Masechet Chullin is sponsored by Judi Felber in honor of the Hadran Community. “During my first cycle of Daf Yomi, just as we began Masechet Chullin, my son was injured while serving in the IDF. Throughout those two and a half months of difficulty and uncertainty, my fellow learners never left my side. With profound gratitude to the community that held me, encouraged me, and ensured I could keep up with the Daf during those trying times.”
This month’s learning is sponsored by Adam, Carolyn, Michal, Josh, Benny, Izzy, Gali, Shim, Zoe, Zachy and Yehuda in loving memory of Judith Rosenfeld Hochstadter, Gittel bat Kreindel v’Binyamin BenZion on her second yahrzeit. “Her curiosity, humor, intellect and devout nature continues to inspire and hold us accountable. We miss her and think of her in all our pursuits, especially in our Hadran learning, where she would be glad to know that she didn’t have to boil more than 1 egg at a time!!”
Want to dedicate learning? Get started here:
Summary
What is the default assumption regarding a gentile’s intent when an animal is slaughtered? The rabbis hold that we do not automatically assume a gentile intends it for idol worship unless he explicitly says so, while Rabbi Eliezer holds a gentile’s default intent is for idol worship. Rabbi Yosi argues that even if he does intend it for idol worship, we do not say that one person’s intent affects another person’s act of slaughter. The Gemara presents two ways to explain this dispute and whether the principle of one person intending and another performing the action applies outside the Temple just as it does inside.
What is the status of an animal if the slaughter was performed with the intent to perform a later part of the service, like throwing the blood or burning the fat, for idol worship? Rabbi Yochanan rules that the animal is disqualified because we can transfer intent from one action to another, and we learn the laws outside the Temple from the laws inside. Reish Lakish rules that it is permitted because we do not transfer intent from one action to another outside the Temple. The Gemara notes they hold the same argument regarding internal Temple sacrifices and l’shma intent, and then explains why it was necessary to state that they argue in both cases. A difficulty is raised against Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish from Rabbi Yosi’s position in the Mishna, but is resolved. A braita is then brought to support Rabbi Yochanan’s position.
What is the law if someone performs shechita and only thinks about sprinkling the blood for idol worship after the slaughter is finished? The Gemara cites a case in Caesarea where the Sages did not rule whether it was forbidden or permitted. The issue is whether or not a later action or statement retroactively proves the initial intent. After attempting to connect their ruling with the rabbis’ and Rabbi Eliezer’s positions, that suggestion is rejected and they say it connects with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel’s ruling. However, the Gemara tries to figure out which ruling of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel it connects to.
Rav Yehuda says in the name of Shmuel that the halakha follows Rabbi Yosi, meaning the gentile’s intent does not disqualify the Jew’s shechita. The Gemara brings a story where gentiles gave animals to a Jewish butcher and stated the blood and fat were for them, and it was permitted.
Rav Ashi qualifies that if a gentile gives money to a Jewish butcher under Rabbi Eliezer’s view, it is only forbidden if the gentile is powerful enough that the butcher cannot refuse his intent.
Today’s daily daf tools:
Masechet Chullin is sponsored by Judi Felber in honor of the Hadran Community. “During my first cycle of Daf Yomi, just as we began Masechet Chullin, my son was injured while serving in the IDF. Throughout those two and a half months of difficulty and uncertainty, my fellow learners never left my side. With profound gratitude to the community that held me, encouraged me, and ensured I could keep up with the Daf during those trying times.”
This month’s learning is sponsored by Adam, Carolyn, Michal, Josh, Benny, Izzy, Gali, Shim, Zoe, Zachy and Yehuda in loving memory of Judith Rosenfeld Hochstadter, Gittel bat Kreindel v’Binyamin BenZion on her second yahrzeit. “Her curiosity, humor, intellect and devout nature continues to inspire and hold us accountable. We miss her and think of her in all our pursuits, especially in our Hadran learning, where she would be glad to know that she didn’t have to boil more than 1 egg at a time!!”
Today’s daf is sponsored by Abby Sosland in honor of Leffell School Beit Midrash class for completing Masechet Taanit this spring! “Mazal tov! Just as you completed Masechet Taanit so may you go on to complete many other masechtot!”
Chullin 39
לָא יָלְפִינַן. וַאֲתָא רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר לְמֵימַר: יָלְפִינַן חוּץ מִפְּנִים, וַאֲתָא רַבִּי יוֹסֵי לְמֵימַר: אֲפִילּוּ בִּפְנִים נָמֵי ״זֶה מְחַשֵּׁב וְזֶה עוֹבֵד״ לָא אָמְרִינַן.
we do not derive in this manner. And Rabbi Eliezer comes to say that we derive the halakhot of non-sacred slaughter outside the Temple from the halakhot of slaughter of sacrificial animals inside the Temple, and therefore the intent of the gentile invalidates non-sacred slaughter. And Rabbi Yosei comes to say that even inside the Temple, in a case where this owner has improper intent and that other person is performing the slaughter, we do not say that the intent of the owner invalidates the slaughter.
אִתְּמַר: הַשּׁוֹחֵט אֶת הַבְּהֵמָה לִזְרוֹק דָּמָהּ לַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה, וּלְהַקְטִיר חֶלְבָּהּ לַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה – רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: פְּסוּלָה, רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ אָמַר: מוּתֶּרֶת.
§ It was stated that there is an amoraic dispute with regard to one who slaughtered an animal in order to sprinkle its blood for idol worship, or to burn its fat for idol worship. Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The slaughter is not valid, and benefit from the animal is forbidden. Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says: The slaughter is valid and deriving benefit from the animal is permitted.
רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר פְּסוּלָה: מְחַשְּׁבִין מֵעֲבוֹדָה לַעֲבוֹדָה, וְיָלְפִינַן חוּץ מִפְּנִים.
The Gemara elaborates. Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The slaughter is not valid and benefit from the animal is forbidden. He holds that one transfers intent from one sacrificial rite to another sacrificial rite. If, while slaughtering a sacrificial animal, one intends to perform one of the other sacrificial rites in an improper manner the offering is invalidated. And Rabbi Yoḥanan holds that we derive the halakhot of non-sacred slaughter outside the Temple from the halakhot of slaughter of sacrificial animals inside the Temple. Since that intent invalidates the slaughter of sacrificial animals inside the Temple, it invalidates the slaughter of non-sacred animals outside the Temple as well.
רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ אָמַר מוּתֶּרֶת: אֵין מְחַשְּׁבִין מֵעֲבוֹדָה לַעֲבוֹדָה, וְלָא גָּמְרִינַן חוּץ מִפְּנִים.
Reish Lakish says: The slaughter is valid, and deriving benefit from the animal is permitted. He holds that one does not transfer intent from one sacrificial rite to another sacrificial rite. Therefore, while slaughtering the animal, only intent to perform the slaughter improperly invalidates the offering, but intent to perform another sacrificial rite improperly does not invalidate the offering. And Reish Lakish holds that we do not derive the halakhot of non-sacred slaughter outside the Temple from the halakhot of slaughter of sacrificial animals inside the Temple.
וְאָזְדוּ לְטַעְמַיְיהוּ, דְּאִתְּמַר: שְׁחָטָהּ לִשְׁמָהּ לִזְרוֹק דָּמָהּ שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָהּ – רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: פְּסוּלָה, רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ אָמַר: כְּשֵׁרָה.
And Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish follow their standard line of reasoning, as it was stated: If one slaughtered a sin offering for its own sake, but with intent to sprinkle its blood not for its own sake but for the sake of another type of offering, Rabbi Yoḥanan says that the offering is unfit, and Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says that the offering is fit.
רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר פְּסוּלָה: מְחַשְּׁבִין מֵעֲבוֹדָה לַעֲבוֹדָה, וְגָמְרִינַן מִמַּחְשֶׁבֶת פִּיגּוּל. רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ אָמַר כְּשֵׁרָה: אֵין מְחַשְּׁבִין מֵעֲבוֹדָה לַעֲבוֹדָה, וְלָא גָּמְרִינַן מִמַּחְשֶׁבֶת פִּיגּוּל.
The Gemara elaborates: Rabbi Yoḥanan says that the offering is unfit. He holds that one transfers intent from one sacrificial rite to another sacrificial rite, and the reason is that we derive the halakha of slaughter of a sin offering not for its sake from the halakha of intent for piggul, i.e., performance of one of the sacrificial rites with the intent to sprinkle the blood of the offering beyond its appointed time. And Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says that the offering is fit because he holds that one does not transfer intent from one sacrificial rite to another sacrificial rite, and the reason is that we do not derive the halakha of any other improper intent from the halakha of intent for piggul.
וּצְרִיכָא, דְּאִי אִיתְּמַר בְּהָא, בְּהָא קָאָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ, מִשּׁוּם דְּחוּץ מִפְּנִים לָא יָלְפִינַן, אֲבָל פְּנִים מִפְּנִים – אֵימָא מוֹדֵי לֵיהּ לְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן.
The Gemara notes: And it is necessary to state the dispute between Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish in both cases. As, if it were stated only with regard to that case of one who slaughters an animal in order to sprinkle its blood for idol worship, perhaps one would conclude that it is specifically in that case that Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish states his opinion that the slaughter is valid, due to the fact that we do not derive the halakhot of non-sacred slaughter outside the Temple from the halakhot of slaughter of sacrificial animals inside the Temple. But in the case of one who slaughters an offering for the sake of another offering, where we would be deriving the halakhot of slaughter of sacrificial animals inside the Temple from the halakhot of another case of slaughter of sacrificial animals inside the Temple, say that Reish Lakish concedes to Rabbi Yoḥanan that the offering is unfit.
וְאִי אִתְּמַר בְּהָךְ, בְּהַהִיא קָאָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, אֲבָל בְּהָא – אֵימָא מוֹדֵי לֵיהּ לְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ, צְרִיכָא.
And if their dispute was stated with regard to this case of one who slaughters an offering for the sake of another offering, perhaps one would conclude that it is specifically in this case that Rabbi Yoḥanan said that the offering is unfit, because he holds that one derives the halakhot of slaughter of sacrificial animals inside the Temple from the halakhot of another case of slaughter of sacrificial animals inside the Temple. But in that case of one who slaughters an animal in order to sprinkle its blood for idol worship, say that Rabbi Yoḥanan concedes to Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish that the offering is fit due to the fact that the halakhot of non-sacred slaughter outside the Temple are not derived from the halakhot of slaughter of sacrificial animals inside the Temple. Therefore, it is necessary to state the dispute between Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish in both cases.
מֵתִיב רַב שֵׁשֶׁת: אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי: קַל וָחוֹמֶר הַדְּבָרִים, וּמָה בִּמְקוֹם שֶׁמַּחְשָׁבָה פּוֹסֶלֶת בְּמוּקְדָּשִׁין – אֵין הַכֹּל הוֹלֵךְ אֶלָּא אַחַר הָעוֹבֵד, מְקוֹם שֶׁאֵין מַחְשָׁבָה פּוֹסֶלֶת בְּחוּלִּין – אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁלֹּא יְהֵא הַכֹּל הוֹלֵךְ אֶלָּא אַחַר הַשּׁוֹחֵט?
Rav Sheshet raises an objection to both Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish from the statement in the mishna with regard to one who slaughters for a gentile when the intent of the gentile is for idol worship. Rabbi Yosei says: The matter of the intent of the gentile is irrelevant in this case as can be derived by means of an a fortiori inference. If in a place where intent while slaughtering the animal invalidates the slaughter, i.e., in sacrificial animals, such as when slaughtering an offering with the intent to sacrifice it beyond its designated time, everything follows only the intent of the priest performing the service and not the intent of the owner, then in a place where intent does not invalidate the slaughter, i.e., in non-sacred animals, is it not right that everything should follow only the intent of the one who slaughters the animal?
מַאי ״אֵין מַחְשָׁבָה פּוֹסֶלֶת בְּחוּלִּין״? אִילֵּימָא דְּלָא פָּסְלָה כְּלָל, אֶלָּא זְבִיחָה דַּעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה דְּמִיתַּסְרָא, הֵיכִי מַשְׁכַּחַתְּ לַהּ?
Rav Sheshet elaborates: What is the meaning of: Intent does not invalidate the slaughter in non-sacred animals? If we say that it means that intent does not invalidate the slaughter of non-sacred animals at all, but then how can you find a case of slaughter with intent for idol worship where the animal is forbidden?
אֶלָּא פְּשִׁיטָא מֵעֲבוֹדָה לַעֲבוֹדָה, וְהָכִי קָאָמַר: וּמָה בִּמְקוֹם שֶׁמַּחְשָׁבָה פּוֹסֶלֶת בְּמוּקְדָּשִׁין מֵעֲבוֹדָה לַעֲבוֹדָה – אֵין הַכֹּל הוֹלֵךְ אֶלָּא אַחַר הָעוֹבֵד, מְקוֹם שֶׁאֵין מַחְשָׁבָה פּוֹסֶלֶת בְּחוּלִּין מֵעֲבוֹדָה לַעֲבוֹדָה, אֶלָּא בְּאוֹתָהּ עֲבוֹדָה – אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁלֹּא יְהֵא הַכֹּל הוֹלֵךְ אֶלָּא אַחַר הַשּׁוֹחֵט?
Rather, it is obvious that the meaning of that phrase in the statement of Rabbi Yosei is that one does not transfer intent from one sacrificial rite to another sacrificial rite, and this is what Rabbi Yosei is saying: If in a place where intent invalidates, i.e., in sacrificial animals, from one sacrificial rite to another sacrificial rite, everything follows only the intent of the one performing the slaughter, and the intent of the owners is irrelevant, in a place where intent does not invalidate, i.e., in non-sacred animals, from one rite to another rite but it does so only within the same rite, is it not right that everything should follow only the intent of the one who slaughters the animal?
פְּנִים קַשְׁיָא לְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ, חוּץ קַשְׁיָא לְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן!
According to this understanding of the contention of Rabbi Yosei in the mishna, the case of the slaughter of a sacrificial animal inside the Temple is difficult for Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish, as contrary to his opinion, Rabbi Yosei says that in that case one transfers intent from one sacrificial rite to another sacrificial rite. The case of slaughter of a non-sacred animal outside the Temple is difficult for Rabbi Yoḥanan, as contrary to his opinion, Rabbi Yosei says that in that case one does not transfer intent from one rite to another rite.
בִּשְׁלָמָא פְּנִים, לְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ לָא קַשְׁיָא: הָא מִקַּמֵּי דְּשַׁמְעַהּ מֵרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, הָא לְבָתַר דְּשַׁמְעַהּ מֵרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן. אֶלָּא חוּץ, קַשְׁיָא לְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן!
Rav Sheshet continues: Granted, the case of inside the Temple is not difficult for Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish, because one can explain that he stated this statement that one does not transfer intent from one sacrificial rite to another sacrificial rite before he heard the mishna from Rabbi Yoḥanan, his teacher, and he stated that one transfers intent from one sacrificial rite to another sacrificial rite after he heard the mishna from Rabbi Yoḥanan. His dispute with Rabbi Yoḥanan is limited to transfer of intent for idol worship from rite to rite. But the case of slaughter of a non-sacred animal outside the Temple is difficult for Rabbi Yoḥanan.
הוּא מוֹתֵיב לַהּ וְהוּא מְפָרֵק לַהּ, בְּאַרְבַּע עֲבוֹדוֹת, וְהָכִי קָאָמַר: וּמָה בִּמְקוֹם שֶׁמַּחְשָׁבָה פּוֹסֶלֶת בְּמוּקְדָּשִׁין בְּאַרְבַּע עֲבוֹדוֹת – אֵין הַכֹּל הוֹלֵךְ אֶלָּא אַחַר הָעוֹבֵד,
Rav Sheshet raises the objection, and he resolves it. That which Rabbi Yosei said, that intent inside the Temple disqualifies the slaughter of a sacrificial animal but intent outside the Temple does not disqualify the slaughter of a non-sacred animal, is unrelated to transfer of intent from one rite to another. Rather, Rabbi Yosei is referring to a case where one performed any of the four sacrificial rites with improper intent, e.g., to eat the offering beyond its appointed time. And this is what Rabbi Yosei is saying: If in a place where intent while slaughtering the animal invalidates the slaughter in sacrificial animals, if that intent was during performance of any of the four sacrificial rites, i.e., slaughter, receiving the blood, conveying the blood to the altar, and sprinkling the blood on the altar, everything follows only the intent of the priest performing the service and not the intent of the owner,
מְקוֹם שֶׁאֵין מַחְשָׁבָה פּוֹסֶלֶת בְּחוּלִּין אֶלָּא בִּשְׁתֵּי עֲבוֹדוֹת – אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁלֹּא יְהֵא הַכֹּל הוֹלֵךְ אֶלָּא אַחַר הַשּׁוֹחֵט.
then in a place where intent invalidates the slaughter in non-sacred animals slaughtered with intent for idol worship during performance of only two sacrificial rites, slaughter and sprinkling the blood, is it not right that everything should follow only the intent of the one who slaughters the animal?
תַּנְיָא כְּוָותֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: הַשּׁוֹחֵט אֶת הַבְּהֵמָה לִזְרוֹק דָּמָהּ לַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה וּלְהַקְטִיר חֶלְבָּהּ לַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה – הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ זִבְחֵי מֵתִים. שְׁחָטָהּ וְאַחַר כָּךְ חִישֵּׁב עָלֶיהָ – זֶה הָיָה מַעֲשֶׂה בְּקֵיסָרִי, וְלֹא אָמְרוּ בָּהּ לֹא אִיסּוּר וְלֹא הֶיתֵּר.
It is taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan: With regard to one who slaughters an animal in order to sprinkle its blood for idol worship or to burn its fat for idol worship, the status of these animals is that of offerings to the dead, i.e., to idols, and the slaughter is not valid. If one slaughtered the animal and thereafter intended in its regard to sprinkle its blood or burn its fats for idol worship, that was the incident in Caesarea, and the Sages did not say anything with regard to the animal, neither prohibition nor permission.
אָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא: לֹא אָמְרוּ בָּהּ אִיסּוּר – מִשּׁוּם כְּבוֹדָן דְּרַבָּנַן. לֹא הֶיתֵּר – מִשּׁוּם כְּבוֹדוֹ דְרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר.
Rav Ḥisda says in explanation of the conduct of the Sages that they did not say prohibition, due to the honor of the Rabbis in the mishna, who hold that the unspecified intent of a gentile, and presumably likewise of a Jew who worships idols, is not presumed to be directed to idol worship, and therefore his slaughter is valid. Nor did the Sages say permission, due to the honor of Rabbi Eliezer, who holds that the unspecified intent of a gentile, and presumably likewise of a Jew who worships idols, is presumed to be directed to idol worship.
מִמַּאי? דִּלְמָא עַד כָּאן לָא קָאָמְרִי רַבָּנַן הָתָם, אֶלָּא דְּלָא שְׁמַעְנֵאּ דְּחַשֵּׁיב, אֲבָל הָכָא דִּשְׁמַעְנֵאּ דְּחַשֵּׁיב – הוֹכִיחַ סוֹפוֹ עַל תְּחִלָּתוֹ!
The Gemara asks: From where is that conclusion drawn? Perhaps the Rabbis say that the slaughter is permitted only there in the mishna, because we did not hear explicitly that the gentile intends the slaughter for idol worship. But here in the case in the baraita, where we hear thereafter that he intends to sprinkle the blood or burn the fats for idol worship, perhaps his ultimate statement proves the nature of his original intent while performing the slaughter.
אִי נָמֵי, עַד כָּאן לָא קָאָמַר רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר הָתָם אֶלָּא גַּבֵּי נׇכְרִי, דִּסְתָם מַחְשֶׁבֶת נׇכְרִי לַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה, אֲבָל יִשְׂרָאֵל – הוֹכִיחַ סוֹפוֹ עַל תְּחִלָּתוֹ לָא אָמְרִינַן.
Alternatively, perhaps when Rabbi Eliezer states there in the mishna that slaughter performed on behalf of a gentile is not valid, this applies only with regard to an animal that is owned by a gentile, as the unspecified intent of a gentile is directed to idol worship. But in the case in the baraita where the animal belongs to a Jew, we do not say that his ultimate statement proves the nature of his original intent.
אֶלָּא אָמַר רַב שֵׁיזְבִי: לֹא אָמְרוּ בָּהּ הֶיתֵּר מִשּׁוּם כְּבוֹדוֹ דְּרַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל, הֵי רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל?
Rather, Rav Sheizevi said that the Sages did not state permission with regard to the animal in the baraita due to the honor of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, who holds that one’s ultimate actions prove the nature of his original intent. The Gemara asks: Which statement of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel indicates that this is his opinion?
אִילֵּימָא רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל דְּגִיטִּין, דִּתְנַן: הַבָּרִיא שֶׁאָמַר ״כִּתְבוּ גֵּט לְאִשְׁתִּי״ – רָצָה לְשַׂחֵק בָּהּ.
If we say that the reference is to the statement of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel with regard to bills of divorce, this is difficult. As we learned in a mishna (Gittin 66a) that if a dying man said to the people present: Write a bill of divorce for my wife, those people should write and deliver the bill of divorce to his wife. Although the delivery was not included in his command, that is clearly his intent. But a healthy man who says: Write a bill of divorce for my wife, but did not say: Deliver it to her, presumably sought to mock her and not to designate his listeners as agents of delivery.
וּמַעֲשֶׂה בְּבָרִיא שֶׁאָמַר ״כִּתְבוּ גֵּט לְאִשְׁתִּי״, וְעָלָה לַגָּג וְנָפַל וָמֵת. אָמַר רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל: אִם מֵעַצְמוֹ נָפַל, הֲרֵי זֶה גֵּט, וְאִם הָרוּחַ דָּחַתּוּ, אֵינוֹ גֵּט.
The mishna continues: And there was an incident involving a healthy man who said: Write a bill of divorce for my wife, and then ascended to the roof and fell, and died. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: If he fell at his own initiative, taking his own life, it is a valid bill of divorce, as it is clear that he anticipated his death, thereby rendering his halakhic status like that of a dying man. But if the wind forced him to fall and he died, it is not a valid bill of divorce, as there was no clear intent to give her the bill of divorce.
וְהָוֵינַן בַּהּ: מַעֲשֶׂה לִסְתּוֹר?
And we discussed the mishna: Did the tanna cite an incident to contradict that which was stated previously in the mishna? The tanna states unequivocally that when a healthy man says: Write a bill of divorce for my wife, the bill of divorce is not valid. The tanna then cites an incident indicating that under certain circumstances, when a healthy man says: Write a bill of divorce for my wife, the bill of divorce is valid.
חַסּוֹרֵי מִיחַסְּרָא וְהָכִי קָתָנֵי: אִם הוֹכִיחַ סוֹפוֹ עַל תְּחִלָּתוֹ – הֲרֵי זֶה גֵּט, וּמַעֲשֶׂה נָמֵי בְּבָרִיא שֶׁאָמַר ״כִּתְבוּ גֵּט לְאִשְׁתִּי״, וְעָלָה לַגָּג וְנָפַל וָמֵת. אָמַר רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל: אִם מֵעַצְמוֹ נָפַל – הֲרֵי זֶה גֵּט, וְאִם הָרוּחַ דָּחַתּוּ – אֵינוֹ גֵּט.
The Gemara answers: The mishna is incomplete and this is what it is teaching: The healthy man who says: Write a bill of divorce for my wife, but did not say: Deliver it to her, presumably sought to mock her. But if his ultimate actions prove the nature of his initial intent, that he seeks to give the bill of divorce because he is about to die, it is a valid bill of divorce. And there was an incident involving a healthy man who said: Write a bill of divorce for my wife, and then ascended to the roof and fell, and died. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: If he fell at his own initiative, it is a valid bill of divorce, but if the wind forced him to fall, it is not a valid bill of divorce.
וְדִלְמָא שָׁאנֵי הָתָם, דְּקָאָמַר ״כִּתְבוּ״.
The Gemara explains why this is not a proof: But perhaps the case cited there is different, as the husband initially says: Write a bill of divorce for my wife, indicating that he originally intended to fall from the roof. By contrast, in the case of slaughter, there is no indication of his original intent.
אֶלָּא אָמַר רָבִינָא: מִשּׁוּם כְּבוֹדוֹ דְּרַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל דְּהָכָא, דְּתַנְיָא: הַכּוֹתֵב נְכָסָיו לַאֲחֵרִים, וְהָיוּ בָּהֶן עֲבָדִים, וְאָמַר הַלָּה ״אִי אֶפְשִׁי בָּהֶן״, אִם הָיָה רַבּוֹ שֵׁנִי כֹּהֵן – הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ אוֹכְלִין בִּתְרוּמָה. רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר: כֵּיוָן שֶׁאָמַר הַלָּה ״אִי אֶפְשִׁי בָּהֶן״ – כְּבָר זָכוּ בָּהֶן יוֹרְשִׁין.
Rather, Ravina said that the Sages did not state permission in the incident in Caesarea with regard to the animal due to the honor of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, to avoid contradicting the opinion that is cited here, as it is taught in a baraita: In a case of a person on his deathbed who wrote a document transferring his property to others, and there were slaves among his property, and that intended recipient says: I do not want to assume ownership of the slaves, if their second master, the intended recipient, was a priest, these slaves may partake of teruma, and his protest is ignored. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Once that intended recipient says: I do not want to assume ownership of the slaves, heirs of the original owner already acquired them.
וְהָוֵינַן בַּהּ: לְתַנָּא קַמָּא, אֲפִילּוּ עוֹמֵד וְצוֹוֵחַ?
And we discussed the baraita: And according to the first tanna, does the intended recipient acquire the slaves even if he stands and shouts in protest that he does not want to assume ownership of the slaves? That is not reasonable.
אֲמַר רַבָּה, וְאִיתֵּימָא רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: בְּצוֹוֵחַ מֵעִיקָּרָא – דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא לָא פְּלִיגִי דְּלָא קָנָה, בְּשׁוֹתֵק וּבַסּוֹף צוֹוֵחַ – דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא לָא פְּלִיגִי דִּקְנָה.
Rabba said, and some say it was Rabbi Yoḥanan who said: In a case where he shouts in protest at the outset, while the owner is giving him the gift, everyone agrees that he did not acquire the slaves. In a case where he was silent at that moment and ultimately shouted his protest at a later opportunity, everyone agrees that he acquired the slaves.
כִּי פְּלִיגִי – שֶׁזִּיכָּה לוֹ עַל יְדֵי אַחֵר, וְשָׁתַק וּלְבַסּוֹף צָוַוח; תַּנָּא קַמָּא סָבַר: מִדִּשְׁתֵיק – קְנָנְהוּ, וְהַאי דְּקָא צָוַוח – מִיהְדָּר קָא הָדַר בֵּיהּ.
When they disagree it is in a case where the owner transferred ownership of the slaves to him through another person, and at that point the recipient was silent, and ultimately, when he actually received the slaves, he shouted in protest. The first tanna holds: Since he was initially silent, he acquired the slaves, and the fact that he is ultimately shouting indicates that he is retracting his initial acceptance of the gift. That retraction is ineffective, as acquisitions cannot be nullified in that manner.
וְרַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל סָבַר: הוֹכִיחַ סוֹפוֹ עַל תְּחִילָּתוֹ, וְהָא דְּלָא צְוַוח מֵעִיקָּרָא, סָבַר: כִּי לָא אָתֵי לִידִי אַמַּאי אֶצְוַוח.
And Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds: His ultimate actions prove the nature of his original intent. He never wanted the slaves and always intended to avoid assuming ownership of them. And the fact that he did not shout initially is because he thought: As the situation is that they did not yet enter my possession, why would I shout?
אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי.
§ The Gemara resumes discussion of the dispute in the mishna where Rabbi Yosei says that when a Jew slaughters an animal on behalf of a gentile, even if it is known that the intent of the gentile is for idol worship, the slaughter is valid, as it is only the intent of the slaughterer that is relevant. Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei.
הָנְהוּ טַיָּיעֵי דַּאֲתוֹ לְצִיקוֹנְיָא, יְהוּב דִּיכְרֵי לְטַבָּחֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל, אֲמַרוּ לְהוּ: דְּמָא וְתַרְבָּא לְדִידַן, מַשְׁכָּא וּבִישְׂרָא לְדִידְכוּ. שַׁלְחַהּ רַב טוֹבִי בַּר רַב מַתְנָה לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב יוֹסֵף: כִּי הַאי גַּוְונָא מַאי? שְׁלַח לֵיהּ: הָכִי אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי.
The Gemara relates: There were these Arabs who came to Tzikuneya, and they gave rams to Jewish slaughterers. The Arabs said to them: The blood and the fat are for us, for use in our idol worship, and the hide and the flesh are for you. Rav Tuvi bar Rav Mattana sent a question to be asked before Rav Yosef: In a case like this, what is the halakha? Rav Yosef sent to him: This is what Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, and it is the intent of the slaughterer and not the intent of the owner that determines the validity of the slaughter.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב אַחָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב אַוְיָא לְרַב אָשֵׁי: לְרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר, יְהֵיב לֵיהּ זוּזָא לְטַבָּח יִשְׂרָאֵל, מַאי? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: חָזֵינַן, אִי אִינִישׁ אַלָּמָא הוּא דְּלָא מָצֵי מְדַחֵי לֵיהּ – אָסוּר, וְאִי לָא – אָמַר לֵיהּ: ״רֵישָׁיךָ וְהַר״.
Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Avya, said to Rav Ashi: According to the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer in the mishna, that if a Jew slaughters an animal on behalf of a gentile the slaughter is not valid, if the gentile gave a dinar to a Jewish slaughterer in order to purchase a small amount of the meat, what is the halakha? Does that small amount invalidate the entire slaughter? Rav Ashi said to him: We examine the situation. If this gentile is a violent man, and the Jew is unable to repudiate his offer and tell him to take his money, the entire animal is forbidden, because the slaughter was partially on behalf of the gentile. And if the gentile is not violent, the Jew can say to him: Go and arrange a collision between your head and a mountain, as I will not slaughter an animal on your behalf.
מַתְנִי׳ הַשּׁוֹחֵט לְשֵׁם הָרִים, לְשֵׁם גְּבָעוֹת, לְשֵׁם יַמִּים, לְשֵׁם נְהָרוֹת, לְשֵׁם מִדְבָּרוֹת – שְׁחִיטָתוֹ פְּסוּלָה.
MISHNA: In the case of one who slaughters an animal for the sake of, i.e., to worship, mountains, for the sake of hills, for the sake of seas, for the sake of rivers, or for the sake of wildernesses, his slaughter is not valid.
Today’s daily daf tools:
Delve Deeper
Broaden your understanding of the topics on this daf with classes and podcasts from top women Talmud scholars.
Hullin 39: Pigul, Divorce, Slaves, and Their Parallels to Shechitah
New to Talmud?
Check out our resources designed to help you navigate a page of Talmud – and study at the pace, level and style that fits you.
The Hadran Women’s Tapestry
Meet the diverse women learning Gemara at Hadran and hear their stories.
New York, United States
I am a Reform rabbi and took Talmud courses in rabbinical school, but I knew there was so much more to learn. It felt inauthentic to serve as a rabbi without having read the entire Talmud, so when the opportunity arose to start Daf Yomi in 2020, I dove in! Thanks to Hadran, Daf Yomi has enriched my understanding of rabbinic Judaism and deepened my love of Jewish text & tradition. Todah rabbah!
California, United States
I never thought I’d be able to do Daf Yomi till I saw the video of Hadran’s Siyum HaShas. Now, 2 years later, I’m about to participate in Siyum Seder Mo’ed with my Hadran community. It has been an incredible privilege to learn with Rabbanit Michelle and to get to know so many caring, talented and knowledgeable women. I look forward with great anticipation and excitement to learning Seder Nashim.
Karmiel, Israel
I started at the beginning of this cycle. No 1 reason, but here’s 5.
In 2019 I read about the upcoming siyum hashas.
There was a sermon at shul about how anyone can learn Talmud.
Talmud references come up when I am studying. I wanted to know more.
Yentl was on telly. Not a great movie but it’s about studying Talmud.
I went to the Hadran website: A new cycle is starting. I’m gonna do this
Cambridge, United Kingdom
Palo Alto, CA, United States
When the new cycle began, I thought, If not now, when? I’d just turned 72. I feel like a tourist on a tour bus passing astonishing scenery each day. Rabbanit Michelle is my beloved tour guide. When the cycle ends, I’ll be 80. I pray that I’ll have strength and mind to continue the journey to glimpse a little more. My grandchildren think having a daf-learning savta is cool!
Jerusalem, Israel
I started learning at the start of this cycle, and quickly fell in love. It has become such an important part of my day, enriching every part of my life.
Toronto, Canada
I started learning at the beginning of the cycle after a friend persuaded me that it would be right up my alley. I was lucky enough to learn at Rabbanit Michelle’s house before it started on zoom and it was quickly part of my daily routine. I find it so important to see for myself where halachot were derived, where stories were told and to get more insight into how the Rabbis interacted.
Ra’anana, Israel
Minneapolis, MN, United States
In January 2020, my chevruta suggested that we “up our game. Let’s do Daf Yomi” – and she sent me the Hadran link. I lost my job (and went freelance), there was a pandemic, and I am still opening the podcast with my breakfast coffee, or after Shabbat with popcorn. My Aramaic is improving. I will need a new bookcase, though.
Atlanta, Georgia, United States
תמיד רציתי. למדתי גמרא בבית ספר בטורונטו קנדה. עליתי ארצה ולמדתי שזה לא מקובל. הופתעתי.
יצאתי לגימלאות לפני שנתיים וזה מאפשר את המחוייבות לדף יומי.
עבורי ההתמדה בלימוד מעגן אותי בקשר שלי ליהדות. אני תמיד מחפשת ותמיד. מוצאת מקור לקשר. ללימוד חדש ומחדש. קשר עם נשים לומדות מעמיק את החוויה ומשמעותית מאוד.
מיתר, ישראל
I learned daf more off than on 40 years ago. At the beginning of the current cycle, I decided to commit to learning daf regularly. Having Rabanit Michelle available as a learning partner has been amazing. Sometimes I learn with Hadran, sometimes with my husband, and sometimes on my own. It’s been fun to be part of an extended learning community.
Honolulu, Hawaii, United States
When I started studying Hebrew at Brown University’s Hillel, I had no idea that almost 38 years later, I’m doing Daf Yomi. My Shabbat haburah is led by Rabbanit Leah Sarna. The women are a hoot. I’m tracking the completion of each tractate by reading Ilana Kurshan’s memoir, If All the Seas Were Ink.
Pennsylvania, United States
Phoenix, Arizona, United States
Attending the Siyyum in Jerusalem 26 months ago inspired me to become part of this community of learners. So many aspects of Jewish life have been illuminated by what we have learned in Seder Moed. My day is not complete without daf Yomi. I am so grateful to Rabbanit Michelle and the Hadran Community.
Newton, United States
It happened without intent (so am I yotzei?!) – I watched the women’s siyum live and was so moved by it that the next morning, I tuned in to Rabbanit Michelle’s shiur, and here I am, still learning every day, over 2 years later. Some days it all goes over my head, but others I grasp onto an idea or a story, and I ‘get it’ and that’s the best feeling in the world. So proud to be a Hadran learner.
Zichron Yaakov, Israel
As Jewish educator and as a woman, I’m mindful that Talmud has been kept from women for many centuries. Now that we are privileged to learn, and learning is so accessible, it’s my intent to complete Daf Yomi. I am so excited to keep learning with my Hadran community.
Denver, United States
I heard the new Daf Yomi cycle was starting and I was curious, so I searched online for a women’s class and was pleasently surprised to find Rabanit Michelle’s great class reviews in many online articles. It has been a splendid journey. It is a way to fill my days with Torah, learning so many amazing things I have never heard before during my Tanach learning at High School. Thanks so much .
Panama, Panama
When I was working and taking care of my children, learning was never on the list. Now that I have more time I have two different Gemora classes and the nach yomi as well as the mishna yomi daily.
Jerusalem, Israel
After reading the book, “ If All The Seas Were Ink “ by Ileana Kurshan I started studying Talmud. I searched and studied with several teachers until I found Michelle Farber. I have been studying with her for two years. I look forward every day to learn from her.
Virginia, United States
Chullin 39
לָא יָלְפִינַן. וַאֲתָא רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר לְמֵימַר: יָלְפִינַן חוּץ מִפְּנִים, וַאֲתָא רַבִּי יוֹסֵי לְמֵימַר: אֲפִילּוּ בִּפְנִים נָמֵי ״זֶה מְחַשֵּׁב וְזֶה עוֹבֵד״ לָא אָמְרִינַן.
we do not derive in this manner. And Rabbi Eliezer comes to say that we derive the halakhot of non-sacred slaughter outside the Temple from the halakhot of slaughter of sacrificial animals inside the Temple, and therefore the intent of the gentile invalidates non-sacred slaughter. And Rabbi Yosei comes to say that even inside the Temple, in a case where this owner has improper intent and that other person is performing the slaughter, we do not say that the intent of the owner invalidates the slaughter.
אִתְּמַר: הַשּׁוֹחֵט אֶת הַבְּהֵמָה לִזְרוֹק דָּמָהּ לַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה, וּלְהַקְטִיר חֶלְבָּהּ לַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה – רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: פְּסוּלָה, רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ אָמַר: מוּתֶּרֶת.
§ It was stated that there is an amoraic dispute with regard to one who slaughtered an animal in order to sprinkle its blood for idol worship, or to burn its fat for idol worship. Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The slaughter is not valid, and benefit from the animal is forbidden. Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says: The slaughter is valid and deriving benefit from the animal is permitted.
רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר פְּסוּלָה: מְחַשְּׁבִין מֵעֲבוֹדָה לַעֲבוֹדָה, וְיָלְפִינַן חוּץ מִפְּנִים.
The Gemara elaborates. Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The slaughter is not valid and benefit from the animal is forbidden. He holds that one transfers intent from one sacrificial rite to another sacrificial rite. If, while slaughtering a sacrificial animal, one intends to perform one of the other sacrificial rites in an improper manner the offering is invalidated. And Rabbi Yoḥanan holds that we derive the halakhot of non-sacred slaughter outside the Temple from the halakhot of slaughter of sacrificial animals inside the Temple. Since that intent invalidates the slaughter of sacrificial animals inside the Temple, it invalidates the slaughter of non-sacred animals outside the Temple as well.
רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ אָמַר מוּתֶּרֶת: אֵין מְחַשְּׁבִין מֵעֲבוֹדָה לַעֲבוֹדָה, וְלָא גָּמְרִינַן חוּץ מִפְּנִים.
Reish Lakish says: The slaughter is valid, and deriving benefit from the animal is permitted. He holds that one does not transfer intent from one sacrificial rite to another sacrificial rite. Therefore, while slaughtering the animal, only intent to perform the slaughter improperly invalidates the offering, but intent to perform another sacrificial rite improperly does not invalidate the offering. And Reish Lakish holds that we do not derive the halakhot of non-sacred slaughter outside the Temple from the halakhot of slaughter of sacrificial animals inside the Temple.
וְאָזְדוּ לְטַעְמַיְיהוּ, דְּאִתְּמַר: שְׁחָטָהּ לִשְׁמָהּ לִזְרוֹק דָּמָהּ שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָהּ – רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: פְּסוּלָה, רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ אָמַר: כְּשֵׁרָה.
And Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish follow their standard line of reasoning, as it was stated: If one slaughtered a sin offering for its own sake, but with intent to sprinkle its blood not for its own sake but for the sake of another type of offering, Rabbi Yoḥanan says that the offering is unfit, and Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says that the offering is fit.
רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר פְּסוּלָה: מְחַשְּׁבִין מֵעֲבוֹדָה לַעֲבוֹדָה, וְגָמְרִינַן מִמַּחְשֶׁבֶת פִּיגּוּל. רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ אָמַר כְּשֵׁרָה: אֵין מְחַשְּׁבִין מֵעֲבוֹדָה לַעֲבוֹדָה, וְלָא גָּמְרִינַן מִמַּחְשֶׁבֶת פִּיגּוּל.
The Gemara elaborates: Rabbi Yoḥanan says that the offering is unfit. He holds that one transfers intent from one sacrificial rite to another sacrificial rite, and the reason is that we derive the halakha of slaughter of a sin offering not for its sake from the halakha of intent for piggul, i.e., performance of one of the sacrificial rites with the intent to sprinkle the blood of the offering beyond its appointed time. And Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says that the offering is fit because he holds that one does not transfer intent from one sacrificial rite to another sacrificial rite, and the reason is that we do not derive the halakha of any other improper intent from the halakha of intent for piggul.
וּצְרִיכָא, דְּאִי אִיתְּמַר בְּהָא, בְּהָא קָאָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ, מִשּׁוּם דְּחוּץ מִפְּנִים לָא יָלְפִינַן, אֲבָל פְּנִים מִפְּנִים – אֵימָא מוֹדֵי לֵיהּ לְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן.
The Gemara notes: And it is necessary to state the dispute between Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish in both cases. As, if it were stated only with regard to that case of one who slaughters an animal in order to sprinkle its blood for idol worship, perhaps one would conclude that it is specifically in that case that Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish states his opinion that the slaughter is valid, due to the fact that we do not derive the halakhot of non-sacred slaughter outside the Temple from the halakhot of slaughter of sacrificial animals inside the Temple. But in the case of one who slaughters an offering for the sake of another offering, where we would be deriving the halakhot of slaughter of sacrificial animals inside the Temple from the halakhot of another case of slaughter of sacrificial animals inside the Temple, say that Reish Lakish concedes to Rabbi Yoḥanan that the offering is unfit.
וְאִי אִתְּמַר בְּהָךְ, בְּהַהִיא קָאָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, אֲבָל בְּהָא – אֵימָא מוֹדֵי לֵיהּ לְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ, צְרִיכָא.
And if their dispute was stated with regard to this case of one who slaughters an offering for the sake of another offering, perhaps one would conclude that it is specifically in this case that Rabbi Yoḥanan said that the offering is unfit, because he holds that one derives the halakhot of slaughter of sacrificial animals inside the Temple from the halakhot of another case of slaughter of sacrificial animals inside the Temple. But in that case of one who slaughters an animal in order to sprinkle its blood for idol worship, say that Rabbi Yoḥanan concedes to Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish that the offering is fit due to the fact that the halakhot of non-sacred slaughter outside the Temple are not derived from the halakhot of slaughter of sacrificial animals inside the Temple. Therefore, it is necessary to state the dispute between Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish in both cases.
מֵתִיב רַב שֵׁשֶׁת: אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי: קַל וָחוֹמֶר הַדְּבָרִים, וּמָה בִּמְקוֹם שֶׁמַּחְשָׁבָה פּוֹסֶלֶת בְּמוּקְדָּשִׁין – אֵין הַכֹּל הוֹלֵךְ אֶלָּא אַחַר הָעוֹבֵד, מְקוֹם שֶׁאֵין מַחְשָׁבָה פּוֹסֶלֶת בְּחוּלִּין – אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁלֹּא יְהֵא הַכֹּל הוֹלֵךְ אֶלָּא אַחַר הַשּׁוֹחֵט?
Rav Sheshet raises an objection to both Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish from the statement in the mishna with regard to one who slaughters for a gentile when the intent of the gentile is for idol worship. Rabbi Yosei says: The matter of the intent of the gentile is irrelevant in this case as can be derived by means of an a fortiori inference. If in a place where intent while slaughtering the animal invalidates the slaughter, i.e., in sacrificial animals, such as when slaughtering an offering with the intent to sacrifice it beyond its designated time, everything follows only the intent of the priest performing the service and not the intent of the owner, then in a place where intent does not invalidate the slaughter, i.e., in non-sacred animals, is it not right that everything should follow only the intent of the one who slaughters the animal?
מַאי ״אֵין מַחְשָׁבָה פּוֹסֶלֶת בְּחוּלִּין״? אִילֵּימָא דְּלָא פָּסְלָה כְּלָל, אֶלָּא זְבִיחָה דַּעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה דְּמִיתַּסְרָא, הֵיכִי מַשְׁכַּחַתְּ לַהּ?
Rav Sheshet elaborates: What is the meaning of: Intent does not invalidate the slaughter in non-sacred animals? If we say that it means that intent does not invalidate the slaughter of non-sacred animals at all, but then how can you find a case of slaughter with intent for idol worship where the animal is forbidden?
אֶלָּא פְּשִׁיטָא מֵעֲבוֹדָה לַעֲבוֹדָה, וְהָכִי קָאָמַר: וּמָה בִּמְקוֹם שֶׁמַּחְשָׁבָה פּוֹסֶלֶת בְּמוּקְדָּשִׁין מֵעֲבוֹדָה לַעֲבוֹדָה – אֵין הַכֹּל הוֹלֵךְ אֶלָּא אַחַר הָעוֹבֵד, מְקוֹם שֶׁאֵין מַחְשָׁבָה פּוֹסֶלֶת בְּחוּלִּין מֵעֲבוֹדָה לַעֲבוֹדָה, אֶלָּא בְּאוֹתָהּ עֲבוֹדָה – אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁלֹּא יְהֵא הַכֹּל הוֹלֵךְ אֶלָּא אַחַר הַשּׁוֹחֵט?
Rather, it is obvious that the meaning of that phrase in the statement of Rabbi Yosei is that one does not transfer intent from one sacrificial rite to another sacrificial rite, and this is what Rabbi Yosei is saying: If in a place where intent invalidates, i.e., in sacrificial animals, from one sacrificial rite to another sacrificial rite, everything follows only the intent of the one performing the slaughter, and the intent of the owners is irrelevant, in a place where intent does not invalidate, i.e., in non-sacred animals, from one rite to another rite but it does so only within the same rite, is it not right that everything should follow only the intent of the one who slaughters the animal?
פְּנִים קַשְׁיָא לְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ, חוּץ קַשְׁיָא לְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן!
According to this understanding of the contention of Rabbi Yosei in the mishna, the case of the slaughter of a sacrificial animal inside the Temple is difficult for Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish, as contrary to his opinion, Rabbi Yosei says that in that case one transfers intent from one sacrificial rite to another sacrificial rite. The case of slaughter of a non-sacred animal outside the Temple is difficult for Rabbi Yoḥanan, as contrary to his opinion, Rabbi Yosei says that in that case one does not transfer intent from one rite to another rite.
בִּשְׁלָמָא פְּנִים, לְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ לָא קַשְׁיָא: הָא מִקַּמֵּי דְּשַׁמְעַהּ מֵרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, הָא לְבָתַר דְּשַׁמְעַהּ מֵרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן. אֶלָּא חוּץ, קַשְׁיָא לְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן!
Rav Sheshet continues: Granted, the case of inside the Temple is not difficult for Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish, because one can explain that he stated this statement that one does not transfer intent from one sacrificial rite to another sacrificial rite before he heard the mishna from Rabbi Yoḥanan, his teacher, and he stated that one transfers intent from one sacrificial rite to another sacrificial rite after he heard the mishna from Rabbi Yoḥanan. His dispute with Rabbi Yoḥanan is limited to transfer of intent for idol worship from rite to rite. But the case of slaughter of a non-sacred animal outside the Temple is difficult for Rabbi Yoḥanan.
הוּא מוֹתֵיב לַהּ וְהוּא מְפָרֵק לַהּ, בְּאַרְבַּע עֲבוֹדוֹת, וְהָכִי קָאָמַר: וּמָה בִּמְקוֹם שֶׁמַּחְשָׁבָה פּוֹסֶלֶת בְּמוּקְדָּשִׁין בְּאַרְבַּע עֲבוֹדוֹת – אֵין הַכֹּל הוֹלֵךְ אֶלָּא אַחַר הָעוֹבֵד,
Rav Sheshet raises the objection, and he resolves it. That which Rabbi Yosei said, that intent inside the Temple disqualifies the slaughter of a sacrificial animal but intent outside the Temple does not disqualify the slaughter of a non-sacred animal, is unrelated to transfer of intent from one rite to another. Rather, Rabbi Yosei is referring to a case where one performed any of the four sacrificial rites with improper intent, e.g., to eat the offering beyond its appointed time. And this is what Rabbi Yosei is saying: If in a place where intent while slaughtering the animal invalidates the slaughter in sacrificial animals, if that intent was during performance of any of the four sacrificial rites, i.e., slaughter, receiving the blood, conveying the blood to the altar, and sprinkling the blood on the altar, everything follows only the intent of the priest performing the service and not the intent of the owner,
מְקוֹם שֶׁאֵין מַחְשָׁבָה פּוֹסֶלֶת בְּחוּלִּין אֶלָּא בִּשְׁתֵּי עֲבוֹדוֹת – אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁלֹּא יְהֵא הַכֹּל הוֹלֵךְ אֶלָּא אַחַר הַשּׁוֹחֵט.
then in a place where intent invalidates the slaughter in non-sacred animals slaughtered with intent for idol worship during performance of only two sacrificial rites, slaughter and sprinkling the blood, is it not right that everything should follow only the intent of the one who slaughters the animal?
תַּנְיָא כְּוָותֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: הַשּׁוֹחֵט אֶת הַבְּהֵמָה לִזְרוֹק דָּמָהּ לַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה וּלְהַקְטִיר חֶלְבָּהּ לַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה – הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ זִבְחֵי מֵתִים. שְׁחָטָהּ וְאַחַר כָּךְ חִישֵּׁב עָלֶיהָ – זֶה הָיָה מַעֲשֶׂה בְּקֵיסָרִי, וְלֹא אָמְרוּ בָּהּ לֹא אִיסּוּר וְלֹא הֶיתֵּר.
It is taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan: With regard to one who slaughters an animal in order to sprinkle its blood for idol worship or to burn its fat for idol worship, the status of these animals is that of offerings to the dead, i.e., to idols, and the slaughter is not valid. If one slaughtered the animal and thereafter intended in its regard to sprinkle its blood or burn its fats for idol worship, that was the incident in Caesarea, and the Sages did not say anything with regard to the animal, neither prohibition nor permission.
אָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא: לֹא אָמְרוּ בָּהּ אִיסּוּר – מִשּׁוּם כְּבוֹדָן דְּרַבָּנַן. לֹא הֶיתֵּר – מִשּׁוּם כְּבוֹדוֹ דְרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר.
Rav Ḥisda says in explanation of the conduct of the Sages that they did not say prohibition, due to the honor of the Rabbis in the mishna, who hold that the unspecified intent of a gentile, and presumably likewise of a Jew who worships idols, is not presumed to be directed to idol worship, and therefore his slaughter is valid. Nor did the Sages say permission, due to the honor of Rabbi Eliezer, who holds that the unspecified intent of a gentile, and presumably likewise of a Jew who worships idols, is presumed to be directed to idol worship.
מִמַּאי? דִּלְמָא עַד כָּאן לָא קָאָמְרִי רַבָּנַן הָתָם, אֶלָּא דְּלָא שְׁמַעְנֵאּ דְּחַשֵּׁיב, אֲבָל הָכָא דִּשְׁמַעְנֵאּ דְּחַשֵּׁיב – הוֹכִיחַ סוֹפוֹ עַל תְּחִלָּתוֹ!
The Gemara asks: From where is that conclusion drawn? Perhaps the Rabbis say that the slaughter is permitted only there in the mishna, because we did not hear explicitly that the gentile intends the slaughter for idol worship. But here in the case in the baraita, where we hear thereafter that he intends to sprinkle the blood or burn the fats for idol worship, perhaps his ultimate statement proves the nature of his original intent while performing the slaughter.
אִי נָמֵי, עַד כָּאן לָא קָאָמַר רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר הָתָם אֶלָּא גַּבֵּי נׇכְרִי, דִּסְתָם מַחְשֶׁבֶת נׇכְרִי לַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה, אֲבָל יִשְׂרָאֵל – הוֹכִיחַ סוֹפוֹ עַל תְּחִלָּתוֹ לָא אָמְרִינַן.
Alternatively, perhaps when Rabbi Eliezer states there in the mishna that slaughter performed on behalf of a gentile is not valid, this applies only with regard to an animal that is owned by a gentile, as the unspecified intent of a gentile is directed to idol worship. But in the case in the baraita where the animal belongs to a Jew, we do not say that his ultimate statement proves the nature of his original intent.
אֶלָּא אָמַר רַב שֵׁיזְבִי: לֹא אָמְרוּ בָּהּ הֶיתֵּר מִשּׁוּם כְּבוֹדוֹ דְּרַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל, הֵי רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל?
Rather, Rav Sheizevi said that the Sages did not state permission with regard to the animal in the baraita due to the honor of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, who holds that one’s ultimate actions prove the nature of his original intent. The Gemara asks: Which statement of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel indicates that this is his opinion?
אִילֵּימָא רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל דְּגִיטִּין, דִּתְנַן: הַבָּרִיא שֶׁאָמַר ״כִּתְבוּ גֵּט לְאִשְׁתִּי״ – רָצָה לְשַׂחֵק בָּהּ.
If we say that the reference is to the statement of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel with regard to bills of divorce, this is difficult. As we learned in a mishna (Gittin 66a) that if a dying man said to the people present: Write a bill of divorce for my wife, those people should write and deliver the bill of divorce to his wife. Although the delivery was not included in his command, that is clearly his intent. But a healthy man who says: Write a bill of divorce for my wife, but did not say: Deliver it to her, presumably sought to mock her and not to designate his listeners as agents of delivery.
וּמַעֲשֶׂה בְּבָרִיא שֶׁאָמַר ״כִּתְבוּ גֵּט לְאִשְׁתִּי״, וְעָלָה לַגָּג וְנָפַל וָמֵת. אָמַר רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל: אִם מֵעַצְמוֹ נָפַל, הֲרֵי זֶה גֵּט, וְאִם הָרוּחַ דָּחַתּוּ, אֵינוֹ גֵּט.
The mishna continues: And there was an incident involving a healthy man who said: Write a bill of divorce for my wife, and then ascended to the roof and fell, and died. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: If he fell at his own initiative, taking his own life, it is a valid bill of divorce, as it is clear that he anticipated his death, thereby rendering his halakhic status like that of a dying man. But if the wind forced him to fall and he died, it is not a valid bill of divorce, as there was no clear intent to give her the bill of divorce.
וְהָוֵינַן בַּהּ: מַעֲשֶׂה לִסְתּוֹר?
And we discussed the mishna: Did the tanna cite an incident to contradict that which was stated previously in the mishna? The tanna states unequivocally that when a healthy man says: Write a bill of divorce for my wife, the bill of divorce is not valid. The tanna then cites an incident indicating that under certain circumstances, when a healthy man says: Write a bill of divorce for my wife, the bill of divorce is valid.
חַסּוֹרֵי מִיחַסְּרָא וְהָכִי קָתָנֵי: אִם הוֹכִיחַ סוֹפוֹ עַל תְּחִלָּתוֹ – הֲרֵי זֶה גֵּט, וּמַעֲשֶׂה נָמֵי בְּבָרִיא שֶׁאָמַר ״כִּתְבוּ גֵּט לְאִשְׁתִּי״, וְעָלָה לַגָּג וְנָפַל וָמֵת. אָמַר רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל: אִם מֵעַצְמוֹ נָפַל – הֲרֵי זֶה גֵּט, וְאִם הָרוּחַ דָּחַתּוּ – אֵינוֹ גֵּט.
The Gemara answers: The mishna is incomplete and this is what it is teaching: The healthy man who says: Write a bill of divorce for my wife, but did not say: Deliver it to her, presumably sought to mock her. But if his ultimate actions prove the nature of his initial intent, that he seeks to give the bill of divorce because he is about to die, it is a valid bill of divorce. And there was an incident involving a healthy man who said: Write a bill of divorce for my wife, and then ascended to the roof and fell, and died. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: If he fell at his own initiative, it is a valid bill of divorce, but if the wind forced him to fall, it is not a valid bill of divorce.
וְדִלְמָא שָׁאנֵי הָתָם, דְּקָאָמַר ״כִּתְבוּ״.
The Gemara explains why this is not a proof: But perhaps the case cited there is different, as the husband initially says: Write a bill of divorce for my wife, indicating that he originally intended to fall from the roof. By contrast, in the case of slaughter, there is no indication of his original intent.
אֶלָּא אָמַר רָבִינָא: מִשּׁוּם כְּבוֹדוֹ דְּרַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל דְּהָכָא, דְּתַנְיָא: הַכּוֹתֵב נְכָסָיו לַאֲחֵרִים, וְהָיוּ בָּהֶן עֲבָדִים, וְאָמַר הַלָּה ״אִי אֶפְשִׁי בָּהֶן״, אִם הָיָה רַבּוֹ שֵׁנִי כֹּהֵן – הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ אוֹכְלִין בִּתְרוּמָה. רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר: כֵּיוָן שֶׁאָמַר הַלָּה ״אִי אֶפְשִׁי בָּהֶן״ – כְּבָר זָכוּ בָּהֶן יוֹרְשִׁין.
Rather, Ravina said that the Sages did not state permission in the incident in Caesarea with regard to the animal due to the honor of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, to avoid contradicting the opinion that is cited here, as it is taught in a baraita: In a case of a person on his deathbed who wrote a document transferring his property to others, and there were slaves among his property, and that intended recipient says: I do not want to assume ownership of the slaves, if their second master, the intended recipient, was a priest, these slaves may partake of teruma, and his protest is ignored. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Once that intended recipient says: I do not want to assume ownership of the slaves, heirs of the original owner already acquired them.
וְהָוֵינַן בַּהּ: לְתַנָּא קַמָּא, אֲפִילּוּ עוֹמֵד וְצוֹוֵחַ?
And we discussed the baraita: And according to the first tanna, does the intended recipient acquire the slaves even if he stands and shouts in protest that he does not want to assume ownership of the slaves? That is not reasonable.
אֲמַר רַבָּה, וְאִיתֵּימָא רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: בְּצוֹוֵחַ מֵעִיקָּרָא – דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא לָא פְּלִיגִי דְּלָא קָנָה, בְּשׁוֹתֵק וּבַסּוֹף צוֹוֵחַ – דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא לָא פְּלִיגִי דִּקְנָה.
Rabba said, and some say it was Rabbi Yoḥanan who said: In a case where he shouts in protest at the outset, while the owner is giving him the gift, everyone agrees that he did not acquire the slaves. In a case where he was silent at that moment and ultimately shouted his protest at a later opportunity, everyone agrees that he acquired the slaves.
כִּי פְּלִיגִי – שֶׁזִּיכָּה לוֹ עַל יְדֵי אַחֵר, וְשָׁתַק וּלְבַסּוֹף צָוַוח; תַּנָּא קַמָּא סָבַר: מִדִּשְׁתֵיק – קְנָנְהוּ, וְהַאי דְּקָא צָוַוח – מִיהְדָּר קָא הָדַר בֵּיהּ.
When they disagree it is in a case where the owner transferred ownership of the slaves to him through another person, and at that point the recipient was silent, and ultimately, when he actually received the slaves, he shouted in protest. The first tanna holds: Since he was initially silent, he acquired the slaves, and the fact that he is ultimately shouting indicates that he is retracting his initial acceptance of the gift. That retraction is ineffective, as acquisitions cannot be nullified in that manner.
וְרַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל סָבַר: הוֹכִיחַ סוֹפוֹ עַל תְּחִילָּתוֹ, וְהָא דְּלָא צְוַוח מֵעִיקָּרָא, סָבַר: כִּי לָא אָתֵי לִידִי אַמַּאי אֶצְוַוח.
And Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds: His ultimate actions prove the nature of his original intent. He never wanted the slaves and always intended to avoid assuming ownership of them. And the fact that he did not shout initially is because he thought: As the situation is that they did not yet enter my possession, why would I shout?
אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי.
§ The Gemara resumes discussion of the dispute in the mishna where Rabbi Yosei says that when a Jew slaughters an animal on behalf of a gentile, even if it is known that the intent of the gentile is for idol worship, the slaughter is valid, as it is only the intent of the slaughterer that is relevant. Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei.
הָנְהוּ טַיָּיעֵי דַּאֲתוֹ לְצִיקוֹנְיָא, יְהוּב דִּיכְרֵי לְטַבָּחֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל, אֲמַרוּ לְהוּ: דְּמָא וְתַרְבָּא לְדִידַן, מַשְׁכָּא וּבִישְׂרָא לְדִידְכוּ. שַׁלְחַהּ רַב טוֹבִי בַּר רַב מַתְנָה לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב יוֹסֵף: כִּי הַאי גַּוְונָא מַאי? שְׁלַח לֵיהּ: הָכִי אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי.
The Gemara relates: There were these Arabs who came to Tzikuneya, and they gave rams to Jewish slaughterers. The Arabs said to them: The blood and the fat are for us, for use in our idol worship, and the hide and the flesh are for you. Rav Tuvi bar Rav Mattana sent a question to be asked before Rav Yosef: In a case like this, what is the halakha? Rav Yosef sent to him: This is what Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, and it is the intent of the slaughterer and not the intent of the owner that determines the validity of the slaughter.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב אַחָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב אַוְיָא לְרַב אָשֵׁי: לְרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר, יְהֵיב לֵיהּ זוּזָא לְטַבָּח יִשְׂרָאֵל, מַאי? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: חָזֵינַן, אִי אִינִישׁ אַלָּמָא הוּא דְּלָא מָצֵי מְדַחֵי לֵיהּ – אָסוּר, וְאִי לָא – אָמַר לֵיהּ: ״רֵישָׁיךָ וְהַר״.
Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Avya, said to Rav Ashi: According to the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer in the mishna, that if a Jew slaughters an animal on behalf of a gentile the slaughter is not valid, if the gentile gave a dinar to a Jewish slaughterer in order to purchase a small amount of the meat, what is the halakha? Does that small amount invalidate the entire slaughter? Rav Ashi said to him: We examine the situation. If this gentile is a violent man, and the Jew is unable to repudiate his offer and tell him to take his money, the entire animal is forbidden, because the slaughter was partially on behalf of the gentile. And if the gentile is not violent, the Jew can say to him: Go and arrange a collision between your head and a mountain, as I will not slaughter an animal on your behalf.
מַתְנִי׳ הַשּׁוֹחֵט לְשֵׁם הָרִים, לְשֵׁם גְּבָעוֹת, לְשֵׁם יַמִּים, לְשֵׁם נְהָרוֹת, לְשֵׁם מִדְבָּרוֹת – שְׁחִיטָתוֹ פְּסוּלָה.
MISHNA: In the case of one who slaughters an animal for the sake of, i.e., to worship, mountains, for the sake of hills, for the sake of seas, for the sake of rivers, or for the sake of wildernesses, his slaughter is not valid.
