Bava Kamma 95

Bava Kamma 95

כָּאן בִּגְזֵילָה קַיֶּימֶת, כָּאן בְּשֶׁאֵין גְּזֵילָה קַיֶּימֶת. וְהָא אַבְנֵט – דִּגְזֵילָה קַיֶּימֶת הִיא! מַאי ״אַבְנֵט״ – דְּמֵי אַבְנֵט.

Here, the baraita that rules that one may accept the stolen item is referring to a case where the stolen item still exists. There, the baraita that rules not to accept it even if the robber seeks only to fulfill his obligation to Heaven is referring to a case where the stolen item does not still exist. The Gemara asks: But the incident in which the robber’s wife told him that he would have to return even the belt, which was the impetus for instituting the ordinance for the penitents, was a case where the stolen item still exists, in which case the robber would be obligated to return it even after the ordinance was instituted. The Gemara answers: What is meant by: Even the belt? The value of the belt, but the actual belt was no longer in his possession.

וְכֹל הֵיכָא דִּגְזֵילָה קַיֶּימֶת, לָא עֲבוּד רַבָּנַן תַּקַּנְתָּא?! וַהֲרֵי מָרִישׁ, דִּגְזֵילָה קַיֶּימֶת הִיא; וּתְנַן: עַל הַמָּרִישׁ הַגָּזוּל שֶׁבְּנָאוֹ בַּבִּירָה, שֶׁיִּטּוֹל דָּמָיו – מִפְּנֵי תַּקָּנַת הַשָּׁבִים! שָׁאנֵי הָתָם, דְּכֵיוָן דְּאִיכָּא פְּסֵידָא דְבִירָה – שַׁוְּיוּהָ רַבָּנַן כִּדְלֵיתַהּ.

The Gemara asks: And is it so that the Sages did not institute an ordinance for the penitent anywhere that the stolen item still exists? But there is the case of a beam, which is a stolen item that still exists, and we learned in a mishna (Gittin 55a): With regard to a stolen beam that the robber built into a building, the Sages instituted that the robbery victim should take its monetary value and not the actual beam because of the ordinance instituted for the penitent, i.e., so that the penitent not be required to destroy his house. This indicates that the ordinance instituted for the penitent is in effect even when the stolen item still exists. The Gemara answers: There it is different. Since in that case there is the loss of the entire building, the Sages treat the beam as though it were not in existence.

גָּזַל פָּרָה מְעוּבֶּרֶת וְיָלְדָה וְכוּ׳. תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: הַגּוֹזֵל רָחֵל וּגְזָזָהּ, פָּרָה וְיָלְדָה – מְשַׁלֵּם אוֹתָהּ וְאֶת גִּיזּוֹתֶיהָ וְאֶת וַלְדוֹתֶיהָ, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: גְּזֵילָה חוֹזֶרֶת בְּעֵינֶיהָ. רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: רוֹאִין אוֹתָהּ כְּאִילּוּ הִיא שׁוּמָא אֶצְלוֹ בְּכֶסֶף.

§ The mishna teaches: If one robbed another of a pregnant cow, and it then gave birth while in the robber’s possession, or if one robbed another of a ewe that was laden with wool and the robber then sheared it, he pays the owner the value of a cow that is ready to give birth, or the value of a ewe that is ready to be shorn. In connection with this, the Sages taught in a baraita: One who robs another of a ewe and sheared it, and similarly, one who robs another of a cow and it gave birth, must pay it and its sheared wool or it and its offspring; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: A stolen item is returned as is. Rabbi Shimon says: A stolen item is viewed as though it had been monetarily appraised at the time of the robbery, and the robber pays only that amount.

אִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: מַאי טַעְמֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר – מִשּׁוּם דְּקָסָבַר: שִׁינּוּי בִּמְקוֹמוֹ עוֹמֵד? אוֹ דִילְמָא, בְּעָלְמָא שִׁינּוּי קוֹנֶה, וְהָכָא קְנָסָא הוּא דְּקָא קָנֵיס?

The Gemara clarifies the different opinions in this baraita. A dilemma was raised before the Sages: What is the reasoning of Rabbi Meir, who holds that the robber returns the animal and its sheared wool or the animal and its offspring? Is it due to the fact that he holds that despite a change, the changed item remains in its place? Despite its changes, the animal always remained in the possession of the robbery victims, and consequently any increase in value belongs to them. Or, perhaps Rabbi Meir generally holds that one acquires an item due to a change in it, and therefore the wool or offspring should belong to the robber by right, but here it is a penalty that he imposes, which forces the robber to return items that are technically his.

לְמַאי נָפְקָא מִינַּהּ? לְהֵיכָא דִּכְחַשָׁה מִכְחָשׁ.

The Gemara explains: In what case does the reasoning of Rabbi Meir make a practical difference? In a case where the stolen item was devalued since the time of the robbery. If Rabbi Meir’s reason is that despite a change, the changed item remains in its place, it is returned as is, even if its current value is less than what its value had been at the time of the robbery. But if he requires the robber to return the item itself because of a penalty, and by right the robber acquired the animal due to the change, then in this case, where the value decreased, the robber would be required to return what its value had been at the time of the robbery.

תָּא שְׁמַע: גָּזַל בְּהֵמָה וְהִזְקִינָה, עֲבָדִים וְהִזְקִינוּ – מְשַׁלֵּם כִּשְׁעַת הַגְּזֵילָה. רַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹמֵר, בַּעֲבָדִים אוֹמֵר לוֹ: ״הֲרֵי שֶׁלְּךָ לְפָנֶיךָ״. וְאִילּוּ בְּהֵמָה – כִּשְׁעַת הַגְּזֵילָה;

The Gemara attempts to find a solution to this question: Come and hear what was taught in the mishna (96b): If one robbed another of an animal and it aged while in his possession, consequently diminishing its value, or if one robbed another of slaves and they aged, he pays according to the value of the stolen item at the time of the robbery. Rabbi Meir says: With regard to slaves, the robber says to the owner: That which is yours is before you. The Gemara comments: But this indicates that with regard to an animal that aged while in the possession of the robber Rabbi Meir concedes to the first tanna, and he too holds that he pays according to what its value had been at the time of the robbery.

וְאִי סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ סָבַר רַבִּי מֵאִיר שִׁינּוּי בִּמְקוֹמוֹ עוֹמֵד, אֲפִילּוּ בְּהֵמָה נָמֵי! אֶלָּא לָאו שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ, קָסָבַר רַבִּי מֵאִיר שִׁינּוּי קוֹנֶה – וְהָכָא קְנָסָא הוּא דְּקָא קָנֵיס?

The Gemara continues: And if it enters your mind to say that Rabbi Meir holds that despite a change, the changed item remains in its place, then the animal should be returned as it is in the case of the animal that aged, as well. Rather, must one not conclude from the mishna that Rabbi Meir holds that one acquires an item due to a change in the item, but here, in the case of a stolen animal that subsequently was shorn or gave birth, the payment of wool or offspring is a penalty with which he penalizes the robber, so that the robber will not benefit from the increased value of the stolen item?

אָמְרִי, רַבִּי מֵאִיר לְדִבְרֵיהֶם דְּרַבָּנַן קָאָמַר לְהוּ: לְדִידִי – שִׁינּוּי אֵין קוֹנֶה, וַאֲפִילּוּ בְּהֵמָה נָמֵי. אֶלָּא לְדִידְכוּ, דְּאָמְרִיתוּ שִׁינּוּי קוֹנֶה – אוֹדוֹ לִי מִיהַת בְּעַבְדָּא, דְּכִמְקַרְקְעֵי דָּמֵי, וְקַרְקַע אֵינָהּ נִגְזֶלֶת! וְאָמְרִי לֵיהּ רַבָּנַן: לָא, עַבְדָּא כְּמִטַּלְטְלִי דָּמֵי.

The Sages say in response: Rabbi Meir’s reasoning cannot be proven from the mishna, since it is possible to say that Rabbi Meir is speaking to the Rabbis in accordance with the Rabbis’ own statement. His statement should be understood as follows: According to my own opinion, one does not acquire an item due to a change in the item, and an animal that was stolen and then aged should be returned as it is now, as well. But according to you, who say that one acquires an item due to a change in it, agree with me in any event that with regard to a slave, he is returned as is. This is because his legal status is like that of real estate, and real estate cannot be stolen. And the Rabbis say to him in response: No, for the purpose of robbery, the legal status of a slave is like that of movable property.

תָּא שְׁמַע: לִצְבּוֹעַ לוֹ אָדוֹם וּצְבָעוֹ שָׁחוֹר, שָׁחוֹר וּצְבָעוֹ אָדוֹם – רַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹמֵר: נוֹתֵן לוֹ דְּמֵי צַמְרוֹ. דְּמֵי צַמְרוֹ – אִין, דְּמֵי צַמְרוֹ וְשִׁבְחוֹ – לָא; וְאִי סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ סָבַר רַבִּי מֵאִיר שִׁינּוּי אֵין קוֹנֶה, דְּמֵי צַמְרוֹ וְשִׁבְחוֹ בָּעֵי לְמִיתַּב לֵיהּ!

The Gemara again attempts to find a solution to the question: Come and hear what was taught in the mishna (100b): If one gave wool to a dyer to dye it red for him and he dyed it black, or to dye it black and he dyed it red, Rabbi Meir says: The dyer gives the owner of the wool the value of his wool, since the dyer violated the owner’s wishes. It can be inferred from this mishna: The value of his wool, yes, he must give it; but the value of his wool and its enhancement, i.e., the amount by which the value of the wool increased because it was dyed, no, he need not give it. And if it enters your mind to say that Rabbi Meir holds that one does not acquire an item due to a change in the item, the dyer should be required to return the value of his wool and its enhancement to the owner, as it never left the owner’s possession.

אֶלָּא לָאו שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ, קָסָבַר רַבִּי מֵאִיר שִׁינּוּי קוֹנֶה, וְהָכָא קְנָסָא הוּא דְּקָא קָנֵיס? שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ.

Rather, isn’t it correct to conclude from the mishna that Rabbi Meir holds that one acquires an item due to a change in the item, but here, in the case of a stolen animal that was subsequently shorn or gave birth, the payment of wool or offspring is a penalty with which he penalizes the robber, so that the robber will not benefit from the increased value of the stolen item? The Gemara affirms this: Learn from the mishna that this is indeed the reasoning of Rabbi Meir.

אִיכָּא דְאָמְרִי: הָא – לָא אִיבְּעִי לַן; מִדְּאָפֵיךְ רַב וְתָנֵי: ״גָּזַל פָּרָה וְהִזְקִינָה, עֲבָדִים וְהִזְקִינוּ – מְשַׁלֵּם כִּשְׁעַת הַגְּזֵילָה, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: בַּעֲבָדִים – אוֹמֵר לוֹ: הֲרֵי שֶׁלְּךָ לְפָנֶיךָ״ – וַדַּאי לְרַבִּי מֵאִיר שִׁינּוּי קוֹנֶה, וְהָכָא קְנָסָא הוּא דְּקָא קָנֵיס לֵיהּ.

There are those who say: This, i.e., Rabbi Meir’s reasoning, was never in question for us. Why not? From the fact that Rav reversed the opinions in the mishna on 96b and taught it as follows: If one robbed another of an animal and it aged, or if one robbed another of slaves and they aged, he pays according to what their value had been at the time of the robbery; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: With regard to slaves, the robber says to the owner: That which is yours is before you. Certainly, then, according to the opinion of Rabbi Meir, one acquires an item due to a change in the item, which is why the robber pays according to what its value had been at the time of the robbery. But here, in the case of the cow that gave birth or the ewe that was shorn, the payment of offspring or wool is a penalty with which he penalizes the robber.

כִּי קָא אִיבְּעִי לַן – הָכִי אִיבְּעִי לַן: כִּי קָא קָנֵיס – בְּמֵזִיד, אֲבָל בְּשׁוֹגֵג לָא קָנֵיס; אוֹ דִילְמָא אֲפִילּוּ בְּשׁוֹגֵג נָמֵי קָנֵיס?

The Gemara continues the alternative explanation. When we asked the question, this is how we asked it: When Rabbi Meir penalizes the robber, is it only for one who robbed intentionally, but if one took an item from its owner unintentionally, Rabbi Meir does not penalize the robber? Or perhaps he penalizes even one who took an item from its owner unintentionally.

תָּא שְׁמַע: חֲמִשָּׁה גּוֹבִין מִן הַמְחוֹרָרִין,

The Gemara tries to resolve this question: Come and hear a proof from a baraita: Five types of monetary claims are collected only from unsold [meḥorarin] property, i.e., property that is still in possession of its owner and has not been sold in the meantime.

וְאֵלּוּ הֵן: פֵּירוֹת, וּשְׁבַח פֵּירוֹת, וְהַמְקַבֵּל עָלָיו לָזוּן בֶּן אִשְׁתּוֹ וּבַת אִשְׁתּוֹ, וְגֵט חוֹב שֶׁאֵין בּוֹ אַחְרָיוּת, וּכְתוּבַּת אִשָּׁה שֶׁאֵין בָּהּ אַחְרָיוּת.

And these are they: Produce, and the enhanced value of produce. Even if one has the right to the produce of a particular property, or the gain accrued from that produce, he cannot claim this payment from liened property. The Gemara continues with the list of monetary claims collected from unsold property: And one who accepts upon himself at the time of his betrothal the obligation to provide sustenance for his wife’s son or his wife’s daughter from a previous marriage; and a promissory note that has no property guarantee, i.e., a document that does not explicitly state that all of the properties of the debtor will serve to guarantee payment of the debt; and similarly, a woman’s marriage contract that has no property guarantee.

מַאן שָׁמְעַתְּ לֵיהּ דְּאָמַר: אַחְרָיוּת – לָאו טָעוּת סוֹפֵר הוּא? רַבִּי מֵאִיר; וְקָתָנֵי: פֵּירוֹת וּשְׁבַח פֵּירוֹת.

The Gemara clarifies: Whom did you hear that says that omission of the guarantee of the sale from the document is not a scribal error? It is Rabbi Meir. There is a dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis with regard to a promissory note that does not contain a property guarantee. According to the Rabbis, it was omitted in error and is always considered as having been written in the document. Rabbi Meir holds that a promissory note that does not contain a property guarantee cannot be used to collect property that has been liened or sold; it can be used to collect only unsold property. This baraita is therefore in accordance with Rabbi Meir’s opinion. And the baraita teaches that produce and the enhanced value of produce are collected only from unsold property.

שְׁבַח פֵּירוֹת הֵיכִי דָּמֵי? כְּגוֹן שֶׁגָּזַל שָׂדֶה מֵחֲבֵירוֹ וּמְכָרָהּ לְאַחֵר, וְהִשְׁבִּיחָהּ, וַהֲרֵי הִיא יוֹצְאָה מִתַּחַת יָדוֹ. כְּשֶׁהוּא גּוֹבֶה,

The Gemara clarifies: What are the circumstances in which he collects the enhanced value of produce? It is a case where one robbed another of a field, and then sold it to another, and the purchaser enhanced it, and it is now leaving the possession of the purchaser because the robbery victim has proved in court that this field is his. When the purchaser collects from the robber who sold him this field, in order to recoup what he had paid,

גּוֹבֶה אֶת הַקֶּרֶן מִנְּכָסִים מְשׁוּעְבָּדִים, וְאֶת הַשֶּׁבַח מִנְּכָסִים בְּנֵי חוֹרִין. דְּאָתֵא בַּעַל אַרְעָא, וְשָׁקֵיל אַרְעֵיהּ וּשְׁבָחֵיהּ.

he can collect the principal, i.e., what he paid for the field, from the robber’s liened property that has been sold. But he can collect the enhanced value, i.e., the value of the improvements made to the field, only from unsold property. Why are both of these collected from the robber? Because the owner of the field came and took both his land and its enhanced value.

מַאי, לָאו בְּעַם הָאָרֶץ – דְּלָא יָדַע דְּקַרְקַע נִגְזֶלֶת אוֹ אֵינָהּ נִגְזֶלֶת, וַאֲפִילּוּ הָכִי קָאָתֵי בַּעַל קַרְקַע וְשָׁקֵיל לְאַרְעָא וּשְׁבָחַהּ, וּשְׁמַע מִינַּהּ: בְּשׁוֹגֵג נָמֵי קָנֵיס? אָמְרִי: לָא; בְּלוֹקֵחַ תַּלְמִיד חָכָם, וְיָדַע.

The Gemara clarifies: What, is it not speaking of a purchaser who is an ignoramus, who does not know whether property can be stolen or cannot be stolen, and when he purchased stolen land from the robber, he did so unintentionally, since he was under the mistaken impression that this land belonged to the robber who sold it? And even so, the owner of the land can come and take the land and its enhanced value. And if so, one may learn from the baraita that Rabbi Meir penalizes even one who acquires stolen items unintentionally. The Sages say in response: No, it is speaking of a purchaser who is a Torah scholar, and he knew that the robber had no right to sell this land. The purchaser is therefore penalized and is required to return the enhanced value of the land as well.

תָּא שְׁמַע: לִצְבּוֹעַ לוֹ אָדוֹם וּצְבָעוֹ שָׁחוֹר, שָׁחוֹר וּצְבָעוֹ אָדוֹם – רַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹמֵר: נוֹתֵן לוֹ דְּמֵי צַמְרוֹ. דְּמֵי צַמְרוֹ – אִין, דְּמֵי צַמְרוֹ וְשִׁבְחוֹ – לָא;

The Gemara again tries to determine the scope of the penalty: Come and hear what was taught in a mishna (100b): If one gave wool to a dyer to dye it red for him and he dyed it black, or to dye it black and he dyed it red, Rabbi Meir says: The dyer gives the owner of the wool the value of his wool, since the dyer violated the owner’s instructions. It can be inferred from the mishna: The value of his wool, yes, he must give; but the value of his wool and its enhanced value, i.e., the amount by which the value of the wool increased because it was dyed, no, he is not required to give.

וְאִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ בְּשׁוֹגֵג נָמֵי קָנֵיס, דְּמֵי צַמְרוֹ וְשִׁבְחוֹ בָּעֵי לְמִיתְּבָא לֵיהּ! אֶלָּא לָאו שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ: בְּמֵזִיד קָנֵיס, בְּשׁוֹגֵג לָא קָנֵיס? שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ.

And if it enters your mind to say that Rabbi Meir penalizes one who acquires a stolen item unintentionally as well, the dyer should be required to return the value of his wool and its enhancement to him. Rather, must one not conclude from the mishna that if it was done intentionally, Rabbi Meir penalizes the robber, but if it was done unintentionally he does not penalize him? The Gemara affirms: Learn from the mishna that this indeed is the reasoning of Rabbi Meir.

רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: גְּזֵילָה חוֹזֶרֶת בְּעֵינֶיהָ. רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: רוֹאִין אוֹתָהּ כְּאִילּוּ הִיא שׁוּמָא אֶצְלוֹ בְּכֶסֶף. מַאי בֵּינַיְיהוּ?

§ The Gemara continues its discussion of the baraita. Rabbi Yehuda says: A stolen item is returned as is. Rabbi Shimon says: The stolen item is viewed as though it had been monetarily appraised at the time of the robbery. The Gemara asks: What is the difference between them, since ostensibly they agree that the robber does not return the value of the enhancement to the robbery victim?

אָמַר רַב זְבִיד: בְּשֶׁבַח שֶׁעַל גַּבֵּי גְּזֵילָה קָמִיפַּלְגִי – רַבִּי יְהוּדָה סָבַר: דְּנִגְזָל הָוֵי, וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן סָבַר: דְּגַזְלָן הָוֵי.

Rav Zevid says: They disagree with regard to enhancement that is still upon the stolen item. The disagreement concerns a case where the enhancement occurred while the stolen item was in the possession of the robber, and when he returned the item it was still enhanced. Therefore, he did not keep any of the enhancement. Rabbi Yehuda holds that the enhancement belongs to the one who was robbed, and Rabbi Shimon holds that it belongs to the robber.

רַב פָּפָּא אָמַר: דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא, שֶׁבַח שֶׁעַל גַּבֵּי גְּזֵילָה – דְּגַזְלָן הָוֵי; וְהָכָא לְמֶחֱצָה, לִשְׁלִישׁ וְלִרְבִיעַ קָמִיפַּלְגִי – רַבִּי יְהוּדָה סָבַר: שֶׁבַח שֶׁעַל גַּבֵּי גְּזֵילָה – כּוּלֵּיהּ דְּגַזְלָן הָוֵי, וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן סָבַר: לְמֶחֱצָה, לִשְׁלִישׁ וְלִרְבִיעַ הוּא דְּשָׁקֵיל גַּזְלָן.

Rav Pappa said that the disagreement between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon can be explained differently: Everyone agrees that the enhancement that is still upon the stolen item belongs to the robber, and here they disagree with regard to whether the robber can keep one-half, or one-third, or one-fourth of the value of the enhancement, and the remainder is kept by the owner of the animal. Rabbi Yehuda holds that the enhancement that is still upon the stolen item belongs entirely to the robber, and Rabbi Shimon holds that the robber takes one-half, or one-third, or one-fourth of the value of the enhancement. In other words, he is treated as a shepherd or rancher and receives the share of the enhancement that local custom dictates be paid to that type of laborer.

תְּנַן: גָּזַל פָּרָה, וְנִתְעַבְּרָה אֶצְלוֹ וְיָלְדָה; רָחֵל, וְנִטְעֲנָה אֶצְלוֹ וּגְזָזָהּ – מְשַׁלֵּם כִּשְׁעַת הַגְּזֵילָה. יָלְדָה – אִין, לֹא יָלְדָה – הָדְרָא בְּעֵינָא;

The Gemara cites a proof for Rav Zevid’s explanation: We learned in the mishna (93b): If one robbed another of a cow, and it became pregnant in his possession, and it then gave birth; or if one robbed another of a ewe, and it became laden with wool in his possession, and he then sheared it, the robber pays according to the value of the animal at the time of the robbery. The Gemara infers from the mishna: If the cow gave birth, yes, he pays the value of the animal at the time of the theft, but if the cow did not give birth and is still pregnant, it is returned as is.

בִּשְׁלָמָא לְרַב זְבִיד, דְּאָמַר: שֶׁבַח שֶׁעַל גַּבֵּי גְּזֵילָה – דְּנִגְזָל הָוֵי לְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה; הָא מַנִּי – רַבִּי יְהוּדָה הִיא. אֶלָּא לְרַב פָּפָּא, דְּאָמַר: דְּגַזְלָן הָוֵי – הָא מַנִּי? לָא רַבִּי יְהוּדָה, וְלָא רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן!

Granted, according to the explanation of Rav Zevid, who says that according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, enhancement that is still upon the stolen item belongs to the one who was robbed, in accordance with whose opinion is this mishna? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, as the pregnant cow is returned as is. But according to the explanation of Rav Pappa, who says that everyone agrees that the enhancement belongs to the robber, in accordance with whose opinion is this mishna? It is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, nor is it in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, as the robber does not retain any of the enhanced value.

אָמַר לְךָ רַב פָּפָּא: הוּא הַדִּין אֲפִילּוּ לֹא יָלְדָה נָמֵי – כִּשְׁעַת הַגְּזֵילָה הוּא דִּמְשַׁלֵּם, וְהָא דְּקָתָנֵי ״יָלְדָה״ – אַיְּידֵי דְּנָסֵיב רֵישָׁא ״יָלְדָה״, נָסֵיב סֵיפָא נָמֵי ״יָלְדָה״.

The Gemara responds: Rav Pappa could have said to you that the inference is incorrect: The same is true that even if it did not give birth, the robber pays according to the value of the animal at the time of the robbery, and the enhanced value due to the pregnancy is returned to him. And that which the mishna teaches: It then gave birth, cannot serve as the basis for an inference pertaining to this discussion. As the tanna needs to cite that it gave birth in the first clause of the mishna, since in that case he acquires the animal due to the change in its condition, therefore he cites that it gave birth in the latter clause as well, but it need not have given birth. It cannot be inferred from this mishna that an animal that has not given birth is returned as is.

תַּנְיָא כְּווֹתֵיהּ דְּרַב פָּפָּא, רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: רוֹאִין אוֹתָהּ כְּאִילּוּ הִיא שׁוּמָא אֶצְלוֹ בְּכֶסֶף – לְמֶחֱצָה, לִשְׁלִישׁ וְלִרְבִיעַ.

The Gemara notes: It is taught in a baraita in accordance with the explanation of Rav Pappa. The baraita states: Rabbi Shimon says: The stolen item is viewed as though it had been monetarily appraised at the time of the theft, for the purpose of keeping one-half, or one-third, or one-fourth of the value of the enhancement.

אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: כִּי הֲוֵינַן בֵּי רַב כָּהֲנָא, אִיבַּעְיָא לַן: לְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן דְּאָמַר לְמֶחֱצָה, לִשְׁלִישׁ וְלִרְבִיעַ הוּא דְּשָׁקֵיל גַּזְלָן, כִּי מְסַלְּקִינַן לֵיהּ – בִּדְמֵי מְסַלְּקִינַן לֵיהּ, אוֹ דִילְמָא מִבִּשְׂרָא שָׁקֵיל?

Rav Ashi said: When we were studying in the study hall of Rav Kahana, we were asked a question: According to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who says that the robber takes one-half, or one-third, or one-fourth of the value of the enhancement; when we remove the robber, taking the stolen animal from him and paying him a portion of the enhanced value, do we remove him by paying him his share with money? Or, perhaps he takes his portion from the meat of the animal.

וּפְשַׁטְנָא מֵהָא דְּאָמַר רַב נַחְמָן אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: שְׁלֹשָׁה שָׁמִין לָהֶן הַשֶּׁבַח, וּמַעֲלִין אוֹתָן בְּדָמִים; וְאֵלּוּ הֵן: בְּכוֹר לְפָשׁוּט,

And we resolved the dilemma from that which Rav Naḥman says that Shmuel says: In three cases, the court appraises the enhanced value for the parties involved in enhancing a field, and they are paid in money rather than by being given a portion of the property, and these are they: A firstborn son who makes payment to a regular son. This is a case where two sons, one firstborn and the other not, inherit a field from their father. Before it is divided, they both work and enhance the field. When the time comes to divide the field, the firstborn son, who receives a double portion, must pay his brother for the enhancement that the latter contributed to the former’s portion. This payment is given in money rather than land.

וּבַעַל חוֹב לְלוֹקֵחַ, וּבַעַל חוֹב לִיתוֹמִים.

And the second case is that of a creditor who is obligated to a purchaser, i.e., a creditor who collects the debt from lands that were sold by the debtor. He pays money to the purchaser for the enhancements generated by the purchaser but does not pay him in land. And the third case is that of a creditor who is obligated to orphans, i.e., a creditor who collects land from the orphans of his debtor. He must pay them for any enhancements done by the orphans after their father’s death. This payment is also given in money rather than land.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבִינָא לְרַב אָשֵׁי, מִי אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: בַּעַל חוֹב לְלוֹקֵחַ יָהֵיב לֵיהּ שֶׁבַח? וְהָאָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: בַּעַל חוֹב גּוֹבֶה אֶת הַשֶּׁבַח! אֲמַר לֵיהּ: לָא קַשְׁיָא, כָּאן בְּשֶׁבַח הַמַּגִּיעַ לִכְתֵפַיִם, וְכָאן בְּשֶׁבַח שֶׁאֵין מַגִּיעַ לִכְתֵפַיִם.

The Gemara discusses Shmuel’s statement. Ravina said to Rav Ashi: Did Shmuel actually say that a creditor gives the purchaser any of the enhanced value at all? But doesn’t Shmuel say: A creditor collects all of the enhanced value? Rav Ashi said to him: This is not difficult. Here, where Shmuel stated that a creditor does not collect the enhanced value, it was with regard to a case where there was enhancement that reaches shoulders [shevaḥ hammaggia likhtefayim], i.e., the produce that grew due to the improvements made by the purchaser is fully grown and ripened and can now be harvested and carried upon one’s shoulders. But there, where Shmuel stated that a creditor does collect the enhanced value, it was with regard to a case where there was enhancement that does not reach shoulders, i.e., its growth is not complete.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ: וְהָא מַעֲשִׂים בְּכׇל יוֹם, וְקָא מַגְבֵּי שְׁמוּאֵל אֲפִילּוּ שֶׁבַח הַמַּגִּיעַ לִכְתֵפַיִם! אֲמַר לֵיהּ: לָא קַשְׁיָא;

Ravina said to him: But there were daily incidents of this type, and Shmuel would collect from purchasers even enhancement that reached shoulders. Rav Ashi said to him: This is not difficult.