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Today's Daf Yomi

February 4, 2016 | 讻状讛 讘砖讘讟 转砖注状讜

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Joanna Rom and Steven Goldberg in loving memory of Steve's mother Shirley "Nana" Goldberg (Sura Tema bat Chaim v'Hanka)

Gittin 53

Is damage that can’t be seen considered damage?

Study Guide Gittin 53

讛讬讬谞讜 诪讚诪注

is the same as mixing teruma with non-sacred produce, as both involve intermingling that which is forbidden with that which is permitted, so that the entire mixture becomes forbidden. There is no difference between these actions, so there would be no need to mention both of them in the mishna.

讜讗讬讚讱 拽谞住讗 讛讜讗 讜诪拽谞住讗 诇讗 讬诇驻讬谞谉

And the other Sage, Shmuel, holds that one who mixes teruma with another person鈥檚 non-sacred produce is liable for a fine. And we do not derive a fine in one case from a fine stated in another case, even if the two cases are similar. Consequently, liability for the fine must be mentioned separately for each case.

讜诇诪讗谉 讚讬诇讬祝 拽谞住讗 诪拽谞住讗 讻诇 讛谞讬 诇诪讛 诇讬

The Gemara asks: And according to the one who says that we do derive a fine in one case from a fine in another case, why do I need all these cases mentioned in the mishna, i.e., one who renders another person鈥檚 food ritually impure, one who mixes teruma with another鈥檚 non-sacred produce, and one who pours another person鈥檚 wine in a rite of idolatry?

爪专讬讻讗 讚讗讬 转谞讗 诪讟诪讗 讗讬 转专讜诪讛 讛讜讛 讗诪讬谞讗 诪砖讜诐 讚拽讗 诪驻住讬讚 诇讛 诇讙诪专讬 讜讗讬 诪讟诪讗 讞讜诇讬谉 诪砖讜诐 讚讗住讜专 诇讙专讜诐 讟讜诪讗讛 诇讞讜诇讬谉 砖讘讗专抓 讬砖专讗诇 讗讘诇 诪讚诪注 讗讬诪讗 诇讗

The Gemara answers: All three rulings are necessary, as, had the mishna taught only the case of one who renders another鈥檚 food impure, there are two possibilities: If it is referring to one who renders another鈥檚 teruma non-sacred, then I would say that they imposed a penalty because he ruined it entirely, as it can no longer be consumed by anyone, neither a priest nor an ordinary Israelite. And if it is referring to one who renders another鈥檚 non-sacred food impure, then I would say the fine is imposed because it is prohibited to cause impurity to non-sacred food in Eretz Yisrael. But in the case of one who mixes teruma with another鈥檚 non-sacred produce, since he neither caused a substantial loss, as the mixture can still be sold to a priest, nor spread impurity in Eretz Yisrael, one might say that a fine is not imposed upon him.

讜讗讬 讗砖诪注讬谞谉 诪讚诪注 诪砖讜诐 讚砖讻讬讞 讗讘诇 诪讟诪讗 讚诇讗 砖讻讬讞 讗讬诪讗 诇讗

And had the mishna taught us only the case of one who mixes teruma with another person鈥檚 non-sacred produce, I would say that a fine is imposed in that case, because mixing two different items together is a common occurrence. But concerning one who renders another person鈥檚 food impure, which is uncommon, one might say that a fine is not imposed, as the Sages did not impose penalties in uncommon cases.

讜讗讬 讗砖诪注讬谞谉 诪讟诪讗 讜诪讚诪注 诪砖讜诐 讚诇讗 拽讬诐 诇讬讛 讘讚专讘讛 诪讬谞讬讛

And had the mishna taught us both the case of one who renders another person鈥檚 food impure and the case of one who mixes teruma with another person鈥檚 non-sacred produce, I would say that fines are imposed in both those cases, because there is no application of the principle that one who has committed two transgressions with a single act, each carrying its own punishment, receives the greater punishment of the two. Neither of these actions carries a punishment beyond paying the fine.

讗讘诇 诪谞住讱 讚拽讬诐 诇讬讛 讘讚专讘讛 诪讬谞讬讛 讗讬诪讗 诇讗 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 讻讚专讘讬 讬专诪讬讛

But concerning one who pours another person鈥檚 wine as a libation before an idol, where one does apply the principle that one who has committed two transgressions with a single act receives the greater punishment of the two for which he is liable, as he is liable to receive court imposed capital punishment for having transgressed the prohibition against idolatry, I would say that a fine is not imposed. Therefore, the mishna teaches us that he is in fact liable to pay the fine. And the reason for this is in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Yirmeya, that since he acquired the wine from the moment he lifted it, he became liable to pay the fine before he became liable to receive court imposed capital punishment, and therefore he is subject to both punishments.

讜诇讛讗 讚转谞讬 讗讘讜讛 讚专讘讬 讗讘讬谉 讘专讗砖讜谞讛 讛讬讜 讗讜诪专讬诐 讛诪讟诪讗 讜讛诪谞住讱 讞讝专讜 诇讜诪专 讗祝 讛诪讚诪注 讻诇 讛谞讬 诇诪讛 诇讬

The Gemara asks: And according to this version of the halakha that the father of Rabbi Avin taught (Tosefta 4:5): Initially the Sages would say that one who renders another person鈥檚 food impure and one who pours another鈥檚 wine as a libation before an idol are subject to a fine, and later they returned to say that even one who mixes teruma with another person鈥檚 non-sacred produce is liable to pay a fine, why do I need all these cases? In this version, the halakha of one who mixes was added later. After the halakhot concerning one who renders another person鈥檚 food impure and one who pours another鈥檚 wine were taught, why could the halakha of one who mixes not be derived from those halakhot?

爪专讬讻讗 讚讗讬 讗砖诪注讬谞谉 诪讟诪讗 诪砖讜诐 讚诇讗 拽讬诐 诇讬讛 讘讚专讘讛 诪讬谞讬讛 讗讘诇 诪谞住讱 讚拽讬诐 诇讬讛 讘讚专讘讛 诪讬谞讬讛 讗讬诪讗 诇讗

The Gemara answers: All three rulings are necessary, as, had the baraita in the Tosefta taught us only the case of one who renders another person鈥檚 food impure, I would say that a fine is imposed, because there is no application of the principle that one who has committed two transgressions with a single act, each carrying its own punishment, receives the greater punishment of the two. But with regard to one who pours another鈥檚 wine as a rite in idolatry, where one does apply the principle that one who has committed two transgressions with a single act receives the greater punishment of the two for which he is liable, one might say that a fine is not imposed.

讜讗讬 讗砖诪注讬谞谉 诪谞住讱 诪砖讜诐 讚拽讗 诪驻住讬讚 诇讬讛 诇讙诪专讬 讗讘诇 诪讟诪讗 讚诇讗 诪驻住讬讚 诇讬讛 诇讙诪专讬 讗讬诪讗 诇讗

And had the baraita taught us only the case of one who pours another鈥檚 wine as a libation before an idol, I would say that they imposed a penalty because he ruined it entirely, as it is now prohibited for one to derive any benefit from it whatsoever. But for one who renders another person鈥檚 food impure, which does not ruin it entirely, as one may derive benefit from it, e.g., by using it as fuel while it is being burned or by feeding it to his animal, one might say that a fine is not imposed.

讜讗讬 讗砖诪注讬谞谉 讛谞讬 转专转讬 诪砖讜诐 讚讛驻住讚 诪专讜讘讛 讗讘诇 诪讚诪注 讚讛驻住讚 诪讜注讟 讗讬诪讗 诇讗 爪专讬讻讗

And had the baraita taught us only these two cases, I would say that here they imposed fines because in each case there is a substantial loss. But with regard to one who mixes teruma with another person鈥檚 non-sacred produce, where the loss he causes is minimal because the owner can still sell the mixture to priests at the price of teruma, one might say that a penalty is not imposed. Therefore, all three rulings are necessary.

讗诪专 讞讝拽讬讛 讚讘专 转讜专讛 讗讞讚 砖讜讙讙 讜讗讞讚 诪讝讬讚 讞讬讬讘 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讛讬讝拽 砖讗讬谞讜 谞讬讻专 砖诪讬讛 讛讬讝拽

搂 The mishna teaches: If one unintentionally committed one of these offenses, either rendering another鈥檚 food impure, mixing teruma with another鈥檚 produce, or pouring another鈥檚 wine before an idol, he is exempt from paying for the damage. If he acted intentionally, he is liable to pay. 岣zkiyya says: By Torah law, one who commits one of the offenses listed in the mishna, whether he did so unintentionally or intentionally, is liable to pay for the damage he caused, like any other person who causes damage. What is the reason for this? The reason is that even damage that is not evident is categorized as damage. One is liable for damage not only when the damage is evident, i.e., when he causes a change in the item鈥檚 physical state, but also when the damage is not evident, i.e., when he causes a reduction in the item鈥檚 value due to a change in its halakhic status, e.g., when he renders it impure.

讜诪讛 讟注诐 讗诪专讜 讘砖讜讙讙 驻讟讜专 讻讚讬 砖讬讜讚讬注讜

And what is the reason that the Sages said that if he committed one of these acts unintentionally he is exempt? This is so that the one who caused the damage will inform the injured party about what happened. If a fine were imposed even in a case where the damage is caused unintentionally, there would be a concern that the guilty party might not report the damage so as to avoid the penalty. In such a situation the injured party will not know what happened, as the damage is not evident, and he will inadvertently use that which has become impure, mixed with teruma, or poured before an idol.

讗讬 讛讻讬 讗驻讬诇讜 讘诪讝讬讚 谞诪讬 讛砖转讗 诇讗讜讝讜拽讬 拽讗 诪讻讜讬谉 讗讜讚讜注讬 诇讗 诪讜讚注 诇讬讛

The Gemara asks: If it is so that there is a concern about this, then he should be exempt from liability even if he committed one of these offenses intentionally, so that he will inform the owner of the item. The Gemara answers: Now, since it was his intention to cause him damage, will he not inform him? If he does not tell him, the other person will never know that he suffered damage. Consequently, he will certainly inform him of what he did and that his property is now subject to a prohibition, and there is no concern that the injured party will inadvertently come to transgress the prohibition. This is 岣zkiyya鈥檚 opinion.

讜专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗诪专 讚讘专 转讜专讛 讗讞讚 砖讜讙讙 讜讗讞讚 诪讝讬讚 驻讟讜专 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讛讬讝拽 砖讗讬谞讜 谞讬讻专 诇讗 砖诪讬讛 讛讬讝拽 讜诪讛 讟注诐 讗诪专讜 讘诪讝讬讚 讞讬讬讘 砖诇讗 讬讛讗 讻诇 讗讞讚 讜讗讞讚 讛讜诇讱 讜诪讟诪讗 讟讛专讜转讬讜 砖诇 讞讘讬专讜 讜讗讜诪专 驻讟讜专 讗谞讬

And Rabbi Yo岣nan says: By Torah law, one who commits one of the offenses listed in the mishna, whether he did so unintentionally or intentionally, is exempt from liability for the damage he caused. What is the reason for this? The reason is that damage that is not evident is not categorized as damage. And what is the reason that the Sages said that if he committed one of these acts intentionally he is liable? This is so that each and every person who has a grievance with his neighbor and wishes to cause him harm should not go and render impure the other person鈥檚 pure foods, and say: I am exempt from liability.

转谞谉 讛讻讛谞讬诐 砖驻讙诇讜 讘诪拽讚砖 诪讝讬讚讬诐 讞讬讬讘讬谉 讜转谞讬 注诇讛 诪驻谞讬 转讬拽讜谉 讛注讜诇诐

The Gemara raises an objection to the opinion of 岣zkiyya from what we learned in a mishna (54b): With regard to priests who disqualified an offering through improper intention in the Temple, by expressing, while sacrificing the offering, the intention of sprinkling the blood of the offering, burning its fats on the altar, or consuming it after its appointed time, if they did so intentionally, they are liable to pay the value of the offering to its owner, who must now bring another offering. And it is taught with regard to this mishna that the Sages instituted this obligation for the betterment of the world, so that priests should not act in this manner toward people to whom they wish to cause harm.

讜讗讬 讗诪专转 讛讬讝拽 砖讗讬谞讜 谞讬讻专 砖诪讬讛 讛讬讝拽 讛讗讬 砖讜讙讙讬谉 驻讟讜专讬谉 诪驻谞讬 转讬拽讜谉 讛注讜诇诐 诪讬讘注讬 诇讬讛

And if you say that damage that is not evident is nevertheless categorized as damage, it should have said that if they acted unintentionally they are exempt due to the betterment of the world. This is because according to 岣zkiyya, if they acted intentionally they should be liable by Torah law for the damage they caused, and not by rabbinic ordinance instituted for the betterment of the world.

讛讻讬 谞诪讬 拽讗诪专 诪讝讬讚讬谉 讞讬讬讘讬谉 讛讗 砖讜讙讙讬谉 驻讟讜专讬谉 诪驻谞讬 转讬拽讜谉 讛注讜诇诐

The Gemara answers: That is also what the tanna is saying, and the mishna should be understood as follows: If they acted intentionally, they are liable, but if they acted unintentionally, they are exempt. And the reason that they are exempt is for the betterment of the world.

诪转讬讘 专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讛注讜砖讛 诪诇讗讻讛 讘诪讬 讞讟讗转 讜讘驻专转 讞讟讗转 驻讟讜专 诪讚讬谞讬 讗讚诐 讜讞讬讬讘 讘讚讬谞讬 砖诪讬诐 讜讗讬 讗诪专转 讛讬讝拽 砖讗讬谞讜 谞讬讻专 砖诪讬讛 讛讬讝拽 讘讚讬谞讬 讗讚诐 谞诪讬 诇讞讬讬讘

Rabbi Elazar raised an objection based on what was taught: With regard to one who performs a task with the water of purification, i.e., water that is to be mixed with the ashes of the red heifer, which was used to purify people and objects that had contracted ritual impurity by contact with a corpse, or performed labor with the red heifer of purification, and by doing so he disqualifies it, he is exempt according to human laws but is liable according to the laws of Heaven. And if you say that damage that is not evident is nevertheless categorized as damage, then according to human laws he should also be liable.

讛讜讗 诪讜转讬讘 诇讛 讜讛讜讗 诪驻专拽 诇讛 驻专讛 砖讛讻谞讬住讛 诇专讘拽讛 注诇 诪谞转 砖转讬谞拽 讜转讚讜砖 诪讬 讞讟讗转 砖砖拽诇 讘讛谉 诪砖拽诇讜转

The Gemara comments that he, Rabbi Elazar, raised the objection and subsequently he himself resolved it: That which they said, that he performed labor with the red heifer, means that he placed it in a pen [lirvaka] so that it would nurse from its mother and would incidentally thresh, meaning that his action is not defined as having the heifer perform labor. And that which they said, that he performed a task with the water of purification, means that he weighed weights with the water, which is not an actual task performed with the water.

讜讛讗诪专 专讘讗 诪讬 讞讟讗转

The Gemara asks: But doesn鈥檛 Rava say: Water of purification

砖砖拽诇 讘讛谉 诪砖拽诇讜转 讻砖专讛 诇讗 拽砖讬讗 讛讗 讘讙讜驻谉 讛讗 讘讻谞讙讚谉

with which he weighed weights is fit? The Gemara answers: It is not difficult: This baraita is referring to a case where he weighs an object with the water itself, and therefore the water is disqualified. And this statement of Rava鈥檚, that the water is fit, is referring to a case where he weighs an object against the water.

讘讙讜驻谉 诪注砖讛 拽讗 注讘讬讚 讘讛讜 讜讗讬 讛讬讝拽 砖讗讬谞讜 谞讬讻专 砖诪讬讛 讛讬讝拽 讘讚讬谞讬 讗讚诐 谞诪讬 诇讞讬讬讘 讗诇讗 讗讬讚讬 讜讗讬讚讬 讘讻谞讙讚谉 讜诇讗 拽砖讬讗 讛讗 讚讗住讞 讚注转讬讛 讛讗 讚诇讗 讗住讞 讚注转讬讛

The Gemara asks: If he weighs an object with the water itself, then he performs a real task with it, and if damage that is not evident is nevertheless categorized as damage, then he should also be liable according to human laws to pay for performing a task with the water. Rather, it is necessary to say that both this and that refer to a case where he weighed an object against the water, and still it is not difficult: This baraita is referring to a case where in the course of the weighing the object his attention was diverted from guarding the water, and owing to this lapse in attention the water became disqualified. And that statement of Rava鈥檚 is referring to a case where his attention was not diverted, and therefore the water did not become disqualified.

诪转讬讘 专讘 驻驻讗 讙讝诇 诪讟讘注 讜谞驻住诇 转专讜诪讛 讜谞讟诪讗转 讞诪抓 讜注讘专 注诇讬讜 讛驻住讞 讗讜诪专 诇讜 讛专讬 砖诇讱 诇驻谞讬讱

Rav Pappa raises an objection against 岣zkiyya鈥檚 opinion from that which is taught in a baraita: If one robbed another of a coin and afterward the coin was rendered invalid by the government, or if he robbed another of teruma and it became ritually impure, or if he robbed another of leavened bread and Passover then elapsed over it, rendering it forbidden, in each of these cases the robber can return the item and say to the robbery victim: That which is yours is before you. Since the robber returned the stolen item, he is not required to compensate the victim of the robbery for his monetary loss, although the stolen items are currently of minimal or no value.

讜讗讬 讗诪专转 讛讬讝拽 砖讗讬谞讜 谞讬讻专 砖诪讬讛 讛讬讝拽 讛讗讬 讙讝诇谉 讛讜讗 诪诪讜谞讗 诪注诇讬讗 讘注讬 砖诇讜诪讬 转讬讜讘转讗

And if you say that damage that is not evident is categorized as damage, then this man is a robber, and he should be required to pay full compensation for the damage he caused. The Gemara concludes: This is a conclusive refutation, and the opinion of 岣zkiyya is rejected.

诇讬诪讗 讻转谞讗讬 讛诪讟诪讗 讜讛诪讚诪注 讜讛诪谞住讱 讗讞讚 砖讜讙讙 讜讗讞讚 诪讝讬讚 讞讬讬讘 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讜诪专 讘砖讜讙讙 驻讟讜专 讘诪讝讬讚 讞讬讬讘

The Gemara suggests: Let us say that this amoraic dispute is parallel to a dispute between tanna鈥檌m, as it was taught in a baraita: With regard to one who renders another鈥檚 food ritually impure, or one who mixes teruma with another鈥檚 non-sacred produce, or one who pours another鈥檚 wine as a libation before an idol, whether he did so unintentionally or intentionally, he is liable to pay for the damage he caused; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: If he acted unintentionally, he is exempt; if he acted intentionally, he is liable to pay.

诪讗讬 诇讗讜 讘讛讗 拽诪讬驻诇讙讬 讚诪专 住讘专 讛讬讝拽 砖讗讬谞讜 谞讬讻专 砖诪讬讛 讛讬讝拽 讜诪专 住讘专 诇讗 砖诪讬讛 讛讬讝拽

The Gemara suggests: What, is it not that they disagree about this very issue? As one Sage, Rabbi Meir, holds that damage that is not evident is nevertheless categorized as damage. Consequently, one is liable to pay even if he caused the damage unintentionally. And one Sage, Rabbi Yehuda, holds that such damage is not categorized as damage, and consequently one is liable to pay only if he caused the damage intentionally, as this is a rabbinically instituted fine.

讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讘专 讬爪讞拽 讚讻讜诇讬 注诇诪讗 讛讬讝拽 砖讗讬谞讜 谞讬讻专 诇讗 砖诪讬讛 讛讬讝拽 讜讛讻讗 讘拽谞住讜 砖讜讙讙 讗讟讜 诪讝讬讚 拽讗 诪讬驻诇讙讬 讚诪专 住讘专 拽谞住讜 砖讜讙讙 讗讟讜 诪讝讬讚 讜诪专 住讘专 诇讗 拽谞住讜 砖讜讙讙 讗讟讜 诪讝讬讚

Rav Na岣an bar Yitz岣k said that it is possible to say that everyone, including Rabbi Meir, agrees that damage that is not evident is not categorized as damage. And here, they disagree with regard to this question: Did the Sages penalize an unintentional offender due to an intentional offender? As one Sage, Rabbi Meir, who states that the one who caused the damage is liable even if he acted unintentionally, holds that the Sages penalized an unintentional offender due to an intentional offender. And one Sage, Rabbi Yehuda, who states that one is liable only if he acted intentionally, holds that they did not penalize an unintentional offender due to an intentional offender.

讜专诪讬 讚专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讗讚专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讜专诪讬 讚专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讚专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讚转谞讬讗 讛诪讘砖诇 讘砖讘转 讘砖讜讙讙 讬讗讻诇 讘诪讝讬讚 诇讗 讬讗讻诇 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讜诪专 讘砖讜讙讙 讬讗讻诇 诇诪讜爪讗讬 砖讘转 讘诪讝讬讚 诇讗 讬讗讻诇 注讜诇诪讬转

The Gemara comments: But then it is possible to raise a contradiction between this statement of Rabbi Meir and another statement of Rabbi Meir; and it is also possible to raise a contradiction between this statement of Rabbi Yehuda and another statement of Rabbi Yehuda. The other statements are as it is taught in a baraita (Tosefta, Shabbat 2:5): With regard to one who cooks on Shabbat, if he did so unintentionally, he may eat what he cooked. If he acted intentionally, he may not eat what he cooked; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: If he cooked the food unintentionally, he may eat what he cooked, but only at the conclusion of Shabbat. If he cooked it intentionally, he may never eat what he cooked.

专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讛住谞讚诇专 讗讜诪专 讘砖讜讙讙 讬讗讻诇 诇诪讜爪讗讬 砖讘转 诇讗讞专讬诐 讜诇讗 诇讜 讘诪讝讬讚 诇讗 讬讗讻诇 注讜诇诪讬转 诇讗 诇讜 讜诇讗 诇讗讞专讬诐 拽砖讬讗 讚专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讗讚专讘讬 诪讗讬专 拽砖讬讗 讚专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讚专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛

The baraita continues: Rabbi Yo岣nan HaSandlar says: If he acted unintentionally, what he cooked may be eaten at the conclusion of Shabbat by others, but not by him, as the food is forbidden to him forever. If he cooked the food intentionally, what he cooked may never be eaten, neither by him nor by others. Consequently, there is a contradiction between one statement of Rabbi Meir and the other statement of Rabbi Meir, and there is also a contradiction between one statement of Rabbi Yehuda and the other statement of Rabbi Yehuda.

讚专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讗讚专讘讬 诪讗讬专 诇讗 拽砖讬讗 讻讬 拽谞讬住 讘讚专讘谞谉 讘讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 诇讗 拽谞讬住

The Gemara answers: There is no contradiction between one statement of Rabbi Meir and the other statement of Rabbi Meir, because one can draw a distinction between them. When Rabbi Meir penalizes an offender for even an unintentional offense, it is where the offender violated a rabbinic law, e.g., he rendered food impure. But where he violated a Torah law, e.g., he cooked on Shabbat, he does not penalize him. The reason for this distinction is that people treat Torah prohibitions more seriously, and consequently there is no need to impose a fine for unintentional transgression in order to distance people from the transgression.

讜讛讗 诪谞住讱 讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 讛讜讗 讜拽讗 拽谞讬住 诪砖讜诐 讞讜诪专讗 讚注讘讜讚讛 讝专讛 拽谞住 诇讬讛

The Gemara asks: But isn鈥檛 pouring wine as a libation before an idol prohibited by Torah law, and even so Rabbi Meir penalizes the offender, even if his transgression is unintentional? The Gemara answers: This is an exception to the principle. Due to the severity of the prohibition against idol worship, Rabbi Meir penalizes the offender even if he acts unintentionally.

讚专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讚专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 诇讗 拽砖讬讗 讻讬 诇讗 拽谞讬住 讘讚专讘谞谉 讘讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 拽谞讬住 讜讛讗 诪谞住讱 讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 讜诇讗 拽谞讬住 诪砖讜诐 讞讜诪专讗 讚注讘讜讚讛 讝专讛 诪讬讘讚诇 讘讚讬诇讬 诪讬谞讬讛

The Gemara continues: And there is also no contradiction between one statement of Rabbi Yehuda and the other statement of Rabbi Yehuda. When Rabbi Yehuda does not penalize an offender for an unintentional offense, it is where he violated a rabbinic law. But where he violated a Torah law, he penalizes him even if he transgressed unintentionally, owing to the severity of the transgression. The Gemara asks: But isn鈥檛 pouring wine as a libation before an idol prohibited by Torah law, and even so Rabbi Yehuda does not penalize the offender if he acted unintentionally? The Gemara answers: The argument raised previously can be reversed: Due to the exceptional severity of the prohibition against idol worship people avoid it on their own, and so there is no need to impose a fine for unintentional transgression in order to distance people from it.

讜专诪讬 讚专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讗讚专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讘讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 讚转谞讬讗 讛谞讜讟注 讘砖讘转 讘砖讜讙讙 讬拽讬讬诐 讘诪讝讬讚 讬注拽专 讜讘砖讘讬注讬转 讘讬谉 讘砖讜讙讙 讘讬谉 讘诪讝讬讚 讬注拽专 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 诪讗讬专

The Gemara comments: But then it is possible to raise a contradiction between one statement of Rabbi Meir and another statement of Rabbi Meir even with respect to matters that are prohibited by Torah law, as it is taught in a baraita (Tosefta, Shabbat 2:11): With regard to one who plants a tree on Shabbat, if he does so unintentionally, he may keep the tree. If he acted intentionally, it must be uprooted. And if he planted the tree during the Sabbatical Year, then whether he did so unintentionally or intentionally, it must be uprooted; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir.

专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讜诪专 讘砖讘讬注讬转 讘砖讜讙讙 讬拽讬讬诐 讘诪讝讬讚 讬注拽专 讜讘砖讘转 讘讬谉 讘砖讜讙讙 讘讬谉 讘诪讝讬讚 讬注拽专

Rabbi Yehuda says: With regard to planting a tree in the Sabbatical Year, if one does so unintentionally, he may keep the tree. If he acted intentionally, it must be uprooted. And if he planted the tree on Shabbat, then whether he did so unintentionally or intentionally, it must be uprooted. Although it is prohibited by Torah law to plant a tree in the Sabbatical Year, Rabbi Meir penalizes the offender and requires that the tree be uprooted, even if he acted unintentionally. This seems to contradict Rabbi Meir鈥檚 ruling in the previously mentioned baraita, that one who unintentionally cooked on Shabbat is not penalized.

讜诇讟注诪讬讱 转拽砖讛 诇讱 讛讬讗 讙讜驻讛 诪讻讚讬 讛讗 讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 讜讛讗 讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 诪讗讬 砖谞讗 砖讘转 讜诪讗讬 砖谞讗 砖讘讬注讬转

The Gemara asks: And according to your reasoning, that you raise such a contradiction, raise a contradiction in this baraita itself. Since this prohibition of planting on Shabbat is by Torah law and this prohibition of planting in the Sabbatical Year is by Torah law, what is different about Shabbat and what is different about the Sabbatical Year, that both Sages distinguish between the two halakhot.

讗诇讗 讛转诐 讻讚拽转谞讬 讟注诪讗 讗诪专 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 诪驻谞讬 诪讛 讗谞讬 讗讜诪专 讘砖讘转 讘砖讜讙讙 讬拽讬讬诐 讘诪讝讬讚 讬注拽专 讜讘砖讘讬注讬转 讘讬谉 讘砖讜讙讙 讘讬谉 讘诪讝讬讚 讬注拽专 诪驻谞讬 砖讬砖专讗诇 诪讜谞讬谉 诇砖讘讬注讬转

Rather, there the reason is as is taught explicitly: Rabbi Meir said: For what reason do I say: If one planted a tree on Shabbat unintentionally, he may keep the tree, but if he did so intentionally, it must be uprooted; but in the Sabbatical Year, whether the tree was planted unintentionally or intentionally, it must be uprooted? It is because Jews count the years of the tree, with regard to the prohibition against eating the fruit of a tree during the first three years after its planting [orla] and with regard to the halakha of fourth-year produce, from the Sabbatical Year. Therefore, if the tree was planted in the Sabbatical Year, people will remember, and they might come to think planting a tree in the Sabbatical Year is permitted. For this reason, Rabbi Meir imposed a fine and required that the tree be uprooted.

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Gittin 53

The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria

Gittin 53

讛讬讬谞讜 诪讚诪注

is the same as mixing teruma with non-sacred produce, as both involve intermingling that which is forbidden with that which is permitted, so that the entire mixture becomes forbidden. There is no difference between these actions, so there would be no need to mention both of them in the mishna.

讜讗讬讚讱 拽谞住讗 讛讜讗 讜诪拽谞住讗 诇讗 讬诇驻讬谞谉

And the other Sage, Shmuel, holds that one who mixes teruma with another person鈥檚 non-sacred produce is liable for a fine. And we do not derive a fine in one case from a fine stated in another case, even if the two cases are similar. Consequently, liability for the fine must be mentioned separately for each case.

讜诇诪讗谉 讚讬诇讬祝 拽谞住讗 诪拽谞住讗 讻诇 讛谞讬 诇诪讛 诇讬

The Gemara asks: And according to the one who says that we do derive a fine in one case from a fine in another case, why do I need all these cases mentioned in the mishna, i.e., one who renders another person鈥檚 food ritually impure, one who mixes teruma with another鈥檚 non-sacred produce, and one who pours another person鈥檚 wine in a rite of idolatry?

爪专讬讻讗 讚讗讬 转谞讗 诪讟诪讗 讗讬 转专讜诪讛 讛讜讛 讗诪讬谞讗 诪砖讜诐 讚拽讗 诪驻住讬讚 诇讛 诇讙诪专讬 讜讗讬 诪讟诪讗 讞讜诇讬谉 诪砖讜诐 讚讗住讜专 诇讙专讜诐 讟讜诪讗讛 诇讞讜诇讬谉 砖讘讗专抓 讬砖专讗诇 讗讘诇 诪讚诪注 讗讬诪讗 诇讗

The Gemara answers: All three rulings are necessary, as, had the mishna taught only the case of one who renders another鈥檚 food impure, there are two possibilities: If it is referring to one who renders another鈥檚 teruma non-sacred, then I would say that they imposed a penalty because he ruined it entirely, as it can no longer be consumed by anyone, neither a priest nor an ordinary Israelite. And if it is referring to one who renders another鈥檚 non-sacred food impure, then I would say the fine is imposed because it is prohibited to cause impurity to non-sacred food in Eretz Yisrael. But in the case of one who mixes teruma with another鈥檚 non-sacred produce, since he neither caused a substantial loss, as the mixture can still be sold to a priest, nor spread impurity in Eretz Yisrael, one might say that a fine is not imposed upon him.

讜讗讬 讗砖诪注讬谞谉 诪讚诪注 诪砖讜诐 讚砖讻讬讞 讗讘诇 诪讟诪讗 讚诇讗 砖讻讬讞 讗讬诪讗 诇讗

And had the mishna taught us only the case of one who mixes teruma with another person鈥檚 non-sacred produce, I would say that a fine is imposed in that case, because mixing two different items together is a common occurrence. But concerning one who renders another person鈥檚 food impure, which is uncommon, one might say that a fine is not imposed, as the Sages did not impose penalties in uncommon cases.

讜讗讬 讗砖诪注讬谞谉 诪讟诪讗 讜诪讚诪注 诪砖讜诐 讚诇讗 拽讬诐 诇讬讛 讘讚专讘讛 诪讬谞讬讛

And had the mishna taught us both the case of one who renders another person鈥檚 food impure and the case of one who mixes teruma with another person鈥檚 non-sacred produce, I would say that fines are imposed in both those cases, because there is no application of the principle that one who has committed two transgressions with a single act, each carrying its own punishment, receives the greater punishment of the two. Neither of these actions carries a punishment beyond paying the fine.

讗讘诇 诪谞住讱 讚拽讬诐 诇讬讛 讘讚专讘讛 诪讬谞讬讛 讗讬诪讗 诇讗 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉 讻讚专讘讬 讬专诪讬讛

But concerning one who pours another person鈥檚 wine as a libation before an idol, where one does apply the principle that one who has committed two transgressions with a single act receives the greater punishment of the two for which he is liable, as he is liable to receive court imposed capital punishment for having transgressed the prohibition against idolatry, I would say that a fine is not imposed. Therefore, the mishna teaches us that he is in fact liable to pay the fine. And the reason for this is in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Yirmeya, that since he acquired the wine from the moment he lifted it, he became liable to pay the fine before he became liable to receive court imposed capital punishment, and therefore he is subject to both punishments.

讜诇讛讗 讚转谞讬 讗讘讜讛 讚专讘讬 讗讘讬谉 讘专讗砖讜谞讛 讛讬讜 讗讜诪专讬诐 讛诪讟诪讗 讜讛诪谞住讱 讞讝专讜 诇讜诪专 讗祝 讛诪讚诪注 讻诇 讛谞讬 诇诪讛 诇讬

The Gemara asks: And according to this version of the halakha that the father of Rabbi Avin taught (Tosefta 4:5): Initially the Sages would say that one who renders another person鈥檚 food impure and one who pours another鈥檚 wine as a libation before an idol are subject to a fine, and later they returned to say that even one who mixes teruma with another person鈥檚 non-sacred produce is liable to pay a fine, why do I need all these cases? In this version, the halakha of one who mixes was added later. After the halakhot concerning one who renders another person鈥檚 food impure and one who pours another鈥檚 wine were taught, why could the halakha of one who mixes not be derived from those halakhot?

爪专讬讻讗 讚讗讬 讗砖诪注讬谞谉 诪讟诪讗 诪砖讜诐 讚诇讗 拽讬诐 诇讬讛 讘讚专讘讛 诪讬谞讬讛 讗讘诇 诪谞住讱 讚拽讬诐 诇讬讛 讘讚专讘讛 诪讬谞讬讛 讗讬诪讗 诇讗

The Gemara answers: All three rulings are necessary, as, had the baraita in the Tosefta taught us only the case of one who renders another person鈥檚 food impure, I would say that a fine is imposed, because there is no application of the principle that one who has committed two transgressions with a single act, each carrying its own punishment, receives the greater punishment of the two. But with regard to one who pours another鈥檚 wine as a rite in idolatry, where one does apply the principle that one who has committed two transgressions with a single act receives the greater punishment of the two for which he is liable, one might say that a fine is not imposed.

讜讗讬 讗砖诪注讬谞谉 诪谞住讱 诪砖讜诐 讚拽讗 诪驻住讬讚 诇讬讛 诇讙诪专讬 讗讘诇 诪讟诪讗 讚诇讗 诪驻住讬讚 诇讬讛 诇讙诪专讬 讗讬诪讗 诇讗

And had the baraita taught us only the case of one who pours another鈥檚 wine as a libation before an idol, I would say that they imposed a penalty because he ruined it entirely, as it is now prohibited for one to derive any benefit from it whatsoever. But for one who renders another person鈥檚 food impure, which does not ruin it entirely, as one may derive benefit from it, e.g., by using it as fuel while it is being burned or by feeding it to his animal, one might say that a fine is not imposed.

讜讗讬 讗砖诪注讬谞谉 讛谞讬 转专转讬 诪砖讜诐 讚讛驻住讚 诪专讜讘讛 讗讘诇 诪讚诪注 讚讛驻住讚 诪讜注讟 讗讬诪讗 诇讗 爪专讬讻讗

And had the baraita taught us only these two cases, I would say that here they imposed fines because in each case there is a substantial loss. But with regard to one who mixes teruma with another person鈥檚 non-sacred produce, where the loss he causes is minimal because the owner can still sell the mixture to priests at the price of teruma, one might say that a penalty is not imposed. Therefore, all three rulings are necessary.

讗诪专 讞讝拽讬讛 讚讘专 转讜专讛 讗讞讚 砖讜讙讙 讜讗讞讚 诪讝讬讚 讞讬讬讘 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讛讬讝拽 砖讗讬谞讜 谞讬讻专 砖诪讬讛 讛讬讝拽

搂 The mishna teaches: If one unintentionally committed one of these offenses, either rendering another鈥檚 food impure, mixing teruma with another鈥檚 produce, or pouring another鈥檚 wine before an idol, he is exempt from paying for the damage. If he acted intentionally, he is liable to pay. 岣zkiyya says: By Torah law, one who commits one of the offenses listed in the mishna, whether he did so unintentionally or intentionally, is liable to pay for the damage he caused, like any other person who causes damage. What is the reason for this? The reason is that even damage that is not evident is categorized as damage. One is liable for damage not only when the damage is evident, i.e., when he causes a change in the item鈥檚 physical state, but also when the damage is not evident, i.e., when he causes a reduction in the item鈥檚 value due to a change in its halakhic status, e.g., when he renders it impure.

讜诪讛 讟注诐 讗诪专讜 讘砖讜讙讙 驻讟讜专 讻讚讬 砖讬讜讚讬注讜

And what is the reason that the Sages said that if he committed one of these acts unintentionally he is exempt? This is so that the one who caused the damage will inform the injured party about what happened. If a fine were imposed even in a case where the damage is caused unintentionally, there would be a concern that the guilty party might not report the damage so as to avoid the penalty. In such a situation the injured party will not know what happened, as the damage is not evident, and he will inadvertently use that which has become impure, mixed with teruma, or poured before an idol.

讗讬 讛讻讬 讗驻讬诇讜 讘诪讝讬讚 谞诪讬 讛砖转讗 诇讗讜讝讜拽讬 拽讗 诪讻讜讬谉 讗讜讚讜注讬 诇讗 诪讜讚注 诇讬讛

The Gemara asks: If it is so that there is a concern about this, then he should be exempt from liability even if he committed one of these offenses intentionally, so that he will inform the owner of the item. The Gemara answers: Now, since it was his intention to cause him damage, will he not inform him? If he does not tell him, the other person will never know that he suffered damage. Consequently, he will certainly inform him of what he did and that his property is now subject to a prohibition, and there is no concern that the injured party will inadvertently come to transgress the prohibition. This is 岣zkiyya鈥檚 opinion.

讜专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗诪专 讚讘专 转讜专讛 讗讞讚 砖讜讙讙 讜讗讞讚 诪讝讬讚 驻讟讜专 诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 讛讬讝拽 砖讗讬谞讜 谞讬讻专 诇讗 砖诪讬讛 讛讬讝拽 讜诪讛 讟注诐 讗诪专讜 讘诪讝讬讚 讞讬讬讘 砖诇讗 讬讛讗 讻诇 讗讞讚 讜讗讞讚 讛讜诇讱 讜诪讟诪讗 讟讛专讜转讬讜 砖诇 讞讘讬专讜 讜讗讜诪专 驻讟讜专 讗谞讬

And Rabbi Yo岣nan says: By Torah law, one who commits one of the offenses listed in the mishna, whether he did so unintentionally or intentionally, is exempt from liability for the damage he caused. What is the reason for this? The reason is that damage that is not evident is not categorized as damage. And what is the reason that the Sages said that if he committed one of these acts intentionally he is liable? This is so that each and every person who has a grievance with his neighbor and wishes to cause him harm should not go and render impure the other person鈥檚 pure foods, and say: I am exempt from liability.

转谞谉 讛讻讛谞讬诐 砖驻讙诇讜 讘诪拽讚砖 诪讝讬讚讬诐 讞讬讬讘讬谉 讜转谞讬 注诇讛 诪驻谞讬 转讬拽讜谉 讛注讜诇诐

The Gemara raises an objection to the opinion of 岣zkiyya from what we learned in a mishna (54b): With regard to priests who disqualified an offering through improper intention in the Temple, by expressing, while sacrificing the offering, the intention of sprinkling the blood of the offering, burning its fats on the altar, or consuming it after its appointed time, if they did so intentionally, they are liable to pay the value of the offering to its owner, who must now bring another offering. And it is taught with regard to this mishna that the Sages instituted this obligation for the betterment of the world, so that priests should not act in this manner toward people to whom they wish to cause harm.

讜讗讬 讗诪专转 讛讬讝拽 砖讗讬谞讜 谞讬讻专 砖诪讬讛 讛讬讝拽 讛讗讬 砖讜讙讙讬谉 驻讟讜专讬谉 诪驻谞讬 转讬拽讜谉 讛注讜诇诐 诪讬讘注讬 诇讬讛

And if you say that damage that is not evident is nevertheless categorized as damage, it should have said that if they acted unintentionally they are exempt due to the betterment of the world. This is because according to 岣zkiyya, if they acted intentionally they should be liable by Torah law for the damage they caused, and not by rabbinic ordinance instituted for the betterment of the world.

讛讻讬 谞诪讬 拽讗诪专 诪讝讬讚讬谉 讞讬讬讘讬谉 讛讗 砖讜讙讙讬谉 驻讟讜专讬谉 诪驻谞讬 转讬拽讜谉 讛注讜诇诐

The Gemara answers: That is also what the tanna is saying, and the mishna should be understood as follows: If they acted intentionally, they are liable, but if they acted unintentionally, they are exempt. And the reason that they are exempt is for the betterment of the world.

诪转讬讘 专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讛注讜砖讛 诪诇讗讻讛 讘诪讬 讞讟讗转 讜讘驻专转 讞讟讗转 驻讟讜专 诪讚讬谞讬 讗讚诐 讜讞讬讬讘 讘讚讬谞讬 砖诪讬诐 讜讗讬 讗诪专转 讛讬讝拽 砖讗讬谞讜 谞讬讻专 砖诪讬讛 讛讬讝拽 讘讚讬谞讬 讗讚诐 谞诪讬 诇讞讬讬讘

Rabbi Elazar raised an objection based on what was taught: With regard to one who performs a task with the water of purification, i.e., water that is to be mixed with the ashes of the red heifer, which was used to purify people and objects that had contracted ritual impurity by contact with a corpse, or performed labor with the red heifer of purification, and by doing so he disqualifies it, he is exempt according to human laws but is liable according to the laws of Heaven. And if you say that damage that is not evident is nevertheless categorized as damage, then according to human laws he should also be liable.

讛讜讗 诪讜转讬讘 诇讛 讜讛讜讗 诪驻专拽 诇讛 驻专讛 砖讛讻谞讬住讛 诇专讘拽讛 注诇 诪谞转 砖转讬谞拽 讜转讚讜砖 诪讬 讞讟讗转 砖砖拽诇 讘讛谉 诪砖拽诇讜转

The Gemara comments that he, Rabbi Elazar, raised the objection and subsequently he himself resolved it: That which they said, that he performed labor with the red heifer, means that he placed it in a pen [lirvaka] so that it would nurse from its mother and would incidentally thresh, meaning that his action is not defined as having the heifer perform labor. And that which they said, that he performed a task with the water of purification, means that he weighed weights with the water, which is not an actual task performed with the water.

讜讛讗诪专 专讘讗 诪讬 讞讟讗转

The Gemara asks: But doesn鈥檛 Rava say: Water of purification

砖砖拽诇 讘讛谉 诪砖拽诇讜转 讻砖专讛 诇讗 拽砖讬讗 讛讗 讘讙讜驻谉 讛讗 讘讻谞讙讚谉

with which he weighed weights is fit? The Gemara answers: It is not difficult: This baraita is referring to a case where he weighs an object with the water itself, and therefore the water is disqualified. And this statement of Rava鈥檚, that the water is fit, is referring to a case where he weighs an object against the water.

讘讙讜驻谉 诪注砖讛 拽讗 注讘讬讚 讘讛讜 讜讗讬 讛讬讝拽 砖讗讬谞讜 谞讬讻专 砖诪讬讛 讛讬讝拽 讘讚讬谞讬 讗讚诐 谞诪讬 诇讞讬讬讘 讗诇讗 讗讬讚讬 讜讗讬讚讬 讘讻谞讙讚谉 讜诇讗 拽砖讬讗 讛讗 讚讗住讞 讚注转讬讛 讛讗 讚诇讗 讗住讞 讚注转讬讛

The Gemara asks: If he weighs an object with the water itself, then he performs a real task with it, and if damage that is not evident is nevertheless categorized as damage, then he should also be liable according to human laws to pay for performing a task with the water. Rather, it is necessary to say that both this and that refer to a case where he weighed an object against the water, and still it is not difficult: This baraita is referring to a case where in the course of the weighing the object his attention was diverted from guarding the water, and owing to this lapse in attention the water became disqualified. And that statement of Rava鈥檚 is referring to a case where his attention was not diverted, and therefore the water did not become disqualified.

诪转讬讘 专讘 驻驻讗 讙讝诇 诪讟讘注 讜谞驻住诇 转专讜诪讛 讜谞讟诪讗转 讞诪抓 讜注讘专 注诇讬讜 讛驻住讞 讗讜诪专 诇讜 讛专讬 砖诇讱 诇驻谞讬讱

Rav Pappa raises an objection against 岣zkiyya鈥檚 opinion from that which is taught in a baraita: If one robbed another of a coin and afterward the coin was rendered invalid by the government, or if he robbed another of teruma and it became ritually impure, or if he robbed another of leavened bread and Passover then elapsed over it, rendering it forbidden, in each of these cases the robber can return the item and say to the robbery victim: That which is yours is before you. Since the robber returned the stolen item, he is not required to compensate the victim of the robbery for his monetary loss, although the stolen items are currently of minimal or no value.

讜讗讬 讗诪专转 讛讬讝拽 砖讗讬谞讜 谞讬讻专 砖诪讬讛 讛讬讝拽 讛讗讬 讙讝诇谉 讛讜讗 诪诪讜谞讗 诪注诇讬讗 讘注讬 砖诇讜诪讬 转讬讜讘转讗

And if you say that damage that is not evident is categorized as damage, then this man is a robber, and he should be required to pay full compensation for the damage he caused. The Gemara concludes: This is a conclusive refutation, and the opinion of 岣zkiyya is rejected.

诇讬诪讗 讻转谞讗讬 讛诪讟诪讗 讜讛诪讚诪注 讜讛诪谞住讱 讗讞讚 砖讜讙讙 讜讗讞讚 诪讝讬讚 讞讬讬讘 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讜诪专 讘砖讜讙讙 驻讟讜专 讘诪讝讬讚 讞讬讬讘

The Gemara suggests: Let us say that this amoraic dispute is parallel to a dispute between tanna鈥檌m, as it was taught in a baraita: With regard to one who renders another鈥檚 food ritually impure, or one who mixes teruma with another鈥檚 non-sacred produce, or one who pours another鈥檚 wine as a libation before an idol, whether he did so unintentionally or intentionally, he is liable to pay for the damage he caused; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: If he acted unintentionally, he is exempt; if he acted intentionally, he is liable to pay.

诪讗讬 诇讗讜 讘讛讗 拽诪讬驻诇讙讬 讚诪专 住讘专 讛讬讝拽 砖讗讬谞讜 谞讬讻专 砖诪讬讛 讛讬讝拽 讜诪专 住讘专 诇讗 砖诪讬讛 讛讬讝拽

The Gemara suggests: What, is it not that they disagree about this very issue? As one Sage, Rabbi Meir, holds that damage that is not evident is nevertheless categorized as damage. Consequently, one is liable to pay even if he caused the damage unintentionally. And one Sage, Rabbi Yehuda, holds that such damage is not categorized as damage, and consequently one is liable to pay only if he caused the damage intentionally, as this is a rabbinically instituted fine.

讗诪专 专讘 谞讞诪谉 讘专 讬爪讞拽 讚讻讜诇讬 注诇诪讗 讛讬讝拽 砖讗讬谞讜 谞讬讻专 诇讗 砖诪讬讛 讛讬讝拽 讜讛讻讗 讘拽谞住讜 砖讜讙讙 讗讟讜 诪讝讬讚 拽讗 诪讬驻诇讙讬 讚诪专 住讘专 拽谞住讜 砖讜讙讙 讗讟讜 诪讝讬讚 讜诪专 住讘专 诇讗 拽谞住讜 砖讜讙讙 讗讟讜 诪讝讬讚

Rav Na岣an bar Yitz岣k said that it is possible to say that everyone, including Rabbi Meir, agrees that damage that is not evident is not categorized as damage. And here, they disagree with regard to this question: Did the Sages penalize an unintentional offender due to an intentional offender? As one Sage, Rabbi Meir, who states that the one who caused the damage is liable even if he acted unintentionally, holds that the Sages penalized an unintentional offender due to an intentional offender. And one Sage, Rabbi Yehuda, who states that one is liable only if he acted intentionally, holds that they did not penalize an unintentional offender due to an intentional offender.

讜专诪讬 讚专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讗讚专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讜专诪讬 讚专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讚专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讚转谞讬讗 讛诪讘砖诇 讘砖讘转 讘砖讜讙讙 讬讗讻诇 讘诪讝讬讚 诇讗 讬讗讻诇 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讜诪专 讘砖讜讙讙 讬讗讻诇 诇诪讜爪讗讬 砖讘转 讘诪讝讬讚 诇讗 讬讗讻诇 注讜诇诪讬转

The Gemara comments: But then it is possible to raise a contradiction between this statement of Rabbi Meir and another statement of Rabbi Meir; and it is also possible to raise a contradiction between this statement of Rabbi Yehuda and another statement of Rabbi Yehuda. The other statements are as it is taught in a baraita (Tosefta, Shabbat 2:5): With regard to one who cooks on Shabbat, if he did so unintentionally, he may eat what he cooked. If he acted intentionally, he may not eat what he cooked; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: If he cooked the food unintentionally, he may eat what he cooked, but only at the conclusion of Shabbat. If he cooked it intentionally, he may never eat what he cooked.

专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讛住谞讚诇专 讗讜诪专 讘砖讜讙讙 讬讗讻诇 诇诪讜爪讗讬 砖讘转 诇讗讞专讬诐 讜诇讗 诇讜 讘诪讝讬讚 诇讗 讬讗讻诇 注讜诇诪讬转 诇讗 诇讜 讜诇讗 诇讗讞专讬诐 拽砖讬讗 讚专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讗讚专讘讬 诪讗讬专 拽砖讬讗 讚专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讚专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛

The baraita continues: Rabbi Yo岣nan HaSandlar says: If he acted unintentionally, what he cooked may be eaten at the conclusion of Shabbat by others, but not by him, as the food is forbidden to him forever. If he cooked the food intentionally, what he cooked may never be eaten, neither by him nor by others. Consequently, there is a contradiction between one statement of Rabbi Meir and the other statement of Rabbi Meir, and there is also a contradiction between one statement of Rabbi Yehuda and the other statement of Rabbi Yehuda.

讚专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讗讚专讘讬 诪讗讬专 诇讗 拽砖讬讗 讻讬 拽谞讬住 讘讚专讘谞谉 讘讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 诇讗 拽谞讬住

The Gemara answers: There is no contradiction between one statement of Rabbi Meir and the other statement of Rabbi Meir, because one can draw a distinction between them. When Rabbi Meir penalizes an offender for even an unintentional offense, it is where the offender violated a rabbinic law, e.g., he rendered food impure. But where he violated a Torah law, e.g., he cooked on Shabbat, he does not penalize him. The reason for this distinction is that people treat Torah prohibitions more seriously, and consequently there is no need to impose a fine for unintentional transgression in order to distance people from the transgression.

讜讛讗 诪谞住讱 讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 讛讜讗 讜拽讗 拽谞讬住 诪砖讜诐 讞讜诪专讗 讚注讘讜讚讛 讝专讛 拽谞住 诇讬讛

The Gemara asks: But isn鈥檛 pouring wine as a libation before an idol prohibited by Torah law, and even so Rabbi Meir penalizes the offender, even if his transgression is unintentional? The Gemara answers: This is an exception to the principle. Due to the severity of the prohibition against idol worship, Rabbi Meir penalizes the offender even if he acts unintentionally.

讚专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讚专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 诇讗 拽砖讬讗 讻讬 诇讗 拽谞讬住 讘讚专讘谞谉 讘讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 拽谞讬住 讜讛讗 诪谞住讱 讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 讜诇讗 拽谞讬住 诪砖讜诐 讞讜诪专讗 讚注讘讜讚讛 讝专讛 诪讬讘讚诇 讘讚讬诇讬 诪讬谞讬讛

The Gemara continues: And there is also no contradiction between one statement of Rabbi Yehuda and the other statement of Rabbi Yehuda. When Rabbi Yehuda does not penalize an offender for an unintentional offense, it is where he violated a rabbinic law. But where he violated a Torah law, he penalizes him even if he transgressed unintentionally, owing to the severity of the transgression. The Gemara asks: But isn鈥檛 pouring wine as a libation before an idol prohibited by Torah law, and even so Rabbi Yehuda does not penalize the offender if he acted unintentionally? The Gemara answers: The argument raised previously can be reversed: Due to the exceptional severity of the prohibition against idol worship people avoid it on their own, and so there is no need to impose a fine for unintentional transgression in order to distance people from it.

讜专诪讬 讚专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讗讚专讘讬 诪讗讬专 讘讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 讚转谞讬讗 讛谞讜讟注 讘砖讘转 讘砖讜讙讙 讬拽讬讬诐 讘诪讝讬讚 讬注拽专 讜讘砖讘讬注讬转 讘讬谉 讘砖讜讙讙 讘讬谉 讘诪讝讬讚 讬注拽专 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 诪讗讬专

The Gemara comments: But then it is possible to raise a contradiction between one statement of Rabbi Meir and another statement of Rabbi Meir even with respect to matters that are prohibited by Torah law, as it is taught in a baraita (Tosefta, Shabbat 2:11): With regard to one who plants a tree on Shabbat, if he does so unintentionally, he may keep the tree. If he acted intentionally, it must be uprooted. And if he planted the tree during the Sabbatical Year, then whether he did so unintentionally or intentionally, it must be uprooted; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir.

专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讜诪专 讘砖讘讬注讬转 讘砖讜讙讙 讬拽讬讬诐 讘诪讝讬讚 讬注拽专 讜讘砖讘转 讘讬谉 讘砖讜讙讙 讘讬谉 讘诪讝讬讚 讬注拽专

Rabbi Yehuda says: With regard to planting a tree in the Sabbatical Year, if one does so unintentionally, he may keep the tree. If he acted intentionally, it must be uprooted. And if he planted the tree on Shabbat, then whether he did so unintentionally or intentionally, it must be uprooted. Although it is prohibited by Torah law to plant a tree in the Sabbatical Year, Rabbi Meir penalizes the offender and requires that the tree be uprooted, even if he acted unintentionally. This seems to contradict Rabbi Meir鈥檚 ruling in the previously mentioned baraita, that one who unintentionally cooked on Shabbat is not penalized.

讜诇讟注诪讬讱 转拽砖讛 诇讱 讛讬讗 讙讜驻讛 诪讻讚讬 讛讗 讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 讜讛讗 讚讗讜专讬讬转讗 诪讗讬 砖谞讗 砖讘转 讜诪讗讬 砖谞讗 砖讘讬注讬转

The Gemara asks: And according to your reasoning, that you raise such a contradiction, raise a contradiction in this baraita itself. Since this prohibition of planting on Shabbat is by Torah law and this prohibition of planting in the Sabbatical Year is by Torah law, what is different about Shabbat and what is different about the Sabbatical Year, that both Sages distinguish between the two halakhot.

讗诇讗 讛转诐 讻讚拽转谞讬 讟注诪讗 讗诪专 专讘讬 诪讗讬专 诪驻谞讬 诪讛 讗谞讬 讗讜诪专 讘砖讘转 讘砖讜讙讙 讬拽讬讬诐 讘诪讝讬讚 讬注拽专 讜讘砖讘讬注讬转 讘讬谉 讘砖讜讙讙 讘讬谉 讘诪讝讬讚 讬注拽专 诪驻谞讬 砖讬砖专讗诇 诪讜谞讬谉 诇砖讘讬注讬转

Rather, there the reason is as is taught explicitly: Rabbi Meir said: For what reason do I say: If one planted a tree on Shabbat unintentionally, he may keep the tree, but if he did so intentionally, it must be uprooted; but in the Sabbatical Year, whether the tree was planted unintentionally or intentionally, it must be uprooted? It is because Jews count the years of the tree, with regard to the prohibition against eating the fruit of a tree during the first three years after its planting [orla] and with regard to the halakha of fourth-year produce, from the Sabbatical Year. Therefore, if the tree was planted in the Sabbatical Year, people will remember, and they might come to think planting a tree in the Sabbatical Year is permitted. For this reason, Rabbi Meir imposed a fine and required that the tree be uprooted.

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