Horayot 8

ושוין שאין מביא אשם תלוי מנלן דכתיב וכפר [עליו] הכהן על שגגתו אשר שגג רבי סבר מי שכל חטאו בשגגה יצא זה שאין [כל] חטאו בשגגה אלא בהעלם דבר

The baraita teaches: And they agree that he does not bring a provisional guilt-offering. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive this halakha? It is derived from a verse, as it is written with regard to the provisional guilt-offering: “And the priest shall atone for him for his unwitting act that he performed unwittingly” (Leviticus 5:18). Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and the Rabbis disagree with regard to the interpretation of this verse, in accordance with their opinions. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds: This is referring to one whose sin-offering for all transgressions is for an unwitting act. This serves to exclude that anointed priest, as all of his sin-offerings are not for an unwitting act alone; rather, he brings a sin-offering only if that unwitting act is performed on the basis of absence of awareness of the matter, leading to an erroneous ruling.

מידי כל כתיב אין דאם כן נכתוב על שגגתו למה לי אשר שגג הא קא משמע לן דעד דאיכא כל חטאו בשגגה יצא משיח שאין כל חטאו בשגגה אלא בעבודה זרה ולא בשאר מצות אלא בהעלם דבר עם שגגת מעשה

The Gemara asks: Is it written in the verse: For all his unwitting acts that he performed unwittingly? Only the phrase “for his unwitting act that he performed unwittingly” is written. The Gemara answers: Yes, it is as though the word: All, is written. As if it were so that the verse is not referring to all unwitting acts, let the Torah write only: “For his unwitting act.” Why do I need the additional phrase: “That he performed unwittingly”? This teaches us that there is no liability to bring a provisional guilt-offering unless liability to bring all his sin-offerings is for unwitting acts. This serves to exclude an anointed priest, all of whose liability to bring a sin-offering for an unwitting act alone is only in cases of idol worship, but in cases involving the rest of the mitzvot there is liability only for absence of awareness of the matter, leading to an erroneous ruling, together with unwitting performance of an action on the basis of that ruling.

ורבנן מי שחטאו בשגגה יצא משיח שאין חטאו בשגגה לא בעבודה זרה ולא בשאר מצות אלא בהעלם דבר עם שגגת מעשה

And the Rabbis interpret the verse in accordance with their opinion that an anointed priest, even in cases of idol worship, brings a sin-offering only for absence of awareness of the matter, leading to an erroneous ruling, together with unwitting performance of an action on the basis of that ruling. They hold: This teaches us that there is liability to bring a provisional guilt-offering only for one whose liability to bring his sin-offerings is for an unwitting act. This serves to exclude an anointed priest, whose liability to bring a sin-offering is not for an unwitting act alone, neither in cases of idol worship, nor in cases involving the rest of the mitzvot, but rather for absence of awareness of the matter, leading to an erroneous ruling, together with unwitting performance of an action on the basis of that ruling.

מתני׳ אין בית דין חייבין עד שיורו בדבר שזדונו כרת ושגגתו חטאת וכן המשיח ולא בעבודה זרה עד שיורו על דבר שזדונו כרת ושגגתו חטאת

MISHNA: The court is not liable to bring an offering for absence of awareness of the matter unless they issue a ruling with regard to a matter for whose intentional violation one is liable to receive karet and for whose unwitting violation one is liable to bring a sin-offering. And likewise the anointed priest is liable only for such a ruling. Neither is the court liable to bring a sin-offering for idol worship unless the judges issue a ruling with regard to a matter for whose intentional violation one is liable to receive karet, and for whose unwitting violation one is liable to bring a sin-offering.

גמ׳ מנלן

GEMARA: With regard to the statement in the mishna that the court is liable only for a ruling with regard to a matter for whose intentional violation one is liable to receive karet and for whose unwitting violation one is liable to bring a sin-offering, the Gemara asks: From where do we derive this halakha?

דתניא רבי אומר נאמר כאן עליה ונאמר להלן עליה מה להלן דבר שזדונו כרת ושגגתו חטאת אף כאן דבר שזדונו כרת ושגגתו חטאת

The Gemara answers: It is derived as it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: The word “that” is stated here in the verse: “And the sin that they sinned” (Leviticus 4:14), with regard to the offering brought by the court for the transgression of the public based on their erroneous ruling, and the word “that” is stated there in the verse: “And you shall not take a woman to her sister, to be a rival to her, to uncover her nakedness, that is in her lifetime” (Leviticus 18:18), with regard to the prohibition against marrying two sisters. It is derived: Just as there it is a matter for whose intentional violation one is liable to receive karet and for whose unwitting violation one is liable to bring a sin-offering, so too here, the reference is to a matter for whose intentional violation one is liable to receive karet and for whose unwitting violation one is liable to bring a sin-offering.

אשכחן צבור משיח מנלן לאשמת העם הרי משיח כצבור

We found a source for the court bringing an offering for a transgression of the general public based on their erroneous ruling. From where do we derive that this is the halakha for an anointed priest? The Gemara answers: It is derived from the verse: “If the anointed priest shall sin so as to bring guilt upon the people” (Leviticus 4:3), indicating that the status of an anointed priest is like that of the transgression of the general public.

נשיא יליף מצות מצות כתיב גבי נשיא ועשה אחת מכל מצות ה׳ וכתיב בצבור ועשו אחת מכל מצות מה צבור דבר שזדונו כרת ושגגתו חטאת אף נשיא דבר שזדונו כרת ושגגתו חטאת

The Gemara asks: From where is it derived that this is the halakha with regard to the king? The Gemara answers: The tanna derives a verbal analogy between the term “commandments” written with regard to a king and the term “commandments” written with regard to the general public. It is written with regard to a king: “And he performed one of all the commandments of the Lord his God that are not to be performed” (Leviticus 4:22), and it is written with regard to the general public: “And performed one of all the commandments of the Lord that are not to be performed” (Leviticus 4:13). Just as with regard to the general public there is liability only for a matter for whose intentional violation one is liable to receive karet and for whose unwitting violation one is liable to bring a sin-offering, so too, in the case of a king there is liability only for a matter for whose intentional violation one is liable to receive karet and for whose unwitting violation one is liable to bring a sin-offering.

יחיד אמר קרא ואם נפש וילמד תחתון מעליון

The Gemara asks further: From where is it derived that an individual is liable to bring a sin-offering only for a matter for whose intentional violation one is liable to receive karet? The Gemara answers: The verse with regard to an individual states: “And if one soul from among the common people shall sin unwittingly” (Leviticus 4:27). The verse begins with the conjunction “and,” represented by the letter vav. This indicates that one shall derive the halakha with regard to the lower verse, i.e., the verse written later in the passage, from that which is written in the upper verses, i.e., those written earlier. Just as in those verses earlier in the passage, addressing the public, priest, and king, there is liability only for a matter for whose intentional violation one is liable to receive karet, so too, in the case of the individual addressed in this verse, there is liability only for a matter for whose intentional violation one is liable to receive karet.

ולא בעבודה זרה עד שיורו בעבודה זרה מנלן דתנו רבנן לפי שיצאה עבודה זרה לדון בעצמה יכול יהו חייבין אפילו על דבר שאין זדונו כרת ושגגתו חטאת

§ The mishna teaches: Neither is the court liable to bring a sin-offering for idol worship unless the judges issue a ruling with regard to a matter for whose intentional violation one is liable to receive karet, and for whose unwitting violation one is liable to bring a sin-offering. The Gemara asks: In the case of idol worship, from where do we derive this halakha? It is derived as the Sages taught: Due to the fact that idol worship left the category of unwitting transgressions to be discussed by itself (see Numbers, chapter 15), one might have thought that the court and the priest would be liable even if it is not for a matter for whose intentional violation one is liable to receive karet and for whose unwitting violation one is liable to bring a sin-offering.

נאמר כאן מעיני ונאמר להלן מעיני מה להלן דבר שזדונו כרת ושגגתו חטאת אף כאן דבר שזדונו כרת ושגגתו חטאת

The baraita continues: Therefore, the term “from the eyes of” is stated here, with regard to idol worship (Numbers 15:24), and “from the eyes of” is stated there, with regard to an unwitting communal sin-offering for all other mitzvot (Leviticus 4:13). Just as there the court is liable only for a matter for whose intentional violation one is liable to receive karet and for whose unwitting violation one is liable to bring a sin-offering, so too here, the court is liable only for a matter for whose intentional violation one is liable to receive karet and for whose unwitting violation one is liable to bring a sin-offering.

אשכחן צבור יחיד נשיא משיח מנלן אמר קרא ואם נפש אחת אחד יחיד ואחד נשיא ואחד משיח כולן בכלל נפש אחת הן וילמד תחתון מן העליון

The baraita concludes: We found a source for the court bringing an offering for a transgression of the general public based on their erroneous ruling; but from where do we derive that this is the halakha for an individual, a king, and an anointed priest who engage in idol worship? It is derived from a verse, as the verse states: “And if one soul sins unwittingly, then he shall offer a female goat of the first year as a sin-offering” (Numbers 15:27). And with regard to an individual, a king, and an anointed priest, they all are included in the category of “one soul.” And one shall derive the halakha with regard to that which is written in the lower verse, i.e., the verses concerning an individual, a king, and an anointed priest, from that which is written in the upper verse, i.e., the verse concerning the transgression of the general public.

הניחא למאן דמפיק לה לעליה לגזרה שוה כדאמרן אלא לרבנן דמפקי לה לעליה לעריות וצרות דבר שזדונו כרת ושגגתו חטאת מנא להו

The Gemara challenges: This works out well according to the one who derives the halakha by using the term “that” for a verbal analogy to teach that the court is liable only for a ruling with regard to a matter for whose intentional violation one is liable to receive karet, in accordance with that which we stated. But according to the Rabbis, who derive the halakha by using the term “that” to teach the halakhot of those with whom relations are forbidden and rival wives with regard to a yevama (see Yevamot 3b), from where do they derive the halakha of a matter for whose intentional violation one is liable to receive karet and for whose unwitting violation one is liable to bring a sin-offering in the case of the transgression of the general public?

נפקא להו מדמתני ליה רבי יהושע בן לוי לבריה תורה אחת יהיה לכם לעשה בשגגה והנפש אשר תעשה ביד רמה וגו׳ הוקשה כל התורה כולה לעבודה זרה מה עבודה זרה שחייבין על זדונו כרת ועל שגגתו חטאת אף כאן שחייבין על זדונו כרת ועל שגגתו חטאת

The Gemara answers: They derive it from that which Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi taught to his son based on the verse: “There shall be one Torah for you for the one who acts unwittingly. And the soul that performs with an upraised hand, he blasphemes the Lord; and that soul shall be cut off [venikhreta] from among his people” (Numbers 15:29–30). The Sages understood the phrase “with an upraised hand” to be referring to idol worship (see Sanhedrin 99a). The entire Torah is juxtaposed to idol worship: Just as idol worship is a prohibition for which one is liable for its intentional violation to receive karet and for its unwitting violation to bring a sin-offering, so too here, for the entire Torah one is liable for its intentional violation to receive karet and for its unwitting violation to bring a sin-offering.

אשכחן יחיד נשיא ומשיח בין בעבודה זרה בין בשאר מצות צבור מנלן יליף עליון מתחתון

The Gemara challenges: We found a source for this halakha with regard to an individual, a king, and an anointed priest, both with regard to idol worship and with regard to the rest of the mitzvot, as all those are included in the category of “one soul” and are juxtaposed to idol worship. But from where do we derive that the general public is liable to bring a sin-offering only for a matter for whose intentional violation one is liable to receive karet? The Gemara answers: One derives the halakha with regard to that which is written in the upper verse, i.e., the verse concerning the general public, from that which is written in the lower verse, i.e., the verse concerning an individual.

ורבי הא דרבי יהושע בן לוי מאי עביד ליה מפיק ליה לכדתניא לפי שמצינו שחלק הכתוב בין רבים ליחידים רבים בסייף וממונן אבד יחידים בסקילה וממונן פלט יכול נחלוק בקרבנותיהם תלמוד לומר תורה אחת יהיה וגו׳

The Gemara asks: And Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who derives this matter from the term “that,” what does he do with this verse, from which Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi taught a halakha to his son? The Gemara answers: He derives a halakha, using the verse to teach that which is taught in a baraita: Due to the fact that we found that the verse distinguished with regard to idol worship between the many, who constitute the majority of a city, and individuals, as the many are executed through beheading with a sword and their property is lost, as the court destroys it, while individuals are executed through stoning and their property is spared, one might have thought that in the case of unwitting idol worship we would distinguish between the offerings that they are liable to bring. Therefore, the verse states: “There shall be one Torah for you for the one who acts unwittingly. And the soul that performs with an upraised hand, he blasphemes the Lord” (Numbers 15:29–30).

מתקיף לה רב חלקיה מהגרוניא טעמא דלא חלק הכתוב הא חלק הוה אמינא נחלוק מאי נייתי

Rav Ḥilkiya of Hagronya objects to it: The reason that both individuals and the general public are liable to bring the same offering for unwitting idol worship is that the verse did not distinguish between them. But had the verse distinguished between them, I would say: Let us distinguish between individuals and the general public, and the general public would bring a different offering for their unwitting idol worship. What different offering shall they bring?

נייתי פר צבור בשאר מצות הוא דמייתו נייתי פר לעולה ושעיר לחטאת צבור בעבודה זרה הוא דמייתו נייתי שעיר נשיא בשאר מצות הוא דמייתי נייתי שעירה יחיד נמי היינו קרבנו

If one would say: Let them bring a bull, that is difficult, as it is for unwitting violation of the rest of the mitzvot that the general public brings a bull. If one would say: Let them bring a bull for a burnt-offering and a goat for a sin-offering, that is difficult, as it is for unwitting idol worship that the general public brings those offerings in the case of an absence of awareness leading to an erroneous ruling by the court. If one would say: Let them bring a goat, that is difficult, as it is for unwitting violation of the rest of the mitzvot that a king brings a goat. If one will say: Let them bring a female goat, that is difficult, as that is the offering for an individual, too.

אלמה לא איצטריך סלקא דעתך אמינא צבור מייתי פר לעולה ושעיר לחטאת הני נייתי איפכא פר לחטאת ושעיר לעולה אי נמי צריך ואין לו תקנה קא משמע לן

The Gemara rejects this: Why do you say that the verse that equates the offerings of the individuals and the public is not necessary? Were it not for the verse, it might enter your mind to say: The general public brings a bull for a burnt-offering and a goat for a sin-offering, but this majority of a city that unwittingly engaged in idol worship shall bring the opposite: A bull for a sin-offering and a goat for a burnt-offering. Alternatively, perhaps the majority of a city that unwittingly engaged in idol worship must bring an offering, but it has no remedy, because there is no unique offering that it can bring. Therefore, the verse teaches us that there is no distinction between many people and individuals in this case.

דכולי עלמא מיהת כי כתיבי הני קראי בעבודה זרה הוא דכתיבי מאי משמע אמר רבא ואי תימא רבי יהושע בן לוי ואמרי לה כדי אמר קרא וכי תשגו ולא תעשו את כל המצות האלה איזו היא מצוה שהיא שקולה ככל המצות הוי אומר זו עבודה זרה

§ In any event, everyone agrees that where these verses are written, it is with regard to idol worship that they are written. The Gemara asks: As the verse does not mention idol worship explicitly, from where is this inferred? Rava said, and some say it was Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi who said, and some say that the statement is unattributed, that the verse states: “And when you act unwittingly, and do not perform all these commandments [kol hamitzvot] that the Lord spoke to Moses” (Numbers 15:22). Which is the mitzva that is the equivalent of all the mitzvot? You must say: It is the prohibition against idol worship.

דבי רבי תנא אמר קרא אשר דבר ה׳ אל משה וכתיב אשר צוה ה׳ אליכם ביד משה איזו היא מצוה שהיא בדיבורו של הקדוש ברוך הוא וצוה על ידי משה הוי אומר זו עבודה זרה דתנא רבי ישמעאל אנכי ולא יהיה לך מפי הגבורה שמענום

The school of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi taught that the verse states: “That the Lord spoke to Moses” (Numbers 15:22), and it is written: “That the Lord has commanded you by the hand of Moses” (Numbers 15:23). Which is the mitzva that was introduced in the speech of the Holy One, Blessed be He, heard by the Jewish people, and which He commanded in the Torah by means of Moses? You must say: This is idol worship, as Rabbi Yishmael taught concerning the first two commandments: “I am the Lord your God” (Exodus 20:2), and: “You shall have no other gods before Me” (Exodus 20:3): We, the Jewish people, heard them from the mouth of the Almighty.

דבי רבי ישמעאל תנא

The school of Rabbi Yishmael taught

למן היום אשר צוה ה׳ והלאה לדורותיכם איזו היא מצוה שהיא נאמרה בתחלה הוי אומר זו עבודה זרה והא אמר מר עשר מצות נצטוו ישראל במרה (דכתיב והיה אם שמוע תשמע לקול ה׳ אלהיך) אלא מחוורתא כדשנינן מעיקרא

that it is derived from the verse: “All that the Lord has commanded you by the hand of Moses, from the day that the Lord commanded and onward throughout your generations” (Numbers 15:23). Which is the mitzva that was stated at the beginning of all the mitzvot? You must say: This is idol worship, as it is the first mitzva in the Ten Commandments. The Gemara asks: But didn’t the Master say: The Jewish people were commanded ten mitzvot in Marah soon after leaving Egypt, prior to the revelation at Sinai, as it is written: “If you shall hearken to the voice of the Lord your God…and listen to His mitzvot” (Exodus 15:26)? Evidently, there were mitzvot that preceded the prohibition against idol worship. Rather, it is clear as we initially answered.

מתני׳ אין חייבין על עשה ועל לא תעשה שבמקדש ואין מביאין אשם תלוי על עשה ועל לא תעשה שבמקדש

MISHNA: The court is not liable to bring a bull as an unwitting communal sin-offering for issuing a ruling with regard to a positive mitzva or a prohibition related to the defiling of the Temple by one being there while ritually impure, or the defiling of its sacrificial foods by one partaking of them while ritually impure. There is a positive mitzva to remove impure people from the Temple, and there is a prohibition against entering the Temple while in a state of ritual impurity. And one does not bring a provisional guilt-offering for a positive mitzva or a prohibition related to the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods.

אבל חייבין על עשה ועל לא תעשה שבנדה ומביאים אשם תלוי על עשה ועל לא תעשה שבנדה איזו היא מצות עשה שבנדה פרוש מן הנדה ומצות לא תעשה אל תבא על הנדה

But the court is liable to bring a bull for a positive mitzva or for a prohibition that is related to a menstruating woman, and one brings a provisional guilt-offering for a positive mitzva or for a prohibition that is related to a menstruating woman. What is the positive mitzva that is related to a menstruating woman? Distance yourself from the menstruating woman. If a man engages in intercourse with a woman and she begins menstruating, he is required to separate from her. And what is the prohibition? Do not engage in intercourse with a woman whom you know is a menstruating woman.

גמ׳ מנא הני מילי דצבור לא מחייבי קרבן בעלמא ויחיד אשם תלוי נמי לא

GEMARA: The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? That is, from where is it derived that the general public is not liable to bring any offering at all for a sin like the defiling of the Temple, which carries no liability for an individual to bring a fixed sin-offering for violating it unwittingly, and from where is it derived that an individual too is not liable to bring a provisional guilt-offering for the defiling of the Temple?

אמר רב יצחק בר אבדימי נאמר ואשם בחטאת ובאשם תלוי ונאמר ואשמו בצבור מה ואשם ביחיד בחטאת קבועה אף ואשמו בצבור בחטאת קבועה

Rav Yitzḥak bar Avdimi says: The term “and he is guilty” is stated with regard to a sin-offering (Leviticus 4:27) and with regard to a provisional guilt-offering (Leviticus 5:17), and the similar term: “And they are guilty” (Leviticus 4:13), is stated with regard to the general public. Just as the term “and he is guilty” that is stated with regard to an individual is concerning a transgression for which one is liable to bring a fixed sin-offering, as it is written there, so too, the term “and they are guilty” that is stated with regard to the general public is concerning a transgression for which one is liable to bring a fixed sin-offering. For the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods one is liable to bring a sliding-scale offering, not a fixed offering.

ומה צבור בחטאת קבועה אף אשם תלוי נמי אין בא אלא על ספק חטאת קבועה אמרי אי הכי קרבן עולה ויורד נמי הא כתיב והיה כי יאשם לאחת מאלה דנין (אשם מן אשמו) [אשמו מן אשם] ואין דנין אשם מן יאשם

And just as with regard to a transgression performed by the general public the liability is to bring a fixed sin-offering, so too, a provisional guilt-offering comes only for uncertainty with regard to a transgression that renders one obligated to bring a fixed sin-offering. This is the source for the fact that there is no liability to bring a sin-offering if the general public defiles the Temple or its sacrificial foods, and individuals are not liable to bring a provisional guilt-offering for those transgressions. The Sages say: If so, and the derivation is based on that term, this is difficult, as isn’t it also written with regard to a sliding-scale offering: “And it shall be when he shall be guilty of one of these matters” (Leviticus 5:5)? The Gemara responds: One derives the meaning of “they are guilty” from the meaning of “he is guilty,” but one does not derive the meaning of “he is guilty” from the meaning of “he shall be guilty,” even though both are stated in the singular.

ומאי נפקא מינה והא תני דבי רבי ישמעאל ושב הכהן ובא הכהן זו היא שיבה זו היא ביאה ועוד נילף מן ואשם מטומאת מקדש וקדשיו דכתיב והוא טמא ואשם

The Gemara asks: And what difference is there between the different verb conjugations? But didn’t the school of Rabbi Yishmael teach a verbal analogy with regard to leprosy of houses? The verse states: “And the priest shall return [veshav]” (Leviticus 14:39), and another verse with regard to the priest’s visit seven days later states: “And the priest shall come [uva] and look” (Leviticus 14:44). This returning and this coming have the same meaning and one can therefore derive by verbal analogy that the halakha that applies if the leprosy had spread at the conclusion of the first week applies if it had spread again by the end of the following week. If a verbal analogy can be derived between two different terms, it can certainly be derived from two conjugations of the same term. And furthermore, let us derive the halakha from the term “and he is guilty,” written with regard to the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods, as it is written: “And he is ritually impure and he is guilty” (Leviticus 5:2), which is a verbal analogy between identical terms.

אמר רב פפא דנין ואשם ומצות ה׳ מן ואשם ומצות ה׳ אמר ליה רב שימי בר אשי לרב פפא ונילף ואשם ונשיאת עון מן ואשם ונשיאת עון

Rav Pappa says: One derives the meaning of: “And he is guilty,” and: “The commandments of the Lord” (Leviticus 5:17), which are written with regard to a provisional guilt-offering, from the meaning of: “And they are guilty,” and: “The commandments of the Lord” (Leviticus 4:13), which are written with regard to the unwitting communal sin-offering. The phrase: The commandments of the Lord, is not written with regard to the sliding-scale offering. Rav Shimi bar Ashi said to Rav Pappa: Let us derive the meaning of: “And he is guilty and bearing of iniquity” (see Leviticus 5:1, 4), from the meaning of: “And he is guilty and bearing of iniquity” (Leviticus 5:17).

אלא אמר רב נחמן בר יצחק דנין ואשם ומצות ה׳ אשר לא תעשינה מואשם ומצות ה׳ אשר לא תעשינה ואל יוכיח שמיעת קול וביטוי שפתים וטומאת מקדש וקדשיו שלא נאמר בהם ואשם ומצות ה׳ אשר לא תעשינה

Rather, Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak says: One derives the meaning of “and he is guilty” and “the commandments of the Lord that shall not be done” written with regard to a provisional guilt-offering, from the meaning of: “And he is guilty,” and: “The commandments of the Lord that shall not be done” (Leviticus 4:27), written with regard to a fixed sin-offering. And the cases of hear-ing of a voice, i.e., an oath of testimony, and a statement of the lips, i.e., an oath on an utterance, and the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods, for which one is liable to bring a sliding-scale offering, shall not prove otherwise, as it is not stated concerning them: And he is guilty, and: The commandments of the Lord that shall not be done.

מתני׳ אין חייבין על שמיעת קול ועל ביטוי שפתים ועל טומאת מקדש וקדשיו והנשיא כיוצא בהם דברי רבי יוסי הגלילי רבי עקיבא אומר הנשיא חייב בכולן חוץ משמיעת הקול שהמלך לא דן ולא דנין אותו [לא מעיד ולא מעידין אותו]

MISHNA: The court is not liable for issuing a ruling with regard to hearing of a voice, i.e., a false oath of testimony taken by a witness who refuses to testify on behalf of a litigant who demands that he testify, or for an utterance of the lips, i.e., a false oath stated about some matter, or for the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods. And the status of the king is like that of the court, and he is exempt from bringing an offering in those cases; this is the statement of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili. Rabbi Akiva says: The king is liable in all of those cases except for the case of hearing of a voice, and even in that case, his exemption is not intrinsic to the mitzva. Rather, it is for technical reasons, as the king neither judges others nor do others judge him; he does not testify nor do others testify against him. Therefore, a demand that he testify is not applicable.

גמ׳ אמר עולא מאי טעמא דרבי יוסי הגלילי אמר קרא והיה כי יאשם לאחת מאלה כל שמתחייב באחת מתחייב בכולן ושאין מתחייב באחת אין מתחייב בכולן

GEMARA: Ulla said: What is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili? It is as the verse states with regard to a sliding-scale offering: “And it shall be when he shall be guilty of one of these matters” (Leviticus 5:5), indicating that anyone who becomes liable in every one of the instances for which one brings a sliding-scale offering becomes liable in all of those instances; and anyone who does not become liable in every one of the instances to bring a sliding-scale offering does not become liable in any of those instances. Since the king is exempt from taking an oath of testimony, he is exempt in the other cases as well.

ואימא מתחייב באחת מהן ואף על פי שאין מתחייב בכולן

The Gemara asks: Why say this? And say an alternative interpretation of the verse: Anyone who becomes liable in any one of these instances brings a sliding-scale offering, and this is the halakha even though he does not become liable in all of them.

אלא טעמא דרבי יוסי הגלילי מהכא דתניא היה רבי ירמיה אומר נאמר

Rather, the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili is from here, as it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yirmeya would say: It is stated: