Bava Batra 93

Bava Batra 93

מַאי טַעְמָא? לָאו מִשּׁוּם דְּרוּבָּא הָכִי אִיתַנְהוּ?

what is the reason that the sale is not considered to be a mistaken transaction? Is it not because a majority of slaves are like this, i.e., either thieves or gamblers? Apparently, the majority is followed in monetary matters.

לָא, כּוּלְּהוּ הָכִי אִיתַנְהוּ.

The Gemara rejects the proof: No, it is because all slaves are like this. Accordingly, no proof can be drawn as to whether we follow the majority in monetary matters.

תָּא שְׁמַע: שׁוֹר שֶׁנָּגַח אֶת הַפָּרָה, וְנִמְצָא עוּבָּרָהּ בְּצִדָּהּ, וְאֵינוֹ יָדוּעַ אִם עַד שֶׁלֹּא נְגָחָהּ יָלְדָה, אוֹ אִם מִשֶּׁנְּגָחָהּ יָלְדָה – מְשַׁלֵּם חֲצִי נֶזֶק לַפָּרָה, וּרְבִיעַ לַוָּלָד.

Come and hear another challenge to Rav’s opinion from a mishna (Bava Kamma 46a): In the case of an innocuous ox that gored and killed a cow, and the cow’s fetus was found dead at its side, and it is not known whether the cow calved before the ox gored it and the fetus’ death was unrelated to the goring, or whether it calved after the ox gored it and the fetus died on account of the goring, the ox’s owner pays half the cost of the damage for the cow, as is the halakha for an innocuous ox (see Exodus 21:35), and one-quarter of the cost of the damage for the offspring. Since it is uncertain whether the ox caused the death of the fetus, its owner pays for half of the standard liability of half the cost of the damage.

וְאַמַּאי? לֵימָא: הַלֵּךְ אַחַר רוֹב פָּרוֹת, וְרוֹב פָּרוֹת מִתְעַבְּרוֹת וְיוֹלְדוֹת; וְהָא וַדַּאי מֵחֲמַת נְגִיחָה הִפִּילָה!

The Gemara explains the proof from the baraita: But why, according to Rav, should he only pay for one-quarter of the damage to the fetus? Since there is an uncertainty, let us say: Follow the majority of cows, and since the majority of cows become pregnant and calve live offspring, one should conclude that this cow, which did not, certainly miscarried due to the ox goring it, and the ox’s owner should be liable for half the cost of the fetus. Since that line of reasoning is not applied here, it is apparent that the majority is not followed in monetary matters.

הָתָם, מִשּׁוּם דִּמְסַפְּקָא לַן, דְּאִיכָּא לְמֵימַר: מִקַּמַּהּ אֲתָא, וּמִבִּיעֲתוּתָא הִפִּילָה; וְאִיכָּא לְמֵימַר: מֵאֲחוֹרַהּ אֲתָא, וּמִינְגָּח נַגְחַהּ וְהִפִּילָה; הָוֵי מָמוֹן הַמּוּטָּל בְּסָפֵק, וְכׇל מָמוֹן הַמּוּטָּל בְּסָפֵק – חוֹלְקִין.

The Gemara rejects the proof: There, the reason that the ox’s owner pays for only one-quarter of the damage for the fetus is due to the fact that we are uncertain about how it died, as it is possible to say that the ox approached the cow from its front and it was due to the cow’s fright, not due to the goring, that it miscarried, meaning that the ox’s owner would not be liable; and it is also possible to say that the ox approached the cow from behind it and gored it, and that is why the cow miscarried. Accordingly, the payment for such damage constitutes property of uncertain ownership, and the halakha is that all property of uncertain ownership is divided equally between the two parties.

לֵימָא כְּתַנָּאֵי: שׁוֹר שֶׁהָיָה רוֹעֶה, וְנִמְצָא שׁוֹר הָרוּג בְּצִדּוֹ; אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁזֶּה מְנוּגָּח וְזֶה מוּעָד לִיגַּח, זֶה מְנוּשָּׁךְ וְזֶה מוּעָד לִישּׁוֹךְ; אֵין אוֹמְרִים: בְּיָדוּעַ שֶׁזֶּה נְגָחוֹ וְזֶה נְשָׁכוֹ. רַבִּי אַחָא אוֹמֵר: גָּמָל הָאוֹחֵר בֵּין הַגְּמַלִּים, וְנִמְצָא גָּמָל הָרוּג בְּצִדּוֹ – בְּיָדוּעַ שֶׁזֶּה הֲרָגוֹ.

The Gemara suggests: Let us say that this dispute between Rav and Shmuel is parallel to a dispute between tanna’im, as it is taught in a baraita: In the case of an ox that was grazing and another ox that was found killed at its side, even though this dead ox has been gored and that grazing ox is forewarned with regard to goring, or this dead ox has been bitten and that grazing ox is forewarned with regard to biting, nevertheless one does not say that it is evident that this grazing ox gored the dead ox or that grazing ox bit it, despite the fact such behavior is typical for the ox; rather, one cannot draw any definite conclusions. Rabbi Aḥa says that in the case of a rutting male camel that is rampaging among other camels and another camel that was found killed at its side, it is evident that this rampaging camel killed it, as such behavior is typical for a rutting camel. Therefore, the owner of that camel is liable.

סַבְרוּהָ דְּרוּבָּא וַחֲזָקָה כִּי הֲדָדֵי נִינְהוּ; לֵימָא רַב דְּאָמַר כְּרַבִּי אַחָא, וּשְׁמוּאֵל דְּאָמַר כְּתַנָּא קַמָּא?

Those who suggested the parallel between the tannaitic dispute and the dispute between Rav and Shmuel assumed that a majority and a logical presumption about whether an event will happen are equivalent in their capacity to determine the facts of a case. Consequently, let us say that Rav, who says that one follows the majority in monetary matters, holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Aḥa, who follows a presumption to determine the facts of a case, and that Shmuel, who says that one does not follow the majority in monetary matters, holds in accordance with the opinion of the first tanna, who does not follow a presumption.

אָמַר לְךָ רַב: אֲנָא דַּאֲמַרִי אֲפִילּוּ לְתַנָּא קַמָּא; עַד כָּאן לָא קָאָמַר תַּנָּא קַמָּא הָתָם – אֶלָּא דְּלָא אָזְלִינַן בָּתַר חֲזָקָה, אֲבָל בָּתַר רוּבָּא – אָזְלִינַן.

The Gemara rejects this: Rav could have said to you: I am stating my ruling even in accordance with the opinion of the first tanna, as the first tanna says that one cannot draw a definite conclusion only there, in the case of the grazing ox, as we do not follow a presumption in monetary matters, but he concedes that we follow the majority in monetary matters.

וּשְׁמוּאֵל אָמַר לָךְ: אֲנָא דַּאֲמַרִי אֲפִילּוּ לְרַבִּי אַחָא; עַד כָּאן לָא קָאָמַר רַבִּי אַחָא הָתָם – אֶלָּא דְּאָזְלִינַן בָּתַר חֲזָקָה, דְּהוּא גּוּפֵיהּ מוּחְזָק; אֲבָל בָּתַר רוּבָּא – לָא אָזְלִינַן.

And Shmuel could have said to you: I am stating my ruling even in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Aḥa, as Rabbi Aḥa says that one can draw a definite conclusion only there, in the case of the camels, since we follow a presumption in monetary matters, as this camel itself is presumed, based on its behavior, to be the killer. But he concedes that we do not follow the majority in deciding monetary matters.

תָּא שְׁמַע: הַמּוֹכֵר פֵּירוֹת לַחֲבֵרוֹ, וּזְרָעָן וְלֹא צִמֵּחוּ; וַאֲפִילּוּ זֶרַע פִּשְׁתָּן – אֵינוֹ חַיָּיב בְּאַחְרָיוּתָן.

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear another challenge to Rav’s opinion from the mishna: With regard to one who sells produce to another that is sometimes purchased for consumption and sometimes for planting, and the buyer planted it and it did not sprout, and even if he had sold flaxseeds, which are rarely sold as food, the seller does not bear financial responsibility for them.

מַאי ״אֲפִילּוּ״? לָאו אֲפִילּוּ זֶרַע פִּשְׁתָּן, דְּרוּבָּא לִזְרִיעָה זָבְנִי, וַאֲפִילּוּ הָכִי לָא אָזְלִינַן בָּתַר רוּבָּא?

The Gemara explains the proof: What novelty is indicated by saying: Even if he had sold flaxseeds? Is it not that even where he sold flaxseeds, of which the majority is purchased for planting, and they were not suitable for that purpose, nevertheless the sale stands because we do not follow the majority in monetary matters?

תַּנָּאֵי הִיא, דְּתַנְיָא: הַמּוֹכֵר פֵּירוֹת לַחֲבֵרוֹ וּזְרָעָן וְלֹא צִמֵּחוּ; זֵרְעוֹנֵי גִינָּה שֶׁאֵין נֶאֱכָלִין – חַיָּיב בְּאַחְרָיוּתָן, זֶרַע פִּשְׁתָּן – אֵינוֹ חַיָּיב בְּאַחְרָיוּתָן. רַבִּי יוֹסֵי אוֹמֵר:

The Gemara concedes that the mishna cannot be reconciled with Rav’s opinion, but suggests that there are other tanna’im who hold in accordance with his opinion. It is a dispute between tanna’im, as it is taught in a baraita: With regard to one who sells produce to another, and the buyer planted it and it did not sprout, if the produce was seeds for garden plants, which are not eaten at all, then the seller bears financial responsibility for them. If the produce was flaxseeds, which are only occasionally eaten, then the seller does not bear financial responsibility for them. Rabbi Yosei says:

נוֹתֵן לוֹ דְּמֵי זֶרַע. אָמְרוּ לוֹ: הַרְבֵּה לוֹקְחִין אוֹתוֹ לִדְבָרִים אֲחֵרִים.

The seller gives back to the buyer the value of the seeds. Since the majority of flaxseeds are sold are for planting, it is a mistaken transaction. They said to him, i.e., to Rabbi Yosei: Many, i.e., a majority of people, purchase flaxseeds for purposes other than planting. Consequently, the sale stands.

מַאן תַּנָּאֵי? אִילֵּימָא רַבִּי יוֹסֵי וְ״אָמְרוּ לוֹ״; תַּרְוַיְיהוּ בָּתַר רוּבָּא אָזְלִי – מָר אָזֵיל בָּתַר רוּבָּא דְאִינָשֵׁי, וּמָר אָזֵיל בָּתַר רוּבָּא דִזְרִיעָה!

The Gemara asks: Who are the tanna’im in this baraita who have a dispute that parallels the dispute between Rav and Shmuel? If we say that they are Rabbi Yosei and the opinion cited as: They said to him, that is incorrect, as both of them hold that one follows the majority in monetary matters. Their dispute concerns only which majority to follow: One Sage, i.e., the opinion cited as: They said to him, follows the majority of people making purchases, and one Sage, i.e., Rabbi Yosei, follows the majority of the volume of seeds that are sold overall. The disparity arises because the majority of sales are each made with a relatively small quantity of seeds that are purchased for purposes other than planting. The minority of sales involve large quantities of seeds that are purchased for planting. This means that the majority of the seeds sold overall are purchased for planting, but the majority of people purchasing seeds do so for purposes other than planting.

אֶלָּא אִי תַּנָּא קַמָּא וְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי, אִי תַּנָּא קַמָּא וְ״אָמְרוּ לוֹ״.

Rather, the dispute that parallels the dispute between Rav and Shmuel is either the dispute between the first tanna and Rabbi Yosei, or the dispute between the first tanna and the opinion cited as: They said to him.

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: מַהוּ נוֹתֵן לוֹ? דְּמֵי זֶרַע, וְלֹא הוֹצָאָה. וְיֵשׁ אוֹמְרִים: אַף הוֹצָאָה.

§ The Sages taught in a baraita: When the seller bears financial responsibility for selling seeds that did not sprout, what is he liable to give to the buyer? He is liable to give him only the value of the seeds themselves, but not the expenses that the buyer incurred in planting them, e.g., the hire of laborers. And some say: He is liable to give him even the expenses that the buyer incurred.

מַאן יֵשׁ אוֹמְרִים? אָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא: רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל הִיא.

The Gemara asks: Who is the tanna whose opinion is cited as: Some say? Rav Ḥisda said that it is Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel.

הֵי רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל? אִילֵּימָא רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל דְּמַתְנִיתִין – דִּתְנַן: הַמּוֹכֵר פֵּירוֹת לַחֲבֵירוֹ וּזְרָעָן וְלֹא צִמֵּחוּ, וַאֲפִילּוּ זֶרַע פִּשְׁתָּן – אֵינוֹ חַיָּיב בְּאַחְרָיוּתָן. הָא זֵרְעוֹנֵי גִינָּה שֶׁאֵינָן נֶאֱכָלִין – חַיָּיב בְּאַחְרָיוּתָן.

The Gemara clarifies: From which statement of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel is it apparent that he holds the seller is liable for the buyer’s expenses? One possibility is if we say that the statement in question is that of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel in the mishna, as we learned in the mishna: One who sells to another produce that is sometimes purchased for consumption and sometimes for planting, and the buyer planted it and it did not sprout, and even if he had sold flaxseeds, which are only occasionally eaten, the seller does not bear financial responsibility for them. The Gemara extrapolates: By inference, if this tanna holds that he had sold seeds for garden plants, which are not eaten at all, then the seller bears financial responsibility to compensate the buyer for them.

אֵימָא סֵיפָא, רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר: זֵרְעוֹנֵי גִינָּה שֶׁאֵינָן נֶאֱכָלִין – חַיָּיב בְּאַחְרָיוּתָן. תַּנָּא קַמָּא נָמֵי הָכִי קָאָמַר – זֶרַע פִּשְׁתָּן הוּא דְּאֵינוֹ חַיָּיב בְּאַחְרָיוּתָן, הָא זֵרְעוֹנֵי גִינָּה שֶׁאֵינָן נֶאֱכָלִין – חַיָּיב בְּאַחְרָיוּתָן!

The Gemara continues: But accordingly, say the latter clause: Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: If he had sold seeds for garden plants, which are not eaten at all, then the seller bears financial responsibility for them. The Gemara asks: But according to the inference made from the first clause, the first tanna is also saying this, as he holds that it is only for the sale of flaxseeds that the seller does not bear financial responsibility to compensate the buyer for them, but with regard to the sale of seeds for garden plants, which are not eaten at all, the seller bears financial responsibility for them. What, then, is the dispute between the first tanna and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel?

אֶלָּא לָאו הוֹצָאָה אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ – מָר סָבַר דְּמֵי זֶרַע, וּמָר סָבַר אַף הוֹצָאָה?

The Gemara therefore suggests: Rather, is it not that the difference between them is whether the seller is liable for the buyer’s expenses? One Sage, i.e., the first tanna, holds that the seller is liable only for the value of the seeds, and the other Sage, i.e., Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, holds that the seller is liable even for the buyer’s expenses.

מִמַּאי? דִּלְמָא אִיפְּכָא! הָא לָא קַשְׁיָא; כׇּל תַּנָּא בָּתְרָא, לְטַפּוֹיֵי מִילְּתָא קָא אָתֵי.

The Gemara asks: From where is it apparent that it is Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel who holds that the seller is liable for the expenses? Perhaps it is the opposite, i.e., it is the first tanna who holds that the seller is liable for the expenses, and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds that he is liable only for the value of the seeds. The Gemara rejects this suggestion: This is not difficult, because the last tanna cited always comes to add something to the ruling of the first tanna, not to detract from it.

וְדִלְמָא כּוּלָּהּ רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל הִיא – וְחַסּוֹרֵי מְחַסְּרָא, וְהָכִי קָתָנֵי: הַמּוֹכֵר פֵּירוֹת לַחֲבֵירוֹ וּזְרָעָן וְלֹא צִמֵּחוּ, אֲפִילּוּ זֶרַע פִּשְׁתָּן – אֵינוֹ חַיָּיב בְּאַחְרָיוּתָן, הָא זֵרְעוֹנֵי גִינָּה שֶׁאֵינָן נֶאֱכָלִין – חַיָּיב בְּאַחְרָיוּתָן; דִּבְרֵי רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל; שֶׁרַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר: זֶרַע פִּשְׁתָּן הוּא דְּאֵינוֹ חַיָּיב בְּאַחְרָיוּתָן, הָא זֵרְעוֹנֵי גִינָּה שֶׁאֵינָן נֶאֱכָלִין – חַיָּיב בְּאַחְרָיוּתָן.

The Gemara suggests: But perhaps all of the mishna is stating the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, and the mishna is incomplete, and this is what it is teaching: With regard to one who sells produce to another that is sometimes purchased for eating and sometimes for planting, and the buyer planted it and it did not sprout, and even if he had sold flaxseeds, which are only occasionally eaten, the seller does not bear financial responsibility for them. But if he sold seeds for garden plants, which are not eaten at all, the seller bears financial responsibility for them. This is the statement of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, as Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says that it is only for the sale of flaxseeds that the seller does not bear financial responsibility to compensate the buyer for them, but by inference, for the sale of seeds for garden plants, which are not eaten at all, the seller bears financial responsibility for them. Interpreted in this way, there is no evidence from the mishna that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds that the seller is liable for the expenses.

אֶלָּא הָא רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל – דְּתַנְיָא: הַמּוֹלִיךְ חִטִּין לַטָּחוֹן, וְלֹא לְתָתָן – וַעֲשָׂאָן סוּבִּין אוֹ מוּרְסָן; קֶמַח לַנַּחְתּוֹם, וַאֲפָאוֹ פַּת נִיפּוּלִין; בְּהֵמָה לַטַּבָּח, וְנִיבְּלָהּ – חַיָּיב, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהוּא כְּנוֹשֵׂא שָׂכָר.

Rather, the statement in question is this statement of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, as it is taught in a baraita (Tosefta, Bava Kamma 10:9) In a case of one who brought wheat to a miller to grind, and the miller did not wet the grains sufficiently for the grinding to be performed effectively, and as a result he converted the grain into bran or coarse bran [mursan], or in a case of one who gave flour to the baker and the baker made it into bread that is underbaked and tends to crumble, or if one gave an animal to a butcher and the butcher killed it in a way that rendered it an unslaughtered animal carcass, in all these cases the worker is liable, because he is like a paid bailee.

רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר: נוֹתֵן לוֹ דְּמֵי בוֹשְׁתּוֹ, וּדְמֵי בּוֹשֶׁת אוֹרְחָיו. וְכֵן הָיָה רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר: מִנְהָג גָּדוֹל הָיָה בִּירוּשָׁלָיִם – הַמּוֹסֵר סְעוּדָה לַחֲבֵרוֹ, וְקִלְקְלָהּ; נוֹתֵן לוֹ דְּמֵי בׇשְׁתּוֹ וּדְמֵי בּוֹשֶׁת אוֹרְחָיו.

The baraita continues: Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: If the owner had invited guests to eat the food and due to the worker’s actions he was unable to serve them, then the worker must give him compensation for his humiliation and compensation for the humiliation of his guests. And similarly, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel would say: There was a great custom in Jerusalem that if one gives raw materials for a meal to another to prepare the meal for him, and that person spoils it, that person gives the former compensation for his humiliation and compensation for the humiliation of his guests.

עוֹד מִנְהָג גָּדוֹל הָיָה בִּירוּשָׁלָיִם – מַפָּה פְּרוּסָה עַל גַּבֵּי הַפֶּתַח; כׇּל זְמַן שֶׁמַּפָּה פְּרוּסָה – אוֹרְחִין נִכְנָסִין. נִסְתַּלְּקָה הַמַּפָּה – אֵין הָאוֹרְחִין נִכְנָסִין.

The baraita continues: Another great custom that was followed in Jerusalem was that when one made a feast, there would be a cloth [mappa] spread over the entrance to the hall. As long as the cloth was spread, the guests would enter, as the presence of the cloth indicated that there was food for more guests. When the cloth was removed, the guests would not enter any more.

מַתְנִי׳ הַמּוֹכֵר פֵּירוֹת לַחֲבֵירוֹ, הֲרֵי זֶה מְקַבֵּל עָלָיו רוֹבַע טִנּוֹפֶת לִסְאָה. תְּאֵנִים – מְקַבֵּל עָלָיו עֶשֶׂר מְתוּלָּעוֹת לְמֵאָה. מַרְתֵּף שֶׁל יַיִן – מְקַבֵּל עָלָיו עֶשֶׂר קוֹסְסוֹת לְמֵאָה. קַנְקַנִּים בַּשָּׁרוֹן – מְקַבֵּל עָלָיו עֶשֶׂר פִּיטָסוֹת לְמֵאָה.

MISHNA: When selling a significant quantity of produce or a number of items, there is a possibility that there will be a certain proportion of impurities in it or that some of the product will be of substandard quality. The mishna delineates what proportion is considered acceptable, for which a buyer may not demand compensation. With regard to one who sells produce, i.e., grain, to another, this buyer accepts upon himself that up to a quarter-kav of impurities may be present in each se’a of produce purchased. When purchasing figs, he accepts upon himself that up to ten infested figs may be present in each hundred figs purchased. When purchasing a cellar containing barrels of wine, he accepts upon himself that up to ten barrels of souring wine may be present in each hundred barrels purchased. When purchasing jugs of wine in the Sharon region, he accepts upon himself that up to ten inferior-quality jugs [pitasot] of wine may be present in each hundred jugs purchased.

גְּמָ׳ תָּאנֵי רַב קַטִּינָא: רוֹבַע קִטְנִית לִסְאָה. וְעַפְרוּרִית לָא?! וְהָאָמַר רַבָּה בַּר חִיָּיא קְטוֹסְפָאָה מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרַבָּה: בּוֹרֵר צְרוֹר מִגׇּרְנוֹ שֶׁל חֲבֵרוֹ –

GEMARA: Rav Ketina taught: When the mishna states that a buyer accepts upon himself that a quarter-kav of impurities per se’a may be present, that means only that he accepts upon himself the presence of a quarter-kav of legumes, but he does not accept upon himself the presence of a quarter-kav of dirt. The Gemara asks: And is it so that the buyer does not also accept upon himself that some quantity of dirt might be present in the produce? But doesn’t Rabba bar Ḥiyya Ketosfa’a say in the name of Rabba: One who picks out a pebble from the wheat on another’s threshing floor