permitted her to marry. The Gemara continues: And we say: Who is the mishna referring to when it mentions our Rabbis? Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: This is referring to the court that permitted the oil of gentiles.

סברי לה כרבי יוסי דאמר זמנו של שטר מוכיח עליו ואמר רבי אבא בריה דרבי חייא בר אבא רבי יהודה הנשיא הורה ולא הודו לו כל שעתו ואמרי לה כל סייעתו

Tangentially, the Gemara examines the reason for the ruling of Rabbi Yehuda Nesia’s court concerning a bill of divorce. They hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, who says: The date written in a document proves when it takes effect. In other words, the bill of divorce takes effect at the time written on it. Therefore, the divorce actually goes into effect before the husband’s death, because it is retroactively initiated on the day that the bill was issued. The Gemara adds: And Rabbi Abba, son of Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba, says: In an earlier period, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi also ruled that the bill of divorce should be valid, but the other Sages did not concede to his opinion during his entire lifetime [sha’ato]. And some say that all of his colleagues [si’ato] did not concede to his opinion.

אמר ליה רבי (אליעזר) [אלעזר] לההוא סבא כי שריתוה לאלתר שריתוה דלא אתי או דלמא לאחר שנים עשר חודש דהא איקיים ליה תנאיה

Rabbi Elazar said to a certain elderly man, who was a member of Rabbi Yehuda Nesia’s court: When you permitted this woman to remarry, did you permit her immediately after the husband died, as he certainly will not arrive within the twelve months, or perhaps you permitted her only after twelve months, because only then was the condition fulfilled?

ותיבעי לך אמתניתין דתנן הרי זה גיטך מעכשיו אם לא באתי מכאן עד שנים עשר חודש ומת בתוך שנים עשר חודש הוי גט דהא איקיים ליה תנאי

That elderly man said to Rabbi Elazar: And let the dilemma be raised with regard to the mishna itself, as we learned in the next line of the mishna in Gittin: If one says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce from now if I do not arrive from now until twelve months have elapsed, and he died within twelve months, this is a valid bill of divorce. The reason is that its condition was fulfilled, as the husband stated explicitly that the bill takes effect immediately.

ותיבעי לך לאלתר הוי גיטא דהא לא אתא או דלמא לאחר שנים עשר חודש דהא איקיים ליה תנאיה אין הכי נמי אלא משום דהוית בההוא מניינא

He explains: And let the dilemma be raised with regard to this case: Is the bill of divorce valid immediately upon the husband’s death because he will certainly not arrive? Or perhaps the bill of divorce is valid only after twelve months have elapsed, because only then is his condition fulfilled? Rabbi Elazar answered: Yes, it is indeed so; this question can be asked with regard to the case of the mishna itself. The Gemara adds: But Rabbi Elazar asked that elder about the decision of Rabbi Yehuda Nesia’s court because he was present at that assembly, and therefore he could report on what had actually occurred.

אמר אביי הכל מודים לכשתצא חמה מנרתיקה לכי נפקא קאמר לה וכי מיית בליליא גט לאחר מיתה הוא

Abaye says: All concede that one who says that a bill of divorce will take effect once the sun emerges from its sheath is saying to his wife that it will be valid once the sun comes out in the morning. And therefore, if the husband dies during the night, before sunrise, it is a posthumous bill of divorce, which is invalid.

על מנת שתצא חמה מנרתיקה מעכשיו קאמר לה וכי מיית בליליא הא ודאי תנאה הוי וגט מחיים הוא כדרב הונא דאמר רב הונא כל האומר על מנת כאומר מעכשיו דמי

Furthermore, if he said to her: On the condition that the sun will come out of its sheath, then he is saying to his wife that the bill of divorce will take effect retroactively from now, on the condition that the sun emerges. And accordingly, if he dies during the night, this is certainly a fulfilled condition, and it is a bill of divorce which takes effect retroactively, while he is alive; in accordance with the statement of Rav Huna. As Rav Huna says: With regard to anyone who states a provision employing the language: On the condition, it is tantamount to his stating in the provision that the document takes effect retroactively from now.

לא נחלקו אלא באם תצא רבי יהודה הנשיא סבר לה כרבי יוסי דאמר זמנו של שטר מוכיח עליו והוה ליה כמהיום אם מתי כמעכשיו אם מתי ורבנן לית להו דרבי יוסי והוה ליה כזה גיטך אם מתי גרידא

They disagreed only in the case of one who said to his wife: This will be your bill of divorce if the sun emerges from its sheath, and the husband died during the night. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, who says that the date written in a document proves when it takes effect, and it is therefore considered as though the husband said: From today if I die, or as though he said: From now if I die. And the Sages do not accept the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, and consequently they maintain that it is considered as though the husband said only: This is your bill of divorce if I die, in which case the bill of divorce is not valid, as it would take effect only after the husband’s death.

גופא העיד יוסי בן יועזר איש צרידה על אייל קמצא דכן ועל משקה בי מטבחיא דכן ועל דיקרב למיתא מסאב וקרו ליה יוסף שריא מאי אייל קמצא רב פפא אמר שושיבא ורב חייא בר אמי משמיה דעולא אמר סוסביל

§ The Gemara returns to the matter itself: Yosei ben Yo’ezer of Tzereida testified with regard to the eil kamtza that it is kosher, and with regard to the liquids of the slaughterhouse in the Temple that they are ritually pure, and with regard to one who touches a corpse that he is impure. And as a result, they called him: Yosef the Permissive. The Gemara asks: What is the eil kamtza? Rav Pappa says: It is a long-headed locust called shoshiva, and Rav Ḥiyya bar Ami says in the name of Ulla: It is a locust called susbil.

רב פפא אמר שושיבא וקמיפלגי בראשו ארוך מר סבר ראשו ארוך אסור ומר סבר ראשו ארוך מותר רב חייא בר אמי משמיה דעולא אמר

The Gemara explains: Rav Pappa says it is a shoshiva, and accordingly Yosei ben Yo’ezer and the other Rabbis disagree with regard to a long-headed locust: One Sage, the Rabbis, holds that a long-headed locust is prohibited, and one Sage, Yosei ben Yo’ezer, holds that a long-headed locust is permitted. Rav Ḥiyya bar Ami says in the name of Ulla that

סוסביל בראשו ארוך כולי עלמא לא פליגי דאסור והכא בכנפיו חופין את רובו על ידי הדחק קמיפלגי מר סבר רובא כל דהו בעינן ומר סבר רובא דמנכר בעינן

it is a susbil, and accordingly, with regard to a long-headed locust, everyone agrees that it is prohibited. And here they disagree with regard to a locust whose wings barely cover most of its body: One Sage, Yosei ben Yo’ezer, holds that we require only a minimal majority of the locust’s body to be covered by its wings, and one Sage, the Rabbis, holds that we require a noticeable majority of the body to be covered.

ועל משקה בי מטבחיא דכן מאי דכן רב אמר דכן ממש ושמואל אמר דכן מלטמא אחרים אבל טומאת עצמן יש בהן

§ It was stated above: And Yosei ben Yo’ezer testified with regard to the liquids of the slaughterhouse in the Temple that they are ritually pure. The Gemara asks: What did Yosei ben Yo’ezer mean when he said they are pure? Rav says: He meant that they are actually ritually pure. And Shmuel says: They are pure in the sense that they do not impart ritual impurity to other substances; but they themselves can contract impurity.

רב אמר דכן ממש קסבר טומאת משקין דרבנן וכי גזור רבנן טומאה במשקין דעלמא אבל במשקה בי מטבחיא לא גזרו רבנן

The Gemara explains the reasons for these opinions. Rav says that these liquids are actually pure, as he maintains that the ritual impurity of liquids applies by rabbinic law, and when the Sages decreed impurity upon liquids, they did so only with regard to ordinary liquids. But the Sages did not issue their decree with regard to the liquids of the slaughterhouse in the Temple.

ושמואל אמר דכן מלטמא אחרים אבל טומאת עצמן יש בהן קסבר טומאת משקין דאורייתא לטמא אחרים דרבנן וכי גזרו רבנן במשקין דעלמא במשקין בי מטבחיא לא גזרו

And Shmuel says: The liquids are ritually pure in the sense that they do not impart impurity to other substances; but they themselves can contract impurity, as Shmuel maintains that the ritual impurity of liquids themselves is by Torah law, whereas their capacity to impart impurity to other substances is by rabbinic law. And when the Sages issued this decree, they did so only with regard to ordinary liquids. But they did not issue their decree with regard to the liquids of the slaughterhouse in the Temple.

ועל דיקרב למיתא מסאב וקרו ליה יוסף שריא יוסף אסרא מיבעי ליה ועוד דאורייתא היא דכתיב וכל אשר יגע על פני השדה בחלל חרב או במת וגו׳

§ It was stated: And Yosei ben Yo’ezer testified with regard to one who touches a corpse that he is impure, and as a result they called him: Yosef the Permissive. The Gemara questions this: Since he issued a stringent ruling, they should have called him: Yosef the Prohibiting. And furthermore, this halakha is explicitly written in the Torah, as it is written: “And whosoever in the open field touches one that is slain with a sword, or one that is dead, or a bone of a man, or a grave, shall be impure seven days” (Numbers 19:16).

דאורייתא דיקרב טמא דיקרב בדיקרב טהור ואתו אינהו וגזור אפילו דיקרב בדיקרב ואתא איהו ואוקמה אדאורייתא

The Gemara explains: By Torah law one who touches a corpse is ritually impure, but one who touches another who has touched a corpse is pure. And the Sages came and decreed that even one who touches another who has touched a corpse is also impure. And Yosei ben Yo’ezer came and established the halakha in accordance with the original, more lenient Torah law.

דיקרב בדיקרב נמי דאורייתא הוא דכתיב וכל אשר יגע בו הטמא יטמא

The Gemara raises a difficulty: One who touches another who has touched a corpse is also rendered impure by Torah law, as it is written: “And whatsoever the impure person touches shall be impure” (Numbers 19:22).

אמרוה רבנן קמיה דרבא משמיה דמר זוטרא בריה דרב נחמן דאמר משמיה דרב נחמן דאורייתא דיקרב בדיקרב בחיבורין טומאת שבעה שלא בחיבורין טומאת ערב ואתו אינהו וגזור אפילו שלא בחיבורין טומאת שבעה ואתא איהו ואוקמה אדאורייתא

The Sages stated this difficulty before Rava in the name of Mar Zutra, the son of Rav Naḥman, who said a response in the name of Rav Naḥman: By Torah law, one who touches another who touches a corpse while the second individual is in concurrent contact with the corpse is impure with seven-day impurity. If this occurs while the second individual is not in concurrent contact with the corpse, he contracts impurity until the evening. And the Sages came and decreed that even where there is no concurrent contact, one still contracts seven-day impurity when he touches someone who touched a corpse. And subsequently Yosei ben Yo’ezer came and established the halakha in accordance with the original Torah law.

דאורייתא מאי היא דכתיב הנגע במת לכל נפש אדם וטמא שבעת ימים וכתיב וכל אשר יגע בו הטמא יטמא וכתיב והנפש הנגעת תטמא עד הערב הא כיצד

The Gemara asks: What is the source of this halakha, prescribed by Torah law? As it is written: “He that touches the dead, even any man’s dead body, shall be impure seven days” (Numbers 19:11), and it is written: “And whatsoever the impure person touches shall be impure” (Numbers 19:22). These two verses indicate that one contracts ritual impurity for seven days. And yet it is also written: “And the soul that touches him shall be impure until evening” (Numbers 19:22). How can these texts be reconciled?

כאן בחיבורין כאן שלא בחיבורין

The Gemara answers: Here, in the first two verses, the Torah is discussing concurrent contact, which results in impurity of seven days; there, in the last verse, it is discussing a case where there is no concurrent contact, and therefore the individual in question is impure only until the evening.

אמר להו רבא לאו אמינא לכו לא תתלו ביה בוקי סריקי ברב נחמן הכי אמר רב נחמן ספק טומאה ברשות הרבים התיר להן

Rava said to the Sages who suggested that explanation citing Rav Naḥman: Didn’t I tell you not to hang empty pitchers [bukei] upon Rav Naḥman, i.e., not to attribute incorrect statements to him? Rather, this is what Rav Naḥman said: Yosei ben Yo’ezer permitted for them a case of uncertain impurity contracted in a public domain. In other words, Yosei ben Yo’ezer ruled leniently that one who is unsure whether or not he came in contact with a corpse in the public domain is ritually pure.

והא הלכתא מסוטה גמרינן לה מה סוטה רשות היחיד אף טומאה רשות היחיד

The Gemara raises a difficulty: But didn’t we learn this halakha from the case of a woman suspected by her husband of having been unfaithful [sota]: Just as a sota can be made to drink the bitter waters only when she is suspected of engaging in adultery in a private domain, so too, uncertain ritual impurity is considered impure only when one suspects that he came into contact with it in a private domain? This shows that even by Torah law one who is unsure whether or not he touched a corpse in the public domain remains pure.

הא אמר רבי יוחנן הלכה ואין מורין כן ואתא איהו ואורי ליה אורויי

Rabbi Yoḥanan said in explanation: This is the halakha, but a public ruling is not issued to that effect. Consequently, the masses treated this matter with stringency. And Yosei ben Yo’ezer came and instructed the masses to follow the original instruction of the Torah. Therefore, his ruling was in fact a leniency.

תניא נמי הכי רבי יהודה אומר קורות נעץ להם ואמר עד כאן רשות הרבים עד כאן רשות היחיד כי אתו לקמיה דרבי ינאי אמר להו הא מיא בשיקעתא דבנהרא זילו טבולו

The Gemara provides support for Rabbi Yoḥanan’s explanation. This is also taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yehuda says that Yosei ben Yo’ezer drove stakes into the ground for the people and said: Until here is the public domain, and until there is the private domain, so that they would know the halakha if they suspected that they had touched a corpse. The Gemara relates that when people came before Rabbi Yannai because they suspected that they might have come into contact with a source of impurity in the public domain, he said to them: Why involve yourselves in matters of uncertainty? There is deep water in the river; go immerse yourselves in it, and resolve the problem in this manner.

והשלקות מנהני מילי אמר רבי חייא בר אבא אמר רבי יוחנן אמר קרא אכל בכסף תשברני ואכלתי ומים בכסף תתן לי ושתיתי כמים מה מים שלא נשתנו אף אוכל שלא נשתנה

§ The mishna teaches: And boiled vegetables prepared by gentiles are prohibited. The Gemara asks: From where is this matter derived? Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The verse states that when Moses asked Sihon, King of the Amorites, for passage through his land, he said: “You shall sell me food for money, that I may eat; and give me water for money, that I may drink” (Deuteronomy 2:28). By juxtaposing food and water, the verse teaches that food is like water: Just as Moses wished to purchase water that was unchanged, so too, he wished to purchase food that was unchanged, i.e., uncooked. Evidently, this is because foods cooked by gentiles are prohibited.

אלא מעתה חטין ועשאן קליות הכי נמי דאסורין וכי תימא הכי נמי והתניא חיטין ועשאן קליות מותרין אלא כמים מה מים שלא נשתנו מברייתן אף אוכל שלא נשתנה מברייתו

The Gemara raises a difficulty: If that is so, then in a case where a gentile had wheat and made it into roasted grains by roasting it in the oven, the wheat should also be prohibited, as it was cooked. And if you would say: Indeed that is so, this cannot be the halakha, as isn’t it taught in baraita: If a gentile had wheat and made it into roasted grains, it is permitted? The Gemara suggests a different explanation: Rather, food is like water in the following manner: Just as Moses wished to purchase water that was not altered from its original state, so too, he wished to purchase food that was not altered from its original state. Roasting wheat kernels does not alter their original state.

אלא מעתה חיטין וטחנן הכי נמי דאסורין וכי תימא הכי נמי והתניא חיטין ועשאן קליות הקמחים והסלתות שלהן מותרין אלא כמים מה מים שלא נשתנו מברייתן על ידי האור אף אוכל שלא נשתנה מברייתו על ידי האור

The Gemara raises another difficulty: If that is so, then if a gentile had wheat and ground it into flour, the flour should also be prohibited, as the wheat has been altered from its original state. And if you would say: Indeed that is so, this cannot be the case, as isn’t it taught in baraita: If a gentile had wheat and made it into roasted grains, it is permitted; similarly, flours and fine flours belonging to gentiles are permitted? Rather, food is like water in the following manner: Just as Moses wished to purchase water that was not altered from its original state by fire, so too, he wished to purchase food that was not altered from its original state by fire. Although wheat ground into flour is altered from its original state, this change is not accomplished by means of fire.

מידי אור כתיב

The Gemara raises a difficulty: Is fire written in the verse? There is no mention of fire in the verse at all. How can it be assumed that this is the similarity between water and food?