Bava Kamma 10
חוֹמֶר בְּשׁוֹר מִבְּאֵשׁ, חוֹמֶר בְּאֵשׁ מִבְּשׁוֹר.
There is a stringency that applies to the category of Ox as opposed to Fire, and conversely, there is a stringency that applies to Fire as opposed to Ox.
חוֹמֶר בְּשׁוֹר מִבְּאֵשׁ – שֶׁהַשּׁוֹר מְשַׁלֵּם כּוֹפֶר, וְחַיָּיב בִּשְׁלֹשִׁים שֶׁל עֶבֶד, נִגְמַר דִּינוֹ – אָסוּר בַּהֲנָאָה, מְסָרוֹ לְחֵרֵשׁ שׁוֹטֶה וְקָטָן – חַיָּיב; מַה שֶּׁאֵין כֵּן בְּאֵשׁ. חוֹמֶר בְּאֵשׁ מִבְּשׁוֹר – שֶׁהָאֵשׁ מוּעֶדֶת מִתְּחִילָּתָהּ, מַה שֶּׁאֵין כֵּן בְּשׁוֹר.
The baraita elucidates: The stringency that applies to the category of Ox as opposed to the category of Fire is that if an ox kills a Jew the owner is liable to pay a ransom, and for killing a slave the owner is liable to pay thirty sela. Furthermore, in such a case, once the court hears the evidence and the verdict of the ox is complete and the court rules that the ox must be killed, it is prohibited to derive any benefit from the ox. And if one transfers his ox to the care of a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor, and it causes damage, he is liable. All of this is not so with regard to a fire. And the stringency that applies to Fire as opposed to Ox is that the one responsible for the fire is considered forewarned from its inception, which is not so with regard to an ox.
חוֹמֶר בְּאֵשׁ מִבְּבוֹר, וְחוֹמֶר בְּבוֹר מִבְּאֵשׁ.
There is a stringency that applies to the category of Fire as opposed to the category of Pit, and conversely, there is a stringency that applies to Pit as opposed to Fire.
חוֹמֶר בְּבוֹר מִבְּאֵשׁ – שֶׁתְּחִילַּת עֲשִׂיָּיתוֹ לְנֵזֶק, מְסָרוֹ לְחֵרֵשׁ שׁוֹטֶה וְקָטָן – חַיָּיב; מַה שֶּׁאֵין כֵּן בְּאֵשׁ. חוֹמֶר בְּאֵשׁ מִבְּבוֹר – שֶׁהָאֵשׁ דַּרְכָּהּ לֵילֵךְ וּלְהַזִּיק, וּמוּעֶדֶת לֶאֱכוֹל בֵּין דָּבָר הָרָאוּי לָהּ, וּבֵין דָּבָר שֶׁאֵינוֹ רָאוּי לָהּ; מָה שֶּׁאֵין כֵּן בְּבוֹר.
The baraita elucidates: The stringency that applies to the category of Pit as opposed to the category of Fire is that its initial formation, e.g., its digging, is done in a manner that can result in damage, and if one transfers it to the care of a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor and it causes damage, one is liable. This is not so with regard to a fire. The stringency that applies to Fire as opposed to Pit is that the typical manner of a fire is to proceed and cause damage. And the one responsible for it is considered forewarned with regard to its consuming both something that is fitting for it and something that is not fitting for it, i.e., both flammable and non-flammable items. This is not so with regard to a pit.
וְלִיתְנֵי חוֹמֶר בְּשׁוֹר מִבְּבוֹר – שֶׁהַשּׁוֹר חִיֵּיב בּוֹ אֶת הַכֵּלִים, מַה שֶּׁאֵין כֵּן בְּבוֹר!
The Gemara asks: But let the baraita also teach the following additional stringency: A stringency that applies to Ox as opposed to Pit is that if the ox damages vessels, the ox’s owner is liable to pay for the vessels, which is not so with regard to a pit, which incurs liability for its owner only for damage it causes to people and to animals but not to vessels.
הָא מַנִּי – רַבִּי יְהוּדָה הִיא, דִּמְחַיֵּיב עַל נִזְקֵי כֵלִים בְּבוֹר.
The Gemara explains: In accordance with whose opinion is this baraita taught? It is taught in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who deems one liable also for damage caused to vessels by his pit.
אִי רַבִּי יְהוּדָה, אֵימָא סֵיפָא: חוֹמֶר בְּאֵשׁ מִבְּבוֹר – שֶׁהָאֵשׁ דַּרְכָּהּ לֵילֵךְ וּלְהַזִּיק, וּמוּעֶדֶ[ת] לֶאֱכוֹל בֵּין דָּבָר הָרָאוּי לָהּ וּבֵין דָּבָר שֶׁאֵינוֹ רָאוּי לָהּ, מַה שֶּׁאֵין כֵּן בְּבוֹר. ״דָּבָר הָרָאוּי לָהּ״ מַאי נִינְהוּ – עֵצִים; ״דָּבָר שֶׁאֵין רָאוּי לָהּ״ מַאי נִינְהוּ – כֵּלִים; ״מַה שֶּׁאֵין כֵּן בְּבוֹר״. אִי רַבִּי יְהוּדָה – הָא אָמְרַתְּ מְחַיֵּיב הָיָה רַבִּי יְהוּדָה עַל נִזְקֵי כֵלִים בְּבוֹר!
The Gemara challenges this: If the baraita is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda, try to say and explain accordingly the latter clause, which states: The stringency that applies to Fire as opposed to Pit is that the typical manner of a fire is to proceed and cause damage. And the one responsible for it is considered forewarned with regard to its consuming both something that is fitting for it and something that is not fitting for it. This is not so with regard to a pit. The Gemara clarifies: Something that is fitting for it, what are these? Pieces of wood. Something that is not fitting for it, what are these? Vessels. And yet the baraita concludes: This is not so with regard to a pit, which indicates that liability is not incurred for damage done to vessels by one’s pit. The Gemara presents the difficulty: If the baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, didn’t you say that Rabbi Yehuda deems one liable for damage caused to vessels by his pit?
אֶלָּא לְעוֹלָם רַבָּנַן הִיא, וּתְנָא וְשַׁיַּיר. מַאי שַׁיַּיר דְּהַאי שַׁיַּיר? שַׁיַּיר טָמוּן.
Rather, actually, the baraita is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, and the additional stringency mentioned is true but was not mentioned because the tanna taught certain cases and omitted others. The Gemara asks: What else did he omit that makes it reasonable to assume that he omitted this? As a tanna would never omit just a single case, perforce there must be more. The Gemara explains: He also omitted the case of damage done to a concealed item. Liability is incurred for damage done to a concealed item only when it was caused through a category of damage other than fire. If it is damaged by a fire that one lit, he is exempt.
אִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: לְעוֹלָם רַבִּי יְהוּדָה, וְ״דָבָר שֶׁאֵין רָאוּי לָהּ״ לָאו לְאֵתוֹיֵי כֵּלִים, אֶלָּא לְאֵתוֹיֵי לִיחֲכָה נִירוֹ וְסִכְסְכָה אֲבָנָיו.
The Gemara suggests another explanation of the baraita: If you wish, say that actually the baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, and explain that the term: Something that is not fitting for it, in the baraita, does not serve to include vessels; with regard to vessels there is no distinction between Fire and Pit. Rather, it serves to include a case where a fire scorched another person’s plowed field or singed [sikhsekha] his stones, which are ways of causing damage that cannot be caused by a pit.
מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַב אָשֵׁי: לִיתְנֵי חוֹמֶר בְּשׁוֹר מִבְּבוֹר – שֶׁהַשּׁוֹר חִיֵּיב בּוֹ שׁוֹר פְּסוּלֵי הַמּוּקְדָּשִׁין, מַה שֶּׁאֵין כֵּן בְּבוֹר!
Rav Ashi objects to this suggestion: If so, let the baraita also teach the following additional stringency: A stringency that applies to Ox as opposed to Pit is that in the primary category of Ox one is liable if his ox damages another’s ox that is in the category of disqualified consecrated animals, i.e., an animal set aside to be an offering that was disqualified from use and then redeemed. He is liable despite the fact that even after being redeemed it retains a degree of sanctity. This is not so with regard to damage caused by a pit to a disqualified consecrated animal, as in that case he is not liable for the damage caused.
אִי אָמְרַתְּ בִּשְׁלָמָא רַבָּנַן הִיא, אַיְּידֵי דְּשַׁיַּיר הָךְ – שַׁיַּיר נָמֵי הָךְ. אֶלָּא אִי אָמְרַתְּ רַבִּי יְהוּדָה, מַאי שַׁיַּיר דְּהַאי שַׁיַּיר?
Rav Ashi explains his objection: Granted, if you say that the baraita is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, then since the tanna omitted that case of damage done to vessels, he also omitted this case of damage done to disqualified consecrated animals. But if you say that the baraita is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda, what else did he omit that makes it reasonable to assume that he omitted this?
שַׁיַּיר דָּשׁ בְּנִירוֹ. אִי מִשּׁוּם דָּשׁ בְּנִירוֹ – לָאו שִׁיּוּרָא הוּא, דְּהָ[קָ]תָנֵא: שֶׁכֵּן דַּרְכּוֹ לֵילֵךְ וּלְהַזִּיק!
The Gemara answers: He omitted the case of an ox that intentionally trampled on a plowed field of another person in order to cause damage. Since the damage was intentional it is included in the primary category of Goring and so one is liable. This manner of causing damage cannot be done by a pit. The Gemara rejects this: If one claims that the tanna omitted the case of damage done to disqualified consecrated animals only due to the fact that he also omitted the case of an ox that intentionally trampled on a plowed field of another person, that is not a sufficient justification. The latter case is not an additional independent omission, as it is included in that which is taught in that baraita: The stringency that applies to Fire as opposed to Pit is that the typical manner of a fire is to proceed and cause damage. The fact that there is no case in the category of Pit corresponding to an ox that intentionally trampled on a plowed field is addressed by this clause.
הִכְשַׁרְתִּי בְּמִקְצָת נִזְקוֹ.
§ The mishna states: In any case in which I facilitated part of the damage it caused, I am liable for payments of restitution for damage it caused, as if I were the one who facilitated the entire damage it caused.
תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: הִכְשַׁרְתִּי מִקְצָת נִזְקוֹ – חַבְתִּי בְּתַשְׁלוּמֵי נִזְקוֹ כְּהֶכְשֵׁר כׇּל נִזְקוֹ. כֵּיצַד? הַחוֹפֵר בּוֹר תִּשְׁעָה, וּבָא אַחֵר וְהִשְׁלִימוֹ לַעֲשָׂרָה – הָאַחֲרוֹן חַיָּיב.
The Sages taught a baraita that elucidates the mishna’s ruling: In any case in which I facilitated part of the damage it caused, I am liable for payments of restitution for damage it caused, as if I were the one who facilitated the entire damage it caused. How so? In the case of one who digs a pit to a depth of nine handbreadths, and another person comes along and completes the digging to a depth of ten handbreadths, the depth at which a pit, according to halakha, can cause death, only the latter individual is liable for injuries and death caused by the pit. Although the pit was already able to cause injury before the second individual deepened it, since by deepening it he increased its capacity to cause damage, he becomes liable for any damage it causes.
וּדְלָא כְּרַבִּי – דְּתַנְיָא: הַחוֹפֵר בּוֹר תִּשְׁעָה, וּבָא אַחֵר וְהִשְׁלִימוֹ לַעֲשָׂרָה – אַחֲרוֹן חַיָּיב. רַבִּי אוֹמֵר: אַחַר אַחֲרוֹן לְמִיתָה, אַחַר שְׁנֵיהֶם לִנְזָקִין.
The Gemara suggests: And this is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, as it is taught in a baraita: In the case of one who digs a pit to a depth of nine handbreadths, and another person comes along and completes the digging to a depth of ten handbreadths, only the latter individual is liable for both injuries and death caused by the pit. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: With regard to death caused by the pit, the responsibility is ascribed to the latter individual. With regard to damage caused by the pit, the responsibility is ascribed to the two of them.
רַב פָּפָּא אָמַר: לְמִיתָה, וְדִבְרֵי הַכֹּל.
Rav Pappa said: The baraita refers only to a digger’s liability for death caused by a pit, and then the ruling of the baraita is unanimous, i.e., it is in accordance with the opinions of both the first tanna and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi.
אִיכָּא דְאָמְרִי: לֵימָא דְּלָא כְּרַבִּי? אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: לְמִיתָה, וְדִבְרֵי הַכֹּל.
There are those who say that the preceding discussion took a slightly different form: The Gemara asks: Shall we say that the baraita is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi? Rav Pappa answered and said: The baraita refers only to a digger’s liability for death caused by a pit, and then the ruling of the baraita is unanimous.
מַתְקֵיף לָהּ רַבִּי זֵירָא: וְתוּ לֵיכָּא? וְהָא אִיכָּא: מָסַר שׁוֹרוֹ לַחֲמִשָּׁה בְּנֵי אָדָם, וּפָשַׁע בּוֹ אֶחָד מֵהֶן – וְהִזִּיק, חַיָּיב.
Rabbi Zeira objects to the explanation of the baraita, that the mishna is referring only to one specific case: But are there no more cases? But isn’t there the case of one who transferred his ox to five individuals in order for them to safeguard it, and one of them was negligent in his duties and the ox caused damage? Isn’t this individual liable for all the damage? This seems to be an additional example of the principle in the mishna that if one facilitated part of the damage caused, he is liable for payments of restitution for the damage caused, as if he were the one who facilitated the entire damage, so the baraita should have mentioned it.
הֵיכִי דָמֵי? אִילֵּימָא דִּבְלָאו אִיהוּ לָא הֲוָה מִינְּטַר, פְּשִׁיטָא דְּאִיהוּ קָעָבֵיד! אֶלָּא דִּבְלָאו אִיהוּ נָמֵי מִינְּטַר? מַאי קָעָבֵיד?
The Gemara rejects the possibility that the mishna could be referring to this case: What are the circumstances in which the negligent watchman bears full liability? If we say that without him the ox would not have been properly safeguarded because the ox was particularly strong and it took all five individuals to safeguard it, it is obvious that the negligent individual is liable for all the damage. The reason is that he alone, through his negligence, caused all the damage, not just part of it. Rather, the case must be where even without him the ox would still have been sufficiently safeguarded. The Gemara asks: But if that is the case, what did he do by not safeguarding it? It was still safeguarded without him, so he should not be liable for even part of the damage. It is apparent, then, that the mishna is not referring to this case.
מַתְקֵיף לָהּ רַב שֵׁשֶׁת: וְהָא אִיכָּא מַרְבֶּה בַּחֲבִילָה!
Rav Sheshet objects to the explanation of the baraita, that the mishna is referring only to one specific case: But isn’t there also the case of a fire that was left unattended by its owner and someone else augmented the fire by adding a bundle of wood to it, thereby increasing the capacity of the fire to cause damage to another’s field? Even though he only increased the fire’s capacity to damage, he is liable for any damage it causes. Seemingly, this is an additional example of the mishna’s principle that if one facilitated part of the damage caused, he is liable for payments of restitution for the damage caused, as if he were one who facilitated the entire damage, so the baraita should have mentioned it.
הֵיכִי דָּמֵי?
The Gemara rejects this suggestion: What are the circumstances?
אִי דִּבְלָאו אִיהוּ לָא אָזְלָא – פְּשִׁיטָא! אֶלָּא דִּבְלָאו אִיהוּ אָזְלָא – מַאי קָא עָבֵיד?
If the fire would not have spread to another person’s field without him adding bundles the fire, it is obvious that he alone is liable for the damage because he alone did everything that led to the damage. Rather, the case must be one where the fire would have spread even without him. The Gemara asks: But if that is the case, what did he do by adding bundles of wood? The fire would have spread without him, so he did not cause even part of the damage. It is apparent, then, that the mishna is not referring to this case.
מַתְקֵיף לָהּ רַב פָּפָּא, וְהָא אִיכָּא הָא דְּתַנְיָא: חֲמִשָּׁה שֶׁיָּשְׁבוּ עַל סַפְסָל אֶחָד וְלֹא שְׁבָרוּהוּ, וּבָא אֶחָד וְיָשַׁב עָלָיו וּשְׁבָרוֹ – הָאַחֲרוֹן חַיָּיב. וְאָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: כְּגוֹן פָּפָּא בַּר אַבָּא.
Rav Pappa objects to the claim of the baraita that the mishna refers only to one specific case: But isn’t there also that which is taught in a baraita: With regard to a case in which five people were sitting on one bench [safsal] and it did not break, and then one additional person came and sat upon it and broke it with his added weight, the latter individual is liable for all the damage. And Rav Pappa said by way of clarification that this applies in a case where the last individual to sit down was as heavy as Pappa bar Abba. Since he could have potentially broken it even on his own, he had no right to use it. In this case, even though the weight of the first five individuals was presumably a contributing factor in causing the damage, since the damage was ultimately caused by the additional weight of the last individual, he is liable for all of the damage. Seemingly, this is an additional example of the mishna’s principle, and the baraita should have mentioned it.
הֵיכִי דָמֵי? אִילֵּימָא דִּבְלָאו אִיהוּ לָא אִיתְּבַר – פְּשִׁיטָא. אֶלָּא דִּבְלָאו אִיהוּ נָמֵי אִיתְּבַר – מַאי קָעָבֵיד?
The Gemara rejects this suggestion: What are the circumstances? If we say that without him the bench would never have broken under the weight of the first five people, then it is obvious that the last individual is liable for all the damage, as ultimately it was his action alone that caused the damage. Rather, it must be that even without him the bench would have broken under the weight of the first five people, and the last individual sat down just as it was about to break. The Gemara asks: But if that is the case, what did he do, i.e., why should he be liable at all? It is apparent, then, that the mishna is not referring to this case.
סוֹף סוֹף, מַתְנִיתָא הֵיכָא מִתָּרְצָא?
The Gemara asks: Ultimately, how is the baraita cited by Rav Pappa to be explained? As the Gemara explained, the ruling of the baraita is understandable only if it is referring to a case where the bench would not have broken without him. But if that is the case, as the Gemara noted, it is obvious and therefore unnecessary to state it.
לָא צְרִיכָא; דִּבְלָאו אִיהוּ הָוֵי מִיתְּבַר בִּתְרֵי שָׁעֵי, וְהַשְׁתָּא אִיתְּבַר בַּחֲדָא שָׁעָה; דְּאָמְרִי לֵיהּ: אִי לָאו אַתְּ – הָוֵי יָתְבִינַן טְפֵי פּוּרְתָּא, וְקָיְימִין.
The Gemara explains: No, it is necessary in a case where without him it would have broken in two hours, and now it broke in one hour. The baraita teaches that the last individual alone is liable and not the first five, as they can say to the last individual: Were it not for you, we would have sat a little bit more and then stood up; consequently, the bench would never have broken. Therefore, it was ultimately you who caused the bench to break, and therefore only you are liable.
וְלֵימָא לְהוּ: אִי לָאו אַתּוּן – בְּדִידִי לָא הֲוָה מִיתְּבַר!
The Gemara rejects this suggestion, because in that situation the last individual would have a valid counterclaim: But let him say to them: Were it not for you continuing to sit on the bench after I sat down, the bench would not have broken, as under my weight alone it would not have broken. Accordingly, we should share the liability for damaging it.
לָא צְרִיכָא, דְּבַהֲדֵי דְּסָמֵיךְ בְּהוּ, תְּבַר.
The Gemara offers a different suggestion: No, it is necessary in a case where instantaneously, as he was leaning upon the other five people, the bench broke.
פְּשִׁיטָא!
The Gemara asks: If so, it is obvious that he alone is liable, as his action alone caused the damage, and the other five could not have done anything to prevent it as he was leaning upon them.
מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא, כֹּחוֹ – לָאו כְּגוּפוֹ דָּמֵי; קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן דְּכֹחוֹ כְּגוּפוֹ דָּמֵי, דְּכֹל הֵיכָא דְּגוּפוֹ תָּבַר – כֹּחוֹ נָמֵי תָּבַר.
The Gemara explains: The ruling is necessary lest you say that when one causes damage with one’s direct force it is not equivalent to a situation where one causes damage with one’s body. If he broke the bench by actually sitting down upon it, his action would be considered a direct act of damage completed with his body and he alone would be liable even though the other peoples’ weight was a contributing factor. In this case, since he broke the bench by merely leaning upon the others sitting there, it is his force that led to the damage, not his body, and one might have thought that since the weight of the others certainly contributed to the breakage they should share liability. Therefore, the baraita teaches us that causing damage with one’s direct force is equivalent to causing damage with one’s body. And it teaches that the halakha is that anywhere that one would be liable if his body broke something, one is also liable if his force broke something.
וְתוּ לֵיכָּא? וְהָא אִיכָּא הָא דְּתַנְיָא: הִכּוּהוּ עֲשָׂרָה בְּנֵי אָדָם בְּעֶשֶׂר מַקְלוֹת, בֵּין בְּבַת אַחַת בֵּין בָּזֶה אַחַר זֶה, וָמֵת – כּוּלָּן פְּטוּרִין. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה בֶּן בְּתֵירָא אוֹמֵר: בְּזֶה אַחַר זֶה – הָאַחֲרוֹן חַיָּיב, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁקֵּירַב אֶת מִיתָתוֹ!
The Gemara continues to consider the possibility that there are additional cases covered by the mishna’s ruling aside from the one listed in the baraita: And are there not more cases? But isn’t there also the case of that which is taught in a baraita: If one was beaten by ten people with ten sticks, whether they beat him simultaneously or one after the other, and he died, they are all exempt from liability for killing him. Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira says: Where they beat him sequentially, the last individual to beat him alone is liable, because he hastened his death. In this case, the other individuals contributed to the man’s death, but the last one alone is liable. Why didn’t the baraita also mention this case?
בִּקְטָלָא לָא קָמַיְירֵי.
The Gemara explains: The baraita is not speaking of one’s liability to receive the death penalty, only of one’s liability to pay damages.
וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: בִּפְלוּגְתָּא לָא קָמַיְירֵי. וְלָא?! וְהָא אוֹקֵימְנַן דְּלָא כְּרַבִּי! דְּלָא כְּרַבִּי – וּכְרַבָּנַן, מוֹקְמִינַן; כְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה בֶּן בְּתֵירָא – וְלָא כְּרַבָּנַן, לָא מוֹקְמִינַן.
And if you wish, say instead that the baraita is not speaking of an issue that is the subject of a dispute. The Gemara asks: But isn’t it? But didn’t we uphold that the case stated in the baraita concerning a pit is subject to a dispute, and it is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, but of the Rabbis? The Gemara explains: We will interpret the baraita to be in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis and not to be in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, but we will not interpret it to be in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira and not in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. In other words, although we will interpret the baraita as referring to a case that is subject to a dispute, that applies only if it is in accordance with the majority opinion in that dispute.
חַבְתִּי בְּתַשְׁלוּמֵי נִזְקוֹ. ״חַבְתִּי בְּנִזְקוֹ״ לָא קָתָנֵי, אֶלָּא ״בְּתַשְׁלוּמֵי נִזְקוֹ״,
§ The mishna teaches: In any case in which I facilitated part of the damage it caused, I am liable for payments of restitution for damage it caused, as if I were the one who facilitated the entire damage. The Gemara notes that the mishna does not teach: I am liable for the damage it caused, rather: I am liable for payments of restitution for damage it caused. The Hebrew terms: Payments of restitution [tashlumim], and: To complete [lehashlim], share the same Hebrew root. This alludes to the halakha that the payment of damages is required only in order to complete the injured party’s compensation, which is already partially accounted for, as the injured party is able to recover his dead animal’s current value by selling its carcass. Accordingly, the one liable for the damage is not required to pay the animal’s prior value; rather, he must pay only the difference in its value from before it was damaged and its current state.
תְּנֵינָא לְהָא דְּתָנוּ רַבָּנַן: תַּשְׁלוּמֵי נֶזֶק – מְלַמֵּד שֶׁהַבְּעָלִים מִטַּפְּלִין בַּנְּבֵילָה.
The Gemara notes: We already learned this, as the Sages taught in a baraita: The mishna uses the term: Payments of restitution for damage, as opposed to simply stating: One is liable for the damage caused, to allude to the halakha that the one who is liable must pay only for the decrease in the value of the animal. This assumes that the injured party is able to recover his animal’s current value by selling the carcass. Therefore, the mishna teaches that the owner of the injured animal attends to, i.e., retains ownership of, the animal carcass so that, if he wishes to, he may sell it and keep the proceeds.
מְנָא הָנֵי מִילֵּי? אָמַר רַבִּי אַמֵּי, דְּאָמַר קְרָא: ״מַכֵּה נֶפֶשׁ בְּהֵמָה, יְשַׁלְּמֶנָּה״ – אַל תִּקְרֵי ״יְשַׁלְּמֶנָּה״, אֶלָּא ״יַשְׁלִימֶנָּה״.
The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? Rabbi Ami said: As the verse states: “One who strikes an animal shall pay for it [yeshallemenna]” (Leviticus 24:18). Do not read the final word yeshallemenna, meaning he shall pay for it; rather, read it as though it were vocalized as yashlimenna, meaning he shall complete it, to teach that he shall complete the injured party’s compensation, which is already partially accounted for by the injured party’s right to sell his animal’s carcass.
רַב כָּהֲנָא אָמַר, מֵהָכָא: ״אִם טָרֹף יִטָּרֵף יְבִאֵהוּ עֵד, הַטְּרֵפָה לֹא יְשַׁלֵּם״ – ״עַד טְרֵפָה יְשַׁלֵּם״, טְרֵפָה עַצְמָהּ לֹא יְשַׁלֵּם.
Rav Kahana said that this halakha is derived from here: The verse states with regard to a case where an animal was entrusted with a paid bailee who did not fulfill his duty to safeguard it, and the animal was attacked by a wild beast: “If it be torn in pieces, let him bring a witness, the torn animal he shall not pay” (Exodus 22:12). Rav Kahana expounds the verse to mean that he shall pay only up until the value of the torn animal; but he shall not pay for the torn animal itself. In other words, he pays only the difference in value between the animal before it was injured and its current torn state. If the owner of the injured animal wishes to fully recover his loss he must sell the animal’s carcass and keep the proceeds.
חִזְקִיָּה אָמַר, מֵהָכָא: ״וְהַמֵּת יִהְיֶה לוֹ״ – לַנִּיזָּק.
Ḥizkiyya said that this halakha is derived from here: The verse states with regard to a person’s ox that fatally gored another ox: “He shall pay an ox for the ox, and the carcass shall be his” (Exodus 21:36), meaning the carcass belongs to the injured party, the owner of the gored animal.
וְכֵן תָּנָא דְּבֵי חִזְקִיָּה: ״וְהַמֵּת יִהְיֶה לוֹ״ – לַנִּיזָּק. אַתָּה אוֹמֵר לַנִּיזָּק, אוֹ אֵינוֹ אֶלָּא לַמַּזִּיק? אָמַרְתָּ: לֹא כָּךְ הָיָה.
And similarly, the school of Ḥizkiyya taught in a baraita: The verse states: “And the carcass shall be his” (Exodus 21:36). The verse means the carcass belongs to the injured party. Do you say it belongs to the injured party? Or perhaps it belongs only to the one liable for the damage? To this suggestion, you should say: It could not have been that.
מַאי ״לֹא כָּךְ הָיָה״?
The Gemara asks: What does the baraita mean by: It could not have been that?
אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: אִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ נְבֵילָה דְּמַזִּיק הָוְיָא, לִיכְתּוֹב רַחֲמָנָא ״שׁוֹר תַּחַת הַשּׁוֹר״, וְלִישְׁתּוֹק; ״וְהַמֵּת יִהְיֶה לוֹ״ לְמָה לִי? שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ – לַנִּיזָּק.
Abaye said: If it enters your mind to say that the animal carcass is the property of the one liable for the damage, let the Merciful One write: “He shall pay an ox for the ox,” and then be silent and state no more. Why do I need the verse to continue: “And the carcass shall be his”? Conclude from it that the carcass belongs to the injured party.
וּצְרִיכָא; דְּאִי כְּתַב רַחֲמָנָא ״מַכֵּה בְּהֵמָה יְשַׁלְּמֶנָּה״ – מִשּׁוּם דְּלָא שְׁכִיחָא; אֲבָל טְרֵפָה, דִּשְׁכִיחָא – אֵימָא לָא; צְרִיכָא.
The Gemara notes: And it is necessary to have multiple sources for this halakha, as if the Merciful One wrote only: “One who strikes an animal shall pay for it,” I could claim that only in that case does one have to pay for only part of the damage because it is an uncommon occurrence. But in the case of a torn animal, which is a common occurrence, I will say that his liability should not be limited to the difference in value between what the animal had been worth and the carcass, but he should pay for the entire value of the injured animal. Therefore, it is necessary to explicitly state the halakha also in that case.
וְאִי אַשְׁמוֹעִינַן טְרֵפָה – מִשּׁוּם דְּמִמֵּילָא; אֲבָל מַכֵּה בְּהֵמָה, דִּבְיָדַיִם – אֵימָא לָא.
And if the Torah had taught us only the case of a torn animal, I could claim that only in that case does one have to pay for only part of the damage because the damage occurred by itself, i.e., it was not directly caused by the one liable for it. But in the case of one who strikes an animal, who does so by direct action, I will say that his liability should not be limited. Therefore, it is necessary to explicitly state the halakha also in that case.
וְאִי אַשְׁמוֹעִינַן הָנֵי תַּרְתֵּי – הָא מִשּׁוּם דְּלָא שְׁכִיחָא, וְהָא מִשּׁוּם דְּמִמֵּילָא; אֲבָל ״וְהַמֵּת יִהְיֶה לוֹ״ – דִּשְׁכִיחָא וּבְיָדַיִם, אֵימָא לָא.
And if the Torah had taught us only these two cases, I could claim that only in those cases does one have to pay for only part of the damage, this one because it is an uncommon occurrence, and that one because the damage occurred by itself. But in a case where one’s ox gores another’s ox, of which the Torah states: “And the carcass shall be his,” which is a common occurrence, and the damage is considered to have been inflicted by its owner’s direct action, since it was under his guard, I will say his liability should not be limited.
וְאִי אַשְׁמוֹעִינַן ״הַמֵּת יִהְיֶה לוֹ״ – מִשּׁוּם דְּמָמוֹנָא קָא מַזֵּיק; אֲבָל הָכָא, דִּבְגוּפָא מַזֵּיק – אֵימָא לָא, צְרִיכָא.
And if the Torah had taught us only the case in the verse “And the carcass shall be his,” I could claim that only in that case does one have to pay for only part of the damage because it is one’s property that causes damage. But here, in the case of one who strikes another’s animal, where one causes damage with one’s own body, I will say his liability should not be limited. Therefore, it is necessary to explicitly state the halakha in each case.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב כָּהֲנָא לְרַב: אֶלָּא טַעְמָא דִּכְתַב רַחֲמָנָא ״וְהַמֵּת יִהְיֶה לוֹ״, הָא לָאו הָכִי הֲוָה אָמֵינָא: נְבֵילָה – דְּמַזִּיק הָוְיָא?
Rav Kahana said to Rav: But according to the statement of Ḥizkiyya, as explained by Abaye, the only reason the injured party retains ownership of the carcass is that the Merciful One wrote: “And the carcass shall be his,” but were it not for that I would say that the carcass is the property of the one liable for the damage.
הַשְׁתָּא אִי אִית לֵיהּ לְדִידֵיהּ כַּמָּה טְרֵיפוֹת – יָהֵיב לֵיהּ, דְּאָמַר מָר: ״יָשִׁיב״ – לְרַבּוֹת שָׁוֶה כֶּסֶף, וַאֲפִילּוּ סוּבִּין; דִּידֵיהּ מִבַּעְיָא?!
Rav Kahana questions the need for the Torah to teach this: Now, if the one liable for the damage had in his possession the carcasses of several torn animals, he could give the injured party a carcass as payment, as the Master said above (7a): The verse states: “He shall recompense” (Exodus 21:34), to include items worth money, and even bran, a relatively inferior commodity, as valid items with which to pay restitution. Is it necessary for the Torah to teach that he can pay restitution with his, i.e., the injured party’s, animal carcass? Granting ownership of the carcass to the injured party seems pointless, because even had the Torah granted it to the one liable for the damage, he could give it to the injured party as payment.
לֹא נִצְרְכָא אֶלָּא לִפְחַת נְבֵילָה.
The Gemara explains: It is necessary only for the issue of who sustains the loss due to the diminishing value of the carcass between its death and when the case is brought before the court. By granting ownership of the carcass to the injured party from the moment of the animal’s death, the Torah limits the damages to the difference between the value of the animal when it was alive and its value immediately after it is killed, irrespective of what happens to the carcass afterward.
לֵימָא פְּחַת נְבֵילָה תַּנָּאֵי הִיא? דְּתַנְיָא: ״אִם טָרֹף יִטָּרֵף יְבִיאֵהוּ עֵד״ –
The Gemara asks: Shall we say that the issue of the diminishing value of the carcass is a dispute between tanna’im? As it is taught in a baraita: The verse states with regard to a case where an animal was entrusted with a paid bailee and was attacked by a wild beast: “If it be torn in pieces, let him bring a witness [ed]” (Exodus 22:12).
