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Today's Daf Yomi

April 16, 2015 | 讻状讝 讘谞讬住谉 转砖注状讛

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Joanna Rom and Steven Goldberg in loving memory of Steve's mother Shirley "Nana" Goldberg (Sura Tema bat Chaim v'Hanka)

Ketubot 73

诇讗 转讬诪讗 讟注诪讬讛 讚专讘 讻讬讜谉 砖讻谞住讛 住转诐 讗讞讜诇讬 讗讞诇讬讛 诇转谞讗讬讛 讗诇讗 讟注诪讗 讚专讘 诇驻讬 砖讗讬谉 讗讚诐 注讜砖讛 讘注讬诇转讜 讘注讬诇转 讝谞讜转

Do not say that Rav鈥檚 reason for requiring a bill of divorce is that since he married her without specification, this indicates that he waived his condition entirely, and therefore he must give her the payment of her marriage contract if he divorces her. Rather, Rav鈥檚 reason is because a person does not intentionally engage in licentious sexual intercourse. He is aware that the initial betrothal may possibly be nullified, rendering sexual intercourse licentious. Therefore, when he marries her, he does so with the intention that the consummation of the marriage serves as unconditional betrothal. However, as he does not entirely waive his condition, if it becomes clear that the condition was not fulfilled, she may be divorced without receiving payment of her marriage contract.

讛讗 驻诇讬讙讬 讘讛 讞讚讗 讝讬诪谞讗 讚讗转诪专 拽讟谞讛 砖诇讗 诪讬讗谞讛 讜讛讙讚讬诇讛 注诪讚讛 讜谞讬砖讗转 专讘 讗诪专 讗讬谉 爪专讬讻讛 讙讟 诪砖谞讬

The Gemara asks: But they already disagree about this fundamental issue of whether it may be assumed that a person does not intentionally engage in licentious sexual intercourse one other time. As it is stated: With regard to a minor girl whose mother or brother married her off, and who did not refuse her husband, despite having the right to do so, and when she became an adult she arose and married someone else, Rav said: She does not require a bill of divorce from the second one. Since she did not refuse the first husband while still a minor, and presumably he later engaged in sexual intercourse with her when she became an adult, and since the assumption is that he does not intentionally engage in licentious relations, the first marriage is binding and the second is meaningless.

讜砖诪讜讗诇 讗诪专 爪专讬讻讛 讙讟 诪砖谞讬

And Shmuel said: She requires a bill of divorce from the second one. Her first husband did not engage in sexual intercourse with the intention that it serve as a new betrothal, rather he intended to continue the relationship established between them when she was a minor. Therefore, she is not considered to be his wife and the second marriage is binding.

爪专讬讻讗 讚讗讬 讗转诪专 讘讛讛讬讗 讘讛讛讬讗 拽讗诪专 专讘 诪砖讜诐 讚诇讬讻讗 转谞讗讛 讗讘诇 讘讛讗 讚讗讬讻讗 转谞讗讛 讗讬诪讗 诪讜讚讬 诇讬讛 诇砖诪讜讗诇

The Gemara explains: It is necessary to state the dispute in both instances. For if it was stated only in that case of the minor who did not refuse, one could say that in that case Rav stated his opinion because there is no condition attached to the betrothal. Consequently, when she becomes an adult, he engages in sexual intercourse with intent to betroth her, as he recognizes that the initial betrothal was ineffective. But in this case, where there is a condition and it is unfulfilled, one could say that he concedes to Shmuel that he did not intend to betroth her through intercourse, and she does not require a bill of divorce.

讜讗讬 讗转诪专 讘讛讗 讘讛讗 拽讗诪专 砖诪讜讗诇 讗讘诇 讘讛讱 讗讬诪讗 诪讜讚讬 诇讬讛 诇专讘 爪专讬讻讗

And conversely, if it was stated only in this case concerning betrothal, it could be argued that in this case Shmuel said that the betrothal is not valid when he engages in sexual intercourse with her, since she violated a condition, but in that case of the minor who did not refuse, one could say that he concedes to Rav. Therefore, it is necessary to state the argument explicitly in both cases.

转谞谉 讻谞住讛 住转诐 讜谞诪爪讗讜 注诇讬讛 谞讚专讬诐 转爪讗 砖诇讗 讘讻转讜讘讛 讻转讜讘讛 讛讜讗 讚诇讗 讘注讬讗 讛讗 讙讬讟讗 讘注讬讗 诪讗讬 诇讗讜 拽讬讚砖讛 注诇 转谞讗讬 讜讻谞住讛 住转诐 转讬讜讘转讗 讚砖诪讜讗诇

The Gemara discusses proofs for both sides of this dispute: We learned in the mishna: If he married her without specification, and it was discovered that vows were incumbent upon her, she may be divorced without receiving payment of her marriage contract. The Gemara infers: She does not require or receive payment of her marriage contract, but she does require a bill of divorce. What, is it not speaking about the case discussed in the first clause, namely that he betrothed her conditionally and then married her without specification? If so, the mishna is a conclusive refutation of Shmuel鈥檚 opinion.

诇讗 拽讬讚砖讛 住转诐 讜讻谞住讛 住转诐

The Gemara rejects the proof: No, the case there is referring to where he betrothed her without specification and then married her without specification.

讗讘诇 拽讬讚砖讛 注诇 转谞讗讬 讜讻谞住讛 住转诐 讛讻讬 谞诪讬 讚诇讗 讘注讬讗 讙讬讟讗 讗讚转谞讬 讛诪拽讚砖 讗转 讛讗砖讛 注诇 诪谞转 砖讗讬谉 注诇讬讛 谞讚专讬诐 讜谞诪爪讗讜 注诇讬讛 谞讚专讬诐 讗讬谞讛 诪拽讜讚砖转 诇讬转谞讬 讻谞住讛 住转诐 讜谞诪爪讗讜 注诇讬讛 谞讚专讬诐 讗讬谞讛 诪拽讜讚砖转 讜讻诇 砖讻谉 讛讗

The Gemara asks: But according to this explanation, if he betrothed her conditionally and then married her without specification, is it indeed the case that she does not require a bill of divorce? If so, instead of teaching in the mishna that if one betroths a woman on condition that there are no vows incumbent upon her to fulfill, and it was subsequently discovered that there are vows that are incumbent upon her, she is not betrothed, let the mishna teach instead a more novel halakha: If he betrothed her with a condition and married her without specification and then it was discovered that vows were incumbent upon her, she is not betrothed. And from this one can derive that all the more so the same halakha would apply in this case, where he betrothed her conditionally but did not repeat the condition when marrying her.

讛讻讬 谞诪讬 拽讗诪专 讛诪拽讚砖 讗转 讛讗砖讛 注诇 诪谞转 砖讗讬谉 注诇讬讛 谞讚专讬诐 讜讻谞住讛 住转诐 讜谞诪爪讗讜 注诇讬讛 谞讚专讬诐 讗讬谞讛 诪拽讜讚砖转 拽讬讚砖讛 住转诐 讜讻谞住讛 住转诐 转爪讗 砖诇讗 讘讻转讜讘讛

The Gemara answers: That is also what he is saying, and one should understand the mishna this way: One who betroths a woman on condition that there are no vows incumbent upon her to fulfill, and then marries her without specification, and it is then discovered that vows were incumbent upon her, she is not betrothed. If he betrothed her without specification and married her without specification, she requires a bill of divorce but may be divorced without receiving payment of her marriage contract.

讻转讜讘讛 讛讜讗 讚诇讗 讘注讬讗 讛讗 讙讬讟讗 讘注讬讗 讜诪讗讬 砖谞讗 讻转讜讘讛 讚诇讗 讘注讬讗 讚讗诪专 讗讬 讗驻砖讬 讘讗砖讛 谞讚专谞讬转 讗讬 讛讻讬 讙讟 谞诪讬 诇讗 转讬讘注讬

The Gemara asks about this halakha according to Shmuel: The mishna says that she does not require or receive payment of her marriage contract, but one can infer that she does require a bill of divorce. And what is different about a marriage contract that she does not require payment? Because he says: I do not want a vowing wife, and therefore the marriage is considered a mistaken transaction. If so, she should also not require a bill of divorce. Since he is clearly particular about this, shouldn鈥檛 the betrothal also be considered a mistaken transaction?

讗诪专 专讘讛 爪专讬讻讛 讙讟 诪讚讘专讬讛诐 讜讻谉 讗诪专 专讘 讞住讚讗 爪专讬讻讛 讙讟 诪讚讘专讬讛诐 专讘讗 讗诪专 转谞讗 住驻讜拽讬 诪住驻拽讗 诇讬讛 讙讘讬 诪诪讜谞讗 诇拽讜诇讗 讙讘讬 讗讬住讜专讗 诇讞讜诪专讗

Rabba said: She requires a bill of divorce from the words of the Sages, i.e., by rabbinic law. Although by Torah law the betrothal is in fact invalid, the Sages declared that since he did not explicitly stipulate the condition, she requires a bill of divorce. And similarly, Rav 岣sda said: She requires a bill of divorce from the words of the Sages. Rava said a different explanation: The tanna is uncertain about the status of the betrothal in this case. Concerning monetary matters, one should be lenient. Therefore, she cannot extract money from the husband for the marriage contract based on the principle that in monetary cases the burden of proof rests upon the claimant. But concerning prohibitions such as adultery, one must be stringent, and she therefore requires a bill of divorce.

讗诪专 专讘讛 诪讞诇讜拽转 讘讟注讜转 砖转讬 谞砖讬诐 讗讘诇 讘讟注讜转 讗砖讛 讗讞转 讚讘专讬 讛讻诇 讗讬谉 爪专讬讻讛 讛讬诪谞讜 讙讟

Rabba said: The dispute between Rav and Shmuel is in the case of an error concerning two women. The same man married one woman on condition that she had no vows incumbent upon her and then married another woman without specification. Rav and Shmuel disagree whether the condition he explicitly stated for the first woman should be seen as proof that he is particular about this with regard to the second one as well, to the point that the betrothal is invalid if the condition was not fulfilled. But in the case of an error concerning one woman, where he betroths her with a condition, marries her without specification, and subsequently discovered that the condition was not fulfilled, all agree, including Rav, that she does not require a bill of divorce from him.

讗诪专 (诇讬讛) 讗讘讬讬 讜讛讗 诪转谞讬转讬谉 讚讟注讜转 讗砖讛 讗讞转 讛讬讗 讜拽诪讜转讘讬谞谉 转讬讜讘转讗 诪讬谞讬讛

Abaye said to him: But the mishna discusses an error concerning one woman, as a second woman is not mentioned, and we raise an objection from it against Shmuel, implying that Rav and Shmuel have a dispute in this case as well. How, then, can you say that dispute is in the case of an error concerning two women?

讗诇讗 讗讬 讗转诪专 讛讻讬 讗转诪专 讗诪专 专讘讛 诪讞诇讜拽转 讘讟注讜转 讗砖讛 讗讞转 讻注讬谉 砖转讬 谞砖讬诐 讗讘诇 讘讟注讜转 讗砖讛 讗讞转 讙专讬讚转讗 讚讘专讬 讛讻诇 讗讬谞讛 爪专讬讻讛 讛讬诪谞讜 讙讟

Rather, the previous explanation must be retracted and instead the Gemara says: If the above statement of Rabba was said, it was said as follows: Rabba said that the dispute between Rav and Shmuel is with regard to a case of an error concerning one woman similar to an error concerning two women. He betrothed one woman conditionally and then divorced her, and subsequently married her again without specification. In this case, Rav and Shmuel dispute whether the assumption is that he intended to nullify the initial condition with the second betrothal or whether he married her the second time based upon the conditions of the first betrothal. But in the case of a simple error only concerning one woman, where he betroths her with a condition, marries her without specification, and then discovers that the condition was not fulfilled, all agree that she does not require a bill of divorce from him.

讗讬转讬讘讬讛 讗讘讬讬 拽讬讚砖讛 讘讟注讜转 讜驻讞讜转 诪砖讜讛 驻专讜讟讛 讜讻谉 拽讟谉 砖拽讬讚砖 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖砖诇讞 住讘诇讜谞讜转 诇讗讞专 诪讬讻谉 讗讬谞讛 诪拽讜讚砖转 砖诪讞诪转 拽讚讜砖讬谉 讛专讗砖讜谞讬诐 砖诇讞 讜讗诐 讘注诇讜 拽谞讜 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讬讛讜讚讛 诪砖讜诐 专讘讬 讬砖诪注讗诇 讗诪专 讗诐 讘注诇讜 诇讗 拽谞讜

Abaye raised an objection to Rabba鈥檚 statement from a baraita: In cases where the man betrothed her in error, or he betrothed her with an item worth less than the value of a peruta, and similarly in a case where there was a minor boy who betrothed a woman, even if the man later sent presents [sivlonot] to the bride after he became an adult, she is not betrothed, because he sent them on the basis of the original betrothal. And if the men in any of these cases engaged in sexual intercourse with the woman after betrothal at the appropriate time, they have acquired the women as their wives, since they presumably intended the intercourse to serve as betrothal. Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda said in the name of Rabbi Yishmael: Even if they engage in sexual intercourse, they have not acquired the women as wives, since they presumably engaged in these relations based upon the earlier betrothal, which was invalid.

讜讛讗 讛讻讗 讚讟注讜转 讗砖讛 讗讞转 讛讬讗 讜驻诇讬讙讬 诪讗讬 诇讗讜 讟注讜转 谞讚专讬诐

Noting that the first case in the baraita is where a man betrothed a woman in error, Abaye asks: But here in this baraita, where the first case is an error concerning one woman, and the first tanna and Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda disagree; what, is it not that the intention of the phrase: Betrothed her in error, is referring to an error in the condition with regard to vows, where he mistakenly believed she didn鈥檛 have any vows incumbent upon her? This would constitute a refutation of Rabba鈥檚 statement that all agree that in a case of an error concerning one woman she is betrothed.

诇讗 讟注讜转 驻讞讜转 诪砖讜讛 驻专讜讟讛 驻讞讜转 诪砖讜讛 驻专讜讟讛 讘讛讚讬讗 拽转谞讬 诇讛 拽讬讚砖讛 讘讟注讜转 讜驻讞讜转 诪砖讜讛 驻专讜讟讛 驻专讜砖讬 拽讗 诪驻专砖 拽讬讚砖讛 讘讟注讜转 讻讬爪讚 讻讙讜谉 砖拽讬讚砖讛 讘驻讞讜转 诪砖讜讛 驻专讜讟讛

The Gemara responds: No, here it is referring to a halakhic error, that he betrothed a woman with an item worth less than the value of a peruta. The Gemara asks: Concerning the case where the betrothal is with an item worth less than the value of a peruta, the baraita teaches it explicitly as a separate case with the following words: If he betrothed her in error, or if he betrothed her with an item worth less than the value of a peruta. The Gemara answers: It is explaining what it stated earlier: What is the case of one who betrothed her in error? For example, when he betrothed her with an item worth less than the value of a peruta, as he did not engage in sexual intercourse with her based on such a betrothal.

讘诪讗讬 拽讗 诪讬驻诇讙讬 诪专 住讘专 讗讚诐 讬讜讚注 砖讗讬谉 拽讚讜砖讬谉 转讜驻住讬谉 讘驻讞讜转 诪砖讜讛 驻专讜讟讛 讜讙诪专 讜讘注诇 诇砖诐 拽讚讜砖讬谉 讜诪专 住讘专 讗讬谉 讗讚诐 讬讜讚注 砖讗讬谉 拽讚讜砖讬谉 转讜驻住讬谉 讘驻讞讜转 诪砖讜讛 驻专讜讟讛 讜讻讬 拽讗 讘注诇 讗讚注转讗 讚拽讚讜砖讬谉 讛专讗砖讜谞讬诐 讘注诇

The Gemara asks: With regard to what do they disagree? The Gemara answers: One Sage, the first tanna, holds that a person knows that betrothal does not take effect with an item worth less than the value of a peruta. Consequently, he decides to engage in sexual intercourse for the purpose of betrothal and therefore acquires the woman as his wife through these relations. And one Sage, Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda, holds that a person does not know that betrothal does not take effect with an item worth less than the value of a peruta, and when he later engages in sexual intercourse, he does so on the basis of the original betrothal, so no new betrothal takes place.

讗讬转讬讘讬讛 讛专讬谞讬 讘讜注诇讬讱 注诇 诪谞转 砖讬专爪讛 讗讘讗 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖诇讗 专爪讛 讛讗讘 诪拽讜讚砖转 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讜诪专 诪砖讜诐 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 专爪讛 讛讗讘 诪拽讜讚砖转 诇讗 专爪讛 讛讗讘 讗讬谞讛 诪拽讜讚砖转 讜讛讗 讛讻讗 讚讻讬 讟注讜转 讗砖讛 讗讞转 讚诪讬 讜驻诇讬讙讬

Abaye again raised an objection to Rabba鈥檚 statement from a baraita: If a man said to a woman: I am engaging in sexual intercourse with you for the purpose of betrothal on condition that my father will desire our betrothal, and then he married her without specification, although the father did not desire it, she is nevertheless betrothed through this act of intercourse. Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda says in the name of Rabbi Shimon: If the father desires it, she is betrothed, and if the father does not desire it, she is not betrothed, since he engaged in intercourse with her based on the initial condition. But here it is similar to a mistake concerning one woman, and they disagree whether the betrothal is valid.

讛转诐 讘讛讗 拽诪讬驻诇讙讬 诪专 住讘专 注诇 诪谞转 砖讬专爪讛 讛讗讘 注诇 诪谞转 砖讬砖转讜拽 讛讗讘 讜讛讗 砖转讬拽 诇讬讛 讜诪专 住讘专 注诇 诪谞转 砖讬讗诪专 讗讘讗 讛谉 讜讛讗 诇讗 讗诪专 讗讘讗 讛谉

The Gemara responds: There, they disagree about this: One Sage, the first tanna, holds that: On condition that my father will desire it, means: On condition that my father is silent. Consequently, if his father does not protest, the betrothal is valid, and he was indeed silent about it. And one Sage, Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda, holds that it means: On condition that my father says yes, and he did not say yes. Therefore, the dispute is about the significance of the father鈥檚 silence in this case.

讗讬转讬讘讬讛 诪讜讚讬诐 讞讻诪讬诐 诇专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讘拽讟谞讛 砖讛砖讬讗讛 讗讘讬讛 讜谞转讙专砖讛 讜讛讬讗 讬转讜诪讛 讘讞讬讬 讛讗讘 讜讛讞讝讬专讛 砖讞讜诇爪转 讜诇讗 诪转讬讘诪转

Abaye again raised an objection to Rabba鈥檚 statement from a baraita: The Rabbis concede to Rabbi Eliezer concerning a minor girl who was married off by her father and then divorced while she was still a minor, and is therefore treated by the halakha as an orphan in the lifetime of the father, since the halakha is that the father is no longer able to marry her off to someone else, and while she was still a minor, her former husband remarried her, and he then died without children, that she performs 岣litza and may not instead enter into levirate marriage.

诪驻谞讬 砖讙讬专讜砖讬讛 讙讬专讜砖讬谉 讙诪讜专讬谉 讜讗讬谉 讞讝专转讛 讞讝专讛 讙诪讜专讛

The baraita continues: This is because her divorce was a full-fledged divorce, since the father has authority to receive her bill of divorce from her husband, and her return to her husband afterward is not a full-fledged return, since she remarries her husband while still a minor, and her father no longer has authority to marry her off, and marriage to a minor girl by her own consent is not considered a full-fledged marriage. She is consequently prohibited from entering into a levirate marriage based on the prohibition against a divorc茅e marrying her former husband鈥檚 brother.

讘诪讛 讚讘专讬诐 讗诪讜专讬诐 砖讙讬专砖讛 讻砖讛讬讗 拽讟谞讛 讜讛讞讝讬专讛 讻砖讛讬讗 拽讟谞讛 讗讘诇 讙讬专砖讛 讻砖讛讬讗 拽讟谞讛 讜讛讞讝讬专讛 讻砖讛讬讗 讙讚讜诇讛 讗讜 砖讛讞讝讬专讛 讻砖讛讬讗 拽讟谞讛 讜讙讚诇讛 讗爪诇讜 讜诪转 讗讜 讞讜诇爪转 讗讜 诪转讬讘诪转

The baraita continues: In what case is this statement said? When he divorced her while she was still a minor girl and then remarried her while she was still a minor girl. But if he divorced her while she was still a minor girl, and then remarried her when she was an adult woman, or if he remarried her while she was still a minor girl and she became an adult woman while married to him, the second marriage is binding, and she has the status of a full-fledged married woman. And therefore, if he died, either she performs 岣litza or she enters into levirate marriage like any other widow.

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Joanna Rom and Steven Goldberg in loving memory of Steve's mother Shirley "Nana" Goldberg (Sura Tema bat Chaim v'Hanka)

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Ketubot 73

The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria

Ketubot 73

诇讗 转讬诪讗 讟注诪讬讛 讚专讘 讻讬讜谉 砖讻谞住讛 住转诐 讗讞讜诇讬 讗讞诇讬讛 诇转谞讗讬讛 讗诇讗 讟注诪讗 讚专讘 诇驻讬 砖讗讬谉 讗讚诐 注讜砖讛 讘注讬诇转讜 讘注讬诇转 讝谞讜转

Do not say that Rav鈥檚 reason for requiring a bill of divorce is that since he married her without specification, this indicates that he waived his condition entirely, and therefore he must give her the payment of her marriage contract if he divorces her. Rather, Rav鈥檚 reason is because a person does not intentionally engage in licentious sexual intercourse. He is aware that the initial betrothal may possibly be nullified, rendering sexual intercourse licentious. Therefore, when he marries her, he does so with the intention that the consummation of the marriage serves as unconditional betrothal. However, as he does not entirely waive his condition, if it becomes clear that the condition was not fulfilled, she may be divorced without receiving payment of her marriage contract.

讛讗 驻诇讬讙讬 讘讛 讞讚讗 讝讬诪谞讗 讚讗转诪专 拽讟谞讛 砖诇讗 诪讬讗谞讛 讜讛讙讚讬诇讛 注诪讚讛 讜谞讬砖讗转 专讘 讗诪专 讗讬谉 爪专讬讻讛 讙讟 诪砖谞讬

The Gemara asks: But they already disagree about this fundamental issue of whether it may be assumed that a person does not intentionally engage in licentious sexual intercourse one other time. As it is stated: With regard to a minor girl whose mother or brother married her off, and who did not refuse her husband, despite having the right to do so, and when she became an adult she arose and married someone else, Rav said: She does not require a bill of divorce from the second one. Since she did not refuse the first husband while still a minor, and presumably he later engaged in sexual intercourse with her when she became an adult, and since the assumption is that he does not intentionally engage in licentious relations, the first marriage is binding and the second is meaningless.

讜砖诪讜讗诇 讗诪专 爪专讬讻讛 讙讟 诪砖谞讬

And Shmuel said: She requires a bill of divorce from the second one. Her first husband did not engage in sexual intercourse with the intention that it serve as a new betrothal, rather he intended to continue the relationship established between them when she was a minor. Therefore, she is not considered to be his wife and the second marriage is binding.

爪专讬讻讗 讚讗讬 讗转诪专 讘讛讛讬讗 讘讛讛讬讗 拽讗诪专 专讘 诪砖讜诐 讚诇讬讻讗 转谞讗讛 讗讘诇 讘讛讗 讚讗讬讻讗 转谞讗讛 讗讬诪讗 诪讜讚讬 诇讬讛 诇砖诪讜讗诇

The Gemara explains: It is necessary to state the dispute in both instances. For if it was stated only in that case of the minor who did not refuse, one could say that in that case Rav stated his opinion because there is no condition attached to the betrothal. Consequently, when she becomes an adult, he engages in sexual intercourse with intent to betroth her, as he recognizes that the initial betrothal was ineffective. But in this case, where there is a condition and it is unfulfilled, one could say that he concedes to Shmuel that he did not intend to betroth her through intercourse, and she does not require a bill of divorce.

讜讗讬 讗转诪专 讘讛讗 讘讛讗 拽讗诪专 砖诪讜讗诇 讗讘诇 讘讛讱 讗讬诪讗 诪讜讚讬 诇讬讛 诇专讘 爪专讬讻讗

And conversely, if it was stated only in this case concerning betrothal, it could be argued that in this case Shmuel said that the betrothal is not valid when he engages in sexual intercourse with her, since she violated a condition, but in that case of the minor who did not refuse, one could say that he concedes to Rav. Therefore, it is necessary to state the argument explicitly in both cases.

转谞谉 讻谞住讛 住转诐 讜谞诪爪讗讜 注诇讬讛 谞讚专讬诐 转爪讗 砖诇讗 讘讻转讜讘讛 讻转讜讘讛 讛讜讗 讚诇讗 讘注讬讗 讛讗 讙讬讟讗 讘注讬讗 诪讗讬 诇讗讜 拽讬讚砖讛 注诇 转谞讗讬 讜讻谞住讛 住转诐 转讬讜讘转讗 讚砖诪讜讗诇

The Gemara discusses proofs for both sides of this dispute: We learned in the mishna: If he married her without specification, and it was discovered that vows were incumbent upon her, she may be divorced without receiving payment of her marriage contract. The Gemara infers: She does not require or receive payment of her marriage contract, but she does require a bill of divorce. What, is it not speaking about the case discussed in the first clause, namely that he betrothed her conditionally and then married her without specification? If so, the mishna is a conclusive refutation of Shmuel鈥檚 opinion.

诇讗 拽讬讚砖讛 住转诐 讜讻谞住讛 住转诐

The Gemara rejects the proof: No, the case there is referring to where he betrothed her without specification and then married her without specification.

讗讘诇 拽讬讚砖讛 注诇 转谞讗讬 讜讻谞住讛 住转诐 讛讻讬 谞诪讬 讚诇讗 讘注讬讗 讙讬讟讗 讗讚转谞讬 讛诪拽讚砖 讗转 讛讗砖讛 注诇 诪谞转 砖讗讬谉 注诇讬讛 谞讚专讬诐 讜谞诪爪讗讜 注诇讬讛 谞讚专讬诐 讗讬谞讛 诪拽讜讚砖转 诇讬转谞讬 讻谞住讛 住转诐 讜谞诪爪讗讜 注诇讬讛 谞讚专讬诐 讗讬谞讛 诪拽讜讚砖转 讜讻诇 砖讻谉 讛讗

The Gemara asks: But according to this explanation, if he betrothed her conditionally and then married her without specification, is it indeed the case that she does not require a bill of divorce? If so, instead of teaching in the mishna that if one betroths a woman on condition that there are no vows incumbent upon her to fulfill, and it was subsequently discovered that there are vows that are incumbent upon her, she is not betrothed, let the mishna teach instead a more novel halakha: If he betrothed her with a condition and married her without specification and then it was discovered that vows were incumbent upon her, she is not betrothed. And from this one can derive that all the more so the same halakha would apply in this case, where he betrothed her conditionally but did not repeat the condition when marrying her.

讛讻讬 谞诪讬 拽讗诪专 讛诪拽讚砖 讗转 讛讗砖讛 注诇 诪谞转 砖讗讬谉 注诇讬讛 谞讚专讬诐 讜讻谞住讛 住转诐 讜谞诪爪讗讜 注诇讬讛 谞讚专讬诐 讗讬谞讛 诪拽讜讚砖转 拽讬讚砖讛 住转诐 讜讻谞住讛 住转诐 转爪讗 砖诇讗 讘讻转讜讘讛

The Gemara answers: That is also what he is saying, and one should understand the mishna this way: One who betroths a woman on condition that there are no vows incumbent upon her to fulfill, and then marries her without specification, and it is then discovered that vows were incumbent upon her, she is not betrothed. If he betrothed her without specification and married her without specification, she requires a bill of divorce but may be divorced without receiving payment of her marriage contract.

讻转讜讘讛 讛讜讗 讚诇讗 讘注讬讗 讛讗 讙讬讟讗 讘注讬讗 讜诪讗讬 砖谞讗 讻转讜讘讛 讚诇讗 讘注讬讗 讚讗诪专 讗讬 讗驻砖讬 讘讗砖讛 谞讚专谞讬转 讗讬 讛讻讬 讙讟 谞诪讬 诇讗 转讬讘注讬

The Gemara asks about this halakha according to Shmuel: The mishna says that she does not require or receive payment of her marriage contract, but one can infer that she does require a bill of divorce. And what is different about a marriage contract that she does not require payment? Because he says: I do not want a vowing wife, and therefore the marriage is considered a mistaken transaction. If so, she should also not require a bill of divorce. Since he is clearly particular about this, shouldn鈥檛 the betrothal also be considered a mistaken transaction?

讗诪专 专讘讛 爪专讬讻讛 讙讟 诪讚讘专讬讛诐 讜讻谉 讗诪专 专讘 讞住讚讗 爪专讬讻讛 讙讟 诪讚讘专讬讛诐 专讘讗 讗诪专 转谞讗 住驻讜拽讬 诪住驻拽讗 诇讬讛 讙讘讬 诪诪讜谞讗 诇拽讜诇讗 讙讘讬 讗讬住讜专讗 诇讞讜诪专讗

Rabba said: She requires a bill of divorce from the words of the Sages, i.e., by rabbinic law. Although by Torah law the betrothal is in fact invalid, the Sages declared that since he did not explicitly stipulate the condition, she requires a bill of divorce. And similarly, Rav 岣sda said: She requires a bill of divorce from the words of the Sages. Rava said a different explanation: The tanna is uncertain about the status of the betrothal in this case. Concerning monetary matters, one should be lenient. Therefore, she cannot extract money from the husband for the marriage contract based on the principle that in monetary cases the burden of proof rests upon the claimant. But concerning prohibitions such as adultery, one must be stringent, and she therefore requires a bill of divorce.

讗诪专 专讘讛 诪讞诇讜拽转 讘讟注讜转 砖转讬 谞砖讬诐 讗讘诇 讘讟注讜转 讗砖讛 讗讞转 讚讘专讬 讛讻诇 讗讬谉 爪专讬讻讛 讛讬诪谞讜 讙讟

Rabba said: The dispute between Rav and Shmuel is in the case of an error concerning two women. The same man married one woman on condition that she had no vows incumbent upon her and then married another woman without specification. Rav and Shmuel disagree whether the condition he explicitly stated for the first woman should be seen as proof that he is particular about this with regard to the second one as well, to the point that the betrothal is invalid if the condition was not fulfilled. But in the case of an error concerning one woman, where he betroths her with a condition, marries her without specification, and subsequently discovered that the condition was not fulfilled, all agree, including Rav, that she does not require a bill of divorce from him.

讗诪专 (诇讬讛) 讗讘讬讬 讜讛讗 诪转谞讬转讬谉 讚讟注讜转 讗砖讛 讗讞转 讛讬讗 讜拽诪讜转讘讬谞谉 转讬讜讘转讗 诪讬谞讬讛

Abaye said to him: But the mishna discusses an error concerning one woman, as a second woman is not mentioned, and we raise an objection from it against Shmuel, implying that Rav and Shmuel have a dispute in this case as well. How, then, can you say that dispute is in the case of an error concerning two women?

讗诇讗 讗讬 讗转诪专 讛讻讬 讗转诪专 讗诪专 专讘讛 诪讞诇讜拽转 讘讟注讜转 讗砖讛 讗讞转 讻注讬谉 砖转讬 谞砖讬诐 讗讘诇 讘讟注讜转 讗砖讛 讗讞转 讙专讬讚转讗 讚讘专讬 讛讻诇 讗讬谞讛 爪专讬讻讛 讛讬诪谞讜 讙讟

Rather, the previous explanation must be retracted and instead the Gemara says: If the above statement of Rabba was said, it was said as follows: Rabba said that the dispute between Rav and Shmuel is with regard to a case of an error concerning one woman similar to an error concerning two women. He betrothed one woman conditionally and then divorced her, and subsequently married her again without specification. In this case, Rav and Shmuel dispute whether the assumption is that he intended to nullify the initial condition with the second betrothal or whether he married her the second time based upon the conditions of the first betrothal. But in the case of a simple error only concerning one woman, where he betroths her with a condition, marries her without specification, and then discovers that the condition was not fulfilled, all agree that she does not require a bill of divorce from him.

讗讬转讬讘讬讛 讗讘讬讬 拽讬讚砖讛 讘讟注讜转 讜驻讞讜转 诪砖讜讛 驻专讜讟讛 讜讻谉 拽讟谉 砖拽讬讚砖 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖砖诇讞 住讘诇讜谞讜转 诇讗讞专 诪讬讻谉 讗讬谞讛 诪拽讜讚砖转 砖诪讞诪转 拽讚讜砖讬谉 讛专讗砖讜谞讬诐 砖诇讞 讜讗诐 讘注诇讜 拽谞讜 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讬讛讜讚讛 诪砖讜诐 专讘讬 讬砖诪注讗诇 讗诪专 讗诐 讘注诇讜 诇讗 拽谞讜

Abaye raised an objection to Rabba鈥檚 statement from a baraita: In cases where the man betrothed her in error, or he betrothed her with an item worth less than the value of a peruta, and similarly in a case where there was a minor boy who betrothed a woman, even if the man later sent presents [sivlonot] to the bride after he became an adult, she is not betrothed, because he sent them on the basis of the original betrothal. And if the men in any of these cases engaged in sexual intercourse with the woman after betrothal at the appropriate time, they have acquired the women as their wives, since they presumably intended the intercourse to serve as betrothal. Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda said in the name of Rabbi Yishmael: Even if they engage in sexual intercourse, they have not acquired the women as wives, since they presumably engaged in these relations based upon the earlier betrothal, which was invalid.

讜讛讗 讛讻讗 讚讟注讜转 讗砖讛 讗讞转 讛讬讗 讜驻诇讬讙讬 诪讗讬 诇讗讜 讟注讜转 谞讚专讬诐

Noting that the first case in the baraita is where a man betrothed a woman in error, Abaye asks: But here in this baraita, where the first case is an error concerning one woman, and the first tanna and Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda disagree; what, is it not that the intention of the phrase: Betrothed her in error, is referring to an error in the condition with regard to vows, where he mistakenly believed she didn鈥檛 have any vows incumbent upon her? This would constitute a refutation of Rabba鈥檚 statement that all agree that in a case of an error concerning one woman she is betrothed.

诇讗 讟注讜转 驻讞讜转 诪砖讜讛 驻专讜讟讛 驻讞讜转 诪砖讜讛 驻专讜讟讛 讘讛讚讬讗 拽转谞讬 诇讛 拽讬讚砖讛 讘讟注讜转 讜驻讞讜转 诪砖讜讛 驻专讜讟讛 驻专讜砖讬 拽讗 诪驻专砖 拽讬讚砖讛 讘讟注讜转 讻讬爪讚 讻讙讜谉 砖拽讬讚砖讛 讘驻讞讜转 诪砖讜讛 驻专讜讟讛

The Gemara responds: No, here it is referring to a halakhic error, that he betrothed a woman with an item worth less than the value of a peruta. The Gemara asks: Concerning the case where the betrothal is with an item worth less than the value of a peruta, the baraita teaches it explicitly as a separate case with the following words: If he betrothed her in error, or if he betrothed her with an item worth less than the value of a peruta. The Gemara answers: It is explaining what it stated earlier: What is the case of one who betrothed her in error? For example, when he betrothed her with an item worth less than the value of a peruta, as he did not engage in sexual intercourse with her based on such a betrothal.

讘诪讗讬 拽讗 诪讬驻诇讙讬 诪专 住讘专 讗讚诐 讬讜讚注 砖讗讬谉 拽讚讜砖讬谉 转讜驻住讬谉 讘驻讞讜转 诪砖讜讛 驻专讜讟讛 讜讙诪专 讜讘注诇 诇砖诐 拽讚讜砖讬谉 讜诪专 住讘专 讗讬谉 讗讚诐 讬讜讚注 砖讗讬谉 拽讚讜砖讬谉 转讜驻住讬谉 讘驻讞讜转 诪砖讜讛 驻专讜讟讛 讜讻讬 拽讗 讘注诇 讗讚注转讗 讚拽讚讜砖讬谉 讛专讗砖讜谞讬诐 讘注诇

The Gemara asks: With regard to what do they disagree? The Gemara answers: One Sage, the first tanna, holds that a person knows that betrothal does not take effect with an item worth less than the value of a peruta. Consequently, he decides to engage in sexual intercourse for the purpose of betrothal and therefore acquires the woman as his wife through these relations. And one Sage, Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda, holds that a person does not know that betrothal does not take effect with an item worth less than the value of a peruta, and when he later engages in sexual intercourse, he does so on the basis of the original betrothal, so no new betrothal takes place.

讗讬转讬讘讬讛 讛专讬谞讬 讘讜注诇讬讱 注诇 诪谞转 砖讬专爪讛 讗讘讗 讗祝 注诇 驻讬 砖诇讗 专爪讛 讛讗讘 诪拽讜讚砖转 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讬讛讜讚讛 讗讜诪专 诪砖讜诐 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 专爪讛 讛讗讘 诪拽讜讚砖转 诇讗 专爪讛 讛讗讘 讗讬谞讛 诪拽讜讚砖转 讜讛讗 讛讻讗 讚讻讬 讟注讜转 讗砖讛 讗讞转 讚诪讬 讜驻诇讬讙讬

Abaye again raised an objection to Rabba鈥檚 statement from a baraita: If a man said to a woman: I am engaging in sexual intercourse with you for the purpose of betrothal on condition that my father will desire our betrothal, and then he married her without specification, although the father did not desire it, she is nevertheless betrothed through this act of intercourse. Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda says in the name of Rabbi Shimon: If the father desires it, she is betrothed, and if the father does not desire it, she is not betrothed, since he engaged in intercourse with her based on the initial condition. But here it is similar to a mistake concerning one woman, and they disagree whether the betrothal is valid.

讛转诐 讘讛讗 拽诪讬驻诇讙讬 诪专 住讘专 注诇 诪谞转 砖讬专爪讛 讛讗讘 注诇 诪谞转 砖讬砖转讜拽 讛讗讘 讜讛讗 砖转讬拽 诇讬讛 讜诪专 住讘专 注诇 诪谞转 砖讬讗诪专 讗讘讗 讛谉 讜讛讗 诇讗 讗诪专 讗讘讗 讛谉

The Gemara responds: There, they disagree about this: One Sage, the first tanna, holds that: On condition that my father will desire it, means: On condition that my father is silent. Consequently, if his father does not protest, the betrothal is valid, and he was indeed silent about it. And one Sage, Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda, holds that it means: On condition that my father says yes, and he did not say yes. Therefore, the dispute is about the significance of the father鈥檚 silence in this case.

讗讬转讬讘讬讛 诪讜讚讬诐 讞讻诪讬诐 诇专讘讬 讗诇讬注讝专 讘拽讟谞讛 砖讛砖讬讗讛 讗讘讬讛 讜谞转讙专砖讛 讜讛讬讗 讬转讜诪讛 讘讞讬讬 讛讗讘 讜讛讞讝讬专讛 砖讞讜诇爪转 讜诇讗 诪转讬讘诪转

Abaye again raised an objection to Rabba鈥檚 statement from a baraita: The Rabbis concede to Rabbi Eliezer concerning a minor girl who was married off by her father and then divorced while she was still a minor, and is therefore treated by the halakha as an orphan in the lifetime of the father, since the halakha is that the father is no longer able to marry her off to someone else, and while she was still a minor, her former husband remarried her, and he then died without children, that she performs 岣litza and may not instead enter into levirate marriage.

诪驻谞讬 砖讙讬专讜砖讬讛 讙讬专讜砖讬谉 讙诪讜专讬谉 讜讗讬谉 讞讝专转讛 讞讝专讛 讙诪讜专讛

The baraita continues: This is because her divorce was a full-fledged divorce, since the father has authority to receive her bill of divorce from her husband, and her return to her husband afterward is not a full-fledged return, since she remarries her husband while still a minor, and her father no longer has authority to marry her off, and marriage to a minor girl by her own consent is not considered a full-fledged marriage. She is consequently prohibited from entering into a levirate marriage based on the prohibition against a divorc茅e marrying her former husband鈥檚 brother.

讘诪讛 讚讘专讬诐 讗诪讜专讬诐 砖讙讬专砖讛 讻砖讛讬讗 拽讟谞讛 讜讛讞讝讬专讛 讻砖讛讬讗 拽讟谞讛 讗讘诇 讙讬专砖讛 讻砖讛讬讗 拽讟谞讛 讜讛讞讝讬专讛 讻砖讛讬讗 讙讚讜诇讛 讗讜 砖讛讞讝讬专讛 讻砖讛讬讗 拽讟谞讛 讜讙讚诇讛 讗爪诇讜 讜诪转 讗讜 讞讜诇爪转 讗讜 诪转讬讘诪转

The baraita continues: In what case is this statement said? When he divorced her while she was still a minor girl and then remarried her while she was still a minor girl. But if he divorced her while she was still a minor girl, and then remarried her when she was an adult woman, or if he remarried her while she was still a minor girl and she became an adult woman while married to him, the second marriage is binding, and she has the status of a full-fledged married woman. And therefore, if he died, either she performs 岣litza or she enters into levirate marriage like any other widow.

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