Bava Kamma 106
בְּפִקָּדוֹן – פָּסוּל לְעֵדוּת.
but one who denies a claim concerning having taken a deposit is disqualified from bearing witness, because if it is clear that the deposit is in his possession, yet he denies it, he must be lying.
וְהָאָמַר אִילְפָא: שְׁבוּעָה קוֹנָה: שְׁבוּעָה הִיא דְּקָנְיָא, אֲבָל כְּפִירָה לָא קָנְיָא! הָכָא נָמֵי – דְּקָיְימָא בַּאֲגַם.
The Gemara raises a further difficulty with regard to Rav Sheshet’s opinion: But didn’t Ilfa say that an oath effects acquisition, meaning that once he testified falsely that he did not become a bailee, the item in question becomes his property, rendering him liable as a robber even for damage or loss resulting from accidents? The Gemara infers: It is the taking of an oath that effects acquisition, but mere denial of having become a bailee does not effect acquisition. The Gemara rejects this distinction: Here too, Ilfa must be referring to a case where the deposit stands in a place not in the bailee’s possession, e.g., a swamp, and as long as he does not take an oath, it can be assumed that his intention is simply to be evasive. But if the animal was standing in his house, then he acquires it as soon as he denies the claim.
וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: מַאי ״שְׁבוּעָה קוֹנָה״ – כִּדְרַב הוּנָא; דְּאָמַר רַב הוּנָא אָמַר רַב: ״מָנֶה לִי בְּיָדְךָ״, וְהַלָּה אוֹמֵר: ״אֵין לְךָ בְּיָדִי״; וְנִשְׁבַּע, וְאַחַר כָּךְ בָּאוּ עֵדִים – פָּטוּר, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״וְלָקַח בְּעָלָיו וְלֹא יְשַׁלֵּם״ – כֵּיוָן שֶׁקִּבְּלוּ הַבְּעָלִים שְׁבוּעָה, שׁוּב אֵין מְשַׁלֵּם מָמוֹן.
And if you wish, say instead: What is the meaning of Ilfa’s statement that an oath effects acquisition? It is in accordance with the statement of Rav Huna, as Rav Huna says that Rav said that if one party says: I have one hundred dinars in your possession, and the other party says: You do not have any money in my possession, and the latter took an oath to that effect, and later, witnesses came and testified that his oath was false, he is exempt, as it is stated: “The oath of the Lord shall be between them both, to see whether he has not put his hand unto his neighbor’s goods; and the owner thereof shall accept it, and he shall not make restitution” (Exodus 22:10); teaching that once the owner received an oath, the one who took the oath no longer pays monetary restitution. Ilfa’s statement that an oath effects acquisition means that the bailee will no longer have to pay monetary restitution, and it does not relate to Rav Sheshet’s statement that the bailee becomes responsible for damage resulting from accidents as soon as he denies the claim.
גּוּפָא. אָמַר רַב הוּנָא אָמַר רַב: ״מָנֶה לִי בְּיָדְךָ״, וְהַלָּה אוֹמֵר: ״אֵין לְךָ בְּיָדִי כְּלוּם״; וְנִשְׁבַּע, וּבָאוּ עֵדִים – פָּטוּר, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״וְלָקַח בְּעָלָיו וְלֹא יְשַׁלֵּם״ – כֵּיוָן שֶׁקִּבְּלוּ בְּעָלִים שְׁבוּעָה, שׁוּב אֵין מְשַׁלְּמִין מָמוֹן.
§ Having mentioned Rav’s ruling, the Gemara addresses the matter itself: Rav Huna says that Rav says that if one party says: I have one hundred dinars in your possession, and the other party says: You do not have any money in my possession, and the latter takes an oath to that effect, and later, witnesses came and testified that his oath was false, he is exempt, as it is stated: “And the owner thereof shall accept it, and he shall not make restitution” (Exodus 22:10); teaching that once the owner received an oath, the one who took the oath no longer pays monetary restitution.
אָמַר רָבָא: מִסְתַּבְּרָא מִילְּתֵיהּ דְּרַב – בְּמִלְוָה, דִּלְהוֹצָאָה נִיתְּנָה; אֲבָל פִּקָּדוֹן – בִּרְשׁוּתֵיהּ דְּמָרֵיהּ קָאֵי. וְהָאֱלֹהִים – אָמַר רַב אֲפִילּוּ בְּפִקָּדוֹן; דְּכִי כְּתִיב קְרָא – בְּפִקָּדוֹן כְּתִיב.
Rava said: Rav’s statement is reasonable in the case of one who denies having taken a loan, which is intended for expenditure. Since the money is no longer in his possession, the Torah exempts him from monetary restitution once he takes an oath. But in the case of one who denies having accepted a deposit, it remains in the owner’s possession and must be returned intact, and it is not considered to be monetary restitution. Rava continues: But, by God, Rav said his statement even in the case of one who denies having accepted a deposit, as when this verse exempting him from payment is written, it is written in the case of one who denies having accepted a deposit.
יָתֵיב רַב נַחְמָן וְקָאָמַר לְהָא שְׁמַעְתָּא. אֵיתִיבֵיהּ רַב אַחָא בַּר מִנְיוֹמֵי לְרַב נַחְמָן: ״הֵיכָן פִּקְדוֹנִי?״ אָמַר לוֹ: ״אָבַד״. ״מַשְׁבִּיעֲךָ אֲנִי״, וְאָמַר: ״אָמֵן״, וְהָעֵדִים מְעִידִים אוֹתוֹ שֶׁאֲכָלוֹ – מְשַׁלֵּם אֶת הַקֶּרֶן. הוֹדָה מֵעַצְמוֹ – מְשַׁלֵּם קֶרֶן וָחוֹמֶשׁ וְאָשָׁם!
§ The Gemara relates that Rav Naḥman was sitting and saying this halakha. Rav Aḥa bar Minyumi raised an objection to Rav Naḥman from that which was taught in a mishna (108b): If the owner asked the bailee: Where is my deposit, and the bailee said to him: It is lost, and the owner said: I administer an oath to you, and the bailee said: Amen, thereby accepting the oath, and the witnesses testify about the bailee that he consumed the deposit, then he must pay the principal. If he admitted of his own accord that he had taken a false oath, then he must pay the principal and the additional one-fifth payment, and bring a guilt-offering. This indicates that one is required to pay monetary restitution for a deposit even after taking an oath.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב נַחְמָן: הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן – כְּגוֹן דְּנִשְׁבַּע חוּץ לְבֵית דִּין. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אִי הָכִי, אֵימָא סֵיפָא: ״הֵיכָן פִּקְדוֹנִי״? אָמַר לוֹ: ״נִגְנַב״. ״מַשְׁבִּיעֲךָ אֲנִי״, וְאָמַר: ״אָמֵן״, וְהָעֵדִים מְעִידִים אוֹתוֹ שֶׁגְּנָבוֹ – מְשַׁלֵּם תַּשְׁלוּמֵי כֶפֶל. הוֹדָה מֵעַצְמוֹ – מְשַׁלֵּם קֶרֶן וָחוֹמֶשׁ וְאָשָׁם. וְאִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ חוּץ לְבֵית דִּין, מִי אִיכָּא כֶּפֶל?
Rav Naḥman said to him: With what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a case where one takes an oath outside of court, which does not exempt him from paying restitution. Rav Aḥa bar Minyumi said to him: If so, say the latter clause of the mishna: If the owner asked the bailee: Where is my deposit, and the bailee said to him: It was stolen, and the owner said: I administer an oath to you, and the bailee said: Amen, thereby accepting the oath; and the witnesses testify about the bailee that he stole it, he must pay the payment of double the principal. If he admitted of his own accord that he had taken a false oath, then he must pay the principal and the additional one-fifth payment, and bring a guilt-offering. And if it enters your mind that this oath was taken outside of court, is there an obligation of double payment in such a circumstance?
אֲמַר לֵיהּ, יָכֵילְנָא לְשַׁנּוֹיֵי לָךְ: רֵישָׁא חוּץ לְבֵית דִּין, וְסֵיפָא בְּבֵית דִּין; מִיהוּ שִׁינּוּיָא דְּחִיקָא לָא מְשַׁנֵּינָא לָךְ. אִידֵּי וְאִידֵּי בְּבֵית דִּין – וְלָא קַשְׁיָא; כָּאן בְּקָפַץ, כָּאן בְּשֶׁלֹּא קָפַץ.
Rav Naḥman said to him: I am able to answer you by saying that the first clause of the mishna is referring to one who took an oath outside of court, and the latter clause of the mishna is referring to one who took an oath in court, but we will not answer you with a forced answer. Instead, I will explain it in this manner: Both this clause and that clause are referring to an oath taken in court, and it is not difficult. Here, the ruling of the first clause is with regard to one who leaped to take an oath as soon as the other litigant stated his claim, even though the court had not yet required him to do so, which is not considered a full-fledged oath. There, the ruling of the latter clause is with regard to one who did not leap but took an oath only when required by the court.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָמֵי בַּר חָמָא לְרַב נַחְמָן: מִכְּדֵי דְּרַב לָא סְבִירָא לָךְ, מַשְׁכּוֹנֵי נַפְשָׁךְ אַדְּרַב לְמָה לָךְ? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: לְפָרוֹשַׁהּ לִדְרַב, דְּרַב הָכִי מְתָרֵץ לַהּ לְמַתְנִיתִין.
Rami bar Ḥama said to Rav Naḥman: After all, you do not hold in accordance with the statement of Rav; why are you pledging yourself to explain the statement of Rav so that it not be contradicted by the mishna? Rav Naḥman said to him: I said this not to justify Rav’s ruling but to clarify the statement of Rav, as Rav would explain the mishna in this manner, as I did.
וְהָא רַב קְרָא קָאָמַר! אָמְרִי: קְרָא לְ״כׇל הַנִּשְׁבָּעִין שֶׁבַּתּוֹרָה – נִשְׁבָּעִין וְלֹא מְשַׁלְּמִין״ הוּא דַּאֲתָא, ״וְלָקַח בְּעָלָיו וְלֹא יְשַׁלֵּם״ – מִי שֶׁעָלָיו לְשַׁלֵּם, הוּא נִשְׁבָּע.
The Gemara asks: But Rav quoted a verse, so how could Rav Naḥman not agree with his statement? The Sages said in response: This verse was not written to teach the ruling of Rav; rather, it comes to teach the halakha that all those discussed in the Torah who are required to take oaths, take oaths and do not pay; as the verse should be interpreted as follows: “And the owner thereof shall accept it, and he shall not make restitution” (Exodus 22:10), teaching that one who has the obligation to pay is the one who takes an oath, and not the one demanding payment.
מֵתִיב רַב הַמְנוּנָא: הִשְׁבִּיעַ עָלָיו חֲמִשָּׁה פְּעָמִים, בֵּין בִּפְנֵי בֵּית דִּין וּבֵין שֶׁלֹּא בִּפְנֵי בֵּית דִּין, וְכָפַר עָלָיו – חַיָּיב עַל כׇּל אַחַת וְאַחַת. וְאָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן: מָה טַעַם? הוֹאִיל וְיָכוֹל לַחֲזוֹר וּלְהוֹדוֹת!
Rav Hamnuna raises an objection to Rav’s statement from a different mishna (Shevuot 36b), which states: If an owner requested the return of his deposit and the purported bailee denied having received it, and the owner administered an oath to the bailee about the deposit five times, whether before the court or not before the court, and the bailee denied the claim each time, he is liable for each and every one of the oaths and must pay the additional one-fifth payment and bring a guilt-offering for each one. And Rabbi Shimon says: What is the reason? Since he is able to retract and admit after each oath, at which point he would be liable to pay, therefore each subsequent false oath is a denial of that liability. It can be seen from this mishna that one who admits liability after having taken a false oath is liable to pay, counter to the statement of Rav.
וְהָכָא, קָפַץ לָא מָצֵית אָמְרַתְּ – ״הִשְׁבִּיעַ עָלָיו״ קָתָנֵי; חוּץ לְבֵית דִּין לָא מָצֵית אָמְרַתְּ – ״בִּפְנֵי בֵּית דִּין״ קָתָנֵי!
And here, you cannot say that the mishna in Shevuot is referring to a case where the bailee leaped to volunteer his oath, because it teaches explicitly that the owner administered an oath to the bailee about the deposit. And you cannot say that the mishna in Shevuot is referring to a case where the bailee took his oath outside of court, because it teaches explicitly that the halakha applies whether the oath was taken before the court or not before the court.
הוּא מוֹתֵיב לַהּ, וְהוּא מְפָרֵק לַהּ; לִצְדָדִין קָתָנֵי: הִשְׁבִּיעַ עָלָיו – חוּץ לְבֵית דִּין, וּבְבֵית דִּין – קָפַץ.
The Gemara explains: He, Rav Hamnuna, raised the objection and he resolved it: The tanna teaches it disjunctively, i.e., the rulings of the mishna are stated with regard to different circumstances. Where it teaches that the owner administered an oath to the bailee about the deposit, that is referring to outside of court, and when it discusses an oath taken before the court, it is referring to a case where the bailee leaped and volunteered his oath. Therefore, the mishna does not discuss the case with regard to which Rav issued his ruling, where the bailee was forced to take an oath before the court.
מֵתִיב רָבָא: בַּעַל הַבַּיִת שֶׁטָּעַן טַעֲנַת גַּנָּב בְּפִקָּדוֹן וְנִשְׁבַּע, וְהוֹדָה, וּבָאוּ עֵדִים – אִם עַד שֶׁלֹּא בָּאוּ עֵדִים הוֹדָה, מְשַׁלֵּם קֶרֶן וָחוֹמֶשׁ וְאָשָׁם; וְאִם מִשֶּׁבָּאוּ עֵדִים הוֹדָה, מְשַׁלֵּם תַּשְׁלוּמֵי כֶפֶל וְאָשָׁם.
Rava raises an objection to Rav’s statement from a baraita: In the case of a homeowner acting as a bailee who falsely claimed, with regard to a deposit, that a thief stole it, and he took an oath to that effect and subsequently admitted that he was lying and that in fact he took the item himself, and witnesses came and testified that the bailee himself indeed took the item, then if he admitted his guilt before the witnesses came and testified, he pays the principal value of the item and the additional one-fifth payment, and he must also bring a guilt-offering. But if he admitted his guilt after the witnesses came and testified, he pays the double payment and brings a guilt-offering. This baraita rules that one who takes an oath is not exempt from payment, counter to the statement of Rav.
וְהָכָא חוּץ לְבֵית דִּין וְקָפַץ לָא מָצֵית אָמְרַתְּ – ״כֶּפֶל״ קָתָנֵי!
And here, in this baraita, you cannot say that it is referring to an oath taken outside of court or that he leaped and volunteered his oath, because double payment is taught in the baraita, and one is obligated to pay double payment only when the accused has an oath administered to him before the court.
אֶלָּא אָמַר רָבָא: כֹּל הוֹדָה, לָא שְׁנָא טוֹעֵן טַעֲנַת אָבַד, וְלָא שְׁנָא טוֹעֵן טַעֲנַת גַּנָּב – נָמֵי לָא אָמַר רַב, דְּהָא כְּתִיב ״וְהִתְוַדָּה״ – דְּבָעֵי שַׁלּוֹמֵי קֶרֶן וָחוֹמֶשׁ.
Rather, Rava said: In any case where one admits to having taken a false oath, there is no difference whether one falsely states the claim that the deposit was lost, and there is no difference whether one falsely states the claim that a thief stole the deposit as well; in these cases, Rav did not say that taking an oath exempts the bailee from restitution, because it is written in the Torah portion discussing a false oath taken with regard to a deposit: “And they shall confess the sin that they performed, and he shall return the principal for his guilt, and he shall add to it one-fifth, and he gives it to the one with regard to whom he is guilty” (Numbers 5:7), teaching that anyone who admits to a false oath concerning a deposit is required to pay the principal and the additional one-fifth payment.
טוֹעֵן טַעֲנַת גַּנָּב וּבָאוּ עֵדִים נָמֵי לָא אָמַר רַב – דְּהָא כְּתִיב תַּשְׁלוּמֵי כֶפֶל. כִּי קָאָמַר, כְּגוֹן שֶׁטּוֹעֵן טַעֲנַת אָבַד, וְנִשְׁבַּע וְלֹא הוֹדָה, וּבָאוּ עֵדִים.
The Gemara continues Rava’s statement: Additionally, in a case where one falsely states the claim that a thief stole the deposit and takes an oath to that effect and witnesses come and say that he had stolen it, as well, Rav did not say that taking an oath exempts the bailee from restitution, because double payment is written in the Torah (see Exodus 22:8). When he says that taking an oath exempts the bailee from restitution, it is in a case where one falsely states the claim that the deposit was lost and takes an oath to that effect, and did not admit it, and witnesses come and testify that he had stolen it.
אֲזַל רַב גַּמָּדָא, וְאַמְרַהּ לִשְׁמַעְתָּא קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב אָשֵׁי. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: הַשְׁתָּא וּמָה רַב הַמְנוּנָא, תַּלְמִידֵיהּ דְּרַב – וְיָדַע דְּאָמַר רַב הוֹדָה, וְקָמוֹתֵיב הוֹדָה; וְאַתְּ אָמְרַתְּ: הוֹדָה לָא אָמַר רַב?!
The Gemara relates that Rav Gamda went and said that halakha before Rav Ashi. Rav Ashi said to him: Now consider: And even Rav Hamnuna, who was Rav’s student and knew that Rav says that one who takes a false oath is exempt from paying restitution even in a case where he admitted it; and Rav Hamnuna therefore challenged him from a mishna that teaches that one is not exempt in a case where he admitted it. And you say that Rav did not say his halakha in a case where one admitted that he took a false oath? Presumably, Rav Hamnuna, as Rav’s student, was aware of the scope of his teacher’s ruling. How, then, can you limit it as being narrower than Rav Hamnuna’s interpretation?
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב אַחָא סָבָא לְרַב אָשֵׁי, רַב הַמְנוּנָא הָכִי קָא קַשְׁיָא לֵיהּ:
Rav Aḥa the Elder said to Rav Ashi: Rav Hamnuna did not raise a difficulty against Rav with regard to the case of one admitting to having taken a false oath, rather, with regard to the case where witnesses came after he took the oath, and this is what is difficult for him:
אִי אָמְרַתְּ בִּשְׁלָמָא נִשְׁבַּע – כִּי אֲתוֹ עֵדִים מִיחַיַּיב, אַמְּטוּ לְהָכִי מְחַיְּיבִינַן לֵיהּ קׇרְבָּן אַשְּׁבוּעָה בָּתְרָיְיתָא, הוֹאִיל וְיָכוֹל לַחֲזוֹר וּלְהוֹדוֹת;
Granted, if you say that when one takes a false oath and then witnesses come, he is liable to pay, that is why we hold him liable for a guilt-offering for the final oath, since he can still retract and admit his liability and incur an obligation to pay. Consequently, the fact that he took another false oath constitutes an additional false denial of his monetary liability.
אֶלָּא אִי אָמְרַתְּ כִּי אֲתוֹ עֵדִים פָּטוּר, מִי אִיכָּא מִידֵּי דְּאִילּוּ אָתוּ סָהֲדִי וּמַסְהֲדִי בֵּיהּ – פָּטוּר, וַאֲנַן נֵיקוּ נִיחַיְּיבֵיהּ קׇרְבָּן אַשְּׁבוּעָה הוֹאִיל וְיָכוֹל לַחֲזוֹר וּלְהוֹדוֹת?! הַשְׁתָּא מִיהַת לָא אוֹדִי!
But if you say, as Rav did, that even when witnesses come he is exempt from paying, then the mishna’s ruling is difficult, as is there any similar case where if witnesses come and testify with regard to it, he would be exempt, and yet we would stand and obligate him to bring a guilt-offering for a later oath, for no reason other than since he can still retract and admit his liability? As of now, in any event, he has not admitted to any liability and has no extant debt, and any further oaths that he takes are not denials of monetary liability. It follows, then, that Rava’s explanation of Rav’s opinion cannot be undermined by Rav Hamnuna’s challenge.
אָמַר רַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר אַבָּא אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: הַטּוֹעֵן טַעֲנַת גַּנָּב בְּפִקָּדוֹן – מְשַׁלֵּם תַּשְׁלוּמֵי כֶפֶל. טָבַח וּמָכַר – מְשַׁלֵּם תַּשְׁלוּמֵי אַרְבָּעָה וַחֲמִשָּׁה.
§ The Gemara cites another ruling concerning the topic of a bailee who claims that a deposit in his possession was stolen. Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: One who falsely states the claim, with regard to a deposit, that a thief stole it, and it becomes clear that he stole it himself, pays double payment. If he slaughtered or sold it, he must pay fourfold or fivefold payment.
הוֹאִיל וְגַנָּב מְשַׁלֵּם תַּשְׁלוּמֵי כֶפֶל, וְטוֹעֵן טַעֲנַת גַּנָּב מְשַׁלֵּם תַּשְׁלוּמֵי כֶפֶל – מָה גַּנָּב, שֶׁהוּא מְשַׁלֵּם כֶּפֶל, טָבַח וּמָכַר מְשַׁלֵּם תַּשְׁלוּמֵי אַרְבָּעָה וַחֲמִשָּׁה; אַף טוֹעֵן טַעֲנַת גַּנָּב בְּפִקָּדוֹן, כְּשֶׁהוּא מְשַׁלֵּם תַּשְׁלוּמֵי כֶפֶל, טָבַח וּמָכַר מְשַׁלֵּם תַּשְׁלוּמֵי אַרְבָּעָה וַחֲמִשָּׁה.
He explains his ruling by means of a comparison: Since a thief pays double payment, and one who falsely states the claim that a thief stole the deposit also pays double payment, it follows that just as a thief, who ordinarily pays double payment, and if he slaughtered or sold an animal he stole pays fourfold or fivefold payment, so too, one who falsely states the claim that a thief stole a deposit, who ordinarily pays double payment, if he slaughtered or sold the animal he received as a deposit pays fourfold or fivefold payment.
מָה לְגַנָּב – שֶׁכֵּן מְשַׁלֵּם תַּשְׁלוּמֵי כֶפֶל שֶׁלֹּא בִּשְׁבוּעָה, תֹּאמַר בְּטוֹעֵן טַעֲנַת גַּנָּב – שֶׁאֵין מְשַׁלֵּם תַּשְׁלוּמֵי כֶפֶל אֶלָּא בִּשְׁבוּעָה?!
The Gemara asks: What is notable about the halakha of a thief? It is notable in that he pays double payment even without having taken a false oath; will you say that this stringency should apply with regard to one who falsely states the claim that a thief stole the deposit, who pays double payment only upon taking a false oath? Therefore, one cannot derive from the obligation of a thief to pay fourfold or fivefold payment to the case of one who falsely states the claim that the deposit was stolen.
אָמְרִי: הֶיקֵּישָׁא הִיא, וְאֵין מְשִׁיבִין עַל הֶיקֵּישָׁא.
The Sages say in response: Rabbi Yoḥanan did not base his ruling on a logical inference; rather, it is a derivation based upon a juxtaposition, as the verses discussing a thief and one who falsely states the claim that a deposit was stolen are juxtaposed, and one cannot refute through analysis a derivation based upon juxtaposition.
הָנִיחָא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר חַד בְּגַנָּב וְחַד בְּטוֹעֵן טַעֲנַת גַּנָּב, שַׁפִּיר. אֶלָּא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר הַאי ״אִם יִמָּצֵא הַגַּנָּב״, וְ״אִם לֹא יִמָּצֵא״ – תַּרְוַיְיהוּ בְּטוֹעֵן טַעֲנַת גַּנָּב; מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר?
The Gemara asks: This works out well according to the one who says that one verse is stated with regard to a thief and one verse is stated with regard to one who falsely states the claim that a thief stole the deposit. According to him, there is a juxtaposition, and one can well derive one from the other. But according to the one who says that both this verse: “If the thief shall be found, he shall pay double” (Exodus 22:6), and: “If the thief shall not be found” (Exodus 22:7), are referring to one who falsely states the claim that a thief stole the deposit, and neither verse is referring to a thief, what is there to say?
אָמְרִי: ״גַּנָּב–הַגַּנָּב״.
The Sages say in response: Rabbi Yoḥanan’s ruling is derived from an amplification indicated by the verse not employing the term “thief [gannav],” and instead employing the expanded term “the thief [hagannav].” This teaches that the halakha of the fourfold and fivefold payment applies to one who falsely states the claim that the deposit was stolen, as well.
אֵיתִיבֵיהּ רַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר אַבָּא לְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: ״הֵיכָן שׁוֹרִי?״ ״נִגְנַב״. ״מַשְׁבִּיעֲךָ אֲנִי״, וְאָמַר: ״אָמֵן״, וְהָעֵדִים מְעִידִים אוֹתוֹ שֶׁאֲכָלוֹ – מְשַׁלֵּם תַּשְׁלוּמֵי כֶפֶל. וְהָא הָכָא, דְּאִי אֶפְשָׁר לִכְזַיִת בָּשָׂר בְּלֹא שְׁחִיטָה, וְקָתָנֵי: מְשַׁלֵּם תַּשְׁלוּמֵי כֶפֶל; תַּשְׁלוּמֵי כֶפֶל – אִין, תַּשְׁלוּמֵי אַרְבָּעָה וַחֲמִשָּׁה – לָא!
Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba raised an objection to the statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan from a baraita: In a scenario where one said to an unpaid bailee: Where is my ox? Then the bailee responded: It was stolen. And the owner said: I administer an oath to you, and the bailee said: Amen. And the witnesses testify about the bailee that he ate it, he pays double payment. But here, the halakha is that it is impossible to eat even an olive-bulk of meat without slaughtering the animal first, indicating that it must have been slaughtered, and nevertheless it teaches that he pays double payment. It can be inferred that double payment, yes, he pays; but fourfold or fivefold payment, no, he does not pay.
הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן – כְּגוֹן שֶׁאֲכָלוֹ נְבֵילָה.
Rabbi Yoḥanan answers: With what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a case where he ate it as an unslaughtered animal carcass. Since it was not killed according to the halakhot of ritual slaughter, the thief does not pay the fourfold or fivefold payment.
וְלִישַׁנֵּי לֵיהּ כְּגוֹן שֶׁאֲכָלוֹ טְרֵיפָה! כְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר, דְּאָמַר: שְׁחִיטָה שֶׁאֵינָהּ רְאוּיָה – שְׁמָהּ שְׁחִיטָה.
The Gemara asks: And let Rabbi Yoḥanan answer Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba by saying that it is a case such as where he ate it as an animal with a wound that will cause it to die within twelve months [tereifa], in accordance with Rabbi Shimon’s opinion that the legal status of an act of slaughter that is not fit for accomplishing its full ritual purpose is not considered an act of slaughter for which the thief must pay the fourfold or fivefold payment. The Gemara responds that Rabbi Yoḥanan holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who says that the legal status of an act of slaughter that is not fit for accomplishing its full ritual purpose is considered an act of slaughter, and the thief would pay the fourfold or fivefold payment.
וְלִישַׁנֵּי לֵיהּ בְּבֶן פְּקוּעָה! כְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר, דְּאָמַר: בֶּן פְּקוּעָה טָעוּן שְׁחִיטָה.
The Gemara further asks: And let Rabbi Yoḥanan answer Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba by saying that the ruling of the baraita is stated with regard to an animal removed from its mother’s womb after the mother was ritually slaughtered [ben pekua], which is permitted for consumption without slaughter, so that there is a possibility that the thief ate it without first slaughtering it. The Gemara responds that Rabbi Yoḥanan holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who says that a ben pekua requires slaughter.
וְלִישַׁנֵּי לֵיהּ כְּגוֹן שֶׁעָמַד בַּדִּין, וְאָמְרוּ לוֹ: ״צֵא תֵּן לוֹ״! דְּהָא אָמַר רָבָא: ״צֵא תֵּן לוֹ״, טָבַח וּמָכַר – פָּטוּר. מַאי טַעְמָא? כֵּיוָן דְּפַסְקֵיהּ לְמִילְּתֵיהּ, וְטָבַח וּמָכַר – הָוֵי גַּזְלָן, וְגַזְלָן לָא מְשַׁלֵּם תַּשְׁלוּמֵי אַרְבָּעָה וַחֲמִשָּׁה.
The Gemara further asks: And let Rabbi Yoḥanan answer Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba by saying that it is a case where the bailee stood in judgment in court, and the judges said to him: Go out and give him the stolen animal, and he did not do so, and subsequently slaughtered or sold it? In this case he would not pay the fourfold or fivefold payment, as doesn’t Rava say that if the judges instruct a thief: Go out and give him the stolen animal, and he instead slaughtered or sold it, he is exempt from paying the fourfold or fivefold payment. What is the reason for this? Once the court ruled on his matter, requiring him to give the animal to the owner, and he did not heed the court’s ruling but slaughtered or sold the animal, he is considered a robber, and not a thief; and a robber does not pay fourfold or fivefold payment.
״חַיָּיב אַתָּה לִיתֵּן לוֹ״, וְטָבַח וּמָכַר – חַיָּיב. מַאי טַעְמָא? כֹּל כַּמָּה דְּלָא פְּסִיקָא לֵיהּ מִילְּתָא, אַכַּתִּי גַּנָּב הוּא.
Rava continues: But if the judges say only: You are obligated to give the animal to him, and he did not heed the court’s statement but slaughtered or sold the animal, then he is obligated to pay the fourfold or fivefold payment. What is the reason for this? Since the court has not issued a definitive ruling in this matter, he is still considered a thief rather than a robber.
אָמְרִי: וְלִיטַעְמָיךְ, לִישַׁנֵּי לֵיהּ בְּשׁוּתָּף שֶׁטָּבַח שֶׁלֹּא מִדַּעַת חֲבֵירוֹ! אֶלָּא חֲדָא מִתְּרֵי וּתְלָתָא נָקֵט.
The Sages say in response: And according to your reasoning, let Rabbi Yoḥanan answer Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba by saying that the ruling of the baraita is stated with regard to a partner who slaughtered an animal stolen by him and his partner without the other partner’s knowledge, as the halakha is that in such a case, the thief, i.e., the partner who slaughtered the animal, does not pay fourfold or fivefold payment. Rather, Rabbi Yoḥanan selected one of two or three possible answers but did not mean to say that it was the only possible answer.
וְאָמַר רַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר אַבָּא אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: הַטּוֹעֵן טַעֲנַת גַּנָּב בַּאֲבֵידָה, מְשַׁלֵּם תַּשְׁלוּמֵי כֶפֶל. מַאי טַעְמָא? דִּכְתִיב: ״עַל כׇּל אֲבֵדָה אֲשֶׁר יֹאמַר״.
§ The Gemara cites a related ruling: And Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: With regard to one who falsely states the claim, with regard to a lost item, that a thief stole it, i.e., he found a lost item, and when the owner requested its return, he claimed that it had been stolen from him, and it became known that he lied and had taken the item himself, he pays double payment. What is the reason for this? As it is written in the verse concerning double payment for a thief: “For any matter of trespass, from an ox, for a donkey, for a sheep, for a garment, or for any lost item about which one shall say: This is it, the claims of both of them shall come before the judges; the one whom the judges convict shall pay double to his neighbor” (Exodus 22:8). It can be seen from here that double payment applies to a false claim of theft even with regard to a lost item.
אֵיתִיבֵיהּ רַבִּי אַבָּא בַּר מֶמֶל לְרַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר אַבָּא: ״כִּי יִתֵּן אִישׁ״ – אֵין נְתִינַת קָטָן כְּלוּם. וְאֵין לִי אֶלָּא שֶׁנְּתָנוֹ כְּשֶׁהוּא קָטָן, וּתְבָעוֹ כְּשֶׁהוּא קָטָן; נְתָנוֹ כְּשֶׁהוּא קָטָן וּתְבָעוֹ כְּשֶׁהוּא גָּדוֹל – מִנַּיִן? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״עַד הָאֱלֹהִים יָבֹא דְּבַר שְׁנֵיהֶם״ – עַד שֶׁתְּהֵא נְתִינָה וּתְבִיעָה שָׁוִין כְּאֶחָד.
Rabbi Abba bar Memel raised an objection to Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba from a baraita: The verse states: “If a man gives his neighbor money or vessels to safeguard, and it was stolen from the house of the man, if the thief shall be found, he shall pay double” (Exodus 22:6). The use of the word “man” indicates that the giving of a deposit by a minor is nothing. And I have derived only a case where he gives the deposit when he is a minor and lodges the claim concerning it against the bailee when he is still a minor. From where is it derived that the halakha would be the same in a case where he gives the deposit when he is a minor and lodges the claim concerning it against the bailee when he is an adult? The verse states: “The claims of both of them shall come before the judges” (Exodus 22:8), i.e., the claim is valid only when the giving of the deposit and the claim are equal, both done when he is an adult.
וְאִם אִיתָא, תֶּיהְוֵי נָמֵי כַּאֲבֵידָה! אֲמַר לֵיהּ: הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן – כְּגוֹן שֶׁאֲכָלוֹ כְּשֶׁהוּא קָטָן.
Based on the ruling of this baraita, Rabbi Abba bar Memel raises his objection: And if it is so that even one who finds a lost item pays double payment for claiming falsely that it was stolen, indicating that the giving of the item as a deposit by the owner is not an essential condition to render the thief liable for double payment, then the claim of a minor should be like a lost item as well, and one who received a deposit from a minor should be liable for double payment. Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said to him: With what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a case where the bailee consumed the deposit when the owner was still a minor, so that at the time it was consumed, the owner had no legal standing. Therefore, the bailee is not obligated to pay.
אֲבָל כְּשֶׁהוּא גָּדוֹל מַאי, הָכִי נָמֵי דִּמְשַׁלֵּם? אִי הָכִי, אַדִּתְנָא: עַד שֶׁתְּהֵא נְתִינָה וּתְבִיעָה שָׁוִין כְּאֶחָד, לִיתְנֵי: עַד שֶׁתְּהֵא אֲכִילָה וּתְבִיעָה שָׁוִין כְּאֶחָד! אֲמַר לֵיהּ, תְּנִי: עַד שֶׁתְּהֵא אֲכִילָה וּתְבִיעָה שָׁוִין כְּאֶחָד.
Rabbi Abba bar Memel questions this answer: But had the bailee consumed it when the owner was already an adult, what is the halakha; indeed, would the halakha be that the bailee pays? If so, rather than teaching: The claim is valid only when the giving of the deposit and the claim are equal, let the baraita teach: The claim is valid only when the consumption of the deposit and the claim are equal, which would be a more precise ruling. Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said to him: Emend the baraita and teach: The claim is valid only when the consumption of the deposit and the claim are equal.
רַב אָשֵׁי אָמַר: לָא דָּמֵי; אֲבֵידָה – קָא אָתְיָא מִכֹּחַ בֶּן דַּעַת, וְהָא – לָא אָתְיָא מִכֹּחַ בֶּן דַּעַת.
Rav Ashi said a different answer to Rabbi Abba bar Memel’s objection: The two cases are not comparable, so an objection to Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba’s statement concerning a lost item cannot be derived from the case of a minor giving a deposit, because the lost item came into the possession of the finder by the power of one who is mentally competent, as the one who lost it is presumed to be an adult, though he did not personally give it to the finder; but this deposit given by a minor did not come into his possession by the power of one who is mentally competent, as from a halakhic perspective, a minor is not considered mentally competent. Therefore, he has no grounds for a claim.
וְאָמַר רַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר אַבָּא אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: הַטּוֹעֵן טַעֲנַת גַּנָּב בְּפִקָּדוֹן, אֵינוֹ חַיָּיב עַד שֶׁיִּכְפּוֹר בְּמִקְצָת וְיוֹדֶה בְּמִקְצָת. מַאי טַעְמָא? דְּאָמַר קְרָא: ״כִּי הוּא זֶה״. וּפְלִיגָא דְּרַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר יוֹסֵף – דְּאָמַר רַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר יוֹסֵף:
§ The Gemara quotes a related ruling: And Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: With regard to one who falsely states the claim, with regard to a deposit, that a thief stole it, he is not obligated to take an oath, nor to pay double payment, until he denies part of the claim and admits to part of the claim. What is the reason for this? As the verse states: “About which one shall say: This is it” (Exodus 22:8), indicating an admittance of only this part, but no more. The Gemara notes: And this disagrees with the ruling of Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Yosef, as Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Yosef says:
