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Today's Daf Yomi

May 29, 2016 | 讻状讗 讘讗讬讬专 转砖注状讜

  • This month's learning is sponsored by Sami Groff in honor of Shoshana Keats Jaskoll and Chochmat Nashim.

Kiddushin 79

Study Guide Kiddushin 79. There is a debate between Rav and Shmuel regarding a case where a father bethrothed a daughter at the same time that the daughter betrothed herself and then it became clear after that the daughter had reached the stage of maturity, which is a stage where the father can no longer betroth her. 聽Rav says we assume she was already mature when the betrothal of the father took place and therefore she is only betrothed from her own betrothal. 聽Shmuel holds that she is betrothed to both because we don’t know what her status was at the time of the betrothal. 聽Two other cases are brought to question Shmuel’s psak – one, a mikveh that was found to be less than the minimum amount and another where wine that was used to separate trumot and maasrot and turned to vinegar. 聽 The gemara then explains why those cases are different. 聽Then the gemara聽suggests that there was a tannaitic debate about the same thing but ultimately rejects the suggestion.


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砖谞讬讛诐 谞讜转谞讬诐 讙讟 讜讗诐 专爪讜 讗讞讚 谞讜转谉 讙讟 讜讗讞讚 讻讜谞住


both men who might have betrothed her give her a bill of divorce in order to render her permitted to marry someone else. And if they wish and agree between them, one gives a bill of divorce and the other marries her.


讜讻谉 讛讗砖讛 砖谞转谞讛 专砖讜转 诇砖诇讜讞讛 诇拽讚砖讛 讜讛诇讻讛 讜拽讚砖讛 讗转 注爪诪讛 讗诐 砖诇讛 拽讚诪讜 拽讚讜砖讬讛 拽讬讚讜砖讬谉 讜讗诐 砖诇 砖诇讜讞讛 拽讚诪讜 拽讬讚讜砖讬讜 拽讬讚讜砖讬谉 讜讗诐 讗讬谞谉 讬讜讚注讬谉 砖谞讬讛诐 谞讜转谞讬诐 诇讛 讙讟 讜讗诐 专爪讜 讗讞讚 谞讜转谉 诇讛 讙讟 讜讗讞讚 讻讜谞住


And similarly, with regard to a woman who authorized her agent to betroth her and she then went and betrothed herself to someone else, if her own betrothal preceded that of the agent, her betrothal is a valid betrothal, and if that of her agent preceded hers, the agent鈥檚 betrothal is a valid betrothal. And if they do not know whose betrothal came first, both men who may have betrothed her give her a bill of divorce. And if they wish, one may give a bill of divorce and the other marries her.


讙诪壮 讜爪专讬讻讗 讚讗讬 讗砖诪注讬谞谉 讙讘讬 讚讬讚讬讛 诪砖讜诐 讚讙讘专讗 拽讬诐 诇讬讛 讘讬讜讞住讬谉 讗讘诇 讗讬转转讗 讚诇讗 拽讬诐 诇讛 讘讬讜讞住讬谉 讗讬诪讗 诇讗 谞讬讛讜讜 拽讬讚讜砖讬讛 拽讬讚讜砖讬谉


GEMARA: And it is necessary to state this halakha with regard to one who betroths his daughter as well as with regard to a woman who betroths herself. As had the mishna taught us this halakha only with regard to the father himself, one might say that it is because a man is expert with regard to lineage, and his decision to betroth his daughter on his own after having appointed an agent must have been due to the superior lineage of the man that he found willing to marry her. But with regard to a woman, who is not expert with regard to lineage, one might say her betrothal should not be considered a valid betrothal, as she still intends for her agent to be able to accept betrothal for her from a man with superior lineage.


讜讗讬 讗砖诪注讬谞谉 讙讘讬 讚讬讚讛 诪砖讜诐 讚讗讬转转讗 讚讬讬拽讗 讜诪讬谞住讘讗 讗讘诇 讗讬讛讜 讗讬诪讗 诇讗 讗讬讻驻转 诇讬讛 爪专讬讻讗


And conversely, had the mishna taught us this halakha only with regard to the woman herself, one might say that it is because a woman is particular about whom she marries, i.e., she is careful when selecting a husband for herself. Therefore, she would have chosen the partner she deems most suitable and would not want the agent to act on her behalf after she had found someone on her own. But with regard to the father, one might say that he does not care to the same extent, and he may authorize the agent to act in any case. Therefore, it is necessary for the mishna to include both cases.


讗讬转诪专 拽讬讚砖讛 讗讘讬讛 讘讚专讱 讜拽讬讚砖讛 注爪诪讛 讘注讬专 讜讛专讬 讛讬讗 讘讜讙专转 专讘 讗诪专 讛专讬 讛讬讗 讘讜讙专转 诇驻谞讬谞讜 讜砖诪讜讗诇 讗诪专 讞讬讬砖讬谞谉 诇拽讬讚讜砖讬 砖谞讬讛诐


It was stated that the amora鈥檌m discussed the following question: If her father betrothed her on the way, when he was traveling, and in the meantime she betrothed herself in the city, and she is now a grown woman, Rav said: She is a grown woman at present, and her father cannot currently betroth her. Therefore, even if he did betroth her at some point, his betrothal is assumed not to have taken effect. And Shmuel said: We are concerned with regard to the betrothal of both of them.


讗讬诪转 讗讬诇讬诪讗 讘转讜讱 砖砖讛 讘讛讗 谞讬诪讗 专讘 讛专讬 讛讬讗 讘讜讙专转 诇驻谞讬谞讜 讛砖转讗 讛讜讗 讚讘讙专讛 讗诇讗 诇讗讞专 砖砖讛 讘讛讗 谞讬诪讗 砖诪讜讗诇 讞讬讬砖讬谞谉 诇拽讬讚讜砖讬 砖谞讬讛诐 讜讛讗 讗诪专 砖诪讜讗诇 讗讬谉 讘讬谉 谞注专讜转 诇讘讙专讜转 讗诇讗 砖砖讛 讞讚砖讬诐 讘诇讘讚


The Gemara clarifies the case: When did the father鈥檚 betrothal occur? If we say it occurred during the six months when the daughter was no longer a minor and had the status of a young woman, in that case would Rav say: She is a grown woman at present? It is reasonable to say that it is only now that she has reached her majority, i.e., assumed the status of a grown woman, and in that case her father鈥檚 betrothal should take effect, since a father can betroth his daughter when she is a young woman. Rav would not rule that the father鈥檚 betrothal is disregarded. Rather, perhaps it occurred after the six months had elapsed since she became a young woman. In that case would Shmuel say: We are concerned with regard to the betrothal of both of them? But doesn鈥檛 Shmuel say: The difference between the status of a young woman and the status of a grown woman is six months alone, after which the girl has the status of a grown woman, which means her father can no longer betroth her?


诇讗 爪专讬讻讗 讚拽讚讬砖 讘讛讛讜讗 讬讜诪讗 讚诪砖诇讬诐 砖砖讛 专讘 讗诪专 讛专讬 讛讬讗 讘讜讙专转 诇驻谞讬谞讜 诪讚讛砖转讗 讘讜讙专转 讘爪驻专讗 谞诪讬 讘讜讙专转 讜砖诪讜讗诇 讗诪专 讛砖转讗 讛讜讗 讚讗讬讬转讬 住讬诪谞讬诐


The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary in a case where he betrothed her on the day that these six months were completed. Rav said: She is a grown woman at present. There is therefore a presumption that since she is now a grown woman, she was also a grown woman when her father betrothed her in the morning. And Shmuel said: Perhaps it is only now that her signs indicating puberty came, but she might have still been a young woman when her father betrothed her.


讜砖诪讜讗诇 诪讗讬 砖谞讗 诪诪拽讜讛 讚转谞谉 诪拽讜讛 砖谞诪讚讚 讜谞诪爪讗 讞住专 讻诇 讟讛专讜转 砖谞注砖讜 注诇 讙讘讬讜 诇诪驻专注 讘讬谉 讘专砖讜转 讛讬讞讬讚 讘讬谉 讘专砖讜转 讛专讘讬诐 讟诪讗讜转


The Gemara asks: And according to Shmuel, in what way is this case different from the case of a ritual bath? As we learned in a mishna (Mikvaot 2:2): With regard to a ritual bath that was known to have contained the requisite forty se鈥檃 of water, which was then measured and found deficient in its quantity of water, what is the halakha? All pure items whose purification had been performed in it, i.e., any impure items that had been purified through immersion in this ritual bath, retroactive to when the ritual bath was last measured, whether this ritual bath is found in the private domain or in the public domain, are impure. This indicates that the current situation, i.e., the deficient ritual bath, is presumed to extend back until when it was known with certainty to have contained the requisite amount of water. In this case too, the woman should be considered a grown woman at the time of the first betrothal, and the second betrothal should not take effect.


砖讗谞讬 讛转诐 讚讗讬讻讗 诇诪讬诪专 讛注诪讚 讟诪讗 注诇 讞讝拽转讜 讜讗讬诪专 诇讗 讟讘诇


The Gemara answers: There, in the case of a ritual bath, it is different, since it can be said: Maintain an impure item in its presumptive status and say that it was not properly immersed. There, the presumptive status of the item being ritually impure is supported by the current state of the ritual bath, which is now deficient.


讗讚专讘讛 讛注诪讚 诪拽讜讛 注诇 讞讝拽转讜 讜讗讬诪专 诇讗 讞住专 讛专讬 讞住专 诇驻谞讬讱 讛讻讗 谞诪讬 讛专讬 讘讜讙专转 诇驻谞讬讱 讛砖转讗 讛讜讗 讚讘讙专讛 讛转诐 谞诪讬 讛砖转讗 讛讜讗 讚讞住专


The Gemara continues to compare the two cases: On the contrary, it could be said: Maintain the ritual bath in its presumptive status, that it was known to have previously contained the requisite forty se鈥檃, and say that it was not deficient at the time of the immersion and that the items should be considered ritually pure. The Gemara answers: There is a deficient ritual bath at present, which counteracts the presumptive status that it contained the requisite forty se鈥檃. The Gemara asks: Here too, there is a grown woman before you, which should counteract the fact that she was previously a young woman. The Gemara answers: In this case, it is only now that she has reached her majority. The Gemara asks: There too, in the case of a ritual bath, one can also say it is only now that it has become deficient. Perhaps it contained the requisite forty se鈥檃 shortly beforehand.


讛转诐 转专转讬 诇专讬注讜转讗 讛讻讗 讞讚讗 诇专讬注讜转讗


The Gemara responds: There, in the case of the ritual bath, there are two reasons to weaken the possibility that the items are ritually pure: First, there is a deficient ritual bath at present; second, the item has a presumptive status of impurity. Here, by contrast, there is only one reason to weaken the possibility that she was a young woman at the time of the betrothal, i.e., the fact that she is now a grown woman. Shmuel therefore maintains that her earlier status of young woman is not nullified, and both betrothals must be taken into account.


讜砖诪讜讗诇 诪讗讬 砖谞讗 诪讞讘讬转 讚转谞讬讗 讛讬讛 讘讜讚拽 讗转 讛讞讘讬转 诇讛驻专讬砖 注诇讬讛 转专讜诪讛 讜讛讜诇讱 讜讗讞专 讻讱 谞诪爪讗转 讞讜诪抓 讻诇 砖诇砖讛 讬诪讬诐 讜讚讗讬 诪讬讻谉 讜讗讬诇讱 住驻拽


The Gemara poses another question: And according to Shmuel, in what way is this case different from the case of a barrel? As it is taught in a baraita (Tosefta, Terumot 2:8): If one would inspect the contents of a barrel to see if it still contained enough wine to continually mentally separate teruma from it to exempt other untithed wine he had, until all the wine in that barrel would be teruma and would be given to a priest, and afterward the contents of the barrel were found to be vinegar, which cannot be set aside as teruma for untithed wine, then all three days after he had last inspected it is definitely viewed as having been wine, and any untithed wine for which teruma was separated during those days is tithed. From then onward, more than three days after the previous inspection, it is uncertain as to whether it had already turned to vinegar, and any untithed wine for which teruma was separated during those days is not tithed.


讜专诪讬谞谉 讞讘讬转 讗诪拽讜讛 诪讗讬 砖谞讗 讚讛讻讗 讜讚讗讬 讜诪讗讬 砖谞讗 讚讛讻讗 住驻拽


Before stating the difficulty with Shmuel鈥檚 opinion, the Gemara first clarifies the baraita. And we raised a contradiction between the halakha of the barrel and that of the ritual bath: What is different in that here, with regard to the ritual bath, the halakha is that the items are definitely impure, and what is different in that there, with regard to the barrel, it is only uncertain whether the produce remains untithed? In both cases the situation at present, the ritual bath being deficient and the contents of the barrel having turned to vinegar, should lead to a definite conclusion.


讜讗诪专 专讘 讞谞讬谞讗 诪住讜专讬讗 诪讗谉 转谞讗 讞讘讬转 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讛讬讗 讚讙讘讬 诪拽讜讛 谞诪讬 住驻讬拽讗 诪砖讜讬


The Gemara continues its analysis of the baraita: And Rav 岣nina from Syria says: Who is the tanna that taught the halakha of the barrel? It is Rabbi Shimon, who with regard to a ritual bath also considers it as a matter of uncertainty rather than as definitively impure. Therefore, there is no contradiction between the baraita and the mishna.


讚转谞讬讗 讻诇 讟讛专讜转 砖谞注砖讜 注诇 讙讘讬讜 诇诪驻专注 讘讬谉 讘专砖讜转 讛讬讞讬讚 讘讬谉 讘专砖讜转 讛专讘讬诐 讟诪讗讜转 讜专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讗讜诪专 讘专砖讜转 讛专讘讬诐 讟讛讜专讜转 讘专砖讜转 讛讬讞讬讚 转讜诇讬谉


As it is taught in a baraita: All pure items whose purification had been performed in it, i.e., any impure items that had been purified through immersion in the ritual bath that was found to be deficient, retroactive to when the ritual bath was last measured, whether this ritual bath is found in the private domain or in the public domain, are impure. And Rabbi Shimon says they are impure due to the uncertainty, and therefore, if the ritual bath was located in the public domain, they are pure, in accordance with the principle that uncertain cases of impurity in the public domain are deemed pure. But if the ritual bath was located in the private domain, the decision is suspended, i.e., if the impure items came into contact with teruma, one may not partake of the teruma due to the uncertainty, but it is also not burned as though it were definitely impure.


讗讘诇 诇专讘谞谉 讟讘诇 诇诪驻专注 砖讗谞讬 讛转诐 讚讗讬讻讗 诇诪讬诪专 讛注诪讚 讟讘诇 注诇 讞讝拽转讜 讜讗讬诪专 诇讗 谞讬转拽谉


The Gemara returns to complete the difficulty with Shmuel鈥檚 opinion: But according to the Rabbis, who hold that in the case of the ritual bath the items are definitely impure, with regard to the wine that had been exempted from teruma by means of separating teruma from the contents of the barrel, that wine will be untithed produce retroactively, since they hold that the current status extends to the past. This is unlike the ruling of Shmuel, who ruled that in the case of the woman who was betrothed to two men it is uncertain to whom she is betrothed. The Gemara answers: There, in the case of the barrel, it is different, as it can be said: Maintain the untithed produce in its presumptive status, as when it first grew it was definitely untithed, and say it was not fixed, i.e., exempted.


讗讚专讘讛 讛注诪讚 讬讬谉 注诇 讞讝拽转讜 讜讗讬诪专 诇讗 讛讞诪讬抓 讛专讬 讛讞诪讬抓 诇驻谞讬讱 讛讻讗 谞诪讬 讛专讬 讛讬讗 讘讜讙专转 诇驻谞讬谞讜 讛砖转讗 讛讜讗 讚讘讙专讛 讛讻讗 谞诪讬 讛砖转讗 讛讜讗 讚讗讞诪讬抓


The Gemara asks: On the contrary, why not maintain the wine in its presumptive status, and say it had not turned to vinegar? The Gemara rejects this: That is impossible, as it is turned to vinegar at present. The Gemara replies: In the case of the betrothal, here too, she is a grown woman at present; what is the difference? The Gemara rejects this claim: With regard to the woman, it is possible that only now has she reached her majority. The Gemara challenges: Here too, it could be that it is only now that it has turned to vinegar, but not earlier.


讛转诐 转专转讬 诇专讬注讜转讗 讛讻讗 讞讚讗 诇专讬注讜转讗 讛讜讗 讚讗讬讻讗


The Gemara explains: There, in the case of the barrel, there are two reasons to weaken the possibility that the wine is tithed: First, it is vinegar at present; second, the wine has a presumptive status of being untithed. Here, by contrast, there is only one reason to weaken the possibility that she was a young woman at the time of the betrothal, i.e., the fact that she is now a grown woman. Shmuel therefore maintains that her earlier status of a young woman is not nullified, and both betrothals must be taken into account.


谞讬诪讗 讻转谞讗讬


The Gemara suggests: Let us say that it is parallel to a dispute between tanna鈥檌m:


诪讬 诪讜爪讬讗 诪讬讚 诪讬


The halakha is that a moribund person who transfers all of his property to others without leaving anything for himself can retract his bequest upon regaining his health. This is due to the assumption that one would give away all his possessions only if he believes he is going to die, and the bequest was therefore made in error. By contrast, if a healthy person gave all his property to others, he cannot later retract his bequest. The tanna鈥檌m discuss the case of one who gave away all his property and later, seeking to retrieve his property, claims that he was moribund at the time, while the recipients of the bequest maintain that he was healthy. Who is able to remove the property from the possession of whom?


讛讜讗 诪讜爪讬讗 诪讬讚诐 讘诇讗 专讗讬讛 讜讛谉 讗讬谉 诪讜爪讬讗讬诐 诪讬讚讜 讘诇讗 专讗讬讛 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 讬注拽讘 专讘讬 谞转谉 讗讜诪专 讗诐 讘专讬讗 讛讜讗 注诇讬讜 诇讛讘讬讗 专讗讬讛 砖讛讬讛 砖讻讬讘 诪专注 讜讗诐 砖讻讬讘 诪专注 讛讜讗 注诇讬讛诐 诇讛讘讬讗 专讗讬讛 砖讘专讬讗 讛讬讛


He is able to remove his property held by others from their possession without needing to bring proof that he was moribund at the time, and they may not remove the property from his possession, if he still is in possession of the property, without proof that he was healthy. This is the statement of Rabbi Ya鈥檃kov. Rabbi Natan says: If he is currently healthy, the obligation is upon him to bring proof that he was on his deathbed at the time of the bequest, and if he is now on his deathbed, the obligation is upon them to bring proof that he was healthy at the time of the bequest.


谞讬诪讗 专讘 讚讗诪专 讻专讘讬 谞转谉 讜砖诪讜讗诇 讚讗诪专 讻专讘讬 讬注拽讘 讗诪专 诇讱 专讘 讗谞讗 讚讗诪专讬 讗驻讬诇讜 讻专讘讬 讬注拽讘 注讚 讻讗谉 诇讗 拽讗诪专 专讘讬 讬注拽讘 讛转诐 讚讗讬讻讗 诇诪讬诪专 讛注诪讚 诪诪讜谉 注诇 讞讝拽转讜 讗讘诇 讛讻讗 诪讬 谞讬诪讗 讛注诪讚 讙讜祝 注诇 讞讝拽转讜


The Gemara suggests: Let us say that Rav spoke in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Natan that one鈥檚 current status is paramount, and Shmuel spoke in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ya鈥檃kov, who holds that the question of whether he was moribund remains a matter of uncertainty, and they may not claim the property from him even if he is now healthy. The Gemara rejects this: Rav could have said to you: I spoke even in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ya鈥檃kov, as Rabbi Ya鈥檃kov states his opinion only there, because it can be said that the principle of: Leave the property in its previous status, applies, so the property should remain where it is. But here, with regard to the question of when a young woman became a grown woman, shall we say: Establish the body according to its previous status? It is obvious that her body was due to mature.


讜砖诪讜讗诇 讗诪专 讗谞讗 讚讗诪专讬 讗驻讬诇讜 诇专讘讬 谞转谉 注讚 讻讗谉 诇讗 拽讗诪专 专讘讬 谞转谉 讛转诐 讚讻讜诇讬 注诇诪讗 讘讞讝拽转 讘专讬讗讬诐 拽讬讬诪讬 诪讗谉 讚拽讗 诪驻讬拽 谞驻砖讬讛 诪讞讝拽讛 讛讜讬 注诇讬讛 诇讗讬转讜讬讬 专讗讬讛 讗讘诇 讛讻讗 诪讬 拽讗 诪驻拽讗 谞驻砖讛 诪讞讝拽讛 讚拽诪讬讛


And Shmuel could have said: I spoke even in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Natan, since Rabbi Natan states his opinion that the current state is paramount only there, as everyone has a presumptive status of being healthy. Consequently, if a person removes himself from this presumption by claiming he was moribund, the obligation falls upon him to bring proof. But here, does she remove herself from a presumption that was present? There is no presumption that she was a grown woman in the morning.


谞讬诪讗 讻讛谞讬 转谞讗讬 拽讬讚砖讛 讗讘讬讛 讘讚专讱 讜拽讬讚砖讛 注爪诪讛 讘注讬专 讜讛专讬 讛讬讗 讘讜讙专转 转谞讗 讞讚讗 讛专讬 讛讬讗 讘讜讙专转 诇驻谞讬谞讜 讜转谞讬讗 讗讬讚讱 讞讬讬砖讬谞谉 诇拽讬讚讜砖讬 砖谞讬讛诐 诪讗讬 诇讗讜 讞讚 讻专讘 讜讞讚 讻砖诪讜讗诇


The Gemara further suggests: Let us say that this dispute between Rav and Shmuel is parallel to a dispute between these tanna鈥檌m: With regard to a case where her father betrothed her on the way, when he was traveling, and in the meantime she betrothed herself in the city, and she is now a grown woman, one baraita taught: She is a grown woman at present, and her father cannot currently betroth her; therefore, his betrothal does not take effect. And it is taught in another baraita: We are concerned with regard to the betrothal of both of them. What, is it not the case that one baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rav, and one baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel?


诇讗 讗讬讚讬 讜讗讬讚讬 讻砖诪讜讗诇 讻讗谉 讘诪讻讞砖转讜 讻讗谉 讘砖讗讬谉 诪讻讞砖转讜


The Gemara rejects this: No; it is possible that both this and that are in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel. Here, in this baraita, it is referring to a case where she denies his right to betroth her, as she claims that she was a grown woman before his betrothal. There, it is referring to a situation where she does not deny his right to betroth her, and therefore it is uncertain which betrothal takes effect.


讜谞讬诪讗 诪讚诪转谞讬转讗 诇讗 驻诇讬讙讬 讗诪讜专讗讬 谞诪讬 诇讗 驻诇讬讙讬 讜转住讘专讗 讛讗 专讘 讬讜住祝 讘专讬讛 讚专讘 诪谞砖讬讗 诪讚讜讜讬诇 注讘讚 注讜讘讚讗 讻讜讜转讬讛 讚专讘 讜讗讬拽驻讬讚 砖诪讜讗诇 讜讗诪专 讻讜诇讬 注诇诪讗 讻讬讬诇讬 诇讬讛 讘拽讘讗 讝讜讟讗 讜讛讗讬 诪讚专讘谞谉 讻讬讬诇讬 诇讬讛 讘拽讘讗 专讘讛 讜讗讬 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 诇讗 驻诇讬讙讬 讗诪讗讬 拽讗 诪拽驻讬讚


The Gemara asks: If so, let us also say that since the baraitot do not disagree, the opinions of the amora鈥檌m, Rav and Shmuel, do not disagree either. One is referring to a case where she denies her father鈥檚 right to betroth her, while the other is referring to a case where she does not. The Gemara rejects this: And how can you understand it that way? But Rav Yosef, son of Rav Menashya of Dabil, performed an action in this case in accordance with the opinion of Rav and did not take the father鈥檚 betrothal into account, and Shmuel took offense at this and said sarcastically: Is wisdom measured out to everyone in a small measure, and measured out to this member of the Sages in a large measure? He was angered that Rav Yosef had the audacity to rule against him in this case. Now, if it enters your mind that they did not disagree at all, why did Shmuel take offense?


讚讬诇诪讗 讻讬 注讘讚 注讜讘讚讗 讘诪讻讞砖转讜


Perhaps when Rav Yosef performed an action, he did so in an instance where she denied her father鈥檚 right to betroth her, in which case even Shmuel would agree that the father鈥檚 betrothal does not take effect. Rather, it must be that Rav and Shmuel did disagree, and Rav Yosef must have ruled in the case of a woman who did not deny her father鈥檚 right to betroth her, which explains why Shmuel took exception to his ruling.


讗诪专 诇讬讛 诪专 讝讜讟专讗 诇专讘 讗砖讬 讛讻讬 讗诪专 讗诪讬诪专 讛讬诇讻转讗 讻讜讜转讬讛 讚砖诪讜讗诇 讜专讘 讗砖讬 讗诪专 讛讬诇讻转讗 讻讜讜转讬讛 讚专讘 讜讛讬诇讻转讗 讻讜讜转讬讛 讚专讘


Mar Zutra said to Rav Ashi: This is what Ameimar said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel. And Rav Ashi said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rav. The Gemara concludes: And the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rav.


诪转谞讬壮 诪讬 砖讬爪讗 讛讜讗 讜讗砖转讜 诇诪讚讬谞转 讛讬诐 讜讘讗 讛讜讗 讜讗砖转讜 讜讘谞讬讜 讜讗诪专 讗砖讛 砖讬爪讗转 注诪讬 诇诪讚讬谞转 讛讬诐 讛专讬 讛讬讗 讝讜 讜讗诇讜 讘谞讬讛 讗讬谉 爪专讬讱 诇讛讘讬讗 专讗讬讛 诇讗 注诇 讛讗砖讛 讜诇讗 注诇 讛讘谞讬诐 诪转讛 讜讗诇讜 讘谞讬讛 诪讘讬讗 专讗讬讛 注诇 讛讘谞讬诐 讜讗讬谞讜 诪讘讬讗 专讗讬讛 注诇 讛讗砖讛


MISHNA: With regard to one who went overseas with his wife, and returned with his wife and children, and said: This is the woman who went overseas with me and these are her children, he is not required to bring proof with regard to the lineage of the woman, since her lineage was already investigated at the time of their marriage, nor with regard to the lineage of the children. If he returned without the woman and said: My wife died and these are her children, he must bring proof that the children were born to his wife, but he does not need to bring proof with regard to the lineage of the woman.


讗砖讛 谞砖讗转讬 讘诪讚讬谞转 讛讬诐 讛专讬 讛讬讗 讝讜 讜讗诇讜 讘谞讬讛 诪讘讬讗 专讗讬讛 注诇 讛讗砖讛 讜讗讬谉 爪专讬讱 诇讛讘讬讗 专讗讬讛 注诇 讛讘谞讬诐 诪转讛 讜讗诇讜 讘谞讬讛 爪专讬讱 诇讛讘讬讗 专讗讬讛 注诇 讛讗砖讛 讜注诇 讛讘谞讬诐


If he left when he was unmarried and said upon his return: I married a woman overseas, and this is she, and these are her children, he must bring proof with regard to the lineage of the woman, but he is not required to bring proof with regard to the lineage of the children. If he said: I married a woman overseas and she died, and these are her children, he is required to bring proof with regard to both the lineage of the woman and the children.


讙诪壮 讗诪专 专讘讛 讘专 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讜讻讜诇谉 讘讻专讜讻讬诐 讗讞专讬讛


GEMARA: Rabba bar Rav Huna says: And all of the statements that he is not required to bring proof with regard to the lineage of the children are said in a case where they cling to her and treat the woman like their mother.


转谞讜 专讘谞谉 讗砖讛 谞砖讗转讬 讘诪讚讬谞转 讛讬诐 诪讘讬讗 专讗讬讛 注诇 讛讗砖讛 讜讗讬谉 爪专讬讱 诇讛讘讬讗 专讗讬讛 注诇 讛讘谞讬诐 讜诪讘讬讗 专讗讬讛 注诇 讛讙讚讜诇讬诐 讜讗讬谉 爪专讬讱 诇讛讘讬讗 专讗讬讛 注诇 讛拽讟谞讬诐 讘诪讛 讚讘专讬诐 讗诪讜专讬诐 讘讗砖讛 讗讞转 讗讘诇 讘砖转讬 谞砖讬诐 诪讘讬讗 专讗讬讛 注诇 讛讗砖讛 讜注诇 讛讘谞讬诐 注诇 讛讙讚讜诇讬诐 讜注诇 讛拽讟谞讬诐


The Sages taught that if a man says: I married a woman overseas, he must bring proof with regard to the lineage of the woman, but he is not required to bring proof with regard to the lineage of the children. And he must bring proof with regard to the lineage of the adult children, but he is not required to bring proof with regard to the lineage of the minor children. Since their attachment to their mother is apparent, it can be assumed they are her offspring. In what case is this statement said? It is in the case of one who said he married one woman, but when it is the case of one who said he married two women overseas, he must bring proof with regard to the lineage of both the woman and the children, with regard to the adult ones and with regard to the minor ones. Even if they cling to the woman whose lineage has been found to be unflawed, they might be the children of the other wife and are merely being raised by this one.


讗诪专 专讬砖 诇拽讬砖


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Kiddushin 79

The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria

Kiddushin 79

砖谞讬讛诐 谞讜转谞讬诐 讙讟 讜讗诐 专爪讜 讗讞讚 谞讜转谉 讙讟 讜讗讞讚 讻讜谞住


both men who might have betrothed her give her a bill of divorce in order to render her permitted to marry someone else. And if they wish and agree between them, one gives a bill of divorce and the other marries her.


讜讻谉 讛讗砖讛 砖谞转谞讛 专砖讜转 诇砖诇讜讞讛 诇拽讚砖讛 讜讛诇讻讛 讜拽讚砖讛 讗转 注爪诪讛 讗诐 砖诇讛 拽讚诪讜 拽讚讜砖讬讛 拽讬讚讜砖讬谉 讜讗诐 砖诇 砖诇讜讞讛 拽讚诪讜 拽讬讚讜砖讬讜 拽讬讚讜砖讬谉 讜讗诐 讗讬谞谉 讬讜讚注讬谉 砖谞讬讛诐 谞讜转谞讬诐 诇讛 讙讟 讜讗诐 专爪讜 讗讞讚 谞讜转谉 诇讛 讙讟 讜讗讞讚 讻讜谞住


And similarly, with regard to a woman who authorized her agent to betroth her and she then went and betrothed herself to someone else, if her own betrothal preceded that of the agent, her betrothal is a valid betrothal, and if that of her agent preceded hers, the agent鈥檚 betrothal is a valid betrothal. And if they do not know whose betrothal came first, both men who may have betrothed her give her a bill of divorce. And if they wish, one may give a bill of divorce and the other marries her.


讙诪壮 讜爪专讬讻讗 讚讗讬 讗砖诪注讬谞谉 讙讘讬 讚讬讚讬讛 诪砖讜诐 讚讙讘专讗 拽讬诐 诇讬讛 讘讬讜讞住讬谉 讗讘诇 讗讬转转讗 讚诇讗 拽讬诐 诇讛 讘讬讜讞住讬谉 讗讬诪讗 诇讗 谞讬讛讜讜 拽讬讚讜砖讬讛 拽讬讚讜砖讬谉


GEMARA: And it is necessary to state this halakha with regard to one who betroths his daughter as well as with regard to a woman who betroths herself. As had the mishna taught us this halakha only with regard to the father himself, one might say that it is because a man is expert with regard to lineage, and his decision to betroth his daughter on his own after having appointed an agent must have been due to the superior lineage of the man that he found willing to marry her. But with regard to a woman, who is not expert with regard to lineage, one might say her betrothal should not be considered a valid betrothal, as she still intends for her agent to be able to accept betrothal for her from a man with superior lineage.


讜讗讬 讗砖诪注讬谞谉 讙讘讬 讚讬讚讛 诪砖讜诐 讚讗讬转转讗 讚讬讬拽讗 讜诪讬谞住讘讗 讗讘诇 讗讬讛讜 讗讬诪讗 诇讗 讗讬讻驻转 诇讬讛 爪专讬讻讗


And conversely, had the mishna taught us this halakha only with regard to the woman herself, one might say that it is because a woman is particular about whom she marries, i.e., she is careful when selecting a husband for herself. Therefore, she would have chosen the partner she deems most suitable and would not want the agent to act on her behalf after she had found someone on her own. But with regard to the father, one might say that he does not care to the same extent, and he may authorize the agent to act in any case. Therefore, it is necessary for the mishna to include both cases.


讗讬转诪专 拽讬讚砖讛 讗讘讬讛 讘讚专讱 讜拽讬讚砖讛 注爪诪讛 讘注讬专 讜讛专讬 讛讬讗 讘讜讙专转 专讘 讗诪专 讛专讬 讛讬讗 讘讜讙专转 诇驻谞讬谞讜 讜砖诪讜讗诇 讗诪专 讞讬讬砖讬谞谉 诇拽讬讚讜砖讬 砖谞讬讛诐


It was stated that the amora鈥檌m discussed the following question: If her father betrothed her on the way, when he was traveling, and in the meantime she betrothed herself in the city, and she is now a grown woman, Rav said: She is a grown woman at present, and her father cannot currently betroth her. Therefore, even if he did betroth her at some point, his betrothal is assumed not to have taken effect. And Shmuel said: We are concerned with regard to the betrothal of both of them.


讗讬诪转 讗讬诇讬诪讗 讘转讜讱 砖砖讛 讘讛讗 谞讬诪讗 专讘 讛专讬 讛讬讗 讘讜讙专转 诇驻谞讬谞讜 讛砖转讗 讛讜讗 讚讘讙专讛 讗诇讗 诇讗讞专 砖砖讛 讘讛讗 谞讬诪讗 砖诪讜讗诇 讞讬讬砖讬谞谉 诇拽讬讚讜砖讬 砖谞讬讛诐 讜讛讗 讗诪专 砖诪讜讗诇 讗讬谉 讘讬谉 谞注专讜转 诇讘讙专讜转 讗诇讗 砖砖讛 讞讚砖讬诐 讘诇讘讚


The Gemara clarifies the case: When did the father鈥檚 betrothal occur? If we say it occurred during the six months when the daughter was no longer a minor and had the status of a young woman, in that case would Rav say: She is a grown woman at present? It is reasonable to say that it is only now that she has reached her majority, i.e., assumed the status of a grown woman, and in that case her father鈥檚 betrothal should take effect, since a father can betroth his daughter when she is a young woman. Rav would not rule that the father鈥檚 betrothal is disregarded. Rather, perhaps it occurred after the six months had elapsed since she became a young woman. In that case would Shmuel say: We are concerned with regard to the betrothal of both of them? But doesn鈥檛 Shmuel say: The difference between the status of a young woman and the status of a grown woman is six months alone, after which the girl has the status of a grown woman, which means her father can no longer betroth her?


诇讗 爪专讬讻讗 讚拽讚讬砖 讘讛讛讜讗 讬讜诪讗 讚诪砖诇讬诐 砖砖讛 专讘 讗诪专 讛专讬 讛讬讗 讘讜讙专转 诇驻谞讬谞讜 诪讚讛砖转讗 讘讜讙专转 讘爪驻专讗 谞诪讬 讘讜讙专转 讜砖诪讜讗诇 讗诪专 讛砖转讗 讛讜讗 讚讗讬讬转讬 住讬诪谞讬诐


The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary in a case where he betrothed her on the day that these six months were completed. Rav said: She is a grown woman at present. There is therefore a presumption that since she is now a grown woman, she was also a grown woman when her father betrothed her in the morning. And Shmuel said: Perhaps it is only now that her signs indicating puberty came, but she might have still been a young woman when her father betrothed her.


讜砖诪讜讗诇 诪讗讬 砖谞讗 诪诪拽讜讛 讚转谞谉 诪拽讜讛 砖谞诪讚讚 讜谞诪爪讗 讞住专 讻诇 讟讛专讜转 砖谞注砖讜 注诇 讙讘讬讜 诇诪驻专注 讘讬谉 讘专砖讜转 讛讬讞讬讚 讘讬谉 讘专砖讜转 讛专讘讬诐 讟诪讗讜转


The Gemara asks: And according to Shmuel, in what way is this case different from the case of a ritual bath? As we learned in a mishna (Mikvaot 2:2): With regard to a ritual bath that was known to have contained the requisite forty se鈥檃 of water, which was then measured and found deficient in its quantity of water, what is the halakha? All pure items whose purification had been performed in it, i.e., any impure items that had been purified through immersion in this ritual bath, retroactive to when the ritual bath was last measured, whether this ritual bath is found in the private domain or in the public domain, are impure. This indicates that the current situation, i.e., the deficient ritual bath, is presumed to extend back until when it was known with certainty to have contained the requisite amount of water. In this case too, the woman should be considered a grown woman at the time of the first betrothal, and the second betrothal should not take effect.


砖讗谞讬 讛转诐 讚讗讬讻讗 诇诪讬诪专 讛注诪讚 讟诪讗 注诇 讞讝拽转讜 讜讗讬诪专 诇讗 讟讘诇


The Gemara answers: There, in the case of a ritual bath, it is different, since it can be said: Maintain an impure item in its presumptive status and say that it was not properly immersed. There, the presumptive status of the item being ritually impure is supported by the current state of the ritual bath, which is now deficient.


讗讚专讘讛 讛注诪讚 诪拽讜讛 注诇 讞讝拽转讜 讜讗讬诪专 诇讗 讞住专 讛专讬 讞住专 诇驻谞讬讱 讛讻讗 谞诪讬 讛专讬 讘讜讙专转 诇驻谞讬讱 讛砖转讗 讛讜讗 讚讘讙专讛 讛转诐 谞诪讬 讛砖转讗 讛讜讗 讚讞住专


The Gemara continues to compare the two cases: On the contrary, it could be said: Maintain the ritual bath in its presumptive status, that it was known to have previously contained the requisite forty se鈥檃, and say that it was not deficient at the time of the immersion and that the items should be considered ritually pure. The Gemara answers: There is a deficient ritual bath at present, which counteracts the presumptive status that it contained the requisite forty se鈥檃. The Gemara asks: Here too, there is a grown woman before you, which should counteract the fact that she was previously a young woman. The Gemara answers: In this case, it is only now that she has reached her majority. The Gemara asks: There too, in the case of a ritual bath, one can also say it is only now that it has become deficient. Perhaps it contained the requisite forty se鈥檃 shortly beforehand.


讛转诐 转专转讬 诇专讬注讜转讗 讛讻讗 讞讚讗 诇专讬注讜转讗


The Gemara responds: There, in the case of the ritual bath, there are two reasons to weaken the possibility that the items are ritually pure: First, there is a deficient ritual bath at present; second, the item has a presumptive status of impurity. Here, by contrast, there is only one reason to weaken the possibility that she was a young woman at the time of the betrothal, i.e., the fact that she is now a grown woman. Shmuel therefore maintains that her earlier status of young woman is not nullified, and both betrothals must be taken into account.


讜砖诪讜讗诇 诪讗讬 砖谞讗 诪讞讘讬转 讚转谞讬讗 讛讬讛 讘讜讚拽 讗转 讛讞讘讬转 诇讛驻专讬砖 注诇讬讛 转专讜诪讛 讜讛讜诇讱 讜讗讞专 讻讱 谞诪爪讗转 讞讜诪抓 讻诇 砖诇砖讛 讬诪讬诐 讜讚讗讬 诪讬讻谉 讜讗讬诇讱 住驻拽


The Gemara poses another question: And according to Shmuel, in what way is this case different from the case of a barrel? As it is taught in a baraita (Tosefta, Terumot 2:8): If one would inspect the contents of a barrel to see if it still contained enough wine to continually mentally separate teruma from it to exempt other untithed wine he had, until all the wine in that barrel would be teruma and would be given to a priest, and afterward the contents of the barrel were found to be vinegar, which cannot be set aside as teruma for untithed wine, then all three days after he had last inspected it is definitely viewed as having been wine, and any untithed wine for which teruma was separated during those days is tithed. From then onward, more than three days after the previous inspection, it is uncertain as to whether it had already turned to vinegar, and any untithed wine for which teruma was separated during those days is not tithed.


讜专诪讬谞谉 讞讘讬转 讗诪拽讜讛 诪讗讬 砖谞讗 讚讛讻讗 讜讚讗讬 讜诪讗讬 砖谞讗 讚讛讻讗 住驻拽


Before stating the difficulty with Shmuel鈥檚 opinion, the Gemara first clarifies the baraita. And we raised a contradiction between the halakha of the barrel and that of the ritual bath: What is different in that here, with regard to the ritual bath, the halakha is that the items are definitely impure, and what is different in that there, with regard to the barrel, it is only uncertain whether the produce remains untithed? In both cases the situation at present, the ritual bath being deficient and the contents of the barrel having turned to vinegar, should lead to a definite conclusion.


讜讗诪专 专讘 讞谞讬谞讗 诪住讜专讬讗 诪讗谉 转谞讗 讞讘讬转 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讛讬讗 讚讙讘讬 诪拽讜讛 谞诪讬 住驻讬拽讗 诪砖讜讬


The Gemara continues its analysis of the baraita: And Rav 岣nina from Syria says: Who is the tanna that taught the halakha of the barrel? It is Rabbi Shimon, who with regard to a ritual bath also considers it as a matter of uncertainty rather than as definitively impure. Therefore, there is no contradiction between the baraita and the mishna.


讚转谞讬讗 讻诇 讟讛专讜转 砖谞注砖讜 注诇 讙讘讬讜 诇诪驻专注 讘讬谉 讘专砖讜转 讛讬讞讬讚 讘讬谉 讘专砖讜转 讛专讘讬诐 讟诪讗讜转 讜专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讗讜诪专 讘专砖讜转 讛专讘讬诐 讟讛讜专讜转 讘专砖讜转 讛讬讞讬讚 转讜诇讬谉


As it is taught in a baraita: All pure items whose purification had been performed in it, i.e., any impure items that had been purified through immersion in the ritual bath that was found to be deficient, retroactive to when the ritual bath was last measured, whether this ritual bath is found in the private domain or in the public domain, are impure. And Rabbi Shimon says they are impure due to the uncertainty, and therefore, if the ritual bath was located in the public domain, they are pure, in accordance with the principle that uncertain cases of impurity in the public domain are deemed pure. But if the ritual bath was located in the private domain, the decision is suspended, i.e., if the impure items came into contact with teruma, one may not partake of the teruma due to the uncertainty, but it is also not burned as though it were definitely impure.


讗讘诇 诇专讘谞谉 讟讘诇 诇诪驻专注 砖讗谞讬 讛转诐 讚讗讬讻讗 诇诪讬诪专 讛注诪讚 讟讘诇 注诇 讞讝拽转讜 讜讗讬诪专 诇讗 谞讬转拽谉


The Gemara returns to complete the difficulty with Shmuel鈥檚 opinion: But according to the Rabbis, who hold that in the case of the ritual bath the items are definitely impure, with regard to the wine that had been exempted from teruma by means of separating teruma from the contents of the barrel, that wine will be untithed produce retroactively, since they hold that the current status extends to the past. This is unlike the ruling of Shmuel, who ruled that in the case of the woman who was betrothed to two men it is uncertain to whom she is betrothed. The Gemara answers: There, in the case of the barrel, it is different, as it can be said: Maintain the untithed produce in its presumptive status, as when it first grew it was definitely untithed, and say it was not fixed, i.e., exempted.


讗讚专讘讛 讛注诪讚 讬讬谉 注诇 讞讝拽转讜 讜讗讬诪专 诇讗 讛讞诪讬抓 讛专讬 讛讞诪讬抓 诇驻谞讬讱 讛讻讗 谞诪讬 讛专讬 讛讬讗 讘讜讙专转 诇驻谞讬谞讜 讛砖转讗 讛讜讗 讚讘讙专讛 讛讻讗 谞诪讬 讛砖转讗 讛讜讗 讚讗讞诪讬抓


The Gemara asks: On the contrary, why not maintain the wine in its presumptive status, and say it had not turned to vinegar? The Gemara rejects this: That is impossible, as it is turned to vinegar at present. The Gemara replies: In the case of the betrothal, here too, she is a grown woman at present; what is the difference? The Gemara rejects this claim: With regard to the woman, it is possible that only now has she reached her majority. The Gemara challenges: Here too, it could be that it is only now that it has turned to vinegar, but not earlier.


讛转诐 转专转讬 诇专讬注讜转讗 讛讻讗 讞讚讗 诇专讬注讜转讗 讛讜讗 讚讗讬讻讗


The Gemara explains: There, in the case of the barrel, there are two reasons to weaken the possibility that the wine is tithed: First, it is vinegar at present; second, the wine has a presumptive status of being untithed. Here, by contrast, there is only one reason to weaken the possibility that she was a young woman at the time of the betrothal, i.e., the fact that she is now a grown woman. Shmuel therefore maintains that her earlier status of a young woman is not nullified, and both betrothals must be taken into account.


谞讬诪讗 讻转谞讗讬


The Gemara suggests: Let us say that it is parallel to a dispute between tanna鈥檌m:


诪讬 诪讜爪讬讗 诪讬讚 诪讬


The halakha is that a moribund person who transfers all of his property to others without leaving anything for himself can retract his bequest upon regaining his health. This is due to the assumption that one would give away all his possessions only if he believes he is going to die, and the bequest was therefore made in error. By contrast, if a healthy person gave all his property to others, he cannot later retract his bequest. The tanna鈥檌m discuss the case of one who gave away all his property and later, seeking to retrieve his property, claims that he was moribund at the time, while the recipients of the bequest maintain that he was healthy. Who is able to remove the property from the possession of whom?


讛讜讗 诪讜爪讬讗 诪讬讚诐 讘诇讗 专讗讬讛 讜讛谉 讗讬谉 诪讜爪讬讗讬诐 诪讬讚讜 讘诇讗 专讗讬讛 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 讬注拽讘 专讘讬 谞转谉 讗讜诪专 讗诐 讘专讬讗 讛讜讗 注诇讬讜 诇讛讘讬讗 专讗讬讛 砖讛讬讛 砖讻讬讘 诪专注 讜讗诐 砖讻讬讘 诪专注 讛讜讗 注诇讬讛诐 诇讛讘讬讗 专讗讬讛 砖讘专讬讗 讛讬讛


He is able to remove his property held by others from their possession without needing to bring proof that he was moribund at the time, and they may not remove the property from his possession, if he still is in possession of the property, without proof that he was healthy. This is the statement of Rabbi Ya鈥檃kov. Rabbi Natan says: If he is currently healthy, the obligation is upon him to bring proof that he was on his deathbed at the time of the bequest, and if he is now on his deathbed, the obligation is upon them to bring proof that he was healthy at the time of the bequest.


谞讬诪讗 专讘 讚讗诪专 讻专讘讬 谞转谉 讜砖诪讜讗诇 讚讗诪专 讻专讘讬 讬注拽讘 讗诪专 诇讱 专讘 讗谞讗 讚讗诪专讬 讗驻讬诇讜 讻专讘讬 讬注拽讘 注讚 讻讗谉 诇讗 拽讗诪专 专讘讬 讬注拽讘 讛转诐 讚讗讬讻讗 诇诪讬诪专 讛注诪讚 诪诪讜谉 注诇 讞讝拽转讜 讗讘诇 讛讻讗 诪讬 谞讬诪讗 讛注诪讚 讙讜祝 注诇 讞讝拽转讜


The Gemara suggests: Let us say that Rav spoke in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Natan that one鈥檚 current status is paramount, and Shmuel spoke in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ya鈥檃kov, who holds that the question of whether he was moribund remains a matter of uncertainty, and they may not claim the property from him even if he is now healthy. The Gemara rejects this: Rav could have said to you: I spoke even in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ya鈥檃kov, as Rabbi Ya鈥檃kov states his opinion only there, because it can be said that the principle of: Leave the property in its previous status, applies, so the property should remain where it is. But here, with regard to the question of when a young woman became a grown woman, shall we say: Establish the body according to its previous status? It is obvious that her body was due to mature.


讜砖诪讜讗诇 讗诪专 讗谞讗 讚讗诪专讬 讗驻讬诇讜 诇专讘讬 谞转谉 注讚 讻讗谉 诇讗 拽讗诪专 专讘讬 谞转谉 讛转诐 讚讻讜诇讬 注诇诪讗 讘讞讝拽转 讘专讬讗讬诐 拽讬讬诪讬 诪讗谉 讚拽讗 诪驻讬拽 谞驻砖讬讛 诪讞讝拽讛 讛讜讬 注诇讬讛 诇讗讬转讜讬讬 专讗讬讛 讗讘诇 讛讻讗 诪讬 拽讗 诪驻拽讗 谞驻砖讛 诪讞讝拽讛 讚拽诪讬讛


And Shmuel could have said: I spoke even in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Natan, since Rabbi Natan states his opinion that the current state is paramount only there, as everyone has a presumptive status of being healthy. Consequently, if a person removes himself from this presumption by claiming he was moribund, the obligation falls upon him to bring proof. But here, does she remove herself from a presumption that was present? There is no presumption that she was a grown woman in the morning.


谞讬诪讗 讻讛谞讬 转谞讗讬 拽讬讚砖讛 讗讘讬讛 讘讚专讱 讜拽讬讚砖讛 注爪诪讛 讘注讬专 讜讛专讬 讛讬讗 讘讜讙专转 转谞讗 讞讚讗 讛专讬 讛讬讗 讘讜讙专转 诇驻谞讬谞讜 讜转谞讬讗 讗讬讚讱 讞讬讬砖讬谞谉 诇拽讬讚讜砖讬 砖谞讬讛诐 诪讗讬 诇讗讜 讞讚 讻专讘 讜讞讚 讻砖诪讜讗诇


The Gemara further suggests: Let us say that this dispute between Rav and Shmuel is parallel to a dispute between these tanna鈥檌m: With regard to a case where her father betrothed her on the way, when he was traveling, and in the meantime she betrothed herself in the city, and she is now a grown woman, one baraita taught: She is a grown woman at present, and her father cannot currently betroth her; therefore, his betrothal does not take effect. And it is taught in another baraita: We are concerned with regard to the betrothal of both of them. What, is it not the case that one baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rav, and one baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel?


诇讗 讗讬讚讬 讜讗讬讚讬 讻砖诪讜讗诇 讻讗谉 讘诪讻讞砖转讜 讻讗谉 讘砖讗讬谉 诪讻讞砖转讜


The Gemara rejects this: No; it is possible that both this and that are in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel. Here, in this baraita, it is referring to a case where she denies his right to betroth her, as she claims that she was a grown woman before his betrothal. There, it is referring to a situation where she does not deny his right to betroth her, and therefore it is uncertain which betrothal takes effect.


讜谞讬诪讗 诪讚诪转谞讬转讗 诇讗 驻诇讬讙讬 讗诪讜专讗讬 谞诪讬 诇讗 驻诇讬讙讬 讜转住讘专讗 讛讗 专讘 讬讜住祝 讘专讬讛 讚专讘 诪谞砖讬讗 诪讚讜讜讬诇 注讘讚 注讜讘讚讗 讻讜讜转讬讛 讚专讘 讜讗讬拽驻讬讚 砖诪讜讗诇 讜讗诪专 讻讜诇讬 注诇诪讗 讻讬讬诇讬 诇讬讛 讘拽讘讗 讝讜讟讗 讜讛讗讬 诪讚专讘谞谉 讻讬讬诇讬 诇讬讛 讘拽讘讗 专讘讛 讜讗讬 住诇拽讗 讚注转讱 诇讗 驻诇讬讙讬 讗诪讗讬 拽讗 诪拽驻讬讚


The Gemara asks: If so, let us also say that since the baraitot do not disagree, the opinions of the amora鈥檌m, Rav and Shmuel, do not disagree either. One is referring to a case where she denies her father鈥檚 right to betroth her, while the other is referring to a case where she does not. The Gemara rejects this: And how can you understand it that way? But Rav Yosef, son of Rav Menashya of Dabil, performed an action in this case in accordance with the opinion of Rav and did not take the father鈥檚 betrothal into account, and Shmuel took offense at this and said sarcastically: Is wisdom measured out to everyone in a small measure, and measured out to this member of the Sages in a large measure? He was angered that Rav Yosef had the audacity to rule against him in this case. Now, if it enters your mind that they did not disagree at all, why did Shmuel take offense?


讚讬诇诪讗 讻讬 注讘讚 注讜讘讚讗 讘诪讻讞砖转讜


Perhaps when Rav Yosef performed an action, he did so in an instance where she denied her father鈥檚 right to betroth her, in which case even Shmuel would agree that the father鈥檚 betrothal does not take effect. Rather, it must be that Rav and Shmuel did disagree, and Rav Yosef must have ruled in the case of a woman who did not deny her father鈥檚 right to betroth her, which explains why Shmuel took exception to his ruling.


讗诪专 诇讬讛 诪专 讝讜讟专讗 诇专讘 讗砖讬 讛讻讬 讗诪专 讗诪讬诪专 讛讬诇讻转讗 讻讜讜转讬讛 讚砖诪讜讗诇 讜专讘 讗砖讬 讗诪专 讛讬诇讻转讗 讻讜讜转讬讛 讚专讘 讜讛讬诇讻转讗 讻讜讜转讬讛 讚专讘


Mar Zutra said to Rav Ashi: This is what Ameimar said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel. And Rav Ashi said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rav. The Gemara concludes: And the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rav.


诪转谞讬壮 诪讬 砖讬爪讗 讛讜讗 讜讗砖转讜 诇诪讚讬谞转 讛讬诐 讜讘讗 讛讜讗 讜讗砖转讜 讜讘谞讬讜 讜讗诪专 讗砖讛 砖讬爪讗转 注诪讬 诇诪讚讬谞转 讛讬诐 讛专讬 讛讬讗 讝讜 讜讗诇讜 讘谞讬讛 讗讬谉 爪专讬讱 诇讛讘讬讗 专讗讬讛 诇讗 注诇 讛讗砖讛 讜诇讗 注诇 讛讘谞讬诐 诪转讛 讜讗诇讜 讘谞讬讛 诪讘讬讗 专讗讬讛 注诇 讛讘谞讬诐 讜讗讬谞讜 诪讘讬讗 专讗讬讛 注诇 讛讗砖讛


MISHNA: With regard to one who went overseas with his wife, and returned with his wife and children, and said: This is the woman who went overseas with me and these are her children, he is not required to bring proof with regard to the lineage of the woman, since her lineage was already investigated at the time of their marriage, nor with regard to the lineage of the children. If he returned without the woman and said: My wife died and these are her children, he must bring proof that the children were born to his wife, but he does not need to bring proof with regard to the lineage of the woman.


讗砖讛 谞砖讗转讬 讘诪讚讬谞转 讛讬诐 讛专讬 讛讬讗 讝讜 讜讗诇讜 讘谞讬讛 诪讘讬讗 专讗讬讛 注诇 讛讗砖讛 讜讗讬谉 爪专讬讱 诇讛讘讬讗 专讗讬讛 注诇 讛讘谞讬诐 诪转讛 讜讗诇讜 讘谞讬讛 爪专讬讱 诇讛讘讬讗 专讗讬讛 注诇 讛讗砖讛 讜注诇 讛讘谞讬诐


If he left when he was unmarried and said upon his return: I married a woman overseas, and this is she, and these are her children, he must bring proof with regard to the lineage of the woman, but he is not required to bring proof with regard to the lineage of the children. If he said: I married a woman overseas and she died, and these are her children, he is required to bring proof with regard to both the lineage of the woman and the children.


讙诪壮 讗诪专 专讘讛 讘专 专讘 讛讜谞讗 讜讻讜诇谉 讘讻专讜讻讬诐 讗讞专讬讛


GEMARA: Rabba bar Rav Huna says: And all of the statements that he is not required to bring proof with regard to the lineage of the children are said in a case where they cling to her and treat the woman like their mother.


转谞讜 专讘谞谉 讗砖讛 谞砖讗转讬 讘诪讚讬谞转 讛讬诐 诪讘讬讗 专讗讬讛 注诇 讛讗砖讛 讜讗讬谉 爪专讬讱 诇讛讘讬讗 专讗讬讛 注诇 讛讘谞讬诐 讜诪讘讬讗 专讗讬讛 注诇 讛讙讚讜诇讬诐 讜讗讬谉 爪专讬讱 诇讛讘讬讗 专讗讬讛 注诇 讛拽讟谞讬诐 讘诪讛 讚讘专讬诐 讗诪讜专讬诐 讘讗砖讛 讗讞转 讗讘诇 讘砖转讬 谞砖讬诐 诪讘讬讗 专讗讬讛 注诇 讛讗砖讛 讜注诇 讛讘谞讬诐 注诇 讛讙讚讜诇讬诐 讜注诇 讛拽讟谞讬诐


The Sages taught that if a man says: I married a woman overseas, he must bring proof with regard to the lineage of the woman, but he is not required to bring proof with regard to the lineage of the children. And he must bring proof with regard to the lineage of the adult children, but he is not required to bring proof with regard to the lineage of the minor children. Since their attachment to their mother is apparent, it can be assumed they are her offspring. In what case is this statement said? It is in the case of one who said he married one woman, but when it is the case of one who said he married two women overseas, he must bring proof with regard to the lineage of both the woman and the children, with regard to the adult ones and with regard to the minor ones. Even if they cling to the woman whose lineage has been found to be unflawed, they might be the children of the other wife and are merely being raised by this one.


讗诪专 专讬砖 诇拽讬砖


Reish Lakish said:


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