Eruvin 15
אִיתְּמַר: לֶחִי הָעוֹמֵד מֵאֵלָיו, אַבָּיֵי אָמַר: הָוֵי לֶחִי, רָבָא אָמַר: לָא הָוֵי לֶחִי.
It was stated that the amora’im disagreed about a side post that stands by itself, i.e., a side post at the entrance to an alleyway that was not put there for the express purpose of permitting one to carry on Shabbat. Abaye said: It is a valid side post. Rava said: It is not a valid side post.
הֵיכָא דְּלָא סָמְכִינַן עֲלֵיהּ מֵאֶתְמוֹל, כּוּלֵּי עָלְמָא לָא פְּלִיגִי דְּלָא הָוֵי לֶחִי. כִּי פְּלִיגִי הֵיכָא דְּסָמְכִינַן עֲלֵיהּ מֵאֶתְמוֹל. אַבָּיֵי אָמַר: הָוֵי לֶחִי, דְּהָא סָמְכִינַן עֲלֵיהּ מֵאֶתְמוֹל. רָבָא אָמַר: לָא הָוֵי לֶחִי, כֵּיוָן דְּמֵעִיקָּרָא לָאו אַדַּעְתֵּיהּ דְּהָכִי עֲבִידִי, לָא הָוֵי לֶחִי.
The Gemara first narrows the scope of the dispute: In a place where the inhabitants of the alleyway did not rely on it from yesterday, e.g., the alleyway had another side post that fell down on Shabbat, all agree that it is not a valid side post. Where they disagree is in a case where they relied on it from yesterday. Abaye said: It is a valid side post, as they relied on it from yesterday. Rava said: It is not a valid side post; since it was not originally erected for this purpose, it is not considered a valid side post.
קָא סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ כִּי הֵיכִי דִּפְלִיגִי בְּלֶחִי פְּלִיגִי נָמֵי בִּמְחִיצָה.
The Gemara comments: It might enter your mind to say that just as they disagree with regard to a side post, they also disagree with regard to whether a partition that was not erected to serve that function is considered a valid partition.
תָּא שְׁמַע: הָעוֹשֶׂה סוּכָּתוֹ בֵּין הָאִילָנוֹת וְאִילָנוֹת דְּפָנוֹת לָהּ — כְּשֵׁירָה. הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן, שֶׁנְּטָעָן מִתְּחִילָּה לְכָךְ. אִי הָכִי פְּשִׁיטָא! מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא: לִיגְזוֹר דִּילְמָא אָתֵי לְאִישְׁתַּמּוֹשֵׁי בְּאִילָן, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.
Come and hear a proof based upon what we learned in the following mishna: With regard to one who makes his sukka among the trees, and the trees serve as its walls, it is a valid sukka. This proves that the trees function as partitions even though they were not erected for this purpose. The Gemara responds: With what are we dealing here, in this mishna? To a case where he planted the trees from the outset for this purpose. The Gemara asks: If so, it is obvious that the trees constitute valid walls. The Gemara answers: Lest you say the Sages should issue a decree to prohibit using a sukka with trees as its walls, due to a concern that perhaps one will come to use the tree on the Festival and detach a branch or leaf in the process, the mishna therefore teaches us that no such decree was made and the sukka is permitted.
תָּא שְׁמַע: הָיָה שָׁם אִילָן אוֹ גָּדֵר אוֹ חִיצַת הַקָּנִים — נִידּוֹן מִשּׁוּם דְּיוֹמָד!
The Gemara tries to present another proof. Come and hear a proof from a baraita: If there was a tree there, or a fence, or a barrier of reeds that are interconnected and form a hedge, it is judged to be a valid double post, i.e., it qualifies as a partition suitable to enclose a public well, as will be explained below. This indicates that a partition not constructed to serve as a partition is nonetheless valid.
הָכָא נָמֵי, בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן — שֶׁעֲשָׂאָן מִתְּחִילָּה לְכָךְ. אִי הָכִי מַאי קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן? [קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן], חִיצַת הַקָּנִים קָנֶה קָנֶה פָּחוֹת מִשְּׁלֹשָׁה טְפָחִים, כְּדִבְעָא מִינֵּיהּ אַבָּיֵי מֵרַבָּה.
The Gemara rejects this proof: Here, too, with what are we dealing? With a case where one constructed them from the outset for this purpose. The Gemara asks: If so, what does it teach us; is it not obvious that it is a valid double post? The Gemara answers: It teaches us that a barrier of reeds is a valid partition if the distance between one reed and the next is less than three handbreadths, as Abaye raised this dilemma to Rabba, and the baraita teaches that it is valid.
תָּא שְׁמַע: אִילָן הַמֵּסֵיךְ עַל הָאָרֶץ, אִם אֵין נוֹפוֹ גָּבוֹהַּ מִן הָאָרֶץ שְׁלֹשָׁה טְפָחִים — מְטַלְטְלִין תַּחְתָּיו. הָכָא נָמֵי, בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן — שֶׁנְּטָעוֹ מִתְּחִילָּה לְכָךְ.
The Gemara suggests another proof. Come and hear a proof from the following mishna: With regard to a tree whose branches hang over from a height of greater than ten handbreadths and reach almost to the ground, if the ends of its branches are not higher than three handbreadths from the ground, one may carry under it; the branches constitute partitions all around, and it is therefore permissible to carry in the enclosed area. The Gemara responds: Here, too, with what are we dealing? With a case where he planted the tree from the outset for this purpose.
אִי הָכִי, לִיטַלְטֵל בְּכוּלּוֹ! אַלְּמָה אָמַר רַב הוּנָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב יְהוֹשֻׁעַ: אֵין מְטַלְטְלִין בּוֹ אֶלָּא בֵּית סָאתַיִם.
The Gemara asks: If so, it should be permitted to carry in all of it no matter how large the area. Why, then, did Rav Huna, the son of Rav Yehoshua, say: One may only carry under the tree if its branches enclose an area no larger than two beit se’a, i.e., five thousand square cubits? If the area is larger, it is not considered a courtyard, and carrying there is prohibited. This indicates that the branches are not considered full-fledged partitions.
מִשּׁוּם דְּהָוֵי דִּירָה שֶׁתַּשְׁמִישָׁהּ לַאֲוִיר, וְכׇל דִּירָה שֶׁתַּשְׁמִישָׁהּ לַאֲוִיר, אֵין מְטַלְטְלִין בָּהּ אֶלָּא בֵּית סָאתַיִם.
The Gemara answers: The reason that carrying is permitted only if the enclosed area is less than this size is because it is a dwelling whose use is for the open air beyond it, i.e., it is used by guards who are watching the fields beyond it, rather than as an independent dwelling place, and the halakha with regard to any dwelling whose use is for the open air beyond it is that one may carry in it only if its area is no larger than two beit se’a.
תָּא שְׁמַע: שָׁבַת בְּתֵל שֶׁהוּא גָּבוֹהַּ עֲשָׂרָה וְהוּא מֵאַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת וְעַד בֵּית סָאתַיִם, וְכֵן בְּנֶקַע שֶׁהוּא עָמוֹק עֲשָׂרָה, וְהוּא מֵאַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת וְעַד בֵּית סָאתַיִם, וְקָמָה קְצוּרָה וְשִׁיבּוֹלוֹת מַקִּיפוֹת אוֹתָהּ — מְהַלֵּךְ אֶת כּוּלָּהּ וְחוּצָה לָהּ אַלְפַּיִם אַמָּה.
The Gemara suggests another proof. Come and hear that which was taught in the following baraita: With regard to one who established his Shabbat abode on a mound that was ten handbreadths high and its area was anywhere from four cubits to the two beit se’a; and similarly, one who established his Shabbat abode in a natural cavity of a rock that is ten handbreadths deep and its area was anywhere from four cubits to two beit se’a; and similarly, one who established his Shabbat abode in a field of reaped grain, and rows of stalks ten handbreadths high that have not been reaped surround it, serving as a partition enclosing the reaped area, he may walk in the entire enclosed area, and outside it an additional two thousand cubits. This indicates that a partition not specifically constructed to serve as a partition is nonetheless valid.
וְכִי תֵּימָא הָכָא נָמֵי שֶׁעָשָׂה מִתְּחִילָּה לְכָךְ, בִּשְׁלָמָא קָמָה לְחַיֵּי, אֶלָּא תֵּל וָנֶקַע — מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר?
And if you say that here, too, it is a case where he made it from the outset for this purpose, there is a difficulty. Granted, in the case of the grain, this answer is all right; but with regard to a mound and a cavity, what can be said? They were there from time immemorial and were not constructed to serve as partitions.
אֶלָּא: בִּמְחִיצוֹת כּוּלֵּי עָלְמָא לָא פְּלִיגִי דְּהָוְיָא מְחִיצָה, כִּי פְּלִיגִי — בְּלֶחִי. אַבָּיֵי לְטַעְמֵיהּ דְּאָמַר: לֶחִי מִשּׁוּם מְחִיצָה, וּמְחִיצָּה הָעֲשׂוּיָה מֵאֵלֶיהָ הָוְיָא מְחִיצָה. וְרָבָא לְטַעְמֵיהּ דְּאָמַר: לֶחִי מִשּׁוּם הֶיכֵּר, אִי עֲבִידָא בְּיָדַיִם הָוְיָא הֶיכֵּר, וְאִי לָא לָא הָוֵי הֶיכֵּר.
Rather, the Gemara rejects its previous argument and explains: With regard to partitions, all agree that a partition that stands by itself is a partition, despite the fact that it was not erected for that purpose. Where they disagree is with regard to a side post. Abaye follows his usual line of reasoning, as he said that a side post serves as a partition, and a partition that stands by itself is a valid partition. And Rava follows his usual line of reasoning, as he said that a side post serves as a conspicuous marker. Therefore, if it was made with a person’s hands for that purpose, it is considered a conspicuous marker; and if not, it is not considered a conspicuous marker.
תָּא שְׁמַע: אַבְנֵי גָדֵר הַיּוֹצְאוֹת מִן הַגָּדֵר מוּבְדָּלוֹת זוֹ מִזּוֹ פָּחוֹת מִשְּׁלֹשָׁה, אֵין צָרִיךְ לֶחִי אַחֵר. שְׁלֹשָׁה — צָרִיךְ לֶחִי אַחֵר.
The Gemara now attempts to prove which side is correct according to this version of the dispute. Come and hear a proof from the Tosefta: With regard to stones of a wall that protrude from the wall and are separated from each other by less than three handbreadths, there is no need for another side post in order to permit carrying in the alleyway; the protruding stones join together to form a side post. However, if they are separated by three handbreadths, there is a need for another side post. This indicates that a side post is valid even if it was not erected for that purpose.
הָכָא נָמֵי שֶׁבְּנָאָן מִתְּחִילָּה לְכָךְ. אִי הָכִי, פְּשִׁיטָא! מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא לְמֵיסַר בִּנְיָינָא הוּא דַּעֲבִידָא. קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.
The Gemara rejects this proof: Here, too, we are dealing with a case where one built them from the outset for this purpose. The Gemara comments: If so, it is obvious that the side post is valid. The Gemara explains: Lest you say that it was only in order to connect the building to another building that he built the wall with protruding stones, it teaches us that it is a valid side post. We are not concerned that onlookers might assume that the wall was not originally built as a side post.
תָּא שְׁמַע, דְּתָנֵי רַבִּי חִיָּיא: כּוֹתֶל שֶׁצִּידּוֹ אֶחָד כָּנוּס מֵחֲבֵרוֹ, בֵּין שֶׁנִּרְאֶה מִבַּחוּץ וְשָׁוֶה מִבִּפְנִים, וּבֵין שֶׁנִּרְאֶה מִבִּפְנִים וְשָׁוֶה מִבַּחוּץ — נִדּוֹן מִשּׁוּם לֶחִי.
The Gemara suggests another proof: Come and hear the following Tosefta taught by Rabbi Ḥiyya: A wall, one side of which is more recessed than the other, whether the indentation is visible from the outside and the wall looks even from the inside, or it is visible from the inside and the wall looks even from the outside, it is considered a side post. This indicates that a side post is valid even if it was not erected for that purpose.
הָכָא נָמֵי שֶׁעֲשָׂאוֹ מִתְּחִילָּה לְכָךְ. אִי הָכִי, מַאי קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן? הָא קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן: נִרְאֶה מִבַּחוּץ וְשָׁוֶה מִבִּפְנִים — נִדּוֹן מִשּׁוּם לֶחִי.
The Gemara answers: Here, too, it is a case where one fashioned it from the outset for this purpose, to serve as a side post. The Gemara asks: If so, what does it teach us? The Gemara answers: This teaches us that a side post that is visible from the outside and looks even with the wall from the inside is considered a side post, although this view is not universally accepted.
תָּא שְׁמַע: דְּרַב הֲוָה יָתֵיב בְּהָהוּא מְבוֹאָה, הֲוָה יָתֵיב רַב הוּנָא קַמֵּיהּ. אֲמַר לֵיהּ לְשַׁמָּעֵיהּ: זִיל אַיְיתִי לִי כּוּזָא דְמַיָּא. עַד דַּאֲתָא, נְפַל לֶחְיָא. אַחְוִי לֵיהּ בִּידֵיהּ קָם אַדּוּכְתֵּיהּ. אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב הוּנָא: לָא סָבַר לַהּ מָר לִסְמוֹךְ אַדִּיקְלָא? אָמַר: דָּמֵי הַאי מֵרַבָּנַן כְּמַאן דְּלָא פָּרְשִׁי אִינָשֵׁי שְׁמַעְתָּא, מִי סָמְכִינַן עֲלֵיהּ מֵאֶתְמוֹל?
The Gemara suggests another proof: Come and hear the following story: Rav was sitting in a certain alleyway, and Rav Huna was sitting before him. He said to his attendant: Go, bring me a small pitcher of water. By the time he came back with the water, the side post at the entrance to the alleyway had fallen. Rav signaled to him with his hand that he should stop, and the attendant stood in his place. Rav Huna said to Rav: Doesn’t the Master hold that it is permissible to rely on the palm tree located at the entrance to this alleyway as a side post? Rav said: This scholar, Rav Huna, is comparable to one who does not know the teachings of the Sages. Did we rely on the palm tree from yesterday? Since we did not, carrying in the alleyway is not permitted.
טַעְמָא — דְּלָא סָמְכִינַן, הָא סָמְכִינַן — הָוֵי לֶחִי.
Based on Rav’s response, the Gemara argues as follows: The reason that the palm tree could not serve as a side post is because we did not rely on the palm tree from yesterday. This indicates that had we relied on it, it would be a valid side post, thus proving that a side post that was not erected for that purpose is nonetheless valid, in accordance with the opinion of Abaye.
לֵימָא אַבָּיֵי וְרָבָא בִּדְלָא סָמְכִינַן עֲלֵיהּ פְּלִיגִי, הָא סָמְכִינַן עֲלֵיהּ — הָוֵה לֶחִי. לָא סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ, דְּהָהוּא בַּרְקָא דַּהֲוָה בֵּי בַּר חָבוּ דַּהֲווֹ פְּלִיגִי בַּהּ אַבָּיֵי וְרָבָא כּוּלֵּי שְׁנַיְיהוּ.
The Gemara suggests: Shall we say that Abaye and Rava disagree only in a case where they did not rely on it before Shabbat, but in a case where they did rely on it, all agree it is a valid side post? The Gemara answers: This should not enter your mind, as there was a certain balcony [barka] that was in the house of Bar Ḥavu that Abaye and Rava disagreed about their entire lives. The residents of the alleyway began relying on a pillar upon which the balcony rested as their side post. Since Abaye and Rava disagreed about this case, it is clear that their disagreement applies even when the residents had relied on the item as a side post from before Shabbat.
מַתְנִי׳ בַּכֹּל עוֹשִׂין לְחָיַיִן אֲפִילּוּ בְּדָבָר שֶׁיֵּשׁ בּוֹ רוּחַ חַיִּים, וְרַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹסֵר. וּמְטַמֵּא מִשּׁוּם גּוֹלֵל,
MISHNA: One may construct side posts from anything, even a living creature, provided that it was properly attached to the entrance of the alleyway, and Rabbi Meir prohibits using a living creature as a side post. The mishna continues with a similar dispute: Even a living creature imparts ritual impurity if it used as the covering of a grave.
וְרַבִּי מֵאִיר מְטַהֵר. וְכוֹתְבִין עָלָיו גִּיטֵּי נָשִׁים, וְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי פּוֹסֵל.
But Rabbi Meir deems it pure. Likewise, one may write women’s bills of divorce on anything, even a living creature. But Rabbi Yosei HaGelili invalidates a bill of divorce written on a living creature.
גְּמָ׳ תַּנְיָא, רַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹמֵר: כָּל דָּבָר שֶׁיֵּשׁ בּוֹ רוּחַ חַיִּים אֵין עוֹשִׂין אוֹתוֹ לֹא דּוֹפֶן לְסוּכָּה וְלֹא לֶחִי לְמָבוֹי, לֹא פַּסִּין לְבֵירָאוֹת וְלֹא גּוֹלֵל לְקֶבֶר. מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי אָמְרוּ: אַף אֵין כּוֹתְבִין עָלָיו גִּיטֵּי נָשִׁים.
GEMARA: It was taught in a baraita that Rabbi Meir says: An animate object may neither be used as a wall for a sukka, nor as a side post for an alleyway, nor as one of the upright boards surrounding a well, nor as the covering of a grave. They said in the name of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili: Nor may one write women’s bills of divorce on it.
מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי, דְּתַנְיָא: ״סֵפֶר״, אֵין לִי אֶלָּא סֵפֶר. מִנַּיִין לְרַבּוֹת כָּל דָּבָר? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״וְכָתַב לָהּ״, מִכׇּל מָקוֹם. אִם כֵּן מָה תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״סֵפֶר״? לוֹמַר לָךְ: מָה סֵפֶר דָּבָר שֶׁאֵין בּוֹ רוּחַ חַיִּים וְאֵינוֹ אוֹכֶל, אַף כָּל דָּבָר שֶׁאֵין בּוֹ רוּחַ חַיִּים וְאֵינוֹ אוֹכֶל.
The Gemara asks: What is the reason for Rabbi Yosei HaGelili’s opinion? As it was taught in a baraita with regard to the verse: “When a man takes a wife, and marries her, then it comes to pass if she finds no favor in his eyes, because he has found some unseemly thing in her; that he write her a scroll of severance and give it in her hand, and send her out of his house” (Deuteronomy 24:1): From the word scroll, I have derived that only a scroll is valid. From where is it derived to include all objects as valid materials upon which a bill of divorce may be written? The Torah states: “That he write her,” in any case, i.e., any surface upon which the formula can be written. If so, why does the verse state “scroll”? To tell you that a bill of divorce must be written on a surface like a scroll: Just as a scroll is neither alive nor food, so too, a bill of divorce may be written on any object that is neither alive nor food. That is why Rabbi Yosei HaGelili invalidates a bill of divorce written on a living being.
וְרַבָּנַן? מִי כְּתִיב ״בְּסֵפֶר״? ״סֵפֶר״ כְּתִיב, לִסְפִירוּת דְּבָרִים בְּעָלְמָא הוּא דַּאֲתָא.
The Gemara asks: And how do the Rabbis, who disagree and say that a bill of divorce may be written even on a living creature or on food, interpret the verse? They contend: Is the verse written: “Let him write for her in the scroll [basefer],” indicating the only type of surface on which the bill of divorce may be written? No, scroll [sefer] is written, which comes to teach that a mere account of the matters [sefirot devarim] is required. In other words, sefer is referring not to the surface on which a bill of divorce must be written, but rather to the essence of the bill of divorce. The verse teaches that the bill of divorce must contain particular content.
וְרַבָּנַן, הַאי ״וְכָתַב לָהּ״ מַאי דָּרְשִׁי בֵּיהּ? הָהוּא מִבְּעֵי לֵיהּ: בִּכְתִיבָה מִתְגָּרֶשֶׁת, וְאֵינָהּ מִתְגָּרֶשֶׁת בְּכֶסֶף. סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אָמֵינָא: הוֹאִיל וְאִיתַּקַּשׁ יְצִיאָה לַהֲוָיָה — מָה הֲוָיָה בְּכֶסֶף, אַף יְצִיאָה בְּכֶסֶף. קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.
The Gemara continues: And what do the Rabbis derive from the phrase “that he write her”? The Gemara answers: That phrase is required to teach the principle that a woman is divorced only by means of writing, i.e., a bill of divorce, and she is not divorced by means of money. It might have entered your mind to say: Since in the verse, leaving marriage, i.e., divorce, is juxtaposed to becoming married, i.e., betrothal, then, just as becoming married is effected with money, so too, leaving marriage may be effected with money. Therefore, the Torah teaches us: “That he write for her”; divorce can be effected only with a written bill of divorce.
וְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי, הַאי סְבָרָא מְנָא לֵיהּ? נָפְקָא לֵיהּ מִ״סֵּפֶר כְּרִיתוּת״: סֵפֶר כּוֹרְתָהּ, וְאֵין דָּבָר אַחֵר כּוֹרְתָהּ.
The Gemara asks: And Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, from where does he derive this reasoning, that a woman cannot be divorced with money? The Gemara answers: He derives it from the phrase: A scroll of severance, which teaches that a scroll, i.e., a written document, severs her from her husband and nothing else severs her from him.
וְרַבָּנַן, הַאי ״סֵפֶר כְּרִיתוּת״ מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ לְדָבָר הַכּוֹרֵת בֵּינוֹ לְבֵינָהּ. לְכִדְתַנְיָא: הֲרֵי זֶה גִּיטֵּךְ עַל מְנָת שֶׁלֹּא תִּשְׁתִּי יַיִן, עַל מְנָת שֶׁלֹּא תֵּלְכִי לְבֵית אָבִיךְ לְעוֹלָם — אֵין זֶה כְּרִיתוּת. כָּל שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם — הֲרֵי זֶה כְּרִיתוּת.
The Gemara continues: And the Rabbis explain that this phrase: A scroll of severance, is required to teach that a bill of divorce must be a matter that severs all connection between him and her. As it was taught in a baraita: If a man says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce, on condition that you will never drink wine, or on condition that you will never go to your father’s house, that is not severance; the bill of divorce is not valid. If a bill of divorce imposes a condition upon the woman that permanently binds her to her husband, her relationship with her husband has not been completely severed, which is a prerequisite for divorce. If, however, he imposes a condition for the duration of thirty days, or any other limited period of time, that is severance, and the bill of divorce is valid, as the relationship will be completely terminated at the end of the thirty-day period.
וְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי, נָפְקָא לֵיהּ מִ״כָּרֵת״ ״כְּרִיתוּת״.
And Rabbi Yosei HaGelili derives that a condition without a termination point invalidates the divorce from the fact that instead of using the term karet, the verse uses the more expanded term keritut. Inasmuch as both terms denote severance, using the longer term teaches us two things: Divorce can be effected only by means of writing and not through money, and divorce requires total severance.
וְרַבָּנַן ״כָּרֵת״ ״כְּרִיתוּת״ לָא דָּרְשִׁי.
And as for the Rabbis, they do not derive anything from the expansion of karet to keritut.
מַתְנִי׳ שְׁיָירָא שֶׁחָנְתָה בְּבִקְעָה וְהִקִּיפוּהָ כְּלֵי בְהֵמָה — מְטַלְטְלִין בְּתוֹכָהּ. וּבִלְבַד שֶׁיְּהֵא גָּדֵר גָּבוֹהַּ עֲשָׂרָה טְפָחִים, וְלֹא יְהוּ פִּירְצוֹת יְתֵרוֹת עַל הַבִּנְיָן.
MISHNA: If a caravan camped in a valley, i.e., an open space not enclosed by walls, and the travelers enclosed their camp with partitions made of the animals’ equipment, e.g., saddles and the like, one may carry inside the enclosed area, provided that the resultant partition will be a fence ten handbreadths high, and that there will not be breaches in the partition greater than the built segment.
כָּל פִּירְצָה שֶׁהִיא כְּעֶשֶׂר אַמּוֹת מוּתֶּרֶת, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהִיא כְּפֶתַח. יָתֵר מִכָּאן — אָסוּר.
Any breach that is approximately ten cubits wide is permitted and does not invalidate the partition because it is considered like an entrance. However, if one of the breaches is greater than ten cubits, it is prohibited to carry anywhere in the enclosed area.
גְּמָ׳ אִיתְּמַר, פָּרוּץ כְּעוֹמֵד — רַב פָּפָּא אָמַר: מוּתָּר, רַב הוּנָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב יְהוֹשֻׁעַ אָמַר: אָסוּר.
GEMARA: It is stated that the amora’im disagree about the case where the breached segment of the partition equals the standing portion. Rav Pappa said: It is permitted to carry within that enclosure. Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said: It is prohibited.
רַב פָּפָּא אָמַר מוּתָּר: הָכִי אַגְמְרֵיהּ רַחֲמָנָא לְמֹשֶׁה — לָא תִּפְרוֹץ רוּבָּה. רַב הוּנָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב יְהוֹשֻׁעַ אָמַר אָסוּר: הָכִי אַגְמְרֵיהּ רַחֲמָנָא לְמֹשֶׁה — גְּדוֹר רוּבָּה.
The Gemara explains: Rav Pappa said: It is permitted. This is what the Merciful One taught Moses: Do not breach the majority of the partition; as long as the greater part is not breached, it is considered a partition. Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said: It is prohibited. This is what the Merciful One taught Moses: Circumscribe the greater part; if the greater part is not enclosed, it is not a partition.
תְּנַן: וְלֹא יְהוּ פִּירְצוֹת יְתֵרוֹת עַל הַבִּנְיָן. הָא כַּבִּנְיָן — מוּתָּר?!
We learned in the mishna: And there will not be breaches in the partition greater than the built segment. Only then would carrying be permitted in the enclosed area. By inference, if the breaches equal the built segment, it is permitted. This presents a difficulty for Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua.
לָא תֵּימָא הָא כַּבִּנְיָן מוּתָּר, אֶלָּא אֵימָא: אִם בִּנְיָן יָתֵר עַל הַפִּירְצָה — מוּתָּר.
The Gemara responds: Do not say: By inference if they equal the built segment, it is permitted; rather, say: If the built segment is greater than the breach, it is permitted to carry in the enclosed area.
אֲבָל כַּבִּנְיָן, מַאי — אָסוּר? אִי הָכִי לִיתְנֵי ״לֹא יְהוּ פִּירְצוֹת כַּבִּנְיָן״! קַשְׁיָא.
The Gemara continues: However, according to that way of understanding the mishna, if the breach equals the built segment, what is the halakha? Is carrying prohibited? If so, let the mishna teach that carrying is permitted, provided that the breaches do not equal the built segment. It can be inferred from this that if the breaches are greater than the built segment, it is certainly prohibited. The Gemara concludes: Indeed, this poses a difficulty to the opinion of Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua.
תָּא שְׁמַע: הַמְקָרֶה סוּכָּתוֹ בְּשַׁפּוּדִין אוֹ בַּאֲרוּכּוֹת הַמִּטָּה, אִם יֵשׁ רֶיוַח בֵּינֵיהֶן כְּמוֹתָן — כְּשֵׁירָה!
The Gemara cites a proof to support Rav Pappa’s opinion. Come and hear that which the mishna taught about the halakhot of sukka: With regard to one who roofed his sukka with metal skewers or with bed posts, both of which are unfit for sukka roofing because they are susceptible to ritual impurity, if there is space between them, equal to their width, filled with materials valid for sukka roofing, the sukka is valid. Apparently, with regard to roofing, if the valid materials equal the invalid, the sukka is valid. Similarly, if the built segment of an enclosure equals the breached segment, it is a valid enclosure for the purpose of carrying on Shabbat. This supports Rav Pappa’s opinion against that of Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua.
הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן: כְּשֶׁנִּכְנָס וְיוֹצֵא.
The Gemara contests this conclusion. With what are we dealing here? It is with a case where the skewers can be inserted and extracted easily. In other words, the case of the mishna in Sukka is not one where there are equal amounts of valid and invalid roofing. It is referring to a case where there is additional space between the skewers, which allows for their easy insertion and removal. Consequently, the space filled by the valid roofing is greater than that filled by the skewers.
וְהָא אֶפְשָׁר לְצַמְצֵם?
The Gemara asks: Isn’t it possible to be precise? Couldn’t the mishna in Sukka be understood as describing a case where the gaps between the skewers equal the width of the skewers? That understanding supports the opinion of Rav Pappa, who maintains that when the valid segment precisely equals the invalid segment, the whole is valid.
אָמַר רַבִּי אַמֵּי: בְּמַעֲדִיף.
Rabbi Ami said: This mishna is referring to a case where one adds roofing, so that the area of the valid roofing is greater than that of the skewers.
רָבָא אָמַר: אִם הָיוּ נְתוּנִין עֵרֶב — נוֹתְנוֹ שְׁתִי, שְׁתִי — נוֹתְנוֹ עֵרֶב.
Rava said: This is referring to a case where if the skewers were placed crosswise to the sukka, he should place the valid roofing lengthwise, and similarly, if the skewers were placed lengthwise, he should place the valid roofing crosswise, ensuring that there is more valid than invalid roofing.
תָּא שְׁמַע: שְׁיָירָא שֶׁחָנְתָה בְּבִקְעָה וְהִקִּיפוּהָ בִּגְמַלִּין, בְּאוּכָּפוֹת,
The Gemara seeks to adduce a proof in support of the opinion of Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua: Come and hear that which was taught in a baraita: If a caravan camped in a field, and the travelers surrounded their camp with camels that were made to crouch down, or with their saddles,
