Shevuot 17
אוֹ דִלְמָא, בִּפְנִים גְּמִירִי שְׁהִיָּיה – לָא שְׁנָא לְקׇרְבָּן וְלָא שְׁנָא לְמַלְקוּת? תֵּיקוּ.
Or perhaps it is learned as a tradition that tarrying is necessary to incur any liability for impurity within the Temple, and it is no different whether the liability is to bring an offering, and it is no different whether it is to receive lashes? The Gemara concludes: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.
בָּעֵי רָבָא: תָּלָה עַצְמוֹ בַּאֲוִיר עֲזָרָה, מַהוּ? כִּי גְּמִירִי שְׁהִיָּיה – שְׁהִיָּיה דְּבַת הִשְׁתַּחֲוָאָה, דְּלָאו בַּת הִשְׁתַּחֲוָאָה לָא גְּמִירִי; אוֹ דִּלְמָא, בִּפְנִים שְׁהִיָּיה גְּמִירִי – לָא שְׁנָא דְּבַת הִשְׁתַּחֲוָאָה וְלָא שְׁנָא דְּלָאו בַּת הִשְׁתַּחֲוָאָה? תֵּיקוּ.
Rava raises another dilemma: If an impure person suspended himself in the airspace of the Temple courtyard long enough to bow down, what is the halakha? When it is learned as a tradition that an impure person is liable for tarrying in the Temple, is this only with regard to tarrying that is suited for bowing; but with regard to tarrying that is not suited for bowing, as in this case, where the person cannot bow down as long as he is suspended in the air, it is not learned as a tradition that one is liable? Or perhaps it is learned as a tradition that there is liability for tarrying within the Temple, and it is no different whether the tarrying is suited for bowing, and it is no different whether the tarrying is not suited for bowing. The Gemara concludes: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.
בָּעֵי רַב אָשֵׁי: טִימֵּא עַצְמוֹ בְּמֵזִיד, מַהוּ? בְּאוֹנֶס גְּמִירִי שְׁהִיָּיה, בְּמֵזִיד לָא גְּמִירִי שְׁהִיָּיה; אוֹ דִּלְמָא, בִּפְנִים גְּמִירִי שְׁהִיָּיה – לָא שְׁנָא בְּאוֹנֶס וְלָא שְׁנָא בְּמֵזִיד? תֵּיקוּ.
Rav Ashi also raises a dilemma relating to this matter: If one intentionally rendered himself ritually impure while he was in the Temple courtyard, what is the halakha with regard to tarrying? Is it learned as a tradition that tarrying is necessary when one contracts impurity while in the Temple in circumstances beyond his control, but not learned as a tradition that tarrying is necessary when he renders himself impure intentionally? Or perhaps it is learned as a tradition that tarrying is necessary for any liability for impurity within the Temple, and it is no different whether the impurity was contracted in circumstances beyond his control, and it is no different whether it was contracted intentionally. The Gemara concludes: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.
בָּעֵי רַב אָשֵׁי: נָזִיר בְּקֶבֶר, בָּעֵי שְׁהִיָּיה לְמַלְקוּת אוֹ אֵינוֹ צָרִיךְ? בִּפְנִים גְּמִירִי שְׁהִיָּיה, בַּחוּץ לָא גְּמִירִי שְׁהִיָּיה; אוֹ דִלְמָא, בְּאוֹנֶס גְּמִירִי שְׁהִיָּיה – לָא שְׁנָא בִּפְנִים וְלָא שְׁנָא בַּחוּץ? תֵּיקוּ.
Rav Ashi raises another dilemma: If a nazirite, who is prohibited from contracting impurity imparted by a corpse, found himself alongside a grave, is tarrying there a necessary condition for him to incur lashes, or is tarrying not necessary, and he is liable immediately? Is it learned as a tradition that tarrying is necessary within the Temple, but not learned as a tradition that tarrying is necessary outside the Temple, and the nazirite is liable immediately? Or perhaps it is learned as a tradition that tarrying is necessary for liability for impurity contracted in circumstances beyond one’s control, and it is no different whether the impurity was contracted within the Temple, and it is no different whether it was contracted outside the Temple. The Gemara concludes: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.
בָּא לוֹ בַּאֲרוּכָּה חַיָּיב, בִּקְצָרָה פָּטוּר וְכוּ׳. אָמַר רָבָא: קְצָרָה שֶׁאָמְרוּ – אֲפִילּוּ עָקֵב בְּצַד גּוּדָל, וַאֲפִילּוּ כׇּל הַיּוֹם כּוּלּוֹ.
§ The mishna teaches: If, at the time that one was unaware either that he was impure, or that he was in the Temple, he went out by way of a longer route when he could have taken a shorter route, he is liable to bring a sliding-scale offering. But if he left the Temple via the shortest way, he is exempt. Rava says: With regard to the short route, which the Sages said here that he is exempt for, this does not necessarily mean that he left the Temple as quickly as possible, as if he took the most direct route he is exempt even if he walked with exceedingly small steps, heel to toe, and even if it took him all day long.
בָּעֵי רָבָא: שְׁהִיּוֹת מַהוּ שֶׁיִּצְטָרְפוּ? וְתִיפְשׁוֹט לֵיהּ מִדִּידֵיהּ! הָתָם בִּדְלָא שְׁהָה.
Rava raised a dilemma: What is the halakha with regard to combining periods of tarrying, each of which is less than the amount of time necessary to recite the second portion of the verse mentioned above (II Chronicles 7:3)? If an impure person tarried in the Temple for less than the amount of time needed to bow down, and then started to leave, and then tarried again for less than the amount of time needed to bow down, do those two periods of tarrying combine together, so that if he tarried in total long enough to bow down, he is liable? The Gemara challenges: Let Rava resolve his dilemma from his own statement with regard to one who left the Temple with small steps, heel to toe, as such a person tarries intermittently between steps. The Gemara answers: There Rava is referring to one who did not tarry at all, walking continuously without interruption, albeit slowly. When Rava raised his dilemma here, it was with regard to one who stopped walking altogether and tarried.
בְּעָא מִינֵּיהּ אַבָּיֵי מֵרַבָּה: בָּא לוֹ בַּאֲרוּכָּה שִׁיעוּר קְצָרָה, מַהוּ? שִׁיעוּר גְּמִירִי – וְכִי בָּא לוֹ בַּאֲרוּכָּה שִׁיעוּר קְצָרָה פָּטוּר, אוֹ דִּלְמָא דַּוְקָא גְּמִירִי: בַּאֲרוּכָּה – חַיָּיב, בִּקְצָרָה – פָּטוּר? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: לֹא נִתְּנָה אֲרוּכָּה לְהִדָּחוֹת אֶצְלוֹ.
Abaye raised a dilemma to Rabba that is the very opposite of the dilemma raised by Rava: If the impure person quickly went out the longer way in the measure of time ordinarily needed to go out the shortest way, what is the halakha? Is it learned as a tradition that he is liable for tarrying for a certain measure of time, and if he went out the longer way in the measure of time ordinarily needed to go out the shortest way, he is exempt? Or perhaps it is learned as a tradition specifically that if he left the longer way, he is liable, whereas if he left the shortest way, he is exempt. Rabba said to Abaye: The liability for leaving using the longer way was not given so that it would be overridden for him; i.e., he is liable if he exits via the longer way, even if he runs.
מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַבִּי זֵירָא, אֶלָּא דְּקַיְימָא לַן: טָמֵא שֶׁשִּׁימֵּשׁ – בְּמִיתָה; הֵיכִי מַשְׁכַּחַתְּ לַהּ? אִי דְּלָא שְׁהָה – הֵיכִי עָבֵיד עֲבוֹדָה? אִי דִּשְׁהָה – בַּר כָּרֵת הוּא!
Rabbi Zeira objects to this: But as for this halakha that we maintain, that an impure priest who intentionally served in the Temple is liable to receive the punishment of death at the hand of Heaven, how can you find these circumstances? If he did not tarry in the Temple long enough to bow down, how could he have performed any service in such a short period of time? And if he tarried long enough to bow down, he is liable to be punished with karet, which is a more severe punishment than death at the hand of Heaven.
אִי אָמְרַתְּ בִּשְׁלָמָא שִׁיעוּרָא גְּמִירִי – מַשְׁכַּחַתְּ לַהּ דְּאָנֵיס נַפְשֵׁיהּ בִּקְצָרָה וְעָבֵד עֲבוֹדָה.
Rabbi Zeira explains his objection: Granted, if you say that it is learned as a tradition that one is liable for tarrying for a certain measure of time, and if he did not tarry for the time it takes to bow down and leave the Temple via the shortest way, he is exempt, then you can find a case where the priest could have served in a state of impurity without becoming liable to be punished with karet. The case is where he exerted himself and ran out very quickly via the shortest way after having performed a service in a state of impurity, so that the total time that he was in the Temple was less time than it would ordinarily take him to bow and leave the shortest way. In such a case he is exempt from being punished with karet, and liable only to be punished with death at the hand of Heaven for having performed the Temple service while impure.
אֶלָּא אִי אָמְרַתְּ דַּוְקָא גְּמִירִי, הֵיכִי מַשְׁכַּחַתְּ לַהּ?
But if you say that it is learned as a tradition specifically that if an impure person tarries long enough to bow down, he is liable even if he does not exceed the time required to go out the shortest way, then how can you find these circumstances?
אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: מַאי קוּשְׁיָא? מַשְׁכַּחַתְּ לַהּ כְּגוֹן שֶׁבָּא בִּקְצָרָה וְהִפֵּךְ בְּצִינּוֹרָא, וְכִדְרַב הוּנָא – דְּאָמַר רַב הוּנָא: זָר שֶׁהִפֵּךְ בְּצִינּוֹרָא, חַיָּיב מִיתָה.
Abaye said: What is the difficulty? You find it in a case such as where he went out from the Temple via the shortest way, but as he was leaving he turned over one of the limbs of an offering on the altar with a fork [betzinnora]. This is an action that takes only a brief moment to perform, and yet it is considered priestly service, in accordance with the opinion of Rav Huna. As Rav Huna says: A non-priest who turns over part of an offering on the altar with a fork is liable to receive the death penalty, because he engaged in Temple service restricted to priests.
גּוּפָא – אָמַר רַב הוּנָא: זָר שֶׁהִפֵּךְ בְּצִינּוֹרָא, חַיָּיב מִיתָה. הֵיכִי דָמֵי? אִי דְּלָא הַפֵּךְ לַהּ לָא מִיעַכְּלִי – פְּשִׁיטָא! וְאִי דְּלָא הַפֵּךְ בְּהוּ נָמֵי מִיעַכְּלִי – מַאי קָא עָבֵיד?
The Gemara proceeds to analyze the matter itself: Rav Huna says: A non-priest who turns over part of an offering on the altar with a fork is liable to receive the death penalty. What are the circumstances of such a case? If in the event that he had not turned it over, the offering would not have been consumed by the fire, then it is obvious that the non-priest is liable, as he performed the service of burning the offering on the altar. And if in the event that he had not turned it over, it would also have been consumed by the fire, then what service did he perform? Even without his action, the offering would have been burned.
לָא צְרִיכָא – דְּאִי לָא הַפֵּךְ בְּהוּ מִיעַכְּלִי בְּתַרְתֵּי שָׁעֵי, וְהַשְׁתָּא מִיעַכְּלִי בְּחַד שַׁעְתָּא; וְהָא קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן: דְּכֹל קָרוֹבֵי עֲבוֹדָה – עֲבוֹדָה הִיא.
The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary for Rav Huna to state this halakha with regard to a case where, had the non-priest not turned it over, it would have been consumed by the fire in two hours, but now that he turned it over, it is consumed by the fire in one hour. And he teaches us this: That any act that accelerates the service, causing it to be performed more quickly, is itself considered a service.
אָמַר רַבִּי אוֹשַׁעְיָא: בָּעֵינָא דְּאֵימָא מִילְּתָא, וּמִסְתְּפֵינָא מֵחַבְרַיָּא. הַנִּכְנָס לְבַיִת הַמְנוּגָּע דֶּרֶךְ אֲחוֹרָיו, וַאֲפִילּוּ כּוּלּוֹ חוּץ מֵחוֹטְמוֹ – טָהוֹר. דִּכְתִיב: ״וְהַבָּא אֶל הַבַּיִת״ – דֶּרֶךְ בִּיאָה אָסְרָה תּוֹרָה.
The Gemara returns to the general topic of one who enters the Temple while in a state of ritual impurity, citing Rabbi Oshaya, who said: I wish to say something, but I am afraid of my colleagues, i.e., I am afraid that they will raise an objection against me. What did he want to say? With regard to one who enters a house afflicted with leprosy, if he enters the house backward, then even if his entire body entered except for his nose, which remained outside the house, he remains pure, as it is written: “He that enters into the house all the time that it is shut up shall be impure until evening” (Leviticus 14:46), teaching that the Torah prohibited, i.e., conferred impurity, only with regard to the normal manner of entering into a house, i.e., face-first.
וּמִסְתְּפֵינָא מֵחַבְרַיָּא – אִי הָכִי כּוּלּוֹ נָמֵי! אָמַר רָבָא: כּוּלּוֹ – לָא גָּרַע מִכֵּלִים שֶׁבְּבַיִת, דִּכְתִיב: ״וְלֹא יִטְמָא כׇּל אֲשֶׁר בַּבָּיִת״.
But I am afraid of my colleagues, as they might raise the following objection: If so, that the impurity depends on the person entering the house in the normal manner, then even if his entire body entered the house, he would also be pure, as he did not go into the house in the normal fashion. Rava said: This is not difficult, as if his entire body entered in this manner, he is impure, because he is no worse now, i.e., his halakha should be no more lenient, than vessels that are in the house, which become impure, as it is written: “And they shall empty the house…so that all that is in the house shall not be made impure” (Leviticus 14:36).
תַּנְיָא נָמֵי הָכִי: גַּגִּין הַלָּלוּ – אֵין אוֹכְלִין שָׁם קׇדְשֵׁי קָדָשִׁים, וְאֵין שׁוֹחֲטִין שָׁם קָדָשִׁים קַלִּים; וְטָמֵא שֶׁנִּכְנָס דֶּרֶךְ גַּגִּין לַהֵיכָל – פָּטוּר, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״וְאֶל הַמִּקְדָּשׁ לֹא תָבֹא״ – דֶּרֶךְ בִּיאָה אָסְרָה תּוֹרָה.
The Gemara comments: This is also taught in a baraita, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Oshaya, that wherever entering is mentioned in the Torah, the reference is to the normal manner of entering: With regard to those roofs that covered the various chambers found in the Temple courtyard, offerings of the most sacred order may not be eaten there, on them, and offerings of lesser sanctity may not be slaughtered there, because those roofs do not have the sanctity of the Temple courtyard. And a ritually impure person who enters the Sanctuary via those roofs is exempt, as it is stated with regard to a woman who became ritually impure: “And she shall not enter into the Sanctuary” (Leviticus 12:4), teaching that the Torah prohibited only the normal manner of entering the Temple. So too, in the case of a house afflicted with leprosy, where mention is made of entering, only one who enters into the house in the normal manner becomes impure, as stated by Rabbi Oshaya.
זוֹ הִיא מִצְוַת עֲשֵׂה שֶׁבַּמִּקְדָּשׁ שֶׁאֵין חַיָּיבִין עָלֶיהָ וְכוּ׳. הֵיכָא קָאֵי דְּקָאָמַר ״זוֹ הִיא״? הָתָם קָאֵי – אֵין חַיָּיבִין עַל עֲשֵׂה וְעַל לֹא תַעֲשֶׂה שֶׁבַּמִּקְדָּשׁ,
§ The mishna teaches: This mitzva that the ritually impure must be sent out of the Temple is the positive mitzva concerning the Temple for which the Sanhedrin is not liable to bring a bull offering for an erroneous ruling. The Gemara asks: To what does the tanna of the mishna refer when he says: This is the positive mitzva concerning the Temple for which the Sanhedrin is not liable to bring a bull offering for an erroneous ruling? Where was it taught that there is such a mitzva for which they are not liable? The Gemara answers: He is referring to a mishna found there in tractate Horayot (8b), which teaches: The Sanhedrin is not liable to bring a bull offering for an erroneous ruling with regard to a positive mitzva or prohibition concerning ritual impurity in the Temple, as this offering is brought only for an erroneous ruling on a matter whose unwitting violation requires the bringing of a fixed sin-offering, and not a sliding-scale offering.
וְאֵין מְבִיאִין אָשָׁם תָּלוּי עַל עֲשֵׂה וְעַל לֹא תַעֲשֶׂה שֶׁבַּמִּקְדָּשׁ.
The mishna there continues: And one who is uncertain whether or not he unwittingly transgressed a prohibition that requires a sin-offering does not bring a provisional guilt-offering for a positive mitzva or prohibition concerning ritual impurity in the Temple, as this offering is brought only when certainty about the unwitting transgression would require a fixed sin-offering, not a sliding-scale offering. Unwitting transgression of a mitzva concerning ritual impurity in the Temple results in an obligation to bring a sliding-scale offering.
אֲבָל חַיָּיבִין עַל עֲשֵׂה וְעַל לֹא תַעֲשֶׂה שֶׁבְּנִדָּה, וּמְבִיאִין אָשָׁם תָּלוּי עַל עֲשֵׂה וְעַל לֹא תַעֲשֶׂה שֶׁבְּנִדָּה.
The mishna there continues: But the Sanhedrin is liable to bring a bull offering for an erroneous ruling with regard to a positive mitzva or prohibition concerning a menstruating woman. And one who is uncertain whether or not he unwittingly transgressed a prohibition that requires a sin-offering brings a provisional guilt-offering for a positive mitzva or prohibition concerning a menstruating woman.
וְקָאָמַר: זוֹ הִיא מִצְוַת עֲשֵׂה שֶׁבַּמִּקְדָּשׁ שֶׁאֵין חַיָּיבִין עָלֶיהָ; וְאֵיזוֹ הִיא מִצְוַת עֲשֵׂה שֶׁבְּנִדָּה שֶׁחַיָּיבִין עָלֶיהָ? הָיָה מְשַׁמֵּשׁ עִם הַטְּהוֹרָה וְאָמְרָה לוֹ ״נִטְמֵאתִי״, וּפֵירַשׁ מִיָּד – חַיָּיב, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁיְּצִיאָתוֹ הֲנָאָה לוֹ כְּבִיאָתוֹ.
And it is in reference to that mishna that the tanna in the mishna here says: This mitzva, that the ritually impure must be sent out of the Temple, is the positive mitzva concerning the Temple for which the Sanhedrin is not liable to bring a bull offering for an erroneous ruling. And which is the positive mitzva with regard to a menstruating woman for which the Sanhedrin is liable to bring a bull offering for an erroneous ruling? If a man was engaging in intercourse with a ritually pure woman, and during the course of their act of intercourse she experienced menstrual bleeding and said to him: I have become impure, and unwittingly he immediately withdrew from her and did not wait until his penis became flaccid, he is liable to bring a sin-offering for engaging in intercourse with a menstruating woman, because his withdrawal from her is as pleasant to him as his entry. If the Sanhedrin mistakenly ruled that one may withdraw immediately, they bring a bull offering for their erroneous ruling.
אִיתְּמַר, אַבָּיֵי אָמַר מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר רַב: חַיָּיב שְׁתַּיִם. וְכֵן אָמַר רָבָא, אָמַר רַב שְׁמוּאֵל בַּר שֶׁבָּא, אָמַר רַב הוּנָא: חַיָּיב שְׁתַּיִם, חֲדָא אַכְּנִיסָה וַחֲדָא אַפְּרִישָׁה.
§ The Gemara further clarifies the matter of a man who immediately withdrew from the woman after she told him that she had experienced menstrual bleeding. It was stated that Abaye says in the name of Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Rav: He is liable to bring two sin-offerings for this unwitting transgression. And so Rava says that Rav Shmuel bar Shaba says that Rav Huna says: He is liable to bring two sin-offerings, one for his initial entry and one for his immediate withdrawal.
הָוֵי בַּהּ רַבָּה: בְּמַאי? אִילֵימָא סָמוּךְ לְוִסְתָּהּ – וּבְמַאן? אִילֵּימָא בְּתַלְמִיד חָכָם – בִּשְׁלָמָא אַכְּנִיסָה לִיחַיַּיב, קָסָבַר יָכוֹלְנִי לִבְעוֹל; אֶלָּא אַפְּרִישָׁה אַמַּאי לִיחַיַּיב? מֵזִיד הוּא!
Rabba discusses this matter, raising a question: About what case are we speaking? If we say that it was near her expected date of menstruation, when sexual intercourse is prohibited due to a concern that the woman might already be menstruating or that she might begin to menstruate during the act of intercourse, and nevertheless they engaged in intercourse, there is a difficulty: With whom are we dealing? If we say that we are dealing with a Torah scholar, granted that he will be liable to bring a sin-offering for his initial entry. That was an unwitting transgression, as he thought to himself: I can engage in intercourse with her before she begins to menstruate. But why will he be liable to bring a sin-offering for his immediate withdrawal? That transgression was intentional, since he is a Torah scholar and he knows that in such a case he must not withdraw immediately, and a sin-offering is not brought for an intentional transgression.
