Bava Kamma 83
לָשׁוֹן סוּרְסִי לָמָּה? אוֹ לְשׁוֹן הַקֹּדֶשׁ, אוֹ לָשׁוֹן יְוָנִית! וְאָמַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי: [בְּ]בָבֶל – לְשׁוֹן אֲרַמִּי לָמָּה? אוֹ לְשׁוֹן הַקֹּדֶשׁ, אוֹ לָשׁוֹן פָּרְסִי! אָמְרִי: לָשׁוֹן יְוָנִי לְחוּד, חׇכְמַת יְוָנִית לְחוּד.
why would one speak the Syriac [Sursi] language? One should speak either the sacred tongue, Hebrew, or the Greek language. And Rabbi Yosei said similarly: In Babylonia, why would one speak the Aramaic language? One should speak either the sacred tongue or the Persian language. At any rate, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi’s statement indicates that there is nothing wrong with learning and speaking Greek. The Sages say in response: The Greek language is discrete, and Greek wisdom is discrete. In other words, these are two separate issues; only Greek wisdom is prohibited, not the Greek language.
וְחׇכְמַת יְוָנִית מִי אֲסִירָא?! וְהָאָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל מִשּׁוּם רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל: ״עֵינִי עוֹלְלָה לְנַפְשִׁי מִכֹּל בְּנוֹת עִירִי״ – אֶלֶף יְלָדִים הָיוּ בְּבֵית אַבָּא; חֲמֵשׁ מֵאוֹת מֵהֶם לָמְדוּ תּוֹרָה, חֲמֵשׁ מֵאוֹת לָמְדוּ חׇכְמַת יְוָנִית; וְלֹא נִשְׁתַּיֵּיר מֵהֶם אֶלָּא אֲנִי – כָּאן, וּבֶן אֲחִי אַבָּא – בְּעַסְיָא!
The Gemara further pursues this line of inquiry: And is Greek wisdom itself actually prohibited? But doesn’t Rav Yehuda say that Shmuel says in the name of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel: It is written: “My eye affected my soul, because of all the daughters of my city” (Lamentations 3:51). Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel applied this verse to a personal tragedy: There were a thousand children in the household of my father, Rabban Gamliel; five hundred of them studied the Torah, and five hundred of them studied Greek wisdom. All of them were killed by the Romans; and the only ones that remain of them are I, who is here, and the son of my father’s brother, who is in Asia Minor [Asya]. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel’s statement indicates that it is permitted to study Greek wisdom.
אָמְרִי: שָׁאנֵי בֵּית רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל, שֶׁהָיוּ קְרוֹבִים לַמַּלְכוּת. וְכִדְתַנְיָא: הַמְסַפֵּר קוֹמֵי – הֲרֵי זֶה מִדַּרְכֵי הָאֱמוֹרִי. אַבְטוּלְמוֹס בַּר רְאוּבֵן הִתִּירוּ לוֹ לְסַפֵּר קוֹמֵי, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהוּא קָרוֹב לַמַּלְכוּת. שֶׁל בֵּית רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל הִתִּירוּ לָהֶם לְסַפֵּר בְּחׇכְמַת יְוָנִית, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁקְּרוֹבִים לַמַּלְכוּת.
The Sages say in response: The household of Rabban Gamliel is different, as they held close ties with the government. Since knowledge of Greek wisdom was crucial for the members of this family, the Sages exempted them from the general decree, as it is taught in a baraita: With regard to one who cuts his hair in the fashion of komi, a certain haircut favored by the Romans, this is considered one of the ways of the Amorites, i.e., a gentile practice prohibited by the Torah (Leviticus 18:3). Despite this, the Sages permitted Avtolmos bar Reuven to cut his hair in the fashion of komi, because he had close ties with the government. Likewise, they permitted the members of the household of Rabban Gamliel to discuss matters of Greek wisdom, because they had close ties with the government.
לֹא יְגַדֵּל אָדָם אֶת הַכֶּלֶב אֶלָּא אִם כֵּן קָשׁוּר בְּשַׁלְשְׁלָאוֹת כּוּ׳. תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: לֹא יְגַדֵּל אָדָם אֶת הַכֶּלֶב – אֶלָּא אִם כֵּן קָשׁוּר בְּשַׁלְשֶׁלֶת. אֲבָל מְגַדֵּל הוּא בָּעִיר הַסְּמוּכָה לַסְּפָר, וְקוֹשְׁרוֹ בַּיּוֹם וּמַתִּירוֹ בַּלַּיְלָה.
§ The mishna teaches: A person may not raise a dog unless it is tied with chains. The Sages taught in a baraita: A person may not raise a dog unless it is tied with a chain. But he may raise a dog in a city that is close to the border of the country, and in that case he should tie it during the day but may release it at night.
תַּנְיָא רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר הַגָּדוֹל אוֹמֵר: הַמְגַדֵּל כְּלָבִים – כִּמְגַדֵּל חֲזִירִים. לְמַאי נָפְקָא מִינַּהּ? לְמֵיקַם עֲלֵיהּ בְּאָרוּר.
It is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Eliezer the Great says: One who raises dogs is like one who raises pigs. The Gemara asks: What is the practical significance of this statement? Since both are prohibited, what is the point of this comparison? The Gemara answers: The significance is with regard to determining when one is liable to be cursed for it. Rabbi Eliezer is saying that the same curse meted out to one who raises pigs also applies to one who raises dogs.
אָמַר רַב יוֹסֵף בַּר מִנְיוֹמֵי אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן: בָּבֶל – כְּעִיר הַסְּמוּכָה לַסְּפָר דָּמֵי. תַּרְגְּמַהּ: נְהַרְדְּעָא.
Rav Yosef bar Minyumi says that Rav Naḥman says: Babylonia is considered like a city close to the border, and therefore it is permitted to raise dogs there. The Gemara qualifies this statement, and in this context, Babylonia is interpreted as referring only to Neharde’a, a city that was close to the border.
דָּרֵישׁ רַבִּי דּוֹסְתַּאי דְּמִן בֵּירֵי: ״וּבְנֻחֹה יֹאמַר שׁוּבָה ה׳ רִבְבוֹת אַלְפֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל״ – לְלַמֶּדְךָ, שֶׁאֵין שְׁכִינָה שׁוֹרָה עַל יִשְׂרָאֵל פָּחוֹת מִשְּׁנֵי אֲלָפִים וּשְׁנֵי רְבָבוֹת. חָסֵר אַחַת, וְהָיְתָה אִשָּׁה מְעוּבֶּרֶת בֵּינֵיהֶם וּרְאוּיָה לְהַשְׁלִים, וְנָבַח בָּהּ כֶּלֶב וְהִפִּילָה, נִמְצָא זֶה גּוֹרֵם לַשְּׁכִינָה שֶׁתִּסְתַּלֵּק מִיִּשְׂרָאֵל.
With regard to raising dogs, Rabbi Dostai from Biri expounded: It is written in connection to the Ark of the Covenant: “And when it rested, he said: Return, O Lord, to the myriads of the thousands of Israel” (Numbers 10:36). This verse serves to teach you that the Divine Presence does not rest upon the Jewish people if they number fewer than two thousand and two myriads, where one myriad is equal to ten thousand. The plural form of “myriads” and “thousands” indicates at least two of each. If they are lacking one individual from this total, and there was a pregnant woman among them, who was fit to complete the number by giving birth, and a dog barked at her and she miscarried as a result of the fright, this owner of the dog is found to have caused the Divine Presence to depart from the Jewish people.
הָהִיא אִיתְּתָא דְּעַלַּת לְמֵיפָא בְּהָהוּא בֵּיתָא, נְבַח בַּהּ כַּלְבָּא. אֲמַר לַהּ מָרֵיהּ: לָא תִּיסְתְּפַי מִינֵּיהּ, שְׁקִילִי נִיבֵיהּ. אֲמַרָה לֵיהּ: שְׁקִילָה טֵיבוּתָיךְ וְשַׁדְיָא אַחִיזְרֵי, כְּבָר נָד וָלָד.
There was a certain woman who entered a certain building to bake. A dog barked at her. Its owner said to her: Do not be afraid of it; its canine teeth have been removed. She said to him: It is too late for your reassurances. Take your favors and throw them on the thorns! I have felt that the baby has already moved from its place in the womb and will not be born alive.
אֵין פּוֹרְסִין נִישְׁבִּין לְיוֹנִים וְכוּ׳. וּמִי אָזְלִי כּוּלֵּי הַאי? וְהָתְנַן: מַרְחִיקִין אֶת הַשּׁוֹבָךְ מִן הָעִיר חֲמִשִּׁים אַמָּה! אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: מֵישָׁט שָׁיְיטִי טוּבָא, כַּרְסַיְיהוּ בַּחֲמִשִּׁים אַמָּה מַלְיָא.
§ The mishna teaches: One may spread out traps for pigeons only if this was performed at a distance of at least thirty ris, which is eight thousand cubits, from any settled area, to ensure that privately owned pigeons are not caught in the traps. The Gemara asks: And do pigeons really travel that far from their established places? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (Bava Batra 23a): One must distance a dovecote fifty cubits from the city, so that the pigeons that settle in the cotes do not eat the crops that grow in the gardens of the city. This shows that the range of a pigeon is only fifty cubits, whereas four mil is eight thousand cubits. Abaye said: Pigeons fly much more than fifty cubits away from their cotes, but their stomachs become full from the food they find within fifty cubits, and therefore they do not eat any more beyond that range.
וּמֵישָׁט שְׁלֹשִׁים רִיס וְתוּ לָא? וְהָתַנְיָא: בַּיִּשּׁוּב – אֲפִילּוּ מֵאָה מִיל לֹא יִפְרוֹס! רַב יוֹסֵף אָמַר: בְּיִשּׁוּב כְּרָמִים. רַבָּה אָמַר: בְּיִשּׁוּב שׁוֹבָכִין.
The Gemara asks: And with regard to flying, is their range only thirty ris and no more? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: In a settled area, one may not spread out a trap for pigeons even at a distance of one hundred mil from the settlement? This indicates that a privately owned pigeon might be trapped even one hundred mil away from a settled area. Why, then, does the mishna permit trapping beyond four mil? Rav Yosef said: The baraita is not talking about an ordinary city but about a settled area where vineyards are grown. Since the pigeons rest in the vineyards as they travel, they are able to traverse great distances. Rabba stated a different answer: The baraita is dealing with a settled area where there are many dovecotes in which they can rest from their flight.
וְתִיפּוֹק לֵיהּ מִשּׁוּם שׁוֹבָכִין גּוּפַיְיהוּ! אִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: בִּדְגוֹי, וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: בִּדְהֶפְקֵר, וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: בְּדִידֵיהּ.
The Gemara asks: If there are many dovecotes along the way, let the tanna derive the prohibition against setting pigeon traps due to the dovecotes themselves. Since the mishna teaches that it is prohibited to trap pigeons within four mil of privately owned dovecotes, it should be irrelevant that there is a city one hundred mil away. The Gemara answers: If you wish, say that the baraita is dealing with dovecotes that belong to a gentile, and the prohibition against trapping pigeons from private dovecotes applies only to birds owned by Jews. Or if you wish, say that the baraita is dealing with abandoned dovecotes that are ownerless. Or if you wish, say that it is referring to dovecotes that are his, i.e., they belong to the same individual who is setting the pigeon trap.
הֲדַרַן עֲלָךְ מְרוּבָּה
MISHNA: One who injures another is liable to pay compensation for that injury due to five types of indemnity: He must pay for damage, for pain, for medical costs, for loss of livelihood, and for humiliation.
מַתְנִי׳ הַחוֹבֵל בַּחֲבֵירוֹ, חַיָּיב עָלָיו מִשּׁוּם חֲמִשָּׁה דְּבָרִים: בְּנֶזֶק, בְּצַעַר, בְּרִיפּוּי, בְּשֶׁבֶת וּבוֹשֶׁת.
How is payment for damage assessed? If one blinded another’s eye, severed his hand, broke his leg, or caused any other injury, the court views the injured party as though he were a slave being sold in the slave market, and the court appraises how much he was worth before the injury and how much he is worth after the injury. The difference between these two sums is the amount that one must pay for causing damage.
בְּנֶזֶק כֵּיצַד? סִימֵּא אֶת עֵינוֹ; קָטַע אֶת יָדוֹ; שִׁיבֵּר אֶת רַגְלוֹ – רוֹאִין אוֹתוֹ כְּאִילּוּ הוּא עֶבֶד נִמְכָּר בַּשּׁוּק, וְשָׁמִין כַּמָּה הָיָה יָפֶה וְכַמָּה הוּא יָפֶה.
How is payment for pain assessed? If one burned another with a skewer [beshapud] or with a hot nail, or even if one burned another on his fingernail, which is a place where he does not cause a bruise that would affect the victim’s value on the slave market, the court evaluates how much money a person with a similar threshold for pain as the victim is willing to take in order to be made to suffer in this way. The one who burned the victim must then pay this amount.
צַעַר – כְּוָאוֹ (אוֹ) בְּשַׁפּוּד אוֹ בְּמַסְמֵר, וַאֲפִילּוּ עַל צִיפּוֹרְנוֹ מְקוֹם שֶׁאֵינוֹ עוֹשֶׂה חַבּוּרָה – אוֹמְדִין כַּמָּה אָדָם כַּיּוֹצֵא בָּזֶה רוֹצֶה לִיטּוֹל, לִהְיוֹת מִצְטַעֵר כָּךְ.
How is payment for medical costs assessed? If one struck another, then he is liable to heal him by paying for his medical costs. In a case where growths, e.g., blisters or rashes, appeared on the injured party, if the growths are due to the blow, the one who struck him is liable; if the growths are not due to the blow, the one who struck him is exempt. In a case where the wound healed, and then reopened, and again healed, and then reopened, the one who struck him remains liable to heal the injured party by paying for his medical costs, as it is apparent that the current wound resulted from the original injury. If the injury healed fully, the one who struck him is not liable to heal him by paying for any subsequent medical costs.
רִיפּוּי – הִכָּהוּ, חַיָּיב לְרַפּאוֹתוֹ. עָלָה בּוֹ צְמָחִים, אִם מֵחֲמַת הַמַּכָּה – חַיָּיב, שֶׁלֹּא מֵחֲמַת הַמַּכָּה – פָּטוּר. חָיְיתָה וְנִסְתְּרָה חָיְיתָה וְנִסְתְּרָה – חַיָּיב לְרַפּאוֹתוֹ. חָיְיתָה כׇּל צוֹרְכָּהּ – אֵינוֹ חַיָּיב לְרַפּאוֹתוֹ.
How is payment for loss of livelihood assessed? The court views the injured party as though he were a watchman of cucumbers, and the one who caused him injury must compensate him based on that pay scale for the income that he lost during his convalescence. This indemnity does not take into account the value of the standard wages of the injured party because the one who caused him injury already gave him compensation for his hand or compensation for his leg, and that compensation took into account his professional skills.
שֶׁבֶת – רוֹאִין אוֹתוֹ כְּאִילּוּ הוּא שׁוֹמֵר קִישּׁוּאִין, שֶׁכְּבָר נָתַן לוֹ דְּמֵי יָדוֹ וּדְמֵי רַגְלוֹ.
How is payment for humiliation assessed? It all depends on the stature of the one who humiliates the other and the one who is humiliated.
בּוֹשֶׁת – הַכֹּל לְפִי הַמְבַיֵּישׁ וְהַמִּתְבַּיֵּישׁ.
GEMARA: The Gemara asks: Why does the mishna take for granted the fact that one who caused injury is liable to pay compensation to the injured party? The Merciful One states in the Torah: “An eye for an eye” (Exodus 21:24). You might say that this means that the one who caused injury shall lose an actual eye rather than pay money.
גְּמָ׳ אַמַּאי? ״עַיִן תַּחַת עַיִן״ אָמַר רַחֲמָנָא – אֵימָא עַיִן מַמָּשׁ!
The Gemara responds: That interpretation should not enter your mind. The principle implicit in the mishna is derived from a verbal analogy in the Torah, as it is taught in a baraita: Based on the verse: “An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, a hand for a hand, a foot for a foot” (Exodus 21:24), one might have thought that if one blinded the eye of another, the court blinds his eye as punishment; or if one severed the hand of another, the court severs his hand; or if one broke the leg of another, the court breaks his leg. Therefore, the verse states: “One who strikes a person,” and the verse also states: “And one who strikes an animal,” to teach that just as one who strikes an animal is liable to pay monetary compensation, so too, one who strikes a person is liable to pay monetary compensation.
לָא סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ; דְּתַנְיָא: יָכוֹל סִימֵּא אֶת עֵינוֹ – מְסַמֵּא אֶת עֵינוֹ, קָטַע אֶת יָדוֹ – מְקַטֵּעַ אֶת יָדוֹ, שִׁיבֵּר אֶת רַגְלוֹ – מְשַׁבֵּר אֶת רַגְלוֹ? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״מַכֵּה אָדָם״ וּ״מַכֵּה בְהֵמָה״; מָה מַכֵּה בְהֵמָה – לְתַשְׁלוּמִין, אַף מַכֵּה אָדָם – לְתַשְׁלוּמִין.
And if it is your wish to say that there is an objection to this derivation, there is an alternative derivation: The verse states: “And you shall not take ransom for the life of a murderer, who is guilty of death, for he shall die” (Numbers 35:31). This indicates that it is only for the life of a murderer that you shall not take ransom; but you shall take ransom for one who severed another’s extremities, which is analogous to the death of a limb, as severed limbs do not regenerate.
וְאִם נַפְשְׁךָ לוֹמַר, הֲרֵי הוּא אוֹמֵר: ״לֹא תִקְחוּ כֹפֶר לְנֶפֶשׁ רֹצֵחַ, אֲשֶׁר הוּא רָשָׁע לָמוּת״ – לְנֶפֶשׁ רוֹצֵחַ אִי אַתָּה לוֹקֵחַ כּוֹפֶר, אֲבָל אַתָּה לוֹקֵחַ כּוֹפֶר לְרָאשֵׁי אֵבָרִים שֶׁאֵין חוֹזְרִין.
The Gemara asks: To which verse is the baraita referring when it quotes: “One who strikes a person” and: “One who strikes an animal”? If we say that the baraita is referring to the verse: “One who strikes an animal shall pay its compensation, and one who strikes a person shall be put to death” (Leviticus 24:21), this cannot be, as that verse is written with regard to killing, not injury, and there is no monetary compensation for killing.
הֵי ״מַכֶּה״? אִילֵימָא ״מַכֵּה בְהֵמָה יְשַׁלְּמֶנָּה, וּמַכֵּה אָדָם יוּמָת״ – הָהוּא בִּקְטָלָא כְּתִיב!
Rather, the baraita references the verse from here: “One who strikes an animal mortally shall pay its compensation, a life for a life” (Leviticus 24:18); and juxtaposed to that is the verse: “And if a man maims his neighbor, as he has done, so shall it be done to him” (Leviticus 24:19). The Gemara challenges: But this latter verse does not use the expression: “One who strikes,” which is the basis for the comparison in the baraita. The Gemara responds: We are stating an analogy from striking to striking that is based not upon the exact phrasing of the verse but upon the details of the halakha, as follows: Just as the act of striking that is stated with regard to an animal renders one liable to pay monetary compensation, so too, the act of striking that is stated with regard to a person renders one liable to pay monetary compensation.
אֶלָּא מֵהָכָא: ״מַכֵּה נֶפֶשׁ בְּהֵמָה יְשַׁלְּמֶנָּה, נֶפֶשׁ תַּחַת נָפֶשׁ״, וּסְמִיךְ לֵיהּ: ״וְאִישׁ כִּי יִתֵּן מוּם בַּעֲמִיתוֹ, כַּאֲשֶׁר עָשָׂה כֵּן יֵעָשֶׂה לוֹ״. הַאי לָאו ״מַכֶּה״ הוּא! ״הַכָּאָה״–״הַכָּאָה״ קָאָמְרִינַן; מָה הַכָּאָה הָאֲמוּרָה בִּבְהֵמָה – לְתַשְׁלוּמִין, אַף הַכָּאָה הָאֲמוּרָה בְּאָדָם – לְתַשְׁלוּמִין.
The Gemara challenges: But isn’t it written in the verses discussing one who injures another: “And a man who strikes any person mortally shall be put to death” (Leviticus 24:17), which presumably means that in the case of one who severs another’s extremity the same injury, i.e., death of a limb, is done to the one who caused the injury, and he does not pay monetary compensation? The Gemara answers: The verse does not mean that his limb shall be put to death, i.e., removed, but rather, that he should pay compensation with money. The Gemara asks: From where do you say that the verse is referring to paying compensation with money? Why not say that he is punished with actual death i.e., loss of a limb?
וְהָא כְּתִיב: ״וְאִישׁ כִּי יַכֶּה כׇּל נֶפֶשׁ אָדָם, מוֹת יוּמָת״! בְּמָמוֹן. מִמַּאי דִּבְמָמוֹן? אֵימָא בְּמִיתָה מַמָּשׁ!
The Gemara answers: That interpretation should not enter your mind for two reasons. One reason is that this verse is juxtaposed to the following verse: “One who strikes an animal mortally shall pay its compensation” (Leviticus 24:18). And furthermore, it is written after it: “A fracture for a fracture, an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth; as he has given a blemish to a person, so shall it be given unto him” (Leviticus 24:20); and learn from the use of the word “given” that the verse is referring to money.
לָא סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ. חֲדָא – דְּהָא אִיתַּקַּשׁ לְ״מַכֵּה בְהֵמָה יְשַׁלְּמֶנָּה״. וְעוֹד, כְּתִיב בָּתְרֵיהּ: ״כַּאֲשֶׁר יִתֵּן מוּם בָּאָדָם, כֵּן יִנָּתֶן בּוֹ״ – וּשְׁמַע מִינַּהּ מָמוֹן.
The Gemara asks: And what potential difficulty with the first derivation did the baraita refer to when it prefaced its second derivation with the phrase: If it is your wish to say? The Gemara explains: The baraita means that a further difficulty was troubling to the tanna: What did you see that led you to derive the principle of monetary payment from the phrase “one who strikes an animal”? Why not derive the halakha from the verse: “One who strikes a person shall be put to death” (Leviticus 24:21), and learn that causing an injury renders one liable to receive physical retribution, which is analogous to death, and not monetary payment?
וּמַאי ״אִם נַפְשְׁךָ לוֹמַר״? תּוּ קָא קַשְׁיָא לְתַנָּא – מַאי חָזֵית דְּיָלְפַתְּ מִמַּכֵּה בְהֵמָה? לֵילַף מִמַּכֵּה אָדָם!
The Sages say in response: The halakhot of damages are derived from a verse concerning damages, and the halakhot of damages are not derived from a verse concerning death. The Gemara questions this statement: On the contrary, why not say that the halakhot concerning a person are derived from a verse concerning a person, and the halakhot concerning a person are not derived from a verse concerning animals?
אָמְרִי: דָּנִין נְיזָקִין מִנְּיזָקִין, וְאֵין דָּנִין נְיזָקִין מִמִּיתָה. אַדְּרַבָּה! דָּנִין אָדָם מֵאָדָם, וְאֵין דָּנִין אָדָם מִבְּהֵמָה!
To deflect this question, this is consistent with that which the second derivation of the baraita teaches: If it is your wish to say that there is an objection to this derivation, there is an alternative derivation, as the verse states: “And you shall not take ransom for the life of a murderer, who is guilty of death, for he shall die” (Numbers 35:31). This indicates that it is only for the life of a murderer that you shall not take ransom; but you shall take ransom for one who severed another’s extremities, which is analogous to the death of a limb, as severed limbs do not regenerate.
הַיְינוּ דְּקָתָנֵי ״אִם נַפְשְׁךָ לוֹמַר״ – הֲרֵי הוּא אוֹמֵר: ״לֹא תִקְחוּ כֹפֶר לְנֶפֶשׁ רֹצֵחַ אֲשֶׁר הוּא רָשָׁע לָמוּת, כִּי מוֹת יוּמָת״ – לְנֶפֶשׁ רוֹצֵחַ אִי אַתָּה לוֹקֵחַ כּוֹפֶר, אֲבָל אַתָּה לוֹקֵחַ כּוֹפֶר לְרָאשֵׁי אֵבָרִים שֶׁאֵינָן חוֹזְרִין.
The Gemara challenges this claim: But is this verse: “You shall not take ransom for the life of a murderer,” coming to exclude the case of one who severs another’s extremities from the prohibition against taking ransom? Isn’t this verse necessary to teach that which the Merciful One states: You shall not mete out two punishments to him; i.e., do not take money from him as ransom and also kill him? The Gemara answers: That halakha is derived from the verse: “Then it shall be, if the guilty deserves to be lashed, that the judge shall lie him down and flog him before him, according to the measure of his evildoing” (Deuteronomy 25:2). From the fact that “evildoing” is singular, the Gemara homiletically infers: For one evildoing, you can render him liable, but you cannot render him liable for two evildoings, i.e., one cannot receive two punishments for the same act.
וְהַאי ״לֹא תִקְחוּ כֹפֶר לְנֶפֶשׁ רֹצֵחַ״ – לְמַעוֹטֵי רָאשֵׁי אֵבָרִים הוּא דַּאֲתָא? הַאי מִבְּעֵי לֵיהּ דְּאָמַר רַחֲמָנָא לָא תַּעֲבֵיד בֵּיהּ תַּרְתֵּי – לָא תִּשְׁקוֹל מִינֵּיהּ מָמוֹן וְתִקְטְלֵיהּ! הַאי מִ״כְּדֵי רִשְׁעָתוֹ״ נָפְקָא – רִשְׁעָה אַחַת אַתָּה מְחַיְּיבוֹ, וְאִי אַתָּה מְחַיְּיבוֹ שְׁתֵּי רִשְׁעָיוֹת.
The Gemara challenges this explanation: But the verse: “You shall not take ransom for the life of a murderer, for one who is guilty of death” is still necessary to teach the primary halakha taught in that verse, in which the Merciful One states: You shall not take money and thereby exempt the guilty from being put to death. The verse does not serve to exclude liability to pay damages from the prohibition against paying restitution. The Gemara answers: If so, i.e., if the Torah desires to teach only that the court cannot take ransom to spare the murderer from being put to death, let the Merciful One write in the Torah: “You shall not take ransom” and follow it immediately with the phrase “for one who is guilty of death.” Why do I need the Torah to also state: “For the life of a murderer”? Learn from the addition of that phrase that it is only for a murderer that you shall not take ransom; but you shall take ransom for one who severed another’s extremities, which do not regenerate once severed.
וְאַכַּתִּי מִבְּעֵי לֵיהּ, דְּקָאָמַר רַחֲמָנָא: לָא תִּשְׁקוֹל מָמוֹן וְתִפְטְרֵיהּ! אִם כֵּן, לִכְתּוֹב רַחֲמָנָא ״לֹא תִקְּחוּ כוֹפֶר לַאֲשֶׁר הוּא רָשָׁע לָמוּת״; ״לְנֶפֶשׁ רֹצֵחַ״ לְמָה לִי? שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ: לְנֶפֶשׁ רוֹצֵחַ אִי אַתָּה לוֹקֵחַ כּוֹפֶר, אֲבָל אַתָּה לוֹקֵחַ כּוֹפֶר לְרָאשֵׁי אֵבָרִים שֶׁאֵינָן חוֹזְרִין.
The Gemara asks: And once it is written: “You shall not take ransom,” why do I need the first derivation of the baraita, which juxtaposes: “One who strikes a person” to: “One who strikes an animal”? The Sages say in response: If the halakha were to be derived only from that verse which states: “You shall not take ransom” (Numbers 35:31), I would say: If the one who caused the damage desires, he may choose to give his eye, and if he desires, he may choose to give the monetary value of his eye. Therefore, the Torah teaches us to derive this halakha from that of an animal: Just as one who strikes an animal is liable to pay monetary compensation and does not receive corporal punishment, so too, one who strikes a person is liable to pay monetary compensation and does not receive corporal punishment.
וְכִי מֵאַחַר דִּכְתִיב ״לֹא תִקְּחוּ כֹפֶר״, ״מַכֵּה״–״מַכֵּה״ לְמָה לִי? אָמְרִי: אִי מֵהַאי, הֲוָה אָמֵינָא: אִי בָּעֵי – עֵינוֹ נִיתֵּיב, וְאִי בָּעֵי – דְּמֵי עֵינוֹ נִיתֵּיב; קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן מִבְּהֵמָה, מָה מַכֵּה בְהֵמָה – לְתַשְׁלוּמִין, אַף מַכֵּה אָדָם – לְתַשְׁלוּמִין.
§ The Gemara presents a series of derivations for the principle that one who injures another is liable to pay monetary compensation. It is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Dostai ben Yehuda says: The phrase: “An eye for an eye” (Leviticus 24:20), means monetary restitution. Do you say that he must pay the victim monetary restitution, or is it only teaching that the one who caused the injury must lose an actual eye? You say: There may be a case where the eye of the one who caused the injury is large and the eye of the injured party is small. How can I read and literally apply the phrase “an eye for an eye” in this case?
תַּנְיָא, רַבִּי דּוֹסְתַּאי בֶּן יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: ״עַיִן תַּחַת עַיִן״ – מָמוֹן. אַתָּה אוֹמֵר מָמוֹן, אוֹ אֵינוֹ אֶלָּא עַיִן מַמָּשׁ? אָמַרְתָּ, הֲרֵי שֶׁהָיְתָה עֵינוֹ שֶׁל זֶה גְּדוֹלָה וְעֵינוֹ שֶׁל זֶה קְטַנָּה, הֵיאַךְ אֲנִי קוֹרֵא בֵּיהּ ״עַיִן תַּחַת עַיִן״?
The Gemara continues the derivation: And if you would say that in all cases like this, where their eyes are different sizes, the injured party takes monetary restitution from the one who caused him injury, but in a case where their eyes are the same size, the one who caused injury is punished by actually having his eye removed, this cannot be, as the Torah said: “You shall have one manner of law” (Leviticus 24:22), teaching that the law shall be equal for all of you.
וְכִי תֵּימָא: כָּל כִּי הַאי – שָׁקֵיל מִינֵּיהּ מָמוֹנָא; הַתּוֹרָה אָמְרָה: ״מִשְׁפַּט אֶחָד יִהְיֶה לָכֶם״ – מִשְׁפָּט הַשָּׁוֶה לְכוּלְּכֶם!
The Sages object to this derivation and say: What is the difficulty in saying that his eye should be blinded? Perhaps, as the one who caused the injury took the sight from the injured party’s eye, the Merciful One states that the court should take the sight from his eye as well, no matter the size of the eye. Since, if you do not say so, then by the same logic,
אָמְרִי: מַאי קוּשְׁיָא? דִּלְמָא נְהוֹרָא שְׁקַיל מִינֵּיהּ, נְהוֹרָא אָמַר רַחֲמָנָא נִישְׁקוֹל מִינֵּיהּ! דְּאִי לָא תֵּימָא הָכִי,
