Ketubot 70
רַבִּי מֵאִיר הִיא, דְּאָמַר: מִצְוָה לְקַיֵּים דִּבְרֵי הַמֵּת.
It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who says it is a mitzva to fulfill the instructions of the dead, as the mishna states that the third party must fulfill the instructions of the deceased, although the daughter is likely to do as she pleases after the third party fulfills his part. In this manner, Ilfa successfully answered the man’s challenge.
אָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא אָמַר מָר עוּקְבָא, הִלְכְתָא: בֵּין שֶׁאָמַר ״תְּנוּ״ וּבֵין שֶׁאָמַר ״אַל תִּתְּנוּ״ — נוֹתְנִין לָהֶם כׇּל צוֹרְכָּם. הָא קַיְימָא לַן הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר, דְּאָמַר: מִצְוָה לְקַיֵּים דִּבְרֵי הַמֵּת? הָנֵי מִילֵּי בְּמִילֵּי אַחְרָנְיָתָא, אֲבָל בְּהָא מֵינָח נִיחָא לֵיהּ, וְהָא דְּאָמַר הָכִי — לְזָרוֹזִינְהוּ הוּא דַּאֲתָא.
Rav Ḥisda said that Mar Ukva said: The halakha is that whether he says: Give a shekel or whether he says: Do not give more than a shekel, the court gives the sons enough for all of their needs. The Gemara asks: But how could we disregard the father’s words and give more, when the father said to give only a shekel? We maintain that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who says that it is a mitzva to fulfill the statements of the dead. How, then, may the father’s instructions be ignored? The Gemara answers: This principle applies only in other matters, in which there is a mitzva to fulfill his wishes, but in this instance it is certainly preferable to him that his children be appropriately provided for. And the reason that he said this statement limiting the allowance is that he came to encourage them to adopt thrifty spending habits.
תְּנַן הָתָם: הַפָּעוֹטוֹת מִקָּחָן מִקָּח וּמִמְכָּרָן מֶכֶר בְּמִטַּלְטְלִים.
We learned in a mishna there (Gittin 59a): With regard to children, their acquisitions are considered acquisitions and their sales are considered sales. This is the case with respect to movable properties, but not with respect to real estate.
אָמַר רַפְרָם: לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא שֶׁאֵין שָׁם אַפּוֹטְרוֹפּוֹס, אֲבָל יֵשׁ שָׁם אַפּוֹטְרוֹפּוֹס — אֵין מִקָּחָן מִקָּח, וְאֵין מִמְכָּרָן מֶכֶר.
Rafram said: They taught this only if there is no steward [apotropos] overseeing the children’s affairs. However, if there is a steward, the children’s acquisitions are not considered acquisitions and their sales are not considered sales, even for movable property.
מִמַּאי? מִדְּקָתָנֵי: אֵין מַעֲשֵׂה קְטַנָּה כְּלוּם. וְדִלְמָא הֵיכָא דְּאִיכָּא שָׁלִישׁ שָׁאנֵי? אִם כֵּן לִיתְנֵי ״אֲבָל בִּקְטַנָּה, יַעֲשֶׂה שָׁלִישׁ מַה שֶּׁהוּשְׁלַשׁ בְּיָדוֹ״. מַאי ״אֵין מַעֲשֵׂה קְטַנָּה כְּלוּם״? שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ אֲפִילּוּ בְּעָלְמָא.
From where does he know this? From the fact that it teaches in the mishna here that even when there is a third party who functions as a steward, any action of a minor girl is nothing. The Gemara asks: And perhaps where there is a third party the halakha is different? It is possible that the act of a minor is discounted only when it clashes with the actions of an appointee who is past majority. The Gemara answers: If so, let it teach: But with regard to a minor girl, the third party should execute the agency that was entrusted in his power. What is the implication of the clause: Any action of a minor girl is nothing? Conclude from this that even generally, without a specific steward, a minor may not conduct transactions involving real estate.
הֲדַרַן עֲלָךְ מְצִיאַת הָאִשָּׁה
הַמַּדִּיר אֶת אִשְׁתּוֹ מִלֵּיהָנוֹת לוֹ, עַד שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם יַעֲמִיד פַּרְנָס. יָתֵר מִיכֵּן — יוֹצִיא וְיִתֵּן כְּתוּבָּה.
MISHNA: With regard to one who vows and obligates his wife, prohibiting her from benefiting from him or his property, if his vow will remain in effect for up to thirty days, he must appoint a trustee [parnas] to support her. But if the vow will remain in effect for more than this amount of time, he must divorce her and give her the payment of her marriage contract.
רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: בְּיִשְׂרָאֵל, חֹדֶשׁ אֶחָד — יְקַיֵּים, וּשְׁנַיִם — יוֹצִיא וְיִתֵּן כְּתוּבָּה. בְּכֹהֵן, שְׁנַיִם — יְקַיֵּים, וּשְׁלֹשָׁה — יוֹצִיא וְיִתֵּן כְּתוּבָּה.
Rabbi Yehuda says: If the husband is an Israelite, then if his vow will remain in effect for up to one month, he may maintain her as his wife; and if it will be two months, he must divorce her and give her the payment of her marriage contract. But if he is a priest, then he is given extra time: If the vow will remain in effect for up to two months, he may maintain her, and if it will be three months, he must divorce her and give her the payment of her marriage contract. The reason for this is that it is prohibited for a priest to marry a divorcée, including his own ex-wife, and therefore if he divorces her and later regrets his decision he will not be able to take her back.
הַמַּדִּיר אֶת אִשְׁתּוֹ שֶׁלֹּא תִּטְעוֹם אֶחָד מִכׇּל הַפֵּירוֹת — יוֹצִיא וְיִתֵּן כְּתוּבָּה, רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: בְּיִשְׂרָאֵל, יוֹם אֶחָד — יְקַיֵּים, שְׁנַיִם — יוֹצִיא וְיִתֵּן כְּתוּבָּה. וּבְכֹהֵן, שְׁנַיִם — יְקַיֵּים, שְׁלֹשָׁה — יוֹצִיא וְיִתֵּן כְּתוּבָּה.
One who vows and obligates his wife, requiring her not to taste a particular type of produce, must divorce her and give her the payment of her marriage contract. Rabbi Yehuda says: If he is an Israelite, then if the vow will remain in effect for one day he may maintain her as his wife, but if it will be two days he must divorce her and give her the payment of her marriage contract. And if he is a priest, then if the vow will be in effect for two days he may maintain her; for three days he must divorce her and give her the payment of her marriage contract.
הַמַּדִּיר אֶת אִשְׁתּוֹ שֶׁלֹּא תִּתְקַשֵּׁט בְּאֶחָד מִכׇּל הַמִּינִין — יוֹצִיא וְיִתֵּן כְּתוּבָּה. רַבִּי יוֹסֵי אוֹמֵר: בַּעֲנִיּוּת — שֶׁלֹּא נָתַן קִצְבָה, וּבַעֲשִׁירוּת — שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם.
One who vows and obligates his wife, requiring her not to adorn herself with a particular type of perfume, must divorce her and give her the payment of her marriage contract. Rabbi Yosei says that one must distinguish between different types of women: For poor women, this applies only when he did not establish a set amount of time for the vow, and for wealthy women, who are accustomed to adorning themselves more elaborately, if she is prohibited from doing so for thirty days, he must divorce her and give her the payment of her marriage contract.
גְּמָ׳ וְכֵיוָן דִּמְשׁוּעְבַּד לָהּ הֵיכִי מָצֵי מַדִּיר לַהּ? כָּל כְּמִינֵּיהּ דְּמַפְקַע לַהּ לְשִׁיעְבּוּדַהּ?
GEMARA: The Gemara questions the efficacy of a vow taken by the husband prohibiting his wife from deriving benefit from him: And since he is under a prior obligation to provide her support in accordance with what is written in the marriage contract, how can he vow prohibiting her from benefiting from him? Is it in his power to remove his obligation to her?
וְהָתְנַן: ״קֻוֽנָּם שֶׁאֵינִי עוֹשָׂה לְפִיךָ״ — אֵינוֹ צָרִיךְ לְהָפֵר. אַלְמָא כֵּיוָן דִּמְשַׁעְבְּדָא לֵיהּ, לָאו כָּל כְּמִינַהּ דְּמַפְקַע לֵיהּ לְשִׁיעְבּוּדֵיהּ. הָכָא נָמֵי: כֵּיוָן דִּמְשׁוּעְבַּד לַהּ, לָאו כָּל כְּמִינֵּיהּ דְּמַפְקַע לַהּ לְשִׁיעְבּוּדַהּ!
But didn’t we learn in a mishna (Nedarim 85a): If his wife said: It is forbidden like an offering [konam] that I will therefore not perform any work for the benefit of your mouth, he does not need to nullify her vow, since this vow does not take effect at all. Apparently, since she is under a prior obligation by power of the Sages’ ordinance to perform work for him, it is not in her power to remove her obligation to him. Here too, since he is under a prior obligation to provide support for her, it is not in his power to remove his obligation to her.
אֶלָּא: מִתּוֹךְ שֶׁיָּכוֹל לוֹמַר לָהּ ״צְאִי מַעֲשֵׂה יָדַיִךְ בִּמְזוֹנוֹתַיִךְ״,
Rather, one must say the following: Since he is able to say to her at any time: Spend your earnings to sustain yourself, meaning that he has the right to instruct her to support herself from her own earnings instead of supporting her himself,
נַעֲשָׂה כְּאוֹמֵר לָהּ ״צְאִי מַעֲשֵׂה יָדַיִךְ בִּמְזוֹנוֹתַיִךְ״. וְאִם אִיתַהּ לְהָא דְּרַב הוּנָא אָמַר רַב, דְּאָמַר רַב הוּנָא אָמַר רַב: יְכוֹלָה אִשָּׁה שֶׁתֹּאמַר לְבַעְלָהּ ״אֵינִי נִיזּוֹנֶת וְאֵינִי עוֹשָׂה״, ״קוּנָּם שֶׁאֲנִי עוֹשָׂה לְפִיךָ״, אַמַּאי אֵינוֹ צָרִיךְ לְהָפֵר? לֵימָא: מִתּוֹךְ שֶׁיְּכוֹלָה לוֹמַר ״אֵינִי נִיזּוֹנֶת וְאֵינִי עוֹשָׂה״, נַעֲשֶׂה כְּמִי שֶׁאוֹמֶרֶת לוֹ: ״אֵינִי נִיזּוֹנֶת וְאֵינִי עוֹשָׂה״.
it is considered as though he were in fact saying to her: Spend your earnings to sustain yourself. The Gemara raises a difficulty: And if it is so, i.e., that the halakha is in accordance with that statement that Rav Huna said that Rav said, as Rav Huna said that Rav said: A wife may say to her husband: I will not be sustained by you and, in turn, I will not work, i.e., you will not keep my earnings, then when she says: That which I perform for the benefit of your mouth will be forbidden like an offering [konam], why does he not need to nullify the vow? Here too, let us say: Since she is able to say: I will not be sustained by you and I will not work, it is considered as though she were in fact saying to him by her vow: I will not be sustained by you and I will not work, and he should therefore have to nullify the vow.
אֶלָּא, לָא תֵּימָא ״נַעֲשֶׂה״, אֶלָּא בְּאוֹמֵר לָהּ: ״צְאִי מַעֲשֵׂה יָדַיִךְ בִּמְזוֹנוֹתַיִךְ״.
Rather, the Gemara retracts its previous interpretation in favor of the following: Do not say it is considered as though he said to her: Spend your earnings to sustain yourself. Rather, the mishna is referring to a case where he explicitly says to her: Spend your earnings to sustain yourself.
אִי הָכִי פַּרְנָס לְמָה לַהּ? בִּדְלָא סָפְקָה: אִי בִּדְלָא סָפְקָה — הֲדַר קוּשְׁיַין לְדוּכְתֵּיהּ? אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: בְּמַסְפֶּקֶת לִדְבָרִים גְּדוֹלִים, וְאֵינָהּ מַסְפֶּקֶת לִדְבָרִים קְטַנִּים.
The Gemara raises a difficulty: If so, if he provided for her sustenance by instructing her to spend her own earnings, why does she require a trustee? The Gemara answers: This is referring to a situation where the amount she earns is not enough for her needs. Therefore, the husband must appoint a trustee to provide the balance. The Gemara asks: If it is a case where the amount she earns is not enough for her needs, our difficulty is restored to its place: How can he prohibit her from benefiting from him if he is under a prior obligation to provide for her? Rav Ashi said: The mishna is referring to a case where her earnings are enough for large things, i.e., her basic requirements, but not enough for small things.
הָנֵי דְּבָרִים קְטַנִּים, הֵיכִי דָמֵי? אִי דִּרְגִילָה בְּהוּ — הָא רְגִילָה בְּהוּ! וְאִי לָא רְגִילָה בְּהוּ — פַּרְנָס לְמָה לַהּ? לָא צְרִיכָא: דִּרְגִילָה בְּבֵית נָשָׁא, וְקָא מְגַלְגְּלָא בַּהֲדֵיהּ, דְּאָמְרָה לֵיהּ: עַד הָאִידָּנָא דְּלָא אַדַּרְתַּן — גַּלְגֵּילְנָא בַּהֲדָךְ, הַשְׁתָּא דְּאַדַּרְתַּן — לָא מָצֵינָא דֶּאֱיגַלְגֵּל בַּהֲדָךְ.
The Gemara asks: With regard to these small things for which her earnings are not enough, what are the circumstances? If the discussion involves a case where she is accustomed to them, then she is accustomed to them and they are equivalent to all other necessities, which he must provide. And if she is not accustomed to them, why does she require a trustee? The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary in a case where she was accustomed to such small provisions in her father’s house, but she agreed to marry him and lower her lifestyle, and she had, until now, abided the lesser lifestyle and remained with him. For she says to him: Until now, when you did not vow to render it prohibited for me to benefit from you, I abided the lesser lifestyle and remained with you. However, now that you have vowed, I can no longer abide the lesser lifestyle and remain with you, and therefore I wish to revert to the conditions of my father’s house.
וּמַאי שְׁנָא עַד שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם? עַד שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם לֹא שָׁמְעִי בַּהּ אִינָשֵׁי וְלָא זִילָא בַּהּ מִילְּתָא, טְפֵי — שָׁמְעִי בַּהּ אִינָשֵׁי וְזִילָא בַּהּ מִילְּתָא.
The Gemara poses a question: And what is different about the time period mentioned in the mishna: Up to thirty days? The Gemara answers: If up to thirty days have passed, this is a short enough amount of time that people do not hear about her, and the matter of her receiving her sustenance through an intermediary is therefore not demeaning for her. However, if the vow lasts longer than this, people do hear about her, and the matter is demeaning for her. The husband must therefore decide if he wants to divorce her or sustain her in the appropriate fashion.
אִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא שֶׁהִדִּירָהּ כְּשֶׁהִיא אֲרוּסָה, אֲרוּסָה מִי אִית לַהּ מְזוֹנֵי? שֶׁהִגִּיעַ זְמַן וְלֹא נִשְּׂאוּ. דִּתְנַן: הִגִּיעַ זְמַן וְלֹא נִשְּׂאוּ — אוֹכְלוֹת מִשֶּׁלּוֹ וְאוֹכְלוֹת בִּתְרוּמָה.
The Gemara suggests an alternative answer: If you wish, say that the husband is under no obligation to sustain her because the case discussed in the mishna was where he vowed and obligated her when she was still a betrothed woman, and therefore he was not yet duty-bound to provide her with sustenance. The Gemara is puzzled by this explanation: Does a betrothed woman have any right to sustenance from her husband at all? The Gemara answers: The circumstance referred to is when the arranged time for the marriage had arrived and they had not yet gotten married. As we learned in a mishna (57a): If the time arrived and they had not yet gotten married, such women may eat food from his property, and if their husbands were priests they may partake of teruma.
וּמַאי שְׁנָא עַד שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם? עַד שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם עָבֵיד שָׁלִיחַ שְׁלִיחוּתֵיהּ, טְפֵי — לָא עָבֵיד שָׁלִיחַ שְׁלִיחוּתֵיהּ.
The Gemara asks: But if so, what is different if the vow will remain in effect for up to thirty days or longer? The Gemara answers: For up to thirty days, the agent will carry out his agency effectively and take proper care of her needs. If the vow lasts longer, the agent will not fully carry out his agency but will begin to neglect her, until she cannot bear the situation any longer.
וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא שֶׁהִדִּירָהּ כְּשֶׁהִיא אֲרוּסָה וְנִישֵּׂאת, נִישֵּׂאת — הָא סְבַרָה וְקַבִּילָה! דְּאָמְרָה: כִּסְבוּרָה אֲנִי שֶׁאֲנִי יְכוֹלָה לְקַבֵּל, עַכְשָׁיו אֵין אֲנִי יְכוֹלָה לְקַבֵּל.
And if you wish, say that he vowed and obligated her when she was still a betrothed woman and she subsequently married him, and therefore he is obligated to provide her sustenance. The Gemara is puzzled: If she married him after his vow, she considered the matter and accepted it upon herself. Why then is he forced to divorce her? The Gemara answers: The case is when she says: I thought that I could accept this manner of living, but now I see that I cannot accept it.
אֵימַר דְּאָמְרִינַן הָכִי גַּבֵּי מוּמִין, לְעִנְיַן מְזוֹנֵי מִי אָמְרִינַן הָכִי? אֶלָּא מְחַוַּורְתָּא כִּדְשַׁנִּינַן מֵעִיקָּרָא.
The Gemara raises a difficulty: You can say that we say so, that if either the husband or the wife suffers from a physical blemish, the other can demand a divorce even after agreeing to the marriage under these conditions. This is with regard to blemishes, but with regard to sustenance can we say so? Rather, it is clear as we initially answered: The mishna discusses either a case where he told her to support herself from her own earnings and she had accepted a lower standard of living while she was with him, or a case where he took the vow when she was betrothed, and now the appointed time for the marriage has arrived and they have not yet gotten married.
עַד שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם יַעֲמִיד פַּרְנָס. וּפַרְנָס לָאו שְׁלִיחוּתֵיהּ קָא עָבֵיד? אָמַר רַב הוּנָא, בְּאוֹמֵר: ״כׇּל הַזָּן אֵינוֹ מַפְסִיד״.
§ The mishna states that if his vow will remain in effect for up to thirty days he must appoint a trustee to provide sustenance to his wife. The Gemara is puzzled by this ruling: And does a trustee not perform the husband’s agency? If through his vow he has rendered it prohibited for her to derive benefit from him, how can he provide for her through the trustee? An action performed by an agent is considered to have been performed by the principal. Rav Huna said: The trustee discussed in the mishna was not actually appointed as an agent. Rather, the mishna is referring to one who says in general terms: Whoever sustains my wife will not lose out. Thus, anyone who complies does so of his own choice, although the husband will later compensate him. Therefore, the wife is not benefiting directly from the husband.
וְכִי אָמַר הָכִי לָאו שְׁלִיחוּתֵיהּ קָעָבֵיד? וְהָתְנַן: מִי שֶׁהָיָה מוּשְׁלָךְ בְּבוֹר, וְאָמַר: ״כׇּל הַשּׁוֹמֵעַ קוֹלוֹ יִכְתּוֹב גֵּט לְאִשְׁתּוֹ״ — הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ יִכְתְּבוּ וְיִתְּנוּ!
The Gemara poses a question: And when a husband says this, is the one who responds not performing the husband’s agency? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (Gittin 66a): With regard to one who was cast into a pit and said that whoever hears his voice should write a bill of divorce for his wife, saying this out of concern that he might not be rescued and that she would not be able to remarry or would be required to enter into levirate marriage, those who heard him should write and give her a bill of divorce? This ruling indicates that they are considered his agents based on his instructions, as otherwise they would not be able to write a bill of divorce on his behalf. The similarly formulated statement here should therefore also endow the trustee with the status of an agent.
הָכִי הַשְׁתָּא?! הָתָם קָאָמַר ״יִכְתּוֹב״, הָכָא מִי קָאָמַר ״יָזוּן״? ״כׇּל הַזָּן״ קָאָמַר!
The Gemara refutes this claim: How can these cases be compared? There, in the case of a bill of divorce, he says that whoever hears his voice should write a bill of divorce, which is a command, and therefore those who hear him are considered his agents. Here, however, does he say that anyone should sustain his wife? He merely says: Whoever sustains her will not lose out, which is a general statement.
וְהָא אָמַר רַבִּי אַמֵּי: בִּדְלֵיקָה הִתִּירוּ לוֹמַר: ״כׇּל הַמְכַבֶּה אֵינוֹ מַפְסִיד״. בִּדְלֵיקָה לְמַעוֹטֵי מַאי? לָאו לְמַעוֹטֵי כִּי הַאי גַוְונָא?! לָא, לְמַעוֹטֵי שְׁאָר אִיסּוּרִים דְּשַׁבָּת.
The Gemara raises a difficulty: But Rabbi Ami said: In the case of a fire that broke out on Shabbat, the Sages permitted him to say in the presence of gentiles: Whoever extinguishes this fire will not lose out. From this it can be inferred that the phrase: In the case of a fire, comes to exclude what? Does it not exclude a case like this? It would seem that it was only in the case of a fire, when there are several extenuating factors, that the Sages permitted the use of such an expression without treating it as the appointment of an agent. The Gemara refutes this: No, this ruling serves to exclude other prohibitions of Shabbat.
מֵתִיב רַבָּה: הַמּוּדָּר הֲנָאָה מֵחֲבֵירוֹ, וְאֵין לוֹ מַה יֹּאכַל — יֵלֵךְ אֵצֶל חֶנְוָנִי הָרָגִיל אֶצְלוֹ, וְיֹאמַר לוֹ: ״אִישׁ פְּלוֹנִי מוּדָּר הֲנָאָה מִמֶּנִּי, וְאֵינִי יוֹדֵעַ מָה אֶעֱשֶׂה לוֹ״. הוּא נוֹתֵן לוֹ, וּבָא וְנוֹטֵל מִזֶּה. הָכִי הוּא דִּשְׁרֵי, אֲבָל ״כׇּל הַזָּן אֵינוֹ מַפְסִיד״ — לָא!
Rabba raised an objection from a mishna (Nedarim 43a): In the case of one prohibited by a vow from deriving benefit from another because of a vow the other took, and he does not have anything to eat, if the one who made the vow wants to help him but is unable to do so due to the vow, he may go to a storekeeper with whom he is familiar and say to him: So-and-so is prohibited by a vow from deriving benefit from me, and I do not know what I can do for him. The storekeeper subsequently gives food to him, and later comes and takes payment from this person who approached him. Rabba infers: This method of indirectly hinting is what is permitted, but he may not say: Whoever sustains the man will not lose out, as a declaration of that kind would make the storekeeper his agent.
לָא מִיבַּעְיָא קָאָמַר: לָא מִיבַּעְיָא ״כׇּל הַזָּן אֵינוֹ מַפְסִיד״ — דִּלְעָלְמָא קָאָמַר, אֲבָל הַאי, כֵּיוָן דְּרָגִיל אֶצְלוֹ וְקָאָזֵיל קָאָמַר לֵיהּ, כְּמַאן דְּאָמַר לֵיהּ זִיל, ״הַב לֵיהּ אַתְּ״ דָּמֵי — קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.
The Gemara refutes this claim: The tanna is speaking utilizing the style of: It is not necessary, and he means the following: It is not necessary to say that he is permitted to say in general terms: Whoever sustains so-and-so will not lose out, as by doing so he is speaking to everyone and therefore does not appoint a specific agent. But this storekeeper, since the one who took the oath is familiar with him and he goes and says this to him, might be considered like the one who said to him: Go, give him yourself. The mishna therefore teaches us that since the one who made the vow did not issue an explicit command, the storekeeper is not considered his agent.
גּוּפָא: הַמּוּדָּר הֲנָאָה מֵחֲבֵירוֹ וְאֵין לוֹ מַה יֹּאכַל, הוֹלֵךְ אֵצֶל חֶנְוָנִי הָרָגִיל אֶצְלוֹ, וְאוֹמֵר לוֹ: ״אִישׁ פְּלוֹנִי מוּדָּר הֲנָאָה מִמֶּנִּי, וְאֵינִי יוֹדֵעַ מָה אֶעֱשֶׂה לוֹ״. הוּא נוֹתֵן לוֹ, וּבָא וְנוֹטֵל מִזֶּה. בֵּיתוֹ לִבְנוֹת, וּגְדֵירוֹ לִגְדּוֹר, וְשָׂדֵהוּ לִקְצוֹר — הוֹלֵךְ אֵצֶל פּוֹעֲלִין הָרְגִילִין אֶצְלוֹ, וְאוֹמֵר לָהֶן: ״אִישׁ פְּלוֹנִי מוּדָּר הֲנָאָה מִמֶּנִּי וְאֵינִי יוֹדֵעַ מָה אֶעֱשֶׂה לוֹ״. הֵן עוֹשִׂין עִמּוֹ, וּבָאִין וְנוֹטְלִים שְׂכָרָן מִזֶּה.
§ Since it mentioned the above case, the Gemara returns to discuss the matter itself: In the case of one prohibited by a vow from deriving benefit from another because of a vow the other took, and he does not have anything to eat, the one who took the vow may go to a storekeeper with whom he is familiar and say to him: So-and-so is prohibited by a vow from deriving benefit from me, and I do not know what I can do for him. The storekeeper gives food to him, and later comes and takes payment from this one who approached him. Similarly, if the subject of the vow needed someone to build his house, or to erect his fence, or to reap his field, and the one who took the vow wants to help him, he should go to workers with whom he is familiar and say to them: So-and-so is prohibited by a vow from deriving benefit from me, and I do not know what I can do for him. They subsequently perform work for the subject of the vow, and they come and take their wages from this person who spoke to them.
הָיוּ מְהַלְּכִין בַּדֶּרֶךְ, וְאֵין עִמּוֹ מַה יֹּאכַל — נוֹתֵן לְאַחֵר לְשׁוּם מַתָּנָה, וְהַלָּה נוֹטֵל וְאוֹכֵל, וּמוּתָּר. וְאִם אֵין שָׁם אַחֵר — מַנִּיחַ עַל גַּבֵּי הַסֶּלַע אוֹ עַל גַּבֵּי הַגָּדֵר, וְאוֹמֵר: ״הֲרֵי הֵן מוּפְקָרִין לְכׇל מִי שֶׁיַּחְפּוֹץ״, וְהַלָּה נוֹטֵל וְאוֹכֵל, וּמוּתָּר. וְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי אוֹסֵר. אָמַר רָבָא: מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי — גְּזֵירָה מִשּׁוּם
If the two were walking along the way, and the one prohibited from benefiting from the other does not have anything with him to eat, the one who took the vow may give food to a different person as a gift, and this one takes it and eats, and this arrangement is permitted, as he did not give the food directly to him. And if there is no other person there apart from the two of them, he should place the items on a rock or on a fence and say: They are hereby declared ownerless for anyone who wants them, and this one takes the food items and eats them, and this too is permitted. But Rabbi Yosei prohibits this practice. Rava said: What is the reason for this ruling of Rabbi Yosei? It is a rabbinic decree due to
