Masechet Chullin is sponsored by Judi Felber in honor of the Hadran Community. “During my first cycle of Daf Yomi, just as we began Masechet Chullin, my son was injured while serving in the IDF. Throughout those two and a half months of difficulty and uncertainty, my fellow learners never left my side. With profound gratitude to the community that held me, encouraged me, and ensured I could keep up with the Daf during those trying times.”
This week’s learning is sponsored by Michelle Winer for a refuah shelaima for Bella Rachel bat Malka Enya and Binyamin Yisrael ben Malka Enya.
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Summary
Rabbi Chiya bar Abba recounts a discussion between Rabbi Ami and Rabbi Yochanan regarding the legal weight of a minor’s intent. In the first version, the question is whether a minor’s thoughts alone are significant. Rabbi Ami argues it is obvious they are not, citing a Mishna in Kelim 17:15. Rabbi Yochanan clarifies that the doubt applies when a minor’s action reasonably demonstrates their intent, but not completely – such as moving an animal to the northern part of the Temple courtyard, the specific area for slaughtering burnt offerings. Rabbi Ami challenges this, noting that Rabbi Yochanan himself previously ruled in the context of ritual impurity that a minor’s action is significant when the minor’s intent is reasonably clear from the action. Rabbi Yochanan responds that his question was whether such actions are valid by Torah law or only by Rabbinic decree; the matter remains unresolved.
Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak offers a different version of the discussion, focusing on whether a minor’s actions are effective. This version concludes with Rabbi Yochanan distinguishing between three categories: actions with clear intent, actions with reasonably clear, but not completely clear intent, and intent without any accompanying action.
Shmuel asks Rav Huna for the biblical source disqualifying sacrifices that were slaughtered without the specific intent to perform a slaughter (mitasek).
The Mishna rules that meat slaughtered by a non-Jew is considered neveila (a carcass) and imparts impurity by carrying (masa). Rabbi Yochanan and Rabbi Ami draw different inferences from this. Rabbi Yochanan suggests the Mishna follows the Sages (against Rabbi Eliezer) in assuming that gentiles do not automatically slaughter for idolatrous purposes; if they did, the meat would be forbidden even for benefit. Rabbi Ami infers that the slaughter of a heretic (min), one who is a devout idol worshipped is strictly forbidden for any benefit, a position supported by a braita.
The Gemara explains that we generally do not fear a gentile will slaughter for idolatry because they are typically not devout in their practice. However, a min is considered deeply dedicated to their worship, and their slaughter is presumed to be for an idol. Rav Nachman distinguishes between Jewish heretics and gentile heretics, showing more leniency toward the latter, though the Gemara clarifies this applies specifically to accepting their sacrifices.
The shechita of one who slaughters in the dark or a blind person is accepted.
Today’s daily daf tools:
Masechet Chullin is sponsored by Judi Felber in honor of the Hadran Community. “During my first cycle of Daf Yomi, just as we began Masechet Chullin, my son was injured while serving in the IDF. Throughout those two and a half months of difficulty and uncertainty, my fellow learners never left my side. With profound gratitude to the community that held me, encouraged me, and ensured I could keep up with the Daf during those trying times.”
This week’s learning is sponsored by Michelle Winer for a refuah shelaima for Bella Rachel bat Malka Enya and Binyamin Yisrael ben Malka Enya.
Today’s daf is sponsored by Deborah Dickson in honor of Audrey Levant on her birthday! “This time next year please God you will be just weeks away from celebrating your Siyum HaShas! Happy birthday!”
Chullin 13
וְאֵין לָהֶן מַחְשָׁבָה.
but they do not have the capacity to effect a halakhic status by means of thought.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מַחְשָׁבָה גְּרֵידְתָּא לָא קָא מִיבַּעְיָא לֵיהּ, כִּי קָא מִיבַּעְיָא לֵיהּ – מַחְשַׁבְתּוֹ נִיכֶּרֶת מִתּוֹךְ מַעֲשָׂיו.
Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said to Rabbi Ami: With regard to a case of effecting a halakhic status by means of thought alone, Rabbi Yoḥanan does not raise a dilemma. When he raises a dilemma, it is with regard to a case where his thought is discernible from his actions.
כְּגוֹן דַּהֲוָה קָיְימָא עוֹלָה בַּדָּרוֹם, וְאַתְיַיהּ בַּצָּפוֹן וְשַׁחְטַהּ, מַאי? מִדְּאַתְיַיהּ בַּצָּפוֹן וְשַׁחְטַהּ אִיכַּוֵּין לַהּ, אוֹ דִילְמָא מָקוֹם הוּא דְּלָא אִיתְרְמִי לֵיהּ?
For example, in a case where an animal that is brought as a burnt offering was standing in the south of the Temple courtyard and a minor took it to the north of the courtyard, the designated place for its slaughter, and slaughtered it there, what is the halakha? Can one conclude from the fact that he took it to the north and slaughtered it there that he had the intent to slaughter the animal for the sake of a burnt offering; or perhaps he moved the animal to the north because a place did not happen to be available for him in the south?
הָא נָמֵי אַמְרַהּ רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן חֲדָא זִימְנָא, דִּתְנַן: הַמַּעֲלֶה פֵּירוֹתָיו לַגַּג מִפְּנֵי הַכְּנִימָה, וְיָרַד עֲלֵיהֶם טַל – אֵינָן בְּ״כִי יוּתַּן״, וְאִם נִתְכַּוֵּין לְכָךְ – הֲרֵי הֵן בְּ״כִי יוּתַּן״.
Rabbi Ami asked: But with regard to this matter, too, Rabbi Yoḥanan already said a conclusive resolution one time, as we learned in a mishna (Makhshirin 6:1): In the case of one who takes his produce up to the roof to protect it from insects, and dew fell upon it, the produce is not in the category of the verse: “But when water is placed upon the seed” (Leviticus 11:38), from which it is derived that produce becomes susceptible to ritual impurity only if it is dampened by one of seven liquids and its owner was agreeable to its dampening. And if after taking the produce up to the roof he intended that the produce would be dampened by dew, the produce is in the category of the verse “But when water is placed upon the seed.”
הֶעֱלוּם חֵרֵשׁ שׁוֹטֶה וְקָטָן, אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁנִּתְכַּוְּונוּ לְכָךְ, אֵינָן בְּ״כִי יוּתַּן״, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁיֵּשׁ לָהֶן מַעֲשֶׂה וְאֵין לָהֶן מַחְשָׁבָה.
That mishna continues: In a case where a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor took the produce up to the roof, even if they intended that the produce would be dampened by dew, the produce is not in the category of the verse “But when water is placed upon the seed” due to the fact that they have the capacity to perform an action but they do not have the capacity for halakhically effective thought.
וְאָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא שֶׁלֹּא הִיפֵּךְ בָּהֶן, אֲבָל הִיפֵּךְ בָּהֶן – הֲרֵי זֶה בְּ״כִי יוּתַּן״.
And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The tanna taught this halakha only in a case where the minor did not turn them over. But if he turned them over, indicating that he wants them to be dampened by the dew, the produce is in the category of the verse “But when water is placed upon the seed.” Evidently, Rabbi Yoḥanan rules that when the intention of a minor is apparent from his actions, it is halakhically effective.
הָכִי קָא מִיבַּעְיָא לֵיהּ: דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא אוֹ דְּרַבָּנַן?
Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said to Rabbi Ami that this is the dilemma that Rabbi Yoḥanan raises: In a case where the intent of a minor is clear from his actions, is the fact that his thought is effective by Torah law or by rabbinic law? That is one version of the exchange between Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba and Rabbi Ami.
רַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק מַתְנֵי הָכִי: אָמַר רַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר אַבָּא, בָּעֵי רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: קָטָן יֵשׁ לוֹ מַעֲשֶׂה אוֹ אֵין לוֹ מַעֲשֶׂה?
Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak teaches their exchange in this manner. Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba says that Rabbi Yoḥanan raises a dilemma: With regard to a minor, does he have the capacity to perform an action that is halakhically effective or does he not have the capacity to perform such an action?
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַבִּי אַמֵּי: וְתִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ מַחְשָׁבָה! מַאי שְׁנָא מַחְשָׁבָה דְּלָא קָא מִיבַּעְיָא לֵיהּ? דִּתְנַן: אֵין לָהֶן מַחְשָׁבָה. מַעֲשֶׂה נָמֵי לָא תִּיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ, דִּתְנַן: יֵשׁ לָהֶן מַעֲשֶׂה.
Rabbi Ami said to Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba: And let Rabbi Yoḥanan raise this dilemma with regard to the thought of a minor. What is different about the thought of a minor that Rabbi Yoḥanan does not raise a dilemma? Is it due to the fact that we learned in a mishna (Kelim 17:15): A deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor do not have the capacity for effective thought? With regard to action as well let him not raise this dilemma, as we learned in the same mishna: They have the capacity to perform an action.
הָכִי קָא מִיבַּעְיָא לֵיהּ: דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא אוֹ דְּרַבָּנַן? וּפָשֵׁיט: יֵשׁ לָהֶן מַעֲשֶׂה, וַאֲפִילּוּ מִדְּאוֹרָיְיתָא, אֵין לָהֶן מַחְשָׁבָה, וַאֲפִילּוּ מִדְּרַבָּנַן. מַחְשַׁבְתּוֹ נִיכֶּרֶת מִתּוֹךְ מַעֲשָׂיו – מִדְּאוֹרָיְיתָא אֵין לוֹ, מִדְּרַבָּנַן יֵשׁ לוֹ.
Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said to Rabbi Ami that this is the dilemma that Rabbi Yoḥanan raises: Is the fact that their actions are effective and their thought is ineffective by Torah law, and a minor’s action would consequently be effective even with regard to the sacrifice of a burnt offering, or is this fact by rabbinic law and it is merely a stringency? And Rabbi Yoḥanan resolves the dilemma: They have the capacity to perform an action and it is effective, even by Torah law. But they do not have the capacity for effective thought, even by rabbinic law. Nevertheless, in a case where his thought is apparent from his actions, by Torah law he does not have effective thought, and by rabbinic law he has effective thought.
בְּעָא מִינֵּיהּ שְׁמוּאֵל מֵרַב הוּנָא: מִנַּיִן לַמִּתְעַסֵּק בְּקָדָשִׁים שֶׁהוּא פָּסוּל? שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״וְשָׁחַט אֶת בֶּן הַבָּקָר״, שֶׁתְּהֵא שְׁחִיטָה לְשֵׁם בֶּן בָּקָר. אָמַר לוֹ: זוֹ בְּיָדֵינוּ הִיא, לְעַכֵּב מִנַּיִן? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״לִרְצוֹנְכֶם תִּזְבָּחֻהוּ״, לְדַעְתְּכֶם זְבוּחוּ.
§ Shmuel asked Rav Huna: From where is it derived with regard to one who acts unawares in the slaughter of sacrificial animals, i.e., he slaughtered without intending to perform the act of slaughter at all, that the offering is disqualified? Rav Huna said to him that it is derived from a verse, as it is stated: “And he shall slaughter the young bull” (Leviticus 1:5), indicating that the slaughter must be for the sake of a young bull, i.e., knowing that he is performing an act of slaughter. Shmuel said to him: we received this as an established halakha already that one must have intent to slaughter the animal ab initio. But from where is it derived that intent to slaughter is indispensable even after the fact? It is derived from a verse, as the verse states: “You shall slaughter it to your will” (Leviticus 19:5), indicating: Slaughter the animal with your intent, i.e., in the form of a purposeful action.
מַתְנִי׳ שְׁחִיטַת נׇכְרִי נְבֵלָה, וּמְטַמְּאָה בְּמַשָּׂא.
MISHNA: Slaughter performed by a gentile renders the animal an unslaughtered carcass, and the carcass imparts ritual impurity through carrying.
גְּמָ׳ נְבֵלָה – אִין, אִיסּוּר הֲנָאָה – לָא. מַאן תַּנָּא? אָמַר רַבִּי חִיָּיא בְּרַבִּי אַבָּא אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: דְּלָא כְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר, דְּאִי רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר – הָאָמַר: סְתָם מַחְשֶׁבֶת נׇכְרִי לַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה.
GEMARA: The slaughter renders the animal an unslaughtered carcass, yes; an item from which deriving benefit is prohibited, no. Who is the tanna who taught the mishna? Rabbi Ḥiyya, son of Rabbi Abba, said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: It is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, as, if it were in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, doesn’t he say: The unspecified thought of a gentile is for idol worship.
רַבִּי אַמֵּי אָמַר: הָכִי קָתָנֵי, שְׁחִיטַת נׇכְרִי – נְבֵלָה, הָא דְּמִין – לַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה. תְּנֵינָא לְהָא דְּתָנוּ רַבָּנַן: שְׁחִיטַת מִין לַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה, פִּיתּוֹ – פַּת כּוּתִי, יֵינוֹ – יֵין נֶסֶךְ, סְפָרָיו – סִפְרֵי קוֹסְמִין, פֵּירוֹתָיו – טְבָלִין, וְיֵשׁ אוֹמְרִים: אַף
Rabbi Ami said that this is what the mishna is teaching: Slaughter performed by a gentile renders the animal an unslaughtered carcass, but slaughter performed by a heretic is for the sake of idol worship. The Gemara notes: We learn from an inference in the mishna that which the Sages taught explictly in a baraita: Slaughter performed by a heretic is for the sake of idol worship and deriving benefit from it is prohibited, the halakhic status of his bread is that of the bread of a Samaritan, the status of his wine is that of wine used for a libation in idol worship, his sacred scrolls that he writes are the scrolls of sorcerers and it is a mitzva to burn them, his produce is untithed produce even if he separated teruma and tithes, and some say: Even
בָּנָיו מַמְזֵרִין.
his sons are mamzerim, as he is indifferent to his wife’s engaging in adultery.
וְתַנָּא קַמָּא, אִשְׁתּוֹ לָא מַפְקַר.
The Gemara asks: And the first tanna, why did he not include the ruling that the sons of a heretic are mamzerim? The Gemara answers: In his opinion, a heretic does not release his wife and allow her to engage in adultery.
אָמַר מָר: שְׁחִיטַת נׇכְרִי נְבֵלָה, וְנֵיחוּשׁ שֶׁמָּא מִין הוּא? אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן אָמַר רַבָּה בַּר אֲבוּהּ: אֵין מִינִין בָּאוּמּוֹת.
The Master said in the mishna: Slaughter performed by a gentile renders the animal an unslaughtered carcass. The Gemara challenges this: And let us be concerned that perhaps he is a heretic who is a devout idolater and deriving benefit from his slaughter is prohibited. Rav Naḥman said that Rabba bar Avuh says: There are no such heretics among the nations of the world.
וְהָא קָחָזֵינַן דְּאִיכָּא? אֵימָא: אֵין רוֹב אוּמּוֹת מִינִין, סָבַר לַהּ כִּי הָא דְּאָמַר רַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר אַבָּא אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: גּוֹיִם שֶׁבְּחוּצָה לְאָרֶץ לָאו עוֹבְדֵי עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה הֵן, אֶלָּא מִנְהַג אֲבוֹתֵיהֶן בִּידֵיהֶן.
The Gemara asks: But don’t we see that there are? The Gemara answers: Say the majority of the people of the nations of the world are not heretics, and with regard to slaughter one follows the majority. The Gemara notes: Rabba bar Avuh holds in accordance with that which Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The status of gentiles outside of Eretz Yisrael is not that of idol worshippers, as their worship is not motivated by faith and devotion. Rather, it is a traditional custom of their ancestors that was transmitted to them.
אָמַר רַב יוֹסֵף בַּר מִנְיוֹמֵי אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן: אֵין מִינִין בָּאוּמּוֹת. לְמַאי? אִילֵימָא לִשְׁחִיטָה, הַשְׁתָּא שְׁחִיטַת מִין דְּיִשְׂרָאֵל אָמְרַתְּ אֲסִירָא, דְּגוֹי מִבַּעְיָא? אֶלָּא לְמוֹרִידִין, הַשְׁתָּא דְּיִשְׂרָאֵל מוֹרִידִין, דְּגוֹיִם מִבַּעְיָא?
Rav Yosef bar Minyumi says that Rav Naḥman says: There are no heretics among the nations of the world, i.e., gentile heretics do not have the halakhic status of actual heretics. The Gemara asks: With regard to what matter did Rav Naḥman state the halakha? If we say that it is with regard to slaughter, now that you said the slaughter of a Jewish heretic is forbidden, is it necessary to say the slaughter of a gentile heretic is forbidden? Rather, it is with regard to the halakha that one lowers them into a pit, i.e., one may kill a heretic, and Rav Naḥman holds that one may not kill them. But this too is difficult, as now if one lowers a Jewish heretic into a pit, is it necessary to say that one lowers a gentile heretic?
אָמַר רַב עוּקְבָא בַּר חָמָא: לְקַבֵּל מֵהֶן קׇרְבָּן, דְּתַנְיָא: ״מִכֶּם״ וְלֹא כּוּלְּכֶם, לְהוֹצִיא אֶת הַמְשׁוּמָּד, ״מִכֶּם״ – בָּכֶם חִלַּקְתִּי וְלֹא בָּאוּמּוֹת.
Rav Ukva bar Ḥama said: It is stated with regard to accepting an offering from them, as it is taught in a baraita with regard to the verse: “When any person of you shall bring an offering” (Leviticus 1:2): The verse states: “Of you,” and not: Of all of you, to exclude the Jewish transgressor who regularly violates a prohibition. Furthermore, God states: “Of you,” to mean that among you, the Jews, I distinguished between a transgressor and other Jews, but not among the nations. One accepts an offering from all gentiles, even a heretic.
מִמַּאי? דִּלְמָא הָכִי קָאָמַר: מִיִּשְׂרָאֵל – מִצַּדִּיקֵי קַבֵּל, מֵרַשִּׁיעֵי לָא תְּקַבֵּל, אֲבָל בְּאוּמּוֹת הָעוֹלָם – כְּלָל כְּלָל לָא! לָא סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ, דְּתַנְיָא: ״אִישׁ״ – מָה תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״אִישׁ אִישׁ״? לְרַבּוֹת הַגּוֹיִם, שֶׁנּוֹדְרִים נְדָרִים וּנְדָבוֹת כְּיִשְׂרָאֵל.
The Gemara asks: From where do you draw that conclusion? Perhaps this is what the verse is saying: With regard to offerings from Jews, from righteous Jews accept the offering and from wicked Jews do not accept the offering; but with regard to the nations of the world, do not accept their offerings at all. The Gemara rejects that possibility: That should not enter your mind, as it is taught in a baraita with regard to the verse: “Any man [ish ish] from the house of Israel…who shall sacrifice his offering” (Leviticus 22:18): Since it would have been sufficient to write: A man [ish], what is the meaning when the verse states: “Any man [ish ish]”? It serves to include the gentiles, who may vow to bring vow offerings and gift offerings like a Jew.
וּמְטַמְּאָה בְּמַשָּׂא. פְּשִׁיטָא, כֵּיוָן דִּנְבֵלָה הִיא מְטַמְּאָה בְּמַשָּׂא! אָמַר רָבָא: הָכִי קָתָנֵי, זוֹ מְטַמְּאָה בְּמַשָּׂא, וְיֵשׁ לְךָ אַחֶרֶת שֶׁהִיא מְטַמְּאָה אֲפִילּוּ בְּאֹהֶל, וְאֵיזוֹ זוֹ? תִּקְרוֹבֶת עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה, וּכְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה בֶּן בְּתִירָא.
§ The mishna states with regard to an animal slaughtered by a gentile: And the carcass imparts ritual impurity through carrying. The Gemara asks: Isn’t it obvious? Since it is considered an unslaughtered carcass it imparts ritual impurity through carrying. Rava said that this is what the tanna is teaching: This slaughtered animal imparts ritual impurity through carrying, and you have another animal that imparts impurity even in a tent, i.e., if one is beneath the same roof with this animal he becomes impure even though he neither touched it nor carried it. And which animal is that? That animal is an idolatrous offering, and this statement is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira cited below.
אִיכָּא דְּאָמְרִי, אָמַר רָבָא: הָכִי קָתָנֵי, זוֹ מְטַמְּאָה בְּמַשָּׂא, וְיֵשׁ לְךָ אַחֶרֶת שֶׁהִיא כָּזוֹ שֶׁמְּטַמְּאָה בְּמַשָּׂא וְאֵינָהּ מְטַמְּאָה בְּאֹהֶל, וְאֵיזוֹ זוֹ? תִּקְרוֹבֶת עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה, וּדְלָא כְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה בֶּן בְּתִירָא.
There are those who say an alternative version of Rava’s statement: Rava said that this is what the tanna is teaching: This slaughtered animal imparts ritual impurity through carrying, and you have another animal that is like this one in that it imparts ritual impurity through carrying and does not impart impurity in a tent. And which animal is this? This animal is an idolatrous offering, and this statement is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira.
דְּתַנְיָא, רַבִּי יְהוּדָה בֶּן בְּתִירָא אוֹמֵר: מִנַּיִן לְתִקְרוֹבֶת עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה שֶׁהִיא מְטַמְּאָה בְּאֹהֶל? שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״וַיִּצָּמְדוּ לְבַעַל פְּעוֹר וַיֹּאכְלוּ זִבְחֵי מֵתִים״, מָה מֵת מְטַמֵּא בְּאֹהֶל, אַף תִּקְרוֹבֶת עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה מְטַמְּאָה בְּאֹהֶל.
As it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira says: From where is it derived with regard to an idolatrous offering that it imparts impurity in a tent? It is derived from a verse, as it is stated: “They adhered to Ba’al-Peor and ate the offerings to the dead” (Psalms 106:28). Just as a corpse imparts impurity in a tent, so too an idolatrous offering imparts impurity in a tent.
מַתְנִי׳ הַשּׁוֹחֵט בַּלַּיְלָה, וְכֵן הַסּוֹמֵא שֶׁשָּׁחַט – שְׁחִיטָתוֹ כְּשֵׁרָה.
MISHNA: In the case of one who slaughters an animal at night, and likewise in the case of the blind person who slaughters an animal, his slaughter is valid.
גְּמָ׳ הַשּׁוֹחֵט דִּיעֲבַד – אִין, לְכַתְּחִלָּה – לָא. וּרְמִינְהִי: לְעוֹלָם שׁוֹחֲטִין, בֵּין בַּיּוֹם וּבֵין בַּלַּיְלָה, בֵּין בְּרֹאשׁ הַגָּג בֵּין בְּרֹאשׁ הַסְּפִינָה!
GEMARA: The Gemara infers from the formulation of the mishna: One who slaughters, and not: One may slaughter, that with regard to the slaughter of one who slaughters at night, after the fact, yes, it is valid, but ab initio, one may not do so. The Gemara raises a contradiction from a baraita (Tosefta 1:4): One may always slaughter, both during the day and at night, both on the rooftop and atop a ship, indicating that slaughter at night is permitted ab initio.
אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: בְּשֶׁאֲבוּקָה כְּנֶגְדּוֹ. אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: דַּיְקָא נָמֵי, דְּקָתָנֵי הָתָם דּוּמְיָא דְּיוֹם, וְהָכָא דּוּמְיָא דְּסוֹמֵא, שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ.
Rav Pappa said: The tanna of the baraita is referring to a case where there is a torch opposite the slaughterer; therefore, it is permitted ab initio. Rav Ashi said: The language of the baraita is also precise, as slaughter at night is taught there in the baraita similar to slaughter during the day, based on the juxtaposition: Both during the day and at night. And here slaughter at night is taught similar to the slaughter performed by a blind person, with no light, based on the juxtaposition: One who slaughters at night, and likewise the blind person who slaughters. Therefore, the slaughter is valid only after the fact. The Gemara concludes: Learn from it.
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Chullin 13
וְאֵין לָהֶן מַחְשָׁבָה.
but they do not have the capacity to effect a halakhic status by means of thought.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מַחְשָׁבָה גְּרֵידְתָּא לָא קָא מִיבַּעְיָא לֵיהּ, כִּי קָא מִיבַּעְיָא לֵיהּ – מַחְשַׁבְתּוֹ נִיכֶּרֶת מִתּוֹךְ מַעֲשָׂיו.
Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said to Rabbi Ami: With regard to a case of effecting a halakhic status by means of thought alone, Rabbi Yoḥanan does not raise a dilemma. When he raises a dilemma, it is with regard to a case where his thought is discernible from his actions.
כְּגוֹן דַּהֲוָה קָיְימָא עוֹלָה בַּדָּרוֹם, וְאַתְיַיהּ בַּצָּפוֹן וְשַׁחְטַהּ, מַאי? מִדְּאַתְיַיהּ בַּצָּפוֹן וְשַׁחְטַהּ אִיכַּוֵּין לַהּ, אוֹ דִילְמָא מָקוֹם הוּא דְּלָא אִיתְרְמִי לֵיהּ?
For example, in a case where an animal that is brought as a burnt offering was standing in the south of the Temple courtyard and a minor took it to the north of the courtyard, the designated place for its slaughter, and slaughtered it there, what is the halakha? Can one conclude from the fact that he took it to the north and slaughtered it there that he had the intent to slaughter the animal for the sake of a burnt offering; or perhaps he moved the animal to the north because a place did not happen to be available for him in the south?
הָא נָמֵי אַמְרַהּ רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן חֲדָא זִימְנָא, דִּתְנַן: הַמַּעֲלֶה פֵּירוֹתָיו לַגַּג מִפְּנֵי הַכְּנִימָה, וְיָרַד עֲלֵיהֶם טַל – אֵינָן בְּ״כִי יוּתַּן״, וְאִם נִתְכַּוֵּין לְכָךְ – הֲרֵי הֵן בְּ״כִי יוּתַּן״.
Rabbi Ami asked: But with regard to this matter, too, Rabbi Yoḥanan already said a conclusive resolution one time, as we learned in a mishna (Makhshirin 6:1): In the case of one who takes his produce up to the roof to protect it from insects, and dew fell upon it, the produce is not in the category of the verse: “But when water is placed upon the seed” (Leviticus 11:38), from which it is derived that produce becomes susceptible to ritual impurity only if it is dampened by one of seven liquids and its owner was agreeable to its dampening. And if after taking the produce up to the roof he intended that the produce would be dampened by dew, the produce is in the category of the verse “But when water is placed upon the seed.”
הֶעֱלוּם חֵרֵשׁ שׁוֹטֶה וְקָטָן, אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁנִּתְכַּוְּונוּ לְכָךְ, אֵינָן בְּ״כִי יוּתַּן״, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁיֵּשׁ לָהֶן מַעֲשֶׂה וְאֵין לָהֶן מַחְשָׁבָה.
That mishna continues: In a case where a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor took the produce up to the roof, even if they intended that the produce would be dampened by dew, the produce is not in the category of the verse “But when water is placed upon the seed” due to the fact that they have the capacity to perform an action but they do not have the capacity for halakhically effective thought.
וְאָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא שֶׁלֹּא הִיפֵּךְ בָּהֶן, אֲבָל הִיפֵּךְ בָּהֶן – הֲרֵי זֶה בְּ״כִי יוּתַּן״.
And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The tanna taught this halakha only in a case where the minor did not turn them over. But if he turned them over, indicating that he wants them to be dampened by the dew, the produce is in the category of the verse “But when water is placed upon the seed.” Evidently, Rabbi Yoḥanan rules that when the intention of a minor is apparent from his actions, it is halakhically effective.
הָכִי קָא מִיבַּעְיָא לֵיהּ: דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא אוֹ דְּרַבָּנַן?
Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said to Rabbi Ami that this is the dilemma that Rabbi Yoḥanan raises: In a case where the intent of a minor is clear from his actions, is the fact that his thought is effective by Torah law or by rabbinic law? That is one version of the exchange between Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba and Rabbi Ami.
רַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק מַתְנֵי הָכִי: אָמַר רַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר אַבָּא, בָּעֵי רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: קָטָן יֵשׁ לוֹ מַעֲשֶׂה אוֹ אֵין לוֹ מַעֲשֶׂה?
Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak teaches their exchange in this manner. Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba says that Rabbi Yoḥanan raises a dilemma: With regard to a minor, does he have the capacity to perform an action that is halakhically effective or does he not have the capacity to perform such an action?
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַבִּי אַמֵּי: וְתִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ מַחְשָׁבָה! מַאי שְׁנָא מַחְשָׁבָה דְּלָא קָא מִיבַּעְיָא לֵיהּ? דִּתְנַן: אֵין לָהֶן מַחְשָׁבָה. מַעֲשֶׂה נָמֵי לָא תִּיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ, דִּתְנַן: יֵשׁ לָהֶן מַעֲשֶׂה.
Rabbi Ami said to Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba: And let Rabbi Yoḥanan raise this dilemma with regard to the thought of a minor. What is different about the thought of a minor that Rabbi Yoḥanan does not raise a dilemma? Is it due to the fact that we learned in a mishna (Kelim 17:15): A deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor do not have the capacity for effective thought? With regard to action as well let him not raise this dilemma, as we learned in the same mishna: They have the capacity to perform an action.
הָכִי קָא מִיבַּעְיָא לֵיהּ: דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא אוֹ דְּרַבָּנַן? וּפָשֵׁיט: יֵשׁ לָהֶן מַעֲשֶׂה, וַאֲפִילּוּ מִדְּאוֹרָיְיתָא, אֵין לָהֶן מַחְשָׁבָה, וַאֲפִילּוּ מִדְּרַבָּנַן. מַחְשַׁבְתּוֹ נִיכֶּרֶת מִתּוֹךְ מַעֲשָׂיו – מִדְּאוֹרָיְיתָא אֵין לוֹ, מִדְּרַבָּנַן יֵשׁ לוֹ.
Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said to Rabbi Ami that this is the dilemma that Rabbi Yoḥanan raises: Is the fact that their actions are effective and their thought is ineffective by Torah law, and a minor’s action would consequently be effective even with regard to the sacrifice of a burnt offering, or is this fact by rabbinic law and it is merely a stringency? And Rabbi Yoḥanan resolves the dilemma: They have the capacity to perform an action and it is effective, even by Torah law. But they do not have the capacity for effective thought, even by rabbinic law. Nevertheless, in a case where his thought is apparent from his actions, by Torah law he does not have effective thought, and by rabbinic law he has effective thought.
בְּעָא מִינֵּיהּ שְׁמוּאֵל מֵרַב הוּנָא: מִנַּיִן לַמִּתְעַסֵּק בְּקָדָשִׁים שֶׁהוּא פָּסוּל? שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״וְשָׁחַט אֶת בֶּן הַבָּקָר״, שֶׁתְּהֵא שְׁחִיטָה לְשֵׁם בֶּן בָּקָר. אָמַר לוֹ: זוֹ בְּיָדֵינוּ הִיא, לְעַכֵּב מִנַּיִן? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״לִרְצוֹנְכֶם תִּזְבָּחֻהוּ״, לְדַעְתְּכֶם זְבוּחוּ.
§ Shmuel asked Rav Huna: From where is it derived with regard to one who acts unawares in the slaughter of sacrificial animals, i.e., he slaughtered without intending to perform the act of slaughter at all, that the offering is disqualified? Rav Huna said to him that it is derived from a verse, as it is stated: “And he shall slaughter the young bull” (Leviticus 1:5), indicating that the slaughter must be for the sake of a young bull, i.e., knowing that he is performing an act of slaughter. Shmuel said to him: we received this as an established halakha already that one must have intent to slaughter the animal ab initio. But from where is it derived that intent to slaughter is indispensable even after the fact? It is derived from a verse, as the verse states: “You shall slaughter it to your will” (Leviticus 19:5), indicating: Slaughter the animal with your intent, i.e., in the form of a purposeful action.
מַתְנִי׳ שְׁחִיטַת נׇכְרִי נְבֵלָה, וּמְטַמְּאָה בְּמַשָּׂא.
MISHNA: Slaughter performed by a gentile renders the animal an unslaughtered carcass, and the carcass imparts ritual impurity through carrying.
גְּמָ׳ נְבֵלָה – אִין, אִיסּוּר הֲנָאָה – לָא. מַאן תַּנָּא? אָמַר רַבִּי חִיָּיא בְּרַבִּי אַבָּא אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: דְּלָא כְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר, דְּאִי רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר – הָאָמַר: סְתָם מַחְשֶׁבֶת נׇכְרִי לַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה.
GEMARA: The slaughter renders the animal an unslaughtered carcass, yes; an item from which deriving benefit is prohibited, no. Who is the tanna who taught the mishna? Rabbi Ḥiyya, son of Rabbi Abba, said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: It is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, as, if it were in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, doesn’t he say: The unspecified thought of a gentile is for idol worship.
רַבִּי אַמֵּי אָמַר: הָכִי קָתָנֵי, שְׁחִיטַת נׇכְרִי – נְבֵלָה, הָא דְּמִין – לַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה. תְּנֵינָא לְהָא דְּתָנוּ רַבָּנַן: שְׁחִיטַת מִין לַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה, פִּיתּוֹ – פַּת כּוּתִי, יֵינוֹ – יֵין נֶסֶךְ, סְפָרָיו – סִפְרֵי קוֹסְמִין, פֵּירוֹתָיו – טְבָלִין, וְיֵשׁ אוֹמְרִים: אַף
Rabbi Ami said that this is what the mishna is teaching: Slaughter performed by a gentile renders the animal an unslaughtered carcass, but slaughter performed by a heretic is for the sake of idol worship. The Gemara notes: We learn from an inference in the mishna that which the Sages taught explictly in a baraita: Slaughter performed by a heretic is for the sake of idol worship and deriving benefit from it is prohibited, the halakhic status of his bread is that of the bread of a Samaritan, the status of his wine is that of wine used for a libation in idol worship, his sacred scrolls that he writes are the scrolls of sorcerers and it is a mitzva to burn them, his produce is untithed produce even if he separated teruma and tithes, and some say: Even
בָּנָיו מַמְזֵרִין.
his sons are mamzerim, as he is indifferent to his wife’s engaging in adultery.
וְתַנָּא קַמָּא, אִשְׁתּוֹ לָא מַפְקַר.
The Gemara asks: And the first tanna, why did he not include the ruling that the sons of a heretic are mamzerim? The Gemara answers: In his opinion, a heretic does not release his wife and allow her to engage in adultery.
אָמַר מָר: שְׁחִיטַת נׇכְרִי נְבֵלָה, וְנֵיחוּשׁ שֶׁמָּא מִין הוּא? אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן אָמַר רַבָּה בַּר אֲבוּהּ: אֵין מִינִין בָּאוּמּוֹת.
The Master said in the mishna: Slaughter performed by a gentile renders the animal an unslaughtered carcass. The Gemara challenges this: And let us be concerned that perhaps he is a heretic who is a devout idolater and deriving benefit from his slaughter is prohibited. Rav Naḥman said that Rabba bar Avuh says: There are no such heretics among the nations of the world.
וְהָא קָחָזֵינַן דְּאִיכָּא? אֵימָא: אֵין רוֹב אוּמּוֹת מִינִין, סָבַר לַהּ כִּי הָא דְּאָמַר רַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר אַבָּא אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: גּוֹיִם שֶׁבְּחוּצָה לְאָרֶץ לָאו עוֹבְדֵי עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה הֵן, אֶלָּא מִנְהַג אֲבוֹתֵיהֶן בִּידֵיהֶן.
The Gemara asks: But don’t we see that there are? The Gemara answers: Say the majority of the people of the nations of the world are not heretics, and with regard to slaughter one follows the majority. The Gemara notes: Rabba bar Avuh holds in accordance with that which Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The status of gentiles outside of Eretz Yisrael is not that of idol worshippers, as their worship is not motivated by faith and devotion. Rather, it is a traditional custom of their ancestors that was transmitted to them.
אָמַר רַב יוֹסֵף בַּר מִנְיוֹמֵי אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן: אֵין מִינִין בָּאוּמּוֹת. לְמַאי? אִילֵימָא לִשְׁחִיטָה, הַשְׁתָּא שְׁחִיטַת מִין דְּיִשְׂרָאֵל אָמְרַתְּ אֲסִירָא, דְּגוֹי מִבַּעְיָא? אֶלָּא לְמוֹרִידִין, הַשְׁתָּא דְּיִשְׂרָאֵל מוֹרִידִין, דְּגוֹיִם מִבַּעְיָא?
Rav Yosef bar Minyumi says that Rav Naḥman says: There are no heretics among the nations of the world, i.e., gentile heretics do not have the halakhic status of actual heretics. The Gemara asks: With regard to what matter did Rav Naḥman state the halakha? If we say that it is with regard to slaughter, now that you said the slaughter of a Jewish heretic is forbidden, is it necessary to say the slaughter of a gentile heretic is forbidden? Rather, it is with regard to the halakha that one lowers them into a pit, i.e., one may kill a heretic, and Rav Naḥman holds that one may not kill them. But this too is difficult, as now if one lowers a Jewish heretic into a pit, is it necessary to say that one lowers a gentile heretic?
אָמַר רַב עוּקְבָא בַּר חָמָא: לְקַבֵּל מֵהֶן קׇרְבָּן, דְּתַנְיָא: ״מִכֶּם״ וְלֹא כּוּלְּכֶם, לְהוֹצִיא אֶת הַמְשׁוּמָּד, ״מִכֶּם״ – בָּכֶם חִלַּקְתִּי וְלֹא בָּאוּמּוֹת.
Rav Ukva bar Ḥama said: It is stated with regard to accepting an offering from them, as it is taught in a baraita with regard to the verse: “When any person of you shall bring an offering” (Leviticus 1:2): The verse states: “Of you,” and not: Of all of you, to exclude the Jewish transgressor who regularly violates a prohibition. Furthermore, God states: “Of you,” to mean that among you, the Jews, I distinguished between a transgressor and other Jews, but not among the nations. One accepts an offering from all gentiles, even a heretic.
מִמַּאי? דִּלְמָא הָכִי קָאָמַר: מִיִּשְׂרָאֵל – מִצַּדִּיקֵי קַבֵּל, מֵרַשִּׁיעֵי לָא תְּקַבֵּל, אֲבָל בְּאוּמּוֹת הָעוֹלָם – כְּלָל כְּלָל לָא! לָא סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ, דְּתַנְיָא: ״אִישׁ״ – מָה תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״אִישׁ אִישׁ״? לְרַבּוֹת הַגּוֹיִם, שֶׁנּוֹדְרִים נְדָרִים וּנְדָבוֹת כְּיִשְׂרָאֵל.
The Gemara asks: From where do you draw that conclusion? Perhaps this is what the verse is saying: With regard to offerings from Jews, from righteous Jews accept the offering and from wicked Jews do not accept the offering; but with regard to the nations of the world, do not accept their offerings at all. The Gemara rejects that possibility: That should not enter your mind, as it is taught in a baraita with regard to the verse: “Any man [ish ish] from the house of Israel…who shall sacrifice his offering” (Leviticus 22:18): Since it would have been sufficient to write: A man [ish], what is the meaning when the verse states: “Any man [ish ish]”? It serves to include the gentiles, who may vow to bring vow offerings and gift offerings like a Jew.
וּמְטַמְּאָה בְּמַשָּׂא. פְּשִׁיטָא, כֵּיוָן דִּנְבֵלָה הִיא מְטַמְּאָה בְּמַשָּׂא! אָמַר רָבָא: הָכִי קָתָנֵי, זוֹ מְטַמְּאָה בְּמַשָּׂא, וְיֵשׁ לְךָ אַחֶרֶת שֶׁהִיא מְטַמְּאָה אֲפִילּוּ בְּאֹהֶל, וְאֵיזוֹ זוֹ? תִּקְרוֹבֶת עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה, וּכְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה בֶּן בְּתִירָא.
§ The mishna states with regard to an animal slaughtered by a gentile: And the carcass imparts ritual impurity through carrying. The Gemara asks: Isn’t it obvious? Since it is considered an unslaughtered carcass it imparts ritual impurity through carrying. Rava said that this is what the tanna is teaching: This slaughtered animal imparts ritual impurity through carrying, and you have another animal that imparts impurity even in a tent, i.e., if one is beneath the same roof with this animal he becomes impure even though he neither touched it nor carried it. And which animal is that? That animal is an idolatrous offering, and this statement is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira cited below.
אִיכָּא דְּאָמְרִי, אָמַר רָבָא: הָכִי קָתָנֵי, זוֹ מְטַמְּאָה בְּמַשָּׂא, וְיֵשׁ לְךָ אַחֶרֶת שֶׁהִיא כָּזוֹ שֶׁמְּטַמְּאָה בְּמַשָּׂא וְאֵינָהּ מְטַמְּאָה בְּאֹהֶל, וְאֵיזוֹ זוֹ? תִּקְרוֹבֶת עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה, וּדְלָא כְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה בֶּן בְּתִירָא.
There are those who say an alternative version of Rava’s statement: Rava said that this is what the tanna is teaching: This slaughtered animal imparts ritual impurity through carrying, and you have another animal that is like this one in that it imparts ritual impurity through carrying and does not impart impurity in a tent. And which animal is this? This animal is an idolatrous offering, and this statement is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira.
דְּתַנְיָא, רַבִּי יְהוּדָה בֶּן בְּתִירָא אוֹמֵר: מִנַּיִן לְתִקְרוֹבֶת עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה שֶׁהִיא מְטַמְּאָה בְּאֹהֶל? שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״וַיִּצָּמְדוּ לְבַעַל פְּעוֹר וַיֹּאכְלוּ זִבְחֵי מֵתִים״, מָה מֵת מְטַמֵּא בְּאֹהֶל, אַף תִּקְרוֹבֶת עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה מְטַמְּאָה בְּאֹהֶל.
As it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira says: From where is it derived with regard to an idolatrous offering that it imparts impurity in a tent? It is derived from a verse, as it is stated: “They adhered to Ba’al-Peor and ate the offerings to the dead” (Psalms 106:28). Just as a corpse imparts impurity in a tent, so too an idolatrous offering imparts impurity in a tent.
מַתְנִי׳ הַשּׁוֹחֵט בַּלַּיְלָה, וְכֵן הַסּוֹמֵא שֶׁשָּׁחַט – שְׁחִיטָתוֹ כְּשֵׁרָה.
MISHNA: In the case of one who slaughters an animal at night, and likewise in the case of the blind person who slaughters an animal, his slaughter is valid.
גְּמָ׳ הַשּׁוֹחֵט דִּיעֲבַד – אִין, לְכַתְּחִלָּה – לָא. וּרְמִינְהִי: לְעוֹלָם שׁוֹחֲטִין, בֵּין בַּיּוֹם וּבֵין בַּלַּיְלָה, בֵּין בְּרֹאשׁ הַגָּג בֵּין בְּרֹאשׁ הַסְּפִינָה!
GEMARA: The Gemara infers from the formulation of the mishna: One who slaughters, and not: One may slaughter, that with regard to the slaughter of one who slaughters at night, after the fact, yes, it is valid, but ab initio, one may not do so. The Gemara raises a contradiction from a baraita (Tosefta 1:4): One may always slaughter, both during the day and at night, both on the rooftop and atop a ship, indicating that slaughter at night is permitted ab initio.
אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: בְּשֶׁאֲבוּקָה כְּנֶגְדּוֹ. אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: דַּיְקָא נָמֵי, דְּקָתָנֵי הָתָם דּוּמְיָא דְּיוֹם, וְהָכָא דּוּמְיָא דְּסוֹמֵא, שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ.
Rav Pappa said: The tanna of the baraita is referring to a case where there is a torch opposite the slaughterer; therefore, it is permitted ab initio. Rav Ashi said: The language of the baraita is also precise, as slaughter at night is taught there in the baraita similar to slaughter during the day, based on the juxtaposition: Both during the day and at night. And here slaughter at night is taught similar to the slaughter performed by a blind person, with no light, based on the juxtaposition: One who slaughters at night, and likewise the blind person who slaughters. Therefore, the slaughter is valid only after the fact. The Gemara concludes: Learn from it.
