Can a master sell the potential k’nas (fine) payment that the master would receive in the event that an ox gored his/her slave and killed him? They bring a source to answer the question, but it is inconclusive. There is a debate regarding a half-slave/half-free man who betroths a woman or a man who betroths a woman who is half maidservant/half-free – is the kiddushin valid? Is it the same as one who betroths half a woman or is there reason to distinguish between the cases? If she was betrothed before she was entirely freed and then freed, does the emancipation cancel the kiddushin or complete it? There was a case where they forced an owner to release his half-maidservant/half-free woman. Was it because they held like Rabbi Yochanan ben Broka that also women are commanded to procreate or was it to protect her as men were taking advantage of her since she was unable to be married? The rabbis penalized those who sold their slaves to a Gentile or Jewish owner outside of Israel. Do they need to also give them an emancipation document? If one used a slave as collateral for a loan to a gentile, at what stage is the slave considered freed?
This month’s learning is dedicated to the refuah shleima of our dear friend, Phyllis Hecht, גיטל פעשא בת מאשה רחל by all her many friends who love and admire her. Phyllis’ emuna, strength, and positivity are an inspiration.
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This month’s learning is dedicated to the refuah shleima of our dear friend, Phyllis Hecht, גיטל פעשא בת מאשה רחל by all her many friends who love and admire her. Phyllis’ emuna, strength, and positivity are an inspiration.
Gittin 43
דִּלְמָא מוֹדֶה וּמִיפְּטַר.
Perhaps he will admit his obligation and become exempt from his obligation to pay, for one who admits that he is required to pay a penalty before the court obligates him to pay it is exempt.
וְתִבְּעֵי לְרַבָּנַן – עַד כָּאן לָא קָאָמְרִי רַבָּנַן אֵין אָדָם מַקְנֶה דָּבָר שֶׁלֹּא בָּא לָעוֹלָם – אֶלָּא כְּגוֹן פֵּירוֹת דֶּקֶל, דְּהַשְׁתָּא מִיהָא לֵיתַנְהוּ; אֲבָל הָכָא – הָא קָאֵי שׁוֹר וְהָא קָאֵי עֶבֶד. מַאי?
And you could raise this dilemma according to the opinion of the Rabbis as well, as the Rabbis state that a person cannot transfer ownership of an entity that has not yet come into the world only in a case such as the produce of a date palm, which now, at least, is not in the world. However, here, the ox is standing and the slave is standing, and there is no need for any change in the reality. What is the halakha in this case?
אָמַר רַבִּי אַבָּא, תָּא שְׁמַע: ״וִילִיד בַּיִת״ – מָה תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר? אִם קִנְיַן כֶּסֶף – אוֹכֵל, יְלִיד בַּיִת – לֹא כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן?!
Rabbi Abba said: Come and hear a proof based on a halakhic exposition of the verse that details those who may partake of teruma. The verse states: “But if a priest buys any person, the purchase of his money, he may eat of it; and those who are born in his house, they may eat of his bread” (Leviticus 22:11), and the Sages expound as follows: What is the meaning when the verse states: “And those who are born in his house”? If a slave, who is the purchase of his money, may partake of teruma, then in the case of those slaves who are born to the priest in his house, is it not all the more so that they should be able to partake of teruma?
אִילּוּ כֵּן, הָיִיתִי אוֹמֵר: מָה קִנְיַן כֶּסֶף, שֶׁיֵּשׁ בּוֹ שָׁוֶה כֶּסֶף – אוֹכֵל; אַף יְלִיד בַּיִת, שֶׁיֵּשׁ בּוֹ שָׁוֶה כֶּסֶף – אוֹכֵל; וּמִנַּיִן שֶׁאַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵינוֹ שָׁוֶה כְּלוּם? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״יְלִיד בַּיִת״ – מִכׇּל מָקוֹם.
The baraita continues: If so, if the halakha that a born slave may partake of teruma is derived only due to this a fortiori inference, I would have said: Just as with regard to the purchase of his money it is only one who has monetary value that partakes, so too, with regard to one born in his house, only one who has monetary value partakes. And from where is it derived that the same halakha applies when a born slave is not worth anything, e.g., in the case of a newborn, who cannot perform any labor? The verse states: “Those who are born in his house,” in any case, regardless of their present monetary value.
וַעֲדַיִין אֲנִי אוֹמֵר: יְלִיד בַּיִת, בֵּין שֶׁיֵּשׁ בּוֹ שָׁוֶה כֶּסֶף, בֵּין שֶׁאֵין בּוֹ שָׁוֶה כֶּסֶף – אוֹכֵל; קִנְיַן כֶּסֶף, יֵשׁ בּוֹ שָׁוֶה כֶּסֶף – אוֹכֵל, אֵין בּוֹ שָׁוֶה כֶּסֶף – אֵינוֹ אוֹכֵל; תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״קִנְיַן כַּסְפּוֹ וִילִיד בֵּיתוֹ״ – מָה יְלִיד בַּיִת, אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵינוֹ שָׁוֶה כְּלוּם – אוֹכֵל; אַף קִנְיַן כַּסְפּוֹ, אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵינוֹ שָׁוֶה כְּלוּם – אוֹכֵל.
The baraita continues: And I still say that perhaps one born in the priest’s house may partake of teruma whether he has monetary value or whether he does not have monetary value. But with regard to a slave purchased of the priest’s money, when he has monetary value, he may partake; when he does not have monetary value, he may not partake. The verse states: “The purchase of his money…and those who are born in his house, they may eat of his bread” (Leviticus 22:11). The verse compares the two, indicating: Just as one born in the priest’s house may partake of teruma although he is not worth anything, so too, the purchase of his money may partake of teruma although he is not worth anything. In any event, it is clear from this baraita that it is possible for a slave to have no monetary value.
וְאִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ, עֶבֶד שֶׁמְּכָרוֹ רַבּוֹ לִקְנָס – מָכוּר; מִי אִיכָּא עַבְדָּא דְּלָא מִזְדַּבַּן לִקְנָסָא?! אִין, אִיכָּא עֶבֶד טְרֵפָה.
Rabbi Abba now states his proof. And if it enters your mind to say that a slave whose master sold him to another person only with regard to the penalty is sold, is there a slave that cannot be sold with regard to the penalty? Even if he cannot perform any labor, he still has value in that he can be sold with regard to the penalty. The Gemara answers: Yes, there is the case of a slave who has a wound that will cause him to die within twelve months [tereifa]. Since he will die from an injury that is already present, one would not be required to pay a penalty if one’s ox gored him.
וְהָא חֲזֵי לְמֵיקַם קַמֵּיהּ! בִּמְנֻוּוֹל וּמוּכֵּה שְׁחִין.
The Gemara challenges: But isn’t he fit to stand before his master in honor, even if he cannot perform any other service, so he has some value as a slave? The Gemara answers: This baraita is referring to a slave who is not only a tereifa and for whom there is no penalty, but is also disgusting [menuvval] or afflicted with boils [mukeh sheḥin]. It would not be a display of honor for the slave to stand before the master, and therefore he is worthless. This question of the Gemara remains unresolved.
אִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: מִי שֶׁחֶצְיוֹ עֶבֶד וְחֶצְיוֹ בֶּן חוֹרִין, שֶׁקִּידֵּשׁ בַּת חוֹרִין, מַהוּ? אִם תִּמְצָא לוֹמַר: ״בֶּן יִשְׂרָאֵל שֶׁאָמַר לְבַת יִשְׂרָאֵל: ׳הִתְקַדְּשִׁי לְחֶצְיִי׳ – מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת״ – דְּחַזְיָא לְכוּלֵּיהּ; הָא – לָא חַזְיָא לְכוּלֵּיהּ.
§ A dilemma was raised before the Sages: In the case of one who is a half-slave half-freeman who betrothed a free woman, what is the halakha? The Gemara discusses the elements of this question: If you say that this should be compared to a Jewish man who said to a Jewish woman: Become betrothed to half of me, and the halakha is that she is betrothed, this is because she is fit to marry all of him. However, in this case one could say that she is not fit to marry all of him because he is a half-slave, so it is not a valid betrothal.
וְאִם תִּמְצָא לוֹמַר: ״בֶּן יִשְׂרָאֵל הַמְקַדֵּשׁ חֲצִי אִשָּׁה – אֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת״ – דְּשִׁיֵּיר בְּקִנְיָנוֹ; וְהָא עֶבֶד – לֹא שִׁיֵּיר בְּקִנְיָנוֹ. מַאי?
However, if you say that this should be compared to the case of a Jewish man who betroths half a woman, where the halakha is that she is not betrothed because he left a portion of the woman out of his acquisition, as betrothal acquires a complete woman and not half of a woman, but this slave did not leave any part of her out of his acquisition, as his Jewish half betrothed her fully. What is the halakha in this case?
תָּא שְׁמַע: הֵמִית מִי שֶׁחֶצְיוֹ עֶבֶד וְחֶצְיוֹ בֶּן חוֹרִין – נוֹתֵן חֲצִי קְנָס לְרַבּוֹ, וַחֲצִי כוֹפֶר לְיוֹרְשָׁיו. וְאִי אָמְרַתְּ קִידּוּשָׁיו לָאו קִידּוּשִׁין, יוֹרְשִׁין מְנָא לֵיהּ?
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof based on that which is taught in a baraita: If an ox killed a half-slave half-freeman, then the owner of the ox gives half of a penalty, i.e., fifteen shekels, to his master and half of a ransom, i.e., half of the value of the deceased, to his heirs. And if you say that his betrothal is not a valid betrothal, and the half-slave half-freeman may not marry a woman, then from where does he have heirs? It must be that he may betroth and marry a woman, and as a result he can have heirs.
אָמַר רַב אַדָּא בַּר אַהֲבָה: כְּשֶׁעֲשָׂאוֹ טְרֵפָה; וּמַאי ״יוֹרְשָׁיו״ – נַפְשֵׁיהּ.
Rav Adda bar Ahava says: This is referring to a case where the ox did not actually kill him. Rather, it made him a tereifa, and a tereifa is like a dead person. And what is the meaning of: His heirs? It means the half-slave half-freeman himself.
אָמַר רָבָא, שְׁתֵּי תְּשׁוּבוֹת בַּדָּבָר: חֲדָא – דְּ״יוֹרְשָׁיו״ קָתָנֵי; וְעוֹד – כּוֹפֶר הוּא, וְאָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: כּוֹפֶר אֵין מִשְׁתַּלֵּם אֶלָּא לְאַחַר מִיתָה! אֶלָּא אָמַר רָבָא: רָאוּי לִיטּוֹל, וְאֵין לוֹ.
Rava said that there are two refutations of your statement: One is that it teaches: His heirs, and it is not reasonable to say that this is referring to the victim himself. And furthermore, it is referring to ransom here, and Reish Lakish says: Ransom is paid only after the death of the victim but not while he is still alive, even if he is a tereifa. Rather, Rava says: When the baraita states that half of the ransom is given to his heirs, it means that it is fitting for heirs to take the ransom, but he does not actually have heirs.
אָמַר רָבָא: כְּשֵׁם שֶׁהַמְקַדֵּשׁ חֲצִי אִשָּׁה – אֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת, כָּךְ חֶצְיָהּ שִׁפְחָה וְחֶצְיָהּ בַּת חוֹרִין שֶׁנִּתְקַדְּשָׁה – אֵין קִדּוּשֶׁיהָ קִדּוּשִׁין.
§ Rava says: Just as the halakha is that in the case of one who betroths half a woman, she is not betrothed, so too, if there is a half-maidservant half-free woman who was betrothed, then her betrothal is not a valid betrothal.
דָּרֵשׁ רַבָּה בַּר רַב הוּנָא: כְּשֵׁם שֶׁהַמְקַדֵּשׁ חֲצִי אִשָּׁה – אֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת, כָּךְ חֶצְיָהּ שִׁפְחָה וְחֶצְיָהּ בַּת חוֹרִין שֶׁנִּתְקַדְּשָׁה – אֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת. אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב חִסְדָּא: מִי דָּמֵי? הָתָם שִׁיֵּיר בְּקִנְיָנוֹ, הָכָא לֹא שִׁיֵּיר בְּקִנְיָנוֹ!
The Gemara says: Rabba bar Rav Huna taught this halakha in public: Just as the halakha is that in the case of one who betroths half a woman, she is not betrothed, so too, if there is a half-maidservant half-free woman who was betrothed, then her betrothal is not a valid betrothal. Rav Ḥisda said to him as a question: Are the cases comparable? There, where he betroths half a woman, he leaves a portion of the woman out of his acquisition. That is why the betrothal does not take effect. However, here, she was a half-maidservant half-free woman when he betrothed her, and he did not leave a portion of the woman out of his acquisition, so the betrothal should take effect.
הֲדַר אוֹקֵים רַבָּה בַּר רַב הוּנָא אָמוֹרָא עֲלֵיהּ, וּדְרַשׁ: ״וְהַמַּכְשֵׁלָה הַזֹּאת תַּחַת יָדֶיךָ״ – אֵין אָדָם עוֹמֵד עַל דִּבְרֵי תוֹרָה, אֶלָּא אִם כֵּן נִכְשָׁל בָּהֶן; אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאָמְרוּ הַמְקַדֵּשׁ חֲצִי אִשָּׁה – אֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת, אֲבָל חֶצְיָהּ שִׁפְחָה וְחֶצְיָהּ בַּת חוֹרִין שֶׁנִּתְקַדְּשָׁה – קִדּוּשֶׁיהָ קִדּוּשִׁין. מַאי טַעְמָא? הָתָם שִׁיֵּיר בְּקִנְיָנוֹ, הָכָא לֹא שִׁיֵּיר בְּקִנְיָנוֹ.
Rabba bar Rav Huna went back and placed an interpreter before him so that he could tell the public that he had been wrong, and he interpreted a verse homiletically. The verse states: “And let this stumbling-block be under your hand” (Isaiah 3:6). A person does not understand statements of Torah unless he stumbles in them. Therefore, I retract my previous statement and say that although the Sages said that in the case of one who betroths half a woman, she is not betrothed, however, if there was a half-maidservant half-free woman who was betrothed, then her betrothal is a valid betrothal. What is the reason for the distinction? There, he left a portion of the woman out of his acquisition; here, he did not leave a portion of the woman out of his acquisition.
אָמַר רַב שֵׁשֶׁת: כְּשֵׁם שֶׁהַמְקַדֵּשׁ חֲצִי אִשָּׁה – אֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת, כָּךְ חֶצְיָהּ שִׁפְחָה וְחֶצְיָהּ בַּת חוֹרִין שֶׁנִּתְקַדְּשָׁה – אֵין קִידּוּשֶׁיהָ קִידּוּשִׁין. וְאִם לְחָשְׁךָ אָדָם לוֹמַר: אֵיזוֹ הִיא שִׁפְחָה חֲרוּפָה – זוֹ שֶׁחֶצְיָהּ שִׁפְחָה וְחֶצְיָהּ בַּת חוֹרִין הַמְאוֹרֶסֶת לְעֶבֶד עִבְרִי; אַלְמָא בַּת אִיתְּרוֹסֵי הִיא! אֱמוֹר לוֹ: כְּלָךְ אֵצֶל רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל, שֶׁהוּא אוֹמֵר – בְּשִׁפְחָה כְּנַעֲנִית הַמְאוֹרֶסֶת לְעֶבֶד עִבְרִי.
Rav Sheshet said in response to this: Just as the halakha is that in the case of one who betroths half a woman, she is not betrothed, so too, if there is a half-maidservant half-free woman who was betrothed, then her betrothal is not a valid betrothal. And if a person whispers to you [leḥashekha], saying, based on what was taught in a baraita: Who is the designated maidservant mentioned in the Torah? This is a woman who is a half-maidservant half-free woman who is betrothed to a Hebrew slave, apparently indicating that she can be betrothed, then say to him: Go to the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, for he says that this is not referring to a woman who is a half-slave, but rather to a Canaanite maidservant betrothed to a Hebrew slave.
וְשִׁפְחָה כְּנַעֲנִית בַּת אִיתְּרוֹסֵי הִיא?! אֶלָּא מַאי אִית לָךְ לְמֵימַר, מַאי ״מְאוֹרֶסֶת״ – מְיוּחֶדֶת; הָכָא נָמֵי, מַאי ״מְאוֹרֶסֶת״ – מְיוּחֶדֶת.
Rav Sheshet questions his own statement: But can a Canaanite maidservant be betrothed? Rather, what have you to say: What is the meaning of the word betrothed in the statement of Rabbi Yishmael? It means that she is designated for him, and it is not actual betrothal. Here, also, in the baraita, what does it mean that the Canaanite maidservant is betrothed to a Hebrew slave? It means that she is designated to cohabit with him, but they are not in fact betrothed.
אָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא: חֶצְיָהּ שִׁפְחָה וְחֶצְיָהּ בַּת חוֹרִין שֶׁנִּתְקַדְּשָׁה לִרְאוּבֵן, וְנִשְׁתַּחְרְרָה, וְחָזְרָה וְנִתְקַדְּשָׁה לְשִׁמְעוֹן, וּמֵתוּ שְׁנֵיהֶם – מִתְיַיבֶּמֶת לְלֵוִי,
Rav Ḥisda says: If there was a half-maidservant half-free woman who was betrothed to Reuven, and afterward she was emancipated entirely, and she went back and was betrothed to Shimon his brother, and both brothers died without children, then she enters into levirate marriage with Levi, the third brother, because she was considered to be the complete wife of only one of the brothers,
וְאֵין אֲנִי קוֹרֵא בָּהּ אֵשֶׁת שְׁנֵי מֵתִים; מָה נַפְשָׁךְ, אִי קִדּוּשֵׁי דִּרְאוּבֵן קִדּוּשִׁין – קִדּוּשֵׁי דְּשִׁמְעוֹן לָאו קִדּוּשִׁין, וְאִי קִדּוּשֵׁי דְּשִׁמְעוֹן קִדּוּשִׁין – קִדּוּשֵׁי דִּרְאוּבֵן לָאו קִדּוּשִׁין.
and I do not declare her to be the wife of two dead men. The halakha is that a yevama whose requirement for levirate marriage results from marriage to two brothers does not enter into levirate marriage at all. Here, that halakha does not apply, as whichever way you look at it, she was not married to two brothers: If Reuven’s betrothal was a valid betrothal, then Shimon’s betrothal was not a valid betrothal, and she is only Reuven’s widow. And if Shimon’s betrothal was a valid betrothal, it could only be that Reuven’s betrothal was not a valid betrothal. Either way, she had been married to only one of the brothers, and therefore she enters into levirate marriage with the third.
אִיתְּמַר: חֶצְיָהּ שִׁפְחָה וְחֶצְיָהּ בַּת חוֹרִין שֶׁנִּתְקַדְּשָׁה לִרְאוּבֵן, וְנִשְׁתַּחְרְרָה, וְחָזְרָה וְנִתְקַדְּשָׁה לְשִׁמְעוֹן, רַב יוֹסֵף בַּר חָמָא אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן: פָּקְעוּ קִדּוּשֵׁי רִאשׁוֹן; רַבִּי זֵירָא אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן: גָּמְרוּ קִדּוּשֵׁי רִאשׁוֹן.
It was stated: If there was a half-maidservant half-free woman who was betrothed to Reuven, and afterward she was emancipated entirely, and she went back and was betrothed to Shimon, who in this case was not the brother of Reuven, then Rav Yosef bar Ḥama says that Rav Naḥman says: Through her emancipation the first betrothal was entirely abrogated, and the second betrothal takes effect. Rabbi Zeira says that Rav Naḥman says: The first betrothal was completed. Reuven’s betrothal took effect immediately once she was emancipated. Consequently, Shimon’s betrothal did not take effect at all.
אָמַר רַבִּי זֵירָא: כְּווֹתֵיהּ דִּידִי מִסְתַּבְּרָא, דִּכְתִיב: ״לֹא יוּמְתוּ כִּי לֹא חוּפָּשָׁה״ – הָא חוּפָּשָׁה, יוּמְתוּ!
Rabbi Zeira says: It stands to reason in accordance with my opinion, as it is written with regard to one who engages in sexual intercourse with a designated maidservant: “They shall not be put to death, because she was not free” (Leviticus 19:20), and one can infer: But if she was free, then they will be put to death, because she is a married woman. This teaches that her betrothal is complete once she is emancipated.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי: וּלְתָנָא דְּבֵי רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל, דְּאָמַר: בְּשִׁפְחָה כְּנַעֲנִית הַמְאוֹרֶסֶת לְעֶבֶד עִבְרִי; הָכִי נָמֵי דְּכִי חוּפָּשָׁה – יוּמְתוּ?! אֶלָּא מַאי אִית לָךְ לְמֵימַר – שֶׁחוּפְּשָׁה וְחָזְרָה וְנִתְקַדְּשָׁה, הָכָא נָמֵי – שֶׁחוּפְּשָׁה וְחָזְרָה וְנִתְקַדְּשָׁה.
Abaye said to him: And according to the tanna of the school of Rabbi Yishmael, who says: It is referring to a Canaanite maidservant betrothed to a Hebrew slave, so too, will you say that when she is free they are put to death? Once she is free, her betrothal to a Hebrew slave certainly is abrogated. Rather, what have you to say in order to understand the inference from the verse according to Rabbi Yishmael? That is a case where she was free, and she then went back and was betrothed. Here too, even if the verse is discussing a half-maidservant half-free woman, they will be put to death only in a case where she was free and she then went back and was betrothed, but the emancipation itself does not complete her earlier betrothal.
אָמַר רַב הוּנָא בַּר קַטִּינָא אָמַר רַבִּי יִצְחָק: מַעֲשֶׂה בְּאִשָּׁה אַחַת שֶׁחֶצְיָהּ שִׁפְחָה וְחֶצְיָהּ בַּת חוֹרִין, וְכָפוּ אֶת רַבָּהּ וַעֲשָׂאָהּ בַּת חוֹרִין. כְּמַאן? כְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן בֶּן בְּרוֹקָה, דְּאָמַר: עַל שְׁנֵיהֶם הוּא אוֹמֵר: ״וַיְבָרֶךְ אוֹתָם אֱלֹהִים וַיֹּאמֶר וְגוֹ׳ פְּרוּ וּרְבוּ וּמִלְאוּ וְגוֹ׳״
§ Rav Huna bar Ketina says that Rabbi Yitzḥak says: An incident occurred involving one woman who was a half-maidservant half-free woman, and they forced her master to emancipate her, and he made her a free woman. The Gemara asks: In accordance with whose opinion is it? Is it in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka, who says: For both Adam and Eve the verse states: “And God blessed them, and God said to them: Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth and subdue it” (Genesis 1:28), indicating that the mitzva to procreate is incumbent upon women as well, and therefore a half-maidservant half-free woman must be freed to enable her to procreate?
אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק: לֹא, מִנְהַג הֶפְקֵר נָהֲגוּ בָּהּ.
Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: No, it need not be in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka, as the reason that he was forced to emancipate her was because she was unable to marry, and other men took liberties with her, i.e., engaged in intercourse with her. Consequently, the court forced her master to emancipate her so that she could marry.
מַתְנִי׳ הַמּוֹכֵר עַבְדּוֹ לַגּוֹיִם אוֹ לְחוּצָה לָאָרֶץ – יָצָא בֶּן חוֹרִין.
MISHNA: In a case of one who sells his slave to gentiles, or even to a Jew outside of Eretz Yisrael, the slave is emancipated. Since the slave, who is partially obligated in the fulfillment of mitzvot, would be restricted in his ability to fulfill them in his new situation, either because he would be under the authority of a gentile or because he will no longer be in Eretz Yisrael, the Sages penalized his original owner that he should become a freeman, so that if he succeeds in escaping his new owner, he is a full-fledged freeman.
גְּמָ׳ תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: הַמּוֹכֵר עַבְדּוֹ לַגּוֹיִם – יָצָא לְחֵירוּת, וְצָרִיךְ גֵּט שִׁחְרוּר מֵרַבּוֹ רִאשׁוֹן. אָמַר רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל: בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים – שֶׁלֹּא כָּתַב עָלָיו אוֹנוֹ, אֲבָל כָּתַב עָלָיו אוֹנוֹ – זֶהוּ שִׁחְרוּרוֹ.
GEMARA: The Sages taught (Tosefta, Avoda Zara 3:16): In a case of one who sells his slave to gentiles, the slave is emancipated, but nevertheless requires a bill of manumission from his first master. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: In what case is this statement said? When the master did not write a document for him, but if he wrote a document for him, then this is his emancipation and he does not require a bill of manumission.
מַאי ״אוֹנוֹ״? אָמַר רַב שֵׁשֶׁת, דִּכְתַב לֵיהּ הָכִי: לִכְשֶׁתִּבְרַח מִמֶּנּוּ, אֵין לִי עֵסֶק בָּךְ.
The Gemara asks: What is the nature of this document? Rav Sheshet said: He writes to him like this: When you will escape from the gentile, I have no business with you. Even though this is not an explicit bill of manumission, it is sufficient for him to be considered a freeman.
תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: לָוָה עָלָיו מִן הַגּוֹי, כֵּיוָן שֶׁעָשָׂה לוֹ גּוֹי נִמוּסוֹ – יָצָא לְחֵירוּת. מַאי נִמוּסוֹ? אָמַר רַב הוּנָא בַּר יְהוּדָה: נַשְׁקִי.
§ The Sages taught: If he borrows from a gentile on the basis of the slave, i.e., using the slave as collateral so that the creditor can collect the slave in payment of the debt in the event that the debtor defaults, then once the gentile behaves with the slave according to his law [nimmuso], the slave is emancipated, just like a slave who is sold to a gentile. The Gemara asks: What is defined as: His law? The Gemara answers: Rav Huna bar Yehuda said: He places a seal [nashkei] upon him.
מֵתִיב רַב שֵׁשֶׁת: הָאֲרִיסִין, וְהַחֲכִירוֹת, וַאֲרִיסֵי בָּתֵּי אָבוֹת, וְגוֹי שֶׁמִּשְׁכֵּן שָׂדֵהוּ לְיִשְׂרָאֵל; אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁעָשָׂה לוֹ נִמוּסוֹ – פְּטוּרָה מִן הַמַּעֲשֵׂר.
Rav Sheshet raises an objection to this based on a baraita (Tosefta, Terumot 2:11): If there was a field owned by a gentile, but there were Jewish sharecroppers, or Jewish tenant farmers, or Jewish family sharecroppers, i.e., an entire family of sharecroppers who work a field generation after generation; or in the case of a gentile who mortgaged his field to a Jew, then even though the gentile acted for the Jew based on his, the Jew’s, law, the field is exempt from tithes, because the field belongs to a gentile. It is not considered as if it were transferred to the Jew.
וְאִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ נַשְׁקִי, שָׂדֶה בַּת נַשְׁקִי הִיא? אֶלָּא אָמַר רַב שֵׁשֶׁת: זְמַן.
And if it enters your mind that the phrase: His law, means a seal, is a field able to be sealed? Rather, Rav Sheshet says: The expression: He acted for him based on his law, means time. In other words, a deadline was set and if the debt was not paid by the given date the slave would automatically be transferred to the possession of the gentile.
קַשְׁיָא זְמַן אַזְּמַן! לָא קַשְׁיָא: הָא דִּמְטָא זִמְנֵיהּ, הָא דְּלָא מְטָא זִמְנֵיהּ.
The Gemara asks: If that is so, there is a difficulty with regard to the issue of time in the case of the slave and the issue of time in the case of the field. In the case of the slave the halakha is that after the set time, he leaves the debtor’s authority and is emancipated, while in the case of the field its produce does not become obligated to be tithed like the produce of a Jew’s field after that set time. The Gemara answers: This is not difficult, since the following distinction can be made: This, the case of the slave who is emancipated, is referring to when his time to be transferred has arrived, and this, the case of the field, is referring to where its time to be transferred has not yet arrived.
אֶלָּא גַּבֵּי עֶבֶד, דִּמְטָא זִמְנֵיהּ צְרִיכָא לְמֵימַר?! אֶלָּא אִידֵּי וְאִידֵּי דְּלָא מְטָא זִמְנֵיהּ, וְלָא קַשְׁיָא: הָא לְגוּפָא, וְהָא לְפֵירָא.
The Gemara asks: But with regard to a slave whose time to be transferred has arrived, does it need to be said that he is emancipated? Isn’t it obvious that once he is transferred to the authority of the gentile, he is emancipated, just as in the case of a sale? Rather, the Gemara offers a different explanation: This case and that case are referring to when his time to be transferred has not yet arrived, and it is not difficult: This, the case of the slave who is emancipated, is with regard to the slave himself, as the slave himself is to be transferred to the gentile, and that case is with regard to the produce. In other words, the Jewish creditor has the rights to the produce of the field, but he does not take possession of the actual field. Therefore, it remains exempt from tithes.
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Englewood NJ, United States
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Jerusalem, Israel
Inspired by Hadran’s first Siyum ha Shas L’Nashim two years ago, I began daf yomi right after for the next cycle. As to this extraordinary journey together with Hadran..as TS Eliot wrote “We must not cease from exploration and the end of all our exploring will be to arrive where we began and to know the place for the first time.
Jerusalem, Israel
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Huntington, United States
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Edmonton, Alberta, Canada
In July, 2012 I wrote for Tablet about the first all women’s siyum at Matan in Jerusalem, with 100 women. At the time, I thought, I would like to start with the next cycle – listening to a podcast at different times of day makes it possible. It is incredible that after 10 years, so many women are so engaged!
Pittsburgh, United States
Minnesota, United States
תמיד רציתי. למדתי גמרא בבית ספר בטורונטו קנדה. עליתי ארצה ולמדתי שזה לא מקובל. הופתעתי.
יצאתי לגימלאות לפני שנתיים וזה מאפשר את המחוייבות לדף יומי.
עבורי ההתמדה בלימוד מעגן אותי בקשר שלי ליהדות. אני תמיד מחפשת ותמיד. מוצאת מקור לקשר. ללימוד חדש ומחדש. קשר עם נשים לומדות מעמיק את החוויה ומשמעותית מאוד.
מיתר, ישראל
Philadelphia, United States
I began my journey two years ago at the beginning of this cycle of the daf yomi. It has been an incredible, challenging experience and has given me a new perspective of Torah Sh’baal Peh and the role it plays in our lives
Efrat, Israel
I started learning Talmud with R’ Haramati in Yeshivah of Flatbush. But after a respite of 60 years, Rabbanit Michelle lit my fire – after attending the last three world siyumim in Miami Beach, Meadowlands and Boca Raton, and now that I’m retired, I decided – “I can do this!” It has been an incredible journey so far, and I look forward to learning Daf everyday – Mazal Tov to everyone!
Florida, United States
תמיד רציתי. למדתי גמרא בבית ספר בטורונטו קנדה. עליתי ארצה ולמדתי שזה לא מקובל. הופתעתי.
יצאתי לגימלאות לפני שנתיים וזה מאפשר את המחוייבות לדף יומי.
עבורי ההתמדה בלימוד מעגן אותי בקשר שלי ליהדות. אני תמיד מחפשת ותמיד. מוצאת מקור לקשר. ללימוד חדש ומחדש. קשר עם נשים לומדות מעמיק את החוויה ומשמעותית מאוד.
מיתר, ישראל
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Riverdale, NY, United States
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Raanana, Israel
I read Ilana Kurshan’s “If All the Seas Were Ink” which inspired me. Then the Women’s Siyum in Jerusalem in 2020 convinced me, I knew I had to join! I have loved it- it’s been a constant in my life daily, many of the sugiyot connect to our lives. My family and friends all are so supportive. It’s incredible being part of this community and love how diverse it is! I am so excited to learn more!
Jerusalem, Israel
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Teaneck NJ, United States
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Tampa, United States
I started at the beginning of this cycle. No 1 reason, but here’s 5.
In 2019 I read about the upcoming siyum hashas.
There was a sermon at shul about how anyone can learn Talmud.
Talmud references come up when I am studying. I wanted to know more.
Yentl was on telly. Not a great movie but it’s about studying Talmud.
I went to the Hadran website: A new cycle is starting. I’m gonna do this
Cambridge, United Kingdom
I started learning when my brother sent me the news clip of the celebration of the last Daf Yomi cycle. I was so floored to see so many women celebrating that I wanted to be a part of it. It has been an enriching experience studying a text in a language I don’t speak, using background knowledge that I don’t have. It is stretching my learning in unexpected ways, bringing me joy and satisfaction.
Warwick, Rhode Island, United States
Gittin 43
דִּלְמָא מוֹדֶה וּמִיפְּטַר.
Perhaps he will admit his obligation and become exempt from his obligation to pay, for one who admits that he is required to pay a penalty before the court obligates him to pay it is exempt.
וְתִבְּעֵי לְרַבָּנַן – עַד כָּאן לָא קָאָמְרִי רַבָּנַן אֵין אָדָם מַקְנֶה דָּבָר שֶׁלֹּא בָּא לָעוֹלָם – אֶלָּא כְּגוֹן פֵּירוֹת דֶּקֶל, דְּהַשְׁתָּא מִיהָא לֵיתַנְהוּ; אֲבָל הָכָא – הָא קָאֵי שׁוֹר וְהָא קָאֵי עֶבֶד. מַאי?
And you could raise this dilemma according to the opinion of the Rabbis as well, as the Rabbis state that a person cannot transfer ownership of an entity that has not yet come into the world only in a case such as the produce of a date palm, which now, at least, is not in the world. However, here, the ox is standing and the slave is standing, and there is no need for any change in the reality. What is the halakha in this case?
אָמַר רַבִּי אַבָּא, תָּא שְׁמַע: ״וִילִיד בַּיִת״ – מָה תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר? אִם קִנְיַן כֶּסֶף – אוֹכֵל, יְלִיד בַּיִת – לֹא כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן?!
Rabbi Abba said: Come and hear a proof based on a halakhic exposition of the verse that details those who may partake of teruma. The verse states: “But if a priest buys any person, the purchase of his money, he may eat of it; and those who are born in his house, they may eat of his bread” (Leviticus 22:11), and the Sages expound as follows: What is the meaning when the verse states: “And those who are born in his house”? If a slave, who is the purchase of his money, may partake of teruma, then in the case of those slaves who are born to the priest in his house, is it not all the more so that they should be able to partake of teruma?
אִילּוּ כֵּן, הָיִיתִי אוֹמֵר: מָה קִנְיַן כֶּסֶף, שֶׁיֵּשׁ בּוֹ שָׁוֶה כֶּסֶף – אוֹכֵל; אַף יְלִיד בַּיִת, שֶׁיֵּשׁ בּוֹ שָׁוֶה כֶּסֶף – אוֹכֵל; וּמִנַּיִן שֶׁאַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵינוֹ שָׁוֶה כְּלוּם? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״יְלִיד בַּיִת״ – מִכׇּל מָקוֹם.
The baraita continues: If so, if the halakha that a born slave may partake of teruma is derived only due to this a fortiori inference, I would have said: Just as with regard to the purchase of his money it is only one who has monetary value that partakes, so too, with regard to one born in his house, only one who has monetary value partakes. And from where is it derived that the same halakha applies when a born slave is not worth anything, e.g., in the case of a newborn, who cannot perform any labor? The verse states: “Those who are born in his house,” in any case, regardless of their present monetary value.
וַעֲדַיִין אֲנִי אוֹמֵר: יְלִיד בַּיִת, בֵּין שֶׁיֵּשׁ בּוֹ שָׁוֶה כֶּסֶף, בֵּין שֶׁאֵין בּוֹ שָׁוֶה כֶּסֶף – אוֹכֵל; קִנְיַן כֶּסֶף, יֵשׁ בּוֹ שָׁוֶה כֶּסֶף – אוֹכֵל, אֵין בּוֹ שָׁוֶה כֶּסֶף – אֵינוֹ אוֹכֵל; תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״קִנְיַן כַּסְפּוֹ וִילִיד בֵּיתוֹ״ – מָה יְלִיד בַּיִת, אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵינוֹ שָׁוֶה כְּלוּם – אוֹכֵל; אַף קִנְיַן כַּסְפּוֹ, אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵינוֹ שָׁוֶה כְּלוּם – אוֹכֵל.
The baraita continues: And I still say that perhaps one born in the priest’s house may partake of teruma whether he has monetary value or whether he does not have monetary value. But with regard to a slave purchased of the priest’s money, when he has monetary value, he may partake; when he does not have monetary value, he may not partake. The verse states: “The purchase of his money…and those who are born in his house, they may eat of his bread” (Leviticus 22:11). The verse compares the two, indicating: Just as one born in the priest’s house may partake of teruma although he is not worth anything, so too, the purchase of his money may partake of teruma although he is not worth anything. In any event, it is clear from this baraita that it is possible for a slave to have no monetary value.
וְאִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ, עֶבֶד שֶׁמְּכָרוֹ רַבּוֹ לִקְנָס – מָכוּר; מִי אִיכָּא עַבְדָּא דְּלָא מִזְדַּבַּן לִקְנָסָא?! אִין, אִיכָּא עֶבֶד טְרֵפָה.
Rabbi Abba now states his proof. And if it enters your mind to say that a slave whose master sold him to another person only with regard to the penalty is sold, is there a slave that cannot be sold with regard to the penalty? Even if he cannot perform any labor, he still has value in that he can be sold with regard to the penalty. The Gemara answers: Yes, there is the case of a slave who has a wound that will cause him to die within twelve months [tereifa]. Since he will die from an injury that is already present, one would not be required to pay a penalty if one’s ox gored him.
וְהָא חֲזֵי לְמֵיקַם קַמֵּיהּ! בִּמְנֻוּוֹל וּמוּכֵּה שְׁחִין.
The Gemara challenges: But isn’t he fit to stand before his master in honor, even if he cannot perform any other service, so he has some value as a slave? The Gemara answers: This baraita is referring to a slave who is not only a tereifa and for whom there is no penalty, but is also disgusting [menuvval] or afflicted with boils [mukeh sheḥin]. It would not be a display of honor for the slave to stand before the master, and therefore he is worthless. This question of the Gemara remains unresolved.
אִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: מִי שֶׁחֶצְיוֹ עֶבֶד וְחֶצְיוֹ בֶּן חוֹרִין, שֶׁקִּידֵּשׁ בַּת חוֹרִין, מַהוּ? אִם תִּמְצָא לוֹמַר: ״בֶּן יִשְׂרָאֵל שֶׁאָמַר לְבַת יִשְׂרָאֵל: ׳הִתְקַדְּשִׁי לְחֶצְיִי׳ – מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת״ – דְּחַזְיָא לְכוּלֵּיהּ; הָא – לָא חַזְיָא לְכוּלֵּיהּ.
§ A dilemma was raised before the Sages: In the case of one who is a half-slave half-freeman who betrothed a free woman, what is the halakha? The Gemara discusses the elements of this question: If you say that this should be compared to a Jewish man who said to a Jewish woman: Become betrothed to half of me, and the halakha is that she is betrothed, this is because she is fit to marry all of him. However, in this case one could say that she is not fit to marry all of him because he is a half-slave, so it is not a valid betrothal.
וְאִם תִּמְצָא לוֹמַר: ״בֶּן יִשְׂרָאֵל הַמְקַדֵּשׁ חֲצִי אִשָּׁה – אֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת״ – דְּשִׁיֵּיר בְּקִנְיָנוֹ; וְהָא עֶבֶד – לֹא שִׁיֵּיר בְּקִנְיָנוֹ. מַאי?
However, if you say that this should be compared to the case of a Jewish man who betroths half a woman, where the halakha is that she is not betrothed because he left a portion of the woman out of his acquisition, as betrothal acquires a complete woman and not half of a woman, but this slave did not leave any part of her out of his acquisition, as his Jewish half betrothed her fully. What is the halakha in this case?
תָּא שְׁמַע: הֵמִית מִי שֶׁחֶצְיוֹ עֶבֶד וְחֶצְיוֹ בֶּן חוֹרִין – נוֹתֵן חֲצִי קְנָס לְרַבּוֹ, וַחֲצִי כוֹפֶר לְיוֹרְשָׁיו. וְאִי אָמְרַתְּ קִידּוּשָׁיו לָאו קִידּוּשִׁין, יוֹרְשִׁין מְנָא לֵיהּ?
The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof based on that which is taught in a baraita: If an ox killed a half-slave half-freeman, then the owner of the ox gives half of a penalty, i.e., fifteen shekels, to his master and half of a ransom, i.e., half of the value of the deceased, to his heirs. And if you say that his betrothal is not a valid betrothal, and the half-slave half-freeman may not marry a woman, then from where does he have heirs? It must be that he may betroth and marry a woman, and as a result he can have heirs.
אָמַר רַב אַדָּא בַּר אַהֲבָה: כְּשֶׁעֲשָׂאוֹ טְרֵפָה; וּמַאי ״יוֹרְשָׁיו״ – נַפְשֵׁיהּ.
Rav Adda bar Ahava says: This is referring to a case where the ox did not actually kill him. Rather, it made him a tereifa, and a tereifa is like a dead person. And what is the meaning of: His heirs? It means the half-slave half-freeman himself.
אָמַר רָבָא, שְׁתֵּי תְּשׁוּבוֹת בַּדָּבָר: חֲדָא – דְּ״יוֹרְשָׁיו״ קָתָנֵי; וְעוֹד – כּוֹפֶר הוּא, וְאָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: כּוֹפֶר אֵין מִשְׁתַּלֵּם אֶלָּא לְאַחַר מִיתָה! אֶלָּא אָמַר רָבָא: רָאוּי לִיטּוֹל, וְאֵין לוֹ.
Rava said that there are two refutations of your statement: One is that it teaches: His heirs, and it is not reasonable to say that this is referring to the victim himself. And furthermore, it is referring to ransom here, and Reish Lakish says: Ransom is paid only after the death of the victim but not while he is still alive, even if he is a tereifa. Rather, Rava says: When the baraita states that half of the ransom is given to his heirs, it means that it is fitting for heirs to take the ransom, but he does not actually have heirs.
אָמַר רָבָא: כְּשֵׁם שֶׁהַמְקַדֵּשׁ חֲצִי אִשָּׁה – אֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת, כָּךְ חֶצְיָהּ שִׁפְחָה וְחֶצְיָהּ בַּת חוֹרִין שֶׁנִּתְקַדְּשָׁה – אֵין קִדּוּשֶׁיהָ קִדּוּשִׁין.
§ Rava says: Just as the halakha is that in the case of one who betroths half a woman, she is not betrothed, so too, if there is a half-maidservant half-free woman who was betrothed, then her betrothal is not a valid betrothal.
דָּרֵשׁ רַבָּה בַּר רַב הוּנָא: כְּשֵׁם שֶׁהַמְקַדֵּשׁ חֲצִי אִשָּׁה – אֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת, כָּךְ חֶצְיָהּ שִׁפְחָה וְחֶצְיָהּ בַּת חוֹרִין שֶׁנִּתְקַדְּשָׁה – אֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת. אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב חִסְדָּא: מִי דָּמֵי? הָתָם שִׁיֵּיר בְּקִנְיָנוֹ, הָכָא לֹא שִׁיֵּיר בְּקִנְיָנוֹ!
The Gemara says: Rabba bar Rav Huna taught this halakha in public: Just as the halakha is that in the case of one who betroths half a woman, she is not betrothed, so too, if there is a half-maidservant half-free woman who was betrothed, then her betrothal is not a valid betrothal. Rav Ḥisda said to him as a question: Are the cases comparable? There, where he betroths half a woman, he leaves a portion of the woman out of his acquisition. That is why the betrothal does not take effect. However, here, she was a half-maidservant half-free woman when he betrothed her, and he did not leave a portion of the woman out of his acquisition, so the betrothal should take effect.
הֲדַר אוֹקֵים רַבָּה בַּר רַב הוּנָא אָמוֹרָא עֲלֵיהּ, וּדְרַשׁ: ״וְהַמַּכְשֵׁלָה הַזֹּאת תַּחַת יָדֶיךָ״ – אֵין אָדָם עוֹמֵד עַל דִּבְרֵי תוֹרָה, אֶלָּא אִם כֵּן נִכְשָׁל בָּהֶן; אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאָמְרוּ הַמְקַדֵּשׁ חֲצִי אִשָּׁה – אֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת, אֲבָל חֶצְיָהּ שִׁפְחָה וְחֶצְיָהּ בַּת חוֹרִין שֶׁנִּתְקַדְּשָׁה – קִדּוּשֶׁיהָ קִדּוּשִׁין. מַאי טַעְמָא? הָתָם שִׁיֵּיר בְּקִנְיָנוֹ, הָכָא לֹא שִׁיֵּיר בְּקִנְיָנוֹ.
Rabba bar Rav Huna went back and placed an interpreter before him so that he could tell the public that he had been wrong, and he interpreted a verse homiletically. The verse states: “And let this stumbling-block be under your hand” (Isaiah 3:6). A person does not understand statements of Torah unless he stumbles in them. Therefore, I retract my previous statement and say that although the Sages said that in the case of one who betroths half a woman, she is not betrothed, however, if there was a half-maidservant half-free woman who was betrothed, then her betrothal is a valid betrothal. What is the reason for the distinction? There, he left a portion of the woman out of his acquisition; here, he did not leave a portion of the woman out of his acquisition.
אָמַר רַב שֵׁשֶׁת: כְּשֵׁם שֶׁהַמְקַדֵּשׁ חֲצִי אִשָּׁה – אֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת, כָּךְ חֶצְיָהּ שִׁפְחָה וְחֶצְיָהּ בַּת חוֹרִין שֶׁנִּתְקַדְּשָׁה – אֵין קִידּוּשֶׁיהָ קִידּוּשִׁין. וְאִם לְחָשְׁךָ אָדָם לוֹמַר: אֵיזוֹ הִיא שִׁפְחָה חֲרוּפָה – זוֹ שֶׁחֶצְיָהּ שִׁפְחָה וְחֶצְיָהּ בַּת חוֹרִין הַמְאוֹרֶסֶת לְעֶבֶד עִבְרִי; אַלְמָא בַּת אִיתְּרוֹסֵי הִיא! אֱמוֹר לוֹ: כְּלָךְ אֵצֶל רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל, שֶׁהוּא אוֹמֵר – בְּשִׁפְחָה כְּנַעֲנִית הַמְאוֹרֶסֶת לְעֶבֶד עִבְרִי.
Rav Sheshet said in response to this: Just as the halakha is that in the case of one who betroths half a woman, she is not betrothed, so too, if there is a half-maidservant half-free woman who was betrothed, then her betrothal is not a valid betrothal. And if a person whispers to you [leḥashekha], saying, based on what was taught in a baraita: Who is the designated maidservant mentioned in the Torah? This is a woman who is a half-maidservant half-free woman who is betrothed to a Hebrew slave, apparently indicating that she can be betrothed, then say to him: Go to the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, for he says that this is not referring to a woman who is a half-slave, but rather to a Canaanite maidservant betrothed to a Hebrew slave.
וְשִׁפְחָה כְּנַעֲנִית בַּת אִיתְּרוֹסֵי הִיא?! אֶלָּא מַאי אִית לָךְ לְמֵימַר, מַאי ״מְאוֹרֶסֶת״ – מְיוּחֶדֶת; הָכָא נָמֵי, מַאי ״מְאוֹרֶסֶת״ – מְיוּחֶדֶת.
Rav Sheshet questions his own statement: But can a Canaanite maidservant be betrothed? Rather, what have you to say: What is the meaning of the word betrothed in the statement of Rabbi Yishmael? It means that she is designated for him, and it is not actual betrothal. Here, also, in the baraita, what does it mean that the Canaanite maidservant is betrothed to a Hebrew slave? It means that she is designated to cohabit with him, but they are not in fact betrothed.
אָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא: חֶצְיָהּ שִׁפְחָה וְחֶצְיָהּ בַּת חוֹרִין שֶׁנִּתְקַדְּשָׁה לִרְאוּבֵן, וְנִשְׁתַּחְרְרָה, וְחָזְרָה וְנִתְקַדְּשָׁה לְשִׁמְעוֹן, וּמֵתוּ שְׁנֵיהֶם – מִתְיַיבֶּמֶת לְלֵוִי,
Rav Ḥisda says: If there was a half-maidservant half-free woman who was betrothed to Reuven, and afterward she was emancipated entirely, and she went back and was betrothed to Shimon his brother, and both brothers died without children, then she enters into levirate marriage with Levi, the third brother, because she was considered to be the complete wife of only one of the brothers,
וְאֵין אֲנִי קוֹרֵא בָּהּ אֵשֶׁת שְׁנֵי מֵתִים; מָה נַפְשָׁךְ, אִי קִדּוּשֵׁי דִּרְאוּבֵן קִדּוּשִׁין – קִדּוּשֵׁי דְּשִׁמְעוֹן לָאו קִדּוּשִׁין, וְאִי קִדּוּשֵׁי דְּשִׁמְעוֹן קִדּוּשִׁין – קִדּוּשֵׁי דִּרְאוּבֵן לָאו קִדּוּשִׁין.
and I do not declare her to be the wife of two dead men. The halakha is that a yevama whose requirement for levirate marriage results from marriage to two brothers does not enter into levirate marriage at all. Here, that halakha does not apply, as whichever way you look at it, she was not married to two brothers: If Reuven’s betrothal was a valid betrothal, then Shimon’s betrothal was not a valid betrothal, and she is only Reuven’s widow. And if Shimon’s betrothal was a valid betrothal, it could only be that Reuven’s betrothal was not a valid betrothal. Either way, she had been married to only one of the brothers, and therefore she enters into levirate marriage with the third.
אִיתְּמַר: חֶצְיָהּ שִׁפְחָה וְחֶצְיָהּ בַּת חוֹרִין שֶׁנִּתְקַדְּשָׁה לִרְאוּבֵן, וְנִשְׁתַּחְרְרָה, וְחָזְרָה וְנִתְקַדְּשָׁה לְשִׁמְעוֹן, רַב יוֹסֵף בַּר חָמָא אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן: פָּקְעוּ קִדּוּשֵׁי רִאשׁוֹן; רַבִּי זֵירָא אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן: גָּמְרוּ קִדּוּשֵׁי רִאשׁוֹן.
It was stated: If there was a half-maidservant half-free woman who was betrothed to Reuven, and afterward she was emancipated entirely, and she went back and was betrothed to Shimon, who in this case was not the brother of Reuven, then Rav Yosef bar Ḥama says that Rav Naḥman says: Through her emancipation the first betrothal was entirely abrogated, and the second betrothal takes effect. Rabbi Zeira says that Rav Naḥman says: The first betrothal was completed. Reuven’s betrothal took effect immediately once she was emancipated. Consequently, Shimon’s betrothal did not take effect at all.
אָמַר רַבִּי זֵירָא: כְּווֹתֵיהּ דִּידִי מִסְתַּבְּרָא, דִּכְתִיב: ״לֹא יוּמְתוּ כִּי לֹא חוּפָּשָׁה״ – הָא חוּפָּשָׁה, יוּמְתוּ!
Rabbi Zeira says: It stands to reason in accordance with my opinion, as it is written with regard to one who engages in sexual intercourse with a designated maidservant: “They shall not be put to death, because she was not free” (Leviticus 19:20), and one can infer: But if she was free, then they will be put to death, because she is a married woman. This teaches that her betrothal is complete once she is emancipated.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי: וּלְתָנָא דְּבֵי רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל, דְּאָמַר: בְּשִׁפְחָה כְּנַעֲנִית הַמְאוֹרֶסֶת לְעֶבֶד עִבְרִי; הָכִי נָמֵי דְּכִי חוּפָּשָׁה – יוּמְתוּ?! אֶלָּא מַאי אִית לָךְ לְמֵימַר – שֶׁחוּפְּשָׁה וְחָזְרָה וְנִתְקַדְּשָׁה, הָכָא נָמֵי – שֶׁחוּפְּשָׁה וְחָזְרָה וְנִתְקַדְּשָׁה.
Abaye said to him: And according to the tanna of the school of Rabbi Yishmael, who says: It is referring to a Canaanite maidservant betrothed to a Hebrew slave, so too, will you say that when she is free they are put to death? Once she is free, her betrothal to a Hebrew slave certainly is abrogated. Rather, what have you to say in order to understand the inference from the verse according to Rabbi Yishmael? That is a case where she was free, and she then went back and was betrothed. Here too, even if the verse is discussing a half-maidservant half-free woman, they will be put to death only in a case where she was free and she then went back and was betrothed, but the emancipation itself does not complete her earlier betrothal.
אָמַר רַב הוּנָא בַּר קַטִּינָא אָמַר רַבִּי יִצְחָק: מַעֲשֶׂה בְּאִשָּׁה אַחַת שֶׁחֶצְיָהּ שִׁפְחָה וְחֶצְיָהּ בַּת חוֹרִין, וְכָפוּ אֶת רַבָּהּ וַעֲשָׂאָהּ בַּת חוֹרִין. כְּמַאן? כְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן בֶּן בְּרוֹקָה, דְּאָמַר: עַל שְׁנֵיהֶם הוּא אוֹמֵר: ״וַיְבָרֶךְ אוֹתָם אֱלֹהִים וַיֹּאמֶר וְגוֹ׳ פְּרוּ וּרְבוּ וּמִלְאוּ וְגוֹ׳״
§ Rav Huna bar Ketina says that Rabbi Yitzḥak says: An incident occurred involving one woman who was a half-maidservant half-free woman, and they forced her master to emancipate her, and he made her a free woman. The Gemara asks: In accordance with whose opinion is it? Is it in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka, who says: For both Adam and Eve the verse states: “And God blessed them, and God said to them: Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth and subdue it” (Genesis 1:28), indicating that the mitzva to procreate is incumbent upon women as well, and therefore a half-maidservant half-free woman must be freed to enable her to procreate?
אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק: לֹא, מִנְהַג הֶפְקֵר נָהֲגוּ בָּהּ.
Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: No, it need not be in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka, as the reason that he was forced to emancipate her was because she was unable to marry, and other men took liberties with her, i.e., engaged in intercourse with her. Consequently, the court forced her master to emancipate her so that she could marry.
מַתְנִי׳ הַמּוֹכֵר עַבְדּוֹ לַגּוֹיִם אוֹ לְחוּצָה לָאָרֶץ – יָצָא בֶּן חוֹרִין.
MISHNA: In a case of one who sells his slave to gentiles, or even to a Jew outside of Eretz Yisrael, the slave is emancipated. Since the slave, who is partially obligated in the fulfillment of mitzvot, would be restricted in his ability to fulfill them in his new situation, either because he would be under the authority of a gentile or because he will no longer be in Eretz Yisrael, the Sages penalized his original owner that he should become a freeman, so that if he succeeds in escaping his new owner, he is a full-fledged freeman.
גְּמָ׳ תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: הַמּוֹכֵר עַבְדּוֹ לַגּוֹיִם – יָצָא לְחֵירוּת, וְצָרִיךְ גֵּט שִׁחְרוּר מֵרַבּוֹ רִאשׁוֹן. אָמַר רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל: בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים – שֶׁלֹּא כָּתַב עָלָיו אוֹנוֹ, אֲבָל כָּתַב עָלָיו אוֹנוֹ – זֶהוּ שִׁחְרוּרוֹ.
GEMARA: The Sages taught (Tosefta, Avoda Zara 3:16): In a case of one who sells his slave to gentiles, the slave is emancipated, but nevertheless requires a bill of manumission from his first master. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: In what case is this statement said? When the master did not write a document for him, but if he wrote a document for him, then this is his emancipation and he does not require a bill of manumission.
מַאי ״אוֹנוֹ״? אָמַר רַב שֵׁשֶׁת, דִּכְתַב לֵיהּ הָכִי: לִכְשֶׁתִּבְרַח מִמֶּנּוּ, אֵין לִי עֵסֶק בָּךְ.
The Gemara asks: What is the nature of this document? Rav Sheshet said: He writes to him like this: When you will escape from the gentile, I have no business with you. Even though this is not an explicit bill of manumission, it is sufficient for him to be considered a freeman.
תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: לָוָה עָלָיו מִן הַגּוֹי, כֵּיוָן שֶׁעָשָׂה לוֹ גּוֹי נִמוּסוֹ – יָצָא לְחֵירוּת. מַאי נִמוּסוֹ? אָמַר רַב הוּנָא בַּר יְהוּדָה: נַשְׁקִי.
§ The Sages taught: If he borrows from a gentile on the basis of the slave, i.e., using the slave as collateral so that the creditor can collect the slave in payment of the debt in the event that the debtor defaults, then once the gentile behaves with the slave according to his law [nimmuso], the slave is emancipated, just like a slave who is sold to a gentile. The Gemara asks: What is defined as: His law? The Gemara answers: Rav Huna bar Yehuda said: He places a seal [nashkei] upon him.
מֵתִיב רַב שֵׁשֶׁת: הָאֲרִיסִין, וְהַחֲכִירוֹת, וַאֲרִיסֵי בָּתֵּי אָבוֹת, וְגוֹי שֶׁמִּשְׁכֵּן שָׂדֵהוּ לְיִשְׂרָאֵל; אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁעָשָׂה לוֹ נִמוּסוֹ – פְּטוּרָה מִן הַמַּעֲשֵׂר.
Rav Sheshet raises an objection to this based on a baraita (Tosefta, Terumot 2:11): If there was a field owned by a gentile, but there were Jewish sharecroppers, or Jewish tenant farmers, or Jewish family sharecroppers, i.e., an entire family of sharecroppers who work a field generation after generation; or in the case of a gentile who mortgaged his field to a Jew, then even though the gentile acted for the Jew based on his, the Jew’s, law, the field is exempt from tithes, because the field belongs to a gentile. It is not considered as if it were transferred to the Jew.
וְאִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ נַשְׁקִי, שָׂדֶה בַּת נַשְׁקִי הִיא? אֶלָּא אָמַר רַב שֵׁשֶׁת: זְמַן.
And if it enters your mind that the phrase: His law, means a seal, is a field able to be sealed? Rather, Rav Sheshet says: The expression: He acted for him based on his law, means time. In other words, a deadline was set and if the debt was not paid by the given date the slave would automatically be transferred to the possession of the gentile.
קַשְׁיָא זְמַן אַזְּמַן! לָא קַשְׁיָא: הָא דִּמְטָא זִמְנֵיהּ, הָא דְּלָא מְטָא זִמְנֵיהּ.
The Gemara asks: If that is so, there is a difficulty with regard to the issue of time in the case of the slave and the issue of time in the case of the field. In the case of the slave the halakha is that after the set time, he leaves the debtor’s authority and is emancipated, while in the case of the field its produce does not become obligated to be tithed like the produce of a Jew’s field after that set time. The Gemara answers: This is not difficult, since the following distinction can be made: This, the case of the slave who is emancipated, is referring to when his time to be transferred has arrived, and this, the case of the field, is referring to where its time to be transferred has not yet arrived.
אֶלָּא גַּבֵּי עֶבֶד, דִּמְטָא זִמְנֵיהּ צְרִיכָא לְמֵימַר?! אֶלָּא אִידֵּי וְאִידֵּי דְּלָא מְטָא זִמְנֵיהּ, וְלָא קַשְׁיָא: הָא לְגוּפָא, וְהָא לְפֵירָא.
The Gemara asks: But with regard to a slave whose time to be transferred has arrived, does it need to be said that he is emancipated? Isn’t it obvious that once he is transferred to the authority of the gentile, he is emancipated, just as in the case of a sale? Rather, the Gemara offers a different explanation: This case and that case are referring to when his time to be transferred has not yet arrived, and it is not difficult: This, the case of the slave who is emancipated, is with regard to the slave himself, as the slave himself is to be transferred to the gentile, and that case is with regard to the produce. In other words, the Jewish creditor has the rights to the produce of the field, but he does not take possession of the actual field. Therefore, it remains exempt from tithes.
