Keritot 7

בת כהן שנישאת לישראל ואכלה בתרומה משלמת את הקרן ואינה משלמת את החומש ומיתתה בשריפה

With regard to the daughter of a priest who married an Israelite and then unwittingly partook of teruma, she pays the principal, as a thief would, as she partook of teruma to which she owns no rights. But she does not pay the additional one-fifth payment, which is the fine paid by an Israelite who partakes of teruma unwittingly (see Leviticus 22:14). This is because she is not completely disqualified from the priesthood, since if she becomes widowed or divorced without having borne children she will again be permitted to partake of teruma. And if she commits adultery her death penalty is administered by burning, as is the halakha with regard to the daughter of a priest (see Leviticus 21:9).

ניסת לאחד מן הפסולין משלמת קרן וחומש ומיתתה בחנק דברי רבי מאיר

By contrast, if she married one of those who are unfit for her to marry due to his lineage, thereby disqualifying herself from the priesthood for the future, she pays the principal and the additional one-fifth payment, and her death is by strangulation, as is the halakha with regard to Israelite women. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir.

וחכמים אומרים אחת זו ואחת זו משלמת הקרן ואינה משלמת החומש ומיתתה בשריפה

And the Rabbis say: In both this case and that case, whether she was married to an Israelite or to one unfit for her to marry, she pays the principal but she does not pay the additional one-fifth payment, and her death is by burning, as she previously had the status of a daughter of the priesthood. This opinion of the Rabbis is presumably that of Rabbi Yehuda, who is usually the disputant of Rabbi Meir. As explained with regard to the anointing of a king, Rabbi Yehuda requires that the individual in question must have the status of a stranger, i.e., not a High Priest or a king, from beginning to end.

אמר רב יוסף מחלוקת בנתינת שמן המשחה ובשינויי דשנינן אבל נתינה דעלמא דברי הכל כזית

Rav Yosef said the dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda applies to the placing of the anointing oil, and it is explained by those answers that we answered earlier, that according to Rabbi Meir one is liable for the placing of any amount, as the verse uses an expression of applying, whereas according to Rabbi Yehuda one is liable only if one places oil that is the volume of an olive-bulk. But with regard to placing in general, e.g., the prohibition not to place frankincense on the meal offering of a sinner (see Leviticus 5:11), everyone agrees one is liable for placing only the volume of an olive-bulk.

גופא תני תנא קמיה דרבי אלעזר כל שישנו בסך ישנו בבל ייסך וכל שאינו בסך אינו בבל ייסך אמר ליה שפיר קאמרת לא ייסך כתיב וקרי ביה לא יסיך

The Gemara discusses the matter itself: A tanna teaches a baraita before Rabbi Elazar: Anyone included in the obligation not to apply anointing oil to himself or others is likewise included as the object of: It shall not be applied, i.e., it is prohibited to apply the oil to him. And anyone not included in the obligation not to apply anointing oil to himself or others is not included as the object of: It shall not be applied. Rabbi Elazar said to that tanna: You are saying well, as it is written: “Upon the flesh of a person it shall not be applied [lo yisakh]” (Exodus 30:32), and you read into the verse: Lo yasikh, he shall not apply it to others. This dual reading indicates that one who is commanded not to apply the oil is the same as the one upon whom it is prohibited to apply the oil, as stated by the tanna.

תני רב חנניה קמיה דרבא מנין לכהן גדול שנטל משמן המשחה שעל ראשו ונתן על בני מעיו מנין שהוא חייב שנאמר על בשר אדם לא ייסך אמר ליה רב אחא בריה דרבא לרב אשי מאי שנא מהא דתניא כהן שסך בשמן של תרומה בן בתו ישראל מתעגל בו ואינו חושש

§ Rav Ḥananya taught a halakha before Rava: From where is it derived with regard to a High Priest who took from the anointing oil that is on his head and placed it on his stomach; from where is it derived that he is liable? It is derived from a verse, as it is stated: “Upon the flesh of a person it shall not be applied” (Exodus 30:32). Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, said to Rav Ashi: What is different between this case and that which is taught in a baraita: In the case of a priest who applied teruma oil to himself, the Israelite son of his daughter may rub against [mitaggel] this oil without concern that he might be deriving benefit from teruma?

אמר ליה התם ומתו בו כי יחללהו כתיב כיון דחלליה הא איתחיל אבל גבי שמן המשחה כתיב כי נזר גו׳ אלהיו עליו שמן משחה קרייה רחמנא דאף על גב דאיתא עליו לא איתחיל

Rav Ashi said to him: There, with regard to teruma oil, it is written: “They will die through it if they profane it” (Leviticus 22:9), and since the priest has already profaned the oil by using it, it is considered profaned. But with regard to the anointing oil it is written: “For the consecration of the anointing oil of His God is upon him” (Leviticus 21:12). The Merciful One calls it anointing oil even at this stage, to teach that even though it is upon the High Priest it is not considered profaned, and instead remains sacred.

על אלו חייבין על זדונו כו׳ קתני חוץ ממטמא מקדש וקדשיו ממאי מפיק ליה הכי קתני חוץ ממטמא מקדש וקדשיו שאין מביא אשם תלוי

§ The mishna teaches: For any of these prohibitions, one is liable to receive karet for its intentional violation and to bring a sin offering for its unwitting violation. And for violation in a case where it is unknown to him whether he transgressed, he is liable to bring a provisional guilt offering. The Gemara notes that the mishna further teaches: This is the halakha for all the transgressions listed above except for one who defiles the Temple, i.e., he enters the Temple while ritually impure or renders its consecrated items ritually impure. The Gemara asks: From what halakha does the tanna exclude these cases? After all, one who enters the Temple while impure or renders its consecrated items impure is also liable to receive karet. The Gemara answers: This is what the mishna is teaching: Except for one who defiles the Temple or renders its consecrated items ritually impure, as he does not bring a provisional guilt offering.

וניתני נמי חוץ ממי שעבר עליו יום הכיפורים שאין מביא אשם תלוי אמר ריש לקיש כי קתני היכא דאיתיה לחטאת ורחמנא פטריה עבר עליו יום הכיפורים ליתיה לחטאת דקא כפר ליה

The Gemara suggests: And let the mishna also teach: Except for one who sinned and Yom Kippur passed, as he too does not bring a provisional guilt offering. Reish Lakish said: When the tanna teaches these exceptions he is referring to those cases where there is a sin and nevertheless the Merciful One exempts him from bringing a provisional guilt offering. By contrast, in a case where Yom Kippur passed, there is no remaining sin, as Yom Kippur atoned for him, i.e., for his sin.

רבי יוחנן אמר במבעט דקאמר אין יום הכפורים מכפר דאי הדר ביה בתר יום הכיפורים בעי לאיתויי אשם תלוי וריש לקיש סבר מבעט נמי מכפר עליה יום הכיפורים

Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The mishna is referring to one who rejects the atonement of Yom Kippur, who says: Yom Kippur does not atone for one’s sins. In this situation Yom Kippur does not atone for him, which means that if he retracted from his sinful ways after Yom Kippur he is required to bring a provisional guilt offering. Therefore, it cannot be listed in the exceptions stated in the mishna. The Gemara notes: And Reish Lakish does not explain the mishna in this manner, as he maintains that even with regard to one who rejects its atonement, Yom Kippur atones for his sins.

ובפלוגתא האומר לא יתכפר לי חטאתי אביי אמר אינה מכפרת רבא אמר מכפרת היכא דאמר לא תיקרב דכולי עלמא לא פליגי דלא מכפרת דכתיב יקריב אותו לרצנו כי פליגי דאמר תיקרב ולא תכפר אביי אמר אין מכפרת דהא אמר לא תכפר רבא אמר מכפרת כיון דאמר תיקרב כפרה ממילא אתי

The Gemara notes: And their dispute is with regard to the issue that is the subject of the dispute between later amora’im: Concerning one who says: My sin offering, which is sacrificed for me, should not atone for me, Abaye said: This sin offering does not atone for him. Rava said: It atones for him. The Gemara explains: In a case where he said: I do not want it to be sacrificed, everyone agrees that it does not atone for him, as it is written: “He shall bring it in accordance with his will” (Leviticus 1:3), which indicates that if the offering is brought against his will it is not effective. Where they disagree is when he says: The sin offering should be sacrificed but it should not atone for me. Abaye said: It does not atone for him, as he said that it should not atone for him. Rava said: It does atone for him, as once he says it should be sacrificed, the atonement comes by itself.

והדר ביה רבא כדתניא יכול יהא יום הכיפורים מכפר על שבין ועל שאין שבין ודין הוא ומה חטאת ואשם מכפרין ויום הכפורים מכפר מה חטאת ואשם אין מכפרין אלא על השבין אף יום הכפורים אין מכפר אלא על השבין

The Gemara notes: And Rava retracted his opinion, as it is taught in a baraita: One might have thought that Yom Kippur atones for those who repent and for those who do not repent. The baraita elaborates: And there is a logical inference to negate this assertion: Just as a sin offering and a guilt offering atone, and likewise Yom Kippur atones, just as a sin offering and a guilt offering atone only for those who repent, so too, Yom Kippur atones only for those who repent.

לא אם אמרת בחטאת ואשם שאין מכפרין על המזיד שוגג תאמר ביום הכפורים שמכפר על המזיד כשוגג והואיל ומכפר על המזיד כשוגג מכפר על שבין ועל שאין שבין תלמוד לומר אך חלק

The baraita rejects this opinion: No, if you said this is the halakha with regard to a sin offering and a guilt offering, which do not atone for intentional sins as they do for unwitting sins, shall you also say that this is the halakha with regard to Yom Kippur, which does atone for intentional sins as it does for unwitting sins? Yom Kippur effects atonement even in cases where offerings do not. And since it is the case that the atonement of Yom Kippur is far-reaching in that it atones for intentional sins as it does for unwitting sins, it follows that it may atone both for those who repent and for those who do not repent. To dispel this notion, the verse states: “Yet on the tenth day of this month it is Yom Kippur” (Leviticus 23:27). By means of the word “yet,” the verse divided and limited the atonement of Yom Kippur so that it atones only for those who repent. This concludes the baraita.

מאי שבין ושאין שבין אלימא שבין שוגג לא שבין מזיד הא קתני לא אם אמרת בחטאת ואשם כו׳

The Gemara analyzes this baraita. What is the meaning of: Those who repent and those who do not repent? Shall we say those who repent are those whose transgressions were unwitting, whereas those who do not repent are those whose transgressions were intentional? This cannot be the case, as the baraita teaches: No, if you said this is the halakha with regard to a sin offering and a guilt offering, which do not atone for intentional sins as they do for unwitting sins. Since the baraita is referring to the concepts of intentional and unwitting sins in this clause, the categories of those who repent and do not repent must have another meaning.

אלא כי הא דעולא אמר רבי יוחנן אכל חלב והפריש קרבן ונשתמד וחזר בו הואיל ונדחה ידחה

Rather, the category of those who do not repent is like that which Ulla says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: If one unwittingly ate forbidden fat and separated an offering for this sin, and became an apostate and subsequently retracted his apostasy, nevertheless, since the offering was rejected from being sacrificed while he was an apostate, it shall remain rejected. Accordingly, the baraita is suggesting that the same applies to one who became an apostate and Yom Kippur passed: Even if he retracts his apostasy, the following Yom Kippur should not atone for his transgression.

נהי דאידחי קרבן גברא בר כפרה הוא אלא שבין דאמר יכפר עלי חטאתי שאין שבין דאמר לא תכפר עלי חטאתי שמע מינה

The Gemara rejects this interpretation: Granted, the offering is rejected from the altar, and therefore it cannot be sacrificed at a later stage. But the man himself is fit for atonement, and he can bring another sin offering. The Gemara suggests another interpretation of the baraita: Rather, it must be that the category of those who repent is referring to one who says: My sin offering should atone for me, and the category of those who do not repent is referring to one who says: My sin offering should not atone for me. The Gemara comments: Conclude from the baraita that a sin offering does not atone for one who states beforehand: My sin offering should not atone for me, in contradiction of the earlier statement of Rava. Since Rava was aware of this baraita, he must have retracted his opinion.

ורמינהי יכול לא יהא יום הכפורים מכפר אלא על שנתענה בו ולא עשה בו מלאכה וקראו מקרא קודש לא נתענה בו ועשה בו מלאכה ולא קראו מקרא קודש יכול לא יהא יום כיפורים מכפר תלמוד לומר יום הכפורים הוא מכל מקום ותרוייהו סתם סיפרא הוא קשיין אהדדי

The Gemara continues its analysis of this baraita by comparing it to another baraita. And the Sages raise a contradiction: One might have thought that Yom Kippur shall atone only for one who fasted on it and did not perform labor on it and declared it a holy convocation. With regard to one who did not fast on it, or performed labor on it, or did not declare it a holy convocation, one might have thought that Yom Kippur shall not atone for him. To counter this the verse states: “Yet on the tenth day of this seventh month it is Yom Kippur” (Leviticus 23:27); the additional emphasis of “it is” serves to teach that the day atones in any case. The ruling of this baraita disputes the one cited earlier, which states that Yom Kippur atones only for those who repent, and both are unattributed baraitot in the Sifra. They are difficult, as they contradict each other.

אמר אביי לא קשיא הא רבי אליבא דרבי יהודה הא רבי אליבא דידיה דתניא רבי אומר כל עבירות שבתורה בין עשה תשובה ובין לא עשה תשובה יום הכפורים מכפר

Abaye said: This is not difficult. This first baraita is the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, and that second baraita is the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi in accordance with his own opinion. As it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: For all transgressions that are stated in the Torah, whether one repented or whether one did not repent, Yom Kippur atones.

חוץ מפורק עול ומגלה פנים בתורה ומפר ברית בשר שאם עשה תשובה יום הכפורים מכפר ואם לאו אין יום הכפורים מכפר

Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi continues: This is the halakha except for one who divests himself of the yoke of God, by denying His existence, and one who impudently reveals facets of the Torah in a manner that departs from their true meaning, and one who nullifies the covenant of the flesh, i.e., circumcision. With regard to these, if one repented, Yom Kippur atones, and if not, Yom Kippur does not atone. This indicates that according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, Yom Kippur atones even if one did not repent.

רבא אמר הא והא רבי אליבא דנפשיה ומודה רבי בעבירות דיום הכפורים גופיה דלא מכפר דאי לא תימא הכי כרת דיום הכפורים לרבי כיון דבכל שעתא ושעתא מכפר היכי משכחת לה

Rava said: Both this baraita and that baraita are the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi in accordance with his own opinion, that Yom Kippur atones even for those who do not repent, but even Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi concedes that with regard to the transgressions of violating Yom Kippur itself, e.g., if one ate or performed labor on Yom Kippur, that Yom Kippur does not atone for those transgressions. He must necessarily concede this point, as if you do not say so, then according to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, with regard to the punishment of karet for transgressing the prohibitions of Yom Kippur, since each and every hour of the day atones for one’s sins, how can you find the application of karet in this case?

ומאי קושיא דילמא דעבד עבידתא כולי ליליא ובהדי עמוד השחר מית דלא הוה יממא דלכפר ליה תינח כרת דליליא כרת דיממא היכי משכחת לה

The Gemara questions this proof: And what is the difficulty? Perhaps you find a case where he performed labor the entire night of Yom Kippur and died at dawn, as in such a case there was no daytime of Yom Kippur, which is the part of Yom Kippur that effects atonement, to atone for him. The Gemara asks: That works out well with regard to the punishment of karet for transgressing at night; but with regard to karet for transgressing at daytime, how can you find these circumstances, i.e., how can he be liable to receive karet for transgressing in the day?

ומאי קושיא דילמא בהדי דקאכל נהמא חנקתיה אומצא דלא הוה ליה שהות ביממא דלכפר ליה אי נמי דעבד עבידתיה סמוך לשקיעת החמה אי נמי בהדי דעביד עבידתיה פסקיה מרא לשקיה ומית דלא הוה ליה שהות ביממא דלכפר ליה

The Gemara responds: And what is the difficulty? Perhaps while eating bread he choked on a chunk of meat he ate with it, and died, as there was not enough time in the day after his transgression to atone for him. Alternatively, it is referring to a case where he performed labor close to sunset; alternatively, it is referring to a case where as he was performing labor, the hoe with which he was working cut his thigh and he died, as in these cases too there was no time in the day after his transgression to atone for him, either because it was no longer Yom Kippur or because he died immediately.

וחכמים אומרים אף המגדף כו׳ מאי אף המגדף שאין בו מעשה

§ The mishna teaches: And the Rabbis say: The halakha is the same, i.e., there is no obligation to bring a sin offering, even with regard to the one who blasphemes, as it is stated with regard to the sin offering: “You shall have one law for him who performs the action unwittingly” (Numbers 15:29), excluding one who blasphemes, as he does not perform an action but sins with speech. The Gemara asks: What caused the Rabbis to specify: Even one who blasphemes, as he does not perform an action? Why do the Rabbis mention this explanation?

רבנן שמעו לרבי עקיבא דתני בעל אוב ולא תני ידעוני אמרו ליה מאי שנא דלא מייתי קרבן משום דלית ביה מעשה מגדף נמי לית ביה מעשה

The Gemara explains: The Rabbis heard that Rabbi Akiva teaches in his list of those who must bring a sin offering a necromancer, and he does not teach a sorcerer in his list, and therefore they said to him: What is different about a sorcerer that he does not bring an offering? It must be due to the fact that his transgression does not involve an action. If so, with regard to the sin of one who blasphemes as well, it does not involve an action.

תנו רבנן מגדף מביא קרבן הואיל ונאמר בו כרת דברי רבי עקיבא ואומר ונשא חטאו וכללא הוא כל היכא דכתיב ביה כרת מייתי קרבן והא פסח ומילה דכתיב בהו כרת ולא מייתי קרבן

The Sages taught in a baraita (Tosefta 1:1): One who unwittingly blasphemes brings an offering, since karet is stated with regard to it. This is the statement of Rabbi Akiva. And the verse states: “Whoever curses his God shall bear his sin” (Leviticus 24:15), as the Gemara will explain. The Gemara asks: And is it an established principle that wherever it is written karet with regard to a mitzva, one who violates it unwittingly brings an offering? But there is the case of the mitzva of the Paschal offering, and the mitzva of circumcision, as the punishment of karet is written for failing to perform them, and yet one does not bring an offering for failing to perform these mitzvot unwittingly.

הכי קאמר מגדף מביא קרבן הואיל ובא בו כרת במקום קרבן דברי רבי עקיבא קסבר מיגו דבעי מכתב כרת בעלמא וכתיב כרת במקום קרבן שמע מינה מייתי קרבן

The Gemara answers that this is what Rabbi Akiva is saying: One who unwittingly blasphemes brings an offering, since its punishment of karet comes, i.e., is written, in a place where the Torah discusses an offering, i.e., karet is mentioned in a passage that discusses a sin offering (see Numbers 15:27–31). This is the statement of Rabbi Akiva, as he maintains: Since the verse should have written karet in general, i.e., without connecting it to bringing an offering, and yet this karet is written in a place where the Torah discusses an offering, conclude from it that the unwitting blasphemer brings an offering for his transgression.

ואומר חטאו ישא אתא לרבנן והכי קאמר רבי עקיבא לרבנן אמריתו מגדף לית ביה מעשה מהו מגדף מברך את השם אלא כרת דכתיב למאי אתא

The Gemara analyzes the next clause of the baraita: And the verse states: “Whoever curses his God shall bear his sin” (Leviticus 24:15). The Gemara explains: Here we arrive at the opinion of the Rabbis, and this is what Rabbi Akiva is saying to the Rabbis: You say that the transgression of one who blasphemes does not involve an action, as what is the case of one who blasphemes? It is one who blesses, i.e., curses, the Name, i.e., God. But if so, then concerning the punishment of karet that is written: “That person blasphemes the Lord; and that soul shall be cut off [venikhreta] from among his people” (Numbers 15:30), for what purpose does it come, if not to render him liable to bring an offering?

אמרי ליה ליתן כרת למקלל דכתיב במקלל (חטאו ישא האיש ההוא) [ונשא חטאו] וכתיב בפסח שני חטאו ישא מה להלן כרת אף כאן כרת

The Rabbis say to him: It comes to give the punishment of karet to one who curses God, in order to teach that the phrase: “Shall bear his sin,” written in the verse: “Whoever curses his God shall bear his sin” (Leviticus 24:15), is referring to karet, so that one can derive by verbal analogy that an individual who was obligated to bring a Paschal offering for the second Pesaḥ and did not do so is likewise liable to receive karet. As it is written with regard to one who curses God: “Whoever curses his God shall bear his sin,” and it is written with regard to one who was obligated to bring a Paschal offering for the second Pesaḥ and did not do so: “That man shall bear his sin” (Numbers 9:13). Just as there, with regard to one who curses God it is referring to the punishment of karet, so too here, with regard to the Paschal offering it is referring to the punishment of karet.

תנו רבנן את ה׳ מגדף איסי בן יהודה אומר כאדם האומר לחבירו גירפתה הקערה וחיסרתה קסבר מגדף מברך את השם הוא

With regard to one who blasphemes, the Sages taught in a baraita: The verse states: “That person blasphemes [megaddef ] the Lord” (Numbers 15:30). Isi ben Yehuda says: This is like a person who says to another: You cleaned [geirafta] the bowl and rendered it lacking, i.e., the transgression of blasphemy is so severe that it is compared to one who does actual damage to God. Isi ben Yehuda maintains that the case of the blasphemer is identical to that of one who blesses, i.e., curses, the Name, i.e., God, which is a particularly severe transgression.

רבי אלעזר בן עזריה אומר כאדם האומר לחבירו גירפתה הקערה ולא חיסרתה קסבר מגדף היינו עובד עבודה זרה

Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya says that this is like a person who says to another: You cleaned the bowl and removed its contents, but did not render it lacking, i.e., the transgression of blasphemy is not compared to one who does actual damage to God. Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya maintains that the case of the blasphemer is the same as that of an idol worshipper, which is a less severe transgression.

תניא אידך את ה׳ רבי אלעזר בן עזריה אומר בעובד עבודה זרה הכתוב מדבר וחכמים אומרים לא בא הכתוב אלא ליתן כרת למברך השם

This dispute as to the nature of the transgression of the blasphemer is taught in another baraita: “That person blasphemes the Lord” (Numbers 15:30), and Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya says: The verse is speaking of an idol worshipper. And the Rabbis say: The verse comes only to give the punishment of karet to one who blesses, i.e., curses, the Name, i.e., God.

מתני׳ יש מביאות קרבן ונאכל ויש מביאות קרבן ואינו נאכל ויש שאינם מביאות

MISHNA: There are some women who bring a sin offering of a woman after childbirth and the offering is eaten by the priests. And there are some women who bring a sin offering but it is not eaten. And there are some women who do not bring a sin offering at all.

מביאות קרבן ונאכל המפלת כמין בהמה חיה ועוף דברי רבי מאיר וחכמים אומרים עד שיהא בו מצורת אדם

The mishna elaborates: The following women bring a sin offering and it is eaten by the priests: One who miscarries a fetus with a form similar to a domesticated animal, one who miscarries a fetus with a form similar to an undomesticated animal, or one who miscarries a fetus with a form similar to a bird; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: She does not bring a sin offering unless the fetus has the form of a person.

המפלת סנדל או שיליא או שפיר מרוקם והיוצא מחותך וכן שפחה שהפילה מביאה קרבן ונאכל

With regard to a woman who miscarries a sandal fetus, i.e., one that has the form of a flat fish; or if she miscarries the placenta; or an amniotic sac in which tissue developed; or a fetus that emerged cut, i.e., in pieces; and likewise a Canaanite maidservant, owned by a Jew, who miscarried; in all these cases she brings a sin offering and it is eaten by the priests.

ואלו מביאות ואינן נאכלות המפלת ואין יודע מה הפילה ושתי נשים שהפילו אחת ממין פטור ואחת ממין חובה אמר רבי יוסי אימתי בזמן שהלכו זה למזרח וזה למערב אבל אם היו שתיהן עומדות שתיהן מביאות קרבן ונאכל

And these women bring sin offerings but their sin offerings are not eaten: One who miscarries and does not know the nature of what she miscarried; and two women who miscarried, in a case where one miscarried a fetus of a type for which a woman is exempt from bringing an offering and the other one miscarried a fetus of a type for which a woman is liable to bring an offering, and they do not know which miscarried which type. Rabbi Yosei said: When is their sin offering not eaten? It is when both women went to different places within the Temple to bring their offerings, e.g., this woman went to the east and that woman went to the west. But if both of them were standing together, both of them together bring one sin offering, and it is eaten.

אלו שאין מביאות המפלת שפיר מלא מים מלא דם מלא גנינים המפלת כמין דגים וחגבים ושקצים ורמשים המפלת יום ארבעים ויוצא דופן רבי שמעון מחייב ביוצא דופן

These women do not bring a sin offering: A woman who miscarries an amniotic sac full of water, or one full of blood, or one full of different colors; and likewise a woman who miscarries a fetus with a form similar to fish, or grasshoppers, or repugnant creatures, or creeping animals; and a woman who miscarries on the fortieth day of her pregnancy; and a woman who gives birth by caesarean section. Rabbi Shimon deems a woman liable to bring a sin offering in the case where she gives birth by caesarean section.

גמ׳ שפחה מנלן דתנו רבנן בני ישראל אין לי אלא בני ישראל גיורת ושפחה מנין תלמוד לומר אשה

GEMARA: From where do we derive that in the case of a Canaanite maidservant, owned by a Jew, who miscarried, she brings a sin offering and it is eaten? As the Sages taught in a baraita: The passage discussing the halakhot of a woman following childbirth begins with the verse: “Speak to the children of Israel, saying: If a woman conceives and gives birth to a male” (Leviticus 12:2). From this verse I have derived only that the full-fledged children of Israel are included in these halakhot; from where do I derive that a convert and a Canaanite maidservant are also included in these halakhot? The verse states “a woman,” which includes other women.

מאי וכן שפחה סלקא דעתך אמינא כי אמרינן כל מצות שהאשה חייבת בה עבד חייב בה הני מילי בדבר ששוה בין איש ובין אשה אבל יולדת דבנשים איתא באנשים ליתא אימא לא תחייב שפחה אהכי תנא שפחה

The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of the special emphasis in the mishna: And likewise a Canaanite maidservant? Why does the mishna deem it necessary to write this halakha? The Gemara answers: It might enter your mind to say that when we say: With regard to any mitzva in which a woman is obligated a Canaanite slave is also obligated in that mitzva, this statement applies with regard to a matter that is the same for a man and for a woman. But with regard to the offerings of a woman after childbirth, which is a category that applies to women but does not apply to men, one might say a Canaanite maidservant is not obligated to bring these offerings. It is for this reason the mishna taught the case of a Canaanite maidservant.

אלו מביאין קרבן כו׳ מאי עבדין מייתין תרוייהו חד קרבן ודאי וחטאת עוף ספק ומתני

§ The mishna teaches: These women bring a sin offering but their sin offerings are not eaten. It then teaches that in a case where one miscarried a fetus of a type for which a woman is exempt from bringing an offering and the other one miscarried a fetus of a type for which a woman is obligated to bring an offering, Rabbi Yosei maintains that if both are standing together they bring one offering together. The Gemara asks: What exactly do they do? The two of them bring one definite burnt offering, and a sin offering of a bird due to uncertainty, and they each stipulate that if she is obligated to bring the sin offering the animal is hers, and if not then it belongs to the other woman.

ומי אית ליה לרבי יוסי תנאה והתנן רבי שמעון אומר מביאות שניהן חטאת אחת רבי יוסי אומר אין שניהן מביאות חטאת אחת אלמא לרבי יוסי לית ליה תנאה

The Gemara asks: And is Rabbi Yosei of the opinion that a stipulation is effective in the case of a sin offering? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (23a): With regard to a situation where one of two women unwittingly ate a piece of forbidden fat and is obligated to bring a sin offering, but it is unknown which woman, Rabbi Shimon says: They both bring one sin offering together, and Rabbi Yosei says: They do not both bring one sin offering together. Evidently, Rabbi Yosei is not of the opinion that a stipulation is effective with regard to a sin offering.

אמר רבא מודה רבי יוסי במחוסר כפרה וכן כי אתא רבין אמר רבי יוחנן מודה רבי יוסי במחוסר כפרה

Rava said: Rabbi Yosei concedes that a stipulation is effective with regard to one who has not yet brought an atonement offering to complete the purification process, as is the case concerning a woman after childbirth. And likewise, when Ravin came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia he said that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Rabbi Yosei concedes with regard to one who has not yet brought an atonement offering that a stipulation is effective.

מאי טעמא התם בעי גברא ידיעה דכתיב או הודע אליו חטאתו הילכך לא מתיין ומתני אבל הכא כי מתיין נשים קרבן לאישתרויי באכילת קדשים

The Gemara asks: What is the reason for this difference between the sin offering of one who has not yet brought an atonement offering and standard sin offerings? The Gemara answers: There, with regard to a sin offering brought for a transgression, the man requires definite awareness of his transgression for him to be obligated to bring a sin offering, as it is written: “If his sin, which he has sinned, be known to him” (Leviticus 4:28). Therefore, in the case where one of two women ate forbidden fat, they do not bring a sin offering together and stipulate that it should be for whichever of them ate the forbidden fat. But here, with regard to a woman after a miscarriage, when these women bring their sin offering they do so only in order to become permitted in the consumption of sacrificial food, and therefore the stipulation is effective.

כדתני סיפא דההיא רבי יוסי אומר כל חטאת שהיא באה על חטא אין שתים מביאות אותה

The Gemara cites a proof that this distinction is in fact the opinion of Rabbi Yosei: As it is taught in the latter clause of that mishna that Rabbi Yosei says: With regard to any sin offering that comes as atonement for a sin, two people do not bring it together. This indicates that if a sin offering does not atone for a sin, two people can bring it together.

אלו שאין מביאות כו׳ רבי שמעון מחייב ביוצא דופן מאי טעמא דרבי שמעון אמר ריש לקיש אמר קרא ואם נקבה תלד לרבות לידה אחרת מאי היא יוצא דופן

§ The mishna teaches: And these women do not bring a sin offering, and among them are a woman who gives birth by caesarean section. Rabbi Shimon deems a woman liable to bring an offering in a case where she gives birth by caesarean section. The Gemara asks: What is the reason of Rabbi Shimon? Reish Lakish said that the verse states: “But if she bears a girl” (Leviticus 12:5). The term “she bears” is superfluous in the context of the passage, and it serves to include another type of birth, and what is it? This is a birth by caesarean section.

ורבנן מאי טעמא אמר רבי מני בר פטיש אשה כי תזריע וילדה עד שתלד ממקום שמזרעת

The Gemara asks: And as for the Rabbis, what is their reasoning? Rabbi Mani bar Pattish said that their ruling is derived from the verse: “If a woman conceives [tazria] and gives birth to a male” (Leviticus 12:2). The word tazria literally means to receive seed, indicating that all the halakhot mentioned in that passage do not apply unless she gives birth through the place where she receives seed, not through any other place, such as in the case of a caesarean section.

מתני׳ המפלת לאור שמונים ואחד בית שמאי פוטרין מן הקרבן ובית הלל מחייבין

MISHNA: A woman who gives birth to a daughter counts fourteen days during which she is ritually impure. That is followed by sixty-six days during which she remains ritually pure even if she experiences a flow of blood. The Torah obligates a woman to bring her offering on the eighty-first day (see Leviticus 12:1–6). If the woman miscarries another fetus before that day, she is not required to bring an additional offering. In the case of a woman who miscarries a fetus on the night of, i.e., preceding, the eighty-first day, Beit Shammai deem her exempt from bringing a second offering and Beit Hillel deem her liable to bring a second offering.

אמרו בית הלל לבית שמאי מאי שנא אור שמונים ואחד מיום שמונים ואחד אם שיוה לו לטומאה לא ישוה לו לקרבן

Beit Hillel said to Beit Shammai: What is different between the night of the eighty-first and the day of the eighty-first? If they are equal with regard to the halakhot of ritual impurity, i.e., the blood flow of this woman on the eighty-first night renders her ritually impure and all the standard strictures of ritual impurity apply to her, will the two time periods not be equal with regard to liability to bring an additional offering as well?

אמרו להם בית שמאי לא אם אמרתם במפלת יום שמונים ואחד שכן יצאה לשעה שהיא ראויה להביא בה קרבן תאמר במפלת לאור שמונים ואחד שלא יצאה לשעה שהיא ראויה להביא בה קרבן

Beit Shammai said to Beit Hillel: No, there is a difference between that night and the following day. If you said with regard to a woman who miscarries on the eighty-first day that she is obligated to bring an additional offering, this is logical, as she emerged into a period that is fit for her to bring her offering. Would you say the same with regard to a woman who miscarries on the night of the eighty-first day, where she did not emerge into a period that is fit for her to bring her offering, as offerings are not sacrificed at night?

אמרו להן בית הלל והלא המפלת יום שמונים ואחד שחל להיות בשבת תוכיח שלא יצאה לשעה שהיא ראויה להביא בה קרבן וחייבת קרבן

Beit Hillel said to Beit Shammai: But let the case of a woman who miscarries on the eighty-first day that occurs on Shabbat prove that this distinction is incorrect, as she did not emerge into a period that is fit for her to bring her offering because individual offerings are not sacrificed on Shabbat, and nevertheless she is obligated to bring an additional offering.

אמרו להן בית שמאי לא אם אמרתם יום שמונים ואחד שחל להיות בשבת שאף על פי שאינו ראוי לקרבן יחיד ראוי לקרבן ציבור תאמר במפלת לאור שמונים יום ואחד שאין הלילה ראוי לא לקרבן יחיד ולא לקרבן ציבור

Beit Shammai said to Beit Hillel: No, there is a difference between these cases. If you said this ruling with regard to a woman who miscarries on the eighty-first day that occurs on Shabbat, the reason is that although Shabbat is unfit for the sacrifice of an individual offering, it is fit for the sacrifice of a communal offering whose time is fixed, e.g., the daily offering. Would you say the same with regard to a woman who miscarries on the night of the eighty-first day, as the night is completely unfit, since neither an individual offering nor a communal offering is sacrificed at night?

והדמים אינן מוכיחים שהמפלת בתוך מלאת דמיה טמאים ופטורה מן הקרבן

Beit Shammai add: And as for the ritual impurity status of the blood, i.e., Beit Hillel’s opinion that the two time periods are equal with regard to the halakhot of ritual impurity, this does not prove what the halakha should be with regard to offerings, as with regard to a woman who miscarries before the completion of the term of eighty days, her blood is impure like the blood of a woman after childbirth, and nevertheless she is exempt from bringing the offering.