Ketubot 109
תֵּשֵׁב עַד שֶׁיַּלְבִּין רֹאשָׁהּ. אַדְמוֹן אוֹמֵר: יְכוֹלָה הִיא שֶׁתֹּאמַר: אִילּוּ אֲנִי פָּסַקְתִּי לְעַצְמִי — אֵשֵׁב עַד שֶׁיַּלְבִּין רֹאשִׁי, עַכְשָׁיו שֶׁאַבָּא פָּסַק — מָה אֲנִי יְכוֹלָה לַעֲשׂוֹת? אוֹ כְּנוֹס, אוֹ פְּטוֹר. אָמַר רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל: רוֹאֶה אֲנִי אֶת דִּבְרֵי אַדְמוֹן.
the betrothed woman can be left to sit unwed in her father’s house until her head turns white. If the groom does not wish to marry without a dowry he cannot be forced to do so, as the father failed to fulfill his promise. Admon says that she can say: Had I apportioned the money myself and broken my promise, I would agree to sit until my head turns white. However, now that my father was the one who apportioned the dowry, what can I do? Either marry me or release me by a bill of divorce. Rabban Gamliel said: I see as correct the statement of Admon.
גְּמָ׳ מַתְנִיתִין דְּלָא כִּי הַאי תַּנָּא, דְּתַנְיָא: אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה: לֹא נֶחְלְקוּ אַדְמוֹן וַחֲכָמִים עַל הַפּוֹסֵק מָעוֹת לַחֲתָנוֹ וּפָשַׁט לוֹ אֶת הָרֶגֶל, שֶׁיְּכוֹלָה הִיא שֶׁתֹּאמַר: ״אַבָּא פָּסַק עָלַי, מָה אֲנִי יְכוֹלָה לַעֲשׂוֹת״.
GEMARA: The mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of this tanna, as it is taught in the Tosefta (13:1) that Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, said: Admon and the Rabbis did not disagree with regard to one who promises and apportions money for his son-in-law as a dowry and subsequently went bankrupt, that the betrothed woman can say: My father apportioned money for me; what can I do?
עַל מָה נֶחְלְקוּ — עַל שֶׁפָּסְקָה הִיא עַל עַצְמָהּ. שֶׁחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: תֵּשֵׁב עַד שֶׁתַּלְבִּין רֹאשָׁהּ. אַדְמוֹן אוֹמֵר, יְכוֹלָה הִיא שֶׁתֹּאמַר: כִּסְבוּרָה אֲנִי שֶׁאַבָּא נוֹתֵן עָלַי, וְעַכְשָׁיו שֶׁאֵין אַבָּא נוֹתֵן עָלַי — מָה אֲנִי יְכוֹלָה לַעֲשׂוֹת? אוֹ כְּנוֹס אוֹ פְּטוֹר. אָמַר רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל: רוֹאֶה אֲנִי אֶת דִּבְרֵי אַדְמוֹן.
With regard to what did they disagree? It is with regard to a case where she apportioned money for herself, as the Rabbis say: Let her sit until her head turns white, as she did not fulfill her promise. However, Admon says that she can say: I thought that my father would give the money for me, and now that my father is not giving the money for me, what can I do? Either marry me or release me. And it is with regard to this case that Rabban Gamliel said: I see as correct the statement of Admon, as the betrothed woman has no money of her own, and she was clearly relying on her father to provide the dowry.
תָּנָא: בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים בִּגְדוֹלָה, אֲבָל בִּקְטַנָּה — כּוֹפִין. כּוֹפִין לְמַאן? אִילֵימָא לְאָב — אִיפְּכָא מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ! אֶלָּא אָמַר רָבָא: כּוֹפִין לַבַּעַל לִיתֵּן גֵּט.
§ It is taught: In what case is this statement said? It is said in the case of an adult woman. However, with regard to a minor girl, the court compels payment. The Gemara asks: Whom do they compel? If we say that they coerce the father to pay, the tanna should have stated the opposite. It is more reasonable to suggest that the father is compelled to pay when an adult woman promises the money, as the promises of an adult are legally valid, whereas a minor is not legally competent and therefore her promises are of no consequence. Rather, Rava said: In the case of a minor, the court compels the groom either to give her a bill of divorce or to marry her.
אָמַר רַבִּי יִצְחָק בֶּן אֶלְעָזָר מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּחִזְקִיָּה: כׇּל מָקוֹם שֶׁאָמַר רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל ״רוֹאֶה אֲנִי אֶת דִּבְרֵי אַדְמוֹן״ — הֲלָכָה כְּמוֹתוֹ. אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבָא לְרַב נַחְמָן: אֲפִילּוּ בְּבָרַיְיתָא? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מִי קָאָמְרִינַן בַּמִּשְׁנָה?! בְּכׇל מָקוֹם שֶׁאָמַר רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל קָאָמְרִינַן.
§ Rabbi Yitzḥak ben Elazar said in the name of Ḥizkiyya: Anywhere it is recorded that Rabban Gamliel said: I see as correct the statement of Admon, the halakha is in accordance with his opinion. Rava said to Rav Naḥman: Does this halakhic principle apply even when the debate between Admon and the Rabbis is recorded in a baraita? Rav Naḥman said to him: Did we say: Anywhere it is recorded in the Mishna? We said: Anywhere it is recorded that Rabban Gamliel said, which means even in a baraita.
אָמַר רַבִּי זֵירָא אָמַר רַבָּה בַּר יִרְמְיָה: שְׁנֵי דְּבָרִים שֶׁאָמַר חָנָן — הֲלָכָה כַּיּוֹצֵא בּוֹ, שִׁבְעָה דְּבָרִים שֶׁאָמַר אַדְמוֹן — אֵין הֲלָכָה כַּיּוֹצֵא בּוֹ. מַאי קָאָמַר?
Rabbi Zeira said that Rabba bar Yirmeya said: With regard to the two statements that Ḥanan said, the halakha is in accordance with he who ruled similarly to him, i.e., Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai (see 107b); however, with regard to the seven statements that Admon said, the halakha is not in accordance with he who ruled similarly to him, i.e., Rabban Gamliel. The Gemara asks: What is he saying? What does this ruling mean?
אִילֵּימָא הָכִי קָאָמַר: שְׁנֵי דְּבָרִים שֶׁאָמַר חָנָן — הֲלָכָה כְּמוֹתוֹ וְכַיּוֹצֵא בּוֹ, וְשִׁבְעָה דְּבָרִים שֶׁאָמַר אַדְמוֹן — אֵין הֲלָכָה כְּמוֹתוֹ וְלֹא כַּיּוֹצֵא בּוֹ. וְהָאָמַר רַבִּי יִצְחָק בֶּן אֶלְעָזָר מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּחִזְקִיָּה: כׇּל מָקוֹם שֶׁאָמַר רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל ״רוֹאֶה אֲנִי אֶת דִּבְרֵי אַדְמוֹן״ — הֲלָכָה כְּמוֹתוֹ!
If we say that this is what he is saying: With regard to the two statements that Ḥanan said, the halakha is in accordance with his opinion and in accordance with he who ruled similarly to him, and with regard to the seven statements that Admon said, the halakha is not in accordance with his opinion and also not in accordance with he who ruled similarly to him, but didn’t Rabbi Yitzḥak ben Elazar say in the name of Ḥizkiyya: Anywhere it is recorded that Rabban Gamliel said: I see as correct the statement of Admon, the halakha is in accordance with his opinion.
אֶלָּא הָכִי קָאָמַר: שְׁנֵי דְּבָרִים שֶׁאָמַר חָנָן — הֲלָכָה כְּמוֹתוֹ וְכַיּוֹצֵא בּוֹ, שִׁבְעָה דְּבָרִים שֶׁאָמַר אַדְמוֹן — אֵין הֲלָכָה כַּיּוֹצֵא בּוֹ. הָא כְּמוֹתוֹ — הֲלָכָה בְּכוּלְּהוּ.
Rather, this is what Rabbi Zeira is saying: With regard to the two statements that Ḥanan said, the halakha is in accordance with his opinion and is also in accordance with he who ruled similarly to him, i.e., Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai. With regard to the seven statements that Admon said, the halakha is not only in accordance with the ruling of Rabban Gamliel, who ruled similarly to Admon in three of these cases. Rather, the halakha is in accordance with Admon’s ruling in all seven cases.
וְהָאָמַר רַבִּי יִצְחָק בֶּן אֶלְעָזָר מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּחִזְקִיָּה: כׇּל מָקוֹם שֶׁאָמַר רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל ״רוֹאֶה אֲנִי אֶת דִּבְרֵי אַדְמוֹן״ — הֲלָכָה כְּמוֹתוֹ, אָמַר — אִין, לֹא אָמַר — לָא!
The Gemara questions this interpretation: Didn’t Rabbi Yitzḥak ben Elazar say in the name of Ḥizkiyya: Anywhere it is recorded that Rabban Gamliel said: I see as correct the statement of Admon, the halakha is in accordance with his opinion? It may be inferred from here that in those cases concerning which Rabban Gamliel said his statement, yes, the halakha is in accordance with Admon’s ruling, but in those cases where Rabban Gamliel did not say his statement, no, the halakha is not in accordance with the opinion of Admon.
אֶלָּא הָכִי קָאָמַר: שְׁנֵי דְּבָרִים שֶׁאָמַר חָנָן — הֲלָכָה כְּמוֹתוֹ וְכַיּוֹצֵא בּוֹ, שִׁבְעָה דְּבָרִים שֶׁאָמַר אַדְמוֹן — יֵשׁ מֵהֶן שֶׁהֲלָכָה כְּמוֹתוֹ וְכַיּוֹצֵא בּוֹ, וְיֵשׁ מֵהֶן שֶׁאֵין הֲלָכָה כְּמוֹתוֹ אֶלָּא כַּיּוֹצֵא בּוֹ.
Rather, this is what Rabbi Zeira is saying: With regard to the two statements that Ḥanan said, the halakha is in accordance with his opinion and is also in accordance with he who ruled similarly to him. With regard to the seven statements that Admon said, there are among these rulings those in which the halakha is in accordance with his opinion and in accordance with he who ruled similarly to him, and there are among these rulings those in which the halakha is not in accordance with his opinion but in accordance with he who ruled similarly to him.
בְּכׇל מָקוֹם שֶׁאָמַר רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל רוֹאֶה אֲנִי אֶת דִּבְרֵי אַדְמוֹן — הֲלָכָה כְּמוֹתוֹ, אִינָךְ — לָא.
The Gemara explains the above statement. In other words, anywhere it is recorded that Rabban Gamliel said: I see as correct the statement of Admon, the halakha is in accordance with his opinion, whereas in those other cases, where Rabban Gamliel remained silent, indicating that he did not agree with him, the halakha is not in accordance with Admon.
מַתְנִי׳ הָעוֹרֵר עַל הַשָּׂדֶה, וְהוּא חָתוּם עָלֶיהָ בְּעֵד — אַדְמוֹן אוֹמֵר: הַשֵּׁנִי נוֹחַ לִי, וְהָרִאשׁוֹן קָשֶׁה הֵימֶנּוּ.
MISHNA: With regard to one who contests ownership of a field, claiming that a field under the control of someone else actually belongs to him, and the claimant himself is signed as a witness on the bill of sale to that other person, Admon says: His signature does not disprove his claim of ownership of the property, as it is possible that the claimant said to himself: The second person is easier for me, as I can reason with him, but the first owner, who sold the field to the current holder, is more difficult to deal with than him. The claimant might have been afraid to protest against the first one, who is perhaps violent, and therefore he was even willing to sign as a witness to transfer the field to the control of someone more amenable to his ensuing protest.
וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: אִיבֵּד אֶת זְכוּתוֹ. עֲשָׂאָהּ סִימָן לְאַחֵר — אִיבֵּד אֶת זְכוּתוֹ.
And the Rabbis say: He has lost his right to contest ownership, as he signed a bill of sale that states that the field belongs to the present holder. If he established that field as a marker for another field, everyone agrees that he has lost his right. In other words, if the claimant wrote a document concerning another field and in that document he listed the first field as a boundary marker and described it as belonging to someone else, even Admon concedes that he has lost his right, as he had no reason to say it belonged to someone else other than his belief this was in fact the case.
גְּמָ׳ אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא עֵד, אֲבָל דַּיָּין — לֹא אִיבֵּד אֶת זְכוּתוֹ. דְּתָנֵי רַבִּי חִיָּיא: אֵין הָעֵדִים חוֹתְמִין עַל הַשְּׁטָר אֶלָּא אִם כֵּן קְרָאוּהוּ.
GEMARA: Abaye said: They taught this dispute only with regard to a witness who signed on a bill of sale. However, a judge who was contesting the ownership of a field and at the same time sat on a court that certified the bill of sale for that very tract of land has not lost his right. This is as Rabbi Ḥiyya taught: Witnesses do not sign a document unless they have read it, which means that a witness cannot reasonably claim that he is certifying only part of document; it is assumed that he read and is aware of everything it contains.
אֲבָל הַדַּיָּינִין חוֹתְמִים אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁלֹּא קְרָאוּהוּ.
However, judges do sign a document even though they have not read it, as they are merely certifying the signatures without relating to the content of the document at all.
עֲשָׂאָהּ סִימָן לְאַחֵר. אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא לְאַחֵר, אֲבָל לְעַצְמוֹ — לֹא אִיבֵּד אֶת זְכוּתוֹ.
§ The mishna taught that if someone established a field as a marker for another field, everyone agrees that he has lost his right to contest its ownership. Abaye said: They taught this only in a case where he stated this in a document unrelated to the field in question, which was written for another person. However, if he established it as a marker for himself, when he was buying a different field owned by the person who is in possession of the contested field, he has not lost his right.
דְּאָמַר: אִי דְּלָא עֲבַדִי לֵיהּ הָכִי לָא הֲוָה מְזַבֵּין לַהּ נִיהֲלִי, מַאי אִית לָךְ לְמֵימַר? אִיבְּעִי לִי לְמִימְסַר מוֹדָעָא — חַבְרָךְ חַבְרָא אִית לֵיהּ, וְחַבְרָא דְחַבְרָךְ חַבְרָא אִית לֵיהּ.
The reason is that the claimant can say: Had I not done this act of writing that the field belongs to him, he would not have sold me this other field. What have you to say against this argument? Will you say that I should have put out a notice and declared in the presence of witnesses that I am forced to write this way in the contract? I was concerned about doing this, as your friend has a friend and your friend’s friend has a friend. In other words, it is hard to keep an announcement of this kind secret, and ultimately my notice would have become public knowledge and would have reached the owner of the field himself, and he would have refused to sell me the other tract of land.
הָהוּא דַּעֲשָׂאָהּ סִימָן לְאַחֵר, עַרְעַר, וּשְׁכֵיב, וְאוֹקֵים אַפּוֹטְרוֹפָּא. אֲתָא אַפּוֹטְרוֹפּוֹס לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּאַבָּיֵי. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: עֲשָׂאָהּ סִימָן לְאַחֵר אִיבֵּד אֶת זְכוּתוֹ.
§ The Gemara relates: There was a certain individual who established a field as a marker for another field, with ownership of the first field ascribed to someone else. Later he contested the ownership of the first field, claiming it as his own, and he subsequently died. And prior to his death he had appointed a steward to manage the properties of his orphans. The steward came before Abaye. Abaye said to him: The deceased established the field as a marker for another, and therefore he has lost his right to contest ownership of the land.
אֲמַר: אִי הֲוָה אֲבוּהוֹן דְּיַתְמֵי קַיָּים, הֲוָה טָעֵין וְאָמַר: ״תֶּלֶם אֶחָד עָשִׂיתִי לָךְ״. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: שַׁפִּיר קָאָמְרַתְּ. דְּאָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, אִם טָעַן וְאָמַר ״תֶּלֶם אֶחָד עָשִׂיתִי לָךְ״ — נֶאֱמָן. זִיל הַב לֵיהּ מִיהַת תֶּלֶם אֶחָד.
The steward said to Abaye: If the father of these orphans were alive he would have claimed and said: I established one furrow for you. In other words, the marker I established by means of this field was not meant as a reference to the entire field but only to a furrow at the edge of the field. Abaye said to him: You have spoken well, as Rabbi Yoḥanan said: If he claimed and said: I established one furrow for you, he is deemed credible. Go and give him one furrow in any event, as you freely admit that at least one furrow belongs to the one currently in control of the property.
הֲוָה עֲלַהּ רִיכְבָּא דְּדִיקְלֵי, אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אִי הֲוָה אֲבוּהוֹן דְּיַתְמֵי קַיָּים, הֲוָה טָעֵין וְאָמַר, חָזַרְתִּי וְלָקַחְתִּי מִמֶּנּוּ. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: שַׁפִּיר קָאָמְרַתְּ. דְּאָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: אִם טָעַן וְאָמַר ״חָזַרְתִּי וּלְקַחְתִּיו מִמֶּנּוּ״ — נֶאֱמָן. אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: הַאי מַאן דְּמוֹקֵים אַפּוֹטְרוֹפָּא — נוֹקֵים כִּי הַאי דְּיָדַע לְאַפּוֹכֵי בִּזְכוּתָא דְיַתְמֵי.
On that particular furrow there was a row of palm trees, which the steward did not want to lose. He said to Abaye: If the father of these orphans were alive he would have claimed and said: I did in fact sell the field to him, but I went back and bought it from him sometime later. Abaye said to him: You have spoken well, as Rabbi Yoḥanan said: If he claimed and said: I went back and bought it from him, he is deemed credible. After the steward won his suit in court, Abaye said: One who wants to appoint a steward should appoint someone like this person, who knows how to look out for the rights of the orphans and how to argue on their behalf.
מַתְנִי׳ מִי שֶׁהָלַךְ לִמְדִינַת הַיָּם וְאָבְדָה דֶּרֶךְ שָׂדֵהוּ. אַדְמוֹן אוֹמֵר: יֵלֵךְ לוֹ בִּקְצָרָה. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: יִקְנֶה לוֹ דֶּרֶךְ בְּמֵאָה מָנֶה, אוֹ יִפְרַח בָּאֲוִיר.
MISHNA: With regard to one who went overseas and in the meantime the path leading to his field was lost, e.g., the path he used to reach his land was taken over by the owner of the field through which it passed, so that its exact position is now unknown, Admon says: Let him go to his field by the shortest possible route. And the Rabbis say: Let him buy himself a path from an owner of a neighboring field at whatever price he can, even if it is one hundred dinars [maneh], or let him fly through the air.
גְּמָ׳ מַאי טַעְמָא דְרַבָּנַן, שַׁפִּיר קָאָמַר אַדְמוֹן! אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר רַב: כְּגוֹן שֶׁהִקִּיפוּהָ אַרְבָּעָה בְּנֵי אָדָם מֵאַרְבַּע רוּחוֹתֶיהָ — אִי הָכִי, מַאי טַעְמָא דְאַדְמוֹן?
GEMARA: The Gemara asks: What is the reason for the opinion of the Rabbis that he is not automatically entitled to a path leading to his field? After all, Admon speaks well, as it was established that he owned a path beforehand. Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: The mishna is dealing with a case where the field was surrounded on four sides by the property of four different people. Each of the four properties adjoining his field belonged to a different person, each of whom denied that his path cut through his land. Since he is unable to prove his claim with regard to each one of them, he has no choice but to buy himself a new path. The Gemara asks: If so, what is the reason for the opinion of Admon?
אָמַר רָבָא: בְּאַרְבְּעָה דְּאָתוּ מִכֹּחַ אַרְבְּעָה, וְאַרְבְּעָה דְּאָתוּ מִכֹּחַ חַד — כּוּלֵּי עָלְמָא לָא פְּלִיגִי דְּמָצֵי מְדַחֵי לֵיהּ. כִּי פְּלִיגִי בְּחַד דְּאָתֵי מִכֹּחַ אַרְבְּעָה.
Rava said: In a case where there are four owners of fields who come by virtue of four previous owners, and in a case where there are four owners who come by virtue of one previous owner of all four properties, everyone agrees that they may put off the claims of the owner of the field in the middle, as each can say: Your path did not cut through my property. When they disagree is in a case where there is one current owner of four fields who comes by virtue of four previous owners.
אַדְמוֹן סָבַר: מִכׇּל מָקוֹם דַּרְכָּא אִית לִי גַּבָּךְ. וְרַבָּנַן סָבְרִי: אִי שָׁתְקַתְּ — שָׁתְקַתְּ, וְאִי לָא — מַהְדַּרְנָא שְׁטָרָא לְמָרַיְיהוּ וְלָא מָצֵית לְאִשְׁתַּעוֹיֵי דִּינָא בַּהֲדַיְיהוּ.
Rava elaborates: Admon holds that the claimant can say to the landowner: In any case, I have a path through your property. Although he cannot prove where the path ran, it was certainly within the perimeter of the landowner’s property that borders his own tract of land, and for this reason he selects the shortest route. And the Rabbis hold that the landowner can say to the man: If you will stay silent, then stay silent and we will compromise; and if not, I will return the document of each field to its previous owner and you will not be able to negotiate with them, as you do not know through which field your path passed.
הָהוּא דַּאֲמַר לְהוּ: דִּיקְלָא לִבְרַת. אֲזוּל יַתְמֵי פְּלוּג לְנִכְסֵי, לָא יְהַבוּ לַהּ דִּיקְלָא. סְבַר רַב יוֹסֵף לְמֵימַר: הַיְינוּ מַתְנִיתִין.
§ The Gemara relates: There was a certain man who said to his heirs, in his will: I am leaving a palm tree for my daughter. The orphans went and divided up the property and they did not give the daughter a palm tree at all. Rav Yosef thought to say that this is exactly like the case of the mishna, as each heir can say to her: The tree designated for you is not in my portion but in that of a different heir.
אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי: מִי דָּמֵי? הָתָם כֹּל חַד וְחַד מָצֵי מְדַחֵי לֵיהּ, הָכָא דִּיקְלָא גַּבַּיְיהוּ הוּא. מַאי תַּקַּנְתַּיְיהוּ? לִיתְּבוּ לַהּ דִּיקְלָא וְלֶיהְדְּרוּ וְלִיפַּלְגוּ מֵרֵישָׁא.
Abaye said to him: Are the cases comparable? There, each and every one of the fields’ owners can put him off, as in fact the path might not have passed through his property, whereas here, the palm tree is in their possession, i.e., they all share the obligation to give her a tree, and each is illegally holding on to a share of it. Abaye adds: What is their remedy? Let them give her a palm tree and go back and divide the inherited property once again from the outset. Since the palm tree will be taken from one of the shares, they must redistribute the estate afresh.
הָהוּא דַּאֲמַר לְהוּ: דִּיקְלָא לִבְרַת. שְׁכֵיב וּשְׁבַיק תְּרֵי פַּלְגֵי דְּדִיקְלָא.
The Gemara relates a similar story: There was a certain man who said to his heirs, in his will: I am leaving a palm tree for my daughter. He died and left behind two halves of palm trees, as there had been two trees he had shared with different business partners. The heirs wished to give the girl these two halves, despite the fact that tending to them would involve considerably more trouble than taking care of a single tree.
יָתֵיב רַב אָשֵׁי וְקָא קַשְׁיָא לֵיהּ: מִי קָרוּ אִינָשֵׁי לִתְרֵי פַּלְגֵי דִּיקְלֵי דִּיקְלָא, אוֹ לָא? אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב מָרְדֳּכַי לְרַב אָשֵׁי: הָכִי אָמַר אֲבִימִי מֵהַגְרוֹנְיָא מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרָבָא: קָרוּ אִינָשֵׁי לִתְרֵי פַּלְגֵי דִּיקְלֵי דִּיקְלָא.
Rav Ashi sat and posed a difficulty to the proposal of the heirs. Do people refer to two halves of a palm tree as a whole palm tree or not? If the statement of the dying father can reasonably be interpreted as referring to these two halves she is at a disadvantage, as the burden of proof rests upon the claimant. Alternatively, if this is an unreasonable explanation of his wishes, they must give her a whole tree. Which alternative is correct? Rav Mordekhai said to Rav Ashi: Avimi of Hagronya said as follows in the name of Rava: People do in fact refer to two halves of a palm tree as a whole palm tree. Consequently, the heirs may fulfill their father’s dying wish by giving the girl the two halves they inherited.
