Avodah Zarah 64

אבל עוקרין עמו כדי למעוטי את התיפלה

but one may uproot diverse kinds with him, in order to reduce impropriety.

סברוה הא מני רבי עקיבא היא דאמר המקיים בכלאים לוקה דתניא המנכש והמחפה בכלאים לוקה רבי עקיבא אומר אף המקיים

The Sages initially assumed that in accordance with whose opinion is this baraita? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who says that not only one who sows or grows diverse kinds, but even one who maintains diverse kinds, is flogged. As it is taught in a baraita: One who removes the weeds interfering with the growth of the plants or who covers up the seeds of diverse kinds with earth is flogged. Rabbi Akiva says: Even one who maintains them instead of actively uprooting them is flogged.

מאי טעמא דרבי עקיבא אמר קרא שדך לא תזרע כלאים אין לי אלא זורע מקיים מנין תלמוד לומר לא כלאים

The Gemara asks: What is the reasoning of Rabbi Akiva? The Gemara answers: The verse states: “You shall not sow your field with diverse kinds of seed” (Leviticus 19:19). I have derived only the case of one who sows. From where is it derived that one who maintains diverse kinds also receives lashes? The verse states: “Not…diverse kinds of seed,” indicating that there should not be diverse kinds in one’s field.

ואילו למעוטי תיפלה שרי

The Gemara concludes its support for the opinion of Rav Naḥman: It is prohibited to maintain diverse kinds, but nevertheless, if one wishes to maintain diverse kinds temporarily in order to be paid for uprooting them, thereby reducing impropriety, it is permitted. Similarly, it is permitted for one to receive payment for breaking barrels of wine used for a libation.

לא הא מני רבנן היא

The Gemara rejects this explanation: No, in accordance with whose opinion is this baraita, which deems it permitted for one to uproot diverse kinds with a gentile? It is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who permit one to maintain diverse kinds, but prohibit one from maintaining wine used for a libation, so there is no proof from this baraita in support of Rav Naḥman’s opinion.

אי רבנן מאי איריא עוקרין אפילו קיומי נמי שפיר דמי הכא במאי עסקינן כגון דקא עביד בחנם ורבי יהודה היא דאמר ליתן להם מתנת חנם אסור

The Gemara asks: If the baraita is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, why does the tanna specifically permit uprooting with a gentile? Even maintaining the diverse kinds is permitted. The Gemara answers: Here we are dealing with a case where he performed the uprooting unpaid, and it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who says that giving an unpaid gift to a gentile is prohibited.

מדרבי יהודה נשמע לרבי עקיבא לאו אמר רבי יהודה אסור ליתן להם מתנת חנם אבל למעוטי תיפלה שפיר דמי לרבי עקיבא נמי אף על גב דאמר רבי עקיבא המקיים בכלאים לוקה למעוטי תיפלה שפיר דמי ותו לא מידי

The Gemara reasons that Rav Naḥman’s ruling can in any event be proven from this baraita: From the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda we may understand the halakha according to the opinion of Rabbi Akiva. Doesn’t Rabbi Yehuda say that it is prohibited to give a gentile an unpaid gift, but to reduce impropriety he holds that it is permitted to work with a gentile? The same can be said according to Rabbi Akiva as well: Although Rabbi Akiva says that one who maintains diverse kinds is flogged, he presumably holds that if the purpose is to reduce impropriety, it is permitted. The Gemara concludes: And nothing more is to be said on this matter.

הדור יתבי וקמבעיא להו דמי עבודה זרה ביד גוי מהו מי תופסת דמיה ביד גוי או לא

§ Rav Naḥman, Ulla, Avimi bar Pappi, and Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Ami were sitting again and a dilemma was raised before them: With regard to the proceeds from the sale of an object of idol worship that are in the possession of a gentile, who sold the object to another, what is the halakha? Does the object of idol worship transfer its forbidden status to the money that is in the possession of a gentile, as it would to money in the possession of a Jew, or not?

אמר להו רב נחמן מסתברא דמי עבודה זרה ביד גוי מותרין מדהנהו דאתו לקמיה דרבה בר אבוה אמר להו זילו זבינו כל מה דאית לכו ותו איתגיירו

Rav Naḥman said to them: It stands to reason that the proceeds from the sale of an object of idol worship in the possession of a gentile are permitted. This may be proven from certain gentiles who came before Rabba bar Avuh to convert. Rabba bar Avuh said to them: Go sell everything that you have, including your objects of idol worship, and then come back to me to convert.

מאי טעמא משום דקסבר דמי עבודה זרה ביד גוי מותרין ודלמא שאני התם דכיון דדעתיה לאיגיורי ודאי בטלה

What is the reason he gave this advice? Isn’t it because he maintains that the proceeds from the sale of an object of idol worship in the possession of a gentile are permitted, and therefore he suggested they sell the objects of idol worship so they could derive benefit from the money after they converted? The Gemara rejects this proof: But perhaps it is different there, as since their intention is to convert, they certainly revoked the idolatrous status of these objects, and when they sold them they were selling permitted items.

אלא מהכא ישראל שהיה נושה בגוי מנה ומכר עבודה זרה והביא לו יין נסך והביא לו מותר אבל אם אמר לו המתן לי עד שאמכור עבודה זרה ואביא לך יין נסך ואביא לך אסור

Rather, proof may be brought from here, as it is taught in a baraita: In the case of a Jew who was a creditor to a gentile for the amount of one hundred dinars, and the gentile sold an object of idol worship and from the proceeds brought him the payment of the debt, or sold wine used for a libation and from the proceeds brought him the payment of the debt, the money is permitted. But if the gentile said to him: Wait for me until I sell an object of idol worship and from the proceeds I will bring you the payment of the debt, or: Wait until I sell wine used for a libation and from the proceeds I will bring you the payment of the debt, this money is forbidden. This proves that the proceeds of an object of idol worship in the possession of a gentile are permitted.

מאי שנא רישא ומאי שנא סיפא אמר רב ששת סיפא משום דהוה ליה כי רוצה בקיומו

The Gemara asks: What is different in the first clause that it is permitted, and what is different in the latter clause that it is forbidden? Rav Sheshet said: In the latter clause the proceeds are forbidden because the Jew desires the preservation of the object of idol worship or wine used for a libation, since he knows that the gentile must sell it in order to repay the debt.

וכי רוצה בקיומו כהאי גוונא מי אסיר והתנן גר וגוי שירשו אביהן גוי גר יכול לומר לו טול אתה עבודה זרה ואני מעות טול אתה יין נסך ואני פירות אם משבאו לרשות הגר אסור

The Gemara asks: And if he desires its preservation in a case like this, is the money forbidden? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (Demai 6:10): In the case of a convert and a gentile who inherited from their gentile father, the convert can say to his gentile brother: You take the objects of idol worship and I will take the money, or: You take the wine used for a libation and I will take the produce; but if they make this exchange after the property came into the possession of the convert, it is forbidden.

אמר רבא בר עולא מתניתין בעבודה זרה המתחלקת לפי שבריה

Rava bar Ulla said: The ruling of the mishna is stated with regard to an object of idol worship whose value can be distributed among its shards, i.e., even if it were broken to pieces its value would remain, so the convert does not desire its preservation.

תינח עבודה זרה יין נסך מאי איכא למימר בחרס הדרייני

The Gemara asks: This resolution works out well in the case of objects of idol worship, but with regard to wine used for a libation, what is there to say? There is no situation in which the convert does not desire the preservation of the wine until the exchange. The Gemara answers: The ruling of the mishna is stated with regard to Hadrianic earthenware permeated with wine used for a libation. Since the wine can be extracted by soaking the earthenware in water, the convert does not desire that the vessel remain intact.

והלא רוצה בקיומו שלא יגנובו ושלא יאבדו אלא אמר רב פפא ירושת הגר קאמרת שאני ירושת הגר דאקילו בה רבנן גזירה שמא יחזור לקלקולו

The Gemara asks: But doesn’t he desire its preservation in the sense that it should not be stolen or lost? Rather, Rav Pappa said that there is a different resolution: You say there is a difficulty from the case of the inheritance of a convert? The inheritance of a convert is different, as the Sages were lenient with regard to it, as a rabbinic decree, lest he return to his corrupted ways if it were prohibited for him to inherit property from his father. In the case of one who is not a convert and desires the preservation of an object of idol worship, it is prohibited for him to profit from it.

תניא נמי הכי במה דברים אמורים שירשו אבל נשתתפו אסור

This is also taught in a baraita: In what case is this statement, that a convert and a gentile are permitted to divide up common property that includes objects of idol worship, said? This is said with regard to property that they inherited; but if they were partners, it is prohibited.

הדור יתבו וקמיבעיא להו גר תושב מהו שיבטל עבודה זרה דפלח מבטיל דלא פלח לא מבטיל או דלמא כל דבר מיניה מבטיל והאי בר מיניה הוא

§ The Gemara mentions another discussion among Rav Naḥman, Ulla, Avimi bar Pappi, and Rav Ḥiyya bar Ami. They were sitting again and a dilemma was raised before them: With regard to a gentile who resides in Eretz Yisrael and observes the seven Noahide mitzvot [ger toshav], including the prohibition against engaging in idol worship, what is the halakha with regard to the possibility that he can revoke the status of objects of idol worship? Is it the case that one who worships idols can revoke the status of one, but one who does not worship them cannot revoke the status of one? Or perhaps should it be reasoned that anyone who is of the same kind as idol worshippers, i.e., a gentile, can revoke its status, and a ger toshav is of the same kind as idol worshippers?

אמר להו רב נחמן מסתברא דפלח מבטיל דלא פלח לא מבטיל

Rav Naḥman said to them: It stands to reason that one who worships idols can revoke the status of one, but one who does not worship them cannot revoke the status of one.

מיתיבי ישראל שמצא עבודה זרה בשוק עד שלא באתה לידו אומר לגוי ומבטלה משבאתה לידו אינו אומר לגוי ומבטלה מפני שאמרו גוי מבטל עבודה זרה שלו ושל חבירו בין עובדה ובין שאין עובדה

The Gemara raises an objection to this ruling from a baraita: In the case of a Jew who found an object of idol worship in the marketplace, as long as it has not yet come into his possession, he can tell a gentile, and the gentile can revoke its idolatrous status. Once it has come into his possession, he cannot tell a gentile and have the gentile revoke its status. This applies to any gentile, because the Sages said: A gentile can revoke the status of his own object of idol worship or that of another gentile, whether he worships it or whether he does not worship it.

מאי עובדה ומאי שאינו עובדה אילימא אידי ואידי גוי היינו שלו ושל חבירו אלא לאו עובדה גוי ומאי שאינו עובדה גר תושב ושמע מינה גר תושב נמי מבטל

What is meant by the phrase: Worships it, and what is meant by the phrase: Does not worship it? If we say both this and that are referring to a gentile, this is the same as the previous statement in the baraita, that a gentile can revoke the status of his own object of idol worship or that of another gentile, i.e., an object that he worships or one that another gentile worships. Rather, isn’t it to be understood that the phrase: Worships it, is referring to a gentile? And what is the meaning of the phrase: Does not worship it? It is referring to a ger toshav, who does not worship any idols. And learn from it that a ger toshav can also revoke the status of objects of idol worship.

לא לעולם אימא לך אידי ואידי גוי ודקאמרת היינו שלו ושל חבירו רישא זה וזה לפעור וזה וזה למרקוליס סיפא זה לפעור וזה למרקוליס

The Gemara rejects this explanation. No, actually, I will say to you that this phrase and that phrase are both referring to a gentile, and with regard to that which you say, that this is the same as the statement concerning his object of idol worship or that of another gentile, it can be explained as follows: The first clause is referring to a case where both gentiles worship the same idol, e.g., this one and that one both worship Peor, or this one and that one both worship Mercury, and the baraita is teaching that one can revoke the status of an idol that belongs to the other. The latter clause, which distinguishes between one who worships it and one who does not worship it, is referring to a case where this one worships Peor and that one worships Mercury, indicating that an idolater can revoke the status of an idol that he does not worship at all, but only if he is himself an idolater, as opposed to a ger toshav.

מיתיבי איזהו גר תושב כל שקיבל עליו בפני שלשה חברים שלא לעבוד עבודה זרה דברי רבי מאיר

The Gemara raises an objection from a baraita: Who is a ger toshav? It is anyone who has accepted upon himself before three ḥaverim, i.e., people devoted to the meticulous observance of mitzvot, especially halakhot of ritual purity, teruma, and tithes, not to worship idols. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir.

וחכמים אומרים כל שקיבל עליו שבע מצות שקבלו עליהם בני נח

And the Rabbis say: Anyone who has accepted upon himself observance of the seven mitzvot that the descendants of Noah accepted upon themselves is a ger toshav.

אחרים אומרים אלו לא באו לכלל גר תושב אלא איזהו גר תושב זה גר אוכל נבילות שקבל עליו לקיים כל מצות האמורות בתורה חוץ מאיסור נבילות

Others say: These have not entered the category of ger toshav. Rather, who is a ger toshav? This is a convert who eats unslaughtered animal carcasses, which are not kosher, but who has accepted upon himself to observe all of the mitzvot that are stated in the Torah except for the prohibition against eating unslaughtered carcasses.

מייחדין אצלו יין ואין מפקידין אצלו יין ואפילו בעיר שרובה ישראל אבל מייחדין אצלו יין ואפילו בעיר שרובה גוים שמנו כיינו

The baraita continues: Whatever the definition of a ger toshav, the following halakhot apply to him: One may leave him alone with wine briefly without Jewish supervision with no concern that he might use it for a libation, thereby rendering it forbidden to Jews, as he is not an idol worshipper. But one may not deposit wine with him for an extended period of time, lest he exchange it with the wine of a gentile, which is forbidden. And this applies even in a town that has a Jewish majority. But one may leave him alone with wine briefly without Jewish supervision even in a town with a majority of gentiles. His oil is treated like his wine in terms of its permissibility.

שמנו כיינו סלקא דעתך שמן מי קא הוי יין נסך אלא יינו כשמנו

The Gemara interjects: His oil is like his wine? Can this enter your mind? Does the oil of a gentile become, i.e., assume the status of, wine used for a libation? Rather, the baraita should be emended as follows: His wine is like his oil. It is permitted to derive benefit from it, but not to consume it.

ולשאר כל דבר הרי הוא כגוי רבן שמעון אומר יינו יין נסך ואמרי לה מותר בשתיה

The baraita continues: And with regard to all other matters, a ger toshav is treated like a gentile. Rabban Shimon says: His wine is treated like wine used for a libation. And some say he says: Even drinking it is permitted.

קתני מיהא ולשאר כל דבריו הרי הוא כגוי למאי הלכתא לאו דמבטל עבודה זרה כגוי אמר רב נחמן בר יצחק לא ליתן רשות ולבטל רשות

The Gemara comments on the baraita: In any event, the baraita teaches: And with regard to all other matters, a ger toshav is treated like a gentile. With regard to what halakha is this stated? Is it not teaching that he can revoke the status of an object of idol worship as a gentile can? Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak says: No, it is stated with regard to giving away rights in a domain or renouncing rights in a domain in the context of the halakhot of joining houses in courtyards for Shabbat.

וכדתניא ישראל משומד משמר שבתו בשוק מבטל רשות שאין משמר שבתו בשוק אין מבטל רשות מפני שאמרו ישראל נותן רשות ומבטל רשות

And this is as it is taught in a baraita: An apostate Jew who nevertheless observes his Shabbat in the marketplace, i.e., in public, can renounce his rights in a shared domain so the other Jews in the domain may carry in it on Shabbat, but an apostate who does not observe his Shabbat even in the marketplace cannot renounce his rights in a domain, because the Sages said that only a Jew can give away rights in his domain or renounce his rights in his domain, and this applies in the context of joining houses in courtyards on Shabbat.

ובגוי עד שישכור כיצד אומר לו רשותי קנויה לך רשותי מבוטלת לך קנה ואין צריך לזכות

But with regard to a gentile, this is not effective unless the Jew leases his domain in the courtyard. How so? A Jew may say to another Jew: My rights in this domain are hereby acquired by you, or: My rights in this domain are hereby renounced to you, and the other Jew thereby acquires those rights, and it is not necessary for him to take possession of it through a formal act of acquisition.

רב יהודה שדר ליה קורבנא

The Gemara relates: Rav Yehuda sent a gift