Ketubot 27

Ketubot 27

הוּרְהֲנָה — אִין, נֶחְבְּשָׁה — לָא. הוּא הַדִּין אֲפִילּוּ נֶחְבְּשָׁה. וּמַעֲשֶׂה שֶׁהָיָה, כָּךְ הָיָה.

If she was taken as security, in a case where her husband stipulated that if he fails to pay a debt the gentiles may take his wife and do with her as they please, yes, she requires witnesses to testify that she was not violated. However, if she was imprisoned by the authorities, no, she is deemed untainted even without witnesses. Apparently, the distinction is not based on the dominance of the Jewish people. Rather, it is based on the manner in which she was apprehended. The Gemara answers: The same is true that she is forbidden to her husband even if she was imprisoned, and the reason that the tanna’im testified about a case where she was taken as security is because the incident that transpired, transpired in that manner.

אִיכָּא דְּאָמְרִי, אָמַר רָבָא: אַף אֲנַן נָמֵי תְּנֵינָא: הֵעִיד רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַכֹּהֵן וְרַבִּי זְכַרְיָה בֶּן הַקַּצָּב עַל בַּת יִשְׂרָאֵל שֶׁהוּרְהֲנָה בְּאַשְׁקְלוֹן, וְרִיחֲקוּהָ בְּנֵי מִשְׁפַּחְתָּהּ, וְעֵדֶיהָ מְעִידִים עָלֶיהָ שֶׁלֹּא נִסְתְּרָה וְשֶׁלֹּא נִטְמָאָה, וְאָמְרוּ חֲכָמִים: אִם אַתֶּם מַאֲמִינִים שֶׁהוּרְהֲנָה — הַאֲמִינוּ שֶׁלֹּא נִסְתְּרָה וְשֶׁלֹּא נִטְמָאָה, וְאִם אֵין אַתֶּם מַאֲמִינִים שֶׁלֹּא נִסְתְּרָה וְשֶׁלֹּא נִטְמָאָה — אַל תַּאֲמִינוּ שֶׁהוּרְהֲנָה.

Some say a different version of this tradition. Rava said that we too learn a proof from a mishna for the statement that Rav Shmuel bar Rav Yitzḥak said that Rav said: Rabbi Yosei the priest and Rabbi Zekharya ben HaKatzav testified about a Jewish woman about whom witnesses testified that she was taken as security for a debt in Ashkelon. And the members of her family, who suspected that she engaged in intercourse there, distanced themselves from her, and her witnesses testified about her that she neither entered into seclusion nor was violated. And the Sages said to the members of the family: If you believe the witnesses that she was taken as collateral, believe the witnesses who say that she neither entered into seclusion nor was violated. And if you do not believe the witnesses that she neither entered into seclusion nor was violated, do not believe the witnesses that she was taken as collateral at all.

וְהָא אַשְׁקְלוֹן, דְּעַל יְדֵי מָמוֹן הֲוָה, וְטַעְמָא דְּעֵדִים מְעִידִין אוֹתָהּ, הָא אֵין עֵדִים מְעִידִין אוֹתָהּ — לָא. מַאי לָאו: לָא שְׁנָא הוּרְהֲנָה, וְלָא שְׁנָא נֶחְבְּשָׁה! לָא, הוּרְהֲנָה שָׁאנֵי.

Rava asks: But in the case in Ashkelon that was due to a monetary offense, the reason that she was permitted is that witnesses testified about her that she was untainted. However, if witnesses did not testify about her, no, she would not be permitted to her husband, although she was taken due to a monetary offense. What, is it not that it is no different if she was taken as collateral and it is no different if she was imprisoned? Apparently, if the authority of the gentiles is dominant, even if she was imprisoned for the sake of money there is concern that she was violated. The Gemara rejects the proof: No, the case where the woman is taken as collateral is different, and only in that case, where her husband stipulated that the gentiles could take her, would the gentiles allow themselves to violate her. However, in a case where she is imprisoned there is no concern of that sort.

אִיכָּא דְּרָמֵי לַהּ מִירְמָא, תְּנַן: עַל יְדֵי מָמוֹן מוּתֶּרֶת לְבַעְלָהּ, וּרְמִינְהוּ: הֵעִיד רַבִּי יוֹסֵי כּוּ׳. וְהָא אַשְׁקְלוֹן, דְּעַל יְדֵי מָמוֹן, וְקָתָנֵי: טַעְמָא דְּעֵדִים מְעִידִים אוֹתָהּ, הָא אֵין עֵדִים מְעִידִין אוֹתָהּ לָא!

Some raise it as a contradiction between the sources. We learned in the mishna: A woman who was taken hostage due to a monetary offense is permitted to her husband. And they raise a contradiction from the mishna in Eduyyot: Rabbi Yosei the priest and Rabbi Zekharya ben HaKatzav testified about a Jewish woman about whom witnesses testified that she was taken as collateral for a debt in Ashkelon. But this is not the case in Ashkelon, which was due to a monetary offense, and it is taught that the reason that the woman was permitted is that witnesses testified about her that she was untainted. However, if witnesses did not testify about her, no, she would not be permitted, although she was taken for the sake of money.

וּמְשַׁנֵּי, אָמַר רַב שְׁמוּאֵל בַּר רַב יִצְחָק, לָא קַשְׁיָא: כָּאן שֶׁיַּד יִשְׂרָאֵל תַּקִּיפָה עַל אוּמּוֹת הָעוֹלָם, כָּאן שֶׁיַּד אוּמּוֹת הָעוֹלָם תַּקִּיפָה עַל עַצְמָן.

And he answers that Rav Shmuel bar Rav Yitzḥak said: This is not difficult. Here, the mishna is referring to a period when the authority of the Jewish people is dominant over the nations of the world. Then, a woman taken hostage for the sake of money is permitted. There it is referring to a period when the authority of the nations of the world is dominant over themselves and over the Jewish people. Therefore, even a woman taken because of a monetary offense is forbidden unless witnesses testify that she is untainted.

עַל יְדֵי נְפָשׁוֹת אֲסוּרָה וְכוּ׳. אָמַר רַב: כְּגוֹן נְשֵׁי גַנָּבֵי. וְלֵוִי אָמַר: כְּגוֹן אִשְׁתּוֹ שֶׁל בֶּן דּוֹנַאי. אָמַר חִזְקִיָּה: וְהוּא שֶׁנִּגְמַר דִּינָן לַהֲרִיגָה, וְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁלֹּא נִגְמַר דִּינָן לַהֲרִיגָה.

§ We learned in the mishna: A woman who was imprisoned because of a capital offense is forbidden to her husband. Rav said: The mishna is referring to a case where the wives of thieves are involved, as when thieves were apprehended and hanged, their wives were abandoned and made available to all, and they were not protected from potential rapists. And Levi said: The mishna is referring to a case where the wife of ben Donai, a murderer, is involved, as in that case the government abandons his wife and makes her available to all, which is not the case when one is condemned for theft. Ḥizkiyya said: And this abandonment is only in a case where the husbands were sentenced to death. And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Although their husbands were not sentenced to death, if the imprisonment is because of a capital offense, the women are abandoned and available to all.

מַתְנִי׳ עִיר שֶׁכְּבָשׁוּהָ כַּרְכּוֹם — כׇּל כֹּהֲנוֹת שֶׁנִּמְצְאוּ בְּתוֹכָהּ פְּסוּלוֹת. וְאִם יֵשׁ לָהֶן עֵדִים, אֲפִילּוּ עֶבֶד, אֲפִילּוּ שִׁפְחָה — הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ נֶאֱמָנִין. וְאֵין נֶאֱמָן אָדָם עַל יְדֵי עַצְמוֹ.

MISHNA: With regard to a city that was conquered by an army laying siege, all the women married to priests located in the city are unfit and forbidden to their husbands, due to the concern that they were raped. And if they have witnesses, even if the witness is a slave, even if the witness is a maidservant, both of whom are generally disqualified as witnesses, they are deemed credible. And a person is not deemed credible to establish his status by his own testimony. Therefore, a woman is not deemed credible to claim that she was not violated.

גְּמָ׳ וּרְמִינְהוּ: בַּלֶּשֶׁת שֶׁבָּאָה לָעִיר, בִּשְׁעַת שָׁלוֹם — חָבִיּוֹת פְּתוּחוֹת אֲסוּרוֹת, סְתוּמוֹת מוּתָּרוֹת. בִּשְׁעַת מִלְחָמָה — אֵלּוּ וְאֵלּוּ מוּתָּרוֹת, לְפִי שֶׁאֵין פְּנַאי לְנַסֵּךְ.

GEMARA: The Gemara raises a contradiction from a mishna (Avoda Zara 70b): If there is a gentile military unit that entered a city, if it entered during peacetime, after the soldiers leave, the open barrels of wine are forbidden and the wine in them may not be drunk, due to suspicion that the gentile soldiers may have poured this wine as a libation for idolatry. The sealed barrels are permitted. However, if the unit entered in wartime, both these and those are permitted because in wartime there is no respite to pour wine for idolatry. One can be certain that the soldiers did not do so because the soldiers were preoccupied with preparations for a potential attack by the enemy. Why, then, is the mishna concerned that perhaps the soldiers laying siege to the city rape the women?

אָמַר רַב מָרִי: לִבְעוֹל יֵשׁ פְּנַאי, לְנַסֵּךְ אֵין פְּנַאי. רַבִּי יִצְחָק בַּר אֶלְעָזָר מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּחִזְקִיָּה אָמַר: כָּאן בְּכַרְכּוֹם שֶׁל אוֹתָהּ מַלְכוּת, כָּאן בְּכַרְכּוֹם שֶׁל מַלְכוּת אַחֶרֶת.

Rav Mari said: To engage in intercourse there is respite; to pour wine for idolatry there is no respite. Rabbi Yitzḥak bar Elazar said in the name of Ḥizkiyya: There is a different distinction between the cases. There, the mishna is referring to the siege of a city under the rule of the same monarchy. In that case, the soldiers, acting as the enforcement body of the monarchy, seek to minimize unnecessary damage to the city and will refrain from ruining the wine and raping the women. Here, the mishna is referring to the siege of a city under the rule of a different monarchy. Therefore, there are no restraints with regard to ruining the wine or raping the women.

שֶׁל אוֹתָהּ מַלְכוּת נָמֵי, אִי אֶפְשָׁר דְּלָא עָרַק חַד מִינַּיְיהוּ. אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: כְּשֶׁמִּשְׁמָרוֹת רוֹאוֹת זוֹ אֶת זוֹ. אִי אֶפְשָׁר דְּלָא נָיְימָא פּוּרְתָּא! אָמַר רַבִּי לֵוִי: כְּגוֹן דִּמְהַדַּר לַהּ לְמָתָא שׁוּשִׁילְתָּא וְכַלְבָּא וּגְווֹזָא וַאֲווֹזָא.

The Gemara asks: Even in the siege of a city under the rule of the same monarchy, it is impossible that one of the soldiers did not wander off and rape a woman. Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: This is referring to a case where the sentries see each other and do not allow the soldiers to plunder the city. The Gemara asks: It is impossible that the sentries would not doze a bit, enabling some soldiers to enter and plunder the city. Rabbi Levi said: It is referring to a case where they surround the city with chains, and dogs, and branches [gavza], and geese, as obstacles preventing unauthorized entry.

אָמַר רַבִּי אַבָּא בַּר זַבְדָּא: פְּלִיגִי בַּהּ רַבִּי יְהוּדָה נְשִׂיאָה וְרַבָּנַן. חַד אָמַר: כָּאן בְּכַרְכּוֹם שֶׁל אוֹתָהּ מַלְכוּת, כָּאן בְּכַרְכּוֹם שֶׁל מַלְכוּת אַחֶרֶת, וְלָא קַשְׁיָא לֵיהּ וְלָא מִידֵּי. וְחַד קַשְׁיָא לֵיהּ כֹּל הָנֵי, וּמְשַׁנֵּי: כְּגוֹן דִּמְהַדַּר לֵיהּ לְמָתָא שׁוּשִׁילְתָּא וְכַלְבָּא וּגְווֹזָא וַאֲווֹזָא.

Rabbi Abba bar Zavda said: Rabbi Yehuda Nesia, grandson of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, redactor of the mishna, and the Rabbis dispute this matter. One said: There, the mishna is referring to the siege of a city under the rule of the same monarchy. Here, the mishna is referring to the siege of a city under the rule of a different monarchy, and it was not difficult for him at all, as in that case there is no concern that perhaps an individual soldier would enter the city. And for the other one, all these questions were difficult, and he answers: It is referring to a case where they surround the city with chains, and dogs, and branches, and geese.

אָמַר רַב אִידִי בַּר אָבִין אָמַר רַבִּי יִצְחָק בַּר אַשְׁיָאן: אִם יֵשׁ שָׁם מַחְבּוֹאָה אַחַת — מַצֶּלֶת עַל הַכֹּהֲנוֹת כּוּלָּן.

§ With regard to the ruling in the mishna, Rav Idi bar Avin said that Rabbi Yitzḥak bar Ashyan said: If there is a single hideaway there in the city, where the women could hide from the soldiers, it saves all the women married to priests. Due to the uncertainty, the presumption is that each of the women found the hideaway, and therefore they are not forbidden to their husbands.

בָּעֵי רַבִּי יִרְמְיָה: אֵינָהּ מַחְזֶקֶת אֶלָּא אַחַת מַהוּ? מִי אָמְרִינַן כֹּל חֲדָא וַחֲדָא הַיְינוּ הָא, אוֹ דִלְמָא לָא אָמְרִינַן?

Rabbi Yirmeya raises a dilemma: If the hideaway holds only one woman, what is the ruling? Do we say that with regard to each woman who appears before us, this is the one who hid there, and each is permitted to her husband? Or, perhaps we do not say that.

וּמַאי שְׁנָא מִשְּׁנֵי שְׁבִילִין, אֶחָד טָמֵא וְאֶחָד טָהוֹר. וְהָלַךְ בְּאֶחָד מֵהֶן וְעָשָׂה טְהָרוֹת, וּבָא חֲבֵירוֹ וְהָלַךְ בַּשֵּׁנִי וְעָשָׂה טְהָרוֹת,

The Gemara asks: And in what way is this different from the case of two paths? As we learned in a mishna: There were two paths, one that was ritually impure due to a corpse buried there and one that was ritually pure. And one walked on one of them, but he does not remember which, and afterward engaged in handling items of ritual purity, e.g., teruma or consecrated items. And another person came and walked on the second path, and he too does not remember which path it was, and he also engaged in handling items of ritual purity.

רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: אִם נִשְׁאַל זֶה בִּפְנֵי עַצְמוֹ וְזֶה בִּפְנֵי עַצְמוֹ — טְהוֹרוֹת. שְׁנֵיהֶם כְּאַחַת — טְמֵאוֹת. רַבִּי יוֹסִי אוֹמֵר: בֵּין כָּךְ וּבֵין כָּךְ טְמֵאִין.

Rabbi Yehuda says: If this one asked a Sage in and of himself, and that one asked a Sage in and of himself, they are both pure. When considered separately, each person retains his presumptive status of ritual purity. However, if they both came to ask at the same time, they are both ritually impure. Since one of the two certainly passed on the impure path, although it is uncertain which, both are deemed impure due to that uncertainty. Rabbi Yosei says: One way or another they are both ritually impure.

וְאָמַר רָבָא, וְאִיתֵּימָא רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: בְּבַת אַחַת — דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל: טְמֵאִין. בְּזֶה אַחַר זֶה — דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל: טְהוֹרִים. לֹא נֶחְלְקוּ אֶלָּא בְּבָא לִישָּׁאֵל עָלָיו וְעַל חֲבֵירוֹ: מָר מְדַמֵּי לֵיהּ לִבְבַת אַחַת, וּמָר מְדַמֵּי לֵיהּ לְבָזֶה אַחַר זֶה. וְהָכָא נָמֵי, כֵּיוָן דְּשָׁרֵי לְהוּ לְכוּלְּהוּ — כְּבַת אַחַת דָּמֵי!

And Rava said, and some say it was Rabbi Yoḥanan who elaborates: If they came at the same time, everyone agrees that they are ritually impure, as even Rabbi Yehuda concedes that this is the halakha. If they came independently, this one after that one, everyone agrees that they are ritually pure. They disagree only with regard to a case where one comes to ask about himself and about the other. One Sage, Rabbi Yosei, likens it to a case where they come to ask at the same time, and Rabbi Yehuda likens it to a case where this one comes after that one. The Gemara concludes the analogy: And here too, where there was room in the hideout for only one woman, although they came and asked individually, since they seek to render all the women married to priests permitted to their husbands based on that hideout, it is tantamount to asking about them all at the same time, and they should be deemed forbidden to their husbands.

הָכִי הַשְׁתָּא?! הָתָם וַדַּאי אִיכָּא טוּמְאָה, הָכָא מִי יֵימַר דְּאִיטַּמַּי.

The Gemara asks: How can these cases be compared? There, in the case of the two paths, there is certainly ritual impurity in one of the paths, and therefore there is certainly one man who is impure. Here, who says any of the women was violated? Since there is uncertainty whether any woman was violated at all, one is more likely to rule that each woman was the one who hid than it is to rule that each of the men walked on the ritually pure path.

בָּעֵי רַב אָשֵׁי, אָמְרָה: לֹא נֶחְבֵּאתִי וְלֹא נִטְמֵאתִי, מַהוּ? מִי אָמְרִינַן:

Rav Ashi raises a dilemma: If there was a hideaway in the city and a woman married to a priest says: Neither did I hide nor was I violated, what is the ruling? Do we say the principle:

מָה לִי לְשַׁקֵּר. אוֹ דִלְמָא לָא אָמְרִינַן?

Why would I lie in so ineffectual a manner, and deem her credible? Had she wanted to lie, she could have claimed that she hid, which is a more effective claim. Or perhaps we do not say that principle.

וּמַאי שְׁנָא מֵהָהוּא מַעֲשֶׂה, דְּהָהוּא גַּבְרָא דְּאֹגַר לֵיהּ חֲמָרָא לְחַבְרֵיהּ, אֲמַר לֵיהּ: לָא תֵּיזִיל בְּאוֹרְחָא דִּנְהַר פְּקוֹד דְּאִיכָּא מַיָּא, זִיל בְּאוֹרְחָא דְּנַרֶשׁ דְּלֵיכָּא מַיָּא, וַאֲזַל אִיהוּ בְּאוֹרְחָא דִּנְהַר פְּקוֹד וּמִית חֲמָרָא.

The Gemara asks: And in what way is this different from that incident where a certain man who rented a donkey to his colleague said to the renter: Do not go on the path of the Pekod River, where there is water, and the donkey is likely to drown. Go on the path of Neresh, where there is no water. And he went on the path along the Pekod River and the donkey died.

אֲתָא לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרָבָא, אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אִין, בְּאוֹרְחָא דִּנְהַר פְּקוֹד אֲזַלִי, מִיהוּ לָא הֲווֹ מַיָּא. אָמַר רַבָּא: ״מָה לִי לְשַׁקֵּר״. אִי בָּעֵי, אֲמַר לֵיהּ: בְּאוֹרְחָא דְנַרֶשׁ אֲזַלִי. וַאֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי: ״מָה לִי לְשַׁקֵּר״ בִּמְקוֹם עֵדִים לָא אָמְרִינַן.

The renter came before Rava and said to him: Yes, I went on the path along the Pekod River; however, there was no water there. The donkey’s death was caused by other factors. Rava said: His claim is accepted based on the principle: Why would I lie. If he wanted to lie, he could have said to him, I went on the path of Neresh. And Abaye said to Rava: We do not say the principle: Why would I lie, in a situation where there are witnesses. This principle, which is a form of miggo, is effective only when his claim does not contradict established facts. In this case, since it is known to all that there is water on the path along the Pekod River, his claim is not accepted. Similarly, as it is an established fact that the women taken captive were certainly raped, her claim is not accepted even though it is based on a miggo.

הָכִי הַשְׁתָּא?! הָתָם וַדַּאי אִיכָּא עֵדִים דְּאִיכָּא מַיָּא. הָכָא, וַדַּאי אִיטַּמַּי? חֲשָׁשָׁא הוּא, וּבִמְקוֹם חֲשָׁשָׁא — אָמְרִינַן.

The Gemara asks: How can these cases be compared? There, in the case of the donkey, there are certainly witnesses capable of confirming that there is water along that path. Here, in the case of the women, is it clearly established that she was definitely defiled? It is merely a concern, and in a situation where there is merely a concern and not an established fact we say the principle: Why would I lie, and her claim is accepted.

אִם יֵשׁ עֵדִים, אֲפִילּוּ עֶבֶד וַאֲפִילּוּ שִׁפְחָה נֶאֱמָנִין. וַאֲפִילּוּ שִׁפְחָה דִּידַהּ מְהֵימְנָא? וּרְמִינְהִי: לֹא תִּתְיַיחֵד עִמּוֹ אֶלָּא עַל פִּי עֵדִים.

§ We learned in the mishna: If they have witnesses, even if the witness is a slave and even if the witness is a maidservant, they are deemed credible. The Gemara asks: And is even her personal maidservant deemed credible? The Gemara raises a contradiction from a mishna (Gittin 73a): With regard to one who divorced his wife conditionally, and the condition was not yet fulfilled, the woman may enter into seclusion with him only on the basis of the presence of witnesses, due to the concern that they will engage in intercourse. If between the drafting of a bill of divorce and its taking effect the husband and wife enter into seclusion together, the bill of divorce must be discarded and a new document drafted in its place.

וַאֲפִילּוּ עַל פִּי עֶבֶד וְעַל פִּי שִׁפְחָה. חוּץ מִשִּׁפְחָתָהּ, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁלִּבָּהּ גַּס בְּשִׁפְחָתָהּ! אָמַר רַב פַּפֵּי: בִּשְׁבוּיָה הֵקֵילּוּ.

And she may enter into seclusion even on the basis of the presence of a slave and on the basis of the presence of a maidservant, except for her personal maidservant, due to the fact that she is accustomed to her maidservant, and her presence will not serve as an impediment that would prevent her from engaging in intercourse. Therefore, with regard to the woman taken captive as well, the testimony of the maidservant is not accepted to establish that she was not defiled. Rav Pappi resolved the contradiction and said: With regard to a captive woman, the Sages ruled leniently. Because the prohibition against intercourse with a captive woman is based on the concern that she was violated, the Sages relied on the testimony of her personal maidservant.

רַב פָּפָּא אָמַר: הָא בְּשִׁפְחָה דִּידַהּ, הָא בְּשִׁפְחָה דִּידֵיהּ.

Rav Pappa resolved the contradiction and said: This halakha in the case of conditional divorce is stated with regard to her maidservant, who is not deemed credible even in the case of a captive woman. That halakha in the case of the captive woman, where they said even the testimony of the maidservant is accepted, is stated with regard to his maidservant to whom the woman is not so accustomed, and therefore her presence serves as an impediment.

וְשִׁפְחָה דִּידַהּ לָא מְהֵימְנָא? הָא קָתָנֵי: אֵין אָדָם מֵעִיד עַל עַצְמוֹ, הָא שִׁפְחָה דִּידַהּ מְהֵימְנָא! שִׁפְחָתָהּ נָמֵי כְּעַצְמָהּ דָּמֵי.

The Gemara asks: And is her maidservant not deemed credible? But isn’t it taught in the mishna: A person is not deemed credible to establish his status by his own testimony? From that statement it may be inferred that the woman is not deemed credible to testify about herself, but her maidservant is deemed credible. The Gemara answers: The legal status of her maidservant is like her own status. Neither is deemed credible.

רַב אָשֵׁי אָמַר: הָא וְהָא בְּשִׁפְחָה דִּידַהּ, וְשִׁפְחָה מִיחְזָא חָזְיָא וְשָׁתְקָה. הָתָם דִּשְׁתִיקָתָהּ מַתִּירָתָהּ — לָא מְהֵימְנָא. הָכָא דִּשְׁתִיקָתָהּ אוֹסַרְתָּהּ — מְהֵימְנָא.

Rav Ashi resolved the contradiction and said: Both halakhot are stated with regard to her maidservant, but there is a distinction between the cases. A maidservant sees what transpires and is silent, but does not testify falsely. Therefore, there, in the case of conditional divorce, where the maidservant’s silence with regard to whether her mistress engaged in intercourse renders the woman permitted, as it is sufficient for the maidservant to say merely: I was there, she is not deemed credible due to the concern lest she witnessed them engaging in intercourse and remained silent. However, here, in the case of the captive woman, where the maidservant’s silence would render her mistress forbidden, as a captive woman is presumed to have been violated and the only way to render her permitted is by saying: She was not defiled, she is deemed credible.

הַשְׁתָּא נָמֵי אָתְיָא וּמְשַׁקְּרָא! תַּרְתֵּי לָא עָבְדָה.

The Gemara asks: Here too there should be concern that she will come and lie for the benefit of her mistress. The Gemara answers: She would not perform two acts of dishonesty. Although there is suspicion that she will refrain from telling the truth, there is no suspicion that she will lie as well. Therefore, if she relates that her mistress was not defiled, she is deemed credible.

כִּי הָא דְּמָרִי בַּר אִיסַק, וְאָמְרִי לַהּ חָנָא בַּר אִיסַק, אֲתָא לֵיהּ אַחָא מִבֵּי חוֹזָאָה. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: פְּלוֹג לִי בְּנִכְסֵי דְּאַבָּא! אֲמַר לֵיהּ: לָא יָדַעְנָא לָךְ. אֲתָא לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב חִסְדָּא. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: שַׁפִּיר קָאָמַר לָךְ, דִּכְתִיב: ״וַיַּכֵּר יוֹסֵף אֶת אֶחָיו וְהֵם לֹא הִכִּירֻהוּ״, מְלַמֵּד שֶׁיָּצָא בְּלֹא חֲתִימַת זָקָן וּבָא בַּחֲתִימַת זָקָן.

Proof that one is not suspected of both concealing the truth and lying is cited, as in that case of Mari bar Isak, and some say it was Ḥana bar Isak, where someone claiming to be his brother came to him from Bei Ḥoza’a, a district located far from the Jewish population centers in Babylonia. This brother said to him: Apportion me a share in my father’s property. Mari said to him: I do not know you. The brother came before Rav Ḥisda seeking a legal remedy. Rav Ḥisda said to him: Your brother is speaking well and his response is well founded, as it is written: “And Joseph recognized his brothers but they recognized him not” (Genesis 42:8). This teaches that Joseph left the land of Canaan without the trace of a beard and came to meet his brothers with the trace of a beard.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ: זִיל אַיְיתִי סָהֲדֵי דַּאֲחוּהּ אַתְּ. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אִית לִי סָהֲדֵי, וּמִסְתְּפוּ מִינֵּיהּ, דְּגַבְרָא אַלָּמָא הוּא. אֲמַר לֵיהּ לְדִידֵיהּ: זִיל אַיְיתִינְהוּ אַתְּ דְּלָאו אֲחוּךְ הוּא. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: דִּינָא הָכִי? הַמּוֹצִיא מֵחֲבֵירוֹ עָלָיו הָרְאָיָה! אֲמַר לֵיהּ: הָכִי דָּאֵינְנָא לָךְ וּלְכוּלְּהוּ אַלָּמֵי חַבְרָךְ. הַשְׁתָּא נָמֵי אָתוּ וּמְשַׁקְּרִי! תַּרְתֵּי לָא עָבְדִי.

Rav Ḥisda said to him: Go bring witnesses that you are his brother. He said to Rav Ḥisda: I have witnesses, but they are afraid of Mari, who is a violent man, and will not testify. Rav Ḥisda said to Mari: Go bring witnesses that he is not your brother. Mari said to him: Is that the halakha? Isn’t the guiding principle in cases of this sort: The burden of proof rests upon the claimant? Let the man claiming part of my inheritance bring proof supporting his claim. Rav Ḥisda said to him: This is how I render judgment for you and for all your fellow violent men; I place the burden of proof upon them. The Gemara asks: Now too, witnesses will come and lie in fear of Mari, and what is accomplished by requiring Mari to bring the witnesses? Apparently, one is not suspected of performing two acts of dishonesty, to both conceal the truth and to lie.

לֵימָא כְּתַנָּאֵי: זוֹ עֵדוּת — אִישׁ וְאִשָּׁה, תִּינוֹק וְתִינוֹקֶת, אָבִיהָ וְאִמָּהּ, וְאָחִיהָ וַאֲחוֹתָהּ. אֲבָל לֹא בְּנָהּ וּבִתָּהּ, לֹא עַבְדָּהּ וְשִׁפְחָתָהּ. וְתַנְיָא אִידַּךְ: הַכֹּל נֶאֱמָנִין לְהָעִיד, חוּץ מֵהֵימֶנָּה וּבַעְלָהּ.

The Gemara suggests: Let us say that the opinions of the amora’im with regard to the testimony of her maidservant are subject to this dispute between tanna’im. It is taught in one baraita: This testimony that a captive woman was not defiled with regard to which a man and a woman, a male child or a female child, the woman’s father, and her mother, and her brother, and her sister are deemed credible, but not her son and her daughter, and not her slave or maidservant. And it is taught in another baraita: All are deemed credible to testify with regard a captive woman, except for her and her husband.

דְּרַב פַּפֵּי וּדְרַב אָשֵׁי תַּנָּאֵי הִיא. דְּרַב פָּפָּא [מִי] לֵימָא תַּנָּאֵי הִיא.

The Gemara notes: The opinion of Rav Pappi and the opinion of Rav Ashi are certainly subject to the dispute between tanna’im, as they hold that her maidservant is deemed credible contrary to the first baraita cited. However, with regard to the opinion of Rav Pappa, who distinguishes between her maidservant, who is not deemed credible, and his maidservant, who is, do we say that it is subject to the dispute between tanna’im? Perhaps the tanna in each baraita holds that her maidservant is not deemed credible, and the baraita that deems everyone credible except for the woman and her husband could be explained in another manner, e.g., the legal status of her maidservant is like her own status.

אָמַר לְךָ רַב פָּפָּא: כִּי תַּנְיָא הָהִיא, בִּמְסִיחָה לְפִי תּוּמָּהּ.

The Gemara says: There is no proof that Rav Pappa’s opinion is contingent upon the tannaitic dispute, as Rav Pappa could have said to you: When that baraita that deems everyone credible except for the woman and her husband is taught, it is taught in a case where she is making an unconsidered, incidental remark in the context of a conversation about an unrelated matter. However, direct testimony of her maidservant is not accepted.

כִּי הָא דְּכִי אֲתָא רַב דִּימִי, אָמַר: רַב חָנָן קַרְטִיגְנָאָה מִשְׁתַּעֵי: מַעֲשֶׂה בָּא לִפְנֵי רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בֶּן לֵוִי, וְאָמְרִי לַהּ רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בֶּן לֵוִי מִישְׁתַּעֵי: מַעֲשֶׂה בָּא לִפְנֵי רַבִּי בְּאָדָם אֶחָד שֶׁהָיָה מֵסִיחַ לְפִי תּוּמּוֹ, וְאָמַר: אֲנִי וְאִמִּי נִשְׁבִּינוּ לְבֵין הַגּוֹיִם. יָצָאתִי לִשְׁאוֹב מַיִם — דַּעְתִּי עַל אִמִּי, לְלַקֵּט עֵצִים — דַּעְתִּי עַל אִמִּי. וְהִשִּׂיאָהּ רַבִּי לִכְהוּנָּה עַל פִּיו.

As in that case when Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia; he said that Rav Ḥanan of Carthage relates: An incident came before Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi for judgment; and some say that Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi relates: An incident came before Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, with regard to a person who was making an unconsidered, incidental remark, and said: My mother and I were taken captive among the gentiles. When I went out to draw water, my thoughts were about my mother; to gather wood, my thoughts were about my mother. We were never separated. And Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi deemed her fit to marry into the priesthood on the basis of those remarks, even though with regard to testimony about his mother, a son is disqualified as a witness. The same is true of the woman’s maidservant.

מַתְנִי׳ אָמַר רַבִּי זְכַרְיָה בֶּן הַקַּצָּב: הַמָּעוֹן הַזֶּה! לֹא זָזָה יָדָהּ מִתּוֹךְ יָדִי מִשָּׁעָה שֶׁנִּכְנְסוּ גּוֹיִם לִירוּשָׁלַיִם וְעַד שֶׁיָּצְאוּ. אָמְרוּ לוֹ: אֵין אָדָם מֵעִיד עַל עַצְמוֹ.

MISHNA: Rabbi Zekharya ben HaKatzav said: I swear by this abode of the Divine Presence that my wife’s hand did not move from my hand from the time that the gentiles entered Jerusalem until they left, and I know for a fact that she was not defiled. The Sages said to him: A person cannot testify about himself. The legal status of one’s wife is like his own status in this regard. Therefore, your testimony is not accepted, and your wife is forbidden to you.

גְּמָ׳ תָּנָא: וְאַף עַל פִּי כֵן, יִיחֵד לָהּ בַּיִת בַּחֲצֵרוֹ, וּכְשֶׁהִיא יוֹצְאָה — יוֹצְאָה בְּרֹאשׁ בָּנֶיהָ, וּכְשֶׁהִיא נִכְנֶסֶת — נִכְנֶסֶת בְּסוֹף בָּנֶיהָ.

GEMARA: The tanna taught in the Tosefta: And even so, despite the fact that the Sages ruled his wife forbidden to him because he was a priest, he did not divorce her. He designated a house in his courtyard for her, but did not enter into seclusion with her, and when she would go out of the courtyard she would go out before her sons so that she would not be alone in the courtyard with her husband, and when she would enter the house, she would enter after her sons, for the same reason.

בָּעֵי אַבָּיֵי: מַהוּ לַעֲשׂוֹת בִּגְרוּשָׁה כֵּן? הָתָם הוּא, דְּבִשְׁבוּיָה הֵקֵילּוּ, אֲבָל הָכָא — לָא, אוֹ דִלְמָא לָא שְׁנָא?

Abaye raises a dilemma: What is the halakha regarding whether we have to do likewise with a divorcée? Can a priest who divorces his wife designate a house for her in the courtyard and rely on the children to ensure that the couple will not enter into seclusion? Is it specifically there, in the case of Rabbi Zekharya ben HaKatzav because with regard to a captive woman the Sages ruled leniently, since the prohibition is based on suspicion and not certainty; however here, in the case of a divorcée, where there is a certain Torah prohibition, no, he may not designate a residence for her in the courtyard? Or perhaps, the case of a divorcée is no different.

תָּא שְׁמַע, דְּתַנְיָא: הַמְגָרֵשׁ אֶת אִשְׁתּוֹ — לֹא תִּנָּשֵׂא בִּשְׁכוּנָתוֹ.

The Gemara cites proof to resolve the dilemma: Come and hear proof as it is taught in a baraita: With regard to one who divorces his wife, she may not marry and live in his immediate vicinity, i.e., his courtyard, due to the concern that because of the intimacy they once shared, her living there will lead to transgression.