If the widow sells items of the orphans for a loss, the sale is invalid, but if the judges do it, they have a margin of error of up to a sixth. Rashbag holds even higher than that we do not invalidate the sale of the judges, as the courts have more power than individuals – in the words of the Mishna, “If not, what is the power of the courts?” What is the law regarding a messenger who sells an orphan’s property- is it like a widow or a court? They quoted that Rav Nachman ruled like the rabbis regarding the court’s sale. But didn’t Rav Nachman say regarding court-appointed stewards (apotropos) who divided up the land of the orphans that the children cannot change the distribution when they get older because “If not, what is the power of the courts?” How is this resolved? A story is brought with Rebbi who ruled like the rabbis but Parta convinced him to change his mind and hold like Rashbag. A different version has Rebbi only considering holding like the rabbis and then Parta convinces him to rule like Rashbag. Do the two versions disagree with each other on halachic grounds (do we hold that one who makes a mistake on a ruling in the Mishna has to undo the ruling or not) or is it just a disagreement about what actually happened? When one sells an orphan’s property, whether or not it was the widow or the courts, the orphans automatically assume the guarantee for the sale. Even though Rashbag said that even if the courts err, the sale is valid, Rav Sheshet limits this to an error of half the price or double the price. Ameimar ruled that the courts who sell an orphan’s property need to announce it, in order to ensure a good price. A question is raised against Ameimar from our Mishna. Three different ukimtot are brought to explain the case in our Mishna so it would not contradict Ameimar. If the orphans have moveable items, do we sell them immediately or wait for an opportunity to get the best price? On what does it depend? There are certain women who don’t receive a ketuba – one who refused a marriage (mi’un – when she was married off by her mother/brother), one who married someone who was forbidden to her by rabbinic law and an aylonit. These women also have no rights to the produce, food, or worn out clothing.
This week’s learning is sponsored by Robert and Paula Cohen in loving memory of Joseph Cohen, Yosef ben Moshe HaCohen, z”l. “He was hard working, loved to sing, esp. as a chazan, and was very dedicated to his family and community.”
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This week’s learning is sponsored by Robert and Paula Cohen in loving memory of Joseph Cohen, Yosef ben Moshe HaCohen, z”l. “He was hard working, loved to sing, esp. as a chazan, and was very dedicated to his family and community.”
Ketubot 100
רָבָא אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן: שָׁלִיחַ כְּדַיָּינִין. רַב שְׁמוּאֵל בַּר בִּיסְנָא אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן: כְּאַלְמָנָה.
Rava said that Rav Naḥman said: The halakha with regard to the agent is like the halakha pertaining to the judges. Rav Shmuel bar Bisna said that Rav Naḥman said: The halakha with regard to the agent is like the halakha with regard to a widow.
רָבָא אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן: שָׁלִיחַ כְּדַיָּינִין. מָה דַיָּינִין לָאו לְדִידְהוּ — אַף שָׁלִיחַ נָמֵי לָאו לְדִידֵיהּ, לְאַפּוֹקֵי אַלְמָנָה דִּלְדִידַהּ.
Rava said that Rav Naḥman said: The halakha with regard to the agent is like the halakha with regard to the judges. Just as the judges have an advantage because they do not assess the value of property for their own benefit, so too, the agent also does not act for his own benefit; this is to the exclusion of a widow who sells for her own benefit.
רַב שְׁמוּאֵל בַּר בִּיסְנָא אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן: כְּאַלְמָנָה, מָה אַלְמָנָה יְחִידָה — אַף שָׁלִיחַ יָחִיד, לְאַפּוֹקֵי בֵּית דִּין — דְּרַבִּים נִינְהוּ. וְהִלְכְתָא, שָׁלִיחַ כְּאַלְמָנָה.
Rav Shmuel, son of Bisna, said that Rav Naḥman said: The halakha with regard to the agent is like the halakha with regard to a widow. Just as a widow is an individual, so too the agent is an individual. This is to the exclusion of the court, which is composed of many people. The Gemara concludes: And the halakha is that with regard to this matter, an agent is like a widow.
וּמַאי שְׁנָא מֵהָא דִּתְנַן: הָאוֹמֵר לִשְׁלוּחוֹ ״צֵא וּתְרוֹם״ — תּוֹרֵם כְּדַעַת בַּעַל הַבַּיִת, וְאִם אֵינוֹ יוֹדֵעַ דַּעְתּוֹ שֶׁל בַּעַל הַבַּיִת — תּוֹרֵם בְּבֵינוֹנִית אֶחָד מֵחֲמִשִּׁים. פִּיחֵת עֲשָׂרָה אוֹ הוֹסִיף עֲשָׂרָה, תְּרוּמָתוֹ תְּרוּמָה.
The Gemara asks: And in what way is that case different from this case? As we learned in a mishna (Terumot 4:4): In the case of one who says to his agent: Go out and separate teruma, the agent separates teruma in accordance with the mind-set of the homeowner. And if he does not know the mind-set of homeowner, he separates an intermediate measure, i.e., one-fiftieth of the produce. If he subtracted ten from the denominator and separated one-fortieth or added ten to the denominator and separated one-sixtieth of the produce, his teruma is considered teruma. If the agent is comparable to a widow, then why isn’t the halakha that the teruma that he has separated is nullified, since he did not act in accordance with the wishes of the homeowner?
הָתָם כֵּיוָן דְּאִיכָּא דְּתוֹרֵם בְּעַיִן רָעָה וְאִיכָּא דְּתוֹרֵם בְּעַיִן יָפָה, אֲמַר לֵיהּ: לְהָכִי אֲמַדְתָּיךְ. אֲבָל הָכָא טָעוּתָא הוּא, אָמַר לֵיהּ: לָא אִיבְּעִי לָךְ לְמִיטְעֵי.
The Gemara answers: There, since there are those who separate in a miserly fashion one-sixtieth, and there are those who separate generously one-fortieth, the agent can say to his employer: I estimated you to be generous or miserly. However, here there is no logical reason for the mistake made by the agent. It is simply an error on the part of the agent, and so the owner can say to him: You ought not to have erred.
אָמַר רַב הוּנָא בַּר חֲנִינָא אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן, הֲלָכָה כְּדִבְרֵי חֲכָמִים: וְלֵית לֵיהּ לְרַב נַחְמָן מָה כֹּחַ בֵּית דִּין יָפֶה? וְהָאָמַר רַב נַחְמָן אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: יְתוֹמִים שֶׁבָּאוּ לַחְלוֹק בְּנִכְסֵי אֲבִיהֶן — בֵּית דִּין מַעֲמִידִין לָהֶן אַפּוֹטְרוֹפּוֹס, וּבוֹרְרִין לָהֶם חֵלֶק יָפֶה. הִגְדִּילוּ — יְכוֹלִין לְמַחוֹת. וְרַב נַחְמָן דִּידֵיהּ אָמַר: הִגְדִּילוּ — אֵין יְכוֹלִין לְמַחוֹת, אִם כֵּן מָה כֹּחַ בֵּית דִּין יָפֶה.
§ Rav Huna bar Ḥanina said that Rav Naḥman said: The halakha is in accordance with the statement of the Rabbis in the mishna. The Gemara asks: Does Rav Naḥman not agree with the argument: What advantage is there to the power of the court? Didn’t Rav Naḥman say that Shmuel said: In a case of orphans who came to divide their father’s property, the court appoints a steward [apotropos] for them and selects for the orphans appropriate portions and divides the property accordingly. Afterward, once the orphans have matured, they are able to protest this division of the property. And Rav Naḥman said his own statement: Once the orphans have matured, they are not able to protest, as if they were able to do so, what advantage would there be to the power of the court? This proves that Rav Naḥman agrees with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel.
לָא קַשְׁיָא: הָא דִּטְעוֹ, הָא דְּלָא טְעוֹ.
The Gemara answers: This is not difficult. The case of the mishna was one where the judges erred in their assessment, and therefore Rav Naḥman said that the sale is void in accordance with the Rabbis. However, the case of the division of property among the orphans is one where they did not err, and so he ruled in accordance with the principle of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, that the court is given an advantage and the orphans are not able to protest the division.
אִי דְּלָא טְעוֹ, בְּמַאי יְכוֹלִין לְמַחוֹת? בְּרוּחוֹת.
The Gemara asks: If the case is one where the judges did not err, with regard to what could the orphans protest? After all, the judges acted correctly. The Gemara answers: They can protest with regard to the locations; one of the orphans can contend that he prefers property in a different location than he was given.
כִּי אֲתָא רַב דִּימִי, אָמַר: מַעֲשֶׂה וְעָשָׂה רַבִּי כְּדִבְרֵי חֲכָמִים, אָמַר לְפָנָיו פַּרְטָא בְּנוֹ שֶׁל רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר בֶּן פַּרְטָא בֶּן בְּנוֹ שֶׁל רַבִּי פַּרְטָא הַגָּדוֹל: אִם כֵּן מָה כֹּחַ בֵּית דִּין יָפֶה, וְהֶחְזִיר רַבִּי אֶת הַמַּעֲשֶׂה.
When Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael, he said: A similar incident occurred and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi acted in accordance with the statement of the Rabbis of the mishna. Perata, son of Rabbi Elazar ben Perata, grandson of Rabbi Perata the Great, said before him: If that is the case, what advantage is there to the power of the court over an ordinary person? And Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi reversed his ruling about the incident.
רַב דִּימִי מַתְנֵי הָכִי, רַב סָפְרָא מַתְנֵי הָכִי: מַעֲשֶׂה וּבִיקֵּשׁ רַבִּי לַעֲשׂוֹת כְּדִבְרֵי חֲכָמִים, אָמַר לְפָנָיו פַּרְטָא בְּנוֹ שֶׁל רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר בֶּן פַּרְטָא בֶּן בְּנוֹ שֶׁל רַבִּי פַּרְטָא הַגָּדוֹל: אִם כֵּן מָה כֹּחַ בֵּית דִּין יָפֶה? לֹא עָשָׂה רַבִּי אֶת הַמַּעֲשֶׂה.
Rav Dimi would teach the incident in this way, as described above. Rav Safra would teach it in this slightly altered way: There was an incident, and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi wished to act in accordance with the statement of the Rabbis of the mishna. Perata, son of Rabbi Elazar ben Perata, grandson of Rabbi Perata the Great, said before him: If that is the case, what advantage is there to the power of the court over an ordinary person? Consequently, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi did not take action according to the statement of the Rabbis.
לֵימָא בְּהָא קָמִיפַּלְגִי, מָר סָבַר: טָעָה בִּדְבַר מִשְׁנָה — חוֹזֵר, וּמָר סָבַר: אֵינוֹ חוֹזֵר.
The Gemara suggests: Let us say that they disagree about this: One Sage, Rav Dimi, holds that if one erred in a matter that appears in the Mishna, the decision is revoked. And one Sage, Rav Safra, holds that if one erred in this manner the decision is not revoked. This is why, in Rav Safra’s version, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi changed his mind before issuing his ruling.
לָא, דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא טָעָה בִּדְבַר מִשְׁנָה חוֹזֵר, וּמָר סָבַר הָכִי הֲוָה מַעֲשֶׂה, וּמָר סָבַר הָכִי הֲוָה מַעֲשֶׂה.
The Gemara rejects this: No, everyone agrees that if one erred in a matter that appears in the Mishna, the decision is revoked. There is no fundamental dispute between them, only a disagreement as to the details of the case. One Sage holds that the incident occurred in this way, and one Sage holds that the incident occurred in this way.
אָמַר רַב יוֹסֵף: אַרְמַלְתָּא דְּזַבִּינָה — אַחְרָיוּת אַיַּתְמֵי. וּבֵית דִּין דְּזַבֵּין — אַחְרָיוּת אַיַּתְמֵי.
§ Rav Yosef said: In the case of a widow who sold property to support herself or as payment of her marriage contract, the property guarantee rests upon the orphans. Therefore, if she sold liened property that was then seized from the purchasers in payment of a previous debt, the buyers are entitled to be reimbursed from the property of the orphans. And so too, if the court sold property for the same purpose, the property guarantee rests upon the orphans.
פְּשִׁיטָא!
The Gemara asks: Isn’t this obvious? The widow does not sell her own property, but rather she sells property from her husband’s estate to pay off his debts to her, and so clearly the guarantee rests on his properties that now belong to the orphans.
אַלְמָנָה לָא אִיצְטְרִיכָא לֵיהּ. כִּי אִיצְטְרִיךְ לֵיהּ, בֵּי דִינָא — מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא:
The Gemara answers: In truth, it was not necessary for Rav Yosef to mention this with regard to the widow, as it is clear that the property guarantee rests upon the orphans. Where it was necessary for him to mention this halakha was with regard to the court. Lest you say:
כֹּל דְּזָבֵין מִבֵּי דִינָא — אַדַּעְתָּא לְמִיפַּק לֵיהּ קָלָא הוּא דְּזָבֵין, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.
Everyone who buys from the court buys with the implicit understanding that the sale generates publicity, as a court sale is conducted in public with notices. The buyer could therefore think to himself that if no claimants came forward until the time of the actual purchase, then it is certain that there can be no problem with his purchase and he forgoes his property guarantee. Lest you say this, Rav Yosef teaches us that there is nevertheless a guarantee on the property, and it rests upon the orphans and not on the court.
רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר כּוּ׳. וְעַד כַּמָּה? אָמַר רַב הוּנָא בַּר יְהוּדָה אָמַר רַב שֵׁשֶׁת: עַד פַּלְגָא.
§ The mishna teaches: Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says that even if the judges err, the transaction is not void because of the prerogative of the court. The Gemara asks: And to what extent can they err without causing the deal to be reversed? Rav Huna bar Yehuda said that Rav Sheshet said: Until half of the value.
תַּנְיָא נָמֵי הָכִי, אָמַר רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל: בֵּית דִּין שֶׁמָּכְרוּ שָׁוֶה מָאתַיִם בְּמָנֶה אוֹ שָׁוֶה מָנֶה בְּמָאתַיִם — מִכְרָן קַיָּים.
That is also taught in a baraita: Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: A court that sold property worth one hundred dinars for two hundred dinars, or property worth two hundred dinars for one hundred dinars, their sale is valid. Since he doesn’t give as an example a larger gap between the market value and the sale price, this must be the most extreme case in which the transaction is not reversed.
אָמַר אַמֵּימָר מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרַב יוֹסֵף: בֵּית דִּין שֶׁמָּכְרוּ בְּלֹא הַכְרָזָה — נַעֲשׂוּ כְּמִי שֶׁטָּעוּ בִּדְבַר מִשְׁנָה וְחוֹזְרִין.
Ameimar said in the name of Rav Yosef: With regard to a court that sold without an announcement, it is considered as if they erred in a matter that appears in the Mishna and their decision is reversed.
נַעֲשׂוּ? וַדַּאי טָעוּ! דִּתְנַן: שׁוּם הַיְּתוֹמִין שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם, וְשׁוּם הַהֶקְדֵּשׁ שִׁשִּׁים יוֹם, וּמַכְרִיזִין בַּבֹּקֶר וּבָעֶרֶב.
The Gemara asks: Why does Rav Yosef say that it is considered as if the court erred in a matter that appears in the Mishna, when it certainly erred in this manner? As we learned in a mishna (Arakhin 21b): The assessment of the orphans is for thirty days, and the assessment for consecrated property is for sixty days, and they make announcements during the thirty and the sixty days respectively both in the morning and in the evening. The mishna states explicitly that announcements must be made. If the court did not make the announcements, it clearly erred in a matter that appears in the Mishna.
אִי מֵהַהִיא הֲוָה אָמֵינָא הָנֵי מִילֵּי שָׁלִיחַ, אֲבָל בֵּית דִּין — לָא, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.
The Gemara answers: If all the information that I had were from that mishna, I would say that this applies to an agent but not to a court. Therefore, Rav Yosef teaches us that even a court that sold property without making announcements has erred.
אֵיתִיבֵיהּ רַב אָשֵׁי לְאַמֵּימָר: שׁוּם הַדַּיָּינִין שֶׁפִּחֲתוּ שְׁתוּת אוֹ הוֹתִירוּ שְׁתוּת — מִכְרָן בָּטֵל. הָא שָׁוֶה בְּשָׁוֶה — מִכְרָן קַיָּים. מַאי לָאו דְּלָא אַכְרוּז? לָא, בִּדְאַכְרוּז.
Rav Ashi raised an objection to the statement of Ameimar: The mishna teaches that the halakha with regard to the assessment of the value of a piece of property in order to sell it through the judges is as follows: In a case where they decreased the price by one-sixth of its market value or added one-sixth to its market value, their sale is void. One can see from here that if the judges sold the property for its value, their sale is valid. What, is the mishna not discussing a case where no announcement was made? Ameimar replied: No, the case under discussion is one where they did make an announcement.
הָא מִדְּסֵיפָא בִּדְאַכְרוּז הָוֵי, רֵישָׁא בִּדְלָא אַכְרוּז, דְּקָתָנֵי סֵיפָא: אִם עָשׂוּ אִגֶּרֶת בִּקּוֹרֶת, אֲפִילּוּ מָכְרוּ שָׁוֶה מָנֶה בְּמָאתַיִם אוֹ שָׁוֶה מָאתַיִם בְּמָנֶה — מִכְרָן קַיָּים.
The Gemara asks: Since the last clause is referring to a case where the court made an announcement, the first clause must be referring to a case where they did not make announcements, as it teaches in the final clause: If they made a document of inspection and announced the sale publicly, then even if they sold property worth one hundred dinars for two hundred dinars or property worth two hundred dinars for one hundred dinars, their sale is valid.
אֶלָּא, לְעוֹלָם בִּדְלָא אַכְרוּז, וְלָא קַשְׁיָא: כָּאן בִּדְבָרִים שֶׁמַּכְרִיזִין עֲלֵיהֶן, כָּאן בִּדְבָרִים שֶׁאֵין מַכְרִיזִין עֲלֵיהֶן.
Rather, this should be understood differently. Actually, the first clause of the mishna is referring to a case where they did not make an announcement, and this is not difficult. Here, Ameimar is referring to items for which one makes an announcement, and if this was not done then the sale is void. There, the mishna is speaking of items for which one does not make announcements.
וְאֵלּוּ הֵן דְּבָרִים שֶׁאֵין מַכְרִיזִין עֲלֵיהֶן: הָעֲבָדִים וְהַמִּטַּלְטְלִין וְהַשְּׁטָרוֹת. עֲבָדִים טַעְמָא מַאי? שֶׁמָּא יִשְׁמְעוּ וְיִבְרְחוּ. מִטַּלְטְלִין וּשְׁטָרוֹת — שֶׁמָּא יִגָּנְבוּ.
And these are the items for which one does not make an announcement: Slaves, movable property, and contracts. The Gemara explains: What is the reason that slaves are sold without an announcement? Slaves are sold without an announcement lest they hear that they are about to be sold and escape. Why is the sale of movable property and contracts also not announced? Lest they be stolen.
וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: כָּאן בְּשָׁעָה שֶׁמַּכְרִיזִין, כָּאן בְּשָׁעָה שֶׁאֵין מַכְרִיזִין.
And if you wish, say instead that here Ameimar is referring to a time when one makes an announcement, while there the mishna is referring to a time when one does not make an announcement.
דְּאָמְרִי נְהַרְדָּעֵי: לִכְרָגָא לִמְזוֹנֵי וְלִקְבוּרָה — מְזַבְּנִינַן בְּלָא אַכְרָזְתָּא.
When does one not make an announcement? As the Sages of Neharde’a say: For the purpose of paying head tax, and for payment to provide for children’s sustenance, and for burial, the court sells property inherited by orphans without an announcement because these are pressing needs. There is no time to wait for an announcement.
וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: כָּאן בִּמְקוֹם שֶׁמַּכְרִיזִין, כָּאן בִּמְקוֹם שֶׁאֵין מַכְרִיזִין. דְּאָמַר רַב נַחְמָן: מֵעוֹלָם לֹא עָשׂוּ אִגֶּרֶת בִּקּוֹרֶת בִּנְהַרְדְּעָא.
And if you wish, say instead that here, Ameimar is referring to a locale where one makes an announcement, while there, the mishna is referring to a locale where one does not make an announcement, as Rav Naḥman said: They never made a document of inspection in Neharde’a.
סְבוּר מִינַּהּ מִשּׁוּם דִּבְקִיאֵי בְּשׁוּמָא. אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב יוֹסֵף בַּר מִנְיוֹמֵי: לְדִידִי מִיפָּרְשָׁא לִי מִינֵּיהּ דְּרַב נַחְמָן, מִשּׁוּם דְּקָרוּ לְהוּ ״בְּנֵי אָכְלִי נִכְסֵי דְאַכְרָזְתָּא״.
Some of the students understood from Rav Naḥman’s statement that no announcements were made in Neharde’a because the Sages there were all expert in the appraisal of an article’s value. Rav Yosef bar Minyumi said to them: This was explained to me personally by Rav Naḥman himself: It was because those who purchase the property are called: People who consume property that was publicly announced. This disparaging nickname was given because the purchasers were perceived as taking advantage of the distress of others by running to buy the property of someone in trouble. Since decent, honest people did not wish to buy property whose sale had been announced, they stopped making announcements.
אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: מִטַּלְטְלִין שֶׁל יְתוֹמִים — שָׁמִין אוֹתָן וּמוֹכְרִין אוֹתָן לְאַלְתַּר. רַב חִסְדָּא אָמַר אֲבִימִי: מוֹכְרִין אוֹתָן לִשְׁוָוקִים.
Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: Movable property that belongs to orphans is appraised and sold immediately so that it not deteriorate over time. Rav Ḥisda said that Avimi said: The movable property is sold on a market day, when there are many potential buyers and the items will sell for a proper price.
וְלָא פְּלִיגִי: הָא — דִּמְיקָרַב שׁוּקָא, הָא — דִּמְרַחַק שׁוּקָא.
The Gemara notes: And they do not disagree with each other. Rather, this opinion, that the items are sold on a market day, applies when the market day is approaching, so the property is not sold immediately. That opinion, that the items are sold immediately, applies when the market day is far off.
רַב כָּהֲנָא הֲוָה בִּידֵיהּ שִׁכְרָא דְּרַב מְשַׁרְשְׁיָא בַּר חִילְקַאי יַתְמָא. שַׁהֲיֵיהּ עַד רִיגְלָא, אָמַר: אַף עַל גַּב דְּנָפֵל בֵּיהּ אִיצְצָתָא, מַיְיתֵי זוּזָא חֲרִיפָא.
Rav Kahana was in possession of beer that belonged to Rav Mesharshiyya bar Ḥilkai, who was an orphan. He delayed selling it until the Festival. He explained the rationale for his actions and said: Although it is possible that it may deteriorate [itzatzta] and sour a little, it nevertheless brings in money at the time of the Festival, as it will sell for a higher price and for money, not credit. Consequently, it is in the best interests of Rav Mesharshiyya bar Ḥilkai to hold off and sell the beer at the next Festival.
רָבִינָא הֲוָה בִּידֵיהּ חַמְרָא דְּרָבִינָא זוּטֵי יַתְמָא בַּר אֲחָתֵיהּ. הֲוָה לְדִידֵיהּ נָמֵי חַמְרָא, הֲוָה קָמַסֵּיק לֵיהּ לְסִיכְרָא.
It is also related that Ravina was in possession of wine belonging to the orphan Ravina the younger, who was his sister’s son. He also had wine of his own, which he was taking to Sikhra to sell.
אֲתָא לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב אָשֵׁי, אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מַהוּ לְאַמְטוֹיֵי בַּהֲדַן? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: זִיל, לָא עֲדִיף מִדִּידָךְ.
He came before Rav Ashi and said to him: What is the halakha here, am I able to bring his wine along with my wine, or must I wait for a more opportune time to sell it? He said to him: Go to Sikhra and take his wine along as well, as his is no better than yours, and if you sell your own wine in this manner, it is clear that you think this is the best way to sell, and it is permitted for you to sell his wine in this manner.
מַתְנִי׳ הַמְמָאֶנֶת, הַשְּׁנִיָּה, וְהָאַיְלוֹנִית — אֵין לָהֶן כְּתוּבָּה, וְלֹא פֵּירוֹת וְלֹא מְזוֹנוֹת וְלֹא בְּלָאוֹת.
MISHNA: An orphan girl who was married off by her mother or brother before reaching the age of majority may refuse to continue living with her husband upon reaching the age of majority, thereby retroactively annulling their marriage. In the case of one who refuses to continue living with her husband in this manner; and in the case of a woman who is a secondary forbidden relative by rabbinic law; and in the case of a sexually underdeveloped woman [ailonit], who is incapable of bearing children, each of these women is not entitled to payment of a marriage contract; and they are not entitled to remuneration for the produce that the husband consumed; and they are not entitled to sustenance; and they are not entitled to their worn clothes that were brought in to the marriage as part of their dowry and became worn out during the marriage.
אִם מִתְּחִלָּה נְשָׂאָהּ לְשֵׁם אַיְלוֹנִית — יֵשׁ לָהּ כְּתוּבָּה.
If, from the start, he married her with the understanding that she is an ailonit, then she is entitled to payment of a marriage contract.
אַלְמָנָה לְכֹהֵן גָּדוֹל, גְּרוּשָׁה וַחֲלוּצָה לְכֹהֵן הֶדְיוֹט, מַמְזֶרֶת וּנְתִינָה לְיִשְׂרָאֵל, בַּת יִשְׂרָאֵל לְנָתִין וּלְמַמְזֵר — יֵשׁ לָהֶם כְּתוּבָּה.
In the case of a widow who married a High Priest; or a divorcée or a yevama who performed ḥalitza and later married a common priest; or a daughter born from an incestuous or adulterous relationship [mamzeret] who married an Israelite; or a Gibeonite woman who married an Israelite; or a Jewish woman who married a Gibeonite or a mamzer, although each of these unions is prohibited by Torah law, the woman is still entitled to payment of a marriage contract.
גְּמָ׳ רַב תָּנֵי: קְטַנָּה — יוֹצְאָה בְּגֵט אֵין לָהּ כְּתוּבָּה. וְכׇל שֶׁכֵּן מְמָאֶנֶת.
GEMARA: Rav taught that a minor girl who was married off by her mother or by her brother and who is divorced with a bill of divorce is not entitled to her marriage contract. According to Torah law, this marriage never took effect, and it was never established that in this situation she would receive a marriage contract. And all the more so, one who refuses to continue living with her husband and annuls the marriage herself is not entitled to payment of a marriage contract.
שְׁמוּאֵל תָּנֵי: מְמָאֶנֶת — אֵין לָהּ כְּתוּבָּה, אֲבָל יוֹצְאָה בְּגֵט — יֵשׁ לָהּ כְּתוּבָּה.
Shmuel taught that one who refuses to continue living with her husband is not entitled to her marriage contract, but one who is divorced with a bill of divorce is entitled to her marriage contract.
וְאַזְדָּא שְׁמוּאֵל לְטַעְמֵיהּ, דְּאָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: מְמָאֶנֶת — אֵין לָהּ כְּתוּבָּה, יוֹצְאָה בְּגֵט — יֵשׁ לָהּ כְּתוּבָּה.
The Gemara notes: And Shmuel follows his line of reasoning, as Shmuel said: One who refuses to continue living with her husband is not entitled to her marriage contract, but one who is divorced with a bill of divorce is entitled to her marriage contract.
מְמָאֶנֶת — לֹא פְּסָלָהּ מִן הָאַחִין, וְלֹא פְּסָלָהּ מִן הַכְּהוּנָּה. יוֹצְאָה בְּגֵט — פְּסָלָהּ מִן הָאַחִין, וּפְסָלָהּ מִן הַכְּהוּנָּה.
Shmuel also said: One who refuses to continue living with her husband is not disqualified from marrying one of the brothers of her husband. Her refusal annuls the marriage, and it is as if it never happened. And for the same reason, unlike a divorcée, this girl is not disqualified from marrying a member of the priesthood. However, one who is divorced with a bill of divorce is disqualified from marrying one of the brothers and is also disqualified from marrying a member of the priesthood.
מְמָאֶנֶת אֵינָהּ צְרִיכָה לְהַמְתִּין שְׁלֹשָׁה חֳדָשִׁים,
Another difference between a woman who refuses to continue living with her husband and a woman who was divorced normally is the following: One who refuses to continue living with her husband does not need to wait three months before remarrying, as other women who separate from their husbands must.
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Ketubot 100
רָבָא אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן: שָׁלִיחַ כְּדַיָּינִין. רַב שְׁמוּאֵל בַּר בִּיסְנָא אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן: כְּאַלְמָנָה.
Rava said that Rav Naḥman said: The halakha with regard to the agent is like the halakha pertaining to the judges. Rav Shmuel bar Bisna said that Rav Naḥman said: The halakha with regard to the agent is like the halakha with regard to a widow.
רָבָא אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן: שָׁלִיחַ כְּדַיָּינִין. מָה דַיָּינִין לָאו לְדִידְהוּ — אַף שָׁלִיחַ נָמֵי לָאו לְדִידֵיהּ, לְאַפּוֹקֵי אַלְמָנָה דִּלְדִידַהּ.
Rava said that Rav Naḥman said: The halakha with regard to the agent is like the halakha with regard to the judges. Just as the judges have an advantage because they do not assess the value of property for their own benefit, so too, the agent also does not act for his own benefit; this is to the exclusion of a widow who sells for her own benefit.
רַב שְׁמוּאֵל בַּר בִּיסְנָא אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן: כְּאַלְמָנָה, מָה אַלְמָנָה יְחִידָה — אַף שָׁלִיחַ יָחִיד, לְאַפּוֹקֵי בֵּית דִּין — דְּרַבִּים נִינְהוּ. וְהִלְכְתָא, שָׁלִיחַ כְּאַלְמָנָה.
Rav Shmuel, son of Bisna, said that Rav Naḥman said: The halakha with regard to the agent is like the halakha with regard to a widow. Just as a widow is an individual, so too the agent is an individual. This is to the exclusion of the court, which is composed of many people. The Gemara concludes: And the halakha is that with regard to this matter, an agent is like a widow.
וּמַאי שְׁנָא מֵהָא דִּתְנַן: הָאוֹמֵר לִשְׁלוּחוֹ ״צֵא וּתְרוֹם״ — תּוֹרֵם כְּדַעַת בַּעַל הַבַּיִת, וְאִם אֵינוֹ יוֹדֵעַ דַּעְתּוֹ שֶׁל בַּעַל הַבַּיִת — תּוֹרֵם בְּבֵינוֹנִית אֶחָד מֵחֲמִשִּׁים. פִּיחֵת עֲשָׂרָה אוֹ הוֹסִיף עֲשָׂרָה, תְּרוּמָתוֹ תְּרוּמָה.
The Gemara asks: And in what way is that case different from this case? As we learned in a mishna (Terumot 4:4): In the case of one who says to his agent: Go out and separate teruma, the agent separates teruma in accordance with the mind-set of the homeowner. And if he does not know the mind-set of homeowner, he separates an intermediate measure, i.e., one-fiftieth of the produce. If he subtracted ten from the denominator and separated one-fortieth or added ten to the denominator and separated one-sixtieth of the produce, his teruma is considered teruma. If the agent is comparable to a widow, then why isn’t the halakha that the teruma that he has separated is nullified, since he did not act in accordance with the wishes of the homeowner?
הָתָם כֵּיוָן דְּאִיכָּא דְּתוֹרֵם בְּעַיִן רָעָה וְאִיכָּא דְּתוֹרֵם בְּעַיִן יָפָה, אֲמַר לֵיהּ: לְהָכִי אֲמַדְתָּיךְ. אֲבָל הָכָא טָעוּתָא הוּא, אָמַר לֵיהּ: לָא אִיבְּעִי לָךְ לְמִיטְעֵי.
The Gemara answers: There, since there are those who separate in a miserly fashion one-sixtieth, and there are those who separate generously one-fortieth, the agent can say to his employer: I estimated you to be generous or miserly. However, here there is no logical reason for the mistake made by the agent. It is simply an error on the part of the agent, and so the owner can say to him: You ought not to have erred.
אָמַר רַב הוּנָא בַּר חֲנִינָא אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן, הֲלָכָה כְּדִבְרֵי חֲכָמִים: וְלֵית לֵיהּ לְרַב נַחְמָן מָה כֹּחַ בֵּית דִּין יָפֶה? וְהָאָמַר רַב נַחְמָן אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: יְתוֹמִים שֶׁבָּאוּ לַחְלוֹק בְּנִכְסֵי אֲבִיהֶן — בֵּית דִּין מַעֲמִידִין לָהֶן אַפּוֹטְרוֹפּוֹס, וּבוֹרְרִין לָהֶם חֵלֶק יָפֶה. הִגְדִּילוּ — יְכוֹלִין לְמַחוֹת. וְרַב נַחְמָן דִּידֵיהּ אָמַר: הִגְדִּילוּ — אֵין יְכוֹלִין לְמַחוֹת, אִם כֵּן מָה כֹּחַ בֵּית דִּין יָפֶה.
§ Rav Huna bar Ḥanina said that Rav Naḥman said: The halakha is in accordance with the statement of the Rabbis in the mishna. The Gemara asks: Does Rav Naḥman not agree with the argument: What advantage is there to the power of the court? Didn’t Rav Naḥman say that Shmuel said: In a case of orphans who came to divide their father’s property, the court appoints a steward [apotropos] for them and selects for the orphans appropriate portions and divides the property accordingly. Afterward, once the orphans have matured, they are able to protest this division of the property. And Rav Naḥman said his own statement: Once the orphans have matured, they are not able to protest, as if they were able to do so, what advantage would there be to the power of the court? This proves that Rav Naḥman agrees with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel.
לָא קַשְׁיָא: הָא דִּטְעוֹ, הָא דְּלָא טְעוֹ.
The Gemara answers: This is not difficult. The case of the mishna was one where the judges erred in their assessment, and therefore Rav Naḥman said that the sale is void in accordance with the Rabbis. However, the case of the division of property among the orphans is one where they did not err, and so he ruled in accordance with the principle of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, that the court is given an advantage and the orphans are not able to protest the division.
אִי דְּלָא טְעוֹ, בְּמַאי יְכוֹלִין לְמַחוֹת? בְּרוּחוֹת.
The Gemara asks: If the case is one where the judges did not err, with regard to what could the orphans protest? After all, the judges acted correctly. The Gemara answers: They can protest with regard to the locations; one of the orphans can contend that he prefers property in a different location than he was given.
כִּי אֲתָא רַב דִּימִי, אָמַר: מַעֲשֶׂה וְעָשָׂה רַבִּי כְּדִבְרֵי חֲכָמִים, אָמַר לְפָנָיו פַּרְטָא בְּנוֹ שֶׁל רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר בֶּן פַּרְטָא בֶּן בְּנוֹ שֶׁל רַבִּי פַּרְטָא הַגָּדוֹל: אִם כֵּן מָה כֹּחַ בֵּית דִּין יָפֶה, וְהֶחְזִיר רַבִּי אֶת הַמַּעֲשֶׂה.
When Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael, he said: A similar incident occurred and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi acted in accordance with the statement of the Rabbis of the mishna. Perata, son of Rabbi Elazar ben Perata, grandson of Rabbi Perata the Great, said before him: If that is the case, what advantage is there to the power of the court over an ordinary person? And Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi reversed his ruling about the incident.
רַב דִּימִי מַתְנֵי הָכִי, רַב סָפְרָא מַתְנֵי הָכִי: מַעֲשֶׂה וּבִיקֵּשׁ רַבִּי לַעֲשׂוֹת כְּדִבְרֵי חֲכָמִים, אָמַר לְפָנָיו פַּרְטָא בְּנוֹ שֶׁל רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר בֶּן פַּרְטָא בֶּן בְּנוֹ שֶׁל רַבִּי פַּרְטָא הַגָּדוֹל: אִם כֵּן מָה כֹּחַ בֵּית דִּין יָפֶה? לֹא עָשָׂה רַבִּי אֶת הַמַּעֲשֶׂה.
Rav Dimi would teach the incident in this way, as described above. Rav Safra would teach it in this slightly altered way: There was an incident, and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi wished to act in accordance with the statement of the Rabbis of the mishna. Perata, son of Rabbi Elazar ben Perata, grandson of Rabbi Perata the Great, said before him: If that is the case, what advantage is there to the power of the court over an ordinary person? Consequently, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi did not take action according to the statement of the Rabbis.
לֵימָא בְּהָא קָמִיפַּלְגִי, מָר סָבַר: טָעָה בִּדְבַר מִשְׁנָה — חוֹזֵר, וּמָר סָבַר: אֵינוֹ חוֹזֵר.
The Gemara suggests: Let us say that they disagree about this: One Sage, Rav Dimi, holds that if one erred in a matter that appears in the Mishna, the decision is revoked. And one Sage, Rav Safra, holds that if one erred in this manner the decision is not revoked. This is why, in Rav Safra’s version, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi changed his mind before issuing his ruling.
לָא, דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא טָעָה בִּדְבַר מִשְׁנָה חוֹזֵר, וּמָר סָבַר הָכִי הֲוָה מַעֲשֶׂה, וּמָר סָבַר הָכִי הֲוָה מַעֲשֶׂה.
The Gemara rejects this: No, everyone agrees that if one erred in a matter that appears in the Mishna, the decision is revoked. There is no fundamental dispute between them, only a disagreement as to the details of the case. One Sage holds that the incident occurred in this way, and one Sage holds that the incident occurred in this way.
אָמַר רַב יוֹסֵף: אַרְמַלְתָּא דְּזַבִּינָה — אַחְרָיוּת אַיַּתְמֵי. וּבֵית דִּין דְּזַבֵּין — אַחְרָיוּת אַיַּתְמֵי.
§ Rav Yosef said: In the case of a widow who sold property to support herself or as payment of her marriage contract, the property guarantee rests upon the orphans. Therefore, if she sold liened property that was then seized from the purchasers in payment of a previous debt, the buyers are entitled to be reimbursed from the property of the orphans. And so too, if the court sold property for the same purpose, the property guarantee rests upon the orphans.
פְּשִׁיטָא!
The Gemara asks: Isn’t this obvious? The widow does not sell her own property, but rather she sells property from her husband’s estate to pay off his debts to her, and so clearly the guarantee rests on his properties that now belong to the orphans.
אַלְמָנָה לָא אִיצְטְרִיכָא לֵיהּ. כִּי אִיצְטְרִיךְ לֵיהּ, בֵּי דִינָא — מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא:
The Gemara answers: In truth, it was not necessary for Rav Yosef to mention this with regard to the widow, as it is clear that the property guarantee rests upon the orphans. Where it was necessary for him to mention this halakha was with regard to the court. Lest you say:
כֹּל דְּזָבֵין מִבֵּי דִינָא — אַדַּעְתָּא לְמִיפַּק לֵיהּ קָלָא הוּא דְּזָבֵין, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.
Everyone who buys from the court buys with the implicit understanding that the sale generates publicity, as a court sale is conducted in public with notices. The buyer could therefore think to himself that if no claimants came forward until the time of the actual purchase, then it is certain that there can be no problem with his purchase and he forgoes his property guarantee. Lest you say this, Rav Yosef teaches us that there is nevertheless a guarantee on the property, and it rests upon the orphans and not on the court.
רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר כּוּ׳. וְעַד כַּמָּה? אָמַר רַב הוּנָא בַּר יְהוּדָה אָמַר רַב שֵׁשֶׁת: עַד פַּלְגָא.
§ The mishna teaches: Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says that even if the judges err, the transaction is not void because of the prerogative of the court. The Gemara asks: And to what extent can they err without causing the deal to be reversed? Rav Huna bar Yehuda said that Rav Sheshet said: Until half of the value.
תַּנְיָא נָמֵי הָכִי, אָמַר רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל: בֵּית דִּין שֶׁמָּכְרוּ שָׁוֶה מָאתַיִם בְּמָנֶה אוֹ שָׁוֶה מָנֶה בְּמָאתַיִם — מִכְרָן קַיָּים.
That is also taught in a baraita: Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: A court that sold property worth one hundred dinars for two hundred dinars, or property worth two hundred dinars for one hundred dinars, their sale is valid. Since he doesn’t give as an example a larger gap between the market value and the sale price, this must be the most extreme case in which the transaction is not reversed.
אָמַר אַמֵּימָר מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרַב יוֹסֵף: בֵּית דִּין שֶׁמָּכְרוּ בְּלֹא הַכְרָזָה — נַעֲשׂוּ כְּמִי שֶׁטָּעוּ בִּדְבַר מִשְׁנָה וְחוֹזְרִין.
Ameimar said in the name of Rav Yosef: With regard to a court that sold without an announcement, it is considered as if they erred in a matter that appears in the Mishna and their decision is reversed.
נַעֲשׂוּ? וַדַּאי טָעוּ! דִּתְנַן: שׁוּם הַיְּתוֹמִין שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם, וְשׁוּם הַהֶקְדֵּשׁ שִׁשִּׁים יוֹם, וּמַכְרִיזִין בַּבֹּקֶר וּבָעֶרֶב.
The Gemara asks: Why does Rav Yosef say that it is considered as if the court erred in a matter that appears in the Mishna, when it certainly erred in this manner? As we learned in a mishna (Arakhin 21b): The assessment of the orphans is for thirty days, and the assessment for consecrated property is for sixty days, and they make announcements during the thirty and the sixty days respectively both in the morning and in the evening. The mishna states explicitly that announcements must be made. If the court did not make the announcements, it clearly erred in a matter that appears in the Mishna.
אִי מֵהַהִיא הֲוָה אָמֵינָא הָנֵי מִילֵּי שָׁלִיחַ, אֲבָל בֵּית דִּין — לָא, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.
The Gemara answers: If all the information that I had were from that mishna, I would say that this applies to an agent but not to a court. Therefore, Rav Yosef teaches us that even a court that sold property without making announcements has erred.
אֵיתִיבֵיהּ רַב אָשֵׁי לְאַמֵּימָר: שׁוּם הַדַּיָּינִין שֶׁפִּחֲתוּ שְׁתוּת אוֹ הוֹתִירוּ שְׁתוּת — מִכְרָן בָּטֵל. הָא שָׁוֶה בְּשָׁוֶה — מִכְרָן קַיָּים. מַאי לָאו דְּלָא אַכְרוּז? לָא, בִּדְאַכְרוּז.
Rav Ashi raised an objection to the statement of Ameimar: The mishna teaches that the halakha with regard to the assessment of the value of a piece of property in order to sell it through the judges is as follows: In a case where they decreased the price by one-sixth of its market value or added one-sixth to its market value, their sale is void. One can see from here that if the judges sold the property for its value, their sale is valid. What, is the mishna not discussing a case where no announcement was made? Ameimar replied: No, the case under discussion is one where they did make an announcement.
הָא מִדְּסֵיפָא בִּדְאַכְרוּז הָוֵי, רֵישָׁא בִּדְלָא אַכְרוּז, דְּקָתָנֵי סֵיפָא: אִם עָשׂוּ אִגֶּרֶת בִּקּוֹרֶת, אֲפִילּוּ מָכְרוּ שָׁוֶה מָנֶה בְּמָאתַיִם אוֹ שָׁוֶה מָאתַיִם בְּמָנֶה — מִכְרָן קַיָּים.
The Gemara asks: Since the last clause is referring to a case where the court made an announcement, the first clause must be referring to a case where they did not make announcements, as it teaches in the final clause: If they made a document of inspection and announced the sale publicly, then even if they sold property worth one hundred dinars for two hundred dinars or property worth two hundred dinars for one hundred dinars, their sale is valid.
אֶלָּא, לְעוֹלָם בִּדְלָא אַכְרוּז, וְלָא קַשְׁיָא: כָּאן בִּדְבָרִים שֶׁמַּכְרִיזִין עֲלֵיהֶן, כָּאן בִּדְבָרִים שֶׁאֵין מַכְרִיזִין עֲלֵיהֶן.
Rather, this should be understood differently. Actually, the first clause of the mishna is referring to a case where they did not make an announcement, and this is not difficult. Here, Ameimar is referring to items for which one makes an announcement, and if this was not done then the sale is void. There, the mishna is speaking of items for which one does not make announcements.
וְאֵלּוּ הֵן דְּבָרִים שֶׁאֵין מַכְרִיזִין עֲלֵיהֶן: הָעֲבָדִים וְהַמִּטַּלְטְלִין וְהַשְּׁטָרוֹת. עֲבָדִים טַעְמָא מַאי? שֶׁמָּא יִשְׁמְעוּ וְיִבְרְחוּ. מִטַּלְטְלִין וּשְׁטָרוֹת — שֶׁמָּא יִגָּנְבוּ.
And these are the items for which one does not make an announcement: Slaves, movable property, and contracts. The Gemara explains: What is the reason that slaves are sold without an announcement? Slaves are sold without an announcement lest they hear that they are about to be sold and escape. Why is the sale of movable property and contracts also not announced? Lest they be stolen.
וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: כָּאן בְּשָׁעָה שֶׁמַּכְרִיזִין, כָּאן בְּשָׁעָה שֶׁאֵין מַכְרִיזִין.
And if you wish, say instead that here Ameimar is referring to a time when one makes an announcement, while there the mishna is referring to a time when one does not make an announcement.
דְּאָמְרִי נְהַרְדָּעֵי: לִכְרָגָא לִמְזוֹנֵי וְלִקְבוּרָה — מְזַבְּנִינַן בְּלָא אַכְרָזְתָּא.
When does one not make an announcement? As the Sages of Neharde’a say: For the purpose of paying head tax, and for payment to provide for children’s sustenance, and for burial, the court sells property inherited by orphans without an announcement because these are pressing needs. There is no time to wait for an announcement.
וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: כָּאן בִּמְקוֹם שֶׁמַּכְרִיזִין, כָּאן בִּמְקוֹם שֶׁאֵין מַכְרִיזִין. דְּאָמַר רַב נַחְמָן: מֵעוֹלָם לֹא עָשׂוּ אִגֶּרֶת בִּקּוֹרֶת בִּנְהַרְדְּעָא.
And if you wish, say instead that here, Ameimar is referring to a locale where one makes an announcement, while there, the mishna is referring to a locale where one does not make an announcement, as Rav Naḥman said: They never made a document of inspection in Neharde’a.
סְבוּר מִינַּהּ מִשּׁוּם דִּבְקִיאֵי בְּשׁוּמָא. אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב יוֹסֵף בַּר מִנְיוֹמֵי: לְדִידִי מִיפָּרְשָׁא לִי מִינֵּיהּ דְּרַב נַחְמָן, מִשּׁוּם דְּקָרוּ לְהוּ ״בְּנֵי אָכְלִי נִכְסֵי דְאַכְרָזְתָּא״.
Some of the students understood from Rav Naḥman’s statement that no announcements were made in Neharde’a because the Sages there were all expert in the appraisal of an article’s value. Rav Yosef bar Minyumi said to them: This was explained to me personally by Rav Naḥman himself: It was because those who purchase the property are called: People who consume property that was publicly announced. This disparaging nickname was given because the purchasers were perceived as taking advantage of the distress of others by running to buy the property of someone in trouble. Since decent, honest people did not wish to buy property whose sale had been announced, they stopped making announcements.
אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: מִטַּלְטְלִין שֶׁל יְתוֹמִים — שָׁמִין אוֹתָן וּמוֹכְרִין אוֹתָן לְאַלְתַּר. רַב חִסְדָּא אָמַר אֲבִימִי: מוֹכְרִין אוֹתָן לִשְׁוָוקִים.
Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: Movable property that belongs to orphans is appraised and sold immediately so that it not deteriorate over time. Rav Ḥisda said that Avimi said: The movable property is sold on a market day, when there are many potential buyers and the items will sell for a proper price.
וְלָא פְּלִיגִי: הָא — דִּמְיקָרַב שׁוּקָא, הָא — דִּמְרַחַק שׁוּקָא.
The Gemara notes: And they do not disagree with each other. Rather, this opinion, that the items are sold on a market day, applies when the market day is approaching, so the property is not sold immediately. That opinion, that the items are sold immediately, applies when the market day is far off.
רַב כָּהֲנָא הֲוָה בִּידֵיהּ שִׁכְרָא דְּרַב מְשַׁרְשְׁיָא בַּר חִילְקַאי יַתְמָא. שַׁהֲיֵיהּ עַד רִיגְלָא, אָמַר: אַף עַל גַּב דְּנָפֵל בֵּיהּ אִיצְצָתָא, מַיְיתֵי זוּזָא חֲרִיפָא.
Rav Kahana was in possession of beer that belonged to Rav Mesharshiyya bar Ḥilkai, who was an orphan. He delayed selling it until the Festival. He explained the rationale for his actions and said: Although it is possible that it may deteriorate [itzatzta] and sour a little, it nevertheless brings in money at the time of the Festival, as it will sell for a higher price and for money, not credit. Consequently, it is in the best interests of Rav Mesharshiyya bar Ḥilkai to hold off and sell the beer at the next Festival.
רָבִינָא הֲוָה בִּידֵיהּ חַמְרָא דְּרָבִינָא זוּטֵי יַתְמָא בַּר אֲחָתֵיהּ. הֲוָה לְדִידֵיהּ נָמֵי חַמְרָא, הֲוָה קָמַסֵּיק לֵיהּ לְסִיכְרָא.
It is also related that Ravina was in possession of wine belonging to the orphan Ravina the younger, who was his sister’s son. He also had wine of his own, which he was taking to Sikhra to sell.
אֲתָא לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב אָשֵׁי, אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מַהוּ לְאַמְטוֹיֵי בַּהֲדַן? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: זִיל, לָא עֲדִיף מִדִּידָךְ.
He came before Rav Ashi and said to him: What is the halakha here, am I able to bring his wine along with my wine, or must I wait for a more opportune time to sell it? He said to him: Go to Sikhra and take his wine along as well, as his is no better than yours, and if you sell your own wine in this manner, it is clear that you think this is the best way to sell, and it is permitted for you to sell his wine in this manner.
מַתְנִי׳ הַמְמָאֶנֶת, הַשְּׁנִיָּה, וְהָאַיְלוֹנִית — אֵין לָהֶן כְּתוּבָּה, וְלֹא פֵּירוֹת וְלֹא מְזוֹנוֹת וְלֹא בְּלָאוֹת.
MISHNA: An orphan girl who was married off by her mother or brother before reaching the age of majority may refuse to continue living with her husband upon reaching the age of majority, thereby retroactively annulling their marriage. In the case of one who refuses to continue living with her husband in this manner; and in the case of a woman who is a secondary forbidden relative by rabbinic law; and in the case of a sexually underdeveloped woman [ailonit], who is incapable of bearing children, each of these women is not entitled to payment of a marriage contract; and they are not entitled to remuneration for the produce that the husband consumed; and they are not entitled to sustenance; and they are not entitled to their worn clothes that were brought in to the marriage as part of their dowry and became worn out during the marriage.
אִם מִתְּחִלָּה נְשָׂאָהּ לְשֵׁם אַיְלוֹנִית — יֵשׁ לָהּ כְּתוּבָּה.
If, from the start, he married her with the understanding that she is an ailonit, then she is entitled to payment of a marriage contract.
אַלְמָנָה לְכֹהֵן גָּדוֹל, גְּרוּשָׁה וַחֲלוּצָה לְכֹהֵן הֶדְיוֹט, מַמְזֶרֶת וּנְתִינָה לְיִשְׂרָאֵל, בַּת יִשְׂרָאֵל לְנָתִין וּלְמַמְזֵר — יֵשׁ לָהֶם כְּתוּבָּה.
In the case of a widow who married a High Priest; or a divorcée or a yevama who performed ḥalitza and later married a common priest; or a daughter born from an incestuous or adulterous relationship [mamzeret] who married an Israelite; or a Gibeonite woman who married an Israelite; or a Jewish woman who married a Gibeonite or a mamzer, although each of these unions is prohibited by Torah law, the woman is still entitled to payment of a marriage contract.
גְּמָ׳ רַב תָּנֵי: קְטַנָּה — יוֹצְאָה בְּגֵט אֵין לָהּ כְּתוּבָּה. וְכׇל שֶׁכֵּן מְמָאֶנֶת.
GEMARA: Rav taught that a minor girl who was married off by her mother or by her brother and who is divorced with a bill of divorce is not entitled to her marriage contract. According to Torah law, this marriage never took effect, and it was never established that in this situation she would receive a marriage contract. And all the more so, one who refuses to continue living with her husband and annuls the marriage herself is not entitled to payment of a marriage contract.
שְׁמוּאֵל תָּנֵי: מְמָאֶנֶת — אֵין לָהּ כְּתוּבָּה, אֲבָל יוֹצְאָה בְּגֵט — יֵשׁ לָהּ כְּתוּבָּה.
Shmuel taught that one who refuses to continue living with her husband is not entitled to her marriage contract, but one who is divorced with a bill of divorce is entitled to her marriage contract.
וְאַזְדָּא שְׁמוּאֵל לְטַעְמֵיהּ, דְּאָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: מְמָאֶנֶת — אֵין לָהּ כְּתוּבָּה, יוֹצְאָה בְּגֵט — יֵשׁ לָהּ כְּתוּבָּה.
The Gemara notes: And Shmuel follows his line of reasoning, as Shmuel said: One who refuses to continue living with her husband is not entitled to her marriage contract, but one who is divorced with a bill of divorce is entitled to her marriage contract.
מְמָאֶנֶת — לֹא פְּסָלָהּ מִן הָאַחִין, וְלֹא פְּסָלָהּ מִן הַכְּהוּנָּה. יוֹצְאָה בְּגֵט — פְּסָלָהּ מִן הָאַחִין, וּפְסָלָהּ מִן הַכְּהוּנָּה.
Shmuel also said: One who refuses to continue living with her husband is not disqualified from marrying one of the brothers of her husband. Her refusal annuls the marriage, and it is as if it never happened. And for the same reason, unlike a divorcée, this girl is not disqualified from marrying a member of the priesthood. However, one who is divorced with a bill of divorce is disqualified from marrying one of the brothers and is also disqualified from marrying a member of the priesthood.
מְמָאֶנֶת אֵינָהּ צְרִיכָה לְהַמְתִּין שְׁלֹשָׁה חֳדָשִׁים,
Another difference between a woman who refuses to continue living with her husband and a woman who was divorced normally is the following: One who refuses to continue living with her husband does not need to wait three months before remarrying, as other women who separate from their husbands must.
