Shabbat 93
בְּעִיגּוּל שֶׁל דְּבֵילָה וְהוֹצִיאוּהוּ לִרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים, בְּקוֹרָה וְהוֹצִיאוּהָ לִרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים, רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: אִם לֹא יָכוֹל אֶחָד לְהוֹצִיאוֹ וְהוֹצִיאוּהוּ שְׁנַיִם — חַיָּיבִין, וְאִם לָאו — פְּטוּרִין. רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁלֹּא יָכוֹל אֶחָד לְהוֹצִיאוֹ וְהוֹצִיאוּהוּ שְׁנַיִם — פְּטוּרִים, לְכָךְ נֶאֱמַר ״בַּעֲשֹׂתָהּ״ — יָחִיד שֶׁעֲשָׂאָהּ חַיָּיב, שְׁנַיִם שֶׁעֲשָׂאוּהָ — פְּטוּרִין.
In contrast, if two people held a round cake of figs, which is too heavy for one person to carry, and they carried it out to the public domain, or if they held a beam and carried it out to the public domain, Rabbi Yehuda says: If one person is incapable of carrying it out alone, and two people carried it out, they are liable. And if not, if one person is capable of carrying it out alone, they are exempt. Rabbi Shimon says: Even if one person is incapable of carrying it out alone, and two people carried it out, they are exempt. It is with regard to that case that it is stated: “By performing it” (Leviticus 4:27), to establish a principle: An individual who performs a transgression is liable, two people who perform a transgression are exempt.
בְּמַאי קָמִיפַּלְגִי? בְּהַאי קְרָא: ״וְאִם נֶפֶשׁ אַחַת תֶּחֱטָא בִשְׁגָגָה מֵעַם הָאָרֶץ בַּעֲשֹׂתָהּ״. רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן סָבַר: תְּלָתָא מִיעוּטֵי כְּתִיבִי, ״נֶפֶשׁ תֶּחְטָא״, ״אַחַת תֶּחְטָא״, ״בַּעֲשֹׂתָהּ תֶּחְטָא״ — חַד לְמַעוֹטֵי זֶה עוֹקֵר וְזֶה מַנִּיחַ, וְחַד לְמַעוֹטֵי זֶה יָכוֹל וְזֶה יָכוֹל, וְחַד לְמַעוֹטֵי זֶה אֵינוֹ יָכוֹל וְזֶה אֵינוֹ יָכוֹל.
The Gemara asks: With regard to what do they disagree? The Gemara answers: They disagree over the interpretation of this verse: “And if one person among the common people sins unwittingly by performing it, any one of God’s commandments not to be done, and be guilty” (Leviticus 4:27). Rabbi Shimon holds: Three exclusionary statements are written in this verse. It is as if it were written: A person who sins, one who sins, and by performing it he sins. The Torah could have conveyed the same meaning by saying simply: And if one of the common people. Apparently, the superfluous words in the verse are exclusionary and the verse should be understood as follows: A person, and not many people; one, and not two; by performing it, and not by two performing it. One of the terms comes to exclude from liability a case where each of the two people performs a part of the transgression, i.e., this person lifts an object from one domain, and that person places it in another domain. And one of the terms comes to exclude a case where this person is capable of performing the action alone, and that person is also capable, and the two of them perform the action together. And one of the terms comes to exclude even a case where this person is incapable of performing the action alone, and that person is incapable of performing the action alone. Since the two of them violated this prohibition together, they are both exempt.
וְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה: חַד לְמַעוֹטֵי זֶה עוֹקֵר וְזֶה מַנִּיחַ, וְחַד לְמַעוֹטֵי זֶה יָכוֹל וְזֶה יָכוֹל, וְחַד לְמַעוֹטֵי יָחִיד שֶׁעֲשָׂאָהּ בְּהוֹרָאַת בֵּית דִּין. וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן: יָחִיד שֶׁעֲשָׂאָהּ בְּהוֹרָאַת בֵּית דִּין — חַיָּיב.
And Rabbi Yehuda holds: One of the terms comes to exclude a case where this person lifts an object, and that person places it, as he agrees that they are exempt in this case. And one of the terms comes to exclude a case where this person is capable of performing the action alone, and that person is also capable. And one of the terms comes to exclude the case of an individual who performed a transgression in accordance with the ruling of a court. If a court issued a mistaken ruling that a prohibited action is permitted, and an individual performed that action based on that ruling, he is exempt from bringing a sin-offering and is considered to have sinned due to circumstances beyond his control. And Rabbi Shimon holds that an individual who performed a transgression in accordance with the ruling of a court is liable to bring a sin-offering for his mistake. His action is not considered intentional, but falls into the category of an unwitting act.
וְרַבִּי מֵאִיר — מִי כְּתִיב ״נֶפֶשׁ תֶּחְטָא״ ״אַחַת תֶּחְטָא״ ״בַּעֲשֹׂתָהּ תֶּחְטָא״? תְּרֵי מִעוּטֵי כְּתִיבִי, חַד לְמַעוֹטֵי זֶה עוֹקֵר וְזֶה מַנִּיחַ, וְחַד לְמַעוֹטֵי יָחִיד שֶׁעֲשָׂאָהּ בְּהוֹרָאַת בֵּית דִּין.
The Gemara asks: And how does Rabbi Meir, who deems them liable in a case where each was capable of performing the act alone, interpret the third exclusionary term? The Gemara answers: Is it written in the verse: A person who sins, one who sins, and by performing it he sins? There are not three exclusionary terms in the verse. Only two exclusionary terms are written, as the words: “One person who sins,” constitutes a single phrase. Therefore, one term comes to exclude from liability a case where this person lifts an object, and that one places it; and one term comes to exclude an individual who performed a transgression in accordance with the ruling of a court.
אָמַר מָר: זֶה יָכוֹל וְזֶה אֵינוֹ יָכוֹל — דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל חַיָּיב. הֵי מִנַּיְיהוּ מִיחַיַּיב? אָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא: זֶה שֶׁיָּכוֹל, דְּאִי זֶה שֶׁאֵינוֹ יָכוֹל — מַאי קָא עָבֵיד! אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב הַמְנוּנָא: דְּקָא מְסַיַּיע בַּהֲדֵיהּ! אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מְסַיֵּיעַ אֵין בּוֹ מַמָּשׁ.
We learned earlier that the Master said: In a case where this person is capable, and this person is incapable, and they performed it together, everyone agrees that he is liable. The Gemara seeks to clarify: Which of them is liable? Rav Ḥisda said: The one who is capable of performing the act alone is liable, as if it was the one who is incapable of performing the act alone that was liable, what is he doing that would render him liable? His efforts are inadequate to perform the task. Rav Hamnuna said to Rav Ḥisda: He is doing quite a bit, as he is assisting him. He said to him: The assistance provided by one who assists another to perform a task that the other could have performed himself is insubstantial.
אָמַר רַב זְבִיד מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרָבָא, אַף אֲנַן נָמֵי תְּנֵינָא: הָיָה יוֹשֵׁב עַל גַּבֵּי הַמִּטָּה, וְאַרְבַּע טַלִּיּוֹת תַּחַת רַגְלֵי הַמִּטָּה — טְמֵאוֹת, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁאֵינָהּ יְכוֹלָה לַעֲמוֹד עַל שָׁלֹשׁ, וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן מְטַהֵר. הָיָה רוֹכֵב עַל גַּבֵּי בְּהֵמָה וְאַרְבַּע טַלִּיּוֹת תַּחַת רַגְלֵי הַבְּהֵמָה — טְהוֹרוֹת, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁיְּכוֹלָה לַעֲמוֹד עַל שָׁלֹשׁ. וְאַמַּאי? הָא קָמְסַיַּיעַ בַּהֲדֵי הֲדָדֵי! לָאו מִשּׁוּם דְּאָמְרִינַן מְסַיֵּיעַ אֵין בּוֹ מַמָּשׁ?
Rav Zevid said in the name of Rava: We, too, also learned that halakha in a mishna, with regard to vessels upon which a zav lies or rides. By Torah law, any vessel designated for lying and riding, upon which a zav lies or rides, becomes impure even if the zav did not come into direct contact with it. If a zav was sitting on a bed, and there were four garments beneath the four legs of the bed, they are all ritually impure. The weight of the zav is considered to have rested on each of the garments because the bed is incapable of standing on three legs. And Rabbi Shimon deems the garments ritually pure, since only a portion of his weight rested on each garment. However, if he was riding on an animal, and there were four garments beneath the legs of the animal, they are all ritually pure because the animal is capable of standing on three legs. And why are the garments ritually pure? Aren’t the animal’s legs assisting each other in supporting the weight of the zav? Is it not because we say: An object that assists is insubstantial?
אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה מִדִּיסְקַרְתָּא: לְעוֹלָם אֵימָא לָךְ מְסַיֵּיעַ יֵשׁ בּוֹ מַמָּשׁ, וְשָׁאנֵי הָכָא דְּעָקְרָה לַהּ לִגְמָרֵי. וְכֵיוָן דְּזִימְנִין עָקְרָה הָא, וְזִימְנִין עָקְרָה הָא, לֶיהֱוֵי כְּזָב הַמִּתְהַפֵּךְ! מִי לָא תְּנַן: זָב שֶׁהָיָה מוּטָּל עַל חֲמִשָּׁה סַפְסָלִין אוֹ עַל חָמֵשׁ פּוּנְדָּאוֹת, לְאוֹרְכָּן — טְמֵאִים, לְרׇחְבָּן — טְהוֹרִין. יָשֵׁן, סָפֵק מִתְהַפֵּךְ עֲלֵיהֶן — טְמֵאִין.
Rav Yehuda of Diskarta said: Actually, I will say to you that a person or an object that assists is substantial. However, it is different here, in this case, as the animal lifted its foot completely. The mishna is not discussing the case of an animal that could theoretically stand on three legs, but an actual situation where it completely lifted one of its feet and the fourth foot did not even assist in supporting the animal’s weight. The Gemara rejects the suggestion of Rav Yehuda of Diskarta. And since it sometimes lifts this foot and sometimes lifts that foot, it should have the legal status of a zav who turns over. Didn’t we learn in a mishna: With regard to a zav who was lying on five benches or on five money belts, if he was lying along their length, they are impure. At different times, his entire body was lying on each of the benches or on each of the money belts. If he was lying across their width, they are ritually pure because at no point was his entire weight supported by one of the benches or the money belts. However, if he slept across their width, there is uncertainty whether or not, while sleeping, he turned over on them. This raises the possibility that, at some point, he lay along their length, and his entire weight was supported by one of the benches. Therefore, all of the benches are impure. A zav who moves his weight from one place to another renders all of those places ritually impure. Similarly, the fact that the animal lifts different legs is not sufficient for each to be considered as not assisting to support the weight of the zav.
אֶלָּא לָאו, מִשּׁוּם דְּאָמְרִינַן מְסַיֵּיעַ אֵין בּוֹ מַמָּשׁ. אָמַר רַב פַּפִּי מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרָבָא: אַף אֲנַן נָמֵי תְּנֵינָא,
Rather, is it not that the garments beneath the legs of the animal remain ritually pure because we say: An object that assists is insubstantial? Each foot merely assists in supporting the weight of the zav. Similarly, Rav Pappi said in the name of Rava: We, too, also learned support for this halakha,
רַבִּי יוֹסֵי אוֹמֵר: הַסּוּס מְטַמֵּא עַל יָדָיו, הַחֲמוֹר — עַל רַגְלָיו, שֶׁמִּשְׁעֶנֶת הַסּוּס עַל יָדָיו, וַחֲמוֹר עַל רַגְלָיו. וְאַמַּאי? הָא קָא מְסַיַּיע בַּהֲדֵי הֲדָדֵי! לָאו מִשּׁוּם דְּאָמְרִינַן מְסַיֵּיעַ אֵין בּוֹ מַמָּשׁ? אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: אַף אֲנַן נָמֵי תְּנֵינָא. רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: רַגְלוֹ אַחַת עַל הַכְּלִי וְרַגְלוֹ אַחַת עַל הָרִצְפָּה, רַגְלוֹ אַחַת עַל הָאֶבֶן וְרַגְלוֹ אַחַת עַל הָרִצְפָּה — רוֹאִין כׇּל שֶׁאִילּוּ יִנָּטֵל הַכְּלִי וְתִינָּטֵל הָאֶבֶן יָכוֹל לַעֲמוֹד עַל רַגְלוֹ אַחַת — עֲבוֹדָתוֹ כְּשֵׁרָה, וְאִם לָאו — עֲבוֹדָתוֹ פְּסוּלָה.
as we learned in a mishna, Rabbi Yosei says: If a zav was riding on an animal, and there was a garment beneath it, if he was riding the horse, he renders the garment impure by means of the horse’s front legs. Only then is it impure; if it was beneath the horse’s hind legs it is not. And if he was riding the donkey, he renders the garment impure by means of the donkey’s hind legs. Only then is it impure; if it was beneath the donkey’s front legs it is not. The reason for this distinction is that a horse rests primarily on its front legs, and a donkey rests primarily on its hind legs. But why should a garment beneath the hind legs of a horse or the front legs of a donkey remain ritually pure? Don’t the legs assist each other? Is the reason not because we say that one who assists is insubstantial? Rav Ashi said: We, too, also learned support for this halakha in a different mishna. Rabbi Eliezer says: With regard to a priest that stood in the Temple, and one of his feet was on a vessel, and one of his feet was on the floor, or one of his feet was on a stone, and one of his feet was on the floor, while performing priestly Temple rites; we see, if the vessel was removed or the stone was removed, whether he would still be capable of standing on one foot on the ground. If so, his service is valid. And if he could not stand on one foot, his service is invalid. Is he considered to be standing on the floor, in which case the service is valid, or is he not considered to be standing on the floor, in which case the service is invalid?
וְאַמַּאי? הָא קָא מְסַיַּיע בַּהֲדֵי הֲדָדֵי! לָאו מִשּׁוּם דְּאָמְרִינַן מְסַיֵּיעַ אֵין בּוֹ מַמָּשׁ. אָמַר רָבִינָא: אַף אֲנַן נָמֵי תְּנֵינָא. קִיבֵּל בְּיָמִין, וּשְׂמֹאל מְסַיַּיעְתּוֹ — עֲבוֹדָתוֹ כְּשֵׁרָה. וְאַמַּאי, הָא קָא מְסַיַּיע בַּהֲדֵי הֲדָדֵי! לָאו מִשּׁוּם דְּאָמְרִינַן מְסַיֵּיעַ אֵין בּוֹ מַמָּשׁ? שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ.
The Gemara asks: And why, if he would still be capable of standing on one foot, should it be valid? Don’t his legs assist each other? Isn’t the reason because we say: One who assists is insubstantial? Ravina said: We, too, also learned support for this in a different mishna. All service performed in the Temple must be performed with the right hand. If he received the blood in his right hand, and his left hand assisted his right hand, his service is valid. And why is his service valid? Aren’t his hands assisting each other? Isn’t the reason because we say: One who assists is insubstantial? The Gemara concludes: Indeed, learn from this that it is so.
אָמַר מָר: זֶה יָכוֹל וְזֶה יָכוֹל, רַבִּי מֵאִיר מְחַיַּיב. אִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: בָּעֵינַן שִׁיעוּר לָזֶה וְשִׁיעוּר לָזֶה, אוֹ דִילְמָא שִׁיעוּר אֶחָד לְכוּלָּם. רַב חִסְדָּא וְרַב הַמְנוּנָא, חַד אָמַר שִׁיעוּר לָזֶה וְשִׁיעוּר לָזֶה, וְחַד אָמַר שִׁיעוּר אֶחָד לְכוּלָּן. אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרָבָא: אַף אֲנַן נָמֵי תְּנֵינָא: הָיָה יוֹשֵׁב עַל גַּבֵּי מִטָּה וְאַרְבַּע טַלִּיּוֹת תַּחַת אַרְבַּע רַגְלֵי הַמִּטָּה — טְמֵאוֹת, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁאֵין יְכוֹלָה לַעֲמוֹד עַל שָׁלֹשׁ. וְאַמַּאי? לִיבְעֵי שִׁיעוּר זִיבָה לָזֶה וְשִׁיעוּר זִיבָה לָזֶה! לָאו מִשּׁוּם דְּאָמְרִינַן שִׁיעוּר אֶחָד לְכוּלָּן.
The Master said in a baraita cited above: With regard to an action performed by two people, when this person is capable of performing it alone and that person is capable of performing it alone, Rabbi Meir deems them liable. A dilemma was raised before the students: Do we require a measure that determines liability for this person and a measure that determines liability for that one; or perhaps one measure that determines liability is sufficient for them all? Rav Ḥisda and Rav Hamnuna disagreed. One said: There must be a measure that determines liability for this person and a measure that determines liability for that one. And one said: One measure of liability is sufficient for them all. Rav Pappa said in the name of Rava: We, too, also learned a mishna in support of the opinion that one measure is sufficient. It states in the mishna in tractate Zavim: If a zav was sitting on a bed, and there were four garments beneath the four legs of the bed, they are all ritually impure because the bed is incapable of standing on three legs. And why should they be ritually impure? Let them require a measure of the weight of a zav for this garment and a measure of the weight of a zav for that garment. All the garments should only become impure if there was one zav on the bed for each garment. Is it not because we say that in order to make the garments impure one measure of impurity is sufficient for them all? Therefore, both parties are liable for one measure that determines liability.
אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק: אַף אֲנַן נָמֵי תְּנֵינָא: צְבִי שֶׁנִּכְנַס לַבַּיִת, וְנָעַל אֶחָד בְּפָנָיו — חַיָּיב. נָעֲלוּ שְׁנַיִם — פְּטוּרִין. לֹא יָכוֹל אֶחָד לִנְעוֹל, וְנָעֲלוּ שְׁנַיִם — חַיָּיבִים. וְאַמַּאי? לִיבְעֵי שִׁיעוּר צֵידָה לָזֶה וְשִׁיעוּר צֵידָה לָזֶה! לָאו מִשּׁוּם דְּאָמְרִינַן שִׁיעוּר אֶחָד לְכוּלָּם? אָמַר רָבִינָא: אַף אֲנַן נָמֵי תְּנֵינָא: הַשּׁוּתָּפִין שֶׁגָּנְבוּ וְטָבְחוּ — חַיָּיבִין. וְאַמַּאי? לִיבְעֵי שִׁיעוּר טְבִיחָה לָזֶה וְשִׁיעוּר טְבִיחָה לָזֶה! לָאו מִשּׁוּם דְּאָמְרִינַן שִׁיעוּר אֶחָד לְכוּלָּם?
Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: We, too, also learned an additional support from a different source. With regard to a deer that entered the house, and one person locked the door before it on Shabbat and prevented it from exiting, one is liable for performing the prohibited labor of trapping on Shabbat. If two people locked the door, they are exempt. If one is incapable of locking the door alone, and two people locked it, they are liable. And why are they liable? Let them require a measure of trapping for this person and a measure of trapping for that person. Is it not because we say that one measure of trapping is sufficient for them all? Ravina said: We, too, also learned an additional support from a different source. With regard to partners who stole an animal and slaughtered it, they are obligated to pay four or five times its value, as stated in the Torah. And why are they liable? Let them require a measure of slaughtering for this one and a measure of slaughtering for that one. Is it not because we say that one measure of slaughtering is sufficient for them all?
וְאָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: אַף אֲנַן נָמֵי תְּנֵינָא: שְׁנַיִם שֶׁהוֹצִיאוּ קָנֶה שֶׁל גַּרְדִּי — חַיָּיבִין. וְאַמַּאי? לִיבְעֵי שִׁיעוּר הוֹצָאָה לָזֶה וְשִׁיעוּר הוֹצָאָה לָזֶה! לָאו מִשּׁוּם דְּאָמְרִינַן שִׁיעוּר אֶחָד לְכוּלָּם? אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב אַחָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרָבָא לְרַב אָשֵׁי: דִילְמָא דְּאִית בֵּיהּ כְּדֵי לְבַשֵּׁל בֵּיצָה קַלָּה לָזֶה וּבֵיצָה קַלָּה לָזֶה! אִם כֵּן, לַישְׁמְעִינַן קָנֶה דְעָלְמָא, מַאי שְׁנָא דְּגַרְדִּי? וְדִילְמָא דְּאִית בֵּיהּ כְּדֵי לֶאֱרוֹג מַפָּה לָזֶה וּכְדֵי לֶאֱרוֹג מַפָּה לָזֶה, אֶלָּא מֵהָא לֵיכָּא לְמִשְׁמַע מִינַּהּ.
And Rav Ashi said: We, too, also learned an additional support from a similar source. Two people who carried out a weaver’s reed on Shabbat are liable. And why are they liable? Let them require a measure of carrying for this one and a measure of carrying for that one. Is it not because we say that one measure of carrying is sufficient for them all? Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, said to Rav Ashi: This cannot serve as a proof, for perhaps the rod has a measure equivalent to that which is used to cook an easily-cooked egg for this one and an easily-cooked egg for that one. That is the measure that determines liability for carrying out wood on Shabbat. He answered him: If so, let the baraita teach us the halakha with regard to an ordinary reed. What is different here that led the baraita to teach the halakha specifically about a weaver’s reed? Rather, the baraita is certainly referring to a reed that is a single unit. Again Rav Aḥa rejects the proof: And perhaps it has a measure equivalent to that which is used to weave a cloth for this one and to weave a cloth for that one. That is the measure that determines liability. Rather, proof cannot be learned from this baraita.
תָּנֵי תַּנָּא קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב נַחְמָן: שְׁנַיִם שֶׁהוֹצִיאוּ קָנֶה שֶׁל גַּרְדִּי — פְּטוּרִין, וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן מְחַיֵּיב. כְּלַפֵּי לְיָיא?! אֶלָּא אֵימָא: חַיָּיבִין, וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן פּוֹטֵר.
The tanna who recited mishnayot in the study hall taught before Rav Naḥman: Two people who carried out a weaver’s reed on Shabbat are exempt, and Rabbi Shimon deems them liable. Rav Naḥman was surprised at this. He asked: Toward where are you facing? This is the diametric opposite of their opinions. Rather, say an emended baraita: They are liable, and Rabbi Shimon deems them exempt.
מַתְנִי׳ הַמּוֹצִיא אוֹכָלִין פָּחוֹת מִכְּשִׁיעוּר בִּכְלִי — פָּטוּר אַף עַל הַכְּלִי, שֶׁהַכְּלִי טְפֵלָה לוֹ, אֶת הַחַי בַּמִּטָּה — פָּטוּר אַף עַל הַמִּטָּה, שֶׁהַמִּטָּה טְפֵלָה לוֹ. אֶת הַמֵּת בַּמִּטָּה — חַיָּיב, וְכֵן כְּזַיִת מִן הַמֵּת וּכְזַיִת מִן הַנְּבֵלָה וְכַעֲדָשָׁה מִן הַשֶּׁרֶץ — חַיָּיב, וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן פּוֹטֵר.
MISHNA: One who carries out foods less than the measure that determines liability for carrying out food in a vessel on Shabbat is exempt, even for carrying out the vessel, because the vessel is secondary to the food inside it. Since one is not liable for carrying out the food, he is not liable for carrying out the vessel either. Similarly, one who carries out a living person on a bed is exempt, even for carrying out the bed, because the bed is secondary to the person. One who carries out a corpse on a bed is liable. And similarly, one who carries out an olive-bulk of a corpse, or an olive-bulk of an animal carcass, or a lentil-bulk of a creeping animal, which are the minimal measures of these items that transmit ritual impurity, is liable. And Rabbi Shimon deems him exempt. He holds that one is only liable for performing a prohibited labor for its own sake. One who carries out an object in order to bring it to its destination is liable. However, people carry out a corpse or an animal carcass only to be rid of them.
גְּמָ׳ תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: הַמּוֹצִיא אוֹכָלִין כְּשִׁיעוּר, אִם בִּכְלִי — חַיָּיב עַל הָאוֹכָלִין וּפָטוּר עַל הַכְּלִי. וְאִם הָיָה כְּלִי צָרִיךְ לוֹ — חַיָּיב אַף עַל הַכְּלִי. שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ, אוֹכֵל שְׁנֵי זֵיתֵי חֵלֶב בְּהֶעְלֵם אֶחָד חַיָּיב שְׁתַּיִם! אָמַר רַב שֵׁשֶׁת: הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן — כְּגוֹן
GEMARA: The Sages taught in a baraita: One who carries out the measure that determines liability for carrying out foods in a vessel on Shabbat is liable for carrying out the food and exempt for carrying out the vessel. And if that vessel was needed by him for another purpose, he is liable even for carrying out the vessel. The Gemara wonders with regard to the second halakha: Can we conclude from it that one who eats two olive-bulks of forbidden fat in the course of one lapse of awareness is liable to bring two sin-offerings? In that case, one who carries out a vessel with food inside it has performed two actions that fall under the rubric of one prohibited labor. Why should he be liable to bring two sin-offerings? Rav Sheshet said: With what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a case where
