This week’s learning is sponsored for the merit and safety of Haymanut (Emuna) Kasau, who was 9 years old when she disappeared from her home in Tzfat two years ago, on the 16th of Adar, 5784 (February 25, 2024), and whose whereabouts remain unknown.
This week’s learning is dedicated of the safety of our nation, the soldiers and citizens of Israel, and for the liberation of the Iranian people. May we soon see the realization of “ליהודים היתה אורה ושמחה וששון ויקר”.
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This week’s learning is sponsored for the merit and safety of Haymanut (Emuna) Kasau, who was 9 years old when she disappeared from her home in Tzfat two years ago, on the 16th of Adar, 5784 (February 25, 2024), and whose whereabouts remain unknown.
This week’s learning is dedicated of the safety of our nation, the soldiers and citizens of Israel, and for the liberation of the Iranian people. May we soon see the realization of “ליהודים היתה אורה ושמחה וששון ויקר”.
Chullin 82
וְאָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ: אוֹמֵר הָיָה רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן, פָּרָה נִפְדֵּית עַל גַּבֵּי מַעֲרַכְתָּהּ. אָמַר רַב שֶׁמֶן בַּר אַבָּא אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: פָּרַת חַטָּאת אֵינָהּ מִשְׁנָה.
And Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says in explanation of Rabbi Shimon’s statement: Rabbi Shimon would say that the red heifer can be redeemed with money even once it has been slaughtered and placed upon its pyre in preparation for being burned. Therefore, Rabbi Shimon states that there could be a time when the heifer was fit for consumption, i.e., if it was redeemed. Why, then, does he deem one who slaughters it exempt from liability for transgressing the prohibition of: Itself and its offspring? Rav Shemen bar Abba said that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The statement with regard to the red heifer of purification is not considered part of the mishna, and Rabbi Shimon agrees that its slaughterer is liable for transgressing the prohibition of: Itself and its offspring.
וְעֶגְלָה עֲרוּפָה, לָאו שְׁחִיטָה רְאוּיָה הִיא? וְהָתְנַן: נִמְצָא הַהוֹרֵג עַד שֶׁלֹּא תֵּעָרֵף הָעֲגָלָה – תֵּצֵא וְתִרְעֶה בָּעֵדֶר. אָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי יַנַּאי: עֶגְלָה עֲרוּפָה אֵינָהּ מִשְׁנָה.
The Gemara asks: And is the slaughter of the heifer whose neck was to have been broken not considered an act of slaughter that is fit? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (Sota 47a): If a heifer was set aside to have its neck broken to atone for the murder of an individual whose murderer was not known, and then the murderer was found before the heifer’s neck was broken, the heifer shall go out and graze among the flock, as it is not consecrated. Evidently, before its neck is broken, deriving benefit from it is not prohibited, and its slaughter would be one that is fit. Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said in the name of Rabbi Yannai: The statement with regard to the heifer whose neck was to have been broken is not considered part of the mishna, and Rabbi Shimon agrees that its slaughterer is liable for violating the prohibition of: Itself and its offspring.
וּמִי אָמַר רַבִּי יַנַּאי הָכִי? וְהָאָמַר רַבִּי יַנַּאי: גְּבוּל שָׁמַעְתִּי בָּהּ, וְשָׁכַחְתִּי, וְנָסְבִין חַבְרַיָּא לוֹמַר: יְרִידָתָהּ לְנַחַל אֵיתָן אוֹסַרְתָּהּ.
The Gemara asks: And does Rabbi Yannai actually say so? But doesn’t Rabbi Yannai say: I heard the boundary, i.e., stage, beyond which the heifer is forbidden, but I have forgotten what it is; but the group of scholars were inclined to say that the heifer’s descent to a hard valley, where its neck is broken, is the action that renders it forbidden?
וְאִם אִיתָא, לִישַׁנֵּי: כָּאן קוֹדֶם יְרִידָה, כָּאן לְאַחַר יְרִידָה.
And if it is so, let him resolve the contradiction by saying: Here, where deriving benefit from the heifer is permitted, and its slaughterer is liable for transgressing the prohibition of: Itself and its offspring, it is referring to an act of slaughtering that is fit and is performed before the heifer’s descent, while there, in the mishna, where Rabbi Shimon holds that there is no liability for transgressing: Itself and its offspring, it is referring to slaughtering performed after its descent. At that time, deriving benefit from the heifer is already prohibited, and the slaughter is therefore not considered fit.
אָמַר רַב פִּנְחָס בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב אַמֵּי: אֲנַן מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ מַתְנֵינַן לַהּ, עֶגְלָה עֲרוּפָה אֵינָהּ מִשְׁנָה. אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: כִּי הֲוֵינַן בֵּי רַב פַּפֵּי קַשְׁיָא לַן, מִי אָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ הָכִי?
Rav Pineḥas, son of Rav Ami, said: We taught the statement in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish himself, not as a quote from Rabbi Yannai: The statement with regard to the heifer whose neck is broken is not considered part of the mishna. Rav Ashi said: When we were studying in the study hall of Rav Pappi, that statement was difficult for us: Did Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish actually say that it is not considered part of the mishna?
וְהָא אִיתְּמַר, צִפּוֹרֵי מְצוֹרָע מֵאֵימָתַי נֶאֱסָרִין? רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: מִשְּׁעַת שְׁחִיטָה, וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ אָמַר: מִשְּׁעַת לְקִיחָה, וְאָמְרִינַן: מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ?
But it was stated that amora’im engaged in a dispute concerning the following issue: From when is one prohibited from deriving benefit from the leper’s birds? Rabbi Yoḥanan says: One is prohibited from the moment of their slaughter; and Reish Lakish says: One is prohibited from the moment they are taken and designated to be a leper’s birds. And we say: What is the reasoning of Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish?
גָּמַר ״קִיחָה״ ״קִיחָה״ מֵעֶגְלָה עֲרוּפָה.
His reasoning is that he derives it via verbal analogy from the terms: “Taking [kiḥa]” (Leviticus 14:4), with regard to the birds, and: “Taking [kiḥa]” (Deuteronomy 21:3), with regard to the heifer whose neck is broken. Consequently, just as deriving benefit from the heifer whose neck is broken is prohibited from the time of its selection, so too must deriving benefit from these birds be prohibited from the time of their selection. Clearly, then, Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish holds that deriving benefit from the heifer whose neck is broken is prohibited while it is still alive. Therefore, its slaughter is one that does not render the animal fit for consumption. Accordingly, Rabbi Shimon would exempt its slaughterer from the prohibition of: Itself and its offspring, as is taught in the mishna.
אֶלָּא אָמַר רַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר אַבָּא אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: עֶגְלָה עֲרוּפָה אֵינָהּ מִשְׁנָה.
Rather, Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The statement with regard to the heifer whose neck is broken is not considered part of the mishna, and this resolution of the difficulty was articulated by Rabbi Yoḥanan rather than Reish Lakish.
מַתְנִי׳ שְׁנַיִם שֶׁלָּקְחוּ פָּרָה וּבְנָהּ, אֵיזֶה שֶׁלָּקַח רִאשׁוֹן יִשְׁחוֹט רִאשׁוֹן, וְאִם קָדַם הַשֵּׁנִי – זָכָה.
MISHNA: With regard to two people who purchased a cow and its offspring, where each purchased one of the animals, whoever purchased his animal first shall slaughter it first, and the second one must wait until the next day to slaughter his animal, so as not to violate the prohibition of: It and its offspring. But if the second one preceded him and slaughtered his animal first, he benefitted, and the one who purchased the animal first may not slaughter it until the next day.
גְּמָ׳ אָמַר רַב יוֹסֵף: לְעִנְיַן דִּינָא תְּנַן, תְּנָא: אִם קָדַם הַשֵּׁנִי – הֲרֵי זֶה זָרִיז וְנִשְׂכָּר, זָרִיז – דְּלָא עֲבַד אִיסּוּרָא, וְנִשְׂכָּר – דְּקָאָכֵיל בִּשְׂרָא.
GEMARA: Rav Yosef said: We learn in the mishna that the first purchaser is granted precedence only with regard to the matter of a court judgment, in case the two purchasers go to court each demanding to slaughter his animal first. But there is no prohibition against the second one slaughtering his animal first if no claim is brought to court. Likewise, a Sage taught in a baraita: If the second one preceded him and slaughtered his animal first, he is diligent and rewarded; he is diligent because he did not violate a prohibition, and he is rewarded because he eats meat already that day.
מַתְנִי׳ שָׁחַט פָּרָה וְאַחַר כָּךְ שְׁנֵי בָּנֶיהָ – סוֹפֵג שְׁמוֹנִים, שָׁחַט שְׁנֵי בָּנֶיהָ וְאַחַר כָּךְ שְׁחָטָהּ – סוֹפֵג אֶת הָאַרְבָּעִים, שְׁחָטָהּ וְאֶת בִּתָּהּ וְאֶת בַּת בִּתָּהּ – סוֹפֵג שְׁמוֹנִים.
MISHNA: If one slaughtered a cow and thereafter slaughtered its two offspring on the same day, he incurs eighty lashes for two separate actions violating the prohibition against slaughtering the mother and the offspring on the same day. If one slaughtered its two offspring and thereafter slaughtered the mother cow, he incurs the forty lashes, as he performed a single prohibited act. If one slaughtered the mother and its daughter, and, later that day, slaughtered its daughter’s daughter, he incurs eighty lashes, as he has performed the act of slaughtering a mother and its offspring twice.
שְׁחָטָהּ וְאֶת בַּת בִּתָּהּ, וְאַחַר כָּךְ שָׁחַט בִּתָּהּ – סוֹפֵג אֶת הָאַרְבָּעִים. סוֹמְכוֹס אוֹמֵר מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי מֵאִיר: סוֹפֵג שְׁמוֹנִים.
But if one slaughtered the mother and its daughter’s daughter and thereafter slaughtered its daughter, he incurs the forty lashes, as he performed a single prohibited act. Sumakhos says in the name of Rabbi Meir: He incurs eighty lashes for slaughtering the daughter on the same day as its calf and its mother, as that act comprises two separate violations of the prohibition.
גְּמָ׳ אַמַּאי? ״אוֹתוֹ וְאֶת בְּנוֹ״ אָמַר רַחֲמָנָא, וְלֹא בְּנוֹ וְאוֹתוֹ! לָא סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ, דְּתַנְיָא: ״אוֹתוֹ וְאֶת בְּנוֹ״ – אֵין לִי אֶלָּא אוֹתוֹ וְאֶת בְּנוֹ, אוֹתוֹ וְאֶת אִמּוֹ מִנַּיִן?
GEMARA: With regard to the statement in the mishna that if one slaughters two calves and thereafter slaughters their mother he incurs the forty lashes, the Gemara asks: Why does he receive lashes? After all, the phrase: “It and its offspring” (Leviticus 22:28), is what the Merciful One states in the Torah, and not: Its offspring and it. The Gemara answers: That thought should not enter your mind, as it is taught in a baraita: From the phrase “it and its offspring” I have derived only that the prohibition includes slaughtering the animal itself first and its offspring afterward. From where do I derive that the prohibition also includes the case of slaughtering the offspring itself first and its mother afterward?
כְּשֶׁהוּא אוֹמֵר ״לֹא תִשְׁחֲטוּ״ – הֲרֵי כָּאן שְׁנַיִם, הָא כֵּיצַד? אֶחָד הַשּׁוֹחֵט אֶת הַפָּרָה, וְאֶחָד הַשּׁוֹחֵט אֶת אִמָּהּ, וְאֶחָד הַשּׁוֹחֵט אֶת בְּנָהּ – שְׁנַיִם הָאַחֲרוֹנִים חַיָּיבִין.
It is derived in the following manner: When the verse states: “You shall not slaughter [tishḥatu] both in one day” (Leviticus 22:28), this is referring to two people who are prohibited from slaughtering on the same day, as the word “slaughter” is phrased in the plural. How so? If, during the course of a single day, there is one person who slaughters the cow and then another who slaughters that cow’s mother, and then there is another person who slaughters that cow’s offspring, the two latter people are liable, the first of them for slaughtering the mother after its offspring was slaughtered, and the second person for slaughtering the offspring after its mother was slaughtered.
הַאי מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ לְגוּפֵיהּ? אִם כֵּן, לִיכְתּוֹב ״לֹא תִשְׁחוֹט״, מַאי ״לֹא תִשְׁחֲטוּ״?
The Gemara challenges: That verse is necessary for the prohibition itself, and it cannot be used to teach this additional halakha. The Gemara explains: If so, that the verse teaches only the prohibition against slaughtering an animal and its offspring in one day, let the Torah write: You shall not slaughter [tishḥot], in the singular. For what reason did the Torah write: “You shall not slaughter [tishḥatu]” (Leviticus 22:28), in the plural? It is to teach that two different people are prohibited from slaughtering, as explained earlier.
וְאַכַּתִּי מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ, דְּאִי כְּתַב רַחֲמָנָא ״לֹא תִשְׁחוֹט״ הֲוָה אָמֵינָא: חַד – אִין, תְּרֵי – לָא.
The Gemara challenges: But, nevertheless, the plural is necessary, as had the Merciful One written in the Torah: You shall not slaughter [tishḥot] in the singular, I would say: With regard to one person, yes, it is prohibited to slaughter an animal and its offspring in a single day, but with regard to two, it is not prohibited for one of them to slaughter the mother and the other to then slaughter the offspring on the same day.
כְּתַב רַחֲמָנָא ״לֹא תִשְׁחֲטוּ״, וַאֲפִילּוּ תְּרֵי! אִם כֵּן, לִכְתּוֹב ״לֹא יִשְׁחֲטוּ״!
Therefore, the Merciful One writes in the Torah: “You shall not slaughter [tishḥatu],” in the plural, indicating that even two individuals may not slaughter an animal and its offspring in a single day. The Gemara answers: If so, that only this is derived from the verse, let the Torah write: They shall not be slaughtered, indicating that whether by one individual or two, the slaughter of an animal and its offspring in a single day is prohibited, but only the one who slaughters the offspring has violated the prohibition.
מַאי ״לֹא תִשְׁחֲטוּ״? שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ תַּרְתֵּי.
What is meant by: “You shall not slaughter,” which indicates that two different people are prohibited from slaughtering? Conclude two conclusions from it: Conclude that the prohibition applies even if two people perform the two acts of slaughter, and that two cases are prohibited: Slaughtering the offspring after the mother, and slaughtering the mother after the offspring.
שְׁחָטָהּ וְאֶת בַּת בִּתָּהּ, אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי לְרַב יוֹסֵף: מַאי טַעְמָא דְּסוֹמְכוֹס?
§ The mishna teaches: If one slaughtered the mother and its daughter’s daughter and thereafter slaughtered its daughter, he incurs the forty lashes. Sumakhos says in the name of Rabbi Meir: He incurs eighty lashes, because by slaughtering the daughter, he transgresses twice the prohibition of: Itself and its offspring. Abaye said to Rav Yosef: What is the reasoning for the opinion of Sumakhos that the transgressor incurs eighty lashes?
קָא סָבַר סוֹמְכוֹס: אָכַל שְׁנֵי זֵיתֵי חֵלֶב בְּהֶעְלֵם אֶחָד – חַיָּיב שְׁתֵּי חַטָּאוֹת.
Does Sumakhos hold, in general, that if one unwittingly ate two olive-bulks of forbidden fat during one lapse of awareness he is liable to bring two sin offerings, since he transgressed the prohibition twice? If so, then in a case where one is forewarned that if he transgresses intentionally he will receive lashes and he then violates the same prohibition twice, as is the case in the mishna, he receives two sets of lashes.
וּבְדִין הוּא דְּלַישְׁמְעִינַן בְּעָלְמָא, וְהַאי דְּקָא מַשְׁמַע לַן בְּהָא, לְהוֹדִיעֲךָ כֹּחָן דְּרַבָּנַן, דְּאַף עַל גַּב דְּגוּפִין מוּחְלָקִין – פָּטְרִי רַבָּנַן.
And by right the mishna should have informed us of Sumakhos’s opinion in a general case, such as that of eating two olive-bulks of forbidden fat during a single lapse of awareness, but the reason that it teaches us this dispute in this situation, where one slaughters an animal and its daughter’s offspring and, later that day, slaughters its daughter, is to convey to you the far-reaching nature of the opinion of the Rabbis, that even though the two animals that caused the daughter to be forbidden are separate entities, the Rabbis still exempt the transgressor from a second set of lashes.
אוֹ דִלְמָא קָסָבַר סוֹמְכוֹס: אָכַל שְׁנֵי זֵיתֵי חֵלֶב בְּהֶעְלֵם אֶחָד אֵינוֹ חַיָּיב אֶלָּא אַחַת, וְהָכָא הַיְינוּ טַעְמָא – הוֹאִיל וְגוּפִין מוּחְלָקִין? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אִין, קָסָבַר אָכַל שְׁנֵי זֵיתֵי חֵלֶב בְּהֶעְלֵם אֶחָד חַיָּיב שְׁתֵּי חַטָּאוֹת.
Or perhaps, Sumakhos holds in general that if one ate two olive-bulks of forbidden fat during one lapse of awareness, he is liable to bring only one sin offering. If so, one who transgresses intentionally after being forewarned receives only one set of lashes even if he transgresses the same prohibition twice. But here, in the mishna, this is the reason that the transgressor receives two sets of lashes: It is that the two animals that caused the daughter to be prohibited are separate entities. Rav Yosef said to Abaye: Yes, Sumakhos holds in general that if one ate two olive-bulks of forbidden fat during one lapse of awareness he is liable to bring two sin offerings.
מִמַּאי? מִדִּתְנַן: הַזּוֹרֵעַ כִּלְאַיִם כִּלְאַיִם לוֹקֶה. מַאי לוֹקֶה? אִילֵּימָא לוֹקֶה אַחַת – פְּשִׁיטָא! וְעוֹד, מַאי כִּלְאַיִם כִּלְאַיִם? אֶלָּא פְּשִׁיטָא שְׁתֵּי מַלְקִיּוֹת.
The Gemara asks: From where does Rav Yosef derive this? He derives it from that which we learn in a baraita: One who sows diverse kinds, diverse kinds, i.e., he twice sows grain together with grape seeds, is flogged for violating the prohibition of diverse kinds. The Gemara asks: What is meant by: Is flogged? If we say it means that he is flogged one set of lashes, this is obvious. And additionally, if he receives only one set of lashes, what is the reason that the case of: Sowing diverse kinds twice, is mentioned, where he transgressed twice? Even if he transgressed only once, he receives lashes. Rather, it is obvious that he receives two sets of lashes.
בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן? אִילֵימָא בְּזֶה אַחַר זֶה וּבִשְׁתֵּי הַתְרָאוֹת – תְּנֵינָא: נָזִיר שֶׁהָיָה שׁוֹתֶה יַיִן כׇּל הַיּוֹם אֵינוֹ חַיָּיב אֶלָּא אַחַת, אָמְרוּ לוֹ: ׳אַל תִּשְׁתֶּה!׳ וְהוּא שׁוֹתֶה, ׳אַל תִּשְׁתֶּה!׳ וְהוּא שׁוֹתֶה – חַיָּיב עַל כׇּל אַחַת וְאַחַת. אֶלָּא פְּשִׁיטָא בְּבַת אַחַת וּבְהַתְרָאָה אַחַת.
The Gemara asks: What are we dealing with? If we say that we are dealing with a case where one violates the prohibition twice, one time after the other and with two separate forewarnings, it is unnecessary for the baraita to teach this, as we already learn it in a mishna (Nazir 42a): A nazirite who was drinking wine all day is liable to receive only one set of lashes. If onlookers said to him: Do not drink, do not drink, forewarning him several times, and he drinks after each forewarning, he is liable to receive lashes for each and every drink. Rather, it is obvious that he violated the prohibition twice at the same time and with a single forewarning, i.e., after he was forewarned he sowed wheat together with a grape seed with one hand, and barley together with a grape seed with the other hand, and he receives two sets of lashes.
מַנִּי? אִילֵּימָא רַבָּנַן דִּפְלִיגִי עֲלֵיהּ דְּסוֹמְכוֹס – הַשְׁתָּא, וּמָה הָתָם דְּגוּפִין מוּחְלָקִין פָּטְרִי רַבָּנַן, הָכָא לֹא כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן?
The Gemara asks: In accordance with whose opinion is this baraita? If we say it is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis who disagree with Sumakhos in the mishna, who hold that one who slaughters an animal and its daughter’s offspring and, later that day, slaughters its daughter receives only one set of lashes, that would not be reasonable: Now, if there, in the mishna, where there are animals that are separate entities, the Rabbis exempt him from a second set of lashes, since he violated a single prohibition with a single forewarning; here, in the baraita with regard to diverse kinds, where, unlike animals, seeds are not considered separate entities (see 83a), if one sows diverse kinds twice at the same time, should they not all the more so exempt him from a second set of lashes?
אֶלָּא לָאו סוֹמְכוֹס הִיא? לָא, לְעוֹלָם רַבָּנַן, וּמִילְּתָא אַגַּב אוֹרְחֵיהּ קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן דְּאִיכָּא תְּרֵי גַּוְונֵי כִּלְאַיִם.
Rather, is it not that the ruling of the baraita with regard to diverse kinds is in accordance with the opinion of Sumakhos and teaches that, even with a single entity, one who violates the same prohibition twice receives two sets of lashes? The Gemara responds: No, actually the baraita with regard to diverse kinds is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, and he was forewarned before each act of sowing, which is why he receives two sets of lashes. And although this statement is redundant, by repeating the phrase: Diverse kinds, it teaches us a matter in passing: That there are two categories of the prohibition of diverse kinds: Sowing wheat together with grape seed and sowing barley together with grape seed.
וּלְאַפּוֹקֵי מִדְּרַבִּי יֹאשִׁיָּה, דְּאָמַר רַבִּי יֹאשִׁיָּה: עַד שֶׁיִּזְרַע חִטָּה וּשְׂעוֹרָה וְחַרְצָן בְּמַפּוֹלֶת יָד, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן דְּכִי זָרַע חִטָּה וְחַרְצָן וּשְׂעוֹרָה וְחַרְצָן נָמֵי מִחַיַּיב.
And the baraita serves to exclude the opinion of Rabbi Yoshiya, as Rabbi Yoshiya says: One who sows diverse kinds is not liable by Torah law until he sows wheat, and barley, and grape seed with a single hand motion, i.e., by sowing in the vineyard he violates the prohibition of diverse kinds that applies to seeds and to the vineyard simultaneously. Therefore, it teaches us that when one sows only wheat and grape seed, or only barley and grape seed, he is liable as well. Consequently, a source clarifying Sumakhos’s opinion in a case where one violates the same prohibition twice during a single lapse of awareness, or with only a single forewarning when one violated the prohibition intentionally, has not been found.
תָּא שְׁמַע: אָכַל מִזֶּה כְּזַיִת וּמִזֶּה כְּזַיִת – סוֹפֵג שְׁמוֹנִים. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: אֵינוֹ סוֹפֵג אֶלָּא אַרְבָּעִים. הֵיכִי דָמֵי? אִילֵּימָא בְּזֶה אַחַר זֶה וּבִשְׁתֵּי הַתְרָאוֹת – מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה? הַתְרָאַת סָפֵק הִיא, וְשָׁמְעִינַן לֵיהּ לְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה דְּאָמַר: הַתְרָאַת סָפֵק לֹא שְׁמָהּ הַתְרָאָה.
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a resolution from a mishna with regard to the prohibition against eating from the sciatic nerve (96a): If one ate an olive-bulk from this sciatic nerve in the right leg of an animal, and an olive-bulk from that sciatic nerve in the left leg of the same animal, he incurs eighty lashes. Rabbi Yehuda says: He incurs only forty lashes. The Gemara analyzes the mishna: What are the circumstances? If we say that he ate them one after the other and with two separate forewarnings, what is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda? According to Rabbi Yehuda, it is an uncertain forewarning, as Rabbi Yehuda is uncertain whether the prohibition against eating from the sciatic nerve applies to the sciatic nerve of the right thigh or that of the left thigh (see 90b). And we have heard that Rabbi Yehuda says: An uncertain forewarning is not considered a forewarning.
דְּתַנְיָא: הִכָּה אֶת זֶה וְחָזַר וְהִכָּה אֶת זֶה, קִלֵּל אֶת זֶה וְחָזַר וְקִלֵּל אֶת זֶה, אוֹ שֶׁהִכָּה שְׁנֵיהֶם בְּבַת אַחַת, אוֹ שֶׁקִּלֵּל שְׁנֵיהֶם בְּבַת אַחַת – חַיָּיב.
As it is taught in a baraita: If one is uncertain which of two men is his father, and he struck this man and then struck that man, or cursed this man and then cursed that man, or struck both of them simultaneously, or cursed both of them simultaneously, in all these cases he is liable for violating the prohibition of: “And he that strikes his father, or his mother, shall be put to death” (Exodus 21:15), or that of: “And he that curses his father, or his mother, shall be put to death” (Exodus 21:17), as one of them is certainly his father.
רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: בְּבַת אַחַת – חַיָּיב, בְּזֶה אַחַר זֶה – פָּטוּר. אֶלָּא פְּשִׁיטָא בְּבַת אַחַת וּבְהַתְרָאָה אַחַת.
Rabbi Yehuda says: Although if he struck or cursed both of them simultaneously he is liable, if he struck or cursed them one after the other, he is exempt, as each time he strikes or curses one of them he receives an uncertain forewarning, as perhaps this man is not his father, and one is liable only after receiving a definite forewarning. Consequently, if one was forewarned before eating from the sciatic nerve from the right leg, and afterward he was forewarned before eating from the sciatic nerve from the left leg, he would similarly be exempt as each of the forewarnings was uncertain. Rather, it is obvious that the case in the mishna is one where he partook of the two sciatic nerves simultaneously and with a single forewarning, and therefore, he incurs only forty lashes according to Rabbi Yehuda.
וּמַאן תַּנָּא קַמָּא? אִילֵימָא רַבָּנַן דִּפְלִיגִי עֲלֵיהּ דְּסוֹמְכוֹס – הַשְׁתָּא, וּמָה הָתָם דְּגוּפִין מוּחְלָקִין פָּטְרִי רַבָּנַן, הָכָא לֹא כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן? אֶלָּא לָאו סוֹמְכוֹס הִיא!
And who is the first tanna who holds that in such a case one receives eighty lashes? If we say that it is the Rabbis who disagree with Sumakhos in the mishna about the prohibition of: Itself and its offspring, that would conflict with their opinion: Now, if there, in the case of the mishna that discusses various animals that are separate entities, the Rabbis deem him exempt from a second set of lashes, here, in the mishna that discusses the sciatic nerve, where there are no separate animals, should they not all the more so exempt him from a second set of lashes? Rather, is the mishna not in accordance with the opinion of Sumakhos? Consequently, in his opinion one who eats the same prohibited item, such as an olive-bulk of forbidden fat, twice after a single forewarning receives two sets of lashes.
לָא, לְעוֹלָם בְּזֶה אַחַר זֶה, וְרַבָּנַן, וְהַאי תַּנָּא סָבַר לַהּ כְּאִידַּךְ תַּנָּא דְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה.
The Gemara responds: No, actually the case is one where he ate from the two sciatic nerves one after the other and received separate forewarnings, and the first opinion in that mishna is that of the Rabbis who disagree with Sumakhos with regard to: Itself and its offspring. And as for the difficulty that Rabbi Yehuda does not render one liable if the forewarning is an uncertain one, this tanna holds in accordance with the opinion of another tanna with regard to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda.
דְּאָמַר: הַתְרָאַת סָפֵק שְׁמָהּ הַתְרָאָה, דְּתַנְיָא: ״לֹא תוֹתִירוּ מִמֶּנּוּ עַד בֹּקֶר וְהַנֹּתָר מִמֶּנּוּ עַד בֹּקֶר בָּאֵשׁ תִּשְׂרֹפוּ״ –
As that other tanna says that Rabbi Yehuda holds: An uncertain forewarning is considered a forewarning, as it is taught in a baraita: The verse states with regard to the Paschal offering: “And you shall not leave any of it until morning; but that which remains of it until morning you shall burn with fire” (Exodus 12:10).
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With Rabbanit Dr. Naomi Cohen in the Women’s Talmud class, over 30 years ago. It was a “known” class and it was accepted, because of who taught. Since then I have also studied with Avigail Gross-Gelman and Dr. Gabriel Hazut for about a year). Years ago, in a shiur in my shul, I did know about Persians doing 3 things with their clothes on. They opened the shiur to woman after that!
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I started learning at the beginning of this cycle more than 2 years ago, and I have not missed a day or a daf. It’s been challenging and enlightening and even mind-numbing at times, but the learning and the shared experience have all been worth it. If you are open to it, there’s no telling what might come into your life.
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Chullin 82
וְאָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ: אוֹמֵר הָיָה רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן, פָּרָה נִפְדֵּית עַל גַּבֵּי מַעֲרַכְתָּהּ. אָמַר רַב שֶׁמֶן בַּר אַבָּא אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: פָּרַת חַטָּאת אֵינָהּ מִשְׁנָה.
And Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says in explanation of Rabbi Shimon’s statement: Rabbi Shimon would say that the red heifer can be redeemed with money even once it has been slaughtered and placed upon its pyre in preparation for being burned. Therefore, Rabbi Shimon states that there could be a time when the heifer was fit for consumption, i.e., if it was redeemed. Why, then, does he deem one who slaughters it exempt from liability for transgressing the prohibition of: Itself and its offspring? Rav Shemen bar Abba said that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The statement with regard to the red heifer of purification is not considered part of the mishna, and Rabbi Shimon agrees that its slaughterer is liable for transgressing the prohibition of: Itself and its offspring.
וְעֶגְלָה עֲרוּפָה, לָאו שְׁחִיטָה רְאוּיָה הִיא? וְהָתְנַן: נִמְצָא הַהוֹרֵג עַד שֶׁלֹּא תֵּעָרֵף הָעֲגָלָה – תֵּצֵא וְתִרְעֶה בָּעֵדֶר. אָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי יַנַּאי: עֶגְלָה עֲרוּפָה אֵינָהּ מִשְׁנָה.
The Gemara asks: And is the slaughter of the heifer whose neck was to have been broken not considered an act of slaughter that is fit? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (Sota 47a): If a heifer was set aside to have its neck broken to atone for the murder of an individual whose murderer was not known, and then the murderer was found before the heifer’s neck was broken, the heifer shall go out and graze among the flock, as it is not consecrated. Evidently, before its neck is broken, deriving benefit from it is not prohibited, and its slaughter would be one that is fit. Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said in the name of Rabbi Yannai: The statement with regard to the heifer whose neck was to have been broken is not considered part of the mishna, and Rabbi Shimon agrees that its slaughterer is liable for violating the prohibition of: Itself and its offspring.
וּמִי אָמַר רַבִּי יַנַּאי הָכִי? וְהָאָמַר רַבִּי יַנַּאי: גְּבוּל שָׁמַעְתִּי בָּהּ, וְשָׁכַחְתִּי, וְנָסְבִין חַבְרַיָּא לוֹמַר: יְרִידָתָהּ לְנַחַל אֵיתָן אוֹסַרְתָּהּ.
The Gemara asks: And does Rabbi Yannai actually say so? But doesn’t Rabbi Yannai say: I heard the boundary, i.e., stage, beyond which the heifer is forbidden, but I have forgotten what it is; but the group of scholars were inclined to say that the heifer’s descent to a hard valley, where its neck is broken, is the action that renders it forbidden?
וְאִם אִיתָא, לִישַׁנֵּי: כָּאן קוֹדֶם יְרִידָה, כָּאן לְאַחַר יְרִידָה.
And if it is so, let him resolve the contradiction by saying: Here, where deriving benefit from the heifer is permitted, and its slaughterer is liable for transgressing the prohibition of: Itself and its offspring, it is referring to an act of slaughtering that is fit and is performed before the heifer’s descent, while there, in the mishna, where Rabbi Shimon holds that there is no liability for transgressing: Itself and its offspring, it is referring to slaughtering performed after its descent. At that time, deriving benefit from the heifer is already prohibited, and the slaughter is therefore not considered fit.
אָמַר רַב פִּנְחָס בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב אַמֵּי: אֲנַן מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ מַתְנֵינַן לַהּ, עֶגְלָה עֲרוּפָה אֵינָהּ מִשְׁנָה. אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: כִּי הֲוֵינַן בֵּי רַב פַּפֵּי קַשְׁיָא לַן, מִי אָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ הָכִי?
Rav Pineḥas, son of Rav Ami, said: We taught the statement in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish himself, not as a quote from Rabbi Yannai: The statement with regard to the heifer whose neck is broken is not considered part of the mishna. Rav Ashi said: When we were studying in the study hall of Rav Pappi, that statement was difficult for us: Did Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish actually say that it is not considered part of the mishna?
וְהָא אִיתְּמַר, צִפּוֹרֵי מְצוֹרָע מֵאֵימָתַי נֶאֱסָרִין? רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: מִשְּׁעַת שְׁחִיטָה, וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ אָמַר: מִשְּׁעַת לְקִיחָה, וְאָמְרִינַן: מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ?
But it was stated that amora’im engaged in a dispute concerning the following issue: From when is one prohibited from deriving benefit from the leper’s birds? Rabbi Yoḥanan says: One is prohibited from the moment of their slaughter; and Reish Lakish says: One is prohibited from the moment they are taken and designated to be a leper’s birds. And we say: What is the reasoning of Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish?
גָּמַר ״קִיחָה״ ״קִיחָה״ מֵעֶגְלָה עֲרוּפָה.
His reasoning is that he derives it via verbal analogy from the terms: “Taking [kiḥa]” (Leviticus 14:4), with regard to the birds, and: “Taking [kiḥa]” (Deuteronomy 21:3), with regard to the heifer whose neck is broken. Consequently, just as deriving benefit from the heifer whose neck is broken is prohibited from the time of its selection, so too must deriving benefit from these birds be prohibited from the time of their selection. Clearly, then, Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish holds that deriving benefit from the heifer whose neck is broken is prohibited while it is still alive. Therefore, its slaughter is one that does not render the animal fit for consumption. Accordingly, Rabbi Shimon would exempt its slaughterer from the prohibition of: Itself and its offspring, as is taught in the mishna.
אֶלָּא אָמַר רַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר אַבָּא אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: עֶגְלָה עֲרוּפָה אֵינָהּ מִשְׁנָה.
Rather, Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The statement with regard to the heifer whose neck is broken is not considered part of the mishna, and this resolution of the difficulty was articulated by Rabbi Yoḥanan rather than Reish Lakish.
מַתְנִי׳ שְׁנַיִם שֶׁלָּקְחוּ פָּרָה וּבְנָהּ, אֵיזֶה שֶׁלָּקַח רִאשׁוֹן יִשְׁחוֹט רִאשׁוֹן, וְאִם קָדַם הַשֵּׁנִי – זָכָה.
MISHNA: With regard to two people who purchased a cow and its offspring, where each purchased one of the animals, whoever purchased his animal first shall slaughter it first, and the second one must wait until the next day to slaughter his animal, so as not to violate the prohibition of: It and its offspring. But if the second one preceded him and slaughtered his animal first, he benefitted, and the one who purchased the animal first may not slaughter it until the next day.
גְּמָ׳ אָמַר רַב יוֹסֵף: לְעִנְיַן דִּינָא תְּנַן, תְּנָא: אִם קָדַם הַשֵּׁנִי – הֲרֵי זֶה זָרִיז וְנִשְׂכָּר, זָרִיז – דְּלָא עֲבַד אִיסּוּרָא, וְנִשְׂכָּר – דְּקָאָכֵיל בִּשְׂרָא.
GEMARA: Rav Yosef said: We learn in the mishna that the first purchaser is granted precedence only with regard to the matter of a court judgment, in case the two purchasers go to court each demanding to slaughter his animal first. But there is no prohibition against the second one slaughtering his animal first if no claim is brought to court. Likewise, a Sage taught in a baraita: If the second one preceded him and slaughtered his animal first, he is diligent and rewarded; he is diligent because he did not violate a prohibition, and he is rewarded because he eats meat already that day.
מַתְנִי׳ שָׁחַט פָּרָה וְאַחַר כָּךְ שְׁנֵי בָּנֶיהָ – סוֹפֵג שְׁמוֹנִים, שָׁחַט שְׁנֵי בָּנֶיהָ וְאַחַר כָּךְ שְׁחָטָהּ – סוֹפֵג אֶת הָאַרְבָּעִים, שְׁחָטָהּ וְאֶת בִּתָּהּ וְאֶת בַּת בִּתָּהּ – סוֹפֵג שְׁמוֹנִים.
MISHNA: If one slaughtered a cow and thereafter slaughtered its two offspring on the same day, he incurs eighty lashes for two separate actions violating the prohibition against slaughtering the mother and the offspring on the same day. If one slaughtered its two offspring and thereafter slaughtered the mother cow, he incurs the forty lashes, as he performed a single prohibited act. If one slaughtered the mother and its daughter, and, later that day, slaughtered its daughter’s daughter, he incurs eighty lashes, as he has performed the act of slaughtering a mother and its offspring twice.
שְׁחָטָהּ וְאֶת בַּת בִּתָּהּ, וְאַחַר כָּךְ שָׁחַט בִּתָּהּ – סוֹפֵג אֶת הָאַרְבָּעִים. סוֹמְכוֹס אוֹמֵר מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי מֵאִיר: סוֹפֵג שְׁמוֹנִים.
But if one slaughtered the mother and its daughter’s daughter and thereafter slaughtered its daughter, he incurs the forty lashes, as he performed a single prohibited act. Sumakhos says in the name of Rabbi Meir: He incurs eighty lashes for slaughtering the daughter on the same day as its calf and its mother, as that act comprises two separate violations of the prohibition.
גְּמָ׳ אַמַּאי? ״אוֹתוֹ וְאֶת בְּנוֹ״ אָמַר רַחֲמָנָא, וְלֹא בְּנוֹ וְאוֹתוֹ! לָא סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ, דְּתַנְיָא: ״אוֹתוֹ וְאֶת בְּנוֹ״ – אֵין לִי אֶלָּא אוֹתוֹ וְאֶת בְּנוֹ, אוֹתוֹ וְאֶת אִמּוֹ מִנַּיִן?
GEMARA: With regard to the statement in the mishna that if one slaughters two calves and thereafter slaughters their mother he incurs the forty lashes, the Gemara asks: Why does he receive lashes? After all, the phrase: “It and its offspring” (Leviticus 22:28), is what the Merciful One states in the Torah, and not: Its offspring and it. The Gemara answers: That thought should not enter your mind, as it is taught in a baraita: From the phrase “it and its offspring” I have derived only that the prohibition includes slaughtering the animal itself first and its offspring afterward. From where do I derive that the prohibition also includes the case of slaughtering the offspring itself first and its mother afterward?
כְּשֶׁהוּא אוֹמֵר ״לֹא תִשְׁחֲטוּ״ – הֲרֵי כָּאן שְׁנַיִם, הָא כֵּיצַד? אֶחָד הַשּׁוֹחֵט אֶת הַפָּרָה, וְאֶחָד הַשּׁוֹחֵט אֶת אִמָּהּ, וְאֶחָד הַשּׁוֹחֵט אֶת בְּנָהּ – שְׁנַיִם הָאַחֲרוֹנִים חַיָּיבִין.
It is derived in the following manner: When the verse states: “You shall not slaughter [tishḥatu] both in one day” (Leviticus 22:28), this is referring to two people who are prohibited from slaughtering on the same day, as the word “slaughter” is phrased in the plural. How so? If, during the course of a single day, there is one person who slaughters the cow and then another who slaughters that cow’s mother, and then there is another person who slaughters that cow’s offspring, the two latter people are liable, the first of them for slaughtering the mother after its offspring was slaughtered, and the second person for slaughtering the offspring after its mother was slaughtered.
הַאי מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ לְגוּפֵיהּ? אִם כֵּן, לִיכְתּוֹב ״לֹא תִשְׁחוֹט״, מַאי ״לֹא תִשְׁחֲטוּ״?
The Gemara challenges: That verse is necessary for the prohibition itself, and it cannot be used to teach this additional halakha. The Gemara explains: If so, that the verse teaches only the prohibition against slaughtering an animal and its offspring in one day, let the Torah write: You shall not slaughter [tishḥot], in the singular. For what reason did the Torah write: “You shall not slaughter [tishḥatu]” (Leviticus 22:28), in the plural? It is to teach that two different people are prohibited from slaughtering, as explained earlier.
וְאַכַּתִּי מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ, דְּאִי כְּתַב רַחֲמָנָא ״לֹא תִשְׁחוֹט״ הֲוָה אָמֵינָא: חַד – אִין, תְּרֵי – לָא.
The Gemara challenges: But, nevertheless, the plural is necessary, as had the Merciful One written in the Torah: You shall not slaughter [tishḥot] in the singular, I would say: With regard to one person, yes, it is prohibited to slaughter an animal and its offspring in a single day, but with regard to two, it is not prohibited for one of them to slaughter the mother and the other to then slaughter the offspring on the same day.
כְּתַב רַחֲמָנָא ״לֹא תִשְׁחֲטוּ״, וַאֲפִילּוּ תְּרֵי! אִם כֵּן, לִכְתּוֹב ״לֹא יִשְׁחֲטוּ״!
Therefore, the Merciful One writes in the Torah: “You shall not slaughter [tishḥatu],” in the plural, indicating that even two individuals may not slaughter an animal and its offspring in a single day. The Gemara answers: If so, that only this is derived from the verse, let the Torah write: They shall not be slaughtered, indicating that whether by one individual or two, the slaughter of an animal and its offspring in a single day is prohibited, but only the one who slaughters the offspring has violated the prohibition.
מַאי ״לֹא תִשְׁחֲטוּ״? שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ תַּרְתֵּי.
What is meant by: “You shall not slaughter,” which indicates that two different people are prohibited from slaughtering? Conclude two conclusions from it: Conclude that the prohibition applies even if two people perform the two acts of slaughter, and that two cases are prohibited: Slaughtering the offspring after the mother, and slaughtering the mother after the offspring.
שְׁחָטָהּ וְאֶת בַּת בִּתָּהּ, אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי לְרַב יוֹסֵף: מַאי טַעְמָא דְּסוֹמְכוֹס?
§ The mishna teaches: If one slaughtered the mother and its daughter’s daughter and thereafter slaughtered its daughter, he incurs the forty lashes. Sumakhos says in the name of Rabbi Meir: He incurs eighty lashes, because by slaughtering the daughter, he transgresses twice the prohibition of: Itself and its offspring. Abaye said to Rav Yosef: What is the reasoning for the opinion of Sumakhos that the transgressor incurs eighty lashes?
קָא סָבַר סוֹמְכוֹס: אָכַל שְׁנֵי זֵיתֵי חֵלֶב בְּהֶעְלֵם אֶחָד – חַיָּיב שְׁתֵּי חַטָּאוֹת.
Does Sumakhos hold, in general, that if one unwittingly ate two olive-bulks of forbidden fat during one lapse of awareness he is liable to bring two sin offerings, since he transgressed the prohibition twice? If so, then in a case where one is forewarned that if he transgresses intentionally he will receive lashes and he then violates the same prohibition twice, as is the case in the mishna, he receives two sets of lashes.
וּבְדִין הוּא דְּלַישְׁמְעִינַן בְּעָלְמָא, וְהַאי דְּקָא מַשְׁמַע לַן בְּהָא, לְהוֹדִיעֲךָ כֹּחָן דְּרַבָּנַן, דְּאַף עַל גַּב דְּגוּפִין מוּחְלָקִין – פָּטְרִי רַבָּנַן.
And by right the mishna should have informed us of Sumakhos’s opinion in a general case, such as that of eating two olive-bulks of forbidden fat during a single lapse of awareness, but the reason that it teaches us this dispute in this situation, where one slaughters an animal and its daughter’s offspring and, later that day, slaughters its daughter, is to convey to you the far-reaching nature of the opinion of the Rabbis, that even though the two animals that caused the daughter to be forbidden are separate entities, the Rabbis still exempt the transgressor from a second set of lashes.
אוֹ דִלְמָא קָסָבַר סוֹמְכוֹס: אָכַל שְׁנֵי זֵיתֵי חֵלֶב בְּהֶעְלֵם אֶחָד אֵינוֹ חַיָּיב אֶלָּא אַחַת, וְהָכָא הַיְינוּ טַעְמָא – הוֹאִיל וְגוּפִין מוּחְלָקִין? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אִין, קָסָבַר אָכַל שְׁנֵי זֵיתֵי חֵלֶב בְּהֶעְלֵם אֶחָד חַיָּיב שְׁתֵּי חַטָּאוֹת.
Or perhaps, Sumakhos holds in general that if one ate two olive-bulks of forbidden fat during one lapse of awareness, he is liable to bring only one sin offering. If so, one who transgresses intentionally after being forewarned receives only one set of lashes even if he transgresses the same prohibition twice. But here, in the mishna, this is the reason that the transgressor receives two sets of lashes: It is that the two animals that caused the daughter to be prohibited are separate entities. Rav Yosef said to Abaye: Yes, Sumakhos holds in general that if one ate two olive-bulks of forbidden fat during one lapse of awareness he is liable to bring two sin offerings.
מִמַּאי? מִדִּתְנַן: הַזּוֹרֵעַ כִּלְאַיִם כִּלְאַיִם לוֹקֶה. מַאי לוֹקֶה? אִילֵּימָא לוֹקֶה אַחַת – פְּשִׁיטָא! וְעוֹד, מַאי כִּלְאַיִם כִּלְאַיִם? אֶלָּא פְּשִׁיטָא שְׁתֵּי מַלְקִיּוֹת.
The Gemara asks: From where does Rav Yosef derive this? He derives it from that which we learn in a baraita: One who sows diverse kinds, diverse kinds, i.e., he twice sows grain together with grape seeds, is flogged for violating the prohibition of diverse kinds. The Gemara asks: What is meant by: Is flogged? If we say it means that he is flogged one set of lashes, this is obvious. And additionally, if he receives only one set of lashes, what is the reason that the case of: Sowing diverse kinds twice, is mentioned, where he transgressed twice? Even if he transgressed only once, he receives lashes. Rather, it is obvious that he receives two sets of lashes.
בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן? אִילֵימָא בְּזֶה אַחַר זֶה וּבִשְׁתֵּי הַתְרָאוֹת – תְּנֵינָא: נָזִיר שֶׁהָיָה שׁוֹתֶה יַיִן כׇּל הַיּוֹם אֵינוֹ חַיָּיב אֶלָּא אַחַת, אָמְרוּ לוֹ: ׳אַל תִּשְׁתֶּה!׳ וְהוּא שׁוֹתֶה, ׳אַל תִּשְׁתֶּה!׳ וְהוּא שׁוֹתֶה – חַיָּיב עַל כׇּל אַחַת וְאַחַת. אֶלָּא פְּשִׁיטָא בְּבַת אַחַת וּבְהַתְרָאָה אַחַת.
The Gemara asks: What are we dealing with? If we say that we are dealing with a case where one violates the prohibition twice, one time after the other and with two separate forewarnings, it is unnecessary for the baraita to teach this, as we already learn it in a mishna (Nazir 42a): A nazirite who was drinking wine all day is liable to receive only one set of lashes. If onlookers said to him: Do not drink, do not drink, forewarning him several times, and he drinks after each forewarning, he is liable to receive lashes for each and every drink. Rather, it is obvious that he violated the prohibition twice at the same time and with a single forewarning, i.e., after he was forewarned he sowed wheat together with a grape seed with one hand, and barley together with a grape seed with the other hand, and he receives two sets of lashes.
מַנִּי? אִילֵּימָא רַבָּנַן דִּפְלִיגִי עֲלֵיהּ דְּסוֹמְכוֹס – הַשְׁתָּא, וּמָה הָתָם דְּגוּפִין מוּחְלָקִין פָּטְרִי רַבָּנַן, הָכָא לֹא כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן?
The Gemara asks: In accordance with whose opinion is this baraita? If we say it is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis who disagree with Sumakhos in the mishna, who hold that one who slaughters an animal and its daughter’s offspring and, later that day, slaughters its daughter receives only one set of lashes, that would not be reasonable: Now, if there, in the mishna, where there are animals that are separate entities, the Rabbis exempt him from a second set of lashes, since he violated a single prohibition with a single forewarning; here, in the baraita with regard to diverse kinds, where, unlike animals, seeds are not considered separate entities (see 83a), if one sows diverse kinds twice at the same time, should they not all the more so exempt him from a second set of lashes?
אֶלָּא לָאו סוֹמְכוֹס הִיא? לָא, לְעוֹלָם רַבָּנַן, וּמִילְּתָא אַגַּב אוֹרְחֵיהּ קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן דְּאִיכָּא תְּרֵי גַּוְונֵי כִּלְאַיִם.
Rather, is it not that the ruling of the baraita with regard to diverse kinds is in accordance with the opinion of Sumakhos and teaches that, even with a single entity, one who violates the same prohibition twice receives two sets of lashes? The Gemara responds: No, actually the baraita with regard to diverse kinds is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, and he was forewarned before each act of sowing, which is why he receives two sets of lashes. And although this statement is redundant, by repeating the phrase: Diverse kinds, it teaches us a matter in passing: That there are two categories of the prohibition of diverse kinds: Sowing wheat together with grape seed and sowing barley together with grape seed.
וּלְאַפּוֹקֵי מִדְּרַבִּי יֹאשִׁיָּה, דְּאָמַר רַבִּי יֹאשִׁיָּה: עַד שֶׁיִּזְרַע חִטָּה וּשְׂעוֹרָה וְחַרְצָן בְּמַפּוֹלֶת יָד, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן דְּכִי זָרַע חִטָּה וְחַרְצָן וּשְׂעוֹרָה וְחַרְצָן נָמֵי מִחַיַּיב.
And the baraita serves to exclude the opinion of Rabbi Yoshiya, as Rabbi Yoshiya says: One who sows diverse kinds is not liable by Torah law until he sows wheat, and barley, and grape seed with a single hand motion, i.e., by sowing in the vineyard he violates the prohibition of diverse kinds that applies to seeds and to the vineyard simultaneously. Therefore, it teaches us that when one sows only wheat and grape seed, or only barley and grape seed, he is liable as well. Consequently, a source clarifying Sumakhos’s opinion in a case where one violates the same prohibition twice during a single lapse of awareness, or with only a single forewarning when one violated the prohibition intentionally, has not been found.
תָּא שְׁמַע: אָכַל מִזֶּה כְּזַיִת וּמִזֶּה כְּזַיִת – סוֹפֵג שְׁמוֹנִים. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: אֵינוֹ סוֹפֵג אֶלָּא אַרְבָּעִים. הֵיכִי דָמֵי? אִילֵּימָא בְּזֶה אַחַר זֶה וּבִשְׁתֵּי הַתְרָאוֹת – מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה? הַתְרָאַת סָפֵק הִיא, וְשָׁמְעִינַן לֵיהּ לְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה דְּאָמַר: הַתְרָאַת סָפֵק לֹא שְׁמָהּ הַתְרָאָה.
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a resolution from a mishna with regard to the prohibition against eating from the sciatic nerve (96a): If one ate an olive-bulk from this sciatic nerve in the right leg of an animal, and an olive-bulk from that sciatic nerve in the left leg of the same animal, he incurs eighty lashes. Rabbi Yehuda says: He incurs only forty lashes. The Gemara analyzes the mishna: What are the circumstances? If we say that he ate them one after the other and with two separate forewarnings, what is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda? According to Rabbi Yehuda, it is an uncertain forewarning, as Rabbi Yehuda is uncertain whether the prohibition against eating from the sciatic nerve applies to the sciatic nerve of the right thigh or that of the left thigh (see 90b). And we have heard that Rabbi Yehuda says: An uncertain forewarning is not considered a forewarning.
דְּתַנְיָא: הִכָּה אֶת זֶה וְחָזַר וְהִכָּה אֶת זֶה, קִלֵּל אֶת זֶה וְחָזַר וְקִלֵּל אֶת זֶה, אוֹ שֶׁהִכָּה שְׁנֵיהֶם בְּבַת אַחַת, אוֹ שֶׁקִּלֵּל שְׁנֵיהֶם בְּבַת אַחַת – חַיָּיב.
As it is taught in a baraita: If one is uncertain which of two men is his father, and he struck this man and then struck that man, or cursed this man and then cursed that man, or struck both of them simultaneously, or cursed both of them simultaneously, in all these cases he is liable for violating the prohibition of: “And he that strikes his father, or his mother, shall be put to death” (Exodus 21:15), or that of: “And he that curses his father, or his mother, shall be put to death” (Exodus 21:17), as one of them is certainly his father.
רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: בְּבַת אַחַת – חַיָּיב, בְּזֶה אַחַר זֶה – פָּטוּר. אֶלָּא פְּשִׁיטָא בְּבַת אַחַת וּבְהַתְרָאָה אַחַת.
Rabbi Yehuda says: Although if he struck or cursed both of them simultaneously he is liable, if he struck or cursed them one after the other, he is exempt, as each time he strikes or curses one of them he receives an uncertain forewarning, as perhaps this man is not his father, and one is liable only after receiving a definite forewarning. Consequently, if one was forewarned before eating from the sciatic nerve from the right leg, and afterward he was forewarned before eating from the sciatic nerve from the left leg, he would similarly be exempt as each of the forewarnings was uncertain. Rather, it is obvious that the case in the mishna is one where he partook of the two sciatic nerves simultaneously and with a single forewarning, and therefore, he incurs only forty lashes according to Rabbi Yehuda.
וּמַאן תַּנָּא קַמָּא? אִילֵימָא רַבָּנַן דִּפְלִיגִי עֲלֵיהּ דְּסוֹמְכוֹס – הַשְׁתָּא, וּמָה הָתָם דְּגוּפִין מוּחְלָקִין פָּטְרִי רַבָּנַן, הָכָא לֹא כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן? אֶלָּא לָאו סוֹמְכוֹס הִיא!
And who is the first tanna who holds that in such a case one receives eighty lashes? If we say that it is the Rabbis who disagree with Sumakhos in the mishna about the prohibition of: Itself and its offspring, that would conflict with their opinion: Now, if there, in the case of the mishna that discusses various animals that are separate entities, the Rabbis deem him exempt from a second set of lashes, here, in the mishna that discusses the sciatic nerve, where there are no separate animals, should they not all the more so exempt him from a second set of lashes? Rather, is the mishna not in accordance with the opinion of Sumakhos? Consequently, in his opinion one who eats the same prohibited item, such as an olive-bulk of forbidden fat, twice after a single forewarning receives two sets of lashes.
לָא, לְעוֹלָם בְּזֶה אַחַר זֶה, וְרַבָּנַן, וְהַאי תַּנָּא סָבַר לַהּ כְּאִידַּךְ תַּנָּא דְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה.
The Gemara responds: No, actually the case is one where he ate from the two sciatic nerves one after the other and received separate forewarnings, and the first opinion in that mishna is that of the Rabbis who disagree with Sumakhos with regard to: Itself and its offspring. And as for the difficulty that Rabbi Yehuda does not render one liable if the forewarning is an uncertain one, this tanna holds in accordance with the opinion of another tanna with regard to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda.
דְּאָמַר: הַתְרָאַת סָפֵק שְׁמָהּ הַתְרָאָה, דְּתַנְיָא: ״לֹא תוֹתִירוּ מִמֶּנּוּ עַד בֹּקֶר וְהַנֹּתָר מִמֶּנּוּ עַד בֹּקֶר בָּאֵשׁ תִּשְׂרֹפוּ״ –
As that other tanna says that Rabbi Yehuda holds: An uncertain forewarning is considered a forewarning, as it is taught in a baraita: The verse states with regard to the Paschal offering: “And you shall not leave any of it until morning; but that which remains of it until morning you shall burn with fire” (Exodus 12:10).
