Bava Kamma 84
קָטָן שֶׁהָרַג אֶת הַגָּדוֹל וְגָדוֹל שֶׁהָרַג אֶת הַקָּטָן, הֵיכִי קָטְלִינַן לֵיהּ? הַתּוֹרָה אָמְרָה: ״מִשְׁפַּט אֶחָד יִהְיֶה לָכֶם״ – מִשְׁפָּט הַשָּׁוֶה לְכוּלְּכֶם! אֶלָּא נְשָׁמָה שְׁקַיל מִינֵּיהּ, נְשָׁמָה אָמַר רַחֲמָנָא נִשְׁקוֹל מִינֵּיהּ; הָכִי נָמֵי, נְהוֹרָא שְׁקַיל מִינֵּיהּ, נְהוֹרָא אָמַר רַחֲמָנָא נִשְׁקוֹל מִינֵּיהּ!
in the case of a small person who killed a large person, or a large person who killed a small person, how do we kill the murderer? If one suggests that in such a case a monetary penalty will be imposed, the Torah stated: “You shall have one manner of law” (Leviticus 24:22), teaching that the law shall be equal for all of you, so the punishment must be the same for all murderers. Rather, explain that since the murderer took the life of the victim, the Merciful One states that the court should likewise take the life from him. So too, since the one who caused the injury took the sight from the eye of the injured party, the Merciful One states that the court should likewise take the sight from his eye. Therefore, the Gemara does not accept the derivation of Rabbi Dostai ben Yehuda, in accordance with the objection of the Sages.
תַּנְיָא אִידַּךְ, רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן יוֹחַי אוֹמֵר: ״עַיִן תַּחַת עַיִן״ – מָמוֹן. אַתָּה אוֹמֵר מָמוֹן, אוֹ אֵינוֹ אֶלָּא עַיִן מַמָּשׁ? הֲרֵי שֶׁהָיָה סוֹמֵא, וְסִימֵּא; קִיטֵּעַ, וְקִיטַּע; חִיגֵּר, וְחִיגֵּר; הֵיאַךְ אֲנִי מְקַיֵּים בָּזֶה ״עַיִן תַּחַת עַיִן״ – וְהַתּוֹרָה אָמְרָה: ״מִשְׁפַּט אֶחָד יִהְיֶה לָכֶם״, מִשְׁפָּט הַשָּׁוֶה לְכוּלְּכֶם?
The Gemara presents another derivation: It is taught in another baraita that Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai says: “An eye for an eye” (Leviticus 24:20), is referring to monetary restitution. Do you say that this is referring to monetary restitution, or is it only teaching that the one who caused the injury must lose an actual eye? There may be a case where there was a blind person and he blinded another, or there was one with a severed limb and he severed the limb of another, or there was a lame person and he caused another to be lame. In this case, how can I fulfill “an eye for an eye” literally, when he is already lacking the limb that must be injured? If one will suggest that in that case, a monetary penalty will be imposed, that can be refuted: But the Torah stated: “You shall have one manner of law” (Leviticus 24:22), which teaches that the law shall be equal for all of you.
אָמְרִי: וּמַאי קוּשְׁיָא? דִּלְמָא הֵיכָא דְּאֶפְשָׁר – אֶפְשָׁר; הֵיכָא דְּלָא אֶפְשָׁר – לָא אֶפְשָׁר, וּפָטְרִינַן לֵיהּ! דְּאִי לָא תֵּימָא הָכִי, טְרֵפָה שֶׁהָרַג אֶת הַשָּׁלֵם – מַאי עָבְדִינַן לֵיהּ?
The Sages object to this derivation and say: And what is the difficulty? Perhaps in a case where it is possible to render the guilty party liable according to the punishment listed in the Torah, it is possible and the court does so; but in a case where it is not possible to enact such a punishment, it is not possible, and we exempt him. As if you do not say so, that punishing one and exempting another is not counter to the principle of: “One manner of law,” then by the same logic, in the case of one who has a wound that will cause him to die within twelve months [tereifa] and who killed a healthy person, what do we do to him?
אֶלָּא הֵיכָא דְּאֶפְשָׁר – אֶפְשָׁר; הֵיכָא דְּלָא אֶפְשָׁר – לָא אֶפְשָׁר, וּפָטְרִינַן לֵיהּ!
Rather, one must say that in a case where it is possible to render the guilty party liable according to the punishment listed in the Torah, it is possible and the court does so; but in a case where it is not possible to do so, it is not possible, and we exempt him. Therefore, the Gemara does not accept the derivation of Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai, in accordance with the objection of the Sages.
דְּבֵי רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל תָּנָא, אָמַר קְרָא: ״כֵּן יִנָּתֶן בּוֹ״ – וְאֵין נְתִינָה אֶלָּא מָמוֹן. אֶלָּא מֵעַתָּה, ״כַּאֲשֶׁר יִתֵּן מוּם בָּאָדָם״ – הָכִי נָמֵי דְּמָמוֹן הוּא?
The Gemara presents another derivation: The school of Rabbi Yishmael taught that the verse states: “A fracture for a fracture, an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth; as he has given a blemish to a person, so shall it be given unto him” (Leviticus 24:20), and giving can refer only to a payment of money. The Gemara challenges: But if that is so, then when the same verse states: “As he has given [yitten] a blemish to a person,” does this word, “yitten,” also refer to money? The word “yitten” means that he caused an actual injury, even though it employs a term whose literal meaning is give.
אָמְרִי: דְּבֵי רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל – קְרָא יַתִּירָא דָּרְשִׁי; מִכְּדֵי כְּתִיב: ״וְאִישׁ כִּי יִתֵּן מוּם בַּעֲמִיתוֹ, כַּאֲשֶׁר עָשָׂה כֵּן יֵעָשֶׂה לוֹ״; ״כֵּן יִנָּתֶן בּוֹ״ לְמָה לִי? שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ: מָמוֹן. ״כַּאֲשֶׁר יִתֵּן מוּם בָּאָדָם״ – לְמָה לִי? אַיְּידֵי דְּבָעֵי מִיכְתַּב ״כֵּן יִנָּתֶן בּוֹ״, כְּתַב נָמֵי ״כַּאֲשֶׁר יִתֵּן מוּם בָּאָדָם״.
The Sages say in response: The rabbis of the school of Rabbi Yishmael are interpreting a superfluous verse. Now, it is written: “And if a man gives a blemish to his neighbor; as he has done, so shall it be done to him” (Leviticus 24:19), so why do I need the verse: “So shall it be given unto him” (Leviticus 24:20)? Learn from the repetition that the verse is referring to monetary restitution. The Gemara asks: But if this is so, why do I need the verse: “As he has given [yitten] a blemish to a person” (Leviticus 24:20)? What does the usage of the term “yitten” teach? The Gemara answers: In fact, it does not teach anything, but rather, since the Merciful One needs to write at the end of that verse: “So shall it be given unto him,” where the employment of a term of giving is accurate, the Merciful One also wrote earlier in the verse: “As he has given [yitten] a blemish to a person.”
דְּבֵי רַבִּי חִיָּיא תָּנָא, אָמַר קְרָא: ״יָד בְּיָד״ – דָּבָר הַנִּיתָּן מִיָּד לְיָד; וּמַאי נִיהוּ? מָמוֹן. אֶלָּא מֵעַתָּה, ״רֶגֶל בְּרָגֶל״ נָמֵי הָכִי הוּא?!
The Gemara presents another derivation: The school of Rabbi Ḥiyya taught that the verse states with regard to conspiring witnesses: “And your eye shall not pity; a life for a life, an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, a hand for a hand, a foot for a foot” (Deuteronomy 19:21). This teaches that the witnesses pay compensation with that which is given from hand to hand. And what type of compensation is that? Monetary restitution. The Gemara challenges: But if that is so, is the phrase: “A foot for a foot” (Deuteronomy 19:21), also like that, i.e., is it teaching that the witnesses pay compensation with an item passed from foot to foot?
אָמְרִי: דְּבֵי רַבִּי חִיָּיא – קְרָא יַתִּירָא קָא דָרְשִׁי; מִכְּדֵי כְּתִיב: ״וַעֲשִׂיתֶם לוֹ כַּאֲשֶׁר זָמַם לַעֲשׂוֹת לְאָחִיו״; אִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ מַמָּשׁ, ״יָד בְּיָד״ לְמָה לִי? שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ: מָמוֹן. ״רֶגֶל בְּרָגֶל״ לְמָה לִי? אַיְּידֵי דִּכְתִיב ״יָד בְּיָד״, כְּתַב נָמֵי ״רֶגֶל בְּרָגֶל״.
The Sages say: The rabbis of the school of Rabbi Ḥiyya are interpreting a superfluous phrase in the verse. Now, it is written: “And you shall do to him as he purposed to do to his brother” (Deuteronomy 19:19). If it enters your mind to say that the verse means this literally, why do I need the Torah to specify: “A hand for a hand” (Deuteronomy 19:21)? The punishment will be whatever he purported to do to his brother. Learn from the extra phrase that the punishment is monetary restitution. If so, why do I need the phrase: “A foot for a foot” (Deuteronomy 19:21)? Since it is written: “A hand for a hand,” the Merciful One also wrote in the Torah: “A foot for a foot.”
אַבָּיֵי אוֹמֵר: אָתְיָא מִדְּתָנֵי דְּבֵי חִזְקִיָּה, דְּתָנָא דְּבֵי חִזְקִיָּה: ״עַיִן תַּחַת עַיִן״; ״נֶפֶשׁ תַּחַת נָפֶשׁ״ – וְלֹא נֶפֶשׁ וְעַיִן תַּחַת עַיִן. וְאִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ מַמָּשׁ, זִימְנִין דְּמַשְׁכַּחַתְּ לַהּ עַיִן וָנֶפֶשׁ תַּחַת עַיִן – דְּבַהֲדֵי דְּעַוַּיר לֵיהּ, נְפַקָא לֵיהּ נִשְׁמְתֵיהּ.
The Gemara presents another derivation: Abaye says that this principle is derived from that which was taught by the school of Ḥizkiyya, as the school of Ḥizkiyya taught that the Torah states: “An eye for an eye” (Exodus 21:24), and: “A life for a life” (Exodus 21:23), but not an eye and a life for an eye. And if it enters your mind to say that the verse means this literally, there could be times when you find a case where both an eye and a life are taken for an eye, i.e., when the one who caused the damage is so weak that as the court blinds his eye, his soul departs from his body.
וּמַאי קוּשְׁיָא? דִּלְמָא מֵימָד אָמְדִינַן לֵיהּ; אִי מָצֵי מְקַבֵּל – עָבְדִינַן, וְאִי לָא מָצֵי מְקַבֵּל – לָא עָבְדִינַן; וְאִי אָמְדִינַן דְּמָצֵי מְקַבֵּל, וְעָבְדִינַן בֵּיהּ וּנְפַק רוּחֵיהּ – אִי מָיֵית, לֵימוּת! מִי לָא תְּנַן גַּבֵּי מַלְקוֹת: אֲמָדוּהוּ, וּמֵת תַּחַת יָדוֹ – פָּטוּר?
The Gemara objects: And what is the difficulty? Perhaps we evaluate the physical condition of the guilty party; if he can withstand this punishment, then we do blind his eye; if he cannot withstand this punishment, then we do not do so and he goes unpunished. And if we evaluate him and determine that he can withstand this punishment, and we do so to him and blind his eye, and yet his soul departs his body as a result, if he dies, he will die. Didn’t we learn in a mishna with regard to lashes (Makkot 22b): If one was sentenced to be flogged, and the court evaluated him and determined that he could withstand a certain number of lashes, and he dies at the hand of the officer tasked with administering the lashes, then the officer is exempt, even though the one who was flogged was not sentenced to the death penalty? Therefore, the Gemara does not accept the derivation of Abaye.
רַב זְבִיד מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרַבָּה אָמַר, אָמַר קְרָא: ״פֶּצַע תַּחַת פָּצַע״ – לִיתֵּן צַעַר בִּמְקוֹם נֶזֶק. וְאִי סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ מַמָּשׁ – כִּי הֵיכִי דִּלְהַאי הָוֵי לֵיהּ צַעֲרָא, לְהַאי נָמֵי אִית לֵיהּ צַעֲרָא!
The Gemara presents another derivation: Rav Zevid said in the name of Rabba that the verse states: “A wound for a wound” (Exodus 21:25), to teach that one who injures another must pay compensation for pain, even in a case where he pays compensation for damage. And if it enters your mind that the phrase: “An eye for an eye” (Exodus 21:24), refers to the removal of an actual eye from the one who injured the other, then just as it is so that the injured party has pain from the loss of his eye, the one who caused him injury also has pain when the court removes his eye; why then does the Torah require that he pay compensation for pain as well?
וּמַאי קוּשְׁיָא? דִּלְמָא אִיכָּא אִינִישׁ דִּמְפַנַּק – אִית לֵיהּ צַעֲרָא טְפֵי, וְאִיכָּא אִינִישׁ דְּלָא מְפַנַּק – לֵית לֵיהּ צַעֲרָא! לְמַאי נָפְקָא מִינַּהּ? לְמִתַּבי לֵיהּ הַיְאךְ דְּבֵינֵי בֵּינֵי.
The Gemara objects: And what is the difficulty? Perhaps there is a person who is delicate, so he has more pain, and there is a person who is not delicate, so he does not have the same amount of pain. Therefore, even if the court actually removes an eye for an eye, the one who caused the injury might still need to compensate the injured party for pain. What is the practical difference when the Torah states: “A wound for a wound” (Exodus 21:25)? It renders the one who caused the injury liable to give the injured party compensation for the difference between them in pain tolerance. Therefore, the Gemara does not accept the derivation of Rav Zevid.
רַב פָּפָּא מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרָבָא אָמַר, אָמַר קְרָא: ״וְרַפֹּא יְרַפֵּא״ – לִיתֵּן רְפוּאָה בִּמְקוֹם נֶזֶק. וְאִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ מַמָּשׁ – כִּי הֵיכִי דְּהַאי בָּעֵי אָסְיָיא, הַאי נָמֵי בָּעֵי אָסְיָיא!
The Gemara presents another derivation: Rav Pappa said in the name of Rava that concerning one who was injured by another, who must pay for damage, the verse states: “If he rises again, and walks outside upon his staff, then he that struck him shall be absolved; only he shall pay for his loss of livelihood, and shall cause him to be thoroughly healed” (Exodus 21:19), which teaches that one who injures another must pay compensation for medical costs even in a case where he pays compensation for damage. And if it enters your mind that the phrase: “An eye for an eye” (Exodus 21:24), is referring to an actual eye, then just as it is so that the injured party needs healing, the one who caused him the injury also needs healing after the court removes his eye; why, then, does the Torah require that he pay compensation for medical costs as well?
מַאי קוּשְׁיָא? דִּלְמָא אִיכָּא דְּסָלֵיק בִּשְׂרֵיהּ הַיָּיא, וְאִיכָּא דְּלָא סָלֵיק בִּשְׂרֵיהּ הַיָּיא! לְמַאי נָפְקָא מִינַּהּ? לְמִיתַּב לֵיהּ הַיְאךְ דְּבֵינֵי בֵּינֵי.
The Gemara objects: What is the difficulty? Perhaps there is one whose flesh heals quickly, and there is another whose flesh does not heal quickly. Therefore, even if the court actually removes an eye for an eye, the one who caused the injury might still need to compensate the injured party for medical costs. What is the practical difference when the Torah states: “And shall cause him to be thoroughly healed” (Exodus 21:19)? It renders the one who caused the injury liable to give the injured party compensation for the difference between their respective medical costs.
רַב אָשֵׁי אָמַר: אָתְיָא ״תַּחַת״–״תַּחַת״ מִשּׁוֹר; כְּתִיב הָכָא: ״עַיִן תַּחַת עַיִן״, וּכְתִיב הָתָם: ״שַׁלֵּם יְשַׁלֵּם שׁוֹר תַּחַת הַשּׁוֹר״ – מָה לְהַלָּן מָמוֹן, אַף כָּאן מָמוֹן.
The Gemara presents another derivation: Rav Ashi said that the fact that one who injures another pays monetary restitution is derived from a verbal analogy of the word “for,” as written with regard to injuries caused to people from the word “for,” as written with regard to an ox that gored another ox. It is written here: “An eye for an eye” (Exodus 21:24), and it is written there, with regard to a forewarned ox that gored the ox of another: “He shall pay an ox for an ox” (Exodus 21:36). Just as there, the verse does not mean that the owner pays compensation with an actual ox, but rather pays monetary restitution, so too here, one who injures another pays monetary restitution.
מַאי חָזֵית דְּיָלְפַתְּ ״תַּחַת״–״תַּחַת״ מִשּׁוֹר? נֵילַף ״תַּחַת״–״תַּחַת״ מֵאָדָם – דִּכְתִיב: ״וְנָתַתָּ נֶפֶשׁ תַּחַת נֶפֶשׁ״; מָה לְהַלָּן מַמָּשׁ, אַף כָּאן מַמָּשׁ!
The Gemara asks: What did you see that led you to derive the halakha from a verbal analogy of the word “for” as stated in the verse with regard to injuries to a person from the word “for” as stated with regard to an ox? Let us learn a verbal analogy of the word “for” as stated in the verse with regard to injuries to a person from the word “for” as stated with regard to a person, as it is written about one who kills another: “You shall give a life for a life” (Exodus 21:23). Just as there, the court punishes the guilty party by taking his actual life, so too here, why not say that the court should take his actual eye?
אָמְרִי: דָּנִין נְזָקִין מִנְּזָקִין, וְאֵין דָּנִין נְזָקִין מִמִּיתָה. אַדְּרַבָּה! דָּנִין אָדָם מֵאָדָם, וְאֵין דָּנִין אָדָם מִבְּהֵמָה!
The Sages say in response: The halakha concerning damages is derived from a verse concerning damages, and the halakha concerning damages is not derived from a verse concerning death. The Gemara objects: On the contrary, say that the halakha concerning a person is derived from a verse concerning a person, and the halakha concerning a person is not derived from a verse concerning animals.
אֶלָּא אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: מִ״תַּחַת אֲשֶׁר עִנָּהּ״ יָלֵיף לֵיהּ – אָדָם מֵאָדָם, וּנְזִיקִין מִנְּזִיקִין.
Rather, Rav Ashi retracted his original statement and said a different derivation: The halakha is derived from a verbal analogy of the word “for” as written with regard to injuries from the word “for” as written with regard to a man who rapes a woman, who must pay monetary compensation. The verse states: “Then the man that lay with her shall give to the girl’s father fifty shekels of silver, and she shall be his wife, for he has afflicted her; he may not send her away all his days” (Deuteronomy 22:29). Based on this verbal analogy, the halakha concerning a person is derived from a verse concerning a person, and the halakha concerning damages is derived from a verse concerning damages.
תַּנְיָא, רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: ״עַיִן תַּחַת עַיִן״ – מַמָּשׁ. ״מַמָּשׁ״ סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ?! רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר לֵית לֵיהּ כְּכֹל הָנֵי תַּנָּאֵי?!
§ It is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Eliezer says: The verse that states: “An eye for an eye” (Exodus 21:24), is referring to an actual eye. The Gemara asks: Can it enter your mind that the verse is referring to an actual eye? Doesn’t Rabbi Eliezer understand the verse like all these tanna’im, who explained that this verse is referring to monetary payment?
אָמַר רַבָּה: לוֹמַר שֶׁאֵין שָׁמִין אוֹתוֹ כְּעֶבֶד. אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי: אֶלָּא כְּמַאן, כְּבֶן חוֹרִין?! בֶּן חוֹרִין מִי אִית לֵיהּ דָּמֵי? אֶלָּא אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: לוֹמַר שֶׁאֵין שָׁמִין אוֹתוֹ בְּנִיזָּק, אֶלָּא בְּמַזִּיק.
Rabba said in response: Rabbi Eliezer means to say that the court does not appraise the injured party as a slave to assess the compensation for the injury. Abaye said to Rabba: Rather, like whom does the court appraise the injured party? If you say that the court appraises him like a freeman, does a freeman have monetary value? Rather, Rav Ashi said: Rabbi Eliezer means to say that the court does not appraise the injured party as if he were going to be sold as a slave, but rather, they appraise the one who caused him damage. The court appraises how much the latter’s value would be reduced were he to sustain the same injury he caused to the injured party, and he pays this amount as indemnity.
הָהוּא חַמְרָא דְּקַטַּע יְדָא דְיָנוֹקָא. אֲתָא לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב פָּפָּא בַּר שְׁמוּאֵל, אֲמַר לְהוּ: זִילוּ שׁוּמוּ לֵיהּ אַרְבָּעָה דְּבָרִים. אָמַר לֵיהּ רָבָא: וְהָא אֲנַן חֲמִשָּׁה תְּנַן! אֲמַר לֵיהּ: לְבַר מִנֶּזֶק קָאָמֵינָא. אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי: וְהָא חֲמוֹר הוּא, וַחֲמוֹר אֵינוֹ מְשַׁלֵּם אֶלָּא נֶזֶק! אֲמַר לְהוּ: זִילוּ שׁוּמוּ לֵיהּ נִזְקֵיהּ. וְהָא כְּעַבְדָּא בָּעֵי לְמִשְׁיְימֵיהּ! אֲמַר לְהוּ: זִילוּ שַׁיְימוּהּו כְּעַבְדָּא.
§ The Gemara relates: There was a certain donkey that severed the hand of a child. The case came before Rav Pappa bar Shmuel. He said to the officers of the court: Go appraise the four types of indemnity for the child. Rava said to him: But didn’t we learn in the mishna that there are five types of indemnity? Rav Pappa bar Shmuel said to him: I was saying to include the indemnities the responsible party is liable to pay other than damage. Abaye said to him: But was this not a donkey that caused this injury, and the owner of a donkey that causes injury pays only for the damage? Rav Pappa bar Shmuel said to the officers of the court: Go appraise for the child the value of his damage. They said to him: But doesn’t the child need to be appraised as a slave? He said to them: Go appraise him as a slave.
אֲמַר לְהוּ אֲבוּהּ דְּיָנוֹקָא: לָא בָּעֵינָא, דְּזִילָא בֵּיהּ מִילְּתָא. אֲמַרוּ לֵיהּ: וְהָא קָא מְחַיְּיבַתְּ לֵיהּ לְיָנוֹקָא! אֲמַר לְהוּ: לְכִי גָדֵיל, מְפַיֵּיסְנָא לֵיהּ מִדִּידִי.
The father of the child said to them: I do not want my child to be appraised as a slave, because this matter would demean him. They said to the father: But you are acting to the detriment of the child, as he will not receive compensation for his injury. He said to them: When he matures, I will appease him with my own money, rather than see him demeaned now.
הָהוּא תּוֹרָא דַּאֲלַס יְדֵיהּ דְּיָנוֹקָא. אֲתָא לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרָבָא, אֲמַר לְהוּ: זִילוּ שַׁיְימוּהּו כְּעַבְדָּא. אֲמַרוּ לֵיהּ: וְהָא מָר הוּא דְּאָמַר: כׇּל הַנִּישּׁוֹם כְּעֶבֶד – אֵין גּוֹבִין אוֹתוֹ בְּבָבֶל! אֲמַר לְהוּ: לָא צְרִיכָא, דְּאִי תְּפַס.
The Gemara relates another incident: There was a certain ox that chewed [da’alas] the hand of a child, injuring him. The case came before Rava. He said to the officers of the court: Go appraise him as a slave. They said to Rava: But wasn’t it you, Master, who said: With regard to anyone who is appraised as a slave in order to determine the amount of a monetary penalty, that penalty is not collected by courts in Babylonia? Rava said to them: It is not necessary to appraise his value in order to force the guilty party to pay restitution, but it is nevertheless necessary to determine his value. This is because if the injured party seizes property from the one who caused him injury, and that property is equal in value to what the payment should be, the court will not compel him to return it.
רָבָא לְטַעְמֵיהּ, דְּאָמַר רָבָא: נִזְקֵי שׁוֹר בְּשׁוֹר, וְנִזְקֵי שׁוֹר בְּאָדָם – גּוֹבִין אוֹתוֹ בְּבָבֶל. נִזְקֵי אָדָם בְּאָדָם, וְנִזְקֵי אָדָם בְּשׁוֹר – אֵין גּוֹבִין אוֹתוֹ בְּבָבֶל.
The Gemara notes: Rava conforms to his standard line of reasoning, as Rava says: Compensation for damage to an ox caused by an ox and for damage to an ox caused by a person is collected by courts in Babylonia, but compensation for damage to a person caused by a person and for damage to a person caused by an ox is not collected by courts in Babylonia.
מַאי שְׁנָא נִזְקֵי אָדָם בְּאָדָם וְנִזְקֵי אָדָם בְּשׁוֹר, דְּלָא – ״אֱלֹהִים״ בָּעֵינַן, וְלֵיכָּא; נִזְקֵי שׁוֹר בְּשׁוֹר וְשׁוֹר בְּאָדָם נָמֵי –
The Gemara clarifies: What is different about compensation for damage to a person caused by a person and for damage to a person caused by an ox, that it is not collected in Babylonia? If you say that we require ordained judges to collect damages, and there are not any ordained judges in Babylonia, then so too, in a case of damage caused by an ox to an ox, and damage caused by a person to an ox,
״אֱלֹהִים״ בָּעֵינַן, וְלֵיכָּא!
say that we require ordained judges [elohim] and there are not any ordained judges in Babylonia.
אֶלָּא מַאי שְׁנָא שׁוֹר בְּשׁוֹר וְשׁוֹר בְּאָדָם? דִּשְׁלִיחוּתַיְיהוּ קָא עָבְדִינַן – מִידֵּי דְּהָוֵה אַהוֹדָאוֹת וְהַלְוָאוֹת. אָדָם בְּאָדָם וְאָדָם בְּשׁוֹר נָמֵי, שְׁלִיחוּתַיְיהוּ קָא עָבְדִינַן – מִידֵּי דְּהָוֵה אַהוֹדָאוֹת וְהַלְוָאוֹת!
Rather, what is different about damage to an ox caused by an ox and damage to an ox caused by a man, so that Babylonian judges can rule in these cases even though they are not ordained? The difference is that we, the judges of Babylonia, perform the agency of the judges of Eretz Yisrael, just as we do with regard to the halakhot of admissions and loans, as we are permitted to rule in those cases as agents of the ordained judges in Eretz Yisrael. If so, then in cases of damage caused to a person by a person and cases of damage caused to a person by an ox as well, why not say that the judges of Babylonia perform the agency of the judges of Eretz Yisrael, just as it is with regard to the halakhot of admissions and loans?
אָמְרִי: כִּי קָא עָבְדִינַן שְׁלִיחוּתַיְיהוּ – בְּמִידֵּי דְּקִים לַן בְּגַוֵּיהּ; בְּמִידֵּי דְּלָא קִים לַן בְּגַוֵּיהּ – לָא עָבְדִינַן שְׁלִיחוּתַיְיהוּ.
The Sages state, with regard to the distinction: When we, the judges of Babylonia, perform the agency of the judges of Eretz Yisrael, we do so in matters where the ruling is clear to us; but in matters where the ruling is not clear to us, such as in the case of an injury to a person, which requires an appraisal, we do not perform the agency of the judges of Eretz Yisrael.
אָמְרִי: שׁוֹר בְּשׁוֹר וְשׁוֹר בְּאָדָם נָמֵי לָא קִים לַן בְּגַוֵּיהּ – אֶלָּא פּוֹק חֲזִי (הֵיכָא) [כַּמָּה] מִזְדַּבְּנִי תּוֹרֵי בְּשׁוּקָא; אָדָם בְּאָדָם וְאָדָם בְּשׁוֹר נָמֵי, פּוֹק חֲזִי (הֵיכָא) [כַּמָּה] מִזְדַּבְּנִי עַבְדֵי בְּשׁוּקָא!
The Sages state an objection: In cases of damage caused to an ox by an ox, and damage caused to an ox by a man, cases that we do judge in Babylonia, the ruling is also not clear to us, as the damage must be appraised. Rather, how is the judgment assessed in those cases? We say: Go out and see how much an ox is sold for in the marketplace, and thereby assess the value of the damages, without a detailed appraisal. If so, in the case of damage caused to a person by a person, and damage caused to a person by an ox, say too: Go out and see how a slave is sold in the slave market. Why, then, are these latter cases not judged in Babylonia?
וְעוֹד, תַּשְׁלוּם כֶּפֶל וְתַשְׁלוּם אַרְבָּעָה וַחֲמִשָּׁה, דְּקִיצִי, נַעֲבֵד שְׁלִיחוּתַיְיהוּ!
And furthermore, in the case of payment of double the principal incurred by a thief, and in the case of the fourfold or fivefold payment incurred by a thief who stole a sheep or ox and then slaughtered or sold the animal, where the payments are fixed and there is no need for an appraisal, we should perform the agency of the judges of Eretz Yisrael.
אָמְרִי: כִּי קָא עָבְדִינַן שְׁלִיחוּתַיְיהוּ – בְּמָמוֹנָא, בִּקְנָסָא – לָא עָבְדִינַן שְׁלִיחוּתַיְיהוּ.
The Sages state, with regard to the distinction: When we perform the agency of the judges of Eretz Yisrael, we do so only in cases where the guilty party pays monetary restitution for a loss he caused. But in cases of a penalty, such as the double, fourfold, or fivefold payments of a thief, we do not perform the agency of the judges of Eretz Yisrael.
אָדָם בְּאָדָם, דְּמָמוֹנָא הוּא, נַעֲבֵד שְׁלִיחוּתַיְיהוּ! כִּי קָא עָבְדִינַן שְׁלִיחוּתַיְיהוּ בְּמִילְּתָא דִשְׁכִיחָא, אָדָם בְּאָדָם דְּלָא שְׁכִיחָא – לָא עָבְדִינַן שְׁלִיחוּתַיְיהוּ.
The Gemara asks: In cases of damage caused to a person by a person, where the liable party pays monetary restitution, should we perform the agency of the judges of Eretz Yisrael? The Gemara answers: When we perform the agency of the judges of Eretz Yisrael, we do so only in cases that are common. Therefore, in cases of damage caused to a person by a person, cases that are uncommon, we do not perform the agency of the judges of Eretz Yisrael.
הֲרֵי בּוֹשֶׁת וּפְגָם, דִּשְׁכִיחַ, נַעֲבֵיד שְׁלִיחוּתַיְיהוּ! אָמְרִי: הָכִי נָמֵי; דְּהָא רַב פָּפָּא אַגְבִּי אַרְבַּע מְאָה זוּזֵי לְבוֹשֶׁת. וְהָא לֵיתֵיהּ לִדְרַב פָּפָּא! דִּשְׁלַח לֵיהּ רַב חִסְדָּא לְרַב נַחְמָן, וּשְׁלַח לֵיהּ: חִסְדָּא חִסְדָּא, קְנָסָא קָא מַגְבֵּית בְּבָבֶל?!
The Gemara challenges: But accordingly, for indemnities paid to a woman for humiliation and degradation after being raped or seduced, a case that is common, we should perform the agency of the judges of Eretz Yisrael. The Sages say in response: Indeed, we do collect compensation for humiliation and degradation in Babylonia, as Rav Pappa collected four hundred dinars as compensation for humiliation when he judged these cases. The Gemara questions this explanation: But the other Sages do not agree with that ruling of Rav Pappa, as Rav Ḥisda sent this question to Rav Naḥman, asking if he should collect compensation for humiliation and degradation, and Rav Naḥman sent him the following reply: Ḥisda, Ḥisda, do you collect a penalty in Babylonia?
אֶלָּא כִּי עָבְדִינַן שְׁלִיחוּתַיְיהוּ – בְּמִילְּתָא דִשְׁכִיחָא, וְאִית בֵּיהּ חֶסְרוֹן כִּיס; אֲבָל מִילְּתָא דִשְׁכִיחָא וְלֵית בֵּיהּ חֶסְרוֹן כִּיס, אִי נָמֵי מִילְּתָא דְלָא שְׁכִיחָא וְאִית בֵּיהּ חֶסְרוֹן כִּיס – לָא עָבְדִינַן שְׁלִיחוּתַיְיהוּ. הִלְכָּךְ, אָדָם בְּאָדָם – אַף עַל גַּב דְּאִית בֵּיהּ חֶסְרוֹן כִּיס, כֵּיוָן דְּלָא שְׁכִיחָא – לָא עָבְדִינַן שְׁלִיחוּתַיְיהוּ; בּוֹשֶׁת – אַף עַל גַּב דִשְׁכִיחָא, כֵּיוָן דְּלֵית בֵּיהּ חֶסְרוֹן כִּיס – לָא עָבְדִינַן שְׁלִיחוּתַיְיהוּ.
Rather, explain the distinction this way: When we perform the agency of the judges of Eretz Yisrael, we do so only in a matter that is common and involves, i.e., the payment is for, a monetary loss. But in a matter that is common but does not involve a monetary loss, or in an uncommon matter which does involve a monetary loss, we do not perform the agency of the judges of Eretz Yisrael. Therefore, in a case of an injury caused to a person by a person, even though it involves a monetary loss, since it is uncommon, we do not perform the agency of the judges of Eretz Yisrael. In a case of humiliation, even though it is common, since it does not involve a monetary loss, we do not perform the agency of the judges of Eretz Yisrael.
וְשׁוֹר בְּשׁוֹר גּוֹבִין בְּבָבֶל? וְהָאָמַר רָבָא: שׁוֹר שֶׁהִזִּיק – אֵין גּוֹבִין אוֹתוֹ בְּבָבֶל. דְּאַזֵּיק מַאן? אִילֵימָא דְּאַזֵּיק אָדָם, מַאי אִירְיָא שׁוֹר דְּאַזֵּיק אָדָם? אֲפִילּוּ אָדָם דְּאַזֵּיק אָדָם נָמֵי אֵין גּוֹבִין אוֹתוֹ בְּבָבֶל! אֶלָּא פְּשִׁיטָא – דְּאַזֵּיק שׁוֹר, וְקָתָנֵי: אֵין גּוֹבִין אוֹתוֹ בְּבָבֶל!
The Gemara challenges the halakha itself: But is it in fact the case that the courts in Babylonia collect restitution for damage caused to an ox by an ox? But doesn’t Rava say: If an ox caused damage, the courts in Babylonia do not collect the compensation. The Gemara clarifies: To whom did the ox cause damage? If we say that it damaged a person, why did Rava specifically state his halakha in a case where there is an ox that damaged a person? Even in a case of a person who damaged a person, which is more common, the court does not collect the compensation in Babylonia. Rather, it is obvious that Rava meant that the ox damaged an ox. And Rava teaches: The court does not collect the compensation in Babylonia.
אָמְרִי: הָתָם בְּתָם, הָכָא בְּמוּעָד. וְהָאָמַר רָבָא: אֵין מוּעָד בְּבָבֶל! אָמְרִי: דְּאִיַּיעַד הָתָם וְאַיְּיתוּהּ לְהָכָא.
The Sages say in response: There, Rava stated his ruling with regard to an innocuous ox, i.e., an ox that was not forewarned, whose owner pays for the damage as a penalty; and penalties are not collected in Babylonia. Here, Rava states his ruling with regard to a forewarned ox, and payment for damage it causes is not a penalty, but rather serves as compensation. The Gemara challenges: But doesn’t Rava say: There are no forewarned oxen in Babylonia, as an ox can be forewarned only by ordained judges? The Sages say in response: This is a case where an ox was forewarned there, in Eretz Yisrael, and then its owners brought it here, to Babylonia.
וְהָא מִילְּתָא דְּלָא שְׁכִיחָא הִיא, וּמִילְּתָא דְלָא שְׁכִיחָא הָא אָמְרַתְּ דְּלָא עָבְדִינַן שְׁלִיחוּתַיְיהוּ! דַּאֲתוֹ רַבָּנַן דְּהָתָם, וְיַיעֲדוּהּ הָכָא. סוֹף סוֹף, מִילְּתָא דְלָא שְׁכִיחָא הִיא, וְאַתְּ אָמְרַתְּ מִילְּתָא דְלָא שְׁכִיחָא לָא (קָא) עָבְדִינַן שְׁלִיחוּתַיְיהוּ!
The Gemara objects: But this is an uncommon matter, as forewarned oxen are not frequently transported from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia. And with regard to an uncommon matter, did you not say that we do not perform the agency of the judges of Eretz Yisrael? The Gemara answers: This is a case where the Rabbis from there, i.e., Eretz Yisrael, who are ordained, came and declared this ox forewarned, here, i.e., in Babylonia. The Gemara challenges this interpretation: Ultimately, this is an uncommon matter, and you say that with regard to an uncommon matter that we do not perform the agency of the judges of Eretz Yisrael.
אֶלָּא כִּי קָאָמַר רָבָא – בְּשֵׁן וָרֶגֶל, דְּמוּעָדִין מִתְּחִילָּתָן נִינְהוּ.
Rather, explain that when Rava says that courts in Babylonia collect restitution for damage caused by an ox, he means with regard to damage in the categories of Eating and Trampling, which are forewarned from the outset. All agree that since these are common forms of damage and involve monetary loss, the judges of Babylonia perform the agency of the judges of Eretz Yisrael and collect compensation for the damage.
צַעַר – כְּווֹאוֹ בְּשַׁפּוּד אוֹ בְּמַסְמֵר וְכוּ׳. צַעַר שֶׁלֹּא בִּמְקוֹם נֶזֶק מִשְׁתַּלֵּם – מַאן תַּנָּא? אָמַר רָבָא: בֶּן עַזַּאי הִיא – דְּתַנְיָא, רַבִּי אוֹמֵר: ״כְּוִיָּה״ נֶאֶמְרָה תְּחִילָּה. בֶּן עַזַּאי אוֹמֵר: ״חַבּוּרָה״ נֶאֶמְרָה תְּחִילָּה.
§ The Gemara returns to its discussion of the mishna, which states: How is payment for pain assessed? If one burned another with a skewer or with a hot nail, or even if he burned him on his fingernail, where he would not cause a bruise that would affect the victim’s value on the slave market, the court evaluates how much money a person with a similar threshold for pain as the victim is willing to take in order to be made to suffer in this way. The Gemara comments: This teaches that even when the pain is not in a place that causes damage to the injured party, the one who caused the injury must pay compensation. The Gemara asks: Who is the tanna who taught this statement? Rava said: This is the opinion of ben Azzai, as it is taught in a baraita: With regard to the verse: “Keviyya for keviyya, a wound for a wound, ḥabura for ḥabura” (Exodus 21:25), Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: A burn [keviyya] is the first term stated in the verse, and ben Azzai says: A bruise [ḥabura] is the first term stated in the verse.
בְּמַאי קָא מִיפַּלְגִי? רַבִּי סָבַר: ״כְּוִיָּה״ – דְּלֵית בַּהּ חַבּוּרָה מַשְׁמַע; כְּתַב רַחֲמָנָא ״חַבּוּרָה״ לְגַלּוֹיֵי עֲלַהּ דִּכְוִיָּה – דְּאִית בַּהּ חַבּוּרָה אִין, אִי לָא לָא.
The Gemara explains the baraita: Ben Azzai certainly agrees that the first term in the verse, “keviyya,” means a burn. With regard to what do they disagree? Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that “keviyya” indicates an injury with no bruise, and that one would be liable to pay for injuring another even in that manner; therefore, when the Merciful One writes in the Torah: “Ḥabura,” it is to reveal about the meaning of “keviyya” that if the burn also has a bruise, then yes, the one who caused the injury must pay compensation for pain; but if the burn has no bruise, then no, the one who caused the injury does not pay compensation for pain alone.
וּבֶן עַזַּאי סָבַר: ״כְּוִיָּה״ – דְּאִית בַּהּ חַבּוּרָה מַשְׁמַע; כְּתַב רַחֲמָנָא ״חַבּוּרָה״ לְגַלּוֹיֵי עֲלַהּ דִּכְוִיָּה – דְּלֵית בַּהּ חַבּוּרָה.
And ben Azzai holds that “keviyya” indicates a burn that also has a bruise, and that one would be liable to pay for injuring another only in that manner; therefore, when the Merciful One writes in the Torah: “Ḥabura,” it is to reveal about the meaning of “keviyya” that even if it is a burn with no bruise, the one who caused the injury must pay compensation for pain alone, even though there is no damage.
מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַב פָּפָּא: אַדְּרַבָּה, אִיפְּכָא מִסְתַּבְּרָא! רַבִּי אוֹמֵר ״כְּוִיָּה״ נֶאֶמְרָה תְּחִילָּה – סָבַר: ״כְּוִיָּה״ – דְּאִית בַּהּ חַבּוּרָה מַשְׁמַע; כְּתַב רַחֲמָנָא ״חַבּוּרָה״ לְגַלּוֹיֵי עֲלַהּ דִּכְוִיָּה – דְּלֵית בַּהּ חַבּוּרָה.
Rav Pappa objects to Rava’s explanation of the baraita: On the contrary, the opposite stands to reason, as Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: A burn [keviyya] is the first term stated in the verse, since he holds that “keviyya” indicates a burn that also has a bruise, and one would be liable to pay for injuring another only in that manner. Therefore, when the Merciful One writes in the Torah: “Ḥabura,” it is to reveal about the meaning of “keviyya” that even if it is a burn with no bruise, the one who caused the injury must pay compensation for pain alone, even though there is no damage.
בֶּן עַזַּאי אוֹמֵר ״חַבּוּרָה״ נֶאֶמְרָה תְּחִילָּה – סָבַר: ״כְּוִיָּה״ – דְּלֵית בַּהּ חַבּוּרָה מַשְׁמַע; כְּתַב רַחֲמָנָא ״חַבּוּרָה״ לְגַלּוֹיֵי עֲלַהּ דִּכְוִיָּה – דְּאִית בַּהּ חַבּוּרָה אִין, אִי לָא לָא. וְאַמַּסְּקָנָא קָיְימִי.
Rav Pappa continues: And ben Azzai says that a bruise [ḥabura] is the first term stated in the verse, as he holds that “keviyya” indicates an injury with no bruise, and that one would be liable to pay for injuring another even in that manner. Therefore, when the Merciful One writes in the Torah: “Ḥabura,” it is to reveal about the meaning of “keviyya” that if the burn also has a bruise, then yes, the one who caused the injury must pay compensation for pain; but if the burn has no bruise, then no, the one who caused the injury does not pay compensation for pain alone. And according to this explanation, the statements of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and ben Azzai with regard to the meaning of the terms in the verse are based on their final understanding of the verse. The term: The first term stated, is referring to the understanding of the first term after the second term has been written, not what the understanding of the first term would have been if not for the addition of the second term. According to the explanation of Rav Pappa, the mishna here is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi.
אִי נָמֵי, דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא: ״כְּוִיָּה״ – בֵּין דְּאִית בָּהּ חַבּוּרָה בֵּין דְּלֵית בַּהּ חַבּוּרָה מַשְׁמַע; וְהָכָא
The Gemara offers another explanation of the dispute between Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and ben Azzai: Alternatively, everyone agrees that “keviyya” indicates an injury whether there is a bruise or whether there is not a bruise. And here,
