Eruvin 35
חַסּוֹרֵי מִיחַסְּרָא וְהָכִי קָתָנֵי: נְתָנוֹ בְּמִגְדָּל, וְנָעַל בְּפָנָיו וְאָבַד הַמַּפְתֵּחַ — הֲרֵי זֶה עֵירוּב. בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים? בְּיוֹם טוֹב, אֲבָל בְּשַׁבָּת — אֵין עֵירוּבוֹ עֵירוּב. נִמְצָא הַמַּפְתֵּחַ, בֵּין בָּעִיר בֵּין בַּשָּׂדֶה — אֵין עֵירוּבוֹ עֵירוּב. רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: בָּעִיר — עֵירוּבוֹ עֵירוּב, בַּשָּׂדֶה — אֵין עֵירוּבוֹ עֵירוּב.
The Gemara answers: The mishna is incomplete and it teaches the following: If one placed the eiruv in a cupboard and locked it, and the key is lost, it is nonetheless a valid eiruv. In what case is this statement said? On a Festival; however, on Shabbat, his eiruv is not a valid eiruv. If the key is found, whether in a city or in a field, his eiruv is not a valid eiruv. Rabbi Eliezer disagrees and says: If it is found in a city, his eiruv is a valid eiruv; but if it is found in a field, his eiruv is not a valid eiruv.
בָּעִיר — עֵירוּבוֹ עֵירוּב, כְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן דְּאָמַר: אֶחָד גַּגּוֹת וְאֶחָד חֲצֵירוֹת וְאֶחָד קַרְפֵּיפוֹת — רְשׁוּת אַחַת הֵן לְכֵלִים שֶׁשָּׁבְתוּ בְּתוֹכָן. בַּשָּׂדֶה אֵין עֵירוּבוֹ עֵירוּב — כְּרַבָּנַן.
The Gemara now explains the difference: If the key is found in a city, his eiruv is a valid eiruv in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who said: Roofs, courtyards, and enclosed fields [karpeifot] are all one domain with regard to utensils that began Shabbat in them. Accordingly, a utensil that was left on a roof at the beginning of Shabbat may be carried into a courtyard or a karpef. It is possible to transfer anything located in a city from one place to another in a similar manner. If, however, the key is found in a field, his eiruv is not a valid eiruv, in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, due to the prohibition to carry in a karmelit. Although carrying there is merely a shevut, the eiruv is not valid.
רַבָּה וְרַב יוֹסֵף דְּאָמְרִי תַּרְוַיְיהוּ: הָכָא בְּמִגְדָּל שֶׁל עֵץ עָסְקִינַן, דְּמָר סָבַר: כְּלִי הוּא, וְאֵין בִּנְיָן בְּכֵלִים וְאֵין סְתִירָה בְּכֵלִים. וּמָר סָבַר: אֹהֶל הוּא.
The discussion above constitutes one understanding of the mishna. Rabba and Rav Yosef, however, both said: Here, we are dealing with a wooden cupboard, and the tanna’im disagree with regard to the following point: The first, anonymous Sage, who rules that the eiruv is valid, holds that the cupboard is a utensil, and that there is no prohibited labor of building utensils, and similarly, there is no dismantling of utensils. Since dismantling a utensil is not included in the prohibited labor of dismantling, one may make a hole in the cupboard in order to access the food used for the eiruv. And the other Sage, Rabbi Eliezer, who invalidates the eiruv, holds that the cupboard is a tent. A wooden implement of such a large size is no longer classified as a utensil; rather, it is considered a building, and therefore it is subject to the prohibitions against building and dismantling on Shabbat.
וּבִפְלוּגְתָּא דְהָנֵי תַנָּאֵי, דִּתְנַן: הִקִּישׁ עַל גַּבֵּי שִׁידָּה תֵּיבָה וּמִגְדָּל — טְמֵאִין. רַבִּי נְחֶמְיָה וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן מְטַהֲרִין.
And their dispute is parallel to the dispute between these tanna’im, as we learned in a mishna with regard to the ritual impurity of a zav: One of the unique laws of a zav is that he imparts impurity to an object simply by moving it, even if he does not touch it directly. If a zav knocked on a carriage, crate, or cupboard, even if he did not actually come into direct contact with them, they are nonetheless ritually impure because he caused them to move when he struck them. Rabbi Neḥemya and Rabbi Shimon disagree and render them pure.
מַאי לָאו, בְּהָא קָמִפַּלְגִי: מָר סָבַר — כְּלִי הוּא, וּמָר סָבַר — אֹהֶל הוּא.
What, are they not disagreeing about this point: The first Sage holds that a carriage, crate, or cupboard is categorized as a utensil, and therefore it contracts ritual impurity when a zav causes it to move; and the other Sage, Rabbi Neḥemya and Rabbi Shimon, holds that it is a tent, and a building does not contract ritual impurity in any way from a zav?
אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: וְתִיסְבְּרָא? וְהָתַנְיָא: אֹהֶל וְנִיסָּט — טָמֵא, כְּלִי וְאֵינוֹ נִיסָּט — טָהוֹר. וְקָתָנֵי סֵיפָא: וְאִם הָיוּ נִיסּוֹטִין — טְמֵאִים, זֶה הַכְּלָל: נִיסָּט מֵחֲמַת כֹּחוֹ — טָמֵא, מֵחֲמַת רְעָדָה — טָהוֹר!
Abaye said in refutation of this proof: And do you think that this is a reasonable explanation of the mishna? Wasn’t it taught in a baraita: If a zav shook a real tent, and it moved, it is ritually impure; and if he shook a utensil and it did not move, it is ritually pure? This indicates that the critical factor is not whether the article is classified as a tent or as a utensil but whether or not it actually moves when shaken. Furthermore, it was taught in the latter clause of that baraita: And if they moved, they are ritually impure, and this is the principle: If a utensil or a tent moved due to the direct force of the zav, it is ritually impure. But if it moved due to vibrations, e.g., if the zav knocked on the floor or on the platform upon which the object is located, and the vibrations of the floor or the platform caused the object to move, it is ritually pure, as it was not moved by the direct force of the zav. Once again, the determining factor is not the object’s classification as a tent or a utensil but whether it was actually moved by the zav.
אֶלָּא אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא הֶיסֵּט מֵחֲמַת כֹּחוֹ — טָמֵא, מֵחֲמַת רְעָדָה — טָהוֹר. וְהָכָא בִּרְעָדָה מֵחֲמַת כֹּחוֹ עָסְקִינַן, וּבְהָא קָא מִיפַּלְגִי: דְּמָר סָבַר — הָוֵי הֶיסֵּט, וּמָר סָבַר — לָא הָוֵי הֶיסֵּט.
Rather, Abaye said that the dispute between the first tanna and Rabbi Neḥemya and Rabbi Shimon should be understood as follows: All agree that movement due to the direct force of the zav causes the object to become ritually impure, whether it is a tent or a utensil. Conversely, if the movement was due to vibrations of the floor or base, it is ritually pure. And here, we are dealing with a case where the object vibrated because of the direct force of the zav, i.e., where he banged upon the object itself, causing it to vibrate but not to move. And the tanna’im disagree with regard to the following point: The first Sage holds that this, too, is considered movement; and the other Sage, Rabbi Neḥemya and Rabbi Shimon, holds that vibration is not considered movement. Therefore, Abaye rejects Rabba and Rav Yosef’s proof for their explanation of the mishna.
וּמַתְנִיתִין בְּמַאי מוֹקְמִינַן לַהּ? אַבָּיֵי וְרָבָא דְּאָמְרִי תַּרְוַיְיהוּ: בְּמַנְעוּל וּקְטִיר בְּמִתְנָא עָסְקִינַן, וּבָעֵי סַכִּינָא לְמִיפְסְקֵיהּ.
The Gemara therefore proceeds to ask: If so, how is the mishna with regard to eiruv to be interpreted? The Gemara answers: Abaye and Rava both said: We are dealing here with a lock that is tied with a leather strap, and a knife is required to cut it if there is no key.
תַּנָּא קַמָּא סָבַר לַהּ כְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי, דְּאָמַר: כָּל הַכֵּלִים נִיטָּלִין בְּשַׁבָּת, חוּץ מִמַּסָּר הַגָּדוֹל וְיָתֵד שֶׁל מַחֲרֵישָׁה.
The anonymous first tanna holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, who said: All utensils may be moved on Shabbat, except for a large saw and the blade of a plow. Consequently, one may take a knife, cut the strap, and remove his eiruv from the cupboard.
וְרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר סָבַר לַהּ כְּרַבִּי נְחֶמְיָה, דְּאָמַר: אֲפִילּוּ טַלִּית אֲפִילּוּ תַּרְווֹד — אֵין נִיטָּלִין אֶלָּא לְצוֹרֶךְ תַּשְׁמִישָׁן.
And Rabbi Eliezer holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Neḥemya, who said: Even a cloak, and even a spoon, which are certainly used only for activities permitted on Shabbat, may be moved on Shabbat only for the purpose of their ordinary use. The same applies to a knife, which may be moved only in order to cut food, but not for any other purpose. Consequently, one cannot cut the strap around the lock of the cupboard, and therefore his eiruv is invalid unless the key is located in town and he can transport it via courtyards.
מַתְנִי׳ נִתְגַּלְגֵּל חוּץ לַתְּחוּם, נָפַל עָלָיו גַּל אוֹ נִשְׂרַף, תְּרוּמָה וְנִטְמֵאת, מִבְּעוֹד יוֹם — אֵינוֹ עֵירוּב. מִשֶּׁחָשֵׁיכָה — הֲרֵי זֶה עֵירוּב.
MISHNA: If one’s eiruv rolled beyond the Shabbat limit, and he no longer has access to his eiruv since he may not go beyond his limit, or if a pile of stones fell on it, or if it was burnt, or if the eiruv was teruma and it became ritually impure; if any of these occurrences took place while it was still day, prior to the onset of Shabbat, it is not a valid eiruv, since one did not have an eiruv at twilight, which is the time one’s Shabbat residence is established. However, if any of these occurred after dark, when it was already Shabbat, it is a valid eiruv, as it was intact and accessible at the time one’s Shabbat residence is determined.
אִם סָפֵק, רַבִּי מֵאִיר וְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמְרִים: הֲרֵי זֶה חַמָּר גַּמָּל.
If the matter is in doubt, i.e., if he does not know when one of the aforementioned incidents occurred, Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda say: This person is in the position of both a donkey driver, who must prod the animal from behind, and a camel driver, who must lead the animal from the front, i.e., he is a person who is pulled in two opposite directions. Due to the uncertainty concerning his Shabbat border, he must act stringently, as though his resting place were both in his town and at the location where he placed the eiruv. He must restrict his Shabbat movement to those areas that are within two thousand cubits of both locations.
רַבִּי יוֹסֵי וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמְרִים: סְפֵק עֵירוּב כָּשֵׁר. אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי: אַבְטוּלְמוֹס הֵעִיד מִשּׁוּם חֲמִשָּׁה זְקֵנִים עַל סְפֵק עֵירוּב שֶׁכָּשֵׁר.
Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Shimon disagree and say: An eiruv whose validity is in doubt is nevertheless valid. Rav Yosei said: The Sage Avtolemos testified in the name of five Elders that an eiruv whose validity is in doubt is valid.
גְּמָ׳ נִתְגַּלְגֵּל חוּץ לַתְּחוּם. אָמַר רָבָא: לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא שֶׁנִּתְגַּלְגֵּל חוּץ לְאַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת, אֲבָל לְתוֹךְ אַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת — הַנּוֹתֵן עֵירוּבוֹ יֵשׁ לוֹ אַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת.
GEMARA: We learned in the mishna: If one’s eiruv rolled beyond the Shabbat limit prior to the onset of Shabbat, it is not a valid eiruv. Rava said: They only taught this in a case where one established his eiruv at the edge of his town’s Shabbat limit and the eiruv rolled more than four cubits outside that limit; however, if it remained within four cubits of the Shabbat limit, it is a valid eiruv. The principle is that one who places his eiruv in a particular location has four cubits around it, since he has established his Shabbat residence there.
נָפַל עָלָיו גַּל וְכוּ׳. קָא סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ דְּאִי בָּעֵי מָצֵי שָׁקֵיל לֵיהּ.
The mishna continues: If a pile of stones fell on the eiruv prior to the onset of Shabbat, it is not a valid eiruv. It might enter your mind to say that the mishna is referring to a case where if one wanted he could take the eiruv, i.e., where it is physically possible to clear the stones and remove the eiruv from underneath them. The only reason he cannot do so is because of the rabbinic prohibition to handle items that are set-aside, such as stones, on Shabbat.
לֵימָא מַתְנִיתִין דְּלָא כְּרַבִּי, דְּאִי כְּרַבִּי, הָאָמַר: כָּל דָּבָר שֶׁהוּא מִשּׁוּם שְׁבוּת — לֹא גָּזְרוּ עָלָיו בֵּין הַשְּׁמָשׁוֹת.
If so, let us say that the mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. As, if you say that it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, there is a difficulty: Didn’t he say that with regard to anything prohibited due to rabbinic decree, they did not issue the decree to apply during twilight? The prohibition to handle items that are set-aside is also a rabbinic decree, and therefore, according to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, since the eiruv was accessible at twilight, it should be valid.
אֲפִילּוּ תֵּימָא כְּרַבִּי, לָא צְרִיכָא, דְּבָעֵי מָרָא וַחֲצִינָא.
The Gemara rejects this argument: Even if you say that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, we can say that this ruling was necessary only in a case where a hoe or a spade would be required in order to remove the eiruv from under the stones, i.e., one would have to dig, which is a Shabbat labor prohibited by Torah law, not only by rabbinic decree.
וּצְרִיכִי. דְּאִי תְּנָא ״נִתְגַּלְגֵּל״ — מִשּׁוּם דְּלֵיתָא גַּבֵּיהּ. אֲבָל נָפַל עָלָיו גַּל, דְּאִיתֵיהּ גַּבֵּיהּ — אֵימָא לֶיהֱוֵי עֵירוּב.
The Gemara comments: And both rulings, the ruling concerning an eiruv that rolled beyond the Shabbat limit and the ruling concerning an eiruv that became buried under a pile of rocks, are necessary. As, if the mishna had only taught the case of the eiruv that rolled away, we might have said that the eiruv is invalid because it is not near him, but if a pile of rocks fell on the eiruv, since it is near him, you might say that it should be a valid eiruv, as one does not actually have to eat the eiruv.
וְאִי תְּנָא ״נָפַל עָלָיו גַּל״ — מִשּׁוּם דְּמִיכַּסֵּי. אֲבָל נִתְגַּלְגֵּל, זִימְנִין דְּאָתֵי זִיקָא וּמַיְיתֵי לֵיהּ — אֵימָא לֶיהֱוֵי עֵירוּב צְרִיכָא.
And conversely, if the mishna had only taught the case where a pile of rocks fell on the eiruv, we might have said that the eiruv is invalid because it is covered, but in the case where it rolled away, since sometimes a wind comes and brings it back, you might say that it should be a valid eiruv. Therefore, it was necessary to teach both cases.
אוֹ נִשְׂרַף, תְּרוּמָה וְנִטְמֵאת. לְמָה לִי? תְּנָא נִשְׂרַף —
The mishna further states: Or if the eiruv was burnt, or if the eiruv was teruma that became ritually impure before Shabbat, it is not a valid eiruv. The Gemara asks: Why do I need to teach these two cases? The essential point of both cases is the same: The eiruv is no longer fit to be eaten. The Gemara answers: The mishna taught the case where the eiruv was burnt
לְהוֹדִיעֲךָ כֹּחוֹ דְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי. תְּנָא תְּרוּמָה וְנִטְמֵאת — לְהוֹדִיעֲךָ כֹּחוֹ דְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר.
to convey the far-reaching nature of Rabbi Yosei’s statement, as he is lenient in a case of uncertainty whether the eiruv was burnt the previous day or only after nightfall, even though the eiruv is now entirely destroyed. Additionally, the mishna taught the case of teruma that became ritually impure to convey the far-reaching nature of Rabbi Meir’s statement, as he is stringent even though the teruma itself is still present, and there is only an uncertainty about when it became impure.
וְסָבַר רַבִּי מֵאִיר סְפֵיקָא לְחוּמְרָא? וְהָתְנַן: טָמֵא שֶׁיָּרַד לִטְבּוֹל, סָפֵק טָבַל סָפֵק לֹא טָבַל; וַאֲפִילּוּ טָבַל — סָפֵק טָבַל בְּאַרְבָּעִים סְאָה, סָפֵק לֹא טָבַל בְּאַרְבָּעִים סְאָה; וְכֵן שְׁנֵי מִקְווֹאוֹת — בְּאַחַת יֵשׁ בָּהּ אַרְבָּעִים סְאָה, וּבְאַחַת אֵין בָּהּ אַרְבָּעִים סְאָה; וְטָבַל בְּאַחַת מֵהֶן, וְאֵינוֹ יוֹדֵעַ בְּאֵיזֶה מֵהֶן טָבַל — סְפֵיקוֹ טָמֵא.
The Gemara questions the mishna’s ruling itself: Does Rabbi Meir really hold that in cases of doubt one must be stringent? Didn’t we learn the following in a mishna: If a ritually impure person descended to immerse in a ritual bath, and there is doubt whether he actually immersed or he did not immerse; and even if he certainly immersed, there is doubt whether he immersed in a ritual bath containing forty se’a of water, the minimal amount of water necessary for the ritual bath to be valid, or he did not immerse in forty se’a; and similarly, if there are two adjacent ritual baths, one of which has forty se’a of water in it and is therefore valid, and one of which does not have forty se’a of water in it, and he immersed in one of them, but he does not know in which of them he immersed; in each of these cases, owing to one’s doubt, he remains ritually impure?
בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים — בְּטוּמְאָה חֲמוּרָה.
In what case is this statement, which maintains that in cases of doubt one is considered impure, said? It is said with regard to severe forms of ritual impurity, i.e., those imparted by a primary source of ritual impurity.
אֲבָל בְּטוּמְאָה קַלָּה, כְּגוֹן שֶׁאָכַל אוֹכָלִין טְמֵאִין וְשָׁתָה מַשְׁקִין טְמֵאִין, וְהַבָּא רֹאשׁוֹ וְרוּבּוֹ בְּמַיִם שְׁאוּבִין, אוֹ שֶׁנָּפְלוּ עַל רֹאשׁוֹ וְעַל רוּבּוֹ שְׁלֹשָׁה לוּגִּין מַיִם שְׁאוּבִין, וְיָרַד לִטְבּוֹל; סָפֵק טָבַל סָפֵק לֹא טָבַל; וַאֲפִילּוּ טָבַל — סָפֵק טָבַל בְּאַרְבָּעִים סְאָה, סָפֵק לֹא טָבַל בְּאַרְבָּעִים סְאָה; וְכֵן שְׁנֵי מִקְווֹאוֹת — בְּאַחַת יֵשׁ בָּהּ אַרְבָּעִים סְאָה, וְאַחַת אֵין בָּהּ אַרְבָּעִים סְאָה; וְטָבַל בְּאַחַת מֵהֶן, וְאֵינוֹ יוֹדֵעַ בְּאֵיזֶה מֵהֶן טָבַל — סְפֵיקוֹ טָהוֹר.
However, with regard to lenient forms of ritual impurity imposed only by rabbinic decree, such as one who ate half a half-loaf of impure foods; and similarly, one who drank impure liquids; and one whose head and most of his body came under drawn water, as opposed to spring water or rainwater, in which case the Sages decreed that person to be ritually impure; or if three log of drawn water fell on one’s head and most of his body, in which case the Sages also decreed that person to be impure; and if in any of these cases one descended to immerse himself in a ritual bath to purify himself of the rabbinically decreed impurity, and there is doubt whether he actually immersed or he did not immerse; and even if he certainly immersed, there is doubt whether he immersed in forty se’a of water or he did not immerse in forty se’a; and similarly, if there were two ritual baths, one of which has forty se’a of water in it and one of which does not have forty se’a of water in it, and he immersed in one of them, but he does not know in which of them he immersed; in all of these cases, owing to his doubt, he is ritually pure.
רַבִּי יוֹסֵי מְטַמֵּא.
Rabbi Yosei disagrees and renders him ritually impure. In any event, it is clear that, according to the unattributed mishna, which is generally presumed to reflect the opinion of Rabbi Meir, the halakha is lenient in cases of doubt relating to ritual impurity that is due to rabbinic decree. Why, then, doesn’t Rabbi Meir agree that we should be lenient in cases of doubt relating to an eiruv, which is also of rabbinic origin?
קָסָבַר רַבִּי מֵאִיר: תְּחוּמִין דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא נִינְהוּ.
The Gemara answers: Rabbi Meir holds that the prohibitions relating to Shabbat limits are prohibited by Torah law, and therefore the uncertainties in the mishna involve a Torah prohibition, with regard to which one may not be lenient.
וְסָבַר רַבִּי מֵאִיר תְּחוּמִין דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא?! וְהָא תְּנַן: אִם אֵין יָכוֹל לְהַבְלִיעוֹ, בְּזוֹ אָמַר רַבִּי דּוֹסְתַּאי בַּר יַנַּאי מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי מֵאִיר: שָׁמַעְתִּי שֶׁמְּקַדְּרִין בֶּהָרִים.
The Gemara asks: Does Rabbi Meir really hold that the prohibitions of Shabbat limits are prohibited by Torah law? Didn’t we learn in a mishna: When taking measurements related to Shabbat boundaries, if a fifty-cubit rope is held at either end by two people, the distance between them is deemed to be fifty cubits, even if the distance on the ground is greater, owing to inclines and depressions? If there is a hill or incline between them that cannot be swallowed by the fifty-cubit measuring rope, so that the usual mode of measurement cannot be used, in this situation, Rabbi Dostai said in the name of Rabbi Meir: I heard that we pierce mountains, i.e., we measure the distance as if there were a hole from one side of the hill to the other, so that in effect we measure only the horizontal distance and ignore the differences in elevation.
וְאִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ תְּחוּמִין דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא — מִי מְקַדְּרִין? וְהָא אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן אָמַר רַבָּה בַּר אֲבוּהּ: אֵין מְקַדְּרִין לֹא בְּעָרֵי מִקְלָט, וְלֹא בְּעֶגְלָה עֲרוּפָה — מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהֵן שֶׁל תּוֹרָה.
And if it should enter your mind to say that the prohibitions relating to Shabbat limits are prohibited by Torah law, would it be permitted to pierce the mountains? Didn’t Rav Naḥman say that Rabba bar Avuh said: We may not pierce mountains when measuring the boundaries of cities of refuge nor when measuring which city is closest to a corpse and is therefore obligated to perform the rite of the heifer whose neck is broken, because those laws are from the Torah; therefore, a more stringent policy is used to measure the distances precisely?
לָא קַשְׁיָא: הָא דִידֵיהּ, הָא דְרַבֵּיהּ. דַּיְקָא נָמֵי, דְּקָתָנֵי: ״בְּזוֹ אָמַר רַבִּי דּוֹסְתַּאי בַּר יַנַּאי מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי מֵאִיר: שָׁמַעְתִּי שֶׁמְּקַדְּרִין בֶּהָרִים״. שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ.
The Gemara answers: This is not difficult, as there is no contradiction between the two statements. This statement, according to which Shabbat limits are by Torah law, is his; that statement, in which he is lenient, is his teacher’s. The language of the mishna is also precise according to this explanation, as we learned: In this case, Rabbi Dostai bar Yannai said in the name of Rabbi Meir: I have heard that we pierce mountains. This formulation indicates that Rabbi Meir did not state his own opinion. Rather, he transmitted a ruling that he had heard from his teacher, even though he did not agree with it himself. The Gemara concludes: Indeed, conclude from this that this resolution is correct.
וּרְמִי דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא אַדְּאוֹרָיְיתָא לְרַבִּי מֵאִיר,
The Gemara continues: There is still room to raise a contradiction between one ruling with regard to Torah law and another ruling with regard to Torah law, according to the opinion of Rabbi Meir.
דִּתְנַן: נָגַע בְּאֶחָד בַּלַּיְלָה, וְאֵינוֹ יוֹדֵעַ אִם חַי אִם מֵת, וּלְמָחָר הִשְׁכִּים וּמְצָאוֹ מֵת. רַבִּי מֵאִיר מְטַהֵר וַחֲכָמִים מְטַמְּאִין, שֶׁכׇּל הַטֻּמְאוֹת כִּשְׁעַת מְצִיאָתָן.
As we learned in a mishna: If one touched one other person at night, and he does not know whether the person he touched was alive or dead, and the following day he arose and found him dead, and he is in doubt as to whether or not he contracted ritual impurity as a result of having come into contact with a corpse, Rabbi Meir renders him ritually pure. It is assumed that the deceased was still alive until the point that it is known with certainty that he is dead. And the Rabbis render him ritually impure because it is assumed that all ritually impure items had already been in the same state as they were at the time they were discovered. Just as the deceased was found dead in the morning, so too, it may be presumed that he was dead when he was touched in the middle of the night. Therefore, Rabbi Meir is lenient even with respect to an uncertainty relating to a Torah law, and he holds that a person is presumed to be alive until it is known with certainty that he died. Why, then, is he stringent concerning doubt as to whether the eiruv had already become impure on the previous day or only after nightfall? Here too, one should assume that the eiruv is ritually pure until he knows with certainty that it became defiled, and so the eiruv should be valid, even if Shabbat limits are considered Torah law.
אָמַר רַבִּי יִרְמְיָה: מִשְׁנָתֵנוּ שֶׁהָיָה עָלֶיהָ שֶׁרֶץ כָּל בֵּין הַשְּׁמָשׁוֹת. אִי הָכִי, בְּהָא לֵימָא רַבִּי יוֹסֵי סְפֵק עֵירוּב כָּשֵׁר?!
The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yirmeya said: The mishna is referring to a case where a creeping animal that imparts ritual impurity was on the teruma that was used to establish the eiruv for the entire twilight period. The Gemara asks: If so, in that case, would Rabbi Yosei say that an eiruv whose validity is in doubt is valid? There is no uncertainty in this case.
רַבָּה וְרַב יוֹסֵף דְּאָמְרִי תַּרְוַיְיהוּ: הָכָא בִּשְׁתֵּי כִּיתֵּי עֵדִים עָסְקִינַן, אַחַת אוֹמֶרֶת: מִבְּעוֹד יוֹם נִטְמָאָה, וְאַחַת אוֹמֶרֶת: מִשֶּׁחָשֵׁיכָה.
It was Rabba and Rav Yosef who both said: The doubt here does not result from the facts of the case themselves, but from conflicting testimonies and an inability to decide between them. Here, we are dealing with two sets of witnesses, one of which says: The teruma became impure while it was still day, before the onset of Shabbat; and one of which says: The teruma became impure only after nightfall.
