Eruvin 37
אוֹמֵר: שְׁנֵי לוּגִּין שֶׁאֲנִי עָתִיד לְהַפְרִישׁ הֲרֵי הֵן תְּרוּמָה, עֲשָׂרָה מַעֲשֵׂר רִאשׁוֹן, תִּשְׁעָה מַעֲשֵׂר שֵׁנִי, וּמֵיחֵל וְשׁוֹתֶה מִיָּד — דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה וְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹסְרִין.
may say: Two log of the hundred log present here, which I will separate in the future, when I have finished drinking, shall be the great teruma given to a priest; ten log shall be first tithe; and nine log, which are a tenth of the remaining ninety log, shall be second tithe. He then redeems the second-tithe with money because in its sanctified state second tithe may only be consumed in Jerusalem, and he may then immediately drink the wine, and the wine remaining at the end will be teruma and tithes. One may rely on the principle of retroactive designation and say that when he is finished drinking, the wine that is left becomes retroactively designated as teruma and tithes, such that the wine he drank was permitted for consumption. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. However, Rabbi Yehuda, Rabbi Yosei, and Rabbi Shimon prohibit drinking the wine in this manner. Therefore, it would appear that Rabbi Yehuda rejects the principle of retroactive designation, contrary to the ruling of the mishna and in accordance with the opinion of Ayo.
עוּלָּא אָמַר: לֵיתָא לְאַיּוֹ מִמַּתְנִיתִין. וְאֶלָּא הָא דְּקָתָנֵי: רַבִּי יְהוּדָה וְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹסְרִין —
Ulla also took note of this contradiction between the statements of Rabbi Yehuda, but he said the opposite: The statement of Ayo should not be accepted because it contradicts what is stated in the mishna. The Gemara raises a difficulty: But that which was taught in the Tosefta: Rabbi Yehuda, Rabbi Yosei, and Rabbi Shimon prohibit drinking the wine in this manner, indicates, as was demonstrated above, that Rabbi Yehuda rejects the principle of retroactive designation.
עוּלָּא זוּזֵי זוּזֵי קָתָנֵי: דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר וְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה, רַבִּי יוֹסֵי וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹסְרִין.
Ulla taught the names of the authorities mentioned in the Tosefta dealing with wine in pairs, as follows: The allowance mentioned in the Tosefta is according to the statement of Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda, whereas Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Shimon prohibit drinking the wine in this manner. Therefore, Rabbi Yehuda agrees with Rabbi Meir and accepts the principle of retroactive designation, in accordance with the mishna.
וְסָבַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי אֵין בְּרֵירָה? וְהָתְנַן: רַבִּי יוֹסֵי אוֹמֵר: שְׁתֵּי נָשִׁים שֶׁלָּקְחוּ אֶת קִינֵּיהֶן בְּעֵירוּב, אוֹ שֶׁנָּתְנוּ קִינֵּיהֶן לַכֹּהֵן — אֵיזֶהוּ שֶׁיִּרְצֶה כֹּהֵן יַקְרִיב עוֹלָה, וּלְאֵיזֶה שֶׁיִּרְצֶה יַקְרִיב חַטָּאת!
To this point, it has been accepted that Rabbi Yosei clearly prohibits the procedure described in the Tosefta. Therefore, he apparently rejects the principle of retroactive designation. With regard to this point, the Gemara asks: Does Rabbi Yosei really hold that there is no retroactive designation? Didn’t we learn in a mishna elsewhere that Rabbi Yosei says: If two women took their birds’ nests, pairs of turtledoves or pigeons as purification offerings following childbirth, jointly and without specifying which pair of birds was for which woman, or if they gave their birds’ nests to a priest but did not inform him which birds were consecrated as sin-offerings and which as burnt-offerings, whichever the priest wishes he may offer as a burnt-offering, and whichever he wishes he may offer as a sin-offering. Therefore, Rabbi Yosei must accept the principle of retroactive designation, such that when the priest offers any of the birds as a sacrifice, it is retroactively clarified that the bird had been selected for that woman and as that sacrifice.
אָמַר רַבָּה: הָתָם — כְּשֶׁהִתְנוּ.
Rabba said: There is no proof from there, with regard to retroactive designation, as the mishna there deals with a special case, where the women stipulated from the outset that the priest would decide which bird would be offered for which woman and as what sacrifice.
אִי הָכִי, מַאי לְמֵימְרָא? קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן כִּדְרַב חִסְדָּא, דְּאָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא: אֵין הַקִּינִּין מִתְפָּרְשׁוֹת.
The Gemara asks: If so, what need was there for the mishna to say anything? If they made an explicit stipulation to that effect, then the priest certainly has the power to fulfill their condition. The Gemara answers: The mishna nonetheless teaches us that the law is in accordance with the opinion of Rav Ḥisda, as Rav Ḥisda said: Birds’ nests become designated as burnt-offerings or sin-offerings only
אֶלָּא אִי בִּלְקִיחַת בְּעָלִים, אִי בַּעֲשִׂיַּית כֹּהֵן.
when they are purchased by their owner, if the owner explicitly consecrated it as a burnt-offering or sin-offering when he purchased it, or through the actions of the priest when he offers the birds as sacrifices. Therefore, even if the women did not verbalize their intentions, it is considered as if they had made a stipulation from the outset. Therefore, this case is not an instance of retroactive designation.
וְאַכַּתִּי: סָבַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי אֵין בְּרֵירָה? וְהָתַנְיָא: עַם הָאָרֶץ שֶׁאָמַר לְחָבֵר ״קַח לִי אֲגוּדָּה אַחַת שֶׁל יָרָק אוֹ גְּלוּסְקָא אַחַת״ — אֵינוֹ צָרִיךְ לְעַשֵּׂר, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יוֹסֵי.
And still the question may be raised: Does Rabbi Yosei really hold that there is no retroactive designation? Wasn’t it taught in a baraita: If an am ha’aretz, who is not known to be scrupulous in separating tithes, said to a ḥaver, one known to be meticulous in his observance of halakha and especially the laws of teruma and tithes, before the ḥaver went to the market to buy himself vegetables from another am ha’aretz: Buy for me as well a bundle of vegetables or a cake [geluska], the ḥaver does not need to tithe the food that he gives to the am ha’aretz. The only reason the food needs to be tithed is because it is demai, and an am ha’aretz is not particular about that issue. This is the statement of Rabbi Yosei. It can be deduced from this ruling that Rabbi Yosei accepts the principle of retroactive designation, as the ḥaver purchased bundles of vegetables without specifying which was for himself and which was for the am ha’aretz, and when he gave one to the am ha’aretz, it became retroactively clear that he had purchased that bundle for the am ha’aretz from the start, and therefore he does not need to separate tithes from it as demai.
וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: צָרִיךְ לְעַשֵּׂר. אֵיפוֹךְ.
And the Rabbis say: He must tithe it. Since we do not accept the principle of retroactive designation, everything that the ḥaver bought was bought for himself, and the fact that he later gave part of it to the am ha’aretz does not exempt him from his original obligation to separate tithes from the demai. In any case, it seems that Rabbi Yosei’s opinion in this baraita contradicts his opinion in the Tosefta cited above with regard to wine. The Gemara answers: Reverse the opinions in the baraita and say that according to Rabbi Yosei he must tithe the produce he gives to the am ha’aretz, while the Rabbis permit him to proceed without tithing.
תָּא שְׁמַע, הָאוֹמֵר: ״מַעֲשֵׂר שֶׁיֵּשׁ לִי בְּבֵיתִי מְחוּלָּל עַל סֶלַע שֶׁתַּעֲלֶה בְּיָדִי מִן הַכִּיס״. רַבִּי יוֹסֵי אוֹמֵר: מְחוּלָּל!
The Gemara attempts to bring another proof. Come and hear a proof from a different Tosefta: In the case of one who says: The second tithe that I have in my house shall be redeemed upon the sela coin that will happen to come up in my hand when I remove it from the pouch, i.e., he did not have a particular coin in mind, Rabbi Yosei says: The second tithe is redeemed. When the coin is removed from the pouch, it is retroactively clarified that this is the coin that he had in his mind from the outset. This indicates that Rabbi Yosei accepts the principle of retroactive designation.
אֵיפוֹךְ, אֵימָא: רַבִּי יוֹסֵי אוֹמֵר: לֹא חִילֵּל. וּמַאי חֲזֵית דְּאָפְכַתְּ תַּרְתֵּי מִקַּמֵּי חֲדָא, אֵיפוֹךְ חֲדָא מִקַּמֵּי תַּרְתֵּי!
The Gemara answers again: Reverse the attributions, and say that Rabbi Yosei says: He has not redeemed the second tithe. The Gemara raises a difficulty: What did you see that you reversed two sources because of one, and made the two baraitot conform to the mishna, which indicates that Rabbi Yosei holds that there is no retroactive designation? Perhaps I should reverse one source, i.e., the mishna, because of the two baraitot and say that in fact Rabbi Yosei accepts the principle of retroactive designation, and it is the lone source that indicates otherwise that must be revised.
הָא וַדַּאי אִיפְּכָא תַּנְיָא, דְּקָתָנֵי סֵיפָא: וּמוֹדֶה רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּאוֹמֵר ״מַעֲשֵׂר שֶׁיֵּשׁ לִי בְּתוֹךְ בֵּיתִי יְהֵא מְחוּלָּל עַל סֶלַע חֲדָשָׁה שֶׁתַּעֲלֶה בְּיָדִי מִן הַכִּיס״ — שֶׁחִילֵּל. מִדְּקָאָמַר הָכָא שֶׁחִילֵּל, מִכְּלָל דְּהָתָם — לֹא חִילֵּל.
The Gemara answers: This Tosefta was certainly taught in reverse, as the latter clause states: And Rabbi Yosei concedes with regard to one who says: The second tithe that I have in my house shall be redeemed with the new sela coin that will happen to come up in my hand when I remove it from the pouch, that he has redeemed the second tithe. The Gemara makes the following inference: From the fact that it said here that he has redeemed the second tithe, it can be proven by inference that there, in the first clause of the Tosefta, he did not redeem the second tithe. Therefore, the wording found in the earlier part of the baraita is clearly incorrect and must be reversed.
הַאי סֶלַע חֲדָשָׁה הֵיכִי דָּמֵי? אִי דְּאִיכָּא תַּרְתֵּי תְּלָת, דְּיֵשׁ בְּרֵירָה — הַיְינוּ קַמַּיְיתָא? אֶלָּא דְּלֵיכָּא אֶלָּא חֲדָא — מַאי ״תַּעֲלֶה״?
The Gemara raises a question with regard to the halakha cited in the Tosefta: This new sela, what are its circumstances? If it is referring to a situation where there are two or three coins in his pouch, so that it is not clear which coin he is referring to, and there is the possibility of retroactive designation, this is exactly the same as the first case. Why does he rule here, as opposed to the earlier case, that there is retroactive designation? Rather, it must refer to a situation where he has only one coin in his pouch. But if so, what is the meaning of the expression: Will happen to come up?
אַיְּידֵי דְּתָנֵי רֵישָׁא ״תַּעֲלֶה״, תְּנָא סֵיפָא נָמֵי ״תַּעֲלֶה״.
The Gemara answers: In fact, it is referring to a case where one has only one coin in his pouch, and the wording of the latter clause is imprecise. Since the first clause taught the halakha using this expression: Will happen to come up, the latter clause also taught the halakha using this same expression: Will happen to come up, even though he was referring to the only new coin that he has in his pouch.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבָא לְרַב נַחְמָן: מַאן הַאי תַּנָּא דַּאֲפִילּוּ בִּדְרַבָּנַן לֵית לֵיהּ בְּרֵירָה? דְּתַנְיָא: אָמַר לַחֲמִשָּׁה הֲרֵינִי מְעָרֵב עַל אֵיזֶה מִכֶּם שֶׁאֶרְצֶה, רָצִיתִי — יֵלֵךְ, לֹא רָצִיתִי — לֹא יֵלֵךְ. רָצָה מִבְּעוֹד יוֹם — עֵירוּבוֹ עֵירוּב, מִשֶּׁחָשֵׁיכָה — אֵין עֵירוּבוֹ עֵירוּב.
Rava said to Rav Naḥman: Who is this tanna who does not accept the principle of retroactive designation even concerning rabbinic decrees? As it was taught in a baraita: If one person said to five people: I am hereby establishing an eiruv for whichever one of you I will choose, so that the person I have chosen will be able to walk two thousand cubits from the spot of the eiruv, whereas whomever I have not chosen will not be able to walk two thousand cubits from the location of the eiruv, the following distinction applies: If he chose the person for whom he was making the eiruv before Shabbat, while it was still day, his eiruv is a valid eiruv; but if he only chose him after nightfall, his eiruv is not a valid eiruv. The tanna of this baraita apparently rejects the principle of retroactive designation, even with regard to rabbinic enactments, as if that were not the case, the eiruv should be valid even if he only chose the person for whom he was making the eiruv after nightfall.
אִישְׁתִּיק, וְלָא אֲמַר לֵיהּ וְלָא מִידֵּי. וְלֵימָא לֵיהּ תַּנָּא דְּבֵי אַיּוֹ הוּא! לָא שְׁמִיעַ לֵיהּ.
Rav Naḥman was silent and did not say anything to Rava. The Gemara asks: And let Rav Naḥman say to him that the baraita is the opinion of a Sage of the school of Ayo, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, which maintains that even with regard to an eiruv there is no retroactive designation. The Gemara answers: He did not accept Ayo’s version of Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion and considered it incorrect.
רַב יוֹסֵף אָמַר: תַּנָּאֵי שָׁקְלַתְּ מֵעָלְמָא? תַּנָּאֵי הִיא! דְּתַנְיָא: הֲרֵינִי מְעָרֵב לְשַׁבָּתוֹת שֶׁל כׇּל הַשָּׁנָה, רָצִיתִי — אֵלֵךְ, לֹא רָצִיתִי — לֹא אֵלֵךְ. רָצָה מִבְּעוֹד יוֹם — עֵירוּבוֹ עֵירוּב. מִשֶּׁחָשֵׁיכָה, רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: עֵירוּבוֹ עֵירוּב, וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: אֵין עֵירוּבוֹ עֵירוּב.
Rav Yosef said, in his unique style: Have you removed the tanna’im from the world? Is there no tanna who holds this position? The possibility of retroactive designation with regard to rabbinic enactments is a dispute among tanna’im, as it was taught in a baraita: One said: I am hereby establishing an eiruv for the Shabbatot of the entire year, so that if I want to make use of it, I will be able to walk two thousand cubits from the eiruv, and if I do not want to do so, I will not walk. If he wanted to make use of the eiruv for a particular Shabbat while it was still day, his eiruv is a valid eiruv for that Shabbat. However, if he only decided after nightfall that he wanted the eiruv to be in effect, the tanna’im disagree: Rabbi Shimon says: His eiruv is a valid eiruv; and the Rabbis say: His eiruv is not a valid eiruv. This indicates that according to the Rabbis there is no retroactive designation, even with regard to eiruvin, while Rabbi Shimon holds that his eiruv is in effect because of the principle of retroactive designation.
וְהָא שָׁמְעִינַן לְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן דְּלֵית לֵיהּ בְּרֵירָה, קַשְׁיָא דְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אַדְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן! אֶלָּא אֵיפוֹךְ.
The Gemara asks: Didn’t we hear that Rabbi Shimon does not accept the principle of retroactive designation in the case of wine from Kutim? The contradiction between one ruling of Rabbi Shimon and another ruling of Rabbi Shimon himself is difficult. The Gemara answers: Rather, reverse the opinions and say that it is Rabbi Shimon who holds that his eiruv is not valid, and therefore he can be identified as the tanna who holds that there is no retroactive designation at all, even with regard to rabbinic decrees.
מַאי קַשְׁיָא? דִּילְמָא כִּי לֵית לֵיהּ לְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בְּרֵירָה — בִּדְאוֹרָיְיתָא, אֲבָל בִּדְרַבָּנַן — אִית לֵיהּ!
The Gemara asks: What is the difficulty here? Perhaps it is with regard to Torah law that Rabbi Shimon does not accept the principle of retroactive designation, but with regard to rabbinic decrees, he does accept the principle of retroactive designation. Therefore, it is not necessary to reverse the opinions.
קָסָבַר רַב יוֹסֵף: מַאן דְּאִית לֵיהּ בְּרֵירָה, לָא שְׁנָא בִּדְאוֹרָיְיתָא, לָא שְׁנָא בִּדְרַבָּנַן — אִית לֵיהּ. וּמַאן דְּלֵית לֵיהּ בְּרֵירָה, לָא שְׁנָא בִּדְאוֹרָיְיתָא וְלָא שְׁנָא בִּדְרַבָּנַן — לֵית לֵיהּ.
The Gemara answers: Rav Yosef holds that one who accepts the principle of retroactive designation accepts it in all cases; there is no difference between Torah law and rabbinic decrees. And one who does not accept the principle of retroactive designation does not accept it at all; there is no difference between Torah law and rabbinic decrees.
רָבָא אָמַר: שָׁאנֵי הָתָם, דְּבָעֵינַן ״רֵאשִׁית שֶׁשְּׁיָרֶיהָ נִיכָּרִין״.
Rava said: The distinction between the case of the wine and the other cases is not related to the principle of retroactive designation. Rather, there, the case of the wine of a Kuti, is different, as we require that the teruma be the first of your produce, whose remnants are recognizable. Since teruma is called the first, if it is not clear which portion was separated and which portion is left over, the designation of part of the wine as teruma is not effective, despite the fact that Rabbi Shimon accepts the principle of retroactive designation.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי: אֶלָּא מֵעַתָּה, הָיוּ לְפָנָיו שְׁנֵי רִמּוֹנִים שֶׁל טֶבֶל, וְאָמַר: אִם יֵרְדוּ גְּשָׁמִים הַיּוֹם יְהֵא זֶה תְּרוּמָה עַל זֶה, וְאִם לֹא יֵרְדוּ גְּשָׁמִים הַיּוֹם יְהֵא זֶה תְּרוּמָה עַל זֶה, הָכִי נָמֵי בֵּין יָרְדוּ בֵּין לֹא יָרְדוּ דְּאֵין בִּדְבָרָיו כְּלוּם?
Abaye said to him: Do you really think that this ruling is correct? But if that is so, if there were two pomegranates that were tevel before him, and he said: If rain falls today, this pomegranate shall be teruma for that other pomegranate, and if rain does not fall today, that second pomegranate shall be teruma for this first one, so too, whether rain fell or did not fall, there is no significance to his statement because the remnants that are not teruma are not immediately recognizable.
וְכִי תֵּימָא הָכִי נָמֵי, וְהָתְנַן: תְּרוּמַת הַכְּרִי הַזֶּה וּמַעְשְׂרוֹתָיו בְּתוֹכוֹ, וּתְרוּמַת מַעֲשֵׂר זֶה בְּתוֹכוֹ. רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: קָרָא הַשֵּׁם!
And if you say that indeed, it is so, there is a difficulty. Didn’t we learn in a mishna that if one says: The teruma of this pile of produce and its tithes shall be inside it, without specifying the location of the produce that he is designating for these purposes, and similarly, if one says about a pile of first-tithe produce: The teruma of this tithe shall be inside it, without specifying the location, Rabbi Shimon says: He has given it a name, i.e., the designation of the teruma and tithes take effect, even though it is impossible to distinguish between them and the permitted portion of the produce? Therefore, it is not necessary for the remnants of the act of separation to be recognizable.
שָׁאנֵי הָתָם — דְּאִיכָּא סְבִיבָיו.
Rava refutes this argument: There, with regard to a pile of produce, it is different because there are recognizable remnants around it. He specified that the teruma should be inside the heap, which indicates that it is in the middle of the pile, and therefore the produce on the perimeter of the pile is certainly not teruma, and some of the remnants of the act of separation are recognizable.
וְאִי בָּעֵית אֵימָא — כִּדְקָתָנֵי טַעְמָא, אָמְרוּ לוֹ לְרַבִּי מֵאִיר: אִי אַתָּה מוֹדֶה שֶׁמָּא יִבָּקַע הַנּוֹד, וְנִמְצָא זֶה שׁוֹתֶה טְבָלִים לְמַפְרֵעַ! אָמַר לָהֶן: לִכְשֶׁיִּבָּקַע!
And if you wish, you can reconcile the difference between the case of separating teruma from wine and the other cases and say in accordance with the reason that was taught in the case of the wine: The Rabbis said to Rabbi Meir: Don’t you concede that perhaps the leather flask will burst before he manages to separate the teruma, and retroactively this person would have been drinking tevel? Since he never ended up separating teruma, the wine remained tevel all along. Rabbi Meir said to them: When it bursts, I will consider the matter, but presently I am not concerned that the bottle might burst. Therefore, we see that these tanna’im do not disagree about the principle of retroactive designation but over the likelihood that the flask will burst.
וּלְמַאי דִּסְלֵיק אַדַּעְתִּין מֵעִיקָּרָא דְּבָעֵינַן רֵאשִׁית שֶׁשְּׁיָרֶיהָ נִיכָּרִין, מַאי קָאָמְרִי לֵיהּ?
The Gemara now asks: And according to what initially entered our minds, which is that we require teruma that is the first, whose remnants are recognizable what did the Rabbis say to Rabbi Meir about that? That is the objection they should have raised against him.
הָכִי קָאָמְרִי לֵיהּ: לְדִידַן — בָּעִינַן רֵאשִׁית שֶׁשְּׁיָרֶיהָ נִיכָּרִין. לְדִידָךְ —
The Gemara answers: This is what they said to him: According to our own opinion, we require teruma that is the first, whose remnants are recognizable; according to your opinion,
