Ketubot 38

Ketubot 38

הָנֵי מִילֵּי, הֵיכָא דַּהֲרָגוֹ דֶּרֶךְ עֲלִיָּיה, שֶׁלֹּא נִיתְּנָה שִׁגְגָתוֹ לְכַפָּרָה. אֲבָל הֲרָגוֹ דֶּרֶךְ יְרִידָה, דְּנִיתְּנָה שִׁגְגָתוֹ לְכַפָּרָה, אֵימָא: נִישְׁקוֹל מָמוֹנָא מִינֵּיהּ וְנִיפְטְרֵיהּ, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.

this principle, that one cannot pay in lieu of execution, applies only when one intentionally killed him in an upward motion, for which no atonement is designated in the Torah for its unwitting performance. However, with regard to one who intentionally killed him in a downward motion, for which atonement, i.e., exile, is designated in the Torah for its unwitting performance, say: Let us take money from him and exempt him. Therefore, the phrase “any ḥerem” teaches us that even in that case there is no payment in lieu of execution.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבָא: הָא מִדְּתַנָּא דְּבֵי חִזְקִיָּה נָפְקָא. דְּתָנָא דְּבֵי חִזְקִיָּה: ״מַכֵּה אָדָם״ וּ״מַכֵּה בְהֵמָה״.

Rava said to him: That principle is derived from that which the Sage of the school of Ḥizkiyya taught, as the Sage of the school of Ḥizkiyya taught: The verse juxtaposes the cases of one who smites a person, and one who smites an animal (Leviticus 24:21).

מָה מַכֵּה בְהֵמָה לֹא חִלַּקְתָּ בּוֹ בֵּין שׁוֹגֵג לְמֵזִיד, בֵּין מִתְכַּוֵּין לְשֶׁאֵין מִתְכַּוֵּין, בֵּין דֶּרֶךְ יְרִידָה לְדֶרֶךְ עֲלִיָּיה — לְפוֹטְרוֹ מָמוֹן אֶלָּא לְחַיְּיבוֹ מָמוֹן. אַף מַכֵּה אָדָם לֹא תַּחְלוֹק בּוֹ בֵּין שׁוֹגֵג לְמֵזִיד, בֵּין מִתְכַּוֵּין לְשֶׁאֵין מִתְכַּוֵּין, בֵּין דֶּרֶךְ יְרִידָה לְדֶרֶךְ עֲלִיָּה — לְחַיְּיבוֹ מָמוֹן אֶלָּא לְפוֹטְרוֹ מָמוֹן.

Just as in the case of one who smites an animal, you did not distinguish between one who did so unwittingly and one who did so intentionally; between one who acted with intent and one who acted with no intent; between one who smites in the course of a downward motion and one who smites in the course of an upward motion; and in all those cases it is not to exempt him from paying money but rather to obligate him to pay money; so too in the case of one who smites a person: Do not distinguish between one who did so unwittingly and one who did so intentionally; between one who acted with intent and one who acted with no intent; between one who smites in the course of a downward motion and one who smites in the course of an upward motion; and in all those cases it is not to obligate him to pay money but rather to exempt him from paying money. Apparently, one who kills another in any manner is exempt from payment, and therefore no additional verse is required to derive that principle.

אֶלָּא אָמַר רָמֵי בַּר חָמָא, אִיצְטְרִיךְ: סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אָמֵינָא, הָנֵי מִילֵּי הֵיכָא דְּסִימֵּא אֶת עֵינוֹ וַהֲרָגוֹ בָּהּ. אֲבָל הֵיכָא דְּסִימֵּא אֶת עֵינוֹ וַהֲרָגוֹ בְּדָבָר אַחֵר, אֵימָא נִישְׁקוֹל מָמוֹנָא מִינֵּיהּ. אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבָא: הָא נָמֵי מֵאִידַּךְ תַּנָּא דְּבֵי חִזְקִיָּה נָפְקָא. דְּתָנָא דְּבֵי חִזְקִיָּה: ״עַיִן תַּחַת עַיִן״, וְלֹא עַיִן וְנֶפֶשׁ תַּחַת עַיִן.

Rather, Rami bar Ḥama said that the phrase “any ḥerem” (Leviticus 27:29) is necessary, as it might enter your mind to say that this halakha, that one who is liable to be executed is exempt from payment, applies only in a case where one blinded another’s eye and killed him with that same blow. However, in a case where one blinded another’s eye and killed him by means of a different blow, say: Let us take money from him to pay the damage inflicted to the eye. Therefore, the verse teaches that this is not the case. Rava said to him: This case of one who blinded another’s eye and killed him is also derived from that which another tanna of the school of Ḥizkiyya taught, as the Sage of the school of Ḥizkiyya taught that the verse states: “An eye for an eye” (Exodus 21:24), from which it may be inferred, but not an eye and a life for an eye. When he gives his life for killing another while blinding him, he need not pay the worth of the eye as well.

אֶלָּא אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: אִיצְטְרִיךְ. סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אָמֵינָא הוֹאִיל וְחִידּוּשׁ הוּא שֶׁחִידְּשָׁה תּוֹרָה בִּקְנָס, אַף עַל גַּב דְּמִיקְּטִיל מְשַׁלֵּם, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן. וּלְרַבָּה דְּאָמַר חִידּוּשׁ הוּא שֶׁחִידְּשָׁה תּוֹרָה בִּקְנָס, אַף עַל גַּב דְּמִיקְּטִיל מְשַׁלֵּם, הַאי ״כׇּל חֵרֶם״ מַאי עָבֵיד לֵיהּ? סָבַר לַהּ כְּתַנָּא קַמָּא דְּרַבִּי חֲנַנְיָא בֶּן עֲקַבְיָא.

Rather, after the Gemara rejected the above explanations, Rav Ashi said: The phrase “any ḥerem” is nonetheless necessary, as it might enter your mind to say: Since it is a novel element that the Torah introduced with regard to the payment of a fine, which is not payment for any damage caused but is a Torah decree, in that case, even though he is killed he pays the fine. Therefore, the verse teaches us that one who is executed is exempt from payment of the fine. The Gemara asks: And according to Rabba, who said that this is indeed the halakha: Since it is a novel element that the Torah introduced with regard to the payment of a fine, even though he is killed he pays the fine, what does he do with this phrase: “Any ḥerem”? The Gemara answers: Rabba holds with regard to this matter in accordance with the opinion of the first tanna, who disagrees with Rabbi Ḥananya ben Akavya and explains that the phrase “Any ḥerem” teaches that the vow one takes to donate the valuation of one being taken to his execution is not binding.

מַתְנִי׳ נַעֲרָה שֶׁנִּתְאָרְסָה וְנִתְגָּרְשָׁה — רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי אוֹמֵר: אֵין לָהּ קְנָס. רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר: יֵשׁ לָהּ קְנָס, וּקְנָסָהּ לְעַצְמָהּ.

MISHNA: With regard to a young woman who was betrothed and divorced, and then raped, Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says: She does not receive payment of a fine for her rape. Rabbi Akiva says: She receives payment of a fine for her rape and her fine is paid to herself, not her father, as since she was betrothed and divorced she is no longer subject to her father’s authority.

גְּמָ׳ מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי — אָמַר קְרָא: ״אֲשֶׁר לֹא אוֹרָשָׂה״, הָא אוֹרָסָה — אֵין לָהּ קְנָס. וְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא? ״אֲשֶׁר לֹא אוֹרָשָׂה״ — לְאָבִיהָ, הָא אוֹרְסָה — לְעַצְמָהּ.

GEMARA: What is the rationale for the opinion of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili? It is as the verse states: “If a man finds a young woman who is a virgin who was not betrothed” (Deuteronomy 22:28), from which it may be inferred: If she was betrothed she does not have a fine for rape. The Gemara asks: And how does Rabbi Akiva explain this verse? The Gemara answers that the verse states: If it is a young woman who was not betrothed, the fine is paid to her father, from which it may be inferred: If she was betrothed, the fine is paid to the betrothed woman herself.

אֶלָּא מֵעַתָּה, ״נַעֲרָה״ וְלֹא בּוֹגֶרֶת, הָכִי נָמֵי דִּלְעַצְמָהּ? ״בְּתוּלָה״ וְלֹא בְּעוּלָה, הָכִי נָמֵי דִּלְעַצְמָהּ? אֶלָּא לִגְמָרֵי, הָכָא נָמֵי לִגְמָרֵי!

The Gemara asks: But if that is so, that the inference from the verse is that the fine is levied on one who rapes a young woman and not on one who rapes a grown woman, so too, there is the halakha in the latter case that the fine is paid to the grown woman herself. Similarly, with regard to the inference that the fine is levied on one who rapes a virgin and not on one who rapes a non-virgin, so too, there is the halakha that in the latter case the fine is paid to the non-virgin herself. A distinction of that kind has never been encountered. Rather, with regard to a grown woman and a non-virgin, the rapist is completely exempt from paying the fine; here too, with regard to a betrothed woman, the rapist is completely exempt from paying the fine.

אָמַר לָךְ רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא: הַאי ״לָא אוֹרָשָׂה״ מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ לְכִדְתַנְיָא: ״אֲשֶׁר לֹא אוֹרָשָׂה״ — פְּרָט לְנַעֲרָה שֶׁנִּתְאָרְסָה וְנִתְגָּרְשָׁה, שֶׁאֵין לָהּ קְנָס, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי. רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר: יֵשׁ לָהּ קְנָס, וּקְנָסָהּ לְאָבִיהָ. וְהַדִּין נוֹתֵן: הוֹאִיל וְאָבִיהָ זַכַּאי בְּכֶסֶף קִידּוּשֶׁיהָ, וְאָבִיהָ זַכַּאי בְּכֶסֶף קְנָסָהּ. מָה כֶּסֶף קִידּוּשֶׁיהָ, אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁנִּתְאָרְסָה וְנִתְגָּרְשָׁה — לְאָבִיהָ, אַף כֶּסֶף קְנָסָהּ, אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁנִּתְאָרְסָה וְנִתְגָּרְשָׁה — לְאָבִיהָ.

The Gemara answers: Rabbi Akiva could have said to you that this verse: “Who was not betrothed,” is required by him to teach another halakha that is taught in a different baraita. “Who was not betrothed” (Deuteronomy 22:28) comes to exclude a young woman who was betrothed and divorced and establish that she does not receive payment of a fine for her rape; this is the statement of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili. Rabbi Akiva says: She receives payment of a fine for her rape, and her fine goes to her father, contrary to the ruling attributed to Rabbi Akiva in the mishna. And ostensibly, no verse is required to derive this halakha, as logic dictates that it is so: Since her father is entitled to the money of her betrothal if she is betrothed before she becomes a grown woman, and likewise her father is entitled to the money of her fine; just as the money of her subsequent betrothal as a young woman, even though she was betrothed and divorced, is paid to her father, so too, the money of her fine, although she was betrothed and divorced, is paid to her father.

אִם כֵּן, מָה תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״אֲשֶׁר לֹא אוֹרָשָׂה״ — מוּפְנֶה, לְהַקִּישׁ לוֹ וְלָדוּן הֵימֶנּוּ גְּזֵירָה שָׁוָה: נֶאֱמַר כָּאן ״אֲשֶׁר לֹא אוֹרָשָׂה״, וְנֶאֱמַר לְהַלָּן ״אֲשֶׁר לֹא אוֹרָשָׂה״. מָה כָּאן חֲמִשִּׁים — אַף לְהַלָּן חֲמִשִּׁים, וּמָה לְהַלָּן שְׁקָלִים — אַף כָּאן שְׁקָלִים.

If so, and the halakha can be logically inferred, why does the verse state: “Who was not betrothed”? This verse is free, as it is superfluous in its own context, and it is written to liken another case to it, and to derive from it a verbal analogy: It is stated here with regard to a woman who was raped: “Who was not betrothed,” and it is stated below: “And if a man seduce a virgin who was not betrothed” (Exodus 22:15). Just as here, with regard to rape, the Torah specifies that the payment is fifty silver pieces (Deuteronomy 22:29), so too below, with regard to seduction, the payment is fifty. And just as below, with regard to seduction, the payment is in shekels, as it is written: “He shall weigh [yishkol] money” (Exodus 22:16), so too here, the payment is in shekels.

וְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא, מַאי חָזֵית דַּ״אֲשֶׁר לֹא אוֹרָשָׂה״ לִגְזֵירָה שָׁוָה, וּ״בְתוּלָה״ לְמַעוֹטֵי בְּעוּלָה?

The Gemara asks: And Rabbi Akiva, what did you see that led you to utilize the phrase: “Who was not betrothed” for a verbal analogy, and the term “virgin” to exclude a non-virgin from the fine?

אֵימָא: ״בְּתוּלָה״ — לִגְזֵירָה שָׁוָה, וַ״אֲשֶׁר לֹא אוֹרָסָה״ — פְּרָט לְנַעֲרָה שֶׁנִּתְאָרְסָה וְנִתְגָּרְשָׁה!

Say to the contrary; the term “virgin,” written with regard to both rape and seduction, is to derive a verbal analogy, and not to exclude a non-virgin, and the phrase “Who was not betrothed” will be interpreted as Rabbi Yosei HaGelili interpreted it, to exclude a young woman who was betrothed and divorced.

מִסְתַּבְּרָא ״אֲשֶׁר לֹא אוֹרָסָה״ לִגְזֵירָה שָׁוָה, שֶׁהֲרֵי אֲנִי קוֹרֵא בָּהּ ״נַעֲרָה בְּתוּלָה״. אַדְּרַבָּה: ״בְּתוּלָה״ לִגְזֵירָה שָׁוָה, שֶׁהֲרֵי אֲנִי קוֹרֵא בָּהּ ״אֲשֶׁר לֹא אוֹרָסָה״! מִסְתַּבְּרָא: הָא אִישְׁתַּנִּי גּוּפַהּ, וְהָא לָא אִישְׁתַּנִּי גּוּפַהּ.

The Gemara answers: It stands to reason that the phrase “Who was not betrothed” is utilized to derive a verbal analogy, and not to exclude one who was betrothed and divorced, as even after the divorce I can still read the phrase “A young woman who is a virgin” as applying to her. The Gemara asks: On the contrary, utilize the term virgin to derive a verbal analogy, as even if she is not a virgin, I can still read the phrase “Who was not betrothed” as applying to her. The Gemara answers: It stands to reason that the term “virgin” excludes a non-virgin, and the phrase “Who was not betrothed” is utilized to derive a verbal analogy, as this woman who engaged in relations, her body changed, and that woman who was betrothed and divorced, her body did not change, and therefore her status with regard to the fine should similarly not change.

וְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי הַאי סְבָרָא מְנָא לֵיהּ? נָפְקָא לֵיהּ מִדְּתַנְיָא: ״כֶּסֶף יִשְׁקוֹל כְּמוֹהַר הַבְּתוּלוֹת״, שֶׁיְּהֵא זֶה כְּמוֹהַר הַבְּתוּלוֹת, וּמוֹהַר הַבְּתוּלוֹת כָּזֶה.

The Gemara asks: And from where does Rabbi Yosei HaGelili derive this conclusion with regard to the amount of the payment for seduction and the type of money used in the payment for rape? The Gemara responds: He derives it from that which was taught in a baraita that it is written with regard to seduction: “He shall weigh money like the dowry of the virgins” (Exodus 22:16), from which it is derived that this fine for seduction will be like the dowry paid to the virgins elsewhere for rape, fifty silver coins, and the dowry paid to the virgins for rape will be like this fine for seduction in shekels.

קַשְׁיָא דְּרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אַדְּרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא. תְּרֵי תַּנָּאֵי וְאַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא.

§ The Gemara comments: It is difficult as there is a contradiction between one statement of Rabbi Akiva and another statement of Rabbi Akiva. In the mishna he ruled that the fine for the rape of a young woman who was betrothed and divorced is paid to the woman, and in the baraita he ruled that it is paid to her father. The Gemara answers: These are conflicting traditions of two tanna’im in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva.

בִּשְׁלָמָא רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא דְּמַתְנִיתִין, לָא אָתְיָא גְּזֵירָה שָׁוָה וּמַפְּקָא לֵיהּ לִקְרָא מִפְּשָׁטֵיהּ לִגְמָרֵי. אֶלָּא לְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא דְּבָרַיְיתָא, אָתְיָא גְּזֵירָה שָׁוָה וּמַפְּקָא מִפְּשָׁטֵיהּ לִגְמָרֵי.

The Gemara observes: Granted, the statement of Rabbi Akiva of the mishna is reasonable, as a verbal analogy does not come and divert the verse from its plain meaning entirely. The plain meaning of the phrase: “Who was not betrothed” is that there is a difference between a young woman who was betrothed, who receives payment of the fine, and one who was not, whose father receives payment of the fine. However, according to Rabbi Akiva of the baraita, does a verbal analogy come and divert the verse from its plain meaning entirely, and teach that there is no difference at all between a young woman who was betrothed and one who was not?

אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק: קְרִי בֵּיהּ ״אֲשֶׁר לֹא אֲרוּסָה״. אֲרוּסָה בַּת סְקִילָה הִיא! סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אָמֵינָא: הוֹאִיל וְחִידּוּשׁ הוּא שֶׁחִידְּשָׁה תּוֹרָה בִּקְנָס, אַף עַל גַּב דְּמִיקְּטִיל — מְשַׁלֵּם.

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: Interpret the verse as: Who is not betrothed. It does not mean that the young woman was not betrothed in the past, rather, that she is not currently betrothed. The Gemara asks: There is no need for a verse to derive that the rapist is exempt from paying a fine if the young woman is betrothed, as the rape of a betrothed young woman is punishable by stoning, and the rapist is certainly exempt from paying the fine. The Gemara answers: As it might enter your mind to say: Since it is a novel element that the Torah introduced with regard to the payment of a fine, even though he is killed he pays the fine. Therefore, the verse teaches us that one who is executed is exempt from payment of the fine.

וּלְרַבָּה דְּאָמַר חִידּוּשׁ הוּא שֶׁחִידְּשָׁה תּוֹרָה בִּקְנָס, אַף עַל גַּב דְּמִיקְּטִיל מְשַׁלֵּם, מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר? סָבַר לַהּ כְּרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא דְּמַתְנִיתִין.

The Gemara asks: And according to Rabba, who said that this is indeed the halakha: Since it is a novel element that the Torah introduced with regard to the payment of a fine, even though he is killed he pays the fine, what is there to say? What is derived from the verse that says that there is no fine if the young woman is betrothed? The Gemara answers: Rabba holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva of the mishna, who interpreted the verse as it is written, meaning that it is referring to one who was betrothed and divorced.

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: קְנָסָהּ לְמִי, לְאָבִיהָ. וְיֵשׁ אוֹמְרִים: לְעַצְמָהּ. לְעַצְמָהּ אַמַּאי! אָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא: הָכָא בְּנַעֲרָה שֶׁנִּתְאָרְסָה וְנִתְגָּרְשָׁה עָסְקִינַן, וְקָמִיפַּלְגִי בִּפְלוּגְתָּא דְּרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא דְּמַתְנִיתִין וְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא דְּבָרַיְיתָא.

The Sages taught: With regard to a young woman who was raped, to whom is her fine paid? It is paid to her father; and some say: It is paid to her. The Gemara asks: To her? Why? The verse explicitly states that the fine is paid to her father. Rav Ḥisda said: Here we are dealing with a young woman who was betrothed and divorced, and these tanna’im in the baraita disagree in the dispute between Rabbi Akiva of the mishna and Rabbi Akiva of the baraita, with regard to whom the rapist pays the fine in that case.

אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: בָּא עָלֶיהָ וּמֵתָה — פָּטוּר, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״וְנָתַן לַאֲבִי הַנַּעֲרָה״ — וְלֹא לַאֲבִי מֵתָה. מִלְּתָא דִּפְשִׁיטָא לֵיהּ לְאַבָּיֵי, מִיבַּעְיָא לֵיהּ לְרָבָא.

§ Abaye said: If one had intercourse with a young woman, and she died before he was sentenced, he is exempt from paying the fine, as it is stated: “And the man who lay with her shall give to the father of the young woman” (Deuteronomy 22:29), from which it is inferred, and not to the father of a dead girl. The Gemara comments: This matter that was obvious to Abaye was raised as a dilemma to Rava.

דְּבָעֵי רָבָא: יֵשׁ בֶּגֶר בַּקֶּבֶר, אוֹ אֵין בֶּגֶר בַּקֶּבֶר? יֵשׁ בֶּגֶר בַּקֶּבֶר — וְדִבְנָהּ הָוֵי, אוֹ דִלְמָא: אֵין בֶּגֶר בַּקֶּבֶר, וּדְאָבִיהָ הָוֵי.

As Rava raised a dilemma: Is there achievement of grown-woman status in the grave or is there not achievement of grown-woman status in the grave? The halakha is that if a young woman is raped and the rapist did not pay the fine until she became a grown woman, the rapist pays the fine to her and not to her father. Rava’s dilemma is in a case where a young woman dies and her rapist was convicted only after the time elapsed that were she alive she would have reached grown-woman status. Is there achievement of grown-woman status in the grave, and therefore she is entitled to the fine and it is the property of her son as his mother’s heir? Or perhaps there is no achievement of grown-woman status in the grave, and the fine is the property of her father, as she was a young woman when she died.