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Today's Daf Yomi

September 14, 2022 | ื™ืดื— ื‘ืืœื•ืœ ืชืฉืคืดื‘

  • This month's learning is dedicated by Debbie and Yossi Gevir to Rabbanit Michelle and the Hadran Zoom group for their kindness, support, and care during a medically challenging year.

  • Masechet Ketubot is sponsored by Erica and Rob Schwartz in honor of the 50th wedding anniversary of Erica's parents Sheira and Steve Schacter.

Ketubot 70

Today’s daf is sponsored by Judi Felber in loving memory of her father, Armin Abramson, Hershel Tzvi Shlomo Chaim ben Dina Sara and Pesach’s 5th yahrzeit. “He was always amazed by the topics the rabbis discussed and the details they considered.”
In the case brought before Ilfa regarding the stipulations made by a father on his deathbed for sustenance for his sons, we rule that no matter what his language, we give the sons the amount they need for food. How does this correspond to the ruling of Rabbi Meir that we take very seriously what people say on their deathbed? A Mishna in Gittin 59a says that when children are old enough to understand the meaning of a sale, their sale is valid, even before they reach the age of maturity. However, this is limited to a case where the father did not set up an agent to be in charge of their inheritance. This law is derived from our Mishna. Someone who takes a vow to forbid his wife to benefit from him, can he stay married to her? If so, how does she get sustenance? At what point do we insist he divorce her? What other types of vows that a husband can make against the wife are cause for divorce? How can the husband even make sure a vow to forbid her to benefit from him if he is obligated to provide her with food? In order to answer this question, the Gemara assumes that the Mishna is referring to a more unique case where the husband told her to keep her salary and he will not pay for her food. An alternative suggestion is that the case if when he vowed during their betrothal period, before he became obligated to pay for her food. and then the time came for him to marry her and he was then obligated to pay for her food. A third possibility is that she was betrothed and then they got married. This possibility is then rejected. According to the Mishna, if he vows that she not benefit for 30 days, he sets up someone else to feed her. How can this work if, in the end, she benefits indirectly from the husband as the other person acts as a messenger of the husband? Rav Huna explains that the intermediary must not be acting as his messenger but on his own as the husband says, “He who wants to provide her with food will not lose out.” Even though the husband will compensate him later, he is doing it by his own choice. A few questions are raised against Rav Huna but are answered.

ืจื‘ื™ ืžืื™ืจ ื”ื™ื ื“ืืžืจ ืžืฆื•ื” ืœืงื™ื™ื ื“ื‘ืจื™ ื”ืžืช

It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who says it is a mitzva to fulfill the instructions of the dead, as the mishna states that the third party must fulfill the instructions of the deceased, although the daughter is likely to do as she pleases after the third party fulfills his part. In this manner, Ilfa successfully answered the manโ€™s challenge.

ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ื—ืกื“ื ืืžืจ ืžืจ ืขื•ืงื‘ื ื”ืœื›ืชื ื‘ื™ืŸ ืฉืืžืจ ืชื ื• ื•ื‘ื™ืŸ ืฉืืžืจ ืืœ ืชืชื ื• ื ื•ืชื ื™ืŸ ืœื”ื ื›ืœ ืฆื•ืจื›ื ื”ื ืงื™ื™ืžื ืœืŸ ื”ืœื›ื” ื›ืจื‘ื™ ืžืื™ืจ ื“ืืžืจ ืžืฆื•ื” ืœืงื™ื™ื ื“ื‘ืจื™ ื”ืžืช ื”ื ื™ ืžื™ืœื™ ื‘ืžื™ืœื™ ืื—ืจื ื™ืชื ืื‘ืœ ื‘ื”ื ืžื™ื ื— ื ื™ื—ื ืœื™ื” ื•ื”ื ื“ืืžืจ ื”ื›ื™ ืœื–ืจื•ื–ื™ื ื”ื• ื”ื•ื ื“ืืชื

Rav แธคisda said that Mar Ukva said: The halakha is that whether he says: Give a shekel or whether he says: Do not give more than a shekel, the court gives the sons enough for all of their needs. The Gemara asks: But how could we disregard the fatherโ€™s words and give more, when the father said to give only a shekel? We maintain that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who says that it is a mitzva to fulfill the statements of the dead. How, then, may the fatherโ€™s instructions be ignored? The Gemara answers: This principle applies only in other matters, in which there is a mitzva to fulfill his wishes, but in this instance it is certainly preferable to him that his children be appropriately provided for. And the reason that he said this statement limiting the allowance is that he came to encourage them to adopt thrifty spending habits.

ืชื ืŸ ื”ืชื ื”ืคืขื•ื˜ื•ืช ืžืงื—ืŸ ืžืงื— ื•ืžืžื›ืจืŸ ืžื›ืจ ื‘ืžื˜ืœื˜ืœื™ื

We learned in a mishna there (Gittin 59a): With regard to children, their acquisitions are considered acquisitions and their sales are considered sales. This is the case with respect to movable properties, but not with respect to real estate.

ืืžืจ ืจืคืจื ืœื ืฉื ื• ืืœื ืฉืื™ืŸ ืฉื ืืคื•ื˜ืจื•ืคื•ืก ืื‘ืœ ื™ืฉ ืฉื ืืคื•ื˜ืจื•ืคื•ืก ืื™ืŸ ืžืงื—ืŸ ืžืงื— ื•ืื™ืŸ ืžืžื›ืจืŸ ืžื›ืจ

Rafram said: They taught this only if there is no steward [apotropos] overseeing the childrenโ€™s affairs. However, if there is a steward, the childrenโ€™s acquisitions are not considered acquisitions and their sales are not considered sales, even for movable property.

ืžืžืื™ ืžื“ืงืชื ื™ ืื™ืŸ ืžืขืฉื” ืงื˜ื ื” ื›ืœื•ื ื•ื“ืœืžื ื”ื™ื›ื ื“ืื™ื›ื ืฉืœื™ืฉ ืฉืื ื™ ืื ื›ืŸ ืœื™ืชื ื™ ืื‘ืœ ื‘ืงื˜ื ื” ื™ืขืฉื” ืฉืœื™ืฉ ืžื” ืฉื”ื•ืฉืœืฉ ื‘ื™ื“ื• ืžืื™ ืื™ืŸ ืžืขืฉื” ืงื˜ื ื” ื›ืœื•ื ืฉืžืข ืžื™ื ื” ืืคื™ืœื• ื‘ืขืœืžื

From where does he know this? From the fact that it teaches in the mishna here that even when there is a third party who functions as a steward, any action of a minor girl is nothing. The Gemara asks: And perhaps where there is a third party the halakha is different? It is possible that the act of a minor is discounted only when it clashes with the actions of an appointee who is past majority. The Gemara answers: If so, let it teach: But with regard to a minor girl, the third party should execute the agency that was entrusted in his power. What is the implication of the clause: Any action of a minor girl is nothing? Conclude from this that even generally, without a specific steward, a minor may not conduct transactions involving real estate.

ื”ื“ืจืŸ ืขืœืš ืžืฆื™ืืช ื”ืืฉื”

 

ืžืชื ื™ืณ ื”ืžื“ื™ืจ ืืช ืืฉืชื• ืžืœื™ื”ื ื•ืช ืœื• ืขื“ ืฉืœืฉื™ื ื™ื•ื ื™ืขืžื™ื“ ืคืจื ืก ื™ืชืจ ืžื™ื›ืŸ ื™ื•ืฆื™ื ื•ื™ืชืŸ ื›ืชื•ื‘ื”

MISHNA: With regard to one who vows and obligates his wife, prohibiting her from benefiting from him or his property, if his vow will remain in effect for up to thirty days, he must appoint a trustee [parnas] to support her. But if the vow will remain in effect for more than this amount of time, he must divorce her and give her the payment of her marriage contract.

ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื”ื•ื“ื” ืื•ืžืจ ื‘ื™ืฉืจืืœ ื—ื“ืฉ ืื—ื“ ื™ืงื™ื™ื ื•ืฉื ื™ื ื™ื•ืฆื™ื ื•ื™ืชืŸ ื›ืชื•ื‘ื” ื‘ื›ื”ืŸ ืฉื ื™ื ื™ืงื™ื™ื ื•ืฉืœืฉื” ื™ื•ืฆื™ื ื•ื™ืชืŸ ื›ืชื•ื‘ื”

Rabbi Yehuda says: If the husband is an Israelite, then if his vow will remain in effect for up to one month, he may maintain her as his wife; and if it will be two months, he must divorce her and give her the payment of her marriage contract. But if he is a priest, then he is given extra time: If the vow will remain in effect for up to two months, he may maintain her, and if it will be three months, he must divorce her and give her the payment of her marriage contract. The reason for this is that it is prohibited for a priest to marry a divorcรฉe, including his own ex-wife, and therefore if he divorces her and later regrets his decision he will not be able to take her back.

ื”ืžื“ื™ืจ ืืช ืืฉืชื• ืฉืœื ืชื˜ืขื•ื ืื—ื“ ืžื›ืœ ื”ืคื™ืจื•ืช ื™ื•ืฆื™ื ื•ื™ืชืŸ ื›ืชื•ื‘ื” ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื”ื•ื“ื” ืื•ืžืจ ื‘ื™ืฉืจืืœ ื™ื•ื ืื—ื“ ื™ืงื™ื™ื ืฉื ื™ื ื™ื•ืฆื™ื ื•ื™ืชืŸ ื›ืชื•ื‘ื” ื•ื‘ื›ื”ืŸ ืฉื ื™ื ื™ืงื™ื™ื ืฉืœืฉื” ื™ื•ืฆื™ื ื•ื™ืชืŸ ื›ืชื•ื‘ื”

One who vows and obligates his wife, requiring her not to taste a particular type of produce, must divorce her and give her the payment of her marriage contract. Rabbi Yehuda says: If he is an Israelite, then if the vow will remain in effect for one day he may maintain her as his wife, but if it will be two days he must divorce her and give her the payment of her marriage contract. And if he is a priest, then if the vow will be in effect for two days he may maintain her; for three days he must divorce her and give her the payment of her marriage contract.

ื”ืžื“ื™ืจ ืืช ืืฉืชื• ืฉืœื ืชืชืงืฉื˜ ื‘ืื—ื“ ืžื›ืœ ื”ืžื™ื ื™ืŸ ื™ื•ืฆื™ื ื•ื™ืชืŸ ื›ืชื•ื‘ื” ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ืกื™ ืื•ืžืจ ื‘ืขื ื™ื•ืช ืฉืœื ื ืชืŸ ืงืฆื‘ื” ื•ื‘ืขืฉื™ืจื•ืช ืฉืœืฉื™ื ื™ื•ื

One who vows and obligates his wife, requiring her not to adorn herself with a particular type of perfume, must divorce her and give her the payment of her marriage contract. Rabbi Yosei says that one must distinguish between different types of women: For poor women, this applies only when he did not establish a set amount of time for the vow, and for wealthy women, who are accustomed to adorning themselves more elaborately, if she is prohibited from doing so for thirty days, he must divorce her and give her the payment of her marriage contract.

ื’ืžืณ ื•ื›ื™ื•ืŸ ื“ืžืฉื•ืขื‘ื“ ืœื” ื”ื™ื›ื™ ืžืฆื™ ืžื“ื™ืจ ืœื” ื›ืœ ื›ืžื™ื ื™ื” ื“ืžืคืงืข ืœื” ืœืฉื™ืขื‘ื•ื“ื”

GEMARA: The Gemara questions the efficacy of a vow taken by the husband prohibiting his wife from deriving benefit from him: And since he is under a prior obligation to provide her support in accordance with what is written in the marriage contract, how can he vow prohibiting her from benefiting from him? Is it in his power to remove his obligation to her?

ื•ื”ืชื ืŸ ืงื•ื ื ืฉืื™ื ื™ ืขื•ืฉื” ืœืคื™ืš ืื™ื ื• ืฆืจื™ืš ืœื”ืคืจ ืืœืžื ื›ื™ื•ืŸ ื“ืžืฉืขื‘ื“ื ืœื™ื” ืœืื• ื›ืœ ื›ืžื™ื ื” ื“ืžืคืงืข ืœื™ื” ืœืฉื™ืขื‘ื•ื“ื™ื” ื”ื›ื ื ืžื™ ื›ื™ื•ืŸ ื“ืžืฉื•ืขื‘ื“ ืœื” ืœืื• ื›ืœ ื›ืžื™ื ื™ื” ื“ืžืคืงืข ืœื” ืœืฉื™ืขื‘ื•ื“ื”

But didnโ€™t we learn in a mishna (Nedarim 85a): If his wife said: It is forbidden like an offering [konam] that I will therefore not perform any work for the benefit of your mouth, he does not need to nullify her vow, since this vow does not take effect at all. Apparently, since she is under a prior obligation by power of the Sagesโ€™ ordinance to perform work for him, it is not in her power to remove her obligation to him. Here too, since he is under a prior obligation to provide support for her, it is not in his power to remove his obligation to her.

ืืœื ืžืชื•ืš ืฉื™ื›ื•ืœ ืœื•ืžืจ ืœื” ืฆืื™ ืžืขืฉื” ื™ื“ื™ืš ื‘ืžื–ื•ื ื•ืชื™ืš

Rather, one must say the following: Since he is able to say to her at any time: Spend your earnings to sustain yourself, meaning that he has the right to instruct her to support herself from her own earnings instead of supporting her himself,

ื ืขืฉื” ื›ืื•ืžืจ ืœื” ืฆืื™ ืžืขืฉื” ื™ื“ื™ืš ื‘ืžื–ื•ื ื•ืชื™ืš ื•ืื ืื™ืชื ืœื”ื ื“ืจื‘ ื”ื•ื ื ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ื“ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ื”ื•ื ื ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ื™ื›ื•ืœื” ืืฉื” ืฉืชืืžืจ ืœื‘ืขืœื” ืื™ื ื™ ื ื™ื–ื•ื ืช ื•ืื™ื ื™ ืขื•ืฉื” ืงื•ื ื ืฉืื ื™ ืขื•ืฉื” ืœืคื™ืš ืืžืื™ ืื™ื ื• ืฆืจื™ืš ืœื”ืคืจ ืœื™ืžื ืžืชื•ืš ืฉื™ื›ื•ืœื” ืœื•ืžืจ ืื™ื ื™ ื ื™ื–ื•ื ืช ื•ืื™ื ื™ ืขื•ืฉื” ื ืขืฉื” ื›ืžื™ ืฉืื•ืžืจืช ืœื• ืื™ื ื™ ื ื™ื–ื•ื ืช ื•ืื™ื ื™ ืขื•ืฉื”

it is considered as though he were in fact saying to her: Spend your earnings to sustain yourself. The Gemara raises a difficulty: And if it is so, i.e., that the halakha is in accordance with that statement that Rav Huna said that Rav said, as Rav Huna said that Rav said: A wife may say to her husband: I will not be sustained by you and, in turn, I will not work, i.e., you will not keep my earnings, then when she says: That which I perform for the benefit of your mouth will be forbidden like an offering [konam], why does he not need to nullify the vow? Here too, let us say: Since she is able to say: I will not be sustained by you and I will not work, it is considered as though she were in fact saying to him by her vow: I will not be sustained by you and I will not work, and he should therefore have to nullify the vow.

ืืœื ืœื ืชื™ืžื ื ืขืฉื” ืืœื ื‘ืื•ืžืจ ืœื” ืฆืื™ ืžืขืฉื” ื™ื“ื™ืš ื‘ืžื–ื•ื ื•ืชื™ืš

Rather, the Gemara retracts its previous interpretation in favor of the following: Do not say it is considered as though he said to her: Spend your earnings to sustain yourself. Rather, the mishna is referring to a case where he explicitly says to her: Spend your earnings to sustain yourself.

ืื™ ื”ื›ื™ ืคืจื ืก ืœืžื” ืœื” ื‘ื“ืœื ืกืคืงื” ืื™ ื‘ื“ืœื ืกืคืงื” ื”ื“ืจ ืงื•ืฉื™ื™ืŸ ืœื“ื•ื›ืชื™ื” ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ืืฉื™ ื‘ืžืกืคืงืช ืœื“ื‘ืจื™ื ื’ื“ื•ืœื™ื ื•ืื™ื ื” ืžืกืคืงืช ืœื“ื‘ืจื™ื ืงื˜ื ื™ื

The Gemara raises a difficulty: If so, if he provided for her sustenance by instructing her to spend her own earnings, why does she require a trustee? The Gemara answers: This is referring to a situation where the amount she earns is not enough for her needs. Therefore, the husband must appoint a trustee to provide the balance. The Gemara asks: If it is a case where the amount she earns is not enough for her needs, our difficulty is restored to its place: How can he prohibit her from benefiting from him if he is under a prior obligation to provide for her? Rav Ashi said: The mishna is referring to a case where her earnings are enough for large things, i.e., her basic requirements, but not enough for small things.

ื”ื ื™ ื“ื‘ืจื™ื ืงื˜ื ื™ื ื”ื™ื›ื™ ื“ืžื™ ืื™ ื“ืจื’ื™ืœื” ื‘ื”ื• ื”ื ืจื’ื™ืœื” ื‘ื”ื• ื•ืื™ ืœื ืจื’ื™ืœื” ื‘ื”ื• ืคืจื ืก ืœืžื” ืœื” ืœื ืฆืจื™ื›ื ื“ืจื’ื™ืœื” ื‘ื‘ื™ืช ื ืฉื ื•ืงื ืžื’ืœื’ืœื ื‘ื”ื“ื™ื” ื“ืืžืจื” ืœื™ื” ืขื“ ื”ืื™ื“ื ื ื“ืœื ืื“ืจืชืŸ ื’ืœื’ื™ืœื ื ื‘ื”ื“ืš ื”ืฉืชื ื“ืื“ืจืชืŸ ืœื ืžืฆื™ื ื ื“ืื™ื’ืœื’ืœ ื‘ื”ื“ืš

The Gemara asks: With regard to these small things for which her earnings are not enough, what are the circumstances? If the discussion involves a case where she is accustomed to them, then she is accustomed to them and they are equivalent to all other necessities, which he must provide. And if she is not accustomed to them, why does she require a trustee? The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary in a case where she was accustomed to such small provisions in her fatherโ€™s house, but she agreed to marry him and lower her lifestyle, and she had, until now, abided the lesser lifestyle and remained with him. For she says to him: Until now, when you did not vow to render it prohibited for me to benefit from you, I abided the lesser lifestyle and remained with you. However, now that you have vowed, I can no longer abide the lesser lifestyle and remain with you, and therefore I wish to revert to the conditions of my fatherโ€™s house.

ื•ืžืื™ ืฉื ื ืขื“ ืฉืœืฉื™ื ื™ื•ื ืขื“ ืฉืœืฉื™ื ื™ื•ื ืœื ืฉืžืขื™ ื‘ื” ืื™ื ืฉื™ ื•ืœื ื–ื™ืœื ื‘ื” ืžื™ืœืชื ื˜ืคื™ ืฉืžืขื™ ื‘ื” ืื™ื ืฉื™ ื•ื–ื™ืœื ื‘ื” ืžื™ืœืชื

The Gemara poses a question: And what is different about the time period mentioned in the mishna: Up to thirty days? The Gemara answers: If up to thirty days have passed, this is a short enough amount of time that people do not hear about her, and the matter of her receiving her sustenance through an intermediary is therefore not demeaning for her. However, if the vow lasts longer than this, people do hear about her, and the matter is demeaning for her. The husband must therefore decide if he wants to divorce her or sustain her in the appropriate fashion.

ืื™ื‘ืขื™ืช ืื™ืžื ืฉื”ื“ื™ืจื” ื›ืฉื”ื™ื ืืจื•ืกื” ืืจื•ืกื” ืžื™ ืื™ืช ืœื” ืžื–ื•ื ื™ ืฉื”ื’ื™ืข ื–ืžืŸ ื•ืœื ื ืฉืื• ื“ืชื ืŸ ื”ื’ื™ืข ื–ืžืŸ ื•ืœื ื ืฉืื• ืื•ื›ืœื•ืช ืžืฉืœื• ื•ืื•ื›ืœื•ืช ื‘ืชืจื•ืžื”

The Gemara suggests an alternative answer: If you wish, say that the husband is under no obligation to sustain her because the case discussed in the mishna was where he vowed and obligated her when she was still a betrothed woman, and therefore he was not yet duty-bound to provide her with sustenance. The Gemara is puzzled by this explanation: Does a betrothed woman have any right to sustenance from her husband at all? The Gemara answers: The circumstance referred to is when the arranged time for the marriage had arrived and they had not yet gotten married. As we learned in a mishna (57a): If the time arrived and they had not yet gotten married, such women may eat food from his property, and if their husbands were priests they may partake of teruma.

ื•ืžืื™ ืฉื ื ืขื“ ืฉืœืฉื™ื ื™ื•ื ืขื“ ืฉืœืฉื™ื ื™ื•ื ืขื‘ื™ื“ ืฉืœื™ื— ืฉืœื™ื—ื•ืชื™ื” ื˜ืคื™ ืœื ืขื‘ื™ื“ ืฉืœื™ื— ืฉืœื™ื—ื•ืชื™ื”

The Gemara asks: But if so, what is different if the vow will remain in effect for up to thirty days or longer? The Gemara answers: For up to thirty days, the agent will carry out his agency effectively and take proper care of her needs. If the vow lasts longer, the agent will not fully carry out his agency but will begin to neglect her, until she cannot bear the situation any longer.

ื•ืื™ื‘ืขื™ืช ืื™ืžื ืฉื”ื“ื™ืจื” ื›ืฉื”ื™ื ืืจื•ืกื” ื•ื ื™ืฉืืช ื ื™ืฉืืช ื”ื ืกื‘ืจื” ื•ืงื‘ืœื” ื“ืืžืจื” ื›ืกื‘ื•ืจื” ืื ื™ ืฉืื ื™ ื™ื›ื•ืœื” ืœืงื‘ืœ ืขื›ืฉื™ื• ืื™ืŸ ืื ื™ ื™ื›ื•ืœื” ืœืงื‘ืœ

And if you wish, say that he vowed and obligated her when she was still a betrothed woman and she subsequently married him, and therefore he is obligated to provide her sustenance. The Gemara is puzzled: If she married him after his vow, she considered the matter and accepted it upon herself. Why then is he forced to divorce her? The Gemara answers: The case is when she says: I thought that I could accept this manner of living, but now I see that I cannot accept it.

ืื™ืžืจ ื“ืืžืจื™ื ืŸ ื”ื›ื™ ื’ื‘ื™ ืžื•ืžื™ืŸ ืœืขื ื™ืŸ ืžื–ื•ื ื™ ืžื™ ืืžืจื™ื ืŸ ื”ื›ื™ ืืœื ืžื—ื•ื•ืจืชื ื›ื“ืฉื ื™ื ืŸ ืžืขื™ืงืจื

The Gemara raises a difficulty: You can say that we say so, that if either the husband or the wife suffers from a physical blemish, the other can demand a divorce even after agreeing to the marriage under these conditions. This is with regard to blemishes, but with regard to sustenance can we say so? Rather, it is clear as we initially answered: The mishna discusses either a case where he told her to support herself from her own earnings and she had accepted a lower standard of living while she was with him, or a case where he took the vow when she was betrothed, and now the appointed time for the marriage has arrived and they have not yet gotten married.

ืขื“ ืฉืœืฉื™ื ื™ื•ื ื™ืขืžื™ื“ ืคืจื ืก ื•ืคืจื ืก ืœืื• ืฉืœื™ื—ื•ืชื™ื” ืงื ืขื‘ื™ื“ ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ื”ื•ื ื ื‘ืื•ืžืจ ื›ืœ ื”ื–ืŸ ืื™ื ื• ืžืคืกื™ื“

ยง The mishna states that if his vow will remain in effect for up to thirty days he must appoint a trustee to provide sustenance to his wife. The Gemara is puzzled by this ruling: And does a trustee not perform the husbandโ€™s agency? If through his vow he has rendered it prohibited for her to derive benefit from him, how can he provide for her through the trustee? An action performed by an agent is considered to have been performed by the principal. Rav Huna said: The trustee discussed in the mishna was not actually appointed as an agent. Rather, the mishna is referring to one who says in general terms: Whoever sustains my wife will not lose out. Thus, anyone who complies does so of his own choice, although the husband will later compensate him. Therefore, the wife is not benefiting directly from the husband.

ื•ื›ื™ ืืžืจ ื”ื›ื™ ืœืื• ืฉืœื™ื—ื•ืชื™ื” ืงืขื‘ื™ื“ ื•ื”ืชื ืŸ ืžื™ ืฉื”ื™ื” ืžื•ืฉืœืš ื‘ื‘ื•ืจ ื•ืืžืจ ื›ืœ ื”ืฉื•ืžืข ืงื•ืœื• ื™ื›ืชื•ื‘ ื’ื˜ ืœืืฉืชื• ื”ืจื™ ืืœื• ื™ื›ืชื‘ื• ื•ื™ืชื ื•

The Gemara poses a question: And when a husband says this, is the one who responds not performing the husbandโ€™s agency? But didnโ€™t we learn in a mishna (Gittin 66a): With regard to one who was cast into a pit and said that whoever hears his voice should write a bill of divorce for his wife, saying this out of concern that he might not be rescued and that she would not be able to remarry or would be required to enter into levirate marriage, those who heard him should write and give her a bill of divorce? This ruling indicates that they are considered his agents based on his instructions, as otherwise they would not be able to write a bill of divorce on his behalf. The similarly formulated statement here should therefore also endow the trustee with the status of an agent.

ื”ื›ื™ ื”ืฉืชื ื”ืชื ืงืืžืจ ื™ื›ืชื•ื‘ ื”ื›ื ืžื™ ืงืืžืจ ื™ื–ื•ืŸ ื›ืœ ื”ื–ืŸ ืงืืžืจ

The Gemara refutes this claim: How can these cases be compared? There, in the case of a bill of divorce, he says that whoever hears his voice should write a bill of divorce, which is a command, and therefore those who hear him are considered his agents. Here, however, does he say that anyone should sustain his wife? He merely says: Whoever sustains her will not lose out, which is a general statement.

ื•ื”ื ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ืืžื™ ื‘ื“ืœื™ืงื” ื”ืชื™ืจื• ืœื•ืžืจ ื›ืœ ื”ืžื›ื‘ื” ืื™ื ื• ืžืคืกื™ื“ ื‘ื“ืœื™ืงื” ืœืžืขื•ื˜ื™ ืžืื™ ืœืื• ืœืžืขื•ื˜ื™ ื›ื™ ื”ืื™ ื’ื•ื•ื ื ืœื ืœืžืขื•ื˜ื™ ืฉืืจ ืื™ืกื•ืจื™ื ื“ืฉื‘ืช

The Gemara raises a difficulty: But Rabbi Ami said: In the case of a fire that broke out on Shabbat, the Sages permitted him to say in the presence of gentiles: Whoever extinguishes this fire will not lose out. From this it can be inferred that the phrase: In the case of a fire, comes to exclude what? Does it not exclude a case like this? It would seem that it was only in the case of a fire, when there are several extenuating factors, that the Sages permitted the use of such an expression without treating it as the appointment of an agent. The Gemara refutes this: No, this ruling serves to exclude other prohibitions of Shabbat.

ืžืชื™ื‘ ืจื‘ื” ื”ืžื•ื“ืจ ื”ื ืื” ืžื—ื‘ื™ืจื• ื•ืื™ืŸ ืœื• ืžื” ื™ืื›ืœ ื™ืœืš ืืฆืœ ื—ื ื•ื ื™ ื”ืจื’ื™ืœ ืืฆืœื• ื•ื™ืืžืจ ืœื• ืื™ืฉ ืคืœื•ื ื™ ืžื•ื“ืจ ื”ื ืื” ืžืžื ื™ ื•ืื™ื ื™ ื™ื•ื“ืข ืžื” ืืขืฉื” ืœื• ื”ื•ื ื ื•ืชืŸ ืœื• ื•ื‘ื ื•ื ื•ื˜ืœ ืžื–ื” ื”ื›ื™ ื”ื•ื ื“ืฉืจื™ ืื‘ืœ ื›ืœ ื”ื–ืŸ ืื™ื ื• ืžืคืกื™ื“ ืœื

Rabba raised an objection from a mishna (Nedarim 43a): In the case of one prohibited by a vow from deriving benefit from another because of a vow the other took, and he does not have anything to eat, if the one who made the vow wants to help him but is unable to do so due to the vow, he may go to a storekeeper with whom he is familiar and say to him: So-and-so is prohibited by a vow from deriving benefit from me, and I do not know what I can do for him. The storekeeper subsequently gives food to him, and later comes and takes payment from this person who approached him. Rabba infers: This method of indirectly hinting is what is permitted, but he may not say: Whoever sustains the man will not lose out, as a declaration of that kind would make the storekeeper his agent.

ืœื ืžื™ื‘ืขื™ื ืงืืžืจ ืœื ืžื™ื‘ืขื™ื ื›ืœ ื”ื–ืŸ ืื™ื ื• ืžืคืกื™ื“ ื“ืœืขืœืžื ืงืืžืจ ืื‘ืœ ื”ืื™ ื›ื™ื•ืŸ ื“ืจื’ื™ืœ ืืฆืœื• ื•ืงืื–ื™ืœ ืงืืžืจ ืœื™ื” ื›ืžืืŸ ื“ืืžืจ ืœื™ื” ื–ื™ืœ ื”ื‘ ืœื™ื” ืืช ื“ืžื™ ืงื ืžืฉืžืข ืœืŸ

The Gemara refutes this claim: The tanna is speaking utilizing the style of: It is not necessary, and he means the following: It is not necessary to say that he is permitted to say in general terms: Whoever sustains so-and-so will not lose out, as by doing so he is speaking to everyone and therefore does not appoint a specific agent. But this storekeeper, since the one who took the oath is familiar with him and he goes and says this to him, might be considered like the one who said to him: Go, give him yourself. The mishna therefore teaches us that since the one who made the vow did not issue an explicit command, the storekeeper is not considered his agent.

ื’ื•ืคื ื”ืžื•ื“ืจ ื”ื ืื” ืžื—ื‘ื™ืจื• ื•ืื™ืŸ ืœื• ืžื” ื™ืื›ืœ ื”ื•ืœืš ืืฆืœ ื—ื ื•ื ื™ ื”ืจื’ื™ืœ ืืฆืœื• ื•ืื•ืžืจ ืœื• ืื™ืฉ ืคืœื•ื ื™ ืžื•ื“ืจ ื”ื ืื” ืžืžื ื™ ื•ืื™ื ื™ ื™ื•ื“ืข ืžื” ืืขืฉื” ืœื• ื”ื•ื ื ื•ืชืŸ ืœื• ื•ื‘ื ื•ื ื•ื˜ืœ ืžื–ื” ื‘ื™ืชื• ืœื‘ื ื•ืช ื•ื’ื“ื™ืจื• ืœื’ื“ื•ืจ ื•ืฉื“ื”ื• ืœืงืฆื•ืจ ื”ื•ืœืš ืืฆืœ ืคื•ืขืœื™ืŸ ื”ืจื’ื™ืœื™ืŸ ืืฆืœื• ื•ืื•ืžืจ ืœื”ืŸ ืื™ืฉ ืคืœื•ื ื™ ืžื•ื“ืจ ื”ื ืื” ืžืžื ื™ ื•ืื™ื ื™ ื™ื•ื“ืข ืžื” ืืขืฉื” ืœื• ื”ืŸ ืขื•ืฉื™ืŸ ืขืžื• ื•ื‘ืื™ืŸ ื•ื ื•ื˜ืœื™ื ืฉื›ืจืŸ ืžื–ื”

ยง Since it mentioned the above case, the Gemara returns to discuss the matter itself: In the case of one prohibited by a vow from deriving benefit from another because of a vow the other took, and he does not have anything to eat, the one who took the vow may go to a storekeeper with whom he is familiar and say to him: So-and-so is prohibited by a vow from deriving benefit from me, and I do not know what I can do for him. The storekeeper gives food to him, and later comes and takes payment from this one who approached him. Similarly, if the subject of the vow needed someone to build his house, or to erect his fence, or to reap his field, and the one who took the vow wants to help him, he should go to workers with whom he is familiar and say to them: So-and-so is prohibited by a vow from deriving benefit from me, and I do not know what I can do for him. They subsequently perform work for the subject of the vow, and they come and take their wages from this person who spoke to them.

ื”ื™ื• ืžื”ืœื›ื™ืŸ ื‘ื“ืจืš ื•ืื™ืŸ ืขืžื• ืžื” ื™ืื›ืœ ื ื•ืชืŸ ืœืื—ืจ ืœืฉื•ื ืžืชื ื” ื•ื”ืœื” ื ื•ื˜ืœ ื•ืื•ื›ืœ ื•ืžื•ืชืจ ื•ืื ืื™ืŸ ืฉื ืื—ืจ ืžื ื™ื— ืขืœ ื’ื‘ื™ ื”ืกืœืข ืื• ืขืœ ื’ื‘ื™ ื”ื’ื“ืจ ื•ืื•ืžืจ ื”ืจื™ ื”ืŸ ืžื•ืคืงืจื™ืŸ ืœื›ืœ ืžื™ ืฉื™ื—ืคื•ืฅ ื•ื”ืœื” ื ื•ื˜ืœ ื•ืื•ื›ืœ ื•ืžื•ืชืจ ื•ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ืกื™ ืื•ืกืจ ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื ืžืื™ ื˜ืขืžื ื“ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ืกื™ ื’ื–ื™ืจื” ืžืฉื•ื

If the two were walking along the way, and the one prohibited from benefiting from the other does not have anything with him to eat, the one who took the vow may give food to a different person as a gift, and this one takes it and eats, and this arrangement is permitted, as he did not give the food directly to him. And if there is no other person there apart from the two of them, he should place the items on a rock or on a fence and say: They are hereby declared ownerless for anyone who wants them, and this one takes the food items and eats them, and this too is permitted. But Rabbi Yosei prohibits this practice. Rava said: What is the reason for this ruling of Rabbi Yosei? It is a rabbinic decree due to

  • This month's learning is dedicated by Debbie and Yossi Gevir to Rabbanit Michelle and the Hadran Zoom group for their kindness, support, and care during a medically challenging year.

  • Masechet Ketubot is sponsored by Erica and Rob Schwartz in honor of the 50th wedding anniversary of Erica's parents Sheira and Steve Schacter.

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Ketubot 70

The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria

Ketubot 70

ืจื‘ื™ ืžืื™ืจ ื”ื™ื ื“ืืžืจ ืžืฆื•ื” ืœืงื™ื™ื ื“ื‘ืจื™ ื”ืžืช

It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who says it is a mitzva to fulfill the instructions of the dead, as the mishna states that the third party must fulfill the instructions of the deceased, although the daughter is likely to do as she pleases after the third party fulfills his part. In this manner, Ilfa successfully answered the manโ€™s challenge.

ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ื—ืกื“ื ืืžืจ ืžืจ ืขื•ืงื‘ื ื”ืœื›ืชื ื‘ื™ืŸ ืฉืืžืจ ืชื ื• ื•ื‘ื™ืŸ ืฉืืžืจ ืืœ ืชืชื ื• ื ื•ืชื ื™ืŸ ืœื”ื ื›ืœ ืฆื•ืจื›ื ื”ื ืงื™ื™ืžื ืœืŸ ื”ืœื›ื” ื›ืจื‘ื™ ืžืื™ืจ ื“ืืžืจ ืžืฆื•ื” ืœืงื™ื™ื ื“ื‘ืจื™ ื”ืžืช ื”ื ื™ ืžื™ืœื™ ื‘ืžื™ืœื™ ืื—ืจื ื™ืชื ืื‘ืœ ื‘ื”ื ืžื™ื ื— ื ื™ื—ื ืœื™ื” ื•ื”ื ื“ืืžืจ ื”ื›ื™ ืœื–ืจื•ื–ื™ื ื”ื• ื”ื•ื ื“ืืชื

Rav แธคisda said that Mar Ukva said: The halakha is that whether he says: Give a shekel or whether he says: Do not give more than a shekel, the court gives the sons enough for all of their needs. The Gemara asks: But how could we disregard the fatherโ€™s words and give more, when the father said to give only a shekel? We maintain that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who says that it is a mitzva to fulfill the statements of the dead. How, then, may the fatherโ€™s instructions be ignored? The Gemara answers: This principle applies only in other matters, in which there is a mitzva to fulfill his wishes, but in this instance it is certainly preferable to him that his children be appropriately provided for. And the reason that he said this statement limiting the allowance is that he came to encourage them to adopt thrifty spending habits.

ืชื ืŸ ื”ืชื ื”ืคืขื•ื˜ื•ืช ืžืงื—ืŸ ืžืงื— ื•ืžืžื›ืจืŸ ืžื›ืจ ื‘ืžื˜ืœื˜ืœื™ื

We learned in a mishna there (Gittin 59a): With regard to children, their acquisitions are considered acquisitions and their sales are considered sales. This is the case with respect to movable properties, but not with respect to real estate.

ืืžืจ ืจืคืจื ืœื ืฉื ื• ืืœื ืฉืื™ืŸ ืฉื ืืคื•ื˜ืจื•ืคื•ืก ืื‘ืœ ื™ืฉ ืฉื ืืคื•ื˜ืจื•ืคื•ืก ืื™ืŸ ืžืงื—ืŸ ืžืงื— ื•ืื™ืŸ ืžืžื›ืจืŸ ืžื›ืจ

Rafram said: They taught this only if there is no steward [apotropos] overseeing the childrenโ€™s affairs. However, if there is a steward, the childrenโ€™s acquisitions are not considered acquisitions and their sales are not considered sales, even for movable property.

ืžืžืื™ ืžื“ืงืชื ื™ ืื™ืŸ ืžืขืฉื” ืงื˜ื ื” ื›ืœื•ื ื•ื“ืœืžื ื”ื™ื›ื ื“ืื™ื›ื ืฉืœื™ืฉ ืฉืื ื™ ืื ื›ืŸ ืœื™ืชื ื™ ืื‘ืœ ื‘ืงื˜ื ื” ื™ืขืฉื” ืฉืœื™ืฉ ืžื” ืฉื”ื•ืฉืœืฉ ื‘ื™ื“ื• ืžืื™ ืื™ืŸ ืžืขืฉื” ืงื˜ื ื” ื›ืœื•ื ืฉืžืข ืžื™ื ื” ืืคื™ืœื• ื‘ืขืœืžื

From where does he know this? From the fact that it teaches in the mishna here that even when there is a third party who functions as a steward, any action of a minor girl is nothing. The Gemara asks: And perhaps where there is a third party the halakha is different? It is possible that the act of a minor is discounted only when it clashes with the actions of an appointee who is past majority. The Gemara answers: If so, let it teach: But with regard to a minor girl, the third party should execute the agency that was entrusted in his power. What is the implication of the clause: Any action of a minor girl is nothing? Conclude from this that even generally, without a specific steward, a minor may not conduct transactions involving real estate.

ื”ื“ืจืŸ ืขืœืš ืžืฆื™ืืช ื”ืืฉื”

 

ืžืชื ื™ืณ ื”ืžื“ื™ืจ ืืช ืืฉืชื• ืžืœื™ื”ื ื•ืช ืœื• ืขื“ ืฉืœืฉื™ื ื™ื•ื ื™ืขืžื™ื“ ืคืจื ืก ื™ืชืจ ืžื™ื›ืŸ ื™ื•ืฆื™ื ื•ื™ืชืŸ ื›ืชื•ื‘ื”

MISHNA: With regard to one who vows and obligates his wife, prohibiting her from benefiting from him or his property, if his vow will remain in effect for up to thirty days, he must appoint a trustee [parnas] to support her. But if the vow will remain in effect for more than this amount of time, he must divorce her and give her the payment of her marriage contract.

ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื”ื•ื“ื” ืื•ืžืจ ื‘ื™ืฉืจืืœ ื—ื“ืฉ ืื—ื“ ื™ืงื™ื™ื ื•ืฉื ื™ื ื™ื•ืฆื™ื ื•ื™ืชืŸ ื›ืชื•ื‘ื” ื‘ื›ื”ืŸ ืฉื ื™ื ื™ืงื™ื™ื ื•ืฉืœืฉื” ื™ื•ืฆื™ื ื•ื™ืชืŸ ื›ืชื•ื‘ื”

Rabbi Yehuda says: If the husband is an Israelite, then if his vow will remain in effect for up to one month, he may maintain her as his wife; and if it will be two months, he must divorce her and give her the payment of her marriage contract. But if he is a priest, then he is given extra time: If the vow will remain in effect for up to two months, he may maintain her, and if it will be three months, he must divorce her and give her the payment of her marriage contract. The reason for this is that it is prohibited for a priest to marry a divorcรฉe, including his own ex-wife, and therefore if he divorces her and later regrets his decision he will not be able to take her back.

ื”ืžื“ื™ืจ ืืช ืืฉืชื• ืฉืœื ืชื˜ืขื•ื ืื—ื“ ืžื›ืœ ื”ืคื™ืจื•ืช ื™ื•ืฆื™ื ื•ื™ืชืŸ ื›ืชื•ื‘ื” ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื”ื•ื“ื” ืื•ืžืจ ื‘ื™ืฉืจืืœ ื™ื•ื ืื—ื“ ื™ืงื™ื™ื ืฉื ื™ื ื™ื•ืฆื™ื ื•ื™ืชืŸ ื›ืชื•ื‘ื” ื•ื‘ื›ื”ืŸ ืฉื ื™ื ื™ืงื™ื™ื ืฉืœืฉื” ื™ื•ืฆื™ื ื•ื™ืชืŸ ื›ืชื•ื‘ื”

One who vows and obligates his wife, requiring her not to taste a particular type of produce, must divorce her and give her the payment of her marriage contract. Rabbi Yehuda says: If he is an Israelite, then if the vow will remain in effect for one day he may maintain her as his wife, but if it will be two days he must divorce her and give her the payment of her marriage contract. And if he is a priest, then if the vow will be in effect for two days he may maintain her; for three days he must divorce her and give her the payment of her marriage contract.

ื”ืžื“ื™ืจ ืืช ืืฉืชื• ืฉืœื ืชืชืงืฉื˜ ื‘ืื—ื“ ืžื›ืœ ื”ืžื™ื ื™ืŸ ื™ื•ืฆื™ื ื•ื™ืชืŸ ื›ืชื•ื‘ื” ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ืกื™ ืื•ืžืจ ื‘ืขื ื™ื•ืช ืฉืœื ื ืชืŸ ืงืฆื‘ื” ื•ื‘ืขืฉื™ืจื•ืช ืฉืœืฉื™ื ื™ื•ื

One who vows and obligates his wife, requiring her not to adorn herself with a particular type of perfume, must divorce her and give her the payment of her marriage contract. Rabbi Yosei says that one must distinguish between different types of women: For poor women, this applies only when he did not establish a set amount of time for the vow, and for wealthy women, who are accustomed to adorning themselves more elaborately, if she is prohibited from doing so for thirty days, he must divorce her and give her the payment of her marriage contract.

ื’ืžืณ ื•ื›ื™ื•ืŸ ื“ืžืฉื•ืขื‘ื“ ืœื” ื”ื™ื›ื™ ืžืฆื™ ืžื“ื™ืจ ืœื” ื›ืœ ื›ืžื™ื ื™ื” ื“ืžืคืงืข ืœื” ืœืฉื™ืขื‘ื•ื“ื”

GEMARA: The Gemara questions the efficacy of a vow taken by the husband prohibiting his wife from deriving benefit from him: And since he is under a prior obligation to provide her support in accordance with what is written in the marriage contract, how can he vow prohibiting her from benefiting from him? Is it in his power to remove his obligation to her?

ื•ื”ืชื ืŸ ืงื•ื ื ืฉืื™ื ื™ ืขื•ืฉื” ืœืคื™ืš ืื™ื ื• ืฆืจื™ืš ืœื”ืคืจ ืืœืžื ื›ื™ื•ืŸ ื“ืžืฉืขื‘ื“ื ืœื™ื” ืœืื• ื›ืœ ื›ืžื™ื ื” ื“ืžืคืงืข ืœื™ื” ืœืฉื™ืขื‘ื•ื“ื™ื” ื”ื›ื ื ืžื™ ื›ื™ื•ืŸ ื“ืžืฉื•ืขื‘ื“ ืœื” ืœืื• ื›ืœ ื›ืžื™ื ื™ื” ื“ืžืคืงืข ืœื” ืœืฉื™ืขื‘ื•ื“ื”

But didnโ€™t we learn in a mishna (Nedarim 85a): If his wife said: It is forbidden like an offering [konam] that I will therefore not perform any work for the benefit of your mouth, he does not need to nullify her vow, since this vow does not take effect at all. Apparently, since she is under a prior obligation by power of the Sagesโ€™ ordinance to perform work for him, it is not in her power to remove her obligation to him. Here too, since he is under a prior obligation to provide support for her, it is not in his power to remove his obligation to her.

ืืœื ืžืชื•ืš ืฉื™ื›ื•ืœ ืœื•ืžืจ ืœื” ืฆืื™ ืžืขืฉื” ื™ื“ื™ืš ื‘ืžื–ื•ื ื•ืชื™ืš

Rather, one must say the following: Since he is able to say to her at any time: Spend your earnings to sustain yourself, meaning that he has the right to instruct her to support herself from her own earnings instead of supporting her himself,

ื ืขืฉื” ื›ืื•ืžืจ ืœื” ืฆืื™ ืžืขืฉื” ื™ื“ื™ืš ื‘ืžื–ื•ื ื•ืชื™ืš ื•ืื ืื™ืชื ืœื”ื ื“ืจื‘ ื”ื•ื ื ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ื“ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ื”ื•ื ื ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ื™ื›ื•ืœื” ืืฉื” ืฉืชืืžืจ ืœื‘ืขืœื” ืื™ื ื™ ื ื™ื–ื•ื ืช ื•ืื™ื ื™ ืขื•ืฉื” ืงื•ื ื ืฉืื ื™ ืขื•ืฉื” ืœืคื™ืš ืืžืื™ ืื™ื ื• ืฆืจื™ืš ืœื”ืคืจ ืœื™ืžื ืžืชื•ืš ืฉื™ื›ื•ืœื” ืœื•ืžืจ ืื™ื ื™ ื ื™ื–ื•ื ืช ื•ืื™ื ื™ ืขื•ืฉื” ื ืขืฉื” ื›ืžื™ ืฉืื•ืžืจืช ืœื• ืื™ื ื™ ื ื™ื–ื•ื ืช ื•ืื™ื ื™ ืขื•ืฉื”

it is considered as though he were in fact saying to her: Spend your earnings to sustain yourself. The Gemara raises a difficulty: And if it is so, i.e., that the halakha is in accordance with that statement that Rav Huna said that Rav said, as Rav Huna said that Rav said: A wife may say to her husband: I will not be sustained by you and, in turn, I will not work, i.e., you will not keep my earnings, then when she says: That which I perform for the benefit of your mouth will be forbidden like an offering [konam], why does he not need to nullify the vow? Here too, let us say: Since she is able to say: I will not be sustained by you and I will not work, it is considered as though she were in fact saying to him by her vow: I will not be sustained by you and I will not work, and he should therefore have to nullify the vow.

ืืœื ืœื ืชื™ืžื ื ืขืฉื” ืืœื ื‘ืื•ืžืจ ืœื” ืฆืื™ ืžืขืฉื” ื™ื“ื™ืš ื‘ืžื–ื•ื ื•ืชื™ืš

Rather, the Gemara retracts its previous interpretation in favor of the following: Do not say it is considered as though he said to her: Spend your earnings to sustain yourself. Rather, the mishna is referring to a case where he explicitly says to her: Spend your earnings to sustain yourself.

ืื™ ื”ื›ื™ ืคืจื ืก ืœืžื” ืœื” ื‘ื“ืœื ืกืคืงื” ืื™ ื‘ื“ืœื ืกืคืงื” ื”ื“ืจ ืงื•ืฉื™ื™ืŸ ืœื“ื•ื›ืชื™ื” ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ืืฉื™ ื‘ืžืกืคืงืช ืœื“ื‘ืจื™ื ื’ื“ื•ืœื™ื ื•ืื™ื ื” ืžืกืคืงืช ืœื“ื‘ืจื™ื ืงื˜ื ื™ื

The Gemara raises a difficulty: If so, if he provided for her sustenance by instructing her to spend her own earnings, why does she require a trustee? The Gemara answers: This is referring to a situation where the amount she earns is not enough for her needs. Therefore, the husband must appoint a trustee to provide the balance. The Gemara asks: If it is a case where the amount she earns is not enough for her needs, our difficulty is restored to its place: How can he prohibit her from benefiting from him if he is under a prior obligation to provide for her? Rav Ashi said: The mishna is referring to a case where her earnings are enough for large things, i.e., her basic requirements, but not enough for small things.

ื”ื ื™ ื“ื‘ืจื™ื ืงื˜ื ื™ื ื”ื™ื›ื™ ื“ืžื™ ืื™ ื“ืจื’ื™ืœื” ื‘ื”ื• ื”ื ืจื’ื™ืœื” ื‘ื”ื• ื•ืื™ ืœื ืจื’ื™ืœื” ื‘ื”ื• ืคืจื ืก ืœืžื” ืœื” ืœื ืฆืจื™ื›ื ื“ืจื’ื™ืœื” ื‘ื‘ื™ืช ื ืฉื ื•ืงื ืžื’ืœื’ืœื ื‘ื”ื“ื™ื” ื“ืืžืจื” ืœื™ื” ืขื“ ื”ืื™ื“ื ื ื“ืœื ืื“ืจืชืŸ ื’ืœื’ื™ืœื ื ื‘ื”ื“ืš ื”ืฉืชื ื“ืื“ืจืชืŸ ืœื ืžืฆื™ื ื ื“ืื™ื’ืœื’ืœ ื‘ื”ื“ืš

The Gemara asks: With regard to these small things for which her earnings are not enough, what are the circumstances? If the discussion involves a case where she is accustomed to them, then she is accustomed to them and they are equivalent to all other necessities, which he must provide. And if she is not accustomed to them, why does she require a trustee? The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary in a case where she was accustomed to such small provisions in her fatherโ€™s house, but she agreed to marry him and lower her lifestyle, and she had, until now, abided the lesser lifestyle and remained with him. For she says to him: Until now, when you did not vow to render it prohibited for me to benefit from you, I abided the lesser lifestyle and remained with you. However, now that you have vowed, I can no longer abide the lesser lifestyle and remain with you, and therefore I wish to revert to the conditions of my fatherโ€™s house.

ื•ืžืื™ ืฉื ื ืขื“ ืฉืœืฉื™ื ื™ื•ื ืขื“ ืฉืœืฉื™ื ื™ื•ื ืœื ืฉืžืขื™ ื‘ื” ืื™ื ืฉื™ ื•ืœื ื–ื™ืœื ื‘ื” ืžื™ืœืชื ื˜ืคื™ ืฉืžืขื™ ื‘ื” ืื™ื ืฉื™ ื•ื–ื™ืœื ื‘ื” ืžื™ืœืชื

The Gemara poses a question: And what is different about the time period mentioned in the mishna: Up to thirty days? The Gemara answers: If up to thirty days have passed, this is a short enough amount of time that people do not hear about her, and the matter of her receiving her sustenance through an intermediary is therefore not demeaning for her. However, if the vow lasts longer than this, people do hear about her, and the matter is demeaning for her. The husband must therefore decide if he wants to divorce her or sustain her in the appropriate fashion.

ืื™ื‘ืขื™ืช ืื™ืžื ืฉื”ื“ื™ืจื” ื›ืฉื”ื™ื ืืจื•ืกื” ืืจื•ืกื” ืžื™ ืื™ืช ืœื” ืžื–ื•ื ื™ ืฉื”ื’ื™ืข ื–ืžืŸ ื•ืœื ื ืฉืื• ื“ืชื ืŸ ื”ื’ื™ืข ื–ืžืŸ ื•ืœื ื ืฉืื• ืื•ื›ืœื•ืช ืžืฉืœื• ื•ืื•ื›ืœื•ืช ื‘ืชืจื•ืžื”

The Gemara suggests an alternative answer: If you wish, say that the husband is under no obligation to sustain her because the case discussed in the mishna was where he vowed and obligated her when she was still a betrothed woman, and therefore he was not yet duty-bound to provide her with sustenance. The Gemara is puzzled by this explanation: Does a betrothed woman have any right to sustenance from her husband at all? The Gemara answers: The circumstance referred to is when the arranged time for the marriage had arrived and they had not yet gotten married. As we learned in a mishna (57a): If the time arrived and they had not yet gotten married, such women may eat food from his property, and if their husbands were priests they may partake of teruma.

ื•ืžืื™ ืฉื ื ืขื“ ืฉืœืฉื™ื ื™ื•ื ืขื“ ืฉืœืฉื™ื ื™ื•ื ืขื‘ื™ื“ ืฉืœื™ื— ืฉืœื™ื—ื•ืชื™ื” ื˜ืคื™ ืœื ืขื‘ื™ื“ ืฉืœื™ื— ืฉืœื™ื—ื•ืชื™ื”

The Gemara asks: But if so, what is different if the vow will remain in effect for up to thirty days or longer? The Gemara answers: For up to thirty days, the agent will carry out his agency effectively and take proper care of her needs. If the vow lasts longer, the agent will not fully carry out his agency but will begin to neglect her, until she cannot bear the situation any longer.

ื•ืื™ื‘ืขื™ืช ืื™ืžื ืฉื”ื“ื™ืจื” ื›ืฉื”ื™ื ืืจื•ืกื” ื•ื ื™ืฉืืช ื ื™ืฉืืช ื”ื ืกื‘ืจื” ื•ืงื‘ืœื” ื“ืืžืจื” ื›ืกื‘ื•ืจื” ืื ื™ ืฉืื ื™ ื™ื›ื•ืœื” ืœืงื‘ืœ ืขื›ืฉื™ื• ืื™ืŸ ืื ื™ ื™ื›ื•ืœื” ืœืงื‘ืœ

And if you wish, say that he vowed and obligated her when she was still a betrothed woman and she subsequently married him, and therefore he is obligated to provide her sustenance. The Gemara is puzzled: If she married him after his vow, she considered the matter and accepted it upon herself. Why then is he forced to divorce her? The Gemara answers: The case is when she says: I thought that I could accept this manner of living, but now I see that I cannot accept it.

ืื™ืžืจ ื“ืืžืจื™ื ืŸ ื”ื›ื™ ื’ื‘ื™ ืžื•ืžื™ืŸ ืœืขื ื™ืŸ ืžื–ื•ื ื™ ืžื™ ืืžืจื™ื ืŸ ื”ื›ื™ ืืœื ืžื—ื•ื•ืจืชื ื›ื“ืฉื ื™ื ืŸ ืžืขื™ืงืจื

The Gemara raises a difficulty: You can say that we say so, that if either the husband or the wife suffers from a physical blemish, the other can demand a divorce even after agreeing to the marriage under these conditions. This is with regard to blemishes, but with regard to sustenance can we say so? Rather, it is clear as we initially answered: The mishna discusses either a case where he told her to support herself from her own earnings and she had accepted a lower standard of living while she was with him, or a case where he took the vow when she was betrothed, and now the appointed time for the marriage has arrived and they have not yet gotten married.

ืขื“ ืฉืœืฉื™ื ื™ื•ื ื™ืขืžื™ื“ ืคืจื ืก ื•ืคืจื ืก ืœืื• ืฉืœื™ื—ื•ืชื™ื” ืงื ืขื‘ื™ื“ ืืžืจ ืจื‘ ื”ื•ื ื ื‘ืื•ืžืจ ื›ืœ ื”ื–ืŸ ืื™ื ื• ืžืคืกื™ื“

ยง The mishna states that if his vow will remain in effect for up to thirty days he must appoint a trustee to provide sustenance to his wife. The Gemara is puzzled by this ruling: And does a trustee not perform the husbandโ€™s agency? If through his vow he has rendered it prohibited for her to derive benefit from him, how can he provide for her through the trustee? An action performed by an agent is considered to have been performed by the principal. Rav Huna said: The trustee discussed in the mishna was not actually appointed as an agent. Rather, the mishna is referring to one who says in general terms: Whoever sustains my wife will not lose out. Thus, anyone who complies does so of his own choice, although the husband will later compensate him. Therefore, the wife is not benefiting directly from the husband.

ื•ื›ื™ ืืžืจ ื”ื›ื™ ืœืื• ืฉืœื™ื—ื•ืชื™ื” ืงืขื‘ื™ื“ ื•ื”ืชื ืŸ ืžื™ ืฉื”ื™ื” ืžื•ืฉืœืš ื‘ื‘ื•ืจ ื•ืืžืจ ื›ืœ ื”ืฉื•ืžืข ืงื•ืœื• ื™ื›ืชื•ื‘ ื’ื˜ ืœืืฉืชื• ื”ืจื™ ืืœื• ื™ื›ืชื‘ื• ื•ื™ืชื ื•

The Gemara poses a question: And when a husband says this, is the one who responds not performing the husbandโ€™s agency? But didnโ€™t we learn in a mishna (Gittin 66a): With regard to one who was cast into a pit and said that whoever hears his voice should write a bill of divorce for his wife, saying this out of concern that he might not be rescued and that she would not be able to remarry or would be required to enter into levirate marriage, those who heard him should write and give her a bill of divorce? This ruling indicates that they are considered his agents based on his instructions, as otherwise they would not be able to write a bill of divorce on his behalf. The similarly formulated statement here should therefore also endow the trustee with the status of an agent.

ื”ื›ื™ ื”ืฉืชื ื”ืชื ืงืืžืจ ื™ื›ืชื•ื‘ ื”ื›ื ืžื™ ืงืืžืจ ื™ื–ื•ืŸ ื›ืœ ื”ื–ืŸ ืงืืžืจ

The Gemara refutes this claim: How can these cases be compared? There, in the case of a bill of divorce, he says that whoever hears his voice should write a bill of divorce, which is a command, and therefore those who hear him are considered his agents. Here, however, does he say that anyone should sustain his wife? He merely says: Whoever sustains her will not lose out, which is a general statement.

ื•ื”ื ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื™ ืืžื™ ื‘ื“ืœื™ืงื” ื”ืชื™ืจื• ืœื•ืžืจ ื›ืœ ื”ืžื›ื‘ื” ืื™ื ื• ืžืคืกื™ื“ ื‘ื“ืœื™ืงื” ืœืžืขื•ื˜ื™ ืžืื™ ืœืื• ืœืžืขื•ื˜ื™ ื›ื™ ื”ืื™ ื’ื•ื•ื ื ืœื ืœืžืขื•ื˜ื™ ืฉืืจ ืื™ืกื•ืจื™ื ื“ืฉื‘ืช

The Gemara raises a difficulty: But Rabbi Ami said: In the case of a fire that broke out on Shabbat, the Sages permitted him to say in the presence of gentiles: Whoever extinguishes this fire will not lose out. From this it can be inferred that the phrase: In the case of a fire, comes to exclude what? Does it not exclude a case like this? It would seem that it was only in the case of a fire, when there are several extenuating factors, that the Sages permitted the use of such an expression without treating it as the appointment of an agent. The Gemara refutes this: No, this ruling serves to exclude other prohibitions of Shabbat.

ืžืชื™ื‘ ืจื‘ื” ื”ืžื•ื“ืจ ื”ื ืื” ืžื—ื‘ื™ืจื• ื•ืื™ืŸ ืœื• ืžื” ื™ืื›ืœ ื™ืœืš ืืฆืœ ื—ื ื•ื ื™ ื”ืจื’ื™ืœ ืืฆืœื• ื•ื™ืืžืจ ืœื• ืื™ืฉ ืคืœื•ื ื™ ืžื•ื“ืจ ื”ื ืื” ืžืžื ื™ ื•ืื™ื ื™ ื™ื•ื“ืข ืžื” ืืขืฉื” ืœื• ื”ื•ื ื ื•ืชืŸ ืœื• ื•ื‘ื ื•ื ื•ื˜ืœ ืžื–ื” ื”ื›ื™ ื”ื•ื ื“ืฉืจื™ ืื‘ืœ ื›ืœ ื”ื–ืŸ ืื™ื ื• ืžืคืกื™ื“ ืœื

Rabba raised an objection from a mishna (Nedarim 43a): In the case of one prohibited by a vow from deriving benefit from another because of a vow the other took, and he does not have anything to eat, if the one who made the vow wants to help him but is unable to do so due to the vow, he may go to a storekeeper with whom he is familiar and say to him: So-and-so is prohibited by a vow from deriving benefit from me, and I do not know what I can do for him. The storekeeper subsequently gives food to him, and later comes and takes payment from this person who approached him. Rabba infers: This method of indirectly hinting is what is permitted, but he may not say: Whoever sustains the man will not lose out, as a declaration of that kind would make the storekeeper his agent.

ืœื ืžื™ื‘ืขื™ื ืงืืžืจ ืœื ืžื™ื‘ืขื™ื ื›ืœ ื”ื–ืŸ ืื™ื ื• ืžืคืกื™ื“ ื“ืœืขืœืžื ืงืืžืจ ืื‘ืœ ื”ืื™ ื›ื™ื•ืŸ ื“ืจื’ื™ืœ ืืฆืœื• ื•ืงืื–ื™ืœ ืงืืžืจ ืœื™ื” ื›ืžืืŸ ื“ืืžืจ ืœื™ื” ื–ื™ืœ ื”ื‘ ืœื™ื” ืืช ื“ืžื™ ืงื ืžืฉืžืข ืœืŸ

The Gemara refutes this claim: The tanna is speaking utilizing the style of: It is not necessary, and he means the following: It is not necessary to say that he is permitted to say in general terms: Whoever sustains so-and-so will not lose out, as by doing so he is speaking to everyone and therefore does not appoint a specific agent. But this storekeeper, since the one who took the oath is familiar with him and he goes and says this to him, might be considered like the one who said to him: Go, give him yourself. The mishna therefore teaches us that since the one who made the vow did not issue an explicit command, the storekeeper is not considered his agent.

ื’ื•ืคื ื”ืžื•ื“ืจ ื”ื ืื” ืžื—ื‘ื™ืจื• ื•ืื™ืŸ ืœื• ืžื” ื™ืื›ืœ ื”ื•ืœืš ืืฆืœ ื—ื ื•ื ื™ ื”ืจื’ื™ืœ ืืฆืœื• ื•ืื•ืžืจ ืœื• ืื™ืฉ ืคืœื•ื ื™ ืžื•ื“ืจ ื”ื ืื” ืžืžื ื™ ื•ืื™ื ื™ ื™ื•ื“ืข ืžื” ืืขืฉื” ืœื• ื”ื•ื ื ื•ืชืŸ ืœื• ื•ื‘ื ื•ื ื•ื˜ืœ ืžื–ื” ื‘ื™ืชื• ืœื‘ื ื•ืช ื•ื’ื“ื™ืจื• ืœื’ื“ื•ืจ ื•ืฉื“ื”ื• ืœืงืฆื•ืจ ื”ื•ืœืš ืืฆืœ ืคื•ืขืœื™ืŸ ื”ืจื’ื™ืœื™ืŸ ืืฆืœื• ื•ืื•ืžืจ ืœื”ืŸ ืื™ืฉ ืคืœื•ื ื™ ืžื•ื“ืจ ื”ื ืื” ืžืžื ื™ ื•ืื™ื ื™ ื™ื•ื“ืข ืžื” ืืขืฉื” ืœื• ื”ืŸ ืขื•ืฉื™ืŸ ืขืžื• ื•ื‘ืื™ืŸ ื•ื ื•ื˜ืœื™ื ืฉื›ืจืŸ ืžื–ื”

ยง Since it mentioned the above case, the Gemara returns to discuss the matter itself: In the case of one prohibited by a vow from deriving benefit from another because of a vow the other took, and he does not have anything to eat, the one who took the vow may go to a storekeeper with whom he is familiar and say to him: So-and-so is prohibited by a vow from deriving benefit from me, and I do not know what I can do for him. The storekeeper gives food to him, and later comes and takes payment from this one who approached him. Similarly, if the subject of the vow needed someone to build his house, or to erect his fence, or to reap his field, and the one who took the vow wants to help him, he should go to workers with whom he is familiar and say to them: So-and-so is prohibited by a vow from deriving benefit from me, and I do not know what I can do for him. They subsequently perform work for the subject of the vow, and they come and take their wages from this person who spoke to them.

ื”ื™ื• ืžื”ืœื›ื™ืŸ ื‘ื“ืจืš ื•ืื™ืŸ ืขืžื• ืžื” ื™ืื›ืœ ื ื•ืชืŸ ืœืื—ืจ ืœืฉื•ื ืžืชื ื” ื•ื”ืœื” ื ื•ื˜ืœ ื•ืื•ื›ืœ ื•ืžื•ืชืจ ื•ืื ืื™ืŸ ืฉื ืื—ืจ ืžื ื™ื— ืขืœ ื’ื‘ื™ ื”ืกืœืข ืื• ืขืœ ื’ื‘ื™ ื”ื’ื“ืจ ื•ืื•ืžืจ ื”ืจื™ ื”ืŸ ืžื•ืคืงืจื™ืŸ ืœื›ืœ ืžื™ ืฉื™ื—ืคื•ืฅ ื•ื”ืœื” ื ื•ื˜ืœ ื•ืื•ื›ืœ ื•ืžื•ืชืจ ื•ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ืกื™ ืื•ืกืจ ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื ืžืื™ ื˜ืขืžื ื“ืจื‘ื™ ื™ื•ืกื™ ื’ื–ื™ืจื” ืžืฉื•ื

If the two were walking along the way, and the one prohibited from benefiting from the other does not have anything with him to eat, the one who took the vow may give food to a different person as a gift, and this one takes it and eats, and this arrangement is permitted, as he did not give the food directly to him. And if there is no other person there apart from the two of them, he should place the items on a rock or on a fence and say: They are hereby declared ownerless for anyone who wants them, and this one takes the food items and eats them, and this too is permitted. But Rabbi Yosei prohibits this practice. Rava said: What is the reason for this ruling of Rabbi Yosei? It is a rabbinic decree due to

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