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Today's Daf Yomi

September 6, 2019 | 讜壮 讘讗诇讜诇 转砖注状讟

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Ron and Shira Krebs to commemorate the 73rd yahrzeit of Shira's grandfather (Yitzchak Leib Ben David Ber HaCohen v'Malka), the 1st yahrzeit of Shira's father (Gershon Pinya Ben Yitzchak Leib HaCohen v'Menucha Sara), and the bar mitzvah of their son Eytan who will be making a siyum on Mishna Shas this month.

  • This month's learning is sponsored for the refuah shleima of Naama bat Yael Esther.

Keritot 16

Did Rabbi Yehoshua concede to Rabbi Akiva that one cannot learn from a case of meilah to a case of eating notar – regarding the questions if one ate notar from five different sacrifices, would one be olbigated to bring five sin offerings? Rabbi Akiva asked Rabbi Eliezer a quesetion about one who does many forbidden acts on Shabbat on various Shabbatot and only at the end finds out that is was forbidden – does one bring many sacrifices or just one? Rabbi Elizer answers that one is obligated to bring on each one and learns it from one who sleeps with many niddot. Rabbi Akiva disagrees and there is a back and forth – it is unclear if in the end Rabbi Akiva agrees with Rabbi Eliezer or not. Three interpretations are brought in the gemara regarding exactly what Rabbi Akiva asked聽(all agree it was two questions) and did Rabbi Akiva aceept Rabbi Eliezer’s answer in the end? Or did he accept for one and not the other?


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讜讗讬诇讜 注诇 住驻讬拽讜 诪讘讬讗 讗砖诐 转诇讜讬 诇讗 拽转谞讬 诪谞讬 讛讗 讗讬诇讬诪讗 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 诇讬转谞讬 谞诪讬 住讬驻讗 讜注诇 住驻讬拽谉 诪讘讬讗 讗砖诐 转诇讜讬 讚讛转谞谉 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 诪讞讬讬讘 注诇 住驻拽 诪注讬诇讛 讗砖诐 转诇讜讬

The Gemara notes: And yet in the final case in the baraita, it does not teach that in a situation where he is uncertain whether he ate from it he brings a provisional guilt offering. Whose opinion is this? If we say it is the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, let him also teach in the last clause: For a case where he is uncertain whether he ate from them he brings a provisional guilt offering, as we learned in the mishna (22b) that Rabbi Akiva deems one liable to bring a provisional guilt offering for uncertainty about misuse of consecrated property.

讗诇讗 诇讗讜 专讘讬 讬讛讜砖注 讛讬讗 讜拽转谞讬 讘讞诪砖 讛注诇诪讜转 诪讘讬讗 讞诪砖 讞讟讗讜转 讜砖诪注 诪讬谞讛 拽讬讘诇讛 诪讬谞讬讛

Rather, isn鈥檛 the baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua, who disagrees with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva and holds that one is not liable to bring a provisional guilt offering for uncertainty about misuse of consecrated property? And it teaches that one who eats notar from one offering cooked in five pots during five separate lapses of awareness brings five sin offerings, which indicates that if he did so during a single lapse of awareness he would be liable to bring only one sin offering, in accordance with the opinion stated by Rabbi Akiva in the mishna. And one can conclude from here that Rabbi Yehoshua accepted the refutation from Rabbi Akiva.

讗诇讗 讗讚专讘讛 诪住讬驻讗 讚拽转谞讬 诪讞诪砖讛 讝讘讞讬诐 讗驻讬诇讜 讘讛注诇诐 讗讞转 讞讬讬讘 注诇 讻诇 讗讞转 讜讗讞转 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛 诇讗 拽讬讘诇讛 诪讬谞讬讛

The Gemara responds: But on the contrary, one can infer otherwise from the latter clause of the baraita, which teaches: If he ate from five separate offerings, even during one lapse of awareness, he is liable to bring a separate sin offering for each and every one. One can conclude from this statement that Rabbi Yehoshua did not accept the refutation from Rabbi Akiva.

讜讗诇讗 诪讗讬 讗讬转 诇诪讬诪专 转谞讗讬 讛讬讗 讚讗讬讻讗 转谞讗 讚拽讬讘诇讛 讜讗讬讻讗 转谞讗 讚诇讗 拽讬讘诇讛

Rather, what is there to say about this baraita? It must be said that it is a dispute between tanna鈥檌m, that there is a tanna who maintains that Rabbi Yehoshua accepted Rabbi Akiva鈥檚 refutation, and there is a tanna who maintains that Rabbi Yehoshua did not accept it.

讗驻讬诇讜 转讬诪讗 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讛讬讗 讜讛讗讬 转谞讗 住讘专 诇讛 讻讜转讬讛 讘讞讚讗 讜驻诇讬讙 注诇讬讛 讘讞讚讗 住讘专 诇讛 讻讜转讬讛 讘讛注诇诪讛 讜驻诇讬讙 注诇讬讛 讘诪注讬诇讜转

But once the baraita is interpreted in accordance with two different tanna鈥檌m, you may even say that the earlier clause of the baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva and not Rabbi Yehoshua. And this tanna of the baraita holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva in one matter and disagrees with his opinion in one matter: He holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva with regard to a lapse of awareness, that if one eats from five offerings during a single lapse of awareness he is liable to bring only one sin offering. But he disagrees with his opinion with regard to misuse of consecrated property, as he does not deem one liable to bring a provisional guilt offering for uncertainty about whether he misused consecrated property.

讛讬讻讬 讚诪讬 讞诪砖 诪注讬诇讜转 讗诪专 砖诪讜讗诇 讻讗讜转讛 砖砖谞讬谞讜 讞诪砖讛 讚讘专讬诐 讘注讜诇讛 诪爪讟专驻讬谉 讛讘砖专 讜讛讞诇讘 讜讛讬讬谉 讜讛住诇转 讜讛砖诪谉

搂 The mishna teaches that if one eats five pieces from a single offering, each of which was cooked in a separate pot, he is liable to bring five guilt offerings for misuse of consecrated property. The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances which require five guilt offerings for misuse of consecrated property? Shmuel says: The five pieces must be from separate parts of the offering, like that which we learned in a mishna (Me鈥檌la 15b) with regard to a different topic: Five items from a burnt offering combine to form an olive-bulk that renders one liable for sacrificing an offering outside the Temple: The meat, and the forbidden fat, and the wine from the libations of the burnt offering, and the fine flour from the meal offering brought with the libations, and the oil for mixing with the meal offering.

讞讝拽讬讛 讗诪专 讻讙讜谉 砖讗讻诇 诪讞诪砖讛 讗讘专讬诐 专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讗诪专 讗驻讬诇讜 转讬诪讗 讘讗讘专 讗讞讚 诪砖讻讞转 诇讛 讘讻转祝 专讘讬 讬爪讞拽 谞驻讞讗 讗诪专 讻讙讜谉 砖讗讻诇 讘讞诪砖讛 诪讬谞讬 拽讚讬专讛 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗诪专 讻讙讜谉 砖讗讻诇 讘讞诪砖讛 讟注诪讬诐

岣zkiyya says: The obligation to bring five guilt offerings applies in a case where he ate from five different limbs of one offering. Reish Lakish says: You may even say that he ate from one limb, and you find this in a case where he ate from the shoulder of an offering, which has several different sections. Rabbi Yitz岣k Nappa岣 says: It applies in a case where he ate pieces of meat prepared as five different types of cooked dishes. Rabbi Yo岣nan says: It applies in a case where he ate five pieces of meat that had five different flavors, as they were prepared with different types of seasonings.

诪转谞讬壮 讗诪专 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 砖讗诇转讬 讗转 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讘注讜砖讛 诪诇讗讻讜转 讛专讘讛 讘砖讘转讜转 讛专讘讛 诪注讬谉 诪诇讗讻讛 讗讞转 讘讛注诇诐 讗讞转 诪讛讜 讞讬讬讘 讗讞转 注诇 讻讜诇谉 讗讜 讞讬讬讘 注诇 讻诇 讗讞转 讜讗讞转

MISHNA: Rabbi Akiva said: I asked Rabbi Eliezer with regard to one who performs multiple prohibited labors on several Shabbatot, and all those labors were subsumed as subcategories of one primary category of prohibited labor, and he performed them during one lapse of awareness. What is the halakha? Is he liable to bring one sin offering for unwitting performance of all these labors or is he liable to bring a sin offering for violation of each and every one of the labors?

讗诪专 诇讜 讞讬讬讘 注诇 讻诇 讗讞转 讜讗讞转 诪拽诇 讜讞讜诪专 讜诪讛 谞讚讛 砖讗讬谉 讘讛 转讜爪讗讜转 讛专讘讛 讜讞讟讗讜转 讛专讘讛 讞讬讬讘 注诇 讻诇 讗讞转 讜讗讞转 砖讘转 砖讬砖 讘讛 转讜爪讗讜转 讛专讘讛 讜诪讬转讜转 讛专讘讛 讗讬谞讜 讚讬谉 砖讬讛讗 讞讬讬讘 注诇 讻诇 讗讞转 讜讗讞转

Rabbi Eliezer said to Rabbi Akiva: He is liable to bring a sin offering for violation of each and every one of the labors, and this is derived from an a fortiori inference: Just as in the case of a menstruating woman, with regard to whom there are not multiple actions that result in transgression and that result in multiple sin offerings, but rather only the prohibition against engaging in intercourse with her, and nevertheless one is liable to bring a separate sin offering for each and every one of his acts of unwitting intercourse; in the case of Shabbat, with regard to which there are multiple primary categories and subcategories of labor that result in transgression and that result in multiple death penalties or sin offerings, is it not right that he will be liable to bring a sin offering for performance of each and every one of the prohibited labors?

讗诪专转讬 诇讜 讗诐 讗诪专转 讘谞讚讛 砖讬砖 讘讛 砖转讬 讗讝讛专讜转 砖讛讜讗 诪讜讝讛专 注诇 讛谞讚讛 讜讛谞讚讛 诪讜讝讛专转 注诇讬讜 转讗诪专 讘砖讘转 砖讗讬谉 讘讛 讗诇讗 讗讝讛专讛 讗讞转

Rabbi Akiva continues: I said to Rabbi Eliezer that the inference is not valid: If you said one is liable to bring multiple sin offerings in the case of a menstruating woman, with regard to whom there are two prohibitions, as the man is prohibited from engaging in intercourse with the menstruating woman and the menstruating woman is prohibited from engaging in intercourse with him, would you say the same in the case of Shabbat, with regard to which there is only one prohibition?

讗诪专 诇讬 讛讘讗 注诇 讛拽讟谞讜转 讬讜讻讬讞 砖讗讬谉 讘讛 讗诇讗 讗讝讛专讛 讗讞转 讜讞讬讬讘 注诇 讻诇 讗讞转 讜讗讞转

Rabbi Eliezer said to me: The halakha of one who engages in intercourse with minor menstruating girls will prove this refutation is not valid, as in that case there is only one prohibition, because the minor is exempt from the mitzvot, and nevertheless the man is liable to bring a separate sin offering for intercourse for each and every one of the acts of intercourse.

讗诪专转讬 诇讜 讗诐 讗诪专转 讘拽讟谞讜转 砖讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖讗讬谉 讘讛谉 注讻砖讬讜 讬砖 讘讛谉 诇讗讞专 讝诪谉 转讗诪专 讘砖讘转 砖讗讬谉 讘讛 注讻砖讬讜 讜诇讗 诇讗讞专 讝诪谉

Rabbi Akiva said: I said to Rabbi Eliezer that the cases of Shabbat and minor menstruating girls are not comparable. If you said in the case of minor girls that although it is not prohibited for them at present it is prohibited for them after the passage of time, when they reach majority, would you say the same in the case of Shabbat, with regard to which there are neither two prohibitions at present, nor will there be after the passage of time?

讗诪专 诇讬 讛讘讗 注诇 讛讘讛诪讛 讬讜讻讬讞 讗诪专转讬 诇讜 讛讘讛诪讛 讻砖讘转

Rabbi Eliezer said to me: The halakha of one who copulates with an animal will prove this refutation is not valid, as there are never two prohibitions in that case, and nevertheless the person is liable to bring a sin offering for each and every act. Rabbi Akiva said: I said to Rabbi Eliezer that no proof can be cited from the case of an animal, as in my opinion the case of the animal is like that of Shabbat; there is uncertainty with regard to both cases.

讙诪壮 诪讗讬 拽讘注讬 诪讬谞讬讛 讗讬 砖讘转讜转 讻讙讜驻讬谉 讚诪讬讬谉 讜讗讬 诇讗 讘注讬 诪讬谞讬讛 谞讬讘注讬 讛注讜砖讛 诪诇讗讻讛 讗讞转 讘砖讘转讜转 讛专讘讛

GEMARA: The Gemara asks: What precise dilemma did Rabbi Akiva raise before Rabbi Eliezer? If he raised a dilemma about whether different Shabbatot are comparable to separate entities or not, i.e., if performing one labor on several Shabbatot during one lapse of awareness is similar to engaging in intercourse with multiple menstruating women during one lapse of awareness, let him raise the dilemma as follows: If one performs one prohibited labor on each of several Shabbatot during a single lapse of awareness, what is the halakha?

讗诇讗 讜诇讚讬 诪诇讗讻讜转 讗讬 讻讗讘讜转 讚诪讬讬谉 讜讗讬 诇讗 讘注讬 诪讬谞讬讛 谞讬讘注讬 诪讬谞讬讛 讛注讜砖讛 诪诇讗讻讜转 讛专讘讛 诪注讬谉 诪诇讗讻讛 讗讞转 讘砖讘转

Rather, perhaps he raised a dilemma about whether different subcategories of a single prohibited labor are comparable to different primary categories, which would mean one is liable separately for each, or not. But if so, let him ask raise the dilemma in the following manner: In the case of one who performs multiple prohibited labors, all subsumed as subcategories of one primary category of labor, on a single Shabbat, during a single lapse of awareness, what is the halakha? Why did Rabbi Akiva specify a case of one who performed multiple prohibited labors on multiple Shabbatot?

讗诪专 专讘讗 讗诪专讬 讘讬 专讘 转专转讬 讘注讗 诪讬谞讬讛 砖讘转讜转 讻讙讜驻讬谉 讚诪讬讬谉 讜讗讬 诇讗 讘注讗 诪讬谞讬讛 讜诇讚讬 诪诇讗讻讜转 讻诪诇讗讻讜转 讚诪讬讬谉 讗讬 诇讗

Rava said: They say in the school of Rav [bei Rav] that Rabbi Akiva raised two dilemmas before him: He raised a dilemma about whether Shabbatot are comparable to separate entities or whether they are not comparable to separate entities, and he also raised a dilemma about whether different subcategories of a single prohibited labor are comparable to different primary categories of labor, or whether they are not. Rabbi Eliezer answered that multiple Shabbatot are comparable to separate entities, and that one who performs different subcategories of a single category of prohibited labor is like one who performs multiple primary categories of labor.

讜砖讘转讜转 讛讬讻讬 诪讬讘注讬 诇讬讛 砖讙讙转 砖讘转 讜讝讚讜谉 诪诇讗讻讜转 驻砖讬讟讗 诇讬讛 讚讬诪讬诐 砖讘讬谞转讬讬诐 讛讜讬讬谉 讬讚讬注讛 诇讞诇拽

The Gemara raises another question with regard to the mishna: And in connection to the performance of the same category of prohibited labor on each of several Shabbatot during a single lapse of awareness, what is the precise case about which Rabbi Akiva raises his dilemma? If the individual was unwitting in that he was unaware that it was Shabbat but acted intentionally with regard to the prohibited labors, i.e., he knew that these labors are prohibited on Shabbat, perhaps it is obvious to Rabbi Akiva that the intervening days constitute an awareness of his sin, which serves to differentiate between the Shabbatot and render the individual liable to bring separate sin offerings for each Shabbat.

讜讝讚讜谉 砖讘转 讜砖讙讙转 诪诇讗讻讜转 讛讜讗 讚讘注讬 诪讬谞讬讛 讗讬 讻讙讜驻讬谉 讚诪讬讬谉 讗讬 诇讗

And if so, it is in reference to a case where the individual acts intentionally with regard to Shabbat, i.e., he knows that it is Shabbat, but he acts unwittingly in that he does not know that the prohibited labors he is performing are prohibited on Shabbat, that Rabbi Akiva raises his dilemma. His dilemma is whether the Shabbatot are comparable to separate entities, which would mean that he is liable to bring a separate sin offering for each Shabbat, or whether they are not comparable to separate entities and therefore he is liable to bring only one sin offering.

讗讜 讚诇诪讗 讝讚讜谉 砖讘转 讜砖讙讙转 诪诇讗讻讜转 驻砖讬讟讗 诇讬讛 讚讻讙讜驻讬谉 讚诪讬讬谉 讜砖讙讙转 砖讘转 讜讝讚讜谉 诪诇讗讻讜转 讛讜讗 讚讘注讬 诪讬谞讬讛 讚讬诪讬诐 砖讘讬谞转讬诐 讗讬 讛讜讬讬谉 讬讚讬注讛 诇讞诇拽 讗讬 诇讗

Or perhaps in the case where he acts intentionally with regard to Shabbat and unwittingly with regard to prohibited labors, it is obvious to Rabbi Akiva that the Shabbatot are comparable to separate entities and he is liable to bring a separate sin offering for each Shabbat. And it is in reference to a case where he acts unwittingly in that he does not know it is Shabbat, but he acts intentionally in that he knows that the labors he is performing are prohibited on Shabbat, that Rabbi Akiva raises his dilemma. His dilemma is whether the intervening days between the Shabbatot are considered awareness of his sin, which would serve to differentiate between one sin and the next, or not.

讗诪专 专讘讛

Rabba said:

诪住转讘专讗 砖讙讙转 砖讘转 讜讝讚讜谉 诪诇讗讻讜转 驻砖讬讟讗 诇讬讛 讚讬诪讬诐 砖讘讬谞转讬讬诐 讛讜讬讬谉 讬讚讬注讛 诇讞诇拽 讜讝讚讜谉 砖讘转 讜砖讙讙转 诪诇讗讻讜转 讛讜讗 讚讘注讬 诪讬谞讬讛 讻讙讜驻讬谉 讚诪讬讬谉 讗讜 诇讗讜

It stands to reason, based on a proof from a mishna, to say that in a case where he acts unwittingly in that he does not know that it is Shabbat, and intentionally in that he knows that the labors he is performing are prohibited on Shabbat, it is obvious to Rabbi Akiva that the intervening days between the Shabbatot are considered awareness of his sin, which would serve to differentiate between one sin and the next. And it is in reference to a case where he acts intentionally with regard to Shabbat and unwittingly with regard to prohibited labors that Rabbi Akiva raises his dilemma, which is about whether the Shabbatot are comparable to separate entities or not.

讜驻砖讬讟 诇讬讛 讚讝讚讜谉 砖讘转 讜砖讙讙转 诪诇讗讻讜转 讻讙讜驻讬谉 讚诪讬讬谉 讜诇讗 拽讘讬诇 诪讬谞讬讛 讜驻砖讟 诇讬讛 讚讜诇讚讬 诪诇讗讻讜转 讻诪诇讗讻讜转 讚诪讬讬谉 讜诇讗 拽讘讬诇 诪讬谞讬讛

And Rabbi Eliezer resolved his dilemma for him by stating that in a case where he acts intentionally with regard to Shabbat and unwittingly with regard to prohibited labors, the Shabbatot are comparable to separate entities. But Rabbi Akiva did not accept this resolution from him. And with regard to Rabbi Akiva鈥檚 other dilemma, Rabbi Eliezer resolved it for him by stating that subcategories of labors are comparable to primary categories of labor, and one is liable to bring a separate sin offering for each act. But Rabbi Akiva did not accept this resolution from him either.

讗诪专 专讘讛 诪谞讗 讗诪讬谞讗 诇讛 讚转谞谉 讻诇诇 讙讚讜诇 讗诪专讜 讘砖讘转 讻诇 讛砖讜讻讞 注讬拽专 砖讘转 讜注砖讛 诪诇讗讻讜转 讛专讘讛 讘砖讘转讜转 讛专讘讛 讗讬谞讜 讞讬讬讘 讗诇讗 讗讞转

Rabba said: From where do I say this? As we learned in a mishna (Shabbat 67b): The Sages stated a significant principle with regard to the halakhot of Shabbat: With regard to anyone who forgets the essence of Shabbat, i.e., one who is entirely ignorant that labor is prohibited on Shabbat, and he performed multiple prohibited labors on multiple Shabbatot, he is liable to bring only one sin offering, as there is only a single, comprehensive lapse of awareness.

讛讬讜讚注 注讬拽专 砖讘转 讜注砖讛 诪诇讗讻讜转 讛专讘讛 讘砖讘转讜转 讛专讘讛 讞讬讬讘 注诇 讻诇 砖讘转 讜砖讘转 讛讬讜讚注 砖讛讜讗 砖讘转 讜注砖讛 诪诇讗讻讜转 讛专讘讛 讘砖讘转讜转 讛专讘讛 讞讬讬讘 注诇 讻诇 讗讘 诪诇讗讻讛 讜诪诇讗讻讛

With regard to one who knows the essence of the prohibition against labor on Shabbat, and he performed multiple prohibited labors on multiple Shabbatot because he was unaware that those days were Shabbat, he is liable to bring a sin offering for each and every Shabbat, as the intervening days are considered awareness which differentiates between the Shabbatot. One who is aware that the day is Shabbat and performed multiple prohibited labors, which he did not know were prohibited, on multiple Shabbatot, is liable to bring a sin offering for each and every primary category of labor that he performed.

讜讗讬诇讜 讞讬讬讘 注诇 讻诇 讗讘 诪诇讗讻讛 砖诇 讻诇 砖讘转 讜砖讘转 诇讗 拽转谞讬

Rabba comments: But in the latter case, the mishna does not teach that he is liable to bring a sin offering for each act of a primary category of labor that he performed on each and every Shabbat. He is liable to bring one sin offering for each primary category of labor, despite the fact that he performed the act on multiple Shabbatot. This indicates that the different Shabbatot are not considered separate entities.

诪谞讬 讛讗 讗讬诇讬诪讗 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讗讬诪讗 住讬驻讗 讛注讜砖讛 诪诇讗讻讜转 讛专讘讛 诪注讬谉 诪诇讗讻讛 讗讞转 讗讬谉 讞讬讬讘 讗诇讗 讗讞转 讜讗讬 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讞讬讬讘 注诇 讻诇 讜诇讚讬 诪诇讗讻讜转 讻诪诇讗讻讜转

Whose opinion is this? If we say it is the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, say the last clause of that mishna: One who performs multiple prohibited labors subsumed, as subcategories, under one primary category of prohibited labor is liable to bring only one sin offering. And if this were the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer it should state: He is liable to bring a separate sin offering for each of the different subcategories of labors as though they were separate primary categories of labor.

讗诇讗 驻砖讬讟讗 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讛讬讗 讜砖诪注 诪讬谞讛 砖讙讙转 砖讘转 讜讝讚讜谉 诪诇讗讻讜转 驻砖讬讟讗 诇讬讛 讚讬诪讬诐 砖讘讬谞转讬讬诐 讛讜讬讬谉 讬讚讬注讛 诇讞诇拽

Rather, it is obvious that this mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva. And you can learn from the mishna that when one acts unwittingly in that he did not know it was Shabbat and he acts intentionally in that he knows that these labors are prohibited on Shabbat, it is obvious to Rabbi Akiva that the intervening days are considered awareness of his sin, which serves to differentiate between the Shabbatot and render the individual liable to bring separate sin offerings for each Shabbat. It is for this reason that the mishna states that if one performs multiple labors on multiple Shabbatot because he was unaware that it was Shabbat, he is liable to bring a sin offering for each Shabbat.

讝讚讜谉 砖讘转 讜砖讙讙转 诪诇讗讻讜转 讛讜讗 讚讘注讬 讗讬 讻讙讜驻讬谉 讚诪讬讬谉 讜驻砖讟 诇讬讛 讚讻讙讜驻讬谉 讚诪讬讬谉 讜诇讚讬 诪诇讗讻讜转 讻诪诇讗讻讜转 讚诪讬讬谉 讜转专讜讬讬讛讜 诇讗 拽讘讬诇 诪讬谞讬讛

Consequently, it is clear that it is in a case where one acted intentionally in that he knew it was Shabbat and unwittingly in that he did not know that the acts he was performing were prohibited labor, that Rabbi Akiva raises his dilemma, as he is uncertain about whether the Shabbatot are comparable to separate entities. And Rabbi Eliezer resolved the dilemma for him by stating that the different Shabbatot are comparable to separate entities, and different subcategories of labors are comparable to primary categories of labor, and therefore one is liable for each act. And Rabbi Akiva did not accept either of these resolutions from Rabbi Eliezer.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗讘讬讬 诇注讜诇诐 讗讬诪讗 诇讱 讝讚讜谉 砖讘转 讜砖讙讙转 诪诇讗讻讜转 驻砖讬讟讗 诇讬讛 诇专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讚砖讘转讜转 诇讗讜 讻讙讜驻讬谉 讚诪讬讬谉 讜砖讙讙转 砖讘转 讜讝讚讜谉 诪诇讗讻讜转 讛讜讗 讚讘注讬 诪讬谞讬讛 讚讬诪讬诐 砖讘讬谞转讬讬诐 诪讬 讛讜讬讬谉 讬讚讬注讛 诇讞诇拽 讗讜 诇讗

Abaye said to Rabba: You cannot prove your claim from the mishna. Actually, I could say to you that in a case where one acts intentionally in that he knows it is Shabbat and unwittingly in that he does not know that his actions are prohibited labors, it is obvious to Rabbi Akiva that Shabbatot are not comparable to separate entities, as it can be inferred from the latter clause of this mishna that one is not liable to bring a separate sin offering for each primary category of labor performed on each individual Shabbat. And it is in reference to a case where one acted unwittingly in that he did not know it was Shabbat and intentionally in that he knew his actions are prohibited labors, that Rabbi Akiva raises his dilemma to Rabbi Eliezer. The dilemma is whether the intervening days are considered awareness to differentiate between the Shabbatot or not.

讜驻砖讬讟 诇讬讛 讚讬诪讬诐 砖讘讬谞转讬讬诐 诇讞诇拽 讜拽讘讬诇 诪讬谞讬讛 讜驻砖讟 诇讬讛 讜诇讚讬 诪诇讗讻讜转 讻诪诇讗讻讜转 讚诪讬讬谉 讜诇讗 拽讘讬诇 诪讬谞讬讛

And Rabbi Eliezer resolved the dilemma for him by stating that the intervening days are considered awareness to differentiate between the Shabbatot. And Rabbi Akiva accepted this resolution from him, due the ruling of the mishna that one who knows the essence of the prohibition against labor on Shabbat and performs multiple prohibited labors on multiple Shabbatot is liable to bring a sin offering for each and every Shabbat. And Rabbi Eliezer also resolved his other dilemma for him by stating that subcategories of labors are comparable to primary categories of labor and one is liable for each act, but Rabbi Akiva did not accept this resolution from him.

专讘 讞住讚讗 讗诪专 讝讚讜谉 砖讘转 讜砖讙讙转 诪诇讗讻讜转 讗驻讬诇讜 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 住讘讬专讗 诇讬讛 讚讻讙讜驻讬谉 讚诪讬讬谉 讜讻讬 讘注讬 诪讬谞讬讛 砖讙讙转 砖讘转 讜讝讚讜谉 诪诇讗讻讜转 讛讜讗 讚讘注讬 诪讬谞讬讛 讚讬诪讬诐 砖讘讬谞转讬讬诐 讗讬 讛讜讬讬谉 讬讚讬注讛 诇讞诇拽

Rav 岣sda says: In a case where one acts intentionally in that he knows it is Shabbat and unwittingly in that he does not know that his actions are prohibited labors, even Rabbi Akiva holds that the Shabbatot are comparable to separate entities; and when he raises the dilemma to Rabbi Eliezer, it is in reference to a case where one acted unwittingly with regard to Shabbat and intentionally with regard to prohibited labor. And he raises the dilemma in order to clarify whether or not the intervening days are considered awareness to differentiate.

讜驻砖讬讟 诇讬讛 讬诪讬诐 砖讘讬谞转讬讬诐 讛讜讬讬谉 讬讚讬注讛 诇讞诇拽 讜拽讘讬诇 诪讬谞讬讛

And Rabbi Eliezer resolved the dilemma for him by stating that the intervening days are considered awareness to differentiate the transgressions, and Rabbi Akiva accepted this resolution from him. This is in accordance with the mishna in tractate Shabbat (67b) cited earlier, that one who knows the essence of the prohibition against labor on Shabbat and performed multiple prohibited labors on multiple Shabbatot is liable to bring a sin offering for each and every Shabbat.

讜驻砖讟 诇讬讛 讚讜诇讚讬 诪诇讗讻讜转 讻诪诇讗讻讜转 讚诪讬讬谉 讜诇讗 拽讘讬诇 诪讬谞讬讛

And Rabbi Eliezer also resolved Rabbi Akiva鈥檚 other dilemma for him by stating that different subcategories of prohibited labors are comparable to primary categories of labor and one is liable for each one separately. But Rabbi Akiva did not accept this resolution from him, due to the final clause of that mishna, which states that one who performs multiple prohibited labors that are subsumed as subcategories under one primary category of prohibited labor is liable to bring only one sin offering.

讗诪专 专讘 讞住讚讗 诪谞讗 讗诪讬谞讗 诇讛 讚转谞讬讗 讛讻讜转讘 砖转讬 讗讜转讬讜转 讘讛注诇诐 讗讞转 讞讬讬讘 讘砖转讬 讛注诇诪讜转 专讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 诪讞讬讬讘 讜讞讻诪讬诐 驻讜讟专讬谉 讜诪讜讚讛 专讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 砖讗诐 讻转讘 讗讜转 讗讞转 讘砖讘转 讝讜 讜讗讜转 讗讞转 讘砖讘转 讗讞专转 驻讟讜专

Rav 岣sda said: From where do I say that according to Rabbi Akiva each Shabbat is considered a separate entity? This is as it is taught in a baraita: One who writes two letters on Shabbat during one lapse of awareness is liable, as writing two letters renders one liable for performing the prohibited labor of writing. If he does so in two separate lapses of awareness, e.g., he wrote one letter without realizing it was Shabbat, then became aware that it was Shabbat, and then again became unaware it was Shabbat and wrote a second letter, Rabban Gamliel deems him liable to bring a sin offering and the Rabbis deem him exempt. And Rabban Gamliel concedes that if he wrote one letter on this Shabbat and one letter on another Shabbat he is exempt.

讜转谞讬讗 讗讞专讬转讬 讛讻讜转讘 砖转讬 讗讜转讬讜转 讘砖转讬 砖讘转讜转 讗讞讚 讘砖讘转 讝讜 讜讗讞讚 讘砖讘转 讝讜 专讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 诪讞讬讬讘 讜讞讻诪讬诐 驻讜讟专讬谉 拽讗 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 讚专讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讻专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 住讘讬专讗 诇讬讛

And it is taught in a different baraita: In the case of one who writes two letters on two Shabbatot, one on this Shabbat and one on that Shabbat, Rabban Gamliel deems him liable and the Rabbis deem him exempt. Rav 岣sda explains: It enters your mind that Rabban Gamliel holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva.

讘砖诇诪讗 诇讚讬讚讬 讚讗诪讬谞讗 讝讚讜谉 砖讘转 讜砖讙讙转 诪诇讗讻讜转 讗驻讬诇讜 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讗讜诪专 讚砖讘转讜转 讻讙讜驻讬谉 讚诪讬讬谉 讛讗 讚转谞讬讗 驻讟讜专 讘讝讚讜谉 砖讘转 讜砖讙讙转 诪诇讗讻讜转 讚砖讘转讜转 讻讙讜驻讬谉 讚诪讬讬谉

Granted, according to my opinion, as I say that in a case where one acts intentionally in that he knows it is Shabbat and unwittingly in that he does not know his actions constitute prohibited labors, even Rabbi Akiva says that the Shabbatot are comparable to separate entities. Consequently, that which is taught in the first baraita, that Rabban Gamliel concedes that if one wrote one letter on Shabbat and another letter the following Shabbat he is exempt, can be interpreted as referring to a case where one acts intentionally in that he knows it is Shabbat but unwittingly in that he does not know his actions constitute prohibited labors. Since separate Shabbatot are comparable to separate entities, the two acts do not combine to form the minimal act of writing that would render one liable to bring a sin offering.

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Ron and Shira Krebs to commemorate the 73rd yahrzeit of Shira's grandfather (Yitzchak Leib Ben David Ber HaCohen v'Malka), the 1st yahrzeit of Shira's father (Gershon Pinya Ben Yitzchak Leib HaCohen v'Menucha Sara), and the bar mitzvah of their son Eytan who will be making a siyum on Mishna Shas this month.

  • This month's learning is sponsored for the refuah shleima of Naama bat Yael Esther.

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Keritot 16

The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria

Keritot 16

讜讗讬诇讜 注诇 住驻讬拽讜 诪讘讬讗 讗砖诐 转诇讜讬 诇讗 拽转谞讬 诪谞讬 讛讗 讗讬诇讬诪讗 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 诇讬转谞讬 谞诪讬 住讬驻讗 讜注诇 住驻讬拽谉 诪讘讬讗 讗砖诐 转诇讜讬 讚讛转谞谉 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 诪讞讬讬讘 注诇 住驻拽 诪注讬诇讛 讗砖诐 转诇讜讬

The Gemara notes: And yet in the final case in the baraita, it does not teach that in a situation where he is uncertain whether he ate from it he brings a provisional guilt offering. Whose opinion is this? If we say it is the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, let him also teach in the last clause: For a case where he is uncertain whether he ate from them he brings a provisional guilt offering, as we learned in the mishna (22b) that Rabbi Akiva deems one liable to bring a provisional guilt offering for uncertainty about misuse of consecrated property.

讗诇讗 诇讗讜 专讘讬 讬讛讜砖注 讛讬讗 讜拽转谞讬 讘讞诪砖 讛注诇诪讜转 诪讘讬讗 讞诪砖 讞讟讗讜转 讜砖诪注 诪讬谞讛 拽讬讘诇讛 诪讬谞讬讛

Rather, isn鈥檛 the baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua, who disagrees with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva and holds that one is not liable to bring a provisional guilt offering for uncertainty about misuse of consecrated property? And it teaches that one who eats notar from one offering cooked in five pots during five separate lapses of awareness brings five sin offerings, which indicates that if he did so during a single lapse of awareness he would be liable to bring only one sin offering, in accordance with the opinion stated by Rabbi Akiva in the mishna. And one can conclude from here that Rabbi Yehoshua accepted the refutation from Rabbi Akiva.

讗诇讗 讗讚专讘讛 诪住讬驻讗 讚拽转谞讬 诪讞诪砖讛 讝讘讞讬诐 讗驻讬诇讜 讘讛注诇诐 讗讞转 讞讬讬讘 注诇 讻诇 讗讞转 讜讗讞转 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛 诇讗 拽讬讘诇讛 诪讬谞讬讛

The Gemara responds: But on the contrary, one can infer otherwise from the latter clause of the baraita, which teaches: If he ate from five separate offerings, even during one lapse of awareness, he is liable to bring a separate sin offering for each and every one. One can conclude from this statement that Rabbi Yehoshua did not accept the refutation from Rabbi Akiva.

讜讗诇讗 诪讗讬 讗讬转 诇诪讬诪专 转谞讗讬 讛讬讗 讚讗讬讻讗 转谞讗 讚拽讬讘诇讛 讜讗讬讻讗 转谞讗 讚诇讗 拽讬讘诇讛

Rather, what is there to say about this baraita? It must be said that it is a dispute between tanna鈥檌m, that there is a tanna who maintains that Rabbi Yehoshua accepted Rabbi Akiva鈥檚 refutation, and there is a tanna who maintains that Rabbi Yehoshua did not accept it.

讗驻讬诇讜 转讬诪讗 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讛讬讗 讜讛讗讬 转谞讗 住讘专 诇讛 讻讜转讬讛 讘讞讚讗 讜驻诇讬讙 注诇讬讛 讘讞讚讗 住讘专 诇讛 讻讜转讬讛 讘讛注诇诪讛 讜驻诇讬讙 注诇讬讛 讘诪注讬诇讜转

But once the baraita is interpreted in accordance with two different tanna鈥檌m, you may even say that the earlier clause of the baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva and not Rabbi Yehoshua. And this tanna of the baraita holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva in one matter and disagrees with his opinion in one matter: He holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva with regard to a lapse of awareness, that if one eats from five offerings during a single lapse of awareness he is liable to bring only one sin offering. But he disagrees with his opinion with regard to misuse of consecrated property, as he does not deem one liable to bring a provisional guilt offering for uncertainty about whether he misused consecrated property.

讛讬讻讬 讚诪讬 讞诪砖 诪注讬诇讜转 讗诪专 砖诪讜讗诇 讻讗讜转讛 砖砖谞讬谞讜 讞诪砖讛 讚讘专讬诐 讘注讜诇讛 诪爪讟专驻讬谉 讛讘砖专 讜讛讞诇讘 讜讛讬讬谉 讜讛住诇转 讜讛砖诪谉

搂 The mishna teaches that if one eats five pieces from a single offering, each of which was cooked in a separate pot, he is liable to bring five guilt offerings for misuse of consecrated property. The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances which require five guilt offerings for misuse of consecrated property? Shmuel says: The five pieces must be from separate parts of the offering, like that which we learned in a mishna (Me鈥檌la 15b) with regard to a different topic: Five items from a burnt offering combine to form an olive-bulk that renders one liable for sacrificing an offering outside the Temple: The meat, and the forbidden fat, and the wine from the libations of the burnt offering, and the fine flour from the meal offering brought with the libations, and the oil for mixing with the meal offering.

讞讝拽讬讛 讗诪专 讻讙讜谉 砖讗讻诇 诪讞诪砖讛 讗讘专讬诐 专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讗诪专 讗驻讬诇讜 转讬诪讗 讘讗讘专 讗讞讚 诪砖讻讞转 诇讛 讘讻转祝 专讘讬 讬爪讞拽 谞驻讞讗 讗诪专 讻讙讜谉 砖讗讻诇 讘讞诪砖讛 诪讬谞讬 拽讚讬专讛 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗诪专 讻讙讜谉 砖讗讻诇 讘讞诪砖讛 讟注诪讬诐

岣zkiyya says: The obligation to bring five guilt offerings applies in a case where he ate from five different limbs of one offering. Reish Lakish says: You may even say that he ate from one limb, and you find this in a case where he ate from the shoulder of an offering, which has several different sections. Rabbi Yitz岣k Nappa岣 says: It applies in a case where he ate pieces of meat prepared as five different types of cooked dishes. Rabbi Yo岣nan says: It applies in a case where he ate five pieces of meat that had five different flavors, as they were prepared with different types of seasonings.

诪转谞讬壮 讗诪专 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 砖讗诇转讬 讗转 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讘注讜砖讛 诪诇讗讻讜转 讛专讘讛 讘砖讘转讜转 讛专讘讛 诪注讬谉 诪诇讗讻讛 讗讞转 讘讛注诇诐 讗讞转 诪讛讜 讞讬讬讘 讗讞转 注诇 讻讜诇谉 讗讜 讞讬讬讘 注诇 讻诇 讗讞转 讜讗讞转

MISHNA: Rabbi Akiva said: I asked Rabbi Eliezer with regard to one who performs multiple prohibited labors on several Shabbatot, and all those labors were subsumed as subcategories of one primary category of prohibited labor, and he performed them during one lapse of awareness. What is the halakha? Is he liable to bring one sin offering for unwitting performance of all these labors or is he liable to bring a sin offering for violation of each and every one of the labors?

讗诪专 诇讜 讞讬讬讘 注诇 讻诇 讗讞转 讜讗讞转 诪拽诇 讜讞讜诪专 讜诪讛 谞讚讛 砖讗讬谉 讘讛 转讜爪讗讜转 讛专讘讛 讜讞讟讗讜转 讛专讘讛 讞讬讬讘 注诇 讻诇 讗讞转 讜讗讞转 砖讘转 砖讬砖 讘讛 转讜爪讗讜转 讛专讘讛 讜诪讬转讜转 讛专讘讛 讗讬谞讜 讚讬谉 砖讬讛讗 讞讬讬讘 注诇 讻诇 讗讞转 讜讗讞转

Rabbi Eliezer said to Rabbi Akiva: He is liable to bring a sin offering for violation of each and every one of the labors, and this is derived from an a fortiori inference: Just as in the case of a menstruating woman, with regard to whom there are not multiple actions that result in transgression and that result in multiple sin offerings, but rather only the prohibition against engaging in intercourse with her, and nevertheless one is liable to bring a separate sin offering for each and every one of his acts of unwitting intercourse; in the case of Shabbat, with regard to which there are multiple primary categories and subcategories of labor that result in transgression and that result in multiple death penalties or sin offerings, is it not right that he will be liable to bring a sin offering for performance of each and every one of the prohibited labors?

讗诪专转讬 诇讜 讗诐 讗诪专转 讘谞讚讛 砖讬砖 讘讛 砖转讬 讗讝讛专讜转 砖讛讜讗 诪讜讝讛专 注诇 讛谞讚讛 讜讛谞讚讛 诪讜讝讛专转 注诇讬讜 转讗诪专 讘砖讘转 砖讗讬谉 讘讛 讗诇讗 讗讝讛专讛 讗讞转

Rabbi Akiva continues: I said to Rabbi Eliezer that the inference is not valid: If you said one is liable to bring multiple sin offerings in the case of a menstruating woman, with regard to whom there are two prohibitions, as the man is prohibited from engaging in intercourse with the menstruating woman and the menstruating woman is prohibited from engaging in intercourse with him, would you say the same in the case of Shabbat, with regard to which there is only one prohibition?

讗诪专 诇讬 讛讘讗 注诇 讛拽讟谞讜转 讬讜讻讬讞 砖讗讬谉 讘讛 讗诇讗 讗讝讛专讛 讗讞转 讜讞讬讬讘 注诇 讻诇 讗讞转 讜讗讞转

Rabbi Eliezer said to me: The halakha of one who engages in intercourse with minor menstruating girls will prove this refutation is not valid, as in that case there is only one prohibition, because the minor is exempt from the mitzvot, and nevertheless the man is liable to bring a separate sin offering for intercourse for each and every one of the acts of intercourse.

讗诪专转讬 诇讜 讗诐 讗诪专转 讘拽讟谞讜转 砖讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖讗讬谉 讘讛谉 注讻砖讬讜 讬砖 讘讛谉 诇讗讞专 讝诪谉 转讗诪专 讘砖讘转 砖讗讬谉 讘讛 注讻砖讬讜 讜诇讗 诇讗讞专 讝诪谉

Rabbi Akiva said: I said to Rabbi Eliezer that the cases of Shabbat and minor menstruating girls are not comparable. If you said in the case of minor girls that although it is not prohibited for them at present it is prohibited for them after the passage of time, when they reach majority, would you say the same in the case of Shabbat, with regard to which there are neither two prohibitions at present, nor will there be after the passage of time?

讗诪专 诇讬 讛讘讗 注诇 讛讘讛诪讛 讬讜讻讬讞 讗诪专转讬 诇讜 讛讘讛诪讛 讻砖讘转

Rabbi Eliezer said to me: The halakha of one who copulates with an animal will prove this refutation is not valid, as there are never two prohibitions in that case, and nevertheless the person is liable to bring a sin offering for each and every act. Rabbi Akiva said: I said to Rabbi Eliezer that no proof can be cited from the case of an animal, as in my opinion the case of the animal is like that of Shabbat; there is uncertainty with regard to both cases.

讙诪壮 诪讗讬 拽讘注讬 诪讬谞讬讛 讗讬 砖讘转讜转 讻讙讜驻讬谉 讚诪讬讬谉 讜讗讬 诇讗 讘注讬 诪讬谞讬讛 谞讬讘注讬 讛注讜砖讛 诪诇讗讻讛 讗讞转 讘砖讘转讜转 讛专讘讛

GEMARA: The Gemara asks: What precise dilemma did Rabbi Akiva raise before Rabbi Eliezer? If he raised a dilemma about whether different Shabbatot are comparable to separate entities or not, i.e., if performing one labor on several Shabbatot during one lapse of awareness is similar to engaging in intercourse with multiple menstruating women during one lapse of awareness, let him raise the dilemma as follows: If one performs one prohibited labor on each of several Shabbatot during a single lapse of awareness, what is the halakha?

讗诇讗 讜诇讚讬 诪诇讗讻讜转 讗讬 讻讗讘讜转 讚诪讬讬谉 讜讗讬 诇讗 讘注讬 诪讬谞讬讛 谞讬讘注讬 诪讬谞讬讛 讛注讜砖讛 诪诇讗讻讜转 讛专讘讛 诪注讬谉 诪诇讗讻讛 讗讞转 讘砖讘转

Rather, perhaps he raised a dilemma about whether different subcategories of a single prohibited labor are comparable to different primary categories, which would mean one is liable separately for each, or not. But if so, let him ask raise the dilemma in the following manner: In the case of one who performs multiple prohibited labors, all subsumed as subcategories of one primary category of labor, on a single Shabbat, during a single lapse of awareness, what is the halakha? Why did Rabbi Akiva specify a case of one who performed multiple prohibited labors on multiple Shabbatot?

讗诪专 专讘讗 讗诪专讬 讘讬 专讘 转专转讬 讘注讗 诪讬谞讬讛 砖讘转讜转 讻讙讜驻讬谉 讚诪讬讬谉 讜讗讬 诇讗 讘注讗 诪讬谞讬讛 讜诇讚讬 诪诇讗讻讜转 讻诪诇讗讻讜转 讚诪讬讬谉 讗讬 诇讗

Rava said: They say in the school of Rav [bei Rav] that Rabbi Akiva raised two dilemmas before him: He raised a dilemma about whether Shabbatot are comparable to separate entities or whether they are not comparable to separate entities, and he also raised a dilemma about whether different subcategories of a single prohibited labor are comparable to different primary categories of labor, or whether they are not. Rabbi Eliezer answered that multiple Shabbatot are comparable to separate entities, and that one who performs different subcategories of a single category of prohibited labor is like one who performs multiple primary categories of labor.

讜砖讘转讜转 讛讬讻讬 诪讬讘注讬 诇讬讛 砖讙讙转 砖讘转 讜讝讚讜谉 诪诇讗讻讜转 驻砖讬讟讗 诇讬讛 讚讬诪讬诐 砖讘讬谞转讬讬诐 讛讜讬讬谉 讬讚讬注讛 诇讞诇拽

The Gemara raises another question with regard to the mishna: And in connection to the performance of the same category of prohibited labor on each of several Shabbatot during a single lapse of awareness, what is the precise case about which Rabbi Akiva raises his dilemma? If the individual was unwitting in that he was unaware that it was Shabbat but acted intentionally with regard to the prohibited labors, i.e., he knew that these labors are prohibited on Shabbat, perhaps it is obvious to Rabbi Akiva that the intervening days constitute an awareness of his sin, which serves to differentiate between the Shabbatot and render the individual liable to bring separate sin offerings for each Shabbat.

讜讝讚讜谉 砖讘转 讜砖讙讙转 诪诇讗讻讜转 讛讜讗 讚讘注讬 诪讬谞讬讛 讗讬 讻讙讜驻讬谉 讚诪讬讬谉 讗讬 诇讗

And if so, it is in reference to a case where the individual acts intentionally with regard to Shabbat, i.e., he knows that it is Shabbat, but he acts unwittingly in that he does not know that the prohibited labors he is performing are prohibited on Shabbat, that Rabbi Akiva raises his dilemma. His dilemma is whether the Shabbatot are comparable to separate entities, which would mean that he is liable to bring a separate sin offering for each Shabbat, or whether they are not comparable to separate entities and therefore he is liable to bring only one sin offering.

讗讜 讚诇诪讗 讝讚讜谉 砖讘转 讜砖讙讙转 诪诇讗讻讜转 驻砖讬讟讗 诇讬讛 讚讻讙讜驻讬谉 讚诪讬讬谉 讜砖讙讙转 砖讘转 讜讝讚讜谉 诪诇讗讻讜转 讛讜讗 讚讘注讬 诪讬谞讬讛 讚讬诪讬诐 砖讘讬谞转讬诐 讗讬 讛讜讬讬谉 讬讚讬注讛 诇讞诇拽 讗讬 诇讗

Or perhaps in the case where he acts intentionally with regard to Shabbat and unwittingly with regard to prohibited labors, it is obvious to Rabbi Akiva that the Shabbatot are comparable to separate entities and he is liable to bring a separate sin offering for each Shabbat. And it is in reference to a case where he acts unwittingly in that he does not know it is Shabbat, but he acts intentionally in that he knows that the labors he is performing are prohibited on Shabbat, that Rabbi Akiva raises his dilemma. His dilemma is whether the intervening days between the Shabbatot are considered awareness of his sin, which would serve to differentiate between one sin and the next, or not.

讗诪专 专讘讛

Rabba said:

诪住转讘专讗 砖讙讙转 砖讘转 讜讝讚讜谉 诪诇讗讻讜转 驻砖讬讟讗 诇讬讛 讚讬诪讬诐 砖讘讬谞转讬讬诐 讛讜讬讬谉 讬讚讬注讛 诇讞诇拽 讜讝讚讜谉 砖讘转 讜砖讙讙转 诪诇讗讻讜转 讛讜讗 讚讘注讬 诪讬谞讬讛 讻讙讜驻讬谉 讚诪讬讬谉 讗讜 诇讗讜

It stands to reason, based on a proof from a mishna, to say that in a case where he acts unwittingly in that he does not know that it is Shabbat, and intentionally in that he knows that the labors he is performing are prohibited on Shabbat, it is obvious to Rabbi Akiva that the intervening days between the Shabbatot are considered awareness of his sin, which would serve to differentiate between one sin and the next. And it is in reference to a case where he acts intentionally with regard to Shabbat and unwittingly with regard to prohibited labors that Rabbi Akiva raises his dilemma, which is about whether the Shabbatot are comparable to separate entities or not.

讜驻砖讬讟 诇讬讛 讚讝讚讜谉 砖讘转 讜砖讙讙转 诪诇讗讻讜转 讻讙讜驻讬谉 讚诪讬讬谉 讜诇讗 拽讘讬诇 诪讬谞讬讛 讜驻砖讟 诇讬讛 讚讜诇讚讬 诪诇讗讻讜转 讻诪诇讗讻讜转 讚诪讬讬谉 讜诇讗 拽讘讬诇 诪讬谞讬讛

And Rabbi Eliezer resolved his dilemma for him by stating that in a case where he acts intentionally with regard to Shabbat and unwittingly with regard to prohibited labors, the Shabbatot are comparable to separate entities. But Rabbi Akiva did not accept this resolution from him. And with regard to Rabbi Akiva鈥檚 other dilemma, Rabbi Eliezer resolved it for him by stating that subcategories of labors are comparable to primary categories of labor, and one is liable to bring a separate sin offering for each act. But Rabbi Akiva did not accept this resolution from him either.

讗诪专 专讘讛 诪谞讗 讗诪讬谞讗 诇讛 讚转谞谉 讻诇诇 讙讚讜诇 讗诪专讜 讘砖讘转 讻诇 讛砖讜讻讞 注讬拽专 砖讘转 讜注砖讛 诪诇讗讻讜转 讛专讘讛 讘砖讘转讜转 讛专讘讛 讗讬谞讜 讞讬讬讘 讗诇讗 讗讞转

Rabba said: From where do I say this? As we learned in a mishna (Shabbat 67b): The Sages stated a significant principle with regard to the halakhot of Shabbat: With regard to anyone who forgets the essence of Shabbat, i.e., one who is entirely ignorant that labor is prohibited on Shabbat, and he performed multiple prohibited labors on multiple Shabbatot, he is liable to bring only one sin offering, as there is only a single, comprehensive lapse of awareness.

讛讬讜讚注 注讬拽专 砖讘转 讜注砖讛 诪诇讗讻讜转 讛专讘讛 讘砖讘转讜转 讛专讘讛 讞讬讬讘 注诇 讻诇 砖讘转 讜砖讘转 讛讬讜讚注 砖讛讜讗 砖讘转 讜注砖讛 诪诇讗讻讜转 讛专讘讛 讘砖讘转讜转 讛专讘讛 讞讬讬讘 注诇 讻诇 讗讘 诪诇讗讻讛 讜诪诇讗讻讛

With regard to one who knows the essence of the prohibition against labor on Shabbat, and he performed multiple prohibited labors on multiple Shabbatot because he was unaware that those days were Shabbat, he is liable to bring a sin offering for each and every Shabbat, as the intervening days are considered awareness which differentiates between the Shabbatot. One who is aware that the day is Shabbat and performed multiple prohibited labors, which he did not know were prohibited, on multiple Shabbatot, is liable to bring a sin offering for each and every primary category of labor that he performed.

讜讗讬诇讜 讞讬讬讘 注诇 讻诇 讗讘 诪诇讗讻讛 砖诇 讻诇 砖讘转 讜砖讘转 诇讗 拽转谞讬

Rabba comments: But in the latter case, the mishna does not teach that he is liable to bring a sin offering for each act of a primary category of labor that he performed on each and every Shabbat. He is liable to bring one sin offering for each primary category of labor, despite the fact that he performed the act on multiple Shabbatot. This indicates that the different Shabbatot are not considered separate entities.

诪谞讬 讛讗 讗讬诇讬诪讗 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讗讬诪讗 住讬驻讗 讛注讜砖讛 诪诇讗讻讜转 讛专讘讛 诪注讬谉 诪诇讗讻讛 讗讞转 讗讬谉 讞讬讬讘 讗诇讗 讗讞转 讜讗讬 专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讞讬讬讘 注诇 讻诇 讜诇讚讬 诪诇讗讻讜转 讻诪诇讗讻讜转

Whose opinion is this? If we say it is the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, say the last clause of that mishna: One who performs multiple prohibited labors subsumed, as subcategories, under one primary category of prohibited labor is liable to bring only one sin offering. And if this were the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer it should state: He is liable to bring a separate sin offering for each of the different subcategories of labors as though they were separate primary categories of labor.

讗诇讗 驻砖讬讟讗 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讛讬讗 讜砖诪注 诪讬谞讛 砖讙讙转 砖讘转 讜讝讚讜谉 诪诇讗讻讜转 驻砖讬讟讗 诇讬讛 讚讬诪讬诐 砖讘讬谞转讬讬诐 讛讜讬讬谉 讬讚讬注讛 诇讞诇拽

Rather, it is obvious that this mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva. And you can learn from the mishna that when one acts unwittingly in that he did not know it was Shabbat and he acts intentionally in that he knows that these labors are prohibited on Shabbat, it is obvious to Rabbi Akiva that the intervening days are considered awareness of his sin, which serves to differentiate between the Shabbatot and render the individual liable to bring separate sin offerings for each Shabbat. It is for this reason that the mishna states that if one performs multiple labors on multiple Shabbatot because he was unaware that it was Shabbat, he is liable to bring a sin offering for each Shabbat.

讝讚讜谉 砖讘转 讜砖讙讙转 诪诇讗讻讜转 讛讜讗 讚讘注讬 讗讬 讻讙讜驻讬谉 讚诪讬讬谉 讜驻砖讟 诇讬讛 讚讻讙讜驻讬谉 讚诪讬讬谉 讜诇讚讬 诪诇讗讻讜转 讻诪诇讗讻讜转 讚诪讬讬谉 讜转专讜讬讬讛讜 诇讗 拽讘讬诇 诪讬谞讬讛

Consequently, it is clear that it is in a case where one acted intentionally in that he knew it was Shabbat and unwittingly in that he did not know that the acts he was performing were prohibited labor, that Rabbi Akiva raises his dilemma, as he is uncertain about whether the Shabbatot are comparable to separate entities. And Rabbi Eliezer resolved the dilemma for him by stating that the different Shabbatot are comparable to separate entities, and different subcategories of labors are comparable to primary categories of labor, and therefore one is liable for each act. And Rabbi Akiva did not accept either of these resolutions from Rabbi Eliezer.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗讘讬讬 诇注讜诇诐 讗讬诪讗 诇讱 讝讚讜谉 砖讘转 讜砖讙讙转 诪诇讗讻讜转 驻砖讬讟讗 诇讬讛 诇专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讚砖讘转讜转 诇讗讜 讻讙讜驻讬谉 讚诪讬讬谉 讜砖讙讙转 砖讘转 讜讝讚讜谉 诪诇讗讻讜转 讛讜讗 讚讘注讬 诪讬谞讬讛 讚讬诪讬诐 砖讘讬谞转讬讬诐 诪讬 讛讜讬讬谉 讬讚讬注讛 诇讞诇拽 讗讜 诇讗

Abaye said to Rabba: You cannot prove your claim from the mishna. Actually, I could say to you that in a case where one acts intentionally in that he knows it is Shabbat and unwittingly in that he does not know that his actions are prohibited labors, it is obvious to Rabbi Akiva that Shabbatot are not comparable to separate entities, as it can be inferred from the latter clause of this mishna that one is not liable to bring a separate sin offering for each primary category of labor performed on each individual Shabbat. And it is in reference to a case where one acted unwittingly in that he did not know it was Shabbat and intentionally in that he knew his actions are prohibited labors, that Rabbi Akiva raises his dilemma to Rabbi Eliezer. The dilemma is whether the intervening days are considered awareness to differentiate between the Shabbatot or not.

讜驻砖讬讟 诇讬讛 讚讬诪讬诐 砖讘讬谞转讬讬诐 诇讞诇拽 讜拽讘讬诇 诪讬谞讬讛 讜驻砖讟 诇讬讛 讜诇讚讬 诪诇讗讻讜转 讻诪诇讗讻讜转 讚诪讬讬谉 讜诇讗 拽讘讬诇 诪讬谞讬讛

And Rabbi Eliezer resolved the dilemma for him by stating that the intervening days are considered awareness to differentiate between the Shabbatot. And Rabbi Akiva accepted this resolution from him, due the ruling of the mishna that one who knows the essence of the prohibition against labor on Shabbat and performs multiple prohibited labors on multiple Shabbatot is liable to bring a sin offering for each and every Shabbat. And Rabbi Eliezer also resolved his other dilemma for him by stating that subcategories of labors are comparable to primary categories of labor and one is liable for each act, but Rabbi Akiva did not accept this resolution from him.

专讘 讞住讚讗 讗诪专 讝讚讜谉 砖讘转 讜砖讙讙转 诪诇讗讻讜转 讗驻讬诇讜 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 住讘讬专讗 诇讬讛 讚讻讙讜驻讬谉 讚诪讬讬谉 讜讻讬 讘注讬 诪讬谞讬讛 砖讙讙转 砖讘转 讜讝讚讜谉 诪诇讗讻讜转 讛讜讗 讚讘注讬 诪讬谞讬讛 讚讬诪讬诐 砖讘讬谞转讬讬诐 讗讬 讛讜讬讬谉 讬讚讬注讛 诇讞诇拽

Rav 岣sda says: In a case where one acts intentionally in that he knows it is Shabbat and unwittingly in that he does not know that his actions are prohibited labors, even Rabbi Akiva holds that the Shabbatot are comparable to separate entities; and when he raises the dilemma to Rabbi Eliezer, it is in reference to a case where one acted unwittingly with regard to Shabbat and intentionally with regard to prohibited labor. And he raises the dilemma in order to clarify whether or not the intervening days are considered awareness to differentiate.

讜驻砖讬讟 诇讬讛 讬诪讬诐 砖讘讬谞转讬讬诐 讛讜讬讬谉 讬讚讬注讛 诇讞诇拽 讜拽讘讬诇 诪讬谞讬讛

And Rabbi Eliezer resolved the dilemma for him by stating that the intervening days are considered awareness to differentiate the transgressions, and Rabbi Akiva accepted this resolution from him. This is in accordance with the mishna in tractate Shabbat (67b) cited earlier, that one who knows the essence of the prohibition against labor on Shabbat and performed multiple prohibited labors on multiple Shabbatot is liable to bring a sin offering for each and every Shabbat.

讜驻砖讟 诇讬讛 讚讜诇讚讬 诪诇讗讻讜转 讻诪诇讗讻讜转 讚诪讬讬谉 讜诇讗 拽讘讬诇 诪讬谞讬讛

And Rabbi Eliezer also resolved Rabbi Akiva鈥檚 other dilemma for him by stating that different subcategories of prohibited labors are comparable to primary categories of labor and one is liable for each one separately. But Rabbi Akiva did not accept this resolution from him, due to the final clause of that mishna, which states that one who performs multiple prohibited labors that are subsumed as subcategories under one primary category of prohibited labor is liable to bring only one sin offering.

讗诪专 专讘 讞住讚讗 诪谞讗 讗诪讬谞讗 诇讛 讚转谞讬讗 讛讻讜转讘 砖转讬 讗讜转讬讜转 讘讛注诇诐 讗讞转 讞讬讬讘 讘砖转讬 讛注诇诪讜转 专讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 诪讞讬讬讘 讜讞讻诪讬诐 驻讜讟专讬谉 讜诪讜讚讛 专讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 砖讗诐 讻转讘 讗讜转 讗讞转 讘砖讘转 讝讜 讜讗讜转 讗讞转 讘砖讘转 讗讞专转 驻讟讜专

Rav 岣sda said: From where do I say that according to Rabbi Akiva each Shabbat is considered a separate entity? This is as it is taught in a baraita: One who writes two letters on Shabbat during one lapse of awareness is liable, as writing two letters renders one liable for performing the prohibited labor of writing. If he does so in two separate lapses of awareness, e.g., he wrote one letter without realizing it was Shabbat, then became aware that it was Shabbat, and then again became unaware it was Shabbat and wrote a second letter, Rabban Gamliel deems him liable to bring a sin offering and the Rabbis deem him exempt. And Rabban Gamliel concedes that if he wrote one letter on this Shabbat and one letter on another Shabbat he is exempt.

讜转谞讬讗 讗讞专讬转讬 讛讻讜转讘 砖转讬 讗讜转讬讜转 讘砖转讬 砖讘转讜转 讗讞讚 讘砖讘转 讝讜 讜讗讞讚 讘砖讘转 讝讜 专讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 诪讞讬讬讘 讜讞讻诪讬诐 驻讜讟专讬谉 拽讗 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 讚专讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讻专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 住讘讬专讗 诇讬讛

And it is taught in a different baraita: In the case of one who writes two letters on two Shabbatot, one on this Shabbat and one on that Shabbat, Rabban Gamliel deems him liable and the Rabbis deem him exempt. Rav 岣sda explains: It enters your mind that Rabban Gamliel holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva.

讘砖诇诪讗 诇讚讬讚讬 讚讗诪讬谞讗 讝讚讜谉 砖讘转 讜砖讙讙转 诪诇讗讻讜转 讗驻讬诇讜 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讗讜诪专 讚砖讘转讜转 讻讙讜驻讬谉 讚诪讬讬谉 讛讗 讚转谞讬讗 驻讟讜专 讘讝讚讜谉 砖讘转 讜砖讙讙转 诪诇讗讻讜转 讚砖讘转讜转 讻讙讜驻讬谉 讚诪讬讬谉

Granted, according to my opinion, as I say that in a case where one acts intentionally in that he knows it is Shabbat and unwittingly in that he does not know his actions constitute prohibited labors, even Rabbi Akiva says that the Shabbatot are comparable to separate entities. Consequently, that which is taught in the first baraita, that Rabban Gamliel concedes that if one wrote one letter on Shabbat and another letter the following Shabbat he is exempt, can be interpreted as referring to a case where one acts intentionally in that he knows it is Shabbat but unwittingly in that he does not know his actions constitute prohibited labors. Since separate Shabbatot are comparable to separate entities, the two acts do not combine to form the minimal act of writing that would render one liable to bring a sin offering.

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