Today's Daf Yomi
April 8, 2016 | 讻状讟 讘讗讚专 讘壮 转砖注状讜
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This month's learning is dedicated by Debbie and Yossi Gevir to Rabbanit Michelle and the Hadran Zoom group for their kindness, support, and care during a medically challenging year.
Kiddushin 28
When one is obligated to swear about something, we can have him swear about something else that if it stod on its own, he would not be obligated to swear. 聽What is the derivation of this law聽and in聽what cases does it apply? 聽Items acquired through bartering are discussed. 聽Can this be done with money? 聽Produce? 聽Or onlyvessels? 聽Items acquired by the temple treasury have different laws than regular items. 聽Regular items can only be acquired through pulling while temple items are acquired with money. 聽Designating something with words for the treasury is as if it was pulled.
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砖诇讗 谞讬转谞讛 诇讛转讘注 讘注讚 讗讞讚 诪讙诇讙诇讬谉 诪诪讜谉 砖谞讬转谉 诇讛转讘注 讘注讚 讗讞讚 讗讬谞讜 讚讬谉 砖诪讙诇讙诇讬谉
where an oath cannot be imposed by one witness, as two witnesses must testify that the wife secluded herself with the man concerning whom she was warned in order for her to be obligated to take the oath of a sota, and yet one can extend her oath, is it not logical that with regard to a claim involving money, where an oath can be imposed by the testimony of one witness, that one can extend the oath?
讗砖讻讞谉 讘讜讚讗讬 住驻拽 诪谞诇谉
The Gemara asks: We found a source for the extension of an oath in the case of a definite claim, i.e., when the plaintiff is certain of his claim. From where do we derive that this halakha of the extension of an oath applies also to uncertain claims, when the plaintiff is not sure the defendant owes him money but merely suspects this to be the case?
转谞讬讗 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讬讜讞讗讬 讗讜诪专 谞讗诪专讛 砖讘讜注讛 讘讞讜抓 讜谞讗诪专讛 砖讘讜注讛 讘驻谞讬诐 诪讛 砖讘讜注讛 讛讗诪讜专讛 讘驻谞讬诐 注砖讛 讘讛 住驻拽 讻讜讚讗讬 讗祝 砖讘讜注讛 讛讗诪讜专讛 讘讞讜抓 注砖讛 讘讛 住驻拽 讻讜讚讗讬
The Gemara answers: It is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Shimon ben Yo岣i says: The Torah states an external oath, i.e., an oath administered outside of the Temple, and it states an internal oath, an oath administered inside the Temple courtyard, i.e., the oath of a sota. Just as with regard to an oath stated in the Torah that is taken inside the Temple, the Torah rendered uncertainty like certainty, as in the case of a sota the husband鈥檚 claim is based on suspicion and yet he can extend that oath; so too, with regard to an oath stated in the Torah that is taken outside the Temple, the Torah rendered uncertainty to be like certainty, i.e., all oaths can be extended to include even uncertain claims.
注讚 讛讬讻谉 讙诇讙讜诇 砖讘讜注讛 讗诪专 专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诪专 专讘 讚讗诪专 诇讬讛 讛讬砖讘注 诇讬 砖讗讬谉 注讘讚讬 讗转讛
搂 The Gemara asks: Until where does the extension of an oath reach? It has been established that a plaintiff can attach other claims to the oath that the defendant is required to take, even if they do not relate to the current claim submitted in court. To what extent can the plaintiff impose additional oaths? Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: The halakha is that a plaintiff can even say to a defendant: Take an oath to me that you are not my Canaanite slave. If the defendant is required to take an oath, e.g., concerning denial of a debt, he can be forced to take an oath about this matter as well.
讛讛讜讗 砖诪讜转讬 诪砖诪转讬谞谉 诇讬讛 讚转谞讬讗 讛拽讜专讗 诇讞讘讬专讜 注讘讚 讬讛讗 讘谞讬讚讜讬 诪诪讝专 住讜驻讙 讗转 讛讗专讘注讬诐 专砖注 讬讜专讚 注诪讜 诇讞讬讬讜
The Gemara asks: But the court ostracizes one who says this to another, as it is taught in a baraita: One who calls another a slave shall be ostracized. One who calls another a mamzer incurs the punishment of forty lashes. If one calls another a wicked person then the insulted person may harass him in all aspects of his life. In light of this halakha, it is clear that the court will not force the accused to respond to this insult by taking an oath.
讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘讗 讛讬砖讘注 诇讬 砖诇讗 谞诪讻专转 诇讬 讘注讘讚 注讘专讬 讛讗讬 讟注谞转讗 诪注诇讬讬转讗 讛讬讗 诪诪讜谞讗 讗讬转 诇讬讛 讙讘讬讛 专讘讗 诇讟注诪讬讛 讚讗诪专 专讘讗 注讘讚 注讘专讬 讙讜驻讜 拽谞讜讬
Rather, Rava said that the plaintiff can extend an oath by stating: Take an oath to me that you were not sold to me as a Hebrew slave. In this case the plaintiff is not questioning the man鈥檚 lineage, as he is simply claiming that he was sold to him as a slave and must work for him. The Gemara asks: But there is nothing novel about this halakha, as this is a proper claim that there is money owed to him by the accused. The sale and service of a Hebrew slave can be assessed in monetary terms, and is analogous to all claims of debt, which can be imposed by extension of an oath. The Gemara answers: Rava conforms to his line of reasoning, as Rava says: The Hebrew slave himself is acquired by his master. Consequently, this claim involves not just money but ownership over his person as well.
讗讬 讛讻讬 讛讬讬谞讜 拽专拽注 诪讛讜 讚转讬诪讗 拽专拽注 讛讜讗 讚注讘讚讬 讗讬谞砖讬 讚诪讝讘谞讬 讘爪讬谞注讗 讗诐 讗讬转讗 讚讝讘讬谉 诇讬转 诇讬讛 拽诇讗
The Gemara asks: If so, this is similar to a claim concerning ownership of land, and the mishna already taught that an oath can be extended to include a claim concerning land. The Gemara answers: This ruling is necessary lest you say: It is land that people are likely to sell privately, and if it is so that the plaintiff had sold it to him, the sale would not have generated publicity, and the public would not know about it. Therefore, the plaintiff鈥檚 claim that the defendant sold land to him is reasonable.
讛讗讬 讗诐 讗讬转讗 讚讝讘讬谉 拽诇讗 讗讬转 诇讬讛 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉
By contrast, in this case, where the plaintiff claims that he purchased the defendant as a Hebrew slave, if it is so that he purchased him as a slave, the sale would have generated publicity. Since this supposed sale is not common knowledge, one might have thought that the defendant cannot be forced to take an oath to deny this claim. Therefore, Rava teaches us that despite the absence of public knowledge, one can extend an oath to this claim as well.
诪转谞讬壮 讻诇 讛谞注砖讛 讚诪讬诐 讘讗讞专 讻讬讜谉 砖讝讻讛 讝讛 谞转讞讬讬讘 讝讛 讘讞诇讬驻讬讜 讻讬爪讚 讛讞诇讬祝 砖讜专 讘驻专讛 讗讜 讞诪讜专 讘砖讜专 讻讬讜谉 砖讝讻讛 讝讛 谞转讞讬讬讘 讝讛 讘讞诇讬驻讬讜
MISHNA: The mishna discusses a transaction involving the barter of two items. With regard to all items used as monetary value for another item, i.e., instead of a buyer paying money to the seller, they exchange items of value with each other, once one party in the transaction acquires the item he is receiving, this party is obligated with regard to the item being exchanged for it. Therefore, if it is destroyed or lost, he incurs the loss. How so? If one exchanges an ox for a cow, or a donkey for an ox, once this party acquires the animal that he is receiving, this party is obligated with regard to the item being exchanged for it.
讙诪壮 讞诇讬驻讬谉 诪讗讬 谞讬讛讜 诪讟讘注 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛 诪讟讘注 谞注砖讛 讞诇讬驻讬谉 讗诪专 专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讛讻讬 拽讗诪专 讻诇 讛谞讬砖讜诐 讚诪讬诐 讘讗讞专
GEMARA: The Gemara asks: What is the item given in exchange mentioned in the mishna? If it is referring to a coin, for which property is usually exchanged, can one learn from the mishna that a coin can effect exchange, i.e., it is possible to perform the act of acquisition of exchange, either a standard exchange or a symbolic exchange, using coins? This is problematic, as the halakha is that coins cannot be used for this act of acquisition. Rav Yehuda said: The phrase: All items used as monetary value for another item, is not referring to a coin. Rather, this is what the mishna is saying: With regard to all items that can be appraised when used as monetary value for another item, i.e., that their value can be appraised relative to the value of another item, excluding a coin, whose value is apparent,
讻讬讜谉 砖讝讻讛 讝讛 谞转讞讬讬讘 讘讞诇讬驻讬谉 讚讬拽讗 谞诪讬 讚拽转谞讬 讻讬爪讚 讛讞诇讬祝 砖讜专 讘驻专讛 讗讜 讞诪讜专 讘砖讜专 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛
once one party in the transaction acquires the item he is receiving, this party is obligated with regard to the item being exchanged for it. The novelty of the mishna is that all items, not only vessels, can be used to perform the act of acquisition of exchange. Therefore, one should not infer that the same is the halakha with regard to coins. The Gemara comments: The language of the mishna is also precise, as it teaches afterward: How so? If one exchanges an ox for a cow, or a donkey for an ox, once this party acquires the animal that he is receiving, this party is obligated with regard to the item being exchanged for it. This clause apparently explains the previous clause, and employs the example of animals, not coins. The Gemara summarizes: Learn from this clause that the mishna is referring to acquisition through the exchange of items, not money.
讜诇诪讗讬 讚住诇讬拽 讗讚注转讬谉 诪注讬拽专讗 讚诪讟讘注 谞注砖讛 讞诇讬驻讬谉 诪讗讬 讻讬爪讚 讛讻讬 拽讗诪专 驻讬专讜转 谞诪讬 注讘讚讬 讞诇讬驻讬谉 讻讬爪讚 讛讞诇讬祝 讘砖专 砖讜专 讘驻专讛 讗讜 讘砖专 讞诪讜专 讘砖讜专 讻讬讜谉 砖讝讻讛 讝讛 谞转讞讬讬讘 讘讞诇讬驻讬谉
The Gemara asks: And with regard to what entered our minds initially, that a coin effects symbolic exchange, what is the meaning of the clause: How so, if one exchanged an ox for a cow, once this party acquires the animal that he is receiving, this party is obligated with regard to the item being exchanged for it. This example does not involve a coin. The Gemara explains that it was assumed that this is what the mishna is saying: Not only can a coin be used in for the act of acquisition of exchange, but produce can also effect exchange. How so? If one exchanged meat of an ox for a cow, or the meat of a donkey for an ox, once this party acquires the item that he is receiving, this party is obligated with regard to the item being exchanged for it.
讛谞讬讞讗 诇专讘 砖砖转 讚讗诪专 驻讬专讜转 注讘讚讬 讞诇讬驻讬谉 讗诇讗 诇专讘 谞讞诪谉 讚讗诪专 驻讬专讜转 诇讗 注讘讚讬 讞诇讬驻讬谉 诪讗讬 讗讬讻讗 诇诪讬诪专
The Gemara asks: This works out well according to the opinion of Rav Sheshet, who says: Produce effects exchange, i.e., the mode of acquisition of exchange applies not only to vessels but also to produce and animals. But according to the opinion of Rav Na岣an, who says: Produce does not effect exchange, what can be said?
讛讻讬 拽讗诪专 讬砖 讚诪讬诐 砖讛谉 讻讞诇讬驻讬谉 讻讬爪讚 讛讞诇讬祝 讚诪讬 砖讜专 讘驻专讛 讗讜 讚诪讬 讞诪讜专 讘砖讜专
The Gemara answers: According to this opinion, the mishna is dealing with money alone, and this is what the mishna is saying: There is a transaction involving money that is like an exchange. How so? If one exchanged the monetary value of an ox for a cow, or the monetary value of a donkey for an ox, the transaction is effective. In this case, one sold his ox to another for an agreed sum of money, and after the buyer acquired the ox by pulling it, he then offered to give the seller his cow in exchange for the money that he owes him. In this case the cow is acquired without the seller having to pull it. Although this acquisition initially was to be an exchange, it is ultimately a purchase for money, as the second animal is acquired as a result of the forgiving of the monetary debt.
诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 住讘专 诇讛 讻专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讚讗诪专 讚讘专 转讜专讛 诪注讜转 拽讜谞讜转 讜诪讛 讟注诐 讗诪专讜 诪砖讬讻讛 拽讜谞讛 讙讝讬专讛 砖诪讗 讬讗诪专 诇讜 谞砖专驻讜 讞讬讟讬讱 讘注诇讬讬讛
What is the reason for this ruling in light of the halakha that one cannot acquire movable property by means of money alone? The Gemara explains that Rav Na岣an holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yo岣nan, who said: By Torah law money effects acquisition, i.e., when one pays money he acquires the item, even if he has not yet performed another act of acquisition. And what is the reason that the Sages said that pulling acquires an item and money does not? This is a rabbinic decree lest the seller say to the buyer after receiving the money: Your wheat was burned in the loft. If a fire breaks out or some other mishap occurs after a seller receives the money, he will not bother to save the goods in his house because they no longer belong to him, and the buyer may incur a loss.
诪讬诇转讗 讚砖讻讬讞 讙讝专讜 讘讛 专讘谞谉 诪讬诇转讗 讚诇讗 砖讻讬讞 诇讗 讙讝专讜 讘讛 专讘谞谉
The Sages therefore decreed that acquisition takes effect only when a buyer pulls the item. The reason that the mishna allows a transaction that indicates that one can effect acquisition using only money is because that case of the mishna as explained by Rav Na岣an is an uncommon occurrence. It is rare for one who has sold his animal in exchange for money to change his mind and request an animal from the purchaser instead. With regard to a common occurrence, the Sages issued a decree, whereas in the case of an uncommon occurrence, the Sages did not issue a decree. Consequently, the Sages did not apply their decree to this situation.
讜诇专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讚讗诪专 诪砖讬讻讛 诪驻讜专砖转 诪谉 讛转讜专讛 讛谞讬讞讗 讗讬 住讘专 诇讛 讻专讘 砖砖转 讚讗诪专 驻讬专讜转 注讘讚讬 讞诇讬驻讬谉 诪转专抓 讻专讘 砖砖转
The Gemara asks: And how is the mishna explained according to the opinion of Reish Lakish, who disagrees with Rabbi Yo岣nan and says that pulling is explicitly stated in the Torah? Reish Lakish maintains that the acquisition of movable property cannot be performed with money by Torah law, and therefore there can be no distinction between common and uncommon cases. This works out well if Reish Lakish holds in accordance with the opinion of Rav Sheshet, who says that produce effects exchange. If so, he can explain the mishna in accordance with the opinion of Rav Sheshet.
讗诇讗 讗讬 住讘专 诇讛 讻专讘 谞讞诪谉 讚讗诪专 驻讬专讜转 诇讗 注讘讚讬 讞诇讬驻讬谉 讜诪讟讘注 诇讗 拽谞讬 讘诪讗讬 诪讜拽讬 诇讛 注诇 讻专讞讱 讻专讘 砖砖转 住讘讬专讗 诇讬讛
But if he holds in accordance with the opinion of Rav Na岣an, who says that produce does not effect exchange and a coin does not effect acquisition by Torah law or by rabbinic law, in what manner does he establish the mishna? The Gemara answers: Perforce Reish Lakish holds in accordance with the opinion of Rav Sheshet.
诪转谞讬壮 专砖讜转 讛讙讘讜讛 讘讻住祝 讜专砖讜转 讛讛讚讬讜讟 讘讞讝拽讛 讗诪讬专转讜 诇讙讘讜讛 讻诪住讬专转讜 诇讛讚讬讜讟
MISHNA: The authority of the Temple treasury effects acquisition by means of money to the seller. And the authority, i.e., the mode of acquisition, of a commoner [hedyot] is by possession. Furthermore, one鈥檚 declaration to the Most High, i.e., when one consecrates an item through speech, is equivalent to transferring an item to a common person, and the item is acquired by the Temple treasury through his mere speech.
讙诪壮 转谞讜 专讘谞谉 讻讬爪讚 专砖讜转 讛讙讘讜讛 讘讻住祝 讙讬讝讘专 砖谞转谉 诪注讜转 讘讘讛诪讛 讗驻讬诇讜 讘讛诪讛 讘住讜祝 讛注讜诇诐 拽谞讛 讜讘讛讚讬讜讟 诇讗 拽谞讛 注讚 砖讬诪砖讜讱
GEMARA: The Sages taught in a baraita (Tosefta 1:6): How does the authority of the Temple treasury effect acquisition by means of money? With regard to the Temple treasurer who gives coins for an animal, even if the animal is at the other end of the world, he acquires it immediately. And with regard to a commoner, he does not acquire the animal until he pulls it.
讻讬爪讚 讗诪讬专转讜 诇讙讘讜讛 讻诪住讬专转讜 诇讛讚讬讜讟 讛讗讜诪专 砖讜专 讝讛 注讜诇讛 讘讬转 讝讛 讛拽讚砖 讗驻讬诇讜 讘住讜祝 讛注讜诇诐 拽谞讛 讘讛讚讬讜讟 诇讗 拽谞讛
How is one鈥檚 declaration to the Most High equivalent to transferring an item to a common person? With regard to one who says: This ox is a burnt-offering, or: This house is consecrated property, the Temple treasury acquires these even if they are at the other end of the world. There is no need for a further act of acquisition, as that statement alone is sufficient. Whereas with regard to a commoner, he does not acquire property in this manner
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This month's learning is dedicated by Debbie and Yossi Gevir to Rabbanit Michelle and the Hadran Zoom group for their kindness, support, and care during a medically challenging year.
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Kiddushin 28
The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria
砖诇讗 谞讬转谞讛 诇讛转讘注 讘注讚 讗讞讚 诪讙诇讙诇讬谉 诪诪讜谉 砖谞讬转谉 诇讛转讘注 讘注讚 讗讞讚 讗讬谞讜 讚讬谉 砖诪讙诇讙诇讬谉
where an oath cannot be imposed by one witness, as two witnesses must testify that the wife secluded herself with the man concerning whom she was warned in order for her to be obligated to take the oath of a sota, and yet one can extend her oath, is it not logical that with regard to a claim involving money, where an oath can be imposed by the testimony of one witness, that one can extend the oath?
讗砖讻讞谉 讘讜讚讗讬 住驻拽 诪谞诇谉
The Gemara asks: We found a source for the extension of an oath in the case of a definite claim, i.e., when the plaintiff is certain of his claim. From where do we derive that this halakha of the extension of an oath applies also to uncertain claims, when the plaintiff is not sure the defendant owes him money but merely suspects this to be the case?
转谞讬讗 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讘谉 讬讜讞讗讬 讗讜诪专 谞讗诪专讛 砖讘讜注讛 讘讞讜抓 讜谞讗诪专讛 砖讘讜注讛 讘驻谞讬诐 诪讛 砖讘讜注讛 讛讗诪讜专讛 讘驻谞讬诐 注砖讛 讘讛 住驻拽 讻讜讚讗讬 讗祝 砖讘讜注讛 讛讗诪讜专讛 讘讞讜抓 注砖讛 讘讛 住驻拽 讻讜讚讗讬
The Gemara answers: It is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Shimon ben Yo岣i says: The Torah states an external oath, i.e., an oath administered outside of the Temple, and it states an internal oath, an oath administered inside the Temple courtyard, i.e., the oath of a sota. Just as with regard to an oath stated in the Torah that is taken inside the Temple, the Torah rendered uncertainty like certainty, as in the case of a sota the husband鈥檚 claim is based on suspicion and yet he can extend that oath; so too, with regard to an oath stated in the Torah that is taken outside the Temple, the Torah rendered uncertainty to be like certainty, i.e., all oaths can be extended to include even uncertain claims.
注讚 讛讬讻谉 讙诇讙讜诇 砖讘讜注讛 讗诪专 专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讗诪专 专讘 讚讗诪专 诇讬讛 讛讬砖讘注 诇讬 砖讗讬谉 注讘讚讬 讗转讛
搂 The Gemara asks: Until where does the extension of an oath reach? It has been established that a plaintiff can attach other claims to the oath that the defendant is required to take, even if they do not relate to the current claim submitted in court. To what extent can the plaintiff impose additional oaths? Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: The halakha is that a plaintiff can even say to a defendant: Take an oath to me that you are not my Canaanite slave. If the defendant is required to take an oath, e.g., concerning denial of a debt, he can be forced to take an oath about this matter as well.
讛讛讜讗 砖诪讜转讬 诪砖诪转讬谞谉 诇讬讛 讚转谞讬讗 讛拽讜专讗 诇讞讘讬专讜 注讘讚 讬讛讗 讘谞讬讚讜讬 诪诪讝专 住讜驻讙 讗转 讛讗专讘注讬诐 专砖注 讬讜专讚 注诪讜 诇讞讬讬讜
The Gemara asks: But the court ostracizes one who says this to another, as it is taught in a baraita: One who calls another a slave shall be ostracized. One who calls another a mamzer incurs the punishment of forty lashes. If one calls another a wicked person then the insulted person may harass him in all aspects of his life. In light of this halakha, it is clear that the court will not force the accused to respond to this insult by taking an oath.
讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘讗 讛讬砖讘注 诇讬 砖诇讗 谞诪讻专转 诇讬 讘注讘讚 注讘专讬 讛讗讬 讟注谞转讗 诪注诇讬讬转讗 讛讬讗 诪诪讜谞讗 讗讬转 诇讬讛 讙讘讬讛 专讘讗 诇讟注诪讬讛 讚讗诪专 专讘讗 注讘讚 注讘专讬 讙讜驻讜 拽谞讜讬
Rather, Rava said that the plaintiff can extend an oath by stating: Take an oath to me that you were not sold to me as a Hebrew slave. In this case the plaintiff is not questioning the man鈥檚 lineage, as he is simply claiming that he was sold to him as a slave and must work for him. The Gemara asks: But there is nothing novel about this halakha, as this is a proper claim that there is money owed to him by the accused. The sale and service of a Hebrew slave can be assessed in monetary terms, and is analogous to all claims of debt, which can be imposed by extension of an oath. The Gemara answers: Rava conforms to his line of reasoning, as Rava says: The Hebrew slave himself is acquired by his master. Consequently, this claim involves not just money but ownership over his person as well.
讗讬 讛讻讬 讛讬讬谞讜 拽专拽注 诪讛讜 讚转讬诪讗 拽专拽注 讛讜讗 讚注讘讚讬 讗讬谞砖讬 讚诪讝讘谞讬 讘爪讬谞注讗 讗诐 讗讬转讗 讚讝讘讬谉 诇讬转 诇讬讛 拽诇讗
The Gemara asks: If so, this is similar to a claim concerning ownership of land, and the mishna already taught that an oath can be extended to include a claim concerning land. The Gemara answers: This ruling is necessary lest you say: It is land that people are likely to sell privately, and if it is so that the plaintiff had sold it to him, the sale would not have generated publicity, and the public would not know about it. Therefore, the plaintiff鈥檚 claim that the defendant sold land to him is reasonable.
讛讗讬 讗诐 讗讬转讗 讚讝讘讬谉 拽诇讗 讗讬转 诇讬讛 拽讗 诪砖诪注 诇谉
By contrast, in this case, where the plaintiff claims that he purchased the defendant as a Hebrew slave, if it is so that he purchased him as a slave, the sale would have generated publicity. Since this supposed sale is not common knowledge, one might have thought that the defendant cannot be forced to take an oath to deny this claim. Therefore, Rava teaches us that despite the absence of public knowledge, one can extend an oath to this claim as well.
诪转谞讬壮 讻诇 讛谞注砖讛 讚诪讬诐 讘讗讞专 讻讬讜谉 砖讝讻讛 讝讛 谞转讞讬讬讘 讝讛 讘讞诇讬驻讬讜 讻讬爪讚 讛讞诇讬祝 砖讜专 讘驻专讛 讗讜 讞诪讜专 讘砖讜专 讻讬讜谉 砖讝讻讛 讝讛 谞转讞讬讬讘 讝讛 讘讞诇讬驻讬讜
MISHNA: The mishna discusses a transaction involving the barter of two items. With regard to all items used as monetary value for another item, i.e., instead of a buyer paying money to the seller, they exchange items of value with each other, once one party in the transaction acquires the item he is receiving, this party is obligated with regard to the item being exchanged for it. Therefore, if it is destroyed or lost, he incurs the loss. How so? If one exchanges an ox for a cow, or a donkey for an ox, once this party acquires the animal that he is receiving, this party is obligated with regard to the item being exchanged for it.
讙诪壮 讞诇讬驻讬谉 诪讗讬 谞讬讛讜 诪讟讘注 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛 诪讟讘注 谞注砖讛 讞诇讬驻讬谉 讗诪专 专讘 讬讛讜讚讛 讛讻讬 拽讗诪专 讻诇 讛谞讬砖讜诐 讚诪讬诐 讘讗讞专
GEMARA: The Gemara asks: What is the item given in exchange mentioned in the mishna? If it is referring to a coin, for which property is usually exchanged, can one learn from the mishna that a coin can effect exchange, i.e., it is possible to perform the act of acquisition of exchange, either a standard exchange or a symbolic exchange, using coins? This is problematic, as the halakha is that coins cannot be used for this act of acquisition. Rav Yehuda said: The phrase: All items used as monetary value for another item, is not referring to a coin. Rather, this is what the mishna is saying: With regard to all items that can be appraised when used as monetary value for another item, i.e., that their value can be appraised relative to the value of another item, excluding a coin, whose value is apparent,
讻讬讜谉 砖讝讻讛 讝讛 谞转讞讬讬讘 讘讞诇讬驻讬谉 讚讬拽讗 谞诪讬 讚拽转谞讬 讻讬爪讚 讛讞诇讬祝 砖讜专 讘驻专讛 讗讜 讞诪讜专 讘砖讜专 砖诪注 诪讬谞讛
once one party in the transaction acquires the item he is receiving, this party is obligated with regard to the item being exchanged for it. The novelty of the mishna is that all items, not only vessels, can be used to perform the act of acquisition of exchange. Therefore, one should not infer that the same is the halakha with regard to coins. The Gemara comments: The language of the mishna is also precise, as it teaches afterward: How so? If one exchanges an ox for a cow, or a donkey for an ox, once this party acquires the animal that he is receiving, this party is obligated with regard to the item being exchanged for it. This clause apparently explains the previous clause, and employs the example of animals, not coins. The Gemara summarizes: Learn from this clause that the mishna is referring to acquisition through the exchange of items, not money.
讜诇诪讗讬 讚住诇讬拽 讗讚注转讬谉 诪注讬拽专讗 讚诪讟讘注 谞注砖讛 讞诇讬驻讬谉 诪讗讬 讻讬爪讚 讛讻讬 拽讗诪专 驻讬专讜转 谞诪讬 注讘讚讬 讞诇讬驻讬谉 讻讬爪讚 讛讞诇讬祝 讘砖专 砖讜专 讘驻专讛 讗讜 讘砖专 讞诪讜专 讘砖讜专 讻讬讜谉 砖讝讻讛 讝讛 谞转讞讬讬讘 讘讞诇讬驻讬谉
The Gemara asks: And with regard to what entered our minds initially, that a coin effects symbolic exchange, what is the meaning of the clause: How so, if one exchanged an ox for a cow, once this party acquires the animal that he is receiving, this party is obligated with regard to the item being exchanged for it. This example does not involve a coin. The Gemara explains that it was assumed that this is what the mishna is saying: Not only can a coin be used in for the act of acquisition of exchange, but produce can also effect exchange. How so? If one exchanged meat of an ox for a cow, or the meat of a donkey for an ox, once this party acquires the item that he is receiving, this party is obligated with regard to the item being exchanged for it.
讛谞讬讞讗 诇专讘 砖砖转 讚讗诪专 驻讬专讜转 注讘讚讬 讞诇讬驻讬谉 讗诇讗 诇专讘 谞讞诪谉 讚讗诪专 驻讬专讜转 诇讗 注讘讚讬 讞诇讬驻讬谉 诪讗讬 讗讬讻讗 诇诪讬诪专
The Gemara asks: This works out well according to the opinion of Rav Sheshet, who says: Produce effects exchange, i.e., the mode of acquisition of exchange applies not only to vessels but also to produce and animals. But according to the opinion of Rav Na岣an, who says: Produce does not effect exchange, what can be said?
讛讻讬 拽讗诪专 讬砖 讚诪讬诐 砖讛谉 讻讞诇讬驻讬谉 讻讬爪讚 讛讞诇讬祝 讚诪讬 砖讜专 讘驻专讛 讗讜 讚诪讬 讞诪讜专 讘砖讜专
The Gemara answers: According to this opinion, the mishna is dealing with money alone, and this is what the mishna is saying: There is a transaction involving money that is like an exchange. How so? If one exchanged the monetary value of an ox for a cow, or the monetary value of a donkey for an ox, the transaction is effective. In this case, one sold his ox to another for an agreed sum of money, and after the buyer acquired the ox by pulling it, he then offered to give the seller his cow in exchange for the money that he owes him. In this case the cow is acquired without the seller having to pull it. Although this acquisition initially was to be an exchange, it is ultimately a purchase for money, as the second animal is acquired as a result of the forgiving of the monetary debt.
诪讗讬 讟注诪讗 住讘专 诇讛 讻专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 讚讗诪专 讚讘专 转讜专讛 诪注讜转 拽讜谞讜转 讜诪讛 讟注诐 讗诪专讜 诪砖讬讻讛 拽讜谞讛 讙讝讬专讛 砖诪讗 讬讗诪专 诇讜 谞砖专驻讜 讞讬讟讬讱 讘注诇讬讬讛
What is the reason for this ruling in light of the halakha that one cannot acquire movable property by means of money alone? The Gemara explains that Rav Na岣an holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yo岣nan, who said: By Torah law money effects acquisition, i.e., when one pays money he acquires the item, even if he has not yet performed another act of acquisition. And what is the reason that the Sages said that pulling acquires an item and money does not? This is a rabbinic decree lest the seller say to the buyer after receiving the money: Your wheat was burned in the loft. If a fire breaks out or some other mishap occurs after a seller receives the money, he will not bother to save the goods in his house because they no longer belong to him, and the buyer may incur a loss.
诪讬诇转讗 讚砖讻讬讞 讙讝专讜 讘讛 专讘谞谉 诪讬诇转讗 讚诇讗 砖讻讬讞 诇讗 讙讝专讜 讘讛 专讘谞谉
The Sages therefore decreed that acquisition takes effect only when a buyer pulls the item. The reason that the mishna allows a transaction that indicates that one can effect acquisition using only money is because that case of the mishna as explained by Rav Na岣an is an uncommon occurrence. It is rare for one who has sold his animal in exchange for money to change his mind and request an animal from the purchaser instead. With regard to a common occurrence, the Sages issued a decree, whereas in the case of an uncommon occurrence, the Sages did not issue a decree. Consequently, the Sages did not apply their decree to this situation.
讜诇专讬砖 诇拽讬砖 讚讗诪专 诪砖讬讻讛 诪驻讜专砖转 诪谉 讛转讜专讛 讛谞讬讞讗 讗讬 住讘专 诇讛 讻专讘 砖砖转 讚讗诪专 驻讬专讜转 注讘讚讬 讞诇讬驻讬谉 诪转专抓 讻专讘 砖砖转
The Gemara asks: And how is the mishna explained according to the opinion of Reish Lakish, who disagrees with Rabbi Yo岣nan and says that pulling is explicitly stated in the Torah? Reish Lakish maintains that the acquisition of movable property cannot be performed with money by Torah law, and therefore there can be no distinction between common and uncommon cases. This works out well if Reish Lakish holds in accordance with the opinion of Rav Sheshet, who says that produce effects exchange. If so, he can explain the mishna in accordance with the opinion of Rav Sheshet.
讗诇讗 讗讬 住讘专 诇讛 讻专讘 谞讞诪谉 讚讗诪专 驻讬专讜转 诇讗 注讘讚讬 讞诇讬驻讬谉 讜诪讟讘注 诇讗 拽谞讬 讘诪讗讬 诪讜拽讬 诇讛 注诇 讻专讞讱 讻专讘 砖砖转 住讘讬专讗 诇讬讛
But if he holds in accordance with the opinion of Rav Na岣an, who says that produce does not effect exchange and a coin does not effect acquisition by Torah law or by rabbinic law, in what manner does he establish the mishna? The Gemara answers: Perforce Reish Lakish holds in accordance with the opinion of Rav Sheshet.
诪转谞讬壮 专砖讜转 讛讙讘讜讛 讘讻住祝 讜专砖讜转 讛讛讚讬讜讟 讘讞讝拽讛 讗诪讬专转讜 诇讙讘讜讛 讻诪住讬专转讜 诇讛讚讬讜讟
MISHNA: The authority of the Temple treasury effects acquisition by means of money to the seller. And the authority, i.e., the mode of acquisition, of a commoner [hedyot] is by possession. Furthermore, one鈥檚 declaration to the Most High, i.e., when one consecrates an item through speech, is equivalent to transferring an item to a common person, and the item is acquired by the Temple treasury through his mere speech.
讙诪壮 转谞讜 专讘谞谉 讻讬爪讚 专砖讜转 讛讙讘讜讛 讘讻住祝 讙讬讝讘专 砖谞转谉 诪注讜转 讘讘讛诪讛 讗驻讬诇讜 讘讛诪讛 讘住讜祝 讛注讜诇诐 拽谞讛 讜讘讛讚讬讜讟 诇讗 拽谞讛 注讚 砖讬诪砖讜讱
GEMARA: The Sages taught in a baraita (Tosefta 1:6): How does the authority of the Temple treasury effect acquisition by means of money? With regard to the Temple treasurer who gives coins for an animal, even if the animal is at the other end of the world, he acquires it immediately. And with regard to a commoner, he does not acquire the animal until he pulls it.
讻讬爪讚 讗诪讬专转讜 诇讙讘讜讛 讻诪住讬专转讜 诇讛讚讬讜讟 讛讗讜诪专 砖讜专 讝讛 注讜诇讛 讘讬转 讝讛 讛拽讚砖 讗驻讬诇讜 讘住讜祝 讛注讜诇诐 拽谞讛 讘讛讚讬讜讟 诇讗 拽谞讛
How is one鈥檚 declaration to the Most High equivalent to transferring an item to a common person? With regard to one who says: This ox is a burnt-offering, or: This house is consecrated property, the Temple treasury acquires these even if they are at the other end of the world. There is no need for a further act of acquisition, as that statement alone is sufficient. Whereas with regard to a commoner, he does not acquire property in this manner
