This week’s learning is sponsored by Helen Danczak in loving memory of her mother, Lucille Fliegler on her 29th yahrzeit. “The years fly past and still it’s as if it’s been only yesterday since I had a chance to visit. Mommele, may your neshama have an aliya.”
This week’s learning is sponsored by Petra, Tova & Orli in honor of their mother, Wendy Proskin. “Happy Mother’s Day!”
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Summary
A kohen gadol is obligated to bring a special bull offering only if he issues an erroneous halachic ruling unintentionally and then personally acts upon that ruling. A braita derives this from the verse “לְאַשְׁמַת הָעָם” (“for the guilt of the nation”), which compares the kohen gadol’s actions to those of the community when they bring a communal sin offering.
This drasha is necessary because one might have assumed that the kohen gadol’s obligation could be learned directly from the communal offering paradigm, given their similarities. However, since the kohen gadol could also be compared to the nasi (king), who brings a sacrifice without issuing a mistaken ruling, the comparison is not straightforward. The drasha clarifies that the kohen gadol’s case aligns specifically with the communal model.
Another drasha teaches that if the kohen gadol issues an erroneous ruling but the people act on it while he himself does not, no special bull offering is brought. The offering is only required when the kohen gadol personally commits the sin.
The Mishna rules that if the kohen gadol and the court issue rulings simultaneously but on different matters—where the community follows the court and the kohen gadol follows his own ruling—he must bring an individual sacrifice. However, if he rules with the court on the same issue and acts together with the community, he is atoned through the communal bull offering, not the unique one designated for the kohen gadol.
A braita attempts to derive this latter case by comparing the kohen gadol to the nasi, but this is rejected. The nasi is included in the communal Yom Kippur offering, whereas the kohen gadol receives atonement through his own unique Yom Kippur sacrifice. Ultimately, the source is derived from the verse “עַל חַטָּאתוֹ אֲשֶׁר חָטָא” (“for the sin which he sinned,” Vayikra 4:3).
Rava and Abaye disagree about whether the earlier case—where the kohen gadol and the court ruled simultaneously—refers to rulings made in the same location or in different places.
The Gemara explores various scenarios in which the kohen gadol and the court ruled on different matters. Some cases are obvious, while others remain uncertain.
The Mishna further explains that the kohen gadol’s sacrifice resembles the communal sin offering in that both require two conditions: (1) a mistaken ruling that leads to erroneous instruction, and (2) an unwitting action based on that ruling. The same principle applies to idol worship—to be liable, there must be both an erroneous ruling and a subsequent action. A braita derives this from a gezeira shava based on the phrase “מֵעֵינֵי” (“from the eyes”).
When the Mishna states that the same applies to idol worship, it does not explicitly say, “And the same is true for the kohen gadol,” as it did earlier. Initially, the Gemara interprets this to mean that the Mishna follows Rebbi, who holds that the kohen gadol brings a sacrifice for idol worship based solely on an unwitting action, even without a mistaken ruling. However, this interpretation is rejected, and the Mishna is re-explained as the sentence “And such is true for the kohen gadol” would apply to both the sentence before and the sentence after, as is the case in the upcoming Mishna.
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This week’s learning is sponsored by Helen Danczak in loving memory of her mother, Lucille Fliegler on her 29th yahrzeit. “The years fly past and still it’s as if it’s been only yesterday since I had a chance to visit. Mommele, may your neshama have an aliya.”
This week’s learning is sponsored by Petra, Tova & Orli in honor of their mother, Wendy Proskin. “Happy Mother’s Day!”
Horayot 7
צִבּוּר מוּצָא מִכְּלַל יָחִיד, וּמָשִׁיחַ מוּצָא מִכְּלַל יָחִיד. מָה צִבּוּר אֵין חַיָּיבִין אֶלָּא עַל הֶעְלֵם דָּבָר עִם שִׁגְגַת מַעֲשֶׂה, אַף מָשִׁיחַ לֹא יְהֵא חַיָּיב אֶלָּא עַל הֶעְלֵם דָּבָר עִם שִׁגְגַת מַעֲשֶׂה.
The general public is removed from the category of an individual, as an individual brings a ewe or female goat as a sin-offering, whereas when the general public sins the sin-offering is a bull. And likewise, an anointed priest is removed from the category of an individual, as his sin-offering is also a bull. Therefore, just as the general public is liable only for absence of awareness of the matter by the court together with unwitting performance of an action by the people, so too, an anointed priest will be liable only for absence of awareness of the matter together with unwitting performance of an action.
אוֹ כְּלָךְ לְדֶרֶךְ זוֹ: נָשִׂיא מוּצָא מִכְּלַל יָחִיד, וּמָשִׁיחַ מוּצָא מִכְּלַל יָחִיד. מָה נָשִׂיא מֵבִיא בְּשִׁגְגַת מַעֲשֶׂה בְּלֹא הֶעְלֵם דָּבָר, אַף מָשִׁיחַ מֵבִיא בְּשִׁגְגַת מַעֲשֶׂה בְּלֹא הֶעְלֵם דָּבָר!
Or perhaps go this way and draw a different analogy: A king [Nasi] is removed from the category of an individual, as his sin-offering is a goat. And an anointed priest is removed from the category of an individual. Therefore, just as a king brings an offering for unwitting performance of an action, even without absence of awareness of the matter leading to an erroneous ruling, like any individual liable to bring a sin-offering, so too, an anointed priest brings an offering for unwitting performance of an action, even without absence of awareness of the matter leading to an erroneous ruling. It is possible to liken the anointed priest to either the general public or to the king.
נִרְאֶה לְמִי דּוֹמֶה? צִבּוּר – בְּפַר וְאֵין מְבִיאִין אָשָׁם תָּלוּי, וּמָשִׁיחַ – בְּפַר וְאֵין מֵבִיא אָשָׁם תָּלוּי. מָה צִבּוּר אֵינוֹ חַיָּיב אֶלָּא עַל הֶעְלֵם דָּבָר עִם שִׁגְגַת מַעֲשֶׂה, אַף מָשִׁיחַ לֹא יְהֵא חַיָּיב אֶלָּא עַל הֶעְלֵם דָּבָר עִם שִׁגְגַת מַעֲשֶׂה.
The Gemara considers these two comparisons: Let us see to which of them, the general public or the king, an anointed priest is similar. The general public achieves atonement with a bull and does not bring a provisional guilt-offering, and an anointed priest achieves atonement with a bull and does not bring a provisional guilt-offering. Therefore one might say: Just as the general public is liable only for absence of awareness of the matter by the court together with unwitting performance of an action by the people, so too, an anointed priest will be liable only for absence of awareness of the matter together with unwitting performance of an action.
אוֹ כְּלָךְ לְדֶרֶךְ זוֹ: נָשִׂיא מֵבִיא שְׂעִירָה בַּעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה וּמֵבִיא אָשָׁם וַדַּאי, וּמָשִׁיחַ מֵבִיא שְׂעִירָה בַּעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה וּמֵבִיא אָשָׁם וַדַּאי. מָה נָשִׂיא מֵבִיא בְּשִׁגְגַת מַעֲשֶׂה, אַף מָשִׁיחַ מֵבִיא בְּשִׁגְגַת מַעֲשֶׂה.
Or perhaps go this way and draw a different analogy: The king brings a female goat for unwitting idol worship and brings a definite guilt-offering for certain other transgressions where there is liability to bring a guilt-offering, e.g., misuse of consecrated property and robbery, and an anointed priest brings a female goat for unwitting idol worship and brings a definite guilt-offering for the same transgressions as the king. This is in contrast to the general public, which brings a bull as a sin-offering for unwitting idol worship and does not bring a definite guilt-offering at all. Therefore conclude: Just as a king brings an offering for unwitting performance of an action without absence of awareness of the matter, like any individual liable to bring a sin-offering, so too, an anointed priest brings an offering for unwitting performance of an action without absence of awareness of the matter.
תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״לְאַשְׁמַת הָעָם״, הֲרֵי הוּא מָשִׁיחַ כְּצִבּוּר. מָה צִבּוּר אֵינוֹ מֵבִיא אֶלָּא עַל הֶעְלֵם דָּבָר עִם שִׁגְגַת מַעֲשֶׂה, אַף מָשִׁיחַ אֵינוֹ מֵבִיא אֶלָּא עַל הֶעְלֵם דָּבָר עִם שִׁגְגַת מַעֲשֶׂה.
Since either conclusion can be derived logically, another source is necessary. Therefore, the verse states: “If the anointed priest shall sin so as to bring guilt upon the people” (Leviticus 4:3), indicating that the status of the anointed priest is like that of the general public. Therefore, just as the general public brings an offering only for absence of awareness of the matter by the court with unwitting performance of an action by the people, so too, an anointed priest brings an offering only for absence of awareness of the matter with unwitting performance of an action.
אֵימָא: מָה צִבּוּר הוֹרָה וְעָשׂוּ אַחֲרָיו בְּהוֹרָאָתוֹ – חַיָּיבִין, אַף מָשִׁיחַ כְּשֶׁהוֹרָה וְעָשׂוּ אַחֲרָיו בְּהוֹרָאָתוֹ – יְהֵא חַיָּיב! תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״וְהִקְרִיב עַל חַטָּאתוֹ אֲשֶׁר חָטָא״, עַל מָה שֶׁחָטָא הוּא מֵבִיא, וְאֵין מֵבִיא עַל מָה שֶׁחָטְאוּ אֲחֵרִים.
The Gemara challenges the comparison: Based on the comparison between the anointed priest and the general public, why not say: Just as with regard to the general public, if the court issued a ruling and the general public performed the transgression after its ruling and in accordance with its ruling, the court is liable, so too, with regard to an anointed priest, when he issued a ruling and the general public performed the transgression after his ruling and in accordance with his ruling, he should be liable. Therefore, the verse states with regard to the anointed priest: “Then he shall offer for his sin that he has sinned” (Leviticus 4:3), from which it is derived: He brings an offering for that sin that he sinned on the basis of his ruling, but he does not bring an offering for that sin that others sinned on the basis of his ruling.
אָמַר מָר: מָשִׁיחַ בְּפַר וְאֵין מֵבִיא אָשָׁם תָּלוּי. מְנָא לֵיהּ דְּאֵין מֵבִיא אָשָׁם תָּלוּי?
The Gemara elaborates on that which the Master said: An anointed priest achieves atonement with a bull and does not bring a provisional guilt-offering. The Gemara asks: From where does the tanna derive that an anointed priest does not bring a provisional guilt-offering?
דִּכְתִיב: ״וְכִפֶּר עָלָיו הַכֹּהֵן עַל שִׁגְגָתוֹ אֲשֶׁר שָׁגָג״, מִי שֶׁחַטָּאתוֹ וְשִׁגְגָתוֹ שָׁוָה, יָצָא מָשִׁיחַ שֶׁאֵין שִׁגְגָתוֹ וְחַטָּאתוֹ שָׁוָה, דִּכְתִיב: ״לְאַשְׁמַת הָעָם״, הֲרֵי הוּא מָשִׁיחַ כְּצִבּוּר.
The Gemara answers: It is derived from a verse, as it is written with regard to the halakhot of the guilt-offering: “And the priest shall atone for him for his unwitting act that he performed unwittingly” (Leviticus 5:18), from which it is derived that this halakha applies only to one whose transgression and his unwitting action are equal, i.e., an ordinary person, whose unwitting act is the very transgression that he performed unwittingly. This serves to exclude an anointed priest, whose unwitting action and his transgression are not equal, as his unwitting act is the erroneous ruling and he is liable to bring an offering only if he performed the transgression on the basis of that ruling. As it is written about the anointed priest: “So as to bring guilt upon the people” (Leviticus 4:3), indicating that the status of the anointed priest is like that of the general public.
״לְאַשְׁמַת הָעָם״, עַד כָּאן לָא קָאָמַר לֵיהּ. אֶלָּא אָשָׁם כְּדִי נַסְבַהּ.
The Gemara questions this proof: How can the Gemara base the halakha on an interpretation of the verse: “So as to bring guilt upon the people”? To this point, the tanna of the baraita did not state this verse. The tanna first states that the anointed priest does not bring a provisional guilt-offering and only then cites the verse from which he proves the halakha that an anointed priest brings an offering only for absence of awareness of the matter together with unwitting performance of an action. Rather, he stated the halakha of the provisional guilt-offering for no reason. Although the halakha is correct, there was no reason to cite it in the baraita.
מַתְנִי׳ הוֹרָה בִּפְנֵי עַצְמוֹ וְעָשָׂה בִּפְנֵי עַצְמוֹ – מִתְכַּפֵּר לוֹ בִּפְנֵי עַצְמוֹ. הוֹרָה עִם הַצִּבּוּר וְעָשָׂה עִם הַצִּבּוּר – מִתְכַּפֵּר לוֹ עִם הַצִּבּוּר, שֶׁאֵין בֵּית דִּין חַיָּיבִין עַד שֶׁיּוֹרוּ לְבַטֵּל מִקְצָת וּלְקַיֵּים מִקְצָת, וְכֵן הַמָּשִׁיחַ, וְלֹא בַּעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה עַד שֶׁיּוֹרוּ לְבַטֵּל מִקְצָת וּלְקַיֵּים מִקְצָת.
MISHNA: If the anointed priest issued a ruling by himself and performed a transgression by himself, he achieves atonement by himself by bringing a bull as his sin-offering. If he issued a ruling with the general public, i.e., the Sanhedrin, and performed a transgression with the general public, i.e., the Jewish people, he achieves atonement with the general public. As, the court is not liable unless the judges issue a ruling to nullify part of a commandment and to sustain part of that commandment, and likewise with regard to the ruling of the anointed priest. And the court and the priest are not liable for a ruling with regard to idol worship unless they issue a ruling to nullify part of that commandment and to sustain part of it.
גְּמָ׳ מְנָהָנֵי מִילֵּי? דְּתָנוּ רַבָּנַן: הוֹרָה עִם הַצִּבּוּר וְעָשָׂה עִם הַצִּבּוּר, יָכוֹל יָבִיא פַּר לְעַצְמוֹ?
GEMARA: Concerning the halakha that there is a difference between an unwitting transgression that the anointed priest performs by himself and one that he performs with the general public, the Gemara asks: From where is this matter derived? The Gemara explains: It is as the Sages taught in a baraita: If the anointed priest issued a ruling with the general public and performed a transgression with the general public, one might have thought that he is liable to bring a bull as a sin-offering for himself.
וְדִין הוּא: נָשִׂיא מוּצָא מִכְּלַל יָחִיד וּמָשִׁיחַ מוּצָא מִכְּלַל יָחִיד, מָה נָשִׂיא, חָטָא בִּפְנֵי עַצְמוֹ – מֵבִיא בִּפְנֵי עַצְמוֹ, חָטָא עִם הַצִּבּוּר – מִתְכַּפֵּר לוֹ עִם הַצִּבּוּר. אַף מָשִׁיחַ, חָטָא בִּפְנֵי עַצְמוֹ – מֵבִיא בִּפְנֵי עַצְמוֹ, חָטָא עִם הַצִּבּוּר – מִתְכַּפֵּר לוֹ עִם הַצִּבּוּר!
The baraita continues: And there is a logical inference to support this: A king is removed from the category of an individual and an anointed priest is removed from the category of an individual, as each brings a different sin-offering than an individual. Just as with regard to a king, if he sinned by himself he brings his sin-offering of a goat by himself, and if he sinned with the general public, he achieves atonement with the general public, so too, with regard to an anointed priest, if he sinned by himself he brings his sin-offering of a bull by himself, and if he sinned with the general public, he achieves atonement with the general public.
לֹא, אִם אָמַרְתָּ בְּנָשִׂיא – שֶׁכֵּן מִתְכַּפֵּר לוֹ עִם הַצִּבּוּר בְּיוֹם הַכִּפּוּרִים. תֹּאמַר בְּמָשִׁיחַ – שֶׁאֵין מִתְכַּפֵּר לוֹ עִם הַצִּבּוּר בְּיוֹם הַכִּפּוּרִים!
The baraita rejects this: No, if you said with regard to a king that he achieves atonement with the general public, that is logical, as he achieves atonement with the general public on Yom Kippur. Shall you also say the same with regard to an anointed priest, who does not achieve atonement with the general public on Yom Kippur but rather brings his own atonement offering?
הוֹאִיל וְאֵין מִתְכַּפֵּר לוֹ עִם הַצִּבּוּר בְּיוֹם הַכִּפּוּרִים, יָכוֹל יָבִיא פַּר לְעַצְמוֹ? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״עַל חַטָּאתוֹ אֲשֶׁר חָטָא״, הָא כֵּיצַד? חָטָא בִּפְנֵי עַצְמוֹ – מֵבִיא בִּפְנֵי עַצְמוֹ, חָטָא עִם הַצִּבּוּר – מִתְכַּפֵּר לוֹ עִם הַצִּבּוּר.
The baraita continues: Since he does not achieve atonement with the general public on Yom Kippur, one might have thought that he will bring a bull for himself even if he unwittingly performed a transgression with the general public. Therefore, the verse states: “Then he shall offer for his sin that he has sinned” (Leviticus 4:3), indicating that he sinned alone, not with the general public. How so? If he sinned by himself he brings his sin-offering of a bull by himself; if he sinned with the general public, he achieves atonement with the general public.
הֵיכִי דָמֵי? אִילֵּימָא דְּהוּא מוּפְלָא וְהֵם אֵינָן מוּפְלָאִין, פְּשִׁיטָא דְּמִתְכַּפֵּר לוֹ בִּפְנֵי עַצְמוֹ, הוֹרָאָה דִּלְהוֹן וְלֹא כְּלוּם. וּבָעֵי אֵתוֹיֵי כִּשְׂבָּה אוֹ שְׂעִירָה כֹּל חַד וְחַד! וְאִי דְּאִינּוּן מוּפְלָאִין וְהוּא לָאו מוּפְלָא, אַמַּאי מִתְכַּפֵּר לוֹ בִּפְנֵי עַצְמוֹ? הָא הוֹרָאָה דִּידֵיהּ וְלֹא כְּלוּם הִיא.
The Gemara elaborates: What are the circumstances of an anointed priest issuing a ruling for himself? If we say that it is a case where the High Priest is a distinguished scholar and the judges of the court are not distinguished scholars, it is obvious that he achieves atonement by himself, as their ruling is nothing at all, since they did not consult the generation’s most prominent scholar. And accordingly, each and every one who performed a transgression needs to bring a ewe or female goat as an individual sin-offering. And if it is a case where the judges are distinguished scholars and he is not a distinguished scholar, why does he achieve atonement by himself? Isn’t his ruling nothing at all, and his transgression is an unwitting performance of an action alone, rather than a transgression performed on the basis of a ruling?
אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: כְּגוֹן שֶׁהָיוּ מוּפְלִין שְׁנֵיהֶן.
Rav Pappa says: The reference is to a case where both the anointed priest and the court, i.e., the judges, were distinguished Torah scholars with the authority to issue rulings.
סָבַר אַבָּיֵי לְמֵימַר: חָטָא בִּפְנֵי עַצְמוֹ וְעָשָׂה בִּפְנֵי עַצְמוֹ הֵיכִי דָּמֵי? דְּיָתְבִי בִּשְׁנֵי מְקוֹמוֹת וְקָא מוֹרוּ בִּתְרֵי אִיסּוּרֵי, אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבָא: אַטּוּ שְׁנֵי מְקוֹמוֹת גּוֹרְמִין? אֶלָּא אֲפִילּוּ יָתְבִי בְּחַד מָקוֹם, וְכֵיוָן דְּקָא מוֹרוּ בִּתְרֵי אִיסּוּרֵי – חָטָא בִּפְנֵי עַצְמוֹ הוּא.
§ Abaye thought to say that with regard to the cases in the mishna: If the anointed priest sinned by himself and performed a transgression by himself, what are the circumstances? It is a case where the priest and the court were convened in two different places and issuing rulings with regard to two different prohibitions. Rava said to Abaye: Is that to say that the fact that there are two places determines that he sinned by himself? Rather, it is even in a case where the High Priest and the court are convened in one place. But since they are issuing rulings with regard to two different prohibitions, it is a case where the anointed priest sinned by himself.
פְּשִׁיטָא: הוּא בְּחֵלֶב וְהֵן בַּעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה – חָטָא בִּפְנֵי עַצְמוֹ הוּא, דְּהָא חֲלוּקִין בְּטַעְמַיְיהוּ, וַחֲלוּקִין בְּקׇרְבָּנוֹת. דְּהוּא בְּפַר, וְהֵן בְּפַר וְשָׂעִיר – דְּהָא קָא מַיְיתוּ הָנֵי שָׂעִיר, וְהוּא לָא מַיְיתֵי. וְכׇל שֶׁכֵּן הוּא בַּעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה וְהֵן בְּחֵלֶב, דַּחֲלוּקִין בְּקׇרְבְּנוֹתֵיהֶן [לִגְמָרֵי] – דְּהוּא שְׂעִירָה, וְאִינְהוּ פַּר,
The Gemara continues: It is obvious that in a case where the anointed priest issued a ruling with regard to forbidden fat and the judges issued a ruling with regard to idol worship, it is a case where the anointed priest sinned by himself. As in this case the rulings are distinct in terms of their reasons, as each ruling is based on a different Torah source, and they are also distinct in terms of their offerings, since the priest achieves atonement with a bull as a sin-offering, and the judges achieve atonement with a bull and a goat as a sin-offering for unwitting idol worship, as these judges bring a goat and the priest does not bring a goat. And all the more so in a case where the anointed priest issued a ruling with regard to idol worship and the judges issued a ruling with regard to forbidden fat, it is a case where the anointed priest sinned by himself, as these rulings are totally distinct in terms of their offerings, since the priest brings a female goat as a sin-offering and the judges bring a bull.
אֶלָּא הוּא בְּחֵלֶב הַמְכַסֶּה אֶת הַקֶּרֶב, וְהֵן בְּחֵלֶב שֶׁעַל הַדַּקִּין, מַהוּ? מִי אָמְרִינַן: אַף עַל גַּב דְּקׇרְבָּנָן שָׁוֶה, כֵּיוָן דְּמִתְּרֵי קְרָאֵי קָאָתוּ, הָא פְּלִיגִין בְּטַעְמַיְיהוּ, אוֹ דִלְמָא שֵׁם חֵלֶב אֶחָד הוּא?
But in a case where the anointed priest issued a ruling with regard to forbidden fat that covers the innards, for example, and the judges issued a ruling with regard to forbidden fat that is on the small intestines, what is the halakha? Do we say: Although their offerings are equal, nevertheless, since it is from two different verses that the prohibitions come, the rulings are distinct in terms of their reasons? Or perhaps, the category of forbidden fat is one designation, and all types of forbidden fat are considered one transgression.
אִם תִּמְצָא לוֹמַר שֵׁם חֵלֶב אֶחָד הוּא, הוּא בְּחֵלֶב וְהֵן בְּדָם, מַהוּ? מִי אָמְרִינַן: בְּטַעְמַיְיהוּ הָא פְּלִיגִין, אוֹ דִלְמָא כֵּיוָן דְּשָׁוִין בְּקׇרְבָּן בָּתַר קׇרְבָּן אָזְלִינַן? תֵּיקוּ.
The Gemara continues: If you say that the category of forbidden fat is one designation, then in a case where the priest issues a ruling with regard to forbidden fat and the judges issue a ruling with regard to blood, what is the halakha? Do we say they are distinct in terms of their reasons, as each prohibition has a different Torah source? Or perhaps, since forbidden fat and blood are equal in terms of the atonement offering that one is liable to bring for unwitting consumption, we follow the offering, so that the rulings of the priest and the judges are considered one ruling? The Gemara concludes: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.
שֶׁאֵין בֵּית דִּין חַיָּיבִין עַד שֶׁיּוֹרוּ לְבַטֵּל מִקְצָת וּלְקַיֵּים מִקְצָת וְכוּ׳. מְנָלַן דְּעַד שֶׁיּוֹרוּ לְבַטֵּל מִקְצָת וּלְקַיֵּים מִקְצָת? כִּדְאָמְרִינַן בְּאִידַּךְ פִּירְקִין: ״וְנֶעֱלַם דָּבָר״ – ״דָּבָר״ – וְלֹא כָּל הַגּוּף.
§ The Gemara analyzes the halakhot stated in the mishna: As the court is not liable unless the judges issue a ruling to nullify part of a mitzva and to sustain part of that mitzva. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive that there is no liability unless the judges issue a ruling to nullify part of a mitzva and to sustain part of it? The Gemara answers: It is as we say in the other chapter of this tractate (3b): From the verse: “And the matter is hidden” (Leviticus 4:13), it is derived that there is liability if only a matter, a single detail, is hidden, but not if the entire essence of a mitzva is hidden.
וְכֵן הַמָּשִׁיחַ. מְנָלַן? דִּכְתִיב: ״לְאַשְׁמַת הָעָם״, הֲרֵי מָשִׁיחַ כְּצִבּוּר.
The mishna teaches: And likewise with regard to the ruling of the anointed priest. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive this halakha? It is derived from a verse, as it is written: “If the anointed priest shall sin so as to bring guilt upon the people” (Leviticus 4:3), indicating that the status of an anointed priest is like that of the general public.
וְלֹא בַּעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה כּוּ׳. מְנָלַן? דְּתָנוּ רַבָּנַן: לְפִי שֶׁיָּצְאָה עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה לָדוּן בְּעַצְמָהּ, יָכוֹל יְהוּ חַיָּיבִין עַל עֲקִירַת מִצְוָה כּוּלָּהּ?
The mishna continues: And the court and the priest are not liable for a ruling with regard to idol worship unless they issue a ruling to nullify part of that mitzva and to sustain part of it. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive this? It is derived as the Sages taught in a baraita: Due to the fact that idol worship left the category of unwitting transgressions, to be discussed by itself (see Numbers, chapter 15), one might have thought that the court and the anointed priest would be liable even for nullifying the mitzva in its entirety.
נֶאֱמַר כָּאן ״מֵעֵינֵי״, וְנֶאֱמַר לְהַלָּן ״מֵעֵינֵי״. מָה לְהַלָּן בְּבֵית דִּין, אַף כָּאן נָמֵי בְּבֵית דִּין. וּמָה לְהַלָּן ״דָּבָר״ וְלֹא כׇּל הַגּוּף, אַף כָּאן נָמֵי ״דָּבָר״ וְלֹא כׇּל הַגּוּף.
Therefore, the term “from the eyes of” is stated here, with regard to idol worship (Numbers 15:24), and the term “from the eyes of” is stated there, with regard to an unwitting communal sin-offering for all other mitzvot (Leviticus 4:13). Just as there the reference is to nullifying the mitzva in court, so too here, the reference is to nullifying the mitzva in court. And just as there, with regard to an unwitting communal sin-offering, the reference is to nullifying a matter, but not the entire essence, so too here, the reference is to nullifying a matter, but not the entire essence.
מַתְנִי׳ אֵין חַיָּיבִין אֶלָּא עַל הֶעְלֵם דָּבָר עִם שִׁגְגַת הַמַּעֲשֶׂה, וְכֵן הַמָּשִׁיחַ, וְלֹא בַּעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה – אֵין חַיָּיבִין אֶלָּא עַל הֶעְלֵם דָּבָר עִם שִׁגְגַת הַמַּעֲשֶׂה.
MISHNA: The court is liable only for absence of awareness of the matter, leading to an erroneous ruling, together with unwitting performance of the action by the general public on the basis of that ruling. And likewise, the anointed priest is liable only for an erroneous ruling and his unwitting performance of an action on the basis of that ruling. And the court and the priest are liable for a ruling with regard to idol worship only for absence of awareness of the matter, leading to an erroneous ruling, together with unwitting performance of the action on the basis of that ruling.
גְּמָ׳ מְנָלַן? דְּתָנוּ רַבָּנַן: ״יִשְׁגּוּ״ – יָכוֹל יְהוּ חַיָּיבִין עַל שִׁגְגַת מַעֲשֶׂה? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״יִשְׁגּוּ וְנֶעֱלַם דָּבָר״, אֵין חַיָּיבִין אֶלָּא עַל הֶעְלֵם דָּבָר עִם שִׁגְגַת מַעֲשֶׂה.
GEMARA: With regard to the halakha that the court is liable only for absence of awareness of the matter together with unwitting performance of an action, the Gemara asks: From where do we derive this halakha? It is derived from a verse, as the Sages taught in a baraita that it is stated: “And if the entire congregation of Israel shall act unwittingly” (Leviticus 4:13). One might have thought that they will be liable to bring a bull for every case of unwitting performance of an action. Therefore, the verse states: “Shall act unwittingly, and the matter was hidden” (Leviticus 4:13), from which it is derived that the court is liable only for absence of awareness of the matter, leading to an erroneous ruling, together with unwitting performance of an action on the basis of that ruling.
וְכֵן הַמָּשִׁיחַ. מְנָלַן? דִּכְתִיב: ״לְאַשְׁמַת הַעָם״, הֲרֵי מָשִׁיחַ כְּצִבּוּר.
The mishna continues: And likewise the anointed priest. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive this? It is derived from a verse, as it is written with regard to the anointed priest: “If the anointed priest shall sin so as to bring guilt upon the people” (Leviticus 4:3), indicating that the status of an anointed priest is like that of the general public.
וְלֹא בַּעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה אֶלָּא עַל הֶעְלֵם דָּבָר עִם שִׁגְגַת מַעֲשֶׂה. מְנָלַן?
The mishna continues: And the court and the priest are liable for a ruling with regard to idol worship only for absence of awareness of the matter, leading to an erroneous ruling, together with unwitting performance of an action on the basis of that ruling. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive this?
דְּתָנוּ רַבָּנַן: לְפִי שֶׁיָּצְאָה עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה לָדוּן בְּעַצְמָהּ, יָכוֹל יְהוּ חַיָּיבִין עַל שִׁגְגַת הַמַּעֲשֶׂה? נֶאֱמַר כָּאן ״מֵעֵינֵי״ וְנֶאֱמַר לְהַלָּן ״מֵעֵינֵי״, מָה לְהַלָּן אֵין חַיָּיבִין אֶלָּא עַל הֶעְלֵם דָּבָר עִם שִׁגְגַת מַעֲשֶׂה, אַף כָּאן אֵין חַיָּיבִין אֶלָּא עַל הֶעְלֵם דָּבָר עִם שִׁגְגַת מַעֲשֶׂה.
The Gemara answers: It is derived as the Sages taught: Due to the fact that idol worship left the category of unwitting transgressions to be discussed by itself (see Numbers, chapter 15), one might have thought that the court and the priest would be liable for a mere unwitting performance of the action. Therefore, the term “from the eyes of” is stated here, with regard to idol worship (Numbers 15:24), and “from the eyes of” is stated there, with regard to an unwitting communal sin-offering for all other mitzvot (Leviticus 4:13). Just as there they are liable only for absence of awareness of the matter, leading to an erroneous ruling, together with unwitting performance of an action on the basis of that ruling, so too here, they are liable only for absence of awareness of the matter, leading to an erroneous ruling, together with unwitting performance of an action on the basis of that ruling.
וְאִילּוּ מָשִׁיחַ בַּעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה לָא קָתָנֵי, מַתְנִיתִין מַנִּי? רַבִּי הִיא.
The Gemara notes: Whereas, the halakha that the status of an anointed priest who issues a ruling with regard to idol worship is like that of the court is not taught in the mishna. Whose opinion is expressed in the mishna? It is the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi.
דְּתַנְיָא: מָשִׁיחַ בַּעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה – רַבִּי אוֹמֵר: בְּשִׁגְגַת מַעֲשֶׂה. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: בְּהֶעְלֵם דָּבָר. וְשָׁוִין שֶׁבִּשְׂעִירָה, וְשָׁוִין שֶׁאֵין מֵבִיא אָשָׁם תָּלוּי.
The Gemara explains: This is as it is taught in a baraita: If an anointed priest unwittingly engages in idol worship, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: He brings an offering for unwitting performance of an action, like any other Jew. And the Rabbis say: He brings an offering for absence of awareness of the matter, leading to an erroneous ruling. And they agree that the atonement of an anointed priest is with a female goat as a sin-offering, and they agree that he does not bring a provisional guilt-offering. Since the mishna omitted the halakha of an anointed priest who engages in idol worship, apparently it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who says that the status of the anointed priest in this regard is like that of any other Jew.
וְתִסְבְּרַאּ: בִּזְדוֹנוֹ כָּרֵת וּבְשִׁגְגָתוֹ חַטָּאת מִי קָתָנֵי?
The Gemara rejects this: And how can you understand the mishna in that manner? In the mishna (8a) that teaches that the court is not liable to bring an offering for absence of awareness of the matter unless they issue a ruling with regard to a matter for whose intentional violation one is liable to receive excision from the World-to-Come [karet] and for whose unwitting violation one is liable to bring a sin-offering, does it teach the halakha concerning an anointed priest in the latter clause of that mishna?
אֶלָּא תָּנֵי הָא הוּא הַדִּין לְהָא. הָכָא נָמֵי תְּנָא הָא וְהוּא הַדִּין לְהָא.
The Gemara explains: Rather, the tanna on 8a teaches this halakha, that in the first clause the anointed priest has the same halakha as the court, and the same is true with regard to that halakha, i.e., that in the latter clause the anointed priest has the same halakha as the court. Here too, the tanna taught this halakha, that in the first clause the anointed priest has the same halakha as the court, and the same is true with regard to that halakha, i.e., that in the latter clause the anointed priest has the same halakha as the court. Therefore, there is no proof that the mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis.
מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי? אָמַר קְרָא: ״וְכִפֶּר הַכֹּהֵן עַל הַנֶּפֶשׁ הַשֹּׁגֶגֶת בְּחֶטְאָה בִשְׁגָגָה״. ״הַנֶּפֶשׁ״ – זֶה מָשִׁיחַ, ״הַשֹּׁגֶגֶת״ – זֶה נָשִׂיא, ״בְּחֶטְאָה בִּשְׁגָגָה״ – רַבִּי סָבַר: חֵטְא זֶה בִּשְׁגָגָה יְהֵא.
The Gemara asks: What is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi? It is as the verse states with regard to idol worship: “And the priest shall atone for the soul that acted unwittingly, when he sins unwittingly” (Numbers 15:28). With regard to the term “the soul,” that is referring to an anointed priest; with regard to the term “that acted unwittingly,” that is referring to a king; and due to the phrase “when he sins unwittingly,” Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds this sin shall be one performed unwittingly, not the result of absence of awareness of the matter, leading to an erroneous ruling.
וְרַבָּנַן סָבְרִי: מִי שֶׁחַטָּאתוֹ בִּשְׁגָגָה, יָצָא מָשִׁיחַ שֶׁאֵין חַטָּאתוֹ בִּשְׁגָגָה אֶלָּא בְּהֶעְלֵם דָּבָר.
And the Rabbis hold: This phrase serves to teach that the halakha that this offering is brought for an unwitting sin applies to one whose sin-offering for all other transgressions is for an unwitting act. This serves to exclude an anointed priest, whose liability to bring a sin-offering for an unwitting act is only for absence of awareness of the matter, leading to an erroneous ruling, together with unwitting performance of an action on the basis of that ruling.
וְשָׁוִין שֶׁבִּשְׂעִירָה כְּיָחִיד. מְנָלַן? דְּאָמַר קְרָא: ״וְאִם נֶפֶשׁ אַחַת״ – אֶחָד יָחִיד וְאֶחָד נָשִׂיא וְאֶחָד מָשִׁיחַ – כּוּלָּם בִּכְלַל ״נֶפֶשׁ אַחַת״ הֵן.
The baraita teaches: And they agree that the atonement of an anointed priest is with a female goat as a sin-offering, as in the case of an ordinary individual. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive this halakha? The Gemara answers: It is derived from a verse, as the verse states: “And if one soul sins unwittingly, then he shall offer a female goat of the first year as a sin-offering” (Numbers 15:27). An ordinary individual, a king, and an anointed priest are all liable to bring an offering, as they are all included in the category of “one soul.”
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I went to day school in Toronto but really began to learn when I attended Brovenders back in the early 1980’s. Last year after talking to my sister who was learning Daf Yomi, inspired, I looked on the computer and the Hadran site came up. I have been listening to each days shiur in the morning as I work. I emphasis listening since I am not sitting with a Gamara. I listen while I work in my studio.
Tekoa, Israel
It’s hard to believe it has been over two years. Daf yomi has changed my life in so many ways and has been sustaining during this global sea change. Each day means learning something new, digging a little deeper, adding another lens, seeing worlds with new eyes. Daf has also fostered new friendships and deepened childhood connections, as long time friends have unexpectedly become havruta.
Northwest Washington, United States
When I was working and taking care of my children, learning was never on the list. Now that I have more time I have two different Gemora classes and the nach yomi as well as the mishna yomi daily.
Jerusalem, Israel
I am a Reform rabbi and took Talmud courses in rabbinical school, but I knew there was so much more to learn. It felt inauthentic to serve as a rabbi without having read the entire Talmud, so when the opportunity arose to start Daf Yomi in 2020, I dove in! Thanks to Hadran, Daf Yomi has enriched my understanding of rabbinic Judaism and deepened my love of Jewish text & tradition. Todah rabbah!
California, United States
Phoenix, Arizona, United States
When I began learning Daf Yomi at the beginning of the current cycle, I was preparing for an upcoming surgery and thought that learning the Daf would be something positive I could do each day during my recovery, even if I accomplished nothing else. I had no idea what a lifeline learning the Daf would turn out to be in so many ways.
Lexington, MA, United States
Jerusalem, Israel
I started learning Daf Yomi inspired by תָּפַסְתָּ מְרוּבֶּה לֹא תָּפַסְתָּ, תָּפַסְתָּ מוּעָט תָּפַסְתָּ. I thought I’d start the first page, and then see. I was swept up into the enthusiasm of the Hadran Siyum, and from there the momentum kept building. Rabbanit Michelle’s shiur gives me an anchor, a connection to an incredible virtual community, and an energy to face whatever the day brings.
בית שמש, Israel
Oceanside NY, United States
I heard about the syium in January 2020 & I was excited to start learning then the pandemic started. Learning Daf became something to focus on but also something stressful. As the world changed around me & my family I had to adjust my expectations for myself & the world. Daf Yomi & the Hadran podcast has been something I look forward to every day. It gives me a moment of centering & Judaism daily.
Denver, United States
I began to learn this cycle of Daf Yomi after my husband passed away 2 1/2 years ago. It seemed a good way to connect to him. Even though I don’t know whether he would have encouraged women learning Gemara, it would have opened wonderful conversations. It also gives me more depth for understanding my frum children and grandchildren. Thank you Hadran and Rabbanit Michelle Farber!!
Tzur Hadassah, Israel
I started learning at the beginning of this Daf Yomi cycle because I heard a lot about the previous cycle coming to an end and thought it would be a good thing to start doing. My husband had already bought several of the Koren Talmud Bavli books and they were just sitting on the shelf, not being used, so here was an opportunity to start using them and find out exactly what was in them. Loving it!
Borehamwood, United Kingdom
I had tried to start after being inspired by the hadran siyum, but did not manage to stick to it. However, just before masechet taanit, our rav wrote a message to the shul WhatsApp encouraging people to start with masechet taanit, so I did! And this time, I’m hooked! I listen to the shiur every day , and am also trying to improve my skills.
Yad Binyamin, Israel
Phoenix, AZ, United States
I never thought I’d be able to do Daf Yomi till I saw the video of Hadran’s Siyum HaShas. Now, 2 years later, I’m about to participate in Siyum Seder Mo’ed with my Hadran community. It has been an incredible privilege to learn with Rabbanit Michelle and to get to know so many caring, talented and knowledgeable women. I look forward with great anticipation and excitement to learning Seder Nashim.
Karmiel, Israel
I had dreamed of doing daf yomi since I had my first serious Talmud class 18 years ago at Pardes with Rahel Berkovitz, and then a couple of summers with Leah Rosenthal. There is no way I would be able to do it without another wonderful teacher, Michelle, and the Hadran organization. I wake up and am excited to start each day with the next daf.
Irvine, United States
Studying has changed my life view on הלכה and יהדות and time. It has taught me bonudaries of the human nature and honesty of our sages in their discourse to try and build a nation of caring people .
Kfar Saba, Israel
Oceanside NY, United States
Minneapolis, MN, United States
I have joined the community of daf yomi learners at the start of this cycle. I have studied in different ways – by reading the page, translating the page, attending a local shiur and listening to Rabbanit Farber’s podcasts, depending on circumstances and where I was at the time. The reactions have been positive throughout – with no exception!
Guildford, United Kingdom
Horayot 7
צִבּוּר מוּצָא מִכְּלַל יָחִיד, וּמָשִׁיחַ מוּצָא מִכְּלַל יָחִיד. מָה צִבּוּר אֵין חַיָּיבִין אֶלָּא עַל הֶעְלֵם דָּבָר עִם שִׁגְגַת מַעֲשֶׂה, אַף מָשִׁיחַ לֹא יְהֵא חַיָּיב אֶלָּא עַל הֶעְלֵם דָּבָר עִם שִׁגְגַת מַעֲשֶׂה.
The general public is removed from the category of an individual, as an individual brings a ewe or female goat as a sin-offering, whereas when the general public sins the sin-offering is a bull. And likewise, an anointed priest is removed from the category of an individual, as his sin-offering is also a bull. Therefore, just as the general public is liable only for absence of awareness of the matter by the court together with unwitting performance of an action by the people, so too, an anointed priest will be liable only for absence of awareness of the matter together with unwitting performance of an action.
אוֹ כְּלָךְ לְדֶרֶךְ זוֹ: נָשִׂיא מוּצָא מִכְּלַל יָחִיד, וּמָשִׁיחַ מוּצָא מִכְּלַל יָחִיד. מָה נָשִׂיא מֵבִיא בְּשִׁגְגַת מַעֲשֶׂה בְּלֹא הֶעְלֵם דָּבָר, אַף מָשִׁיחַ מֵבִיא בְּשִׁגְגַת מַעֲשֶׂה בְּלֹא הֶעְלֵם דָּבָר!
Or perhaps go this way and draw a different analogy: A king [Nasi] is removed from the category of an individual, as his sin-offering is a goat. And an anointed priest is removed from the category of an individual. Therefore, just as a king brings an offering for unwitting performance of an action, even without absence of awareness of the matter leading to an erroneous ruling, like any individual liable to bring a sin-offering, so too, an anointed priest brings an offering for unwitting performance of an action, even without absence of awareness of the matter leading to an erroneous ruling. It is possible to liken the anointed priest to either the general public or to the king.
נִרְאֶה לְמִי דּוֹמֶה? צִבּוּר – בְּפַר וְאֵין מְבִיאִין אָשָׁם תָּלוּי, וּמָשִׁיחַ – בְּפַר וְאֵין מֵבִיא אָשָׁם תָּלוּי. מָה צִבּוּר אֵינוֹ חַיָּיב אֶלָּא עַל הֶעְלֵם דָּבָר עִם שִׁגְגַת מַעֲשֶׂה, אַף מָשִׁיחַ לֹא יְהֵא חַיָּיב אֶלָּא עַל הֶעְלֵם דָּבָר עִם שִׁגְגַת מַעֲשֶׂה.
The Gemara considers these two comparisons: Let us see to which of them, the general public or the king, an anointed priest is similar. The general public achieves atonement with a bull and does not bring a provisional guilt-offering, and an anointed priest achieves atonement with a bull and does not bring a provisional guilt-offering. Therefore one might say: Just as the general public is liable only for absence of awareness of the matter by the court together with unwitting performance of an action by the people, so too, an anointed priest will be liable only for absence of awareness of the matter together with unwitting performance of an action.
אוֹ כְּלָךְ לְדֶרֶךְ זוֹ: נָשִׂיא מֵבִיא שְׂעִירָה בַּעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה וּמֵבִיא אָשָׁם וַדַּאי, וּמָשִׁיחַ מֵבִיא שְׂעִירָה בַּעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה וּמֵבִיא אָשָׁם וַדַּאי. מָה נָשִׂיא מֵבִיא בְּשִׁגְגַת מַעֲשֶׂה, אַף מָשִׁיחַ מֵבִיא בְּשִׁגְגַת מַעֲשֶׂה.
Or perhaps go this way and draw a different analogy: The king brings a female goat for unwitting idol worship and brings a definite guilt-offering for certain other transgressions where there is liability to bring a guilt-offering, e.g., misuse of consecrated property and robbery, and an anointed priest brings a female goat for unwitting idol worship and brings a definite guilt-offering for the same transgressions as the king. This is in contrast to the general public, which brings a bull as a sin-offering for unwitting idol worship and does not bring a definite guilt-offering at all. Therefore conclude: Just as a king brings an offering for unwitting performance of an action without absence of awareness of the matter, like any individual liable to bring a sin-offering, so too, an anointed priest brings an offering for unwitting performance of an action without absence of awareness of the matter.
תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״לְאַשְׁמַת הָעָם״, הֲרֵי הוּא מָשִׁיחַ כְּצִבּוּר. מָה צִבּוּר אֵינוֹ מֵבִיא אֶלָּא עַל הֶעְלֵם דָּבָר עִם שִׁגְגַת מַעֲשֶׂה, אַף מָשִׁיחַ אֵינוֹ מֵבִיא אֶלָּא עַל הֶעְלֵם דָּבָר עִם שִׁגְגַת מַעֲשֶׂה.
Since either conclusion can be derived logically, another source is necessary. Therefore, the verse states: “If the anointed priest shall sin so as to bring guilt upon the people” (Leviticus 4:3), indicating that the status of the anointed priest is like that of the general public. Therefore, just as the general public brings an offering only for absence of awareness of the matter by the court with unwitting performance of an action by the people, so too, an anointed priest brings an offering only for absence of awareness of the matter with unwitting performance of an action.
אֵימָא: מָה צִבּוּר הוֹרָה וְעָשׂוּ אַחֲרָיו בְּהוֹרָאָתוֹ – חַיָּיבִין, אַף מָשִׁיחַ כְּשֶׁהוֹרָה וְעָשׂוּ אַחֲרָיו בְּהוֹרָאָתוֹ – יְהֵא חַיָּיב! תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״וְהִקְרִיב עַל חַטָּאתוֹ אֲשֶׁר חָטָא״, עַל מָה שֶׁחָטָא הוּא מֵבִיא, וְאֵין מֵבִיא עַל מָה שֶׁחָטְאוּ אֲחֵרִים.
The Gemara challenges the comparison: Based on the comparison between the anointed priest and the general public, why not say: Just as with regard to the general public, if the court issued a ruling and the general public performed the transgression after its ruling and in accordance with its ruling, the court is liable, so too, with regard to an anointed priest, when he issued a ruling and the general public performed the transgression after his ruling and in accordance with his ruling, he should be liable. Therefore, the verse states with regard to the anointed priest: “Then he shall offer for his sin that he has sinned” (Leviticus 4:3), from which it is derived: He brings an offering for that sin that he sinned on the basis of his ruling, but he does not bring an offering for that sin that others sinned on the basis of his ruling.
אָמַר מָר: מָשִׁיחַ בְּפַר וְאֵין מֵבִיא אָשָׁם תָּלוּי. מְנָא לֵיהּ דְּאֵין מֵבִיא אָשָׁם תָּלוּי?
The Gemara elaborates on that which the Master said: An anointed priest achieves atonement with a bull and does not bring a provisional guilt-offering. The Gemara asks: From where does the tanna derive that an anointed priest does not bring a provisional guilt-offering?
דִּכְתִיב: ״וְכִפֶּר עָלָיו הַכֹּהֵן עַל שִׁגְגָתוֹ אֲשֶׁר שָׁגָג״, מִי שֶׁחַטָּאתוֹ וְשִׁגְגָתוֹ שָׁוָה, יָצָא מָשִׁיחַ שֶׁאֵין שִׁגְגָתוֹ וְחַטָּאתוֹ שָׁוָה, דִּכְתִיב: ״לְאַשְׁמַת הָעָם״, הֲרֵי הוּא מָשִׁיחַ כְּצִבּוּר.
The Gemara answers: It is derived from a verse, as it is written with regard to the halakhot of the guilt-offering: “And the priest shall atone for him for his unwitting act that he performed unwittingly” (Leviticus 5:18), from which it is derived that this halakha applies only to one whose transgression and his unwitting action are equal, i.e., an ordinary person, whose unwitting act is the very transgression that he performed unwittingly. This serves to exclude an anointed priest, whose unwitting action and his transgression are not equal, as his unwitting act is the erroneous ruling and he is liable to bring an offering only if he performed the transgression on the basis of that ruling. As it is written about the anointed priest: “So as to bring guilt upon the people” (Leviticus 4:3), indicating that the status of the anointed priest is like that of the general public.
״לְאַשְׁמַת הָעָם״, עַד כָּאן לָא קָאָמַר לֵיהּ. אֶלָּא אָשָׁם כְּדִי נַסְבַהּ.
The Gemara questions this proof: How can the Gemara base the halakha on an interpretation of the verse: “So as to bring guilt upon the people”? To this point, the tanna of the baraita did not state this verse. The tanna first states that the anointed priest does not bring a provisional guilt-offering and only then cites the verse from which he proves the halakha that an anointed priest brings an offering only for absence of awareness of the matter together with unwitting performance of an action. Rather, he stated the halakha of the provisional guilt-offering for no reason. Although the halakha is correct, there was no reason to cite it in the baraita.
מַתְנִי׳ הוֹרָה בִּפְנֵי עַצְמוֹ וְעָשָׂה בִּפְנֵי עַצְמוֹ – מִתְכַּפֵּר לוֹ בִּפְנֵי עַצְמוֹ. הוֹרָה עִם הַצִּבּוּר וְעָשָׂה עִם הַצִּבּוּר – מִתְכַּפֵּר לוֹ עִם הַצִּבּוּר, שֶׁאֵין בֵּית דִּין חַיָּיבִין עַד שֶׁיּוֹרוּ לְבַטֵּל מִקְצָת וּלְקַיֵּים מִקְצָת, וְכֵן הַמָּשִׁיחַ, וְלֹא בַּעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה עַד שֶׁיּוֹרוּ לְבַטֵּל מִקְצָת וּלְקַיֵּים מִקְצָת.
MISHNA: If the anointed priest issued a ruling by himself and performed a transgression by himself, he achieves atonement by himself by bringing a bull as his sin-offering. If he issued a ruling with the general public, i.e., the Sanhedrin, and performed a transgression with the general public, i.e., the Jewish people, he achieves atonement with the general public. As, the court is not liable unless the judges issue a ruling to nullify part of a commandment and to sustain part of that commandment, and likewise with regard to the ruling of the anointed priest. And the court and the priest are not liable for a ruling with regard to idol worship unless they issue a ruling to nullify part of that commandment and to sustain part of it.
גְּמָ׳ מְנָהָנֵי מִילֵּי? דְּתָנוּ רַבָּנַן: הוֹרָה עִם הַצִּבּוּר וְעָשָׂה עִם הַצִּבּוּר, יָכוֹל יָבִיא פַּר לְעַצְמוֹ?
GEMARA: Concerning the halakha that there is a difference between an unwitting transgression that the anointed priest performs by himself and one that he performs with the general public, the Gemara asks: From where is this matter derived? The Gemara explains: It is as the Sages taught in a baraita: If the anointed priest issued a ruling with the general public and performed a transgression with the general public, one might have thought that he is liable to bring a bull as a sin-offering for himself.
וְדִין הוּא: נָשִׂיא מוּצָא מִכְּלַל יָחִיד וּמָשִׁיחַ מוּצָא מִכְּלַל יָחִיד, מָה נָשִׂיא, חָטָא בִּפְנֵי עַצְמוֹ – מֵבִיא בִּפְנֵי עַצְמוֹ, חָטָא עִם הַצִּבּוּר – מִתְכַּפֵּר לוֹ עִם הַצִּבּוּר. אַף מָשִׁיחַ, חָטָא בִּפְנֵי עַצְמוֹ – מֵבִיא בִּפְנֵי עַצְמוֹ, חָטָא עִם הַצִּבּוּר – מִתְכַּפֵּר לוֹ עִם הַצִּבּוּר!
The baraita continues: And there is a logical inference to support this: A king is removed from the category of an individual and an anointed priest is removed from the category of an individual, as each brings a different sin-offering than an individual. Just as with regard to a king, if he sinned by himself he brings his sin-offering of a goat by himself, and if he sinned with the general public, he achieves atonement with the general public, so too, with regard to an anointed priest, if he sinned by himself he brings his sin-offering of a bull by himself, and if he sinned with the general public, he achieves atonement with the general public.
לֹא, אִם אָמַרְתָּ בְּנָשִׂיא – שֶׁכֵּן מִתְכַּפֵּר לוֹ עִם הַצִּבּוּר בְּיוֹם הַכִּפּוּרִים. תֹּאמַר בְּמָשִׁיחַ – שֶׁאֵין מִתְכַּפֵּר לוֹ עִם הַצִּבּוּר בְּיוֹם הַכִּפּוּרִים!
The baraita rejects this: No, if you said with regard to a king that he achieves atonement with the general public, that is logical, as he achieves atonement with the general public on Yom Kippur. Shall you also say the same with regard to an anointed priest, who does not achieve atonement with the general public on Yom Kippur but rather brings his own atonement offering?
הוֹאִיל וְאֵין מִתְכַּפֵּר לוֹ עִם הַצִּבּוּר בְּיוֹם הַכִּפּוּרִים, יָכוֹל יָבִיא פַּר לְעַצְמוֹ? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״עַל חַטָּאתוֹ אֲשֶׁר חָטָא״, הָא כֵּיצַד? חָטָא בִּפְנֵי עַצְמוֹ – מֵבִיא בִּפְנֵי עַצְמוֹ, חָטָא עִם הַצִּבּוּר – מִתְכַּפֵּר לוֹ עִם הַצִּבּוּר.
The baraita continues: Since he does not achieve atonement with the general public on Yom Kippur, one might have thought that he will bring a bull for himself even if he unwittingly performed a transgression with the general public. Therefore, the verse states: “Then he shall offer for his sin that he has sinned” (Leviticus 4:3), indicating that he sinned alone, not with the general public. How so? If he sinned by himself he brings his sin-offering of a bull by himself; if he sinned with the general public, he achieves atonement with the general public.
הֵיכִי דָמֵי? אִילֵּימָא דְּהוּא מוּפְלָא וְהֵם אֵינָן מוּפְלָאִין, פְּשִׁיטָא דְּמִתְכַּפֵּר לוֹ בִּפְנֵי עַצְמוֹ, הוֹרָאָה דִּלְהוֹן וְלֹא כְּלוּם. וּבָעֵי אֵתוֹיֵי כִּשְׂבָּה אוֹ שְׂעִירָה כֹּל חַד וְחַד! וְאִי דְּאִינּוּן מוּפְלָאִין וְהוּא לָאו מוּפְלָא, אַמַּאי מִתְכַּפֵּר לוֹ בִּפְנֵי עַצְמוֹ? הָא הוֹרָאָה דִּידֵיהּ וְלֹא כְּלוּם הִיא.
The Gemara elaborates: What are the circumstances of an anointed priest issuing a ruling for himself? If we say that it is a case where the High Priest is a distinguished scholar and the judges of the court are not distinguished scholars, it is obvious that he achieves atonement by himself, as their ruling is nothing at all, since they did not consult the generation’s most prominent scholar. And accordingly, each and every one who performed a transgression needs to bring a ewe or female goat as an individual sin-offering. And if it is a case where the judges are distinguished scholars and he is not a distinguished scholar, why does he achieve atonement by himself? Isn’t his ruling nothing at all, and his transgression is an unwitting performance of an action alone, rather than a transgression performed on the basis of a ruling?
אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: כְּגוֹן שֶׁהָיוּ מוּפְלִין שְׁנֵיהֶן.
Rav Pappa says: The reference is to a case where both the anointed priest and the court, i.e., the judges, were distinguished Torah scholars with the authority to issue rulings.
סָבַר אַבָּיֵי לְמֵימַר: חָטָא בִּפְנֵי עַצְמוֹ וְעָשָׂה בִּפְנֵי עַצְמוֹ הֵיכִי דָּמֵי? דְּיָתְבִי בִּשְׁנֵי מְקוֹמוֹת וְקָא מוֹרוּ בִּתְרֵי אִיסּוּרֵי, אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבָא: אַטּוּ שְׁנֵי מְקוֹמוֹת גּוֹרְמִין? אֶלָּא אֲפִילּוּ יָתְבִי בְּחַד מָקוֹם, וְכֵיוָן דְּקָא מוֹרוּ בִּתְרֵי אִיסּוּרֵי – חָטָא בִּפְנֵי עַצְמוֹ הוּא.
§ Abaye thought to say that with regard to the cases in the mishna: If the anointed priest sinned by himself and performed a transgression by himself, what are the circumstances? It is a case where the priest and the court were convened in two different places and issuing rulings with regard to two different prohibitions. Rava said to Abaye: Is that to say that the fact that there are two places determines that he sinned by himself? Rather, it is even in a case where the High Priest and the court are convened in one place. But since they are issuing rulings with regard to two different prohibitions, it is a case where the anointed priest sinned by himself.
פְּשִׁיטָא: הוּא בְּחֵלֶב וְהֵן בַּעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה – חָטָא בִּפְנֵי עַצְמוֹ הוּא, דְּהָא חֲלוּקִין בְּטַעְמַיְיהוּ, וַחֲלוּקִין בְּקׇרְבָּנוֹת. דְּהוּא בְּפַר, וְהֵן בְּפַר וְשָׂעִיר – דְּהָא קָא מַיְיתוּ הָנֵי שָׂעִיר, וְהוּא לָא מַיְיתֵי. וְכׇל שֶׁכֵּן הוּא בַּעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה וְהֵן בְּחֵלֶב, דַּחֲלוּקִין בְּקׇרְבְּנוֹתֵיהֶן [לִגְמָרֵי] – דְּהוּא שְׂעִירָה, וְאִינְהוּ פַּר,
The Gemara continues: It is obvious that in a case where the anointed priest issued a ruling with regard to forbidden fat and the judges issued a ruling with regard to idol worship, it is a case where the anointed priest sinned by himself. As in this case the rulings are distinct in terms of their reasons, as each ruling is based on a different Torah source, and they are also distinct in terms of their offerings, since the priest achieves atonement with a bull as a sin-offering, and the judges achieve atonement with a bull and a goat as a sin-offering for unwitting idol worship, as these judges bring a goat and the priest does not bring a goat. And all the more so in a case where the anointed priest issued a ruling with regard to idol worship and the judges issued a ruling with regard to forbidden fat, it is a case where the anointed priest sinned by himself, as these rulings are totally distinct in terms of their offerings, since the priest brings a female goat as a sin-offering and the judges bring a bull.
אֶלָּא הוּא בְּחֵלֶב הַמְכַסֶּה אֶת הַקֶּרֶב, וְהֵן בְּחֵלֶב שֶׁעַל הַדַּקִּין, מַהוּ? מִי אָמְרִינַן: אַף עַל גַּב דְּקׇרְבָּנָן שָׁוֶה, כֵּיוָן דְּמִתְּרֵי קְרָאֵי קָאָתוּ, הָא פְּלִיגִין בְּטַעְמַיְיהוּ, אוֹ דִלְמָא שֵׁם חֵלֶב אֶחָד הוּא?
But in a case where the anointed priest issued a ruling with regard to forbidden fat that covers the innards, for example, and the judges issued a ruling with regard to forbidden fat that is on the small intestines, what is the halakha? Do we say: Although their offerings are equal, nevertheless, since it is from two different verses that the prohibitions come, the rulings are distinct in terms of their reasons? Or perhaps, the category of forbidden fat is one designation, and all types of forbidden fat are considered one transgression.
אִם תִּמְצָא לוֹמַר שֵׁם חֵלֶב אֶחָד הוּא, הוּא בְּחֵלֶב וְהֵן בְּדָם, מַהוּ? מִי אָמְרִינַן: בְּטַעְמַיְיהוּ הָא פְּלִיגִין, אוֹ דִלְמָא כֵּיוָן דְּשָׁוִין בְּקׇרְבָּן בָּתַר קׇרְבָּן אָזְלִינַן? תֵּיקוּ.
The Gemara continues: If you say that the category of forbidden fat is one designation, then in a case where the priest issues a ruling with regard to forbidden fat and the judges issue a ruling with regard to blood, what is the halakha? Do we say they are distinct in terms of their reasons, as each prohibition has a different Torah source? Or perhaps, since forbidden fat and blood are equal in terms of the atonement offering that one is liable to bring for unwitting consumption, we follow the offering, so that the rulings of the priest and the judges are considered one ruling? The Gemara concludes: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.
שֶׁאֵין בֵּית דִּין חַיָּיבִין עַד שֶׁיּוֹרוּ לְבַטֵּל מִקְצָת וּלְקַיֵּים מִקְצָת וְכוּ׳. מְנָלַן דְּעַד שֶׁיּוֹרוּ לְבַטֵּל מִקְצָת וּלְקַיֵּים מִקְצָת? כִּדְאָמְרִינַן בְּאִידַּךְ פִּירְקִין: ״וְנֶעֱלַם דָּבָר״ – ״דָּבָר״ – וְלֹא כָּל הַגּוּף.
§ The Gemara analyzes the halakhot stated in the mishna: As the court is not liable unless the judges issue a ruling to nullify part of a mitzva and to sustain part of that mitzva. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive that there is no liability unless the judges issue a ruling to nullify part of a mitzva and to sustain part of it? The Gemara answers: It is as we say in the other chapter of this tractate (3b): From the verse: “And the matter is hidden” (Leviticus 4:13), it is derived that there is liability if only a matter, a single detail, is hidden, but not if the entire essence of a mitzva is hidden.
וְכֵן הַמָּשִׁיחַ. מְנָלַן? דִּכְתִיב: ״לְאַשְׁמַת הָעָם״, הֲרֵי מָשִׁיחַ כְּצִבּוּר.
The mishna teaches: And likewise with regard to the ruling of the anointed priest. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive this halakha? It is derived from a verse, as it is written: “If the anointed priest shall sin so as to bring guilt upon the people” (Leviticus 4:3), indicating that the status of an anointed priest is like that of the general public.
וְלֹא בַּעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה כּוּ׳. מְנָלַן? דְּתָנוּ רַבָּנַן: לְפִי שֶׁיָּצְאָה עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה לָדוּן בְּעַצְמָהּ, יָכוֹל יְהוּ חַיָּיבִין עַל עֲקִירַת מִצְוָה כּוּלָּהּ?
The mishna continues: And the court and the priest are not liable for a ruling with regard to idol worship unless they issue a ruling to nullify part of that mitzva and to sustain part of it. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive this? It is derived as the Sages taught in a baraita: Due to the fact that idol worship left the category of unwitting transgressions, to be discussed by itself (see Numbers, chapter 15), one might have thought that the court and the anointed priest would be liable even for nullifying the mitzva in its entirety.
נֶאֱמַר כָּאן ״מֵעֵינֵי״, וְנֶאֱמַר לְהַלָּן ״מֵעֵינֵי״. מָה לְהַלָּן בְּבֵית דִּין, אַף כָּאן נָמֵי בְּבֵית דִּין. וּמָה לְהַלָּן ״דָּבָר״ וְלֹא כׇּל הַגּוּף, אַף כָּאן נָמֵי ״דָּבָר״ וְלֹא כׇּל הַגּוּף.
Therefore, the term “from the eyes of” is stated here, with regard to idol worship (Numbers 15:24), and the term “from the eyes of” is stated there, with regard to an unwitting communal sin-offering for all other mitzvot (Leviticus 4:13). Just as there the reference is to nullifying the mitzva in court, so too here, the reference is to nullifying the mitzva in court. And just as there, with regard to an unwitting communal sin-offering, the reference is to nullifying a matter, but not the entire essence, so too here, the reference is to nullifying a matter, but not the entire essence.
מַתְנִי׳ אֵין חַיָּיבִין אֶלָּא עַל הֶעְלֵם דָּבָר עִם שִׁגְגַת הַמַּעֲשֶׂה, וְכֵן הַמָּשִׁיחַ, וְלֹא בַּעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה – אֵין חַיָּיבִין אֶלָּא עַל הֶעְלֵם דָּבָר עִם שִׁגְגַת הַמַּעֲשֶׂה.
MISHNA: The court is liable only for absence of awareness of the matter, leading to an erroneous ruling, together with unwitting performance of the action by the general public on the basis of that ruling. And likewise, the anointed priest is liable only for an erroneous ruling and his unwitting performance of an action on the basis of that ruling. And the court and the priest are liable for a ruling with regard to idol worship only for absence of awareness of the matter, leading to an erroneous ruling, together with unwitting performance of the action on the basis of that ruling.
גְּמָ׳ מְנָלַן? דְּתָנוּ רַבָּנַן: ״יִשְׁגּוּ״ – יָכוֹל יְהוּ חַיָּיבִין עַל שִׁגְגַת מַעֲשֶׂה? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״יִשְׁגּוּ וְנֶעֱלַם דָּבָר״, אֵין חַיָּיבִין אֶלָּא עַל הֶעְלֵם דָּבָר עִם שִׁגְגַת מַעֲשֶׂה.
GEMARA: With regard to the halakha that the court is liable only for absence of awareness of the matter together with unwitting performance of an action, the Gemara asks: From where do we derive this halakha? It is derived from a verse, as the Sages taught in a baraita that it is stated: “And if the entire congregation of Israel shall act unwittingly” (Leviticus 4:13). One might have thought that they will be liable to bring a bull for every case of unwitting performance of an action. Therefore, the verse states: “Shall act unwittingly, and the matter was hidden” (Leviticus 4:13), from which it is derived that the court is liable only for absence of awareness of the matter, leading to an erroneous ruling, together with unwitting performance of an action on the basis of that ruling.
וְכֵן הַמָּשִׁיחַ. מְנָלַן? דִּכְתִיב: ״לְאַשְׁמַת הַעָם״, הֲרֵי מָשִׁיחַ כְּצִבּוּר.
The mishna continues: And likewise the anointed priest. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive this? It is derived from a verse, as it is written with regard to the anointed priest: “If the anointed priest shall sin so as to bring guilt upon the people” (Leviticus 4:3), indicating that the status of an anointed priest is like that of the general public.
וְלֹא בַּעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה אֶלָּא עַל הֶעְלֵם דָּבָר עִם שִׁגְגַת מַעֲשֶׂה. מְנָלַן?
The mishna continues: And the court and the priest are liable for a ruling with regard to idol worship only for absence of awareness of the matter, leading to an erroneous ruling, together with unwitting performance of an action on the basis of that ruling. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive this?
דְּתָנוּ רַבָּנַן: לְפִי שֶׁיָּצְאָה עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה לָדוּן בְּעַצְמָהּ, יָכוֹל יְהוּ חַיָּיבִין עַל שִׁגְגַת הַמַּעֲשֶׂה? נֶאֱמַר כָּאן ״מֵעֵינֵי״ וְנֶאֱמַר לְהַלָּן ״מֵעֵינֵי״, מָה לְהַלָּן אֵין חַיָּיבִין אֶלָּא עַל הֶעְלֵם דָּבָר עִם שִׁגְגַת מַעֲשֶׂה, אַף כָּאן אֵין חַיָּיבִין אֶלָּא עַל הֶעְלֵם דָּבָר עִם שִׁגְגַת מַעֲשֶׂה.
The Gemara answers: It is derived as the Sages taught: Due to the fact that idol worship left the category of unwitting transgressions to be discussed by itself (see Numbers, chapter 15), one might have thought that the court and the priest would be liable for a mere unwitting performance of the action. Therefore, the term “from the eyes of” is stated here, with regard to idol worship (Numbers 15:24), and “from the eyes of” is stated there, with regard to an unwitting communal sin-offering for all other mitzvot (Leviticus 4:13). Just as there they are liable only for absence of awareness of the matter, leading to an erroneous ruling, together with unwitting performance of an action on the basis of that ruling, so too here, they are liable only for absence of awareness of the matter, leading to an erroneous ruling, together with unwitting performance of an action on the basis of that ruling.
וְאִילּוּ מָשִׁיחַ בַּעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה לָא קָתָנֵי, מַתְנִיתִין מַנִּי? רַבִּי הִיא.
The Gemara notes: Whereas, the halakha that the status of an anointed priest who issues a ruling with regard to idol worship is like that of the court is not taught in the mishna. Whose opinion is expressed in the mishna? It is the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi.
דְּתַנְיָא: מָשִׁיחַ בַּעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה – רַבִּי אוֹמֵר: בְּשִׁגְגַת מַעֲשֶׂה. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: בְּהֶעְלֵם דָּבָר. וְשָׁוִין שֶׁבִּשְׂעִירָה, וְשָׁוִין שֶׁאֵין מֵבִיא אָשָׁם תָּלוּי.
The Gemara explains: This is as it is taught in a baraita: If an anointed priest unwittingly engages in idol worship, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: He brings an offering for unwitting performance of an action, like any other Jew. And the Rabbis say: He brings an offering for absence of awareness of the matter, leading to an erroneous ruling. And they agree that the atonement of an anointed priest is with a female goat as a sin-offering, and they agree that he does not bring a provisional guilt-offering. Since the mishna omitted the halakha of an anointed priest who engages in idol worship, apparently it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who says that the status of the anointed priest in this regard is like that of any other Jew.
וְתִסְבְּרַאּ: בִּזְדוֹנוֹ כָּרֵת וּבְשִׁגְגָתוֹ חַטָּאת מִי קָתָנֵי?
The Gemara rejects this: And how can you understand the mishna in that manner? In the mishna (8a) that teaches that the court is not liable to bring an offering for absence of awareness of the matter unless they issue a ruling with regard to a matter for whose intentional violation one is liable to receive excision from the World-to-Come [karet] and for whose unwitting violation one is liable to bring a sin-offering, does it teach the halakha concerning an anointed priest in the latter clause of that mishna?
אֶלָּא תָּנֵי הָא הוּא הַדִּין לְהָא. הָכָא נָמֵי תְּנָא הָא וְהוּא הַדִּין לְהָא.
The Gemara explains: Rather, the tanna on 8a teaches this halakha, that in the first clause the anointed priest has the same halakha as the court, and the same is true with regard to that halakha, i.e., that in the latter clause the anointed priest has the same halakha as the court. Here too, the tanna taught this halakha, that in the first clause the anointed priest has the same halakha as the court, and the same is true with regard to that halakha, i.e., that in the latter clause the anointed priest has the same halakha as the court. Therefore, there is no proof that the mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis.
מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי? אָמַר קְרָא: ״וְכִפֶּר הַכֹּהֵן עַל הַנֶּפֶשׁ הַשֹּׁגֶגֶת בְּחֶטְאָה בִשְׁגָגָה״. ״הַנֶּפֶשׁ״ – זֶה מָשִׁיחַ, ״הַשֹּׁגֶגֶת״ – זֶה נָשִׂיא, ״בְּחֶטְאָה בִּשְׁגָגָה״ – רַבִּי סָבַר: חֵטְא זֶה בִּשְׁגָגָה יְהֵא.
The Gemara asks: What is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi? It is as the verse states with regard to idol worship: “And the priest shall atone for the soul that acted unwittingly, when he sins unwittingly” (Numbers 15:28). With regard to the term “the soul,” that is referring to an anointed priest; with regard to the term “that acted unwittingly,” that is referring to a king; and due to the phrase “when he sins unwittingly,” Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds this sin shall be one performed unwittingly, not the result of absence of awareness of the matter, leading to an erroneous ruling.
וְרַבָּנַן סָבְרִי: מִי שֶׁחַטָּאתוֹ בִּשְׁגָגָה, יָצָא מָשִׁיחַ שֶׁאֵין חַטָּאתוֹ בִּשְׁגָגָה אֶלָּא בְּהֶעְלֵם דָּבָר.
And the Rabbis hold: This phrase serves to teach that the halakha that this offering is brought for an unwitting sin applies to one whose sin-offering for all other transgressions is for an unwitting act. This serves to exclude an anointed priest, whose liability to bring a sin-offering for an unwitting act is only for absence of awareness of the matter, leading to an erroneous ruling, together with unwitting performance of an action on the basis of that ruling.
וְשָׁוִין שֶׁבִּשְׂעִירָה כְּיָחִיד. מְנָלַן? דְּאָמַר קְרָא: ״וְאִם נֶפֶשׁ אַחַת״ – אֶחָד יָחִיד וְאֶחָד נָשִׂיא וְאֶחָד מָשִׁיחַ – כּוּלָּם בִּכְלַל ״נֶפֶשׁ אַחַת״ הֵן.
The baraita teaches: And they agree that the atonement of an anointed priest is with a female goat as a sin-offering, as in the case of an ordinary individual. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive this halakha? The Gemara answers: It is derived from a verse, as the verse states: “And if one soul sins unwittingly, then he shall offer a female goat of the first year as a sin-offering” (Numbers 15:27). An ordinary individual, a king, and an anointed priest are all liable to bring an offering, as they are all included in the category of “one soul.”
