Today's Daf Yomi
September 22, 2022 | 讻状讜 讘讗诇讜诇 转砖驻状讘
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This month is sponsored by Esther Kremer in loving memory of her father, Manny Gross z'l, on his 1st yahrzeit
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Masechet Ketubot is sponsored by Erica and Rob Schwartz in honor of the 50th wedding anniversary of Erica's parents Sheira and Steve Schacter.
Ketubot 78
Today’s daf is sponsored by Malka Abraham. ” Thank you to Rabbanit Michelle and the entire Hadran community. Shana Tova!”
Beit Shamai and Beit Hillel both agree that if a woman received usufruct property before she was betrothed, she had the rights to sell it. But they disagree regarding the usufruct property of a woman that comes to her possession when she is betrothed. Can she sell it? And if the answer is no, if she does it anyway, is the sale a valid sale? According to Rabbi Yehuda, a discussion ensued between the rabbis and Rabban Gamliel debating whether the husband during the betrothal should or should not be able to prevent his wife from being able to sell her property. In the case where she receives usufruct property during the marriage, all agree that if she were to sell it, the sale is not valid. However, Rabban Gamliel holds that if she received the property during or before the betrothal and sold it after she was married, the sale is valid. Rabbi Chanina ben Akavia holds explained that a discussion ensued between the rabbis and Rabban Gamliel debating whether the husband during the marriage should have full rights to the property she inherited before or not. Rabbi Shimon distinguishes between property the husband knew of (sale is not valid) and property he did not know of (sale is valid, even though ideally, she should not sell it). Why do Beit Shamai and Beit Hillel agree in the case before the betrothal but disagree after the betrothal? Was Rabbi Yehuda’s description of the discussion between Rabban Gamliel and the rabbis referring to her ability to sell the property ab initio (Beit Shamai) or post facto (where both Beit Shamai and Beit Hillel agree)? To answer the question they quote the Tosefta Ketubot 8:1. In that source Rabbi Chanina is quoted there with a different version of the line of argumentation of Rabban Gamliel against the rabbis. Also there, he has a different opinion regarding the sale of property received before the wedding but sold during the marriage – he says it can be done ab initio. This contradicts our Mishna that says the sale is valid only after the fact, but ideally, she can’t sell it. The contradiction is resolved by explaining that Rabbi Yehuda (the Mishna) and Rabbi Chanina (the Tosefta) disagree about what Rabban Gamliel held in this case. Rav and Shmuel have a third approach that in this case, the sale would be invalid. As this corresponds with no opinion we have seen thus far, how can they say that? Once she is married and inherits property, all agree that the sale is not valid. Is this the same as the takana they instituted in Usha? What did Rabbi Shimon mean by “property he knew about” and “property he did not know about”? Two explanations are brought.
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讛讗砖讛 砖谞驻诇讜 诇讛 谞讻住讬诐 注讚 砖诇讗 转转讗专住 诪讜讚讬诐 讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 讜讘讬转 讛诇诇 砖诪讜讻专转 讜谞讜转谞转 讜拽讬讬诐 谞驻诇讜 诇讛 诪砖谞转讗专住讛 讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 讗讜诪专讬诐 转诪讻讜专 讜讘讬转 讛诇诇 讗讜诪专讬诐 诇讗 转诪讻讜专 讗诇讜 讜讗诇讜 诪讜讚讬诐 砖讗诐 诪讻专讛 讜谞转谞讛 拽讬讬诐
MISHNA: With regard to a woman to whom property was bequeathed before she was betrothed, and she was then betrothed, Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel agree that she may sell or give the property as a gift, and the transaction is valid. However, if the property was bequeathed to her after she was betrothed, Beit Shammai say: She may sell it as long as she is betrothed, and Beit Hillel say: She may not sell it. Both these, Beit Shammai, and those, Beit Hillel, agree that if she sold it or gave it away as a gift, the transaction is valid.
讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诪专讜 讞讻诪讬诐 诇驻谞讬 专讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讛讜讗讬诇 讜讝讻讛 讘讗砖讛 诇讗 讬讝讻讛 讘谞讻住讬诐 讗诪专 诇讛诐 注诇 讛讞讚砖讬诐 讗谞讜 讘讜砖讬诐 讗诇讗 砖讗转诐 诪讙诇讙诇讬谉 注诇讬谞讜 讗转 讛讬砖谞讬诐
Rabbi Yehuda said that the Sages said before Rabban Gamliel: Since he acquired the woman herself through betrothal, will he not acquire the property from the moment of their betrothal? Why, then, is her transaction valid? Rabban Gamliel said to them: With regard to the new property that she inherited after marriage, we are ashamed, because it is unclear why she cannot sell it, as it is hers; and you also seek to impose upon us a prohibition with regard to the old property that she owned beforehand?
谞驻诇讜 诇讛 诪砖谞砖讗转 讗诇讜 讜讗诇讜 诪讜讚讬诐 砖讗诐 诪讻专讛 讜谞转谞讛 砖讛讘注诇 诪讜爪讬讗 诪讬讚 讛诇拽讜讞讜转 注讚 砖诇讗 谞砖讗转 讜谞砖讗转 专讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讗讜诪专 讗诐 诪讻专讛 讜谞转谞讛 拽讬讬诐 讗诪专 专讘讬 讞谞讬谞讗 讘谉 注拽讘讬讗 讗诪专讜 诇驻谞讬 专讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讛讜讗讬诇 讜讝讻讛 讘讗砖讛 诇讗 讬讝讻讛 讘谞讻住讬诐 讗诪专 诇讛诐 注诇 讛讞讚砖讬诐 讗谞讜 讘讜砖讬诐 讗诇讗 砖讗转诐 诪讙诇讙诇讬谉 注诇讬谞讜 讛讬砖谞讬诐
If the property was bequeathed to her after she was married, both these, Beit Shammai, and those, Beit Hillel, agree that if she sold the property or gave it away, the husband may repossess it from the purchasers. If she inherited the property before she was married and then was married, Rabban Gamliel says: If she sold or gave the property away, the transaction is valid. Rabbi 岣nina ben Akavya said that the Sages said before Rabban Gamliel: Since he acquired the woman through marriage, will he not acquire the property? Rabban Gamliel said to them: With regard to the new property we are ashamed, and you also seek to impose upon us a prohibition with regard to the old property?
专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讞讜诇拽 讘讬谉 谞讻住讬诐 诇谞讻住讬诐 谞讻住讬诐 讛讬讚讜注讬谉 诇讘注诇 诇讗 转诪讻讜专 讜讗诐 诪讻专讛 讜谞转谞讛 讘讟诇 砖讗讬谞谉 讬讚讜注讬谉 诇讘注诇 诇讗 转诪讻讜专 讜讗诐 诪讻专讛 讜谞转谞讛 拽讬讬诐:
Rabbi Shimon distinguishes between one type of property and another type of property: Property that is known to the husband she may not sell once she is married, and if she sold it or gave it away, the transaction is void. Property that is unknown to the husband she may not sell, but if she sold it or gave it away, the transaction is valid.
讙诪壮 诪讗讬 砖谞讗 专讬砖讗 讚诇讗 驻诇讬讙讬 讜诪讗讬 砖谞讗 住讬驻讗 讚驻诇讬讙讬
GEMARA: The Gemara asks: What is different in the first clause of the mishna, when she inherited property before she was betrothed, such that Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel do not disagree, and what is different in the latter clause, when she inherited property after betrothal, such that they disagree? If the dispute concerns the right to her property after she is betrothed, what difference does it make whether her ownership began before or after the betrothal?
讗诪专讬 讚讘讬 专讘讬 讬谞讗讬 专讬砖讗 讘讝讻讜转讛 谞驻诇讜 住讬驻讗 讘讝讻讜转讜 谞驻诇讜
The Gemara answers that the Sages of the school of Rabbi Yannai say: In the first clause, where she inherited the property before her betrothal, the inheritance was bequeathed to her during a period when she had rights to her property, whereas in the latter clause, the inheritance was bequeathed to her during a period when he had rights to her property.
讗诐 讘讝讻讜转讜 谞驻诇讜 讻讬 诪讻专讛 讜谞转谞讛 讗诪讗讬 拽讬讬诐 讗诇讗 专讬砖讗 讜讚讗讬 讘讝讻讜转讛 谞驻诇讜 住讬驻讗 讗讬诪专 讘讝讻讜转讛 讗讬诪专 讘讝讻讜转讜 诇讻转讞诇讛 诇讗 转诪讻讜专 讗诐 诪讻专讛 讜谞转谞讛 拽讬讬诐:
The Gemara raises a difficulty: If, in the latter clause the property was bequeathed to her when he had rights to it, why is the transaction valid when she sold it or gave it away? Rather, in the first clause, where she inherited the property before her betrothal, it certainly was bequeathed to her when she had rights to it and it therefore fully belongs to her. However, in the latter clause, where she inherited it after her betrothal, one can say that perhaps during this time she has rights to it, or say that perhaps during this time he has rights to it. Since the ownership of the property is a matter of uncertainty, Beit Hillel rule that she may not sell ab initio, but if she sold it or gave it away, the transaction is valid.
讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诪专讜 诇驻谞讬 专讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇: 讗讬讘注讬讗 诇讛讜 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诇讻转讞诇讛 讗讜 讗讚讬注讘讚
搂 The mishna states that Rabbi Yehuda said that the Sages said before Rabban Gamliel: Since he acquired the woman herself through betrothal, will he not acquire the property from the moment of their betrothal? A dilemma was raised before the Sages: When Rabbi Yehuda cited this question of the Sages, was he referring to her selling the property ab initio, which is permitted only according to Beit Shammai, or was he referring to the sale after the fact, which is valid even according to Beit Hillel?
转讗 砖诪注 讚转谞讬讗 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诪专讜 诇驻谞讬 专讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讛讜讗讬诇 讜讝讜 讗砖转讜 讜讝讜 讗砖转讜 讝讜 诪讻专讛 讘讟诇 讗祝 讝讜 诪讻专讛 讘讟诇 讗诪专 诇讛谉 注诇 讛讞讚砖讬诐 讗谞讜 讘讜砖讬诐 讗诇讗 砖讗转诐 诪讙诇讙诇讬诐 注诇讬谞讜 讗转 讛讬砖谞讬诐 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛 讚讬注讘讚 拽讗诪专 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛
The Gemara replies: Come and hear an answer to this question, as it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yehuda said that they said before Rabban Gamliel: Since this one, when she is fully married, is legally his wife, and that one, when she is merely betrothed, is legally his wife, therefore, just as for this married one her sale is void, so too, for this betrothed one her sale should be void. Rabban Gamliel said to them: With regard to the new property, which she inherited after marriage, we are ashamed of this ruling, while you seek to impose upon us the same ruling even with regard to the old property that she owned beforehand? Learn from this that Rabbi Yehuda stated his question with regard to the halakha of a case brought after the fact, as they claim that the sale should be void. The Gemara concludes: Indeed, learn from this that it is so.
转谞讬讗 讗诪专 专讘讬 讞谞讬谞讗 讘谉 注拽讘讬讗 诇讗 讻讱 讛砖讬讘谉 专讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 诇讞讻诪讬诐 讗诇讗 讻讱 讛砖讬讘谉 诇讗 讗诐 讗诪专转诐 讘谞砖讜讗讛 砖讻谉 讘注诇讛 讝讻讗讬 讘诪爪讬讗转讛 讜讘诪注砖讛 讬讚讬讛 讜讘讛驻专转 谞讚专讬讛 转讗诪专讜 讘讗专讜住讛 砖讗讬谉 讘注诇讛 讝讻讗讬 诇讗 讘诪爪讬讗转讛 讜诇讗 讘诪注砖讛 讬讚讬讛 讜诇讗 讘讛驻专转 谞讚专讬讛
It is taught in a baraita: Rabbi 岣nina ben Akavya said that Rabban Gamliel did not respond to the Sages in that manner. Rather, this is what he replied to them: No, if you said that the sale is void with regard to a married woman, concerning whom the husband has many rights, as her husband is entitled to items she has found and to her earnings and to the right to nullify her vows, will you say the same with regard to a betrothed woman, whose husband is not entitled to items she has found, nor to her earnings, nor to the right of nullification of her vows?
讗诪专讜 诇讜 专讘讬 诪讻专讛 诇讛 注讚 砖诇讗 谞砖讗转 谞砖讗转 讜讗讞专 讻讱 诪讻专讛 诪讛讜 讗诪专 诇讛讜 讗祝 讝讜 诪讜讻专转 讜谞讜转谞转 讜拽讬讬诐 讗诪专讜 诇讜 讛讜讗讬诇 讜讝讻讛 讘讗砖讛 诇讗 讬讝讻讛 讘谞讻住讬诐 讗诪专 诇讛诐 注诇 讛讞讚砖讬诐 讗谞讜 讘讜砖讬谉 讗诇讗 砖讗转诐 诪讙诇讙诇讬谉 注诇讬谞讜 讗转 讛讬砖谞讬诐
The Sages said to him: My teacher, this reasoning is accepted if she sold it for herself before she was married, but if she was married and afterward sold the property she had earlier inherited, what is the halakha? Rabban Gamliel said to them: Even this one may sell the property and give it away, and her action is valid. They said to him: Since he acquired the woman, will he not acquire the property? He said to them: With regard to the new property she inherited later we are ashamed, and now you impose upon us the old property?
讜讛讗谞谉 转谞谉 注讚 砖诇讗 谞砖讗转 讜谞砖讗转 专讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讗讜诪专 讗诐 诪讻专讛 讜谞转谞讛 拽讬讬诐
The Gemara raises a difficulty: But didn鈥檛 we learn in the mishna: If she inherited property before she was married and was later married, Rabban Gamliel says: If she sold it or gave the property away, the transaction is valid. The wording of the baraita, in contrast, indicates that she may sell or give the property away ab initio.
讗诪专 专讘 讝讘讬讚 转谞讬 诪讜讻专转 讜谞讜转谞转 讜拽讬讬诐 专讘 驻驻讗 讗诪专 诇讗 拽砖讬讗 讛讗 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诇讬讘讗 讚专讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讛讗 专讘讬 讞谞讬谞讗 讘谉 注拽讘讬讗 讗诇讬讘讗 讚专讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讜专讘讬 讞谞讬谞讗 讘谉 注拽讘讬讗 讻讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 讛讻讬 拽讗诪专 诇讗 谞讞诇拽讜 讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 讜讘讬转 讛诇诇 注诇 讚讘专 讝讛
Rav Zevid said: Teach the text of the mishna as follows: She may sell and give away the property, and her transaction is valid. Rav Pappa stated another answer: This is not difficult, as this mishna is consistent with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda according to the opinion of Rabban Gamliel, but that baraita is consistent with the opinion of Rabbi 岣nina ben Akavya according to the opinion of Rabban Gamliel. The Gemara poses a question: If so, then apparently Rabbi 岣nina ben Akavya agrees with Beit Shammai, as Beit Hillel maintain that she may not sell the property ab initio even while she is betrothed; yet it is well known that the halakha is ruled in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel. The Gemara answers: This is what Rabbi 岣nina is saying: Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel did not disagree with regard to this matter of property that a woman inherited before marriage, as they agree she may sell it ab initio.
专讘 讜砖诪讜讗诇 讚讗诪专讬 转专讜讬讬讛讜 讘讬谉 砖谞驻诇讜 诇讛 谞讻住讬诐 注讚 砖诇讗 谞转讗专住讛 讘讬谉 砖谞驻诇讜 诇讛 谞讻住讬诐 诪砖谞转讗专住讛 讜谞讬住转 讛讘注诇 诪讜爪讬讗 诪讬讚 讛诇拽讜讞讜转
The Gemara cites the opinions of Rav and Shmuel, who both say: Whether property was bequeathed to her before she was betrothed, or whether property was bequeathed to her after she was betrothed and she was then married, and after her marriage she sold it or gave it away, the husband may repossess the property from the purchasers.
讻诪讗谉 讚诇讗 讻专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讜诇讗 讻专讘讬 讞谞讬谞讗 讘谉 注拽讘讬讗 讗讬谞讛讜 讚讗诪专讬 讻专讘讜转讬谞讜 讚转谞讬讗 专讘讜转讬谞讜 讞讝专讜 讜谞诪谞讜 讘讬谉 砖谞驻诇讜 诇讛 注讚 砖诇讗 转转讗专住 讜讘讬谉 砖谞驻诇讜 诇讛 诪砖谞转讗专住讛 讜谞讬住转 讛讘注诇 诪讜爪讬讗 诪讬讚 讛诇拽讜讞讜转:
The Gemara asks: According to whose opinion was this stated? It is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda and not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi 岣nina ben Akavya, who both maintain that the sale is valid. The Gemara answers: They, i.e., Rav and Shmuel, say so, in accordance with the opinion of our Rabbis. As it is taught in a baraita: Our Rabbis returned and voted after discussing this issue and decided that whether property was bequeathed to her before she was betrothed, or whether property was bequeathed to her after she was betrothed and she was subsequently married, the husband may repossess it from the purchasers.
诪砖谞讬住转 讗诇讜 讜讗诇讜 诪讜讚讬诐: 诇讬诪讗 转谞讬谞讗 诇转拽谞转 讗讜砖讗 讚讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讘专讘讬 讞谞讬谞讗 讘讗讜砖讗 讛转拽讬谞讜 讛讗砖讛 砖诪讻专讛 讘谞讻住讬 诪诇讜讙 讘讞讬讬 讘注诇讛 讜诪转讛 讛讘注诇 诪讜爪讬讗 诪讬讚 讛诇拽讜讞讜转
搂 It was taught in the mishna that if she inherited the property after she was married, both these, Beit Shammai, and those, Beit Hillel, agree that the husband may repossess it from the buyers. The Gemara comments: Let us say that we already learned in the mishna about the rabbinic ordinance instituted in Usha. As Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi 岣nina, said: In Usha they instituted an ordinance that in the case of a woman who sold her usufruct property, i.e., property that she alone owns and her husband benefits only from the dividends, in her husband鈥檚 lifetime and then died, the husband repossesses it from the purchasers. This appears to be the same halakha stated by the mishna.
诪转谞讬转讬谉 讘讞讬讬讛 讜诇驻讬专讜转 转拽谞转 讗讜砖讗 讘讙讜驻讛 砖诇 拽专拽注 讜诇讗讞专 诪讬转讛:
The Gemara responds: This is not so, as the mishna is discussing the husband鈥檚 claim during her lifetime, and it is referring only to the value of the produce that the husband collects from the purchasers if she sold the land during their marriage, as the produce of usufruct property belongs to him but the land itself remains fully in the possession of the buyer. The ordinance of Usha, in contrast, applies even to the land itself, and even after the death of his wife he may repossess it because he inherits it.
专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讞讜诇拽 讘讬谉 谞讻住讬诐: 讗诇讜 讛谉 讬讚讜注讬谉 讜讗诇讜 讛谉 砖讗讬谞谉 讬讚讜注讬谉 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讘专讘讬 讞谞讬谞讗 讬讚讜注讬谉 诪拽专拽注讬 砖讗讬谞谉 讬讚讜注讬谉 诪讟诇讟诇讬谉 讜专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗诪专 讗诇讜 讜讗诇讜 讬讚讜注讬谉 讛谉 讜讗诇讜 讛谉 砖讗讬谞谉 讬讚讜注讬谉 讻诇 砖讬讜砖讘转 讻讗谉 讜谞驻诇讜 诇讛 谞讻住讬诐 讘诪讚讬谞转 讛讬诐
搂 The mishna further taught that Rabbi Shimon distinguishes between property that is known to the husband and property that is unknown to him. The Gemara asks: Which properties are deemed known and which properties are deemed unknown? Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi 岣nina, said: Property that is known is referring to land, which cannot be concealed. The husband knew that she would inherit it, and he married her with the intention of using its produce. Property that is unknown is referring to movable property. And Rabbi Yo岣nan said: Both these, land, and those, movable property, are deemed known property. And these are unknown properties: They are properties in any case where she resides here and property was bequeathed to her overseas. Since the husband did not consider this property when marrying her, the sale is binding after the fact.
转谞讬讗 谞诪讬 讛讻讬 讗诇讜 讛谉 砖讗讬谞谉 讬讚讜注讬谉 讻诇 砖讬讜砖讘转 讻讗谉 讜谞驻诇讜 诇讛 谞讻住讬诐 讘诪讚讬谞转 讛讬诐:
The Gemara comments: That opinion is also taught in a baraita. The baraita states: These are unknown properties: They are properties in any case where she resides here and property was bequeathed to her overseas.
讛讛讬讗 讗讬转转讗 讚讘注讬讗 讚转讘专讞讬谞讛讜 诇谞讻住讛 诪讙讘专讛 讻转讘转讬谞讛讜 诇讘专转讛 讗讬谞住讬讘讛 讜讗讬讙专砖讛
The Gemara relates: There was a certain woman who was about to remarry after she was divorced or widowed, who sought to distance the rights to her property from her future husband. She therefore wrote a document stipulating that her property be given as a gift to her daughter before marriage. Ultimately, the mother was married and then divorced. She wanted her daughter to return the property, and her daughter claimed that it was given to her as a gift.
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Ketubot 78
The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria
讛讗砖讛 砖谞驻诇讜 诇讛 谞讻住讬诐 注讚 砖诇讗 转转讗专住 诪讜讚讬诐 讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 讜讘讬转 讛诇诇 砖诪讜讻专转 讜谞讜转谞转 讜拽讬讬诐 谞驻诇讜 诇讛 诪砖谞转讗专住讛 讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 讗讜诪专讬诐 转诪讻讜专 讜讘讬转 讛诇诇 讗讜诪专讬诐 诇讗 转诪讻讜专 讗诇讜 讜讗诇讜 诪讜讚讬诐 砖讗诐 诪讻专讛 讜谞转谞讛 拽讬讬诐
MISHNA: With regard to a woman to whom property was bequeathed before she was betrothed, and she was then betrothed, Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel agree that she may sell or give the property as a gift, and the transaction is valid. However, if the property was bequeathed to her after she was betrothed, Beit Shammai say: She may sell it as long as she is betrothed, and Beit Hillel say: She may not sell it. Both these, Beit Shammai, and those, Beit Hillel, agree that if she sold it or gave it away as a gift, the transaction is valid.
讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诪专讜 讞讻诪讬诐 诇驻谞讬 专讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讛讜讗讬诇 讜讝讻讛 讘讗砖讛 诇讗 讬讝讻讛 讘谞讻住讬诐 讗诪专 诇讛诐 注诇 讛讞讚砖讬诐 讗谞讜 讘讜砖讬诐 讗诇讗 砖讗转诐 诪讙诇讙诇讬谉 注诇讬谞讜 讗转 讛讬砖谞讬诐
Rabbi Yehuda said that the Sages said before Rabban Gamliel: Since he acquired the woman herself through betrothal, will he not acquire the property from the moment of their betrothal? Why, then, is her transaction valid? Rabban Gamliel said to them: With regard to the new property that she inherited after marriage, we are ashamed, because it is unclear why she cannot sell it, as it is hers; and you also seek to impose upon us a prohibition with regard to the old property that she owned beforehand?
谞驻诇讜 诇讛 诪砖谞砖讗转 讗诇讜 讜讗诇讜 诪讜讚讬诐 砖讗诐 诪讻专讛 讜谞转谞讛 砖讛讘注诇 诪讜爪讬讗 诪讬讚 讛诇拽讜讞讜转 注讚 砖诇讗 谞砖讗转 讜谞砖讗转 专讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讗讜诪专 讗诐 诪讻专讛 讜谞转谞讛 拽讬讬诐 讗诪专 专讘讬 讞谞讬谞讗 讘谉 注拽讘讬讗 讗诪专讜 诇驻谞讬 专讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讛讜讗讬诇 讜讝讻讛 讘讗砖讛 诇讗 讬讝讻讛 讘谞讻住讬诐 讗诪专 诇讛诐 注诇 讛讞讚砖讬诐 讗谞讜 讘讜砖讬诐 讗诇讗 砖讗转诐 诪讙诇讙诇讬谉 注诇讬谞讜 讛讬砖谞讬诐
If the property was bequeathed to her after she was married, both these, Beit Shammai, and those, Beit Hillel, agree that if she sold the property or gave it away, the husband may repossess it from the purchasers. If she inherited the property before she was married and then was married, Rabban Gamliel says: If she sold or gave the property away, the transaction is valid. Rabbi 岣nina ben Akavya said that the Sages said before Rabban Gamliel: Since he acquired the woman through marriage, will he not acquire the property? Rabban Gamliel said to them: With regard to the new property we are ashamed, and you also seek to impose upon us a prohibition with regard to the old property?
专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讞讜诇拽 讘讬谉 谞讻住讬诐 诇谞讻住讬诐 谞讻住讬诐 讛讬讚讜注讬谉 诇讘注诇 诇讗 转诪讻讜专 讜讗诐 诪讻专讛 讜谞转谞讛 讘讟诇 砖讗讬谞谉 讬讚讜注讬谉 诇讘注诇 诇讗 转诪讻讜专 讜讗诐 诪讻专讛 讜谞转谞讛 拽讬讬诐:
Rabbi Shimon distinguishes between one type of property and another type of property: Property that is known to the husband she may not sell once she is married, and if she sold it or gave it away, the transaction is void. Property that is unknown to the husband she may not sell, but if she sold it or gave it away, the transaction is valid.
讙诪壮 诪讗讬 砖谞讗 专讬砖讗 讚诇讗 驻诇讬讙讬 讜诪讗讬 砖谞讗 住讬驻讗 讚驻诇讬讙讬
GEMARA: The Gemara asks: What is different in the first clause of the mishna, when she inherited property before she was betrothed, such that Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel do not disagree, and what is different in the latter clause, when she inherited property after betrothal, such that they disagree? If the dispute concerns the right to her property after she is betrothed, what difference does it make whether her ownership began before or after the betrothal?
讗诪专讬 讚讘讬 专讘讬 讬谞讗讬 专讬砖讗 讘讝讻讜转讛 谞驻诇讜 住讬驻讗 讘讝讻讜转讜 谞驻诇讜
The Gemara answers that the Sages of the school of Rabbi Yannai say: In the first clause, where she inherited the property before her betrothal, the inheritance was bequeathed to her during a period when she had rights to her property, whereas in the latter clause, the inheritance was bequeathed to her during a period when he had rights to her property.
讗诐 讘讝讻讜转讜 谞驻诇讜 讻讬 诪讻专讛 讜谞转谞讛 讗诪讗讬 拽讬讬诐 讗诇讗 专讬砖讗 讜讚讗讬 讘讝讻讜转讛 谞驻诇讜 住讬驻讗 讗讬诪专 讘讝讻讜转讛 讗讬诪专 讘讝讻讜转讜 诇讻转讞诇讛 诇讗 转诪讻讜专 讗诐 诪讻专讛 讜谞转谞讛 拽讬讬诐:
The Gemara raises a difficulty: If, in the latter clause the property was bequeathed to her when he had rights to it, why is the transaction valid when she sold it or gave it away? Rather, in the first clause, where she inherited the property before her betrothal, it certainly was bequeathed to her when she had rights to it and it therefore fully belongs to her. However, in the latter clause, where she inherited it after her betrothal, one can say that perhaps during this time she has rights to it, or say that perhaps during this time he has rights to it. Since the ownership of the property is a matter of uncertainty, Beit Hillel rule that she may not sell ab initio, but if she sold it or gave it away, the transaction is valid.
讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诪专讜 诇驻谞讬 专讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇: 讗讬讘注讬讗 诇讛讜 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诇讻转讞诇讛 讗讜 讗讚讬注讘讚
搂 The mishna states that Rabbi Yehuda said that the Sages said before Rabban Gamliel: Since he acquired the woman herself through betrothal, will he not acquire the property from the moment of their betrothal? A dilemma was raised before the Sages: When Rabbi Yehuda cited this question of the Sages, was he referring to her selling the property ab initio, which is permitted only according to Beit Shammai, or was he referring to the sale after the fact, which is valid even according to Beit Hillel?
转讗 砖诪注 讚转谞讬讗 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诪专讜 诇驻谞讬 专讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讛讜讗讬诇 讜讝讜 讗砖转讜 讜讝讜 讗砖转讜 讝讜 诪讻专讛 讘讟诇 讗祝 讝讜 诪讻专讛 讘讟诇 讗诪专 诇讛谉 注诇 讛讞讚砖讬诐 讗谞讜 讘讜砖讬诐 讗诇讗 砖讗转诐 诪讙诇讙诇讬诐 注诇讬谞讜 讗转 讛讬砖谞讬诐 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛 讚讬注讘讚 拽讗诪专 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛
The Gemara replies: Come and hear an answer to this question, as it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yehuda said that they said before Rabban Gamliel: Since this one, when she is fully married, is legally his wife, and that one, when she is merely betrothed, is legally his wife, therefore, just as for this married one her sale is void, so too, for this betrothed one her sale should be void. Rabban Gamliel said to them: With regard to the new property, which she inherited after marriage, we are ashamed of this ruling, while you seek to impose upon us the same ruling even with regard to the old property that she owned beforehand? Learn from this that Rabbi Yehuda stated his question with regard to the halakha of a case brought after the fact, as they claim that the sale should be void. The Gemara concludes: Indeed, learn from this that it is so.
转谞讬讗 讗诪专 专讘讬 讞谞讬谞讗 讘谉 注拽讘讬讗 诇讗 讻讱 讛砖讬讘谉 专讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 诇讞讻诪讬诐 讗诇讗 讻讱 讛砖讬讘谉 诇讗 讗诐 讗诪专转诐 讘谞砖讜讗讛 砖讻谉 讘注诇讛 讝讻讗讬 讘诪爪讬讗转讛 讜讘诪注砖讛 讬讚讬讛 讜讘讛驻专转 谞讚专讬讛 转讗诪专讜 讘讗专讜住讛 砖讗讬谉 讘注诇讛 讝讻讗讬 诇讗 讘诪爪讬讗转讛 讜诇讗 讘诪注砖讛 讬讚讬讛 讜诇讗 讘讛驻专转 谞讚专讬讛
It is taught in a baraita: Rabbi 岣nina ben Akavya said that Rabban Gamliel did not respond to the Sages in that manner. Rather, this is what he replied to them: No, if you said that the sale is void with regard to a married woman, concerning whom the husband has many rights, as her husband is entitled to items she has found and to her earnings and to the right to nullify her vows, will you say the same with regard to a betrothed woman, whose husband is not entitled to items she has found, nor to her earnings, nor to the right of nullification of her vows?
讗诪专讜 诇讜 专讘讬 诪讻专讛 诇讛 注讚 砖诇讗 谞砖讗转 谞砖讗转 讜讗讞专 讻讱 诪讻专讛 诪讛讜 讗诪专 诇讛讜 讗祝 讝讜 诪讜讻专转 讜谞讜转谞转 讜拽讬讬诐 讗诪专讜 诇讜 讛讜讗讬诇 讜讝讻讛 讘讗砖讛 诇讗 讬讝讻讛 讘谞讻住讬诐 讗诪专 诇讛诐 注诇 讛讞讚砖讬诐 讗谞讜 讘讜砖讬谉 讗诇讗 砖讗转诐 诪讙诇讙诇讬谉 注诇讬谞讜 讗转 讛讬砖谞讬诐
The Sages said to him: My teacher, this reasoning is accepted if she sold it for herself before she was married, but if she was married and afterward sold the property she had earlier inherited, what is the halakha? Rabban Gamliel said to them: Even this one may sell the property and give it away, and her action is valid. They said to him: Since he acquired the woman, will he not acquire the property? He said to them: With regard to the new property she inherited later we are ashamed, and now you impose upon us the old property?
讜讛讗谞谉 转谞谉 注讚 砖诇讗 谞砖讗转 讜谞砖讗转 专讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讗讜诪专 讗诐 诪讻专讛 讜谞转谞讛 拽讬讬诐
The Gemara raises a difficulty: But didn鈥檛 we learn in the mishna: If she inherited property before she was married and was later married, Rabban Gamliel says: If she sold it or gave the property away, the transaction is valid. The wording of the baraita, in contrast, indicates that she may sell or give the property away ab initio.
讗诪专 专讘 讝讘讬讚 转谞讬 诪讜讻专转 讜谞讜转谞转 讜拽讬讬诐 专讘 驻驻讗 讗诪专 诇讗 拽砖讬讗 讛讗 专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诇讬讘讗 讚专讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讛讗 专讘讬 讞谞讬谞讗 讘谉 注拽讘讬讗 讗诇讬讘讗 讚专讘谉 讙诪诇讬讗诇 讜专讘讬 讞谞讬谞讗 讘谉 注拽讘讬讗 讻讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 讛讻讬 拽讗诪专 诇讗 谞讞诇拽讜 讘讬转 砖诪讗讬 讜讘讬转 讛诇诇 注诇 讚讘专 讝讛
Rav Zevid said: Teach the text of the mishna as follows: She may sell and give away the property, and her transaction is valid. Rav Pappa stated another answer: This is not difficult, as this mishna is consistent with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda according to the opinion of Rabban Gamliel, but that baraita is consistent with the opinion of Rabbi 岣nina ben Akavya according to the opinion of Rabban Gamliel. The Gemara poses a question: If so, then apparently Rabbi 岣nina ben Akavya agrees with Beit Shammai, as Beit Hillel maintain that she may not sell the property ab initio even while she is betrothed; yet it is well known that the halakha is ruled in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel. The Gemara answers: This is what Rabbi 岣nina is saying: Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel did not disagree with regard to this matter of property that a woman inherited before marriage, as they agree she may sell it ab initio.
专讘 讜砖诪讜讗诇 讚讗诪专讬 转专讜讬讬讛讜 讘讬谉 砖谞驻诇讜 诇讛 谞讻住讬诐 注讚 砖诇讗 谞转讗专住讛 讘讬谉 砖谞驻诇讜 诇讛 谞讻住讬诐 诪砖谞转讗专住讛 讜谞讬住转 讛讘注诇 诪讜爪讬讗 诪讬讚 讛诇拽讜讞讜转
The Gemara cites the opinions of Rav and Shmuel, who both say: Whether property was bequeathed to her before she was betrothed, or whether property was bequeathed to her after she was betrothed and she was then married, and after her marriage she sold it or gave it away, the husband may repossess the property from the purchasers.
讻诪讗谉 讚诇讗 讻专讘讬 讬讛讜讚讛 讜诇讗 讻专讘讬 讞谞讬谞讗 讘谉 注拽讘讬讗 讗讬谞讛讜 讚讗诪专讬 讻专讘讜转讬谞讜 讚转谞讬讗 专讘讜转讬谞讜 讞讝专讜 讜谞诪谞讜 讘讬谉 砖谞驻诇讜 诇讛 注讚 砖诇讗 转转讗专住 讜讘讬谉 砖谞驻诇讜 诇讛 诪砖谞转讗专住讛 讜谞讬住转 讛讘注诇 诪讜爪讬讗 诪讬讚 讛诇拽讜讞讜转:
The Gemara asks: According to whose opinion was this stated? It is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda and not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi 岣nina ben Akavya, who both maintain that the sale is valid. The Gemara answers: They, i.e., Rav and Shmuel, say so, in accordance with the opinion of our Rabbis. As it is taught in a baraita: Our Rabbis returned and voted after discussing this issue and decided that whether property was bequeathed to her before she was betrothed, or whether property was bequeathed to her after she was betrothed and she was subsequently married, the husband may repossess it from the purchasers.
诪砖谞讬住转 讗诇讜 讜讗诇讜 诪讜讚讬诐: 诇讬诪讗 转谞讬谞讗 诇转拽谞转 讗讜砖讗 讚讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讘专讘讬 讞谞讬谞讗 讘讗讜砖讗 讛转拽讬谞讜 讛讗砖讛 砖诪讻专讛 讘谞讻住讬 诪诇讜讙 讘讞讬讬 讘注诇讛 讜诪转讛 讛讘注诇 诪讜爪讬讗 诪讬讚 讛诇拽讜讞讜转
搂 It was taught in the mishna that if she inherited the property after she was married, both these, Beit Shammai, and those, Beit Hillel, agree that the husband may repossess it from the buyers. The Gemara comments: Let us say that we already learned in the mishna about the rabbinic ordinance instituted in Usha. As Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi 岣nina, said: In Usha they instituted an ordinance that in the case of a woman who sold her usufruct property, i.e., property that she alone owns and her husband benefits only from the dividends, in her husband鈥檚 lifetime and then died, the husband repossesses it from the purchasers. This appears to be the same halakha stated by the mishna.
诪转谞讬转讬谉 讘讞讬讬讛 讜诇驻讬专讜转 转拽谞转 讗讜砖讗 讘讙讜驻讛 砖诇 拽专拽注 讜诇讗讞专 诪讬转讛:
The Gemara responds: This is not so, as the mishna is discussing the husband鈥檚 claim during her lifetime, and it is referring only to the value of the produce that the husband collects from the purchasers if she sold the land during their marriage, as the produce of usufruct property belongs to him but the land itself remains fully in the possession of the buyer. The ordinance of Usha, in contrast, applies even to the land itself, and even after the death of his wife he may repossess it because he inherits it.
专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讞讜诇拽 讘讬谉 谞讻住讬诐: 讗诇讜 讛谉 讬讚讜注讬谉 讜讗诇讜 讛谉 砖讗讬谞谉 讬讚讜注讬谉 讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜住讬 讘专讘讬 讞谞讬谞讗 讬讚讜注讬谉 诪拽专拽注讬 砖讗讬谞谉 讬讚讜注讬谉 诪讟诇讟诇讬谉 讜专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讗诪专 讗诇讜 讜讗诇讜 讬讚讜注讬谉 讛谉 讜讗诇讜 讛谉 砖讗讬谞谉 讬讚讜注讬谉 讻诇 砖讬讜砖讘转 讻讗谉 讜谞驻诇讜 诇讛 谞讻住讬诐 讘诪讚讬谞转 讛讬诐
搂 The mishna further taught that Rabbi Shimon distinguishes between property that is known to the husband and property that is unknown to him. The Gemara asks: Which properties are deemed known and which properties are deemed unknown? Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi 岣nina, said: Property that is known is referring to land, which cannot be concealed. The husband knew that she would inherit it, and he married her with the intention of using its produce. Property that is unknown is referring to movable property. And Rabbi Yo岣nan said: Both these, land, and those, movable property, are deemed known property. And these are unknown properties: They are properties in any case where she resides here and property was bequeathed to her overseas. Since the husband did not consider this property when marrying her, the sale is binding after the fact.
转谞讬讗 谞诪讬 讛讻讬 讗诇讜 讛谉 砖讗讬谞谉 讬讚讜注讬谉 讻诇 砖讬讜砖讘转 讻讗谉 讜谞驻诇讜 诇讛 谞讻住讬诐 讘诪讚讬谞转 讛讬诐:
The Gemara comments: That opinion is also taught in a baraita. The baraita states: These are unknown properties: They are properties in any case where she resides here and property was bequeathed to her overseas.
讛讛讬讗 讗讬转转讗 讚讘注讬讗 讚转讘专讞讬谞讛讜 诇谞讻住讛 诪讙讘专讛 讻转讘转讬谞讛讜 诇讘专转讛 讗讬谞住讬讘讛 讜讗讬讙专砖讛
The Gemara relates: There was a certain woman who was about to remarry after she was divorced or widowed, who sought to distance the rights to her property from her future husband. She therefore wrote a document stipulating that her property be given as a gift to her daughter before marriage. Ultimately, the mother was married and then divorced. She wanted her daughter to return the property, and her daughter claimed that it was given to her as a gift.
