Rosh Hashanah 6
מִדְּבֶן עַזַּאי נָפְקָא, דְּתַנְיָא: בֶּן עַזַּאי אוֹמֵר: ״אוֹתוֹ״
as this halakha is derived from that which ben Azzai said, as it is taught in a baraita that ben Azzai says: The verse states: “And if any of the flesh of the sacrifice of his peace-offering be eaten at all on the third day, it shall not be accepted, neither shall it be imputed to him who offers it, it shall be piggul” (Leviticus 7:18).
מַה תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר? לְפִי שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״לֹא תְאַחֵר לְשַׁלְּמוֹ״, שׁוֹמֵעַ אֲנִי אַף מְאַחֵר נִדְרוֹ בְּ״בַל יֵרָצֶה״, תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״אוֹתוֹ״ — אוֹתוֹ בְּ״לֹא יֵרָצֶה״, וְאֵין מְאַחֵר נִדְרוֹ בְּ״לֹא יֵרָצֶה״,
For what purpose does the verse state the word “it”? Since elsewhere it states: “When you shall vow a vow to the Lord your God, you shall not delay paying it; for the Lord your God will surely require it from you, and it would be sin in you” (Deuteronomy 23:22), I might have interpreted from this verse that even one who is late in paying his vow is included in: It shall not be accepted. Therefore, the verse states “it.” It, an offering disqualified by improper intention [piggul], is included in the halakha of: “It shall not be accepted,” but the animal of one who is late in paying his vow is not included in the halakha of: “It shall not be accepted.”
אֶלָּא: ״בְּךָ חֵטְא״ — וְלֹא בְּאִשְׁתְּךָ חֵטְא.
The Gemara rejects what was said above; rather, the explanation of the verse is as follows. The phrase: “And it would be sin in you” comes to teach that there would be a sin in you, but there would not be a sin in your wife.
סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אָמֵינָא: הוֹאִיל וְאָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, וְאִי תֵּימָא רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: אֵין אִשְׁתּוֹ שֶׁל אָדָם מֵתָה אֶלָּא אִם כֵּן מְבַקְּשִׁין מִמֶּנּוּ מָמוֹן וְאֵין לוֹ, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״אִם אֵין לְךָ לְשַׁלֵּם לָמָּה יִקַּח מִשְׁכָּבְךָ מִתַּחְתֶּיךָ״, אֵימָא בְּהַאי עָוֹן דְּ״בַל תְּאַחֵר״ נָמֵי אִשְׁתּוֹ מֵתָה, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.
It was necessary to say that the lateness is not imputed to the other members of one’s household for the following reason: It might enter your mind to say: Since Rabbi Yoḥanan said, and some say that it was Rabbi Elazar who said: A person’s wife dies only because others demand of him money and he does not have means with which to pay, as it is stated about one who commits himself to guarantee a loan: “If you have nothing with which to pay, why should he take away your bed from under you?” (Proverbs 22:27). The verse warns one who takes a loan that incurring debt may result in one losing the very sheets that he sleeps on to his creditor. The Gemara understands this homiletically: Why should you cause God to take away your wife, i.e., she who shares your bed, so that she dies? Consequently, you might say that one’s wife also dies for this transgression of the prohibition: You shall not delay, in that one fails to fulfill his commitment. Therefore, the verse teaches us that this is not so. Rather, this sin is imputed to him alone.
תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: ״מוֹצָא שְׂפָתֶיךָ״ — זוֹ מִצְוַת עֲשֵׂה, ״תִּשְׁמוֹר״ — זוֹ מִצְוַת לֹא תַעֲשֶׂה, ״וְעָשִׂיתָ״ — אַזְהָרָה לְבֵית דִּין שֶׁיְּעַשּׂוּךְ, ״כַּאֲשֶׁר נָדַרְתָּ״ — זֶה נֶדֶר, ״לַה׳ אֱלֹהֶיךָ״ — אֵלּוּ חַטָּאוֹת וַאֲשָׁמוֹת עוֹלוֹת וּשְׁלָמִים, ״נְדָבָה״ — כְּמַשְׁמָעוֹ, ״אֲשֶׁר דִּבַּרְתָּ״ — אֵלּוּ קׇדְשֵׁי בֶּדֶק הַבַּיִת, ״בְּפִיךְ״ — זוֹ צְדָקָה.
§ The Sages taught in a baraita: The verse states: “That which is gone out of your lips you shall keep and do; as you have vowed as a gift to the Lord your God, which you have promised with your mouth” (Deuteronomy 23:24). “That which is gone out of your lips”; this is a positive mitzva. “You shall keep”; this is a prohibition, as the phrase “you shall keep” is a warning to keep oneself from sinning. “And do”; this is an admonition to the court to make you fulfill your vow. “As you have vowed”; this is referring to a vow-offering. “To the Lord your God”; this is referring to sin-offerings, guilt-offerings, burnt-offerings, and peace-offerings, teaching that one must keep his word and bring them. “As a gift”; this is understood in its literal sense to be referring to a gift-offering. “Which you have promised”; this is referring to objects consecrated for Temple maintenance. “With your mouth”; this is referring to vows of charity, to which one commits himself with his mouth.
אָמַר מָר: ״מוֹצָא שְׂפָתֶיךָ״ — זוֹ מִצְוַת עֲשֵׂה. לְמָה לִי? מִ״וּבָאתָ שָּׁמָּה … וַהֲבֵאתֶם שָׁמָּה״ נָפְקָא! ״תִּשְׁמוֹר״ — זוֹ מִצְוַת לֹא תַעֲשֶׂה. לְמָה לִי? מִ״לֹּא תְאַחֵר לְשַׁלְּמוֹ״ נָפְקָא!
The Gemara clarifies the details mentioned in this baraita. The Master said: “That which is gone out of your lips”; this is a positive mitzva. Why do I need this derivation? Isn’t the positive mitzva derived from the verse: “And there you shall come; and there you shall bring your burnt-offerings and your sacrifices, and your tithes, and the offering of your hand, and your vows, and your gift-offerings, and the firstborn of your herd and of your flock” (Deuteronomy 12:5–6)? The baraita continues: “You shall keep”; this is a prohibition. Why do I need this derivation; this is derived from the verse: “You shall not delay paying it” (Deuteronomy 23:22).
״וְעָשִׂיתָ״ — אַזְהָרָה לְבֵית דִּין שֶׁיְּעַשּׂוּךְ. לְמָה לִי? מִ״יַּקְרִיב אוֹתוֹ״ נָפְקָא, דְּתַנְיָא: ״יַקְרִיב אוֹתוֹ״ — מְלַמֵּד שֶׁכּוֹפִין אוֹתוֹ. יָכוֹל בְּעַל כׇּרְחוֹ — תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״לִרְצוֹנוֹ״, הָא כֵּיצַד? כּוֹפִין אוֹתוֹ עַד שֶׁיֹּאמַר ״רוֹצֶה אֲנִי״.
“And do”; this is a warning to the court to make you fulfill your vow. Why do I need this derivation? This rule is derived from the verse: “He shall offer it” (Leviticus 1:3), as it is taught in a baraita: The verse states: “He shall offer it,” which teaches that he must be forced to bring his offering. One might have thought that he may be forced to bring his offering even against his will. Therefore, the verse states: “In accordance with his will” (Leviticus 1:3). How so? The court coerces him until he says: I want to bring the offering. Now, since all of these halakhot are already known from other sources, what is the point of this repetition?
חַד, דַּאֲמַר וְלָא אַפְרֵישׁ, וְחַד, אַפְרֵישׁ וְלָא אַקְרֵיב.
The Gemara answers: One set of verses is referring to a case where one said that he vowed to bring an offering but did not yet set aside a specific animal for his vow, and one set of verses is referring to a case where he set aside a specific animal for his vow but did not yet sacrifice it on the altar.
וּצְרִיכָא, דְּאִי אַשְׁמְעִינַן אֲמַר וְלָא אַפְרֵישׁ, מִשּׁוּם דְּלָא קַיְּימֵיהּ לְדִיבּוּרֵיהּ, אֲבָל אַפְרֵישׁ וְלָא אַקְרֵיב, אֵימָא: כֹּל הֵיכָא דְּאִיתֵיהּ — בֵּי גַזָּא דְּרַחֲמָנָא אִיתֵיהּ. צְרִיכָא.
And it is necessary to teach the halakha in both cases, as had the Torah taught us only about the halakha of the case where one said that he vowed to bring an offering but did not yet set aside a specific animal for his vow, one might have said that only in this case has he transgressed because he did not keep his word; however, if he set aside a specific animal for his vow but did not yet sacrifice it on the altar, one might say that anywhere that it is, it is in the treasure house of the Merciful One, as the world and everything in it belongs to God, and therefore it makes no difference if he delays in bringing it to the Temple. Therefore, it is necessary to teach that even when one has set aside a specific animal he transgresses the prohibition.
וְאִי אַשְׁמְעִינַן אַפְרֵישׁ וְלָא אַקְרֵיב, דְּקָא מַשְׁהֵי לֵיהּ גַּבֵּיהּ, אֲבָל אָמַר וְלָא אַפְרֵישׁ, אֵימָא דִּיבּוּרָא לֹא כְּלוּם הוּא. צְרִיכָא.
And had the Torah taught us only about the case where one set aside a specific animal for his vow but did not yet sacrifice it on the altar, one might have said that only in this case has he transgressed because he is keeping the animal for himself. But if he said that he vowed to bring an offering but did not yet set aside a specific animal for his vow, one might say that his mere speech is nothing, and there is no transgression provided he has not actually set aside an animal. Therefore, it is necessary to teach the halakha in both cases.
וּמִי מָצֵית אָמְרַתְּ דְּאָמַר וְלָא אַפְרֵישׁ? וְהָא נְדָבָה כְּתִיבָא, וּתְנַן: אֵי זֶהוּ נֶדֶר — הָאוֹמֵר: הֲרֵי עָלַי עוֹלָה. וְאֵי זוֹ הִיא נְדָבָה — הָאוֹמֵר: הֲרֵי זוֹ עוֹלָה.
The Gemara raises a difficulty: How can you say that the Gemara is dealing with a case where one merely said that he vowed to bring an offering but did not yet set aside a specific animal? Isn’t a gift-offering mentioned in the verse, and we learned in a mishna: What is a vow-offering? It is an offering brought by one who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a burnt-offering. And what is a gift-offering? It is an offering brought by one who says, concerning a particular animal: I undertake to bring this animal as a burnt-offering.
וּמָה בֵּין נֶדֶר לִנְדָבָה? נֶדֶר, מֵת אוֹ נִגְנַב — חַיָּיב בְּאַחְרָיוּתוֹ. נְדָבָה, מֵתָה אוֹ נִגְנְבָה — אֵינוֹ חַיָּיב בְּאַחְרָיוּתָהּ.
And what is the difference between a vow-offering and a gift-offering? With regard to vow-offerings, if the animal died or was stolen, the one who took the vow is obligated to pay restitution for it. He undertook to bring a burnt-offering without specifying the animal, and therefore until he brings that offering he is not absolved of his obligation. With regard to a gift-offering, however, if the animal died or was stolen, he is not obligated to pay restitution for it because he undertook to bring a specific animal, and that is no longer possible. In the case of a gift-offering, then, a specific animal must have already been set aside as an offering.
אָמַר רָבָא: מַשְׁכַּחַתְּ לַהּ, כְּגוֹן דְּאָמַר: הֲרֵי עָלַי עוֹלָה עַל מְנָת שֶׁאֵינִי חַיָּיב בְּאַחְרָיוּתָהּ.
Rava said: You can find a case of a gift-offering where a specific animal has not yet been set aside; for example, where one said: It is incumbent upon me to bring a burnt-offering on the condition that after I set an animal aside in fulfillment of my vow, I will not be liable to replace it should the animal die or be stolen.
״בְּפִיךְ״ — זוֹ צְדָקָה. אָמַר רָבָא: וּצְדָקָה — מִיחַיַּיב עֲלַהּ לְאַלְתַּר. מַאי טַעְמָא — דְּהָא קָיְימִי עֲנִיִּים.
§ The baraita stated: “With your mouth”; this is referring to vows of charity. Rava said: In the case of vows of charity, one is liable immediately if he is late in distributing the charity that he had promised to give. What is the reason for this halakha? It is that poor people to whom the charity may be given exist in all places, and so the charity can be distributed to them immediately, unlike an offering, which must be brought to the Temple.
פְּשִׁיטָא! מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא: כֵּיוָן דִּבְעִנְיָינָא דְּקׇרְבָּנוֹת כְּתִיבָא, עַד דְּעָבְרִי עֲלַהּ שְׁלֹשָׁה רְגָלִים כְּקׇרְבָּנוֹת, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן: הָתָם הוּא דִּתְלִינְהוּ רַחֲמָנָא בִּרְגָלִים, אֲבָל הָכָא לָא — דְּהָא שְׁכִיחִי עֲנִיִּים.
The Gemara asks: It is obvious that charity must be given to the poor without delay. The Gemara explains: Lest you say that since the halakha pertaining to vows of charity is written in the passage dealing with offerings, perhaps one does not transgress the prohibition against delaying until three Festivals have passed, as is the halakha with regard to offerings, therefore Rava teaches us that this is not so. Rather, there, with regard to the offerings, the Merciful One made the timing of the transgression dependent upon the time of the Festivals, when one must go on pilgrimage to the Temple. However, here, with regard to charity vows, this is not so because poor people who are ready to accept charity are found in all places.
אָמַר רָבָא: כֵּיוָן שֶׁעָבַר עָלָיו רֶגֶל אֶחָד — עוֹבֵר בַּעֲשֵׂה.
Rava said: Although, according to most opinions one transgresses the prohibition against delaying only after three Festivals have elapsed, once even one Festival has passed and he has not sacrificed the offerings that he vowed to bring, he immediately violates a positive mitzva.
מֵיתִיבִי: הֵעִיד רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ וְרַבִּי פַּפְּיָיס עַל וָלָד שְׁלָמִים שֶׁיִּקְרַב שְׁלָמִים. אָמַר רַבִּי פַּפְּיָיס: אֲנִי מֵעִיד שֶׁהָיְתָה לָנוּ פָּרָה שֶׁל זִבְחֵי שְׁלָמִים וַאֲכַלְנוּהָ בַּפֶּסַח, וְאָכַלְנוּ וְלָדָהּ שְׁלָמִים בֶּחָג.
The Gemara raises an objection from the following mishna: Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Papeyyas testified about the offspring of peace-offerings. They said that if the mother animal was consecrated before it conceived or during its pregnancy, the offspring, too, must be sacrificed as a peace-offering. Rabbi Papeyyas said: I testify that we once had a cow that was sacrificed as a peace-offering, and we ate it on Passover [beFesaḥ], and we ate its offspring as a peace-offering on the Festival [beḤag], i.e., on Sukkot.
בִּשְׁלָמָא בְּפֶסַח לָא אַקְרְבוּהּ, אֵימוֹר דִּמְחוּסָּר זְמַן הֲוָה. אֶלָּא וַלְדַּהּ בַּעֲצֶרֶת הֵיכִי מַשְׁהִי לֵהּ וְעָבְרִי עֲלֵיהּ בַּעֲשֵׂה!
The Gemara clarifies the details of this story: Granted, on Passover itself Rabbi Papeyyas and his family did not sacrifice the offspring, as one can say that the animal was lacking the requisite time, i.e., it was less than eight days old, and it is prohibited to sacrifice such a young animal. But how could they delay and not sacrifice the offspring on Shavuot, the first Festival after Passover, if, according to Rava, they would violate a positive mitzva as soon as the first Festival passed?
אָמַר רַב זְבִיד מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרָבָא: כְּגוֹן
Rav Zevid said in the name of Rava: For example, this occurs
שֶׁהָיָה חוֹלֶה בָּעֲצֶרֶת. רַב אָשֵׁי אָמַר: מַאי ״וְאָכַלְנוּ וְלָדָהּ שְׁלָמִים בֶּחָג״ דְּקָתָנֵי — חַג הַשָּׁבוּעוֹת.
in a case where the offspring was sick on Shavuot, and therefore it could be brought to the altar only on the next Festival. Rav Ashi said an alternative explanation: What is the statement: And we ate its offspring as a peace-offering on the Festival, coming to teach? This is not referring to the festival of Sukkot, which is the usual meaning of the term the Festival; rather, it is referring to the festival of Shavuot. Therefore, there is no difficulty here whatsoever.
וְאִידַּךְ: כֹּל הֵיכָא דְּתָנֵי פֶּסַח, תָּנֵי עֲצֶרֶת.
The Gemara asks: And what does the other amora, Rav Zevid, say to this? He argues that anywhere that the tanna teaches a halakha concerning Passover using the term Pesaḥ, he teaches the halakha concerning Shavuot using the term Atzaret, not the term Ḥag. In such a context, the term Ḥag is reserved exclusively for Sukkot.
אָמַר רָבָא: כֵּיוָן שֶׁעָבְרוּ עָלָיו שְׁלֹשָׁה רְגָלִים, בְּכׇל יוֹם וָיוֹם עוֹבֵר בְּ״בַל תְּאַחֵר״. מֵיתִיבִי: אֶחָד בְּכוֹר, וְאֶחָד כׇּל הַקֳּדָשִׁים, כֵּיוָן שֶׁעָבְרוּ עֲלֵיהֶם שָׁנָה בְּלֹא רְגָלִים, רְגָלִים בְּלֹא שָׁנָה — עוֹבֵר בְּ״בַל תְּאַחֵר״.
Rava said: Once three Festivals have passed, every day he transgresses the prohibition: You shall not delay. The Gemara raises an objection from that which is taught in the following baraita: In the case of both a firstborn animal and all consecrated animals, once a year has passed without three Festivals, or three Festivals have passed without a year elapsing, the owner transgresses the prohibition: You shall not delay.
וְהַאי מַאי תְּיוּבְתֵּיהּ? אָמַר רַב כָּהֲנָא: מַאן דְּקָא מוֹתֵיב — שַׁפִּיר קָא מוֹתֵיב: מִכְּדֵי תַּנָּא אַלָּאוֵי קָא מְהַדַּר, לִיתְנֵי: בְּכׇל יוֹם וָיוֹם עוֹבֵר בְּ״בַל תְּאַחֵר״.
The Gemara first expresses its astonishment at the question itself: What is this objection? What is the comparison between this ruling and the statement of Rava? Rav Kahana said: He who raises an objection here raises a valid objection, and this is the way the question should be understood. Since the tanna of the baraita is looking for prohibitions to add, and he shows that the prohibition applies in additional cases, then if Rava is correct, let the tanna of the baraita teach that once three Festivals have passed he transgresses the prohibition: You shall not delay, every single day.
וְאִידַּךְ — תַּנָּא לְמִיקְבְּעֵיהּ בְּלָאו קָא מְהַדַּר, בְּלָאוֵי יְתֵירִי לָא קָא מְהַדַּר.
And how does the other amora, Rava, explain the baraita? He understands that the tanna is trying to establish the action only as subject to a prohibition, i.e., he merely wishes to set the parameters of the prohibition; but once the action is established as prohibited, he is not looking for additional prohibitions.
גּוּפָא: אֶחָד בְּכוֹר וְאֶחָד כׇּל הַקֳּדָשִׁים, כֵּיוָן שֶׁעָבְרוּ עֲלֵיהֶם שָׁנָה בְּלֹא רְגָלִים, רְגָלִים בְּלֹא שָׁנָה — עוֹבֵר בְּ״בַל תְּאַחֵר״. בִּשְׁלָמָא רְגָלִים בְּלֹא שָׁנָה מַשְׁכַּחַתְּ לַהּ, אֶלָּא שָׁנָה בְּלֹא רְגָלִים הֵיכִי מַשְׁכַּחַתְּ לַהּ?
The Gemara proceeds to discuss the matter itself, i.e., the baraita cited above, which stated: In the case of both a firstborn animal and all consecrated animals, once a year has passed, even if three Festivals have not passed, or once three Festivals have passed, even if a whole year has not passed, the owner transgresses the prohibition: You shall not delay. Granted, it is possible to have three Festivals without a year; you find it because three Festivals can pass in half a year, between Passover and Sukkot. But a year without three Festivals, under what circumstances can you find this case? How can a year pass without three Festivals also passing?
הָנִיחָא לְמַאן דְּאִית לֵיהּ כְּסִדְרָן, מַשְׁכַּחַתְּ לַהּ. אֶלָּא לְמַאן דְּלֵית לֵיהּ כְּסִדְרָן, הֵיכִי מַשְׁכַּחַתְּ לַהּ?
The Gemara clarifies the question: This works out well according to the one who is of the opinion that one transgresses the prohibition against delaying only if the three Festivals have passed in their proper order. You can find a year without three Festivals in their proper order, e.g., if one made his vow shortly before Shavuot, in which case the year will end before Shavuot the following year, but three Festivals in order will not have elapsed until Sukkot of the third year. But according to the one who is not of the opinion that the three Festivals must be in their proper order, under what circumstances can you find this case of a year without three Festivals?
בִּשְׁלָמָא לְרַבִּי מַשְׁכַּחַתְּ לַהּ בְּשָׁנָה מְעוּבֶּרֶת. דְּתַנְיָא: ״שָׁנָה תְּמִימָה״, רַבִּי אוֹמֵר: מוֹנֶה שְׁלֹשׁ מֵאוֹת וְשִׁשִּׁים וַחֲמִשָּׁה יוֹם כְּמִנְיָן יְמוֹת הַחַמָּה,
The Gemara clarifies again: Granted, according to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, you find a year without three Festivals in a leap year, as it is taught in a baraita: In the case of houses of walled cities, with regard to which an owner is given only one year to redeem his home if he sells it, after which it becomes the permanent possession of the purchaser, the verse states: “And if it be not redeemed within the space of a full year” (Leviticus 25:30). How is the year determined? Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: One counts 365 days like the number of the days in a solar year, and not the usual lunar year, which is why it is called a full year.
וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: מוֹנֶה שְׁנֵים עָשָׂר חֹדֶשׁ מִיּוֹם לְיוֹם, וְאִם נִתְעַבְּרָה שָׁנָה — נִתְעַבְּרָה לוֹ. מַשְׁכַּחַתְּ לַהּ לְרַבִּי דְּאַקְדְּשַׁהּ בָּתַר חַג הַמַּצּוֹת, דְּכִי מְטָא שִׁילְהֵי אֲדָר בָּתְרָאָה — שָׁנָה מַלְיָא, רְגָלִים לָא מְלוּ. אֶלָּא לְרַבָּנַן, הֵיכִי מַשְׁכַּחַתְּ לַהּ?
And the Rabbis disagree and say: One counts twelve months from day to day, from the date of the sale until that same date twelve months later, and if it is a leap year with an added month, the leap month is for the seller’s benefit, i.e., he has thirteen months to redeem his house. You can find a year without three Festivals according to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. How so? It is possible in a case where one consecrated the animal after the festival of Passover, so that once he reaches the end of the second month of Adar in a leap year, the year is completed, but the Festivals are not yet completed, as the third Festival is still to come. But according to the Sages, under what circumstances can you find this case of a year without three Festivals?
כִּדְתָנֵי רַב שְׁמַעְיָה: עֲצֶרֶת פְּעָמִים חֲמִשָּׁה, פְּעָמִים שִׁשָּׁה, פְּעָמִים שִׁבְעָה. הָא כֵּיצַד? שְׁנֵיהֶן מְלֵאִין — חֲמִשָּׁה, שְׁנֵיהֶן חֲסֵרִין — שִׁבְעָה, אֶחָד מָלֵא וְאֶחָד חָסֵר — שִׁשָּׁה.
The Gemara answers: As Rav Shemaya taught in a baraita: Shavuot sometimes occurs on the fifth of Sivan, sometimes on the sixth of Sivan, and sometimes on the seventh. How so? If both the months of Nisan and Iyyar are full months of thirty days each, the festival of Shavuot, which is celebrated fifty days after the second day of Passover, occurs on the fifth of Sivan; if both months are short, with twenty-nine days each, it occurs on the seventh of Sivan; and if one of them is full and the other is short, it occurs on the sixth of Sivan. According to this opinion, if both months were full and the festival of Shavuot occurred on the fifth day of Sivan, and one made his vow on the day after Shavuot, i.e., the sixth of Sivan, and in the following year both months were short, so that the festival of Shavuot occurred on the seventh of Sivan, a whole year would have passed without three Festivals.
וּמַאן תַּנָּא דִּפְלִיג עֲלֵיהּ דְּרַב שְׁמַעְיָה — אֲחֵרִים הִיא. דְּתַנְיָא, אֲחֵרִים אוֹמְרִים: אֵין בֵּין עֲצֶרֶת לַעֲצֶרֶת, אֵין בֵּין רֹאשׁ הַשָּׁנָה לְרֹאשׁ הַשָּׁנָה, אֶלָּא אַרְבָּעָה יָמִים בִּלְבַד. וְאִם הָיְתָה שָׁנָה מְעוּבֶּרֶת — חֲמִשָּׁה.
The Gemara comments: And who is the tanna who disagrees with Rav Shemaya and says that a year has a fixed number of days? It is Aḥerim, as it is taught in a baraita: Aḥerim say: The difference between Shavuot of one year and Shavuot of the following year, and similarly, between Rosh HaShana of one year and Rosh HaShana of the following year, is only four days of the week. There are 354 days in a lunar year, which are divided into twelve alternating months, six months that are thirty days long and six months that are twenty-nine days long. Therefore, every year is fifty weeks and four days long. And if it were a leap year, in which case the year is comprised of 383 days, or fifty-four weeks and five days, there is a difference of five days between them.
בָּעֵי רַבִּי זֵירָא: יוֹרֵשׁ, מַהוּ בְּ״בַל תְּאַחֵר״? ״כִּי תִדּוֹר נֶדֶר״ אָמַר רַחֲמָנָא, וְהָא לָא נְדַר, אוֹ דִלְמָא: ״וּבָאתָ שָּׁמָּה וַהֲבֵאתֶם שָׁמָּה״, וְהָא מִיחַיַּיב.
§ Rabbi Zeira asks: In the case of an heir, what is the halakha with regard to the prohibition of: You shall not delay? That is to say, does an heir transgress the prohibition against delaying a vow taken by his father? The Gemara explains the two sides of the question: Is it that the Merciful One states in the Torah: “When you shall vow a vow to the Lord your God, you shall not delay paying it” (Deuteronomy 23:22), and this one, the heir, did not make a vow? Or perhaps the essence of the mitzva is as it says: “And there you shall come; and there you shall bring your burnt-offerings and your sacrifices” (Deuteronomy 12:5–6), and this one, the heir, is obligated to come and bring his father’s offerings.
תָּא שְׁמַע: דְּתָנֵי רַבִּי חִיָּיא — ״מֵעִמָּךְ״, פְּרָט לְיוֹרֵשׁ.
Come and hear an answer to this, as Rabbi Ḥiyya taught a baraita that says: The verse states: “For the Lord your God will surely require it from you” (Deuteronomy 23:22), which is interpreted to mean: To the exclusion of an heir. This teaches that an heir does not transgress the prohibition against delaying a vow taken by his father.
וְהַאי ״מֵעִמָּךְ״ מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ, זֶה לֶקֶט שִׁכְחָה וּפֵאָה! קְרִי בֵּיהּ ״עִמָּךְ״, וּקְרִי בֵּיהּ ״מֵעִמָּךְ״.
The Gemara asks: But this phrase “from you” is necessary to teach a different halakha, namely, that one transgresses the prohibition against delaying even for gleanings, forgotten sheaves, and the produce of the corner of his field. The Gemara answers: Rabbi Ḥiyya derived two halakhot from this word. He read into the verse: “You [imakh],” which he expounded as coming to include gleanings, forgotten sheaves and the produce of the corner of the field in the prohibition, and he read into the verse: “From you [me’imakh],” with the extra letter mem coming to exclude an heir.
בָּעֵי רַבִּי זֵירָא: אִשָּׁה, מַה הִיא בְּ״בַל תְּאַחֵר״? מִי אָמְרִינַן: הָא לָא מִיחַיְּיבָא בִּרְאִיָּה, אוֹ דִלְמָא הָא אִיתַהּ בְּשִׂמְחָה?
§ Rabbi Zeira asks another question on this topic: In the case of a woman who made a vow, what is the halakha with regard to the prohibition: You shall not delay? The Gemara explains: Do we say that since she is not obligated to appear in the Temple on the pilgrimage Festivals, as this obligation is a positive, time-bound mitzva, from which women are exempt, she also does not transgress if she is late in bringing her offering? Or perhaps, since she is obligated in the mitzva of rejoicing on a Festival, she should also be obligated in some of the other mitzvot connected to the day?
אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי: וְתִיפּוֹק לֵיהּ דְּהָא אִיתַהּ בְּשִׂמְחָה. וּמִי אָמַר אַבָּיֵי הָכִי? וְהָאָמַר אַבָּיֵי: אִשָּׁה — בַּעֲלָהּ מְשַׂמְּחָהּ! לִדְבָרָיו דְּרַבִּי זֵירָא קָאָמַר.
Abaye said to him: Derive this from the fact that she is also obligated in the mitzva of rejoicing on a Festival. The Gemara asks: And did Abaye actually say this, that a woman is obligated to rejoice on a Festival? But didn’t Abaye say: As for a woman, her husband must make her joyful on a Festival? This means that the obligation falls not on the woman, but upon her husband. The Gemara answers: Abaye stated his opinion in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Zeira. Rabbi Zeira holds that women are bound by a positive mitzva to rejoice on a Festival. Since, according to Rabbi Zeira’s opinion, they are obligated in the mitzva of rejoicing on a Festival, they are also subject to the prohibition: You shall not delay.
אִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: בְּכוֹר, מֵאֵימָתַי מוֹנִין לוֹ שָׁנָה? אַבָּיֵי אָמַר: מִשָּׁעָה שֶׁנּוֹלַד, רַב אַחָא בַּר יַעֲקֹב אָמַר: מִשָּׁעָה שֶׁנִּרְאָה לְהַרְצָאָה.
§ A dilemma was raised before the Sages: In the case of a firstborn animal, from when does one begin to count a year with regard to the prohibition against delaying? Abaye said: One counts from the time it is born. Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov said: One counts from the time it is fit for appeasement, i.e., from its eighth day, when it is fit to be brought as an offering, as explicitly stated in the Torah (see Leviticus 22:27).
וְלָא פְּלִיגִי: הָא בְּתָם,
The Gemara comments: The two Sages do not disagree. This one, Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov, who said that one counts from the time that the animal is fit for appeasement, is speaking about an unblemished firstborn, which must be brought to the altar for sacrifice.
