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Today's Daf Yomi

December 24, 2017 | 讜壮 讘讟讘转 转砖注状讞

  • This month's learning is dedicated by Debbie and Yossi Gevir to Rabbanit Michelle and the Hadran Zoom group for their kindness, support, and care during a medically challenging year.

Shevuot 26

Rav holds that one who swears about someone else having done something in the past would be a valid oath as it can be formulated in the negative (and disagrees with Shmuel who holds that it can’t since it can’t be formulated in the future tense). Abaye points out that if it were someone saying he/she knows testimony and doesn’t, since it the negative it would be an “oath of testimony” and not an “oath of expression,” one would not be obligated. This leads to a whole discussion regarding why the Torah specified an “oath of testimony” if聽 it could have been included in an “oath of expression.” Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva debate their opinions (which cases are included in an oath of expression for which one needs to bring a sliding scale sin offering) based on how each one extrapolates the verses using different聽exegetical principles. An oath聽of expression is only brought if the person is “shogeg”聽– accidental but not if they did it on purpose or if it was totally beyond one’s control. The gemara聽tries to find a case where it could be accidental聽relating to a past event that wouldn’t be considered totally beyond one’s control. An oath of expression is only brought by one who “forgot” the oath but not the object. What is the case?


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讞讚讗 诪讬谞讬讬讛讜 专讘 驻驻讗 讗诪专讛

Rav Pappa said one of those statements, not Abaye.

专讘讬 讬砖诪注讗诇 讗讜诪专 讗讬谞讜 讞讬讬讘 讗诇讗 注诇 讛注转讬讚 诇讘讗 转谞讜 专讘谞谉 诇讛专注 讗讜 诇讛讬讟讬讘 讗讬谉 诇讬 讗诇讗 讚讘专讬诐 砖讬砖 讘讛谉 讛专注讛 讜讛讟讘讛 砖讗讬谉 讘讛谉 讛专注讛 讜讛讟讘讛 诪谞讬谉 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讗讜 谞驻砖 讻讬 转砖讘注 诇讘讟讗 讘砖驻转讬诐

搂 The mishna teaches that Rabbi Yishmael says: One is liable only for an oath on an utterance taken about the future. The Sages taught in a baraita with regard to an oath on an utterance: From the verse: 鈥淥r if anyone take an oath clearly with his lips to do evil, or to do good鈥 (Leviticus 5:4), I have derived only that one is liable for an oath on an utterance with regard to matters to which doing evil and doing good apply. From where do I derive that one is liable for an oath on an utterance with regard to matters to which doing evil and doing good do not apply? The verse states: 鈥淥r if anyone take an oath clearly with his lips,鈥 which includes other matters.

讗讬谉 诇讬 讗诇讗 诇讛讘讗 诇砖注讘专 诪谞讬谉 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 诇讻诇 讗砖专 讬讘讟讗 讛讗讚诐 讘砖讘注讛 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 专讘讬 讬砖诪注讗诇 讗讜诪专 诇讛专注 讗讜 诇讛讬讟讬讘 诇讛讘讗

I have derived only that one is liable for oaths referring to the future. From where do I derive that one is liable for oaths referring to the past? The verse subsequently states: 鈥淲hatsoever it be that a man shall utter clearly with an oath鈥 (Leviticus 5:4); this is the statement of Rabbi Akiva. Rabbi Yishmael says: The verse states: 鈥淭o do evil, or to do good,鈥 referring exclusively to oaths about the future.

讗诪专 诇讜 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讗诐 讻谉 讗讬谉 诇讬 讗诇讗 讚讘专讬诐 砖讬砖 讘讛谉 讛讟讘讛 讜讛专注讛 讚讘专讬诐 砖讗讬谉 讘讛谉 讛专注讛 讜讛讟讘讛 诪谞讬谉 讗诪专 诇讜 诪专讘讜讬 讛讻转讜讘 讗诪专 诇讜 讗诐 专讬讘讛 讛讻转讜讘 诇讻讱 专讬讘讛 讛讻转讜讘 诇讻讱

The baraita continues: Rabbi Akiva said to him: If so, then I have derived only that one is liable for an oath on an utterance with regard to matters to which doing evil and doing good apply. From where do I derive that one is liable for an oath on an utterance with regard to matters to which doing evil and doing good do not apply? Rabbi Yishmael said to Rabbi Akiva in response: It is derived from an amplification of the meaning of the verse. Rabbi Akiva said to him: If the verse is amplified for this, i.e., to extend the halakha of an oath on an utterance to matters that do not involve doing evil or good, the verse is amplified for that, i.e., oaths about the past.

砖驻讬专 拽讗 讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 诇专讘讬 讬砖诪注讗诇

The Gemara questions: Rabbi Akiva said well his critique of the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael. Why does Rabbi Yishmael disagree?

讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 专讘讬 讬砖诪注讗诇 砖砖讬诪砖 讗转 专讘讬 谞讞讜谞讬讗 讘谉 讛拽谞讛 砖讛讬讛 讚讜专砖 讗转 讻诇 讛转讜专讛 讻讜诇讛 讘讻诇诇 讜驻专讟 讗讬讛讜 谞诪讬 讚讜专砖 讘讻诇诇 讜驻专讟 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 砖砖讬诪砖 讗转 谞讞讜诐 讗讬砖 讙诐 讝讜 砖讛讬讛 讚讜专砖 讗转 讻诇 讛转讜专讛 讻讜诇讛 讘专讬讘讛 讜诪讬注讟 讗讬讛讜 谞诪讬 讚讜专砖 专讬讘讛 讜诪讬注讟

Rabbi Yo岣nan said: It is because Rabbi Yishmael was the one who served as a disciple of Rabbi Ne岣nya ben HaKana, who would interpret the entire Torah with the hermeneutical principle of a generalization and a detail. Therefore, Rabbi Yishmael also interprets the Torah with the method of a generalization and a detail. Rabbi Akiva was one who served as a disciple of Na岣m of Gam Zo, who would interpret the entire Torah with the hermeneutical principle of amplification and restriction. Therefore, Rabbi Akiva also interprets the Torah by amplification and restriction.

诪讗讬 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讚讚专讬砖 专讬讘讜讬讬 讜诪讬注讜讟讬 讚转谞讬讗 讗讜 谞驻砖 讻讬 转砖讘注 专讬讘讛 诇讛专注 讗讜 诇讛讬讟讬讘 诪讬注讟 诇讻诇 讗砖专 讬讘讟讗 讛讗讚诐 讞讝专 讜专讬讘讛 专讬讘讛 讜诪讬注讟 讜专讬讘讛 专讬讘讛 讛讻诇

What is the specific instance in this context where one finds that Rabbi Akiva interprets with amplifications and restrictions? It is as it is taught in a baraita that when the verse states: 鈥淥r if anyone take an oath clearly with his lips鈥 (Leviticus 5:4), it amplifies the range of possible oaths for which one could be liable to bring an offering for an oath on an utterance. When the verse continues: 鈥淭o do evil, or to do good,鈥 it restricts that range. When it further continues: 鈥淲hatsoever it be that a man shall utter clearly with an oath,鈥 it then amplifies again. According to the hermeneutical principle that when a verse amplified, and then restricted, and then amplified, it amplified the relevant category to include everything except for the specific matter that was excluded by the restriction.

诪讗讬 专讬讘讛 专讬讘讛 讻诇 诪讬诇讬 讜诪讗讬 诪讬注讟 诪讬注讟 讚讘专 诪爪讜讛

What was included when the verse amplified the range of liability? It amplified it to include all matters about which one might take an oath. And in what way did it restrict it when it continued: 鈥淭o do evil, or to do good鈥? It restricted the range of liability for an oath on an utterance to exclude an oath that is a matter involving a mitzva, i.e., an oath to refrain from performing a mitzva.

讜专讘讬 讬砖诪注讗诇 讚专讬砖 讻诇诇 讜驻专讟 讗讜 谞驻砖 讻讬 转砖讘注 诇讘讟讗 讘砖驻转讬诐 讻诇诇 诇讛专注 讗讜 诇讛讬讟讬讘 驻专讟 诇讻诇 讗砖专 讬讘讟讗 讛讗讚诐 讞讝专 讜讻诇诇 讻诇诇 讜驻专讟 讜讻诇诇 讗讬 讗转讛 讚谉 讗诇讗 讻注讬谉 讛驻专讟 诪讛 讛驻专讟 诪驻讜专砖 诇讛讘讗 讗祝 讻诇 诇讛讘讗

And Rabbi Yishmael interprets the verse following the hermeneutical principle of a generalization and a detail: 鈥淥r if anyone take an oath clearly with his lips鈥 (Leviticus 5:4), is a generalization; 鈥渢o do evil, or to do good,鈥 is a detail; 鈥渨hatsoever it be that a man shall utter clearly with an oath,鈥 the verse then further generalized. There is a hermeneutical principle that when a verse contains a generalization, and a detail, and another generalization, you may deduce that the verse is referring only to items similar to the detail. Just as the detail in the verse is explicitly an oath referring to the future, so too, all the oaths for which one is liable must be referring to the future.

讗讛谞讬 讻诇诇讗 诇讗转讜讬讬 讗驻讬诇讜 讚讘专讬诐 砖讗讬谉 讘讛谉 讛专注讛 讜讛讟讘讛 诇讛讘讗 讗讛谞讬 驻专讟讗 诇诪注讜讟讬 讗驻讬诇讜 讚讘专讬诐 砖讬砖 讘讛谉 讛专注讛 讜讛讟讘讛 诇砖注讘专

The generalization serves to include even those matters that do not concern doing evil or doing good when they refer to the future; the detail serves to exclude even matters that concern doing evil or doing good when they refer to the past.

讗讬驻讜讱 讗谞讗

The Gemara challenges: I will reverse it and say that the generalization serves to include oaths concerning the past, and the detail serves to exclude matters that do not involve doing evil or doing good. Why is that not an equally legitimate interpretation of the verse?

讗诪专 专讘讬 讬爪讞拽 讚讜诪讬讗 讚诇讛专注 讗讜 诇讛讬讟讬讘 诪讬 砖讗讬住讜专讜 诪砖讜诐 讘诇 讬讞诇 讚讘专讜 讬爪讗转讛 讝讜 砖讗讬谉 讗讬住讜专讜 诪砖讜诐 讘诇 讬讞诇 讚讘专讜 讗诇讗 诪砖讜诐 讘诇 转砖拽专讜

Rabbi Yitz岣k said that Rabbi Yishmael understands that liability is extended to one whose oath is similar to an oath 鈥渢o do evil, or to do good鈥 (Leviticus 5:4). He whose prohibition is due to the verse: 鈥淗e shall not break his word鈥 (Numbers 30:3), is liable, as liability for an oath about the future entails breaking one鈥檚 word. Excluded is that oath whose prohibition is not due to the verse: 鈥淗e shall not break his word鈥; rather, it is due to the verse: 鈥淵ou shall not lie鈥 (Leviticus 19:11), since liability for an oath about the past applies when the oath itself was a lie.

专讘 讬爪讞拽 讘专 讗讘讬谉 讗诪专 讗诪专 拽专讗 讗讜 谞驻砖 讻讬 转砖讘注 诇讘讟讗 讘砖驻转讬诐 诪讬 砖讛砖讘讜注讛 拽讜讚诪转 诇讘讬讟讜讬 讜诇讗 砖讛讘讬讟讜讬 拽讜讚诪转 诇砖讘讜注讛 讬爪讗 讝讛 讗讻诇转讬 讜诇讗 讗讻诇转讬 砖讛诪注砖讛 拽讜讚诐 诇砖讘讜注讛

Rav Yitz岣k bar Avin says that there is a different explanation of Rabbi Yishmael鈥檚 opinion: The verse states: 鈥淥r if anyone take an oath clearly with his lips to do evil, or to do good,鈥 referring to one whose oath precedes its clarification, i.e., the action that breaks it, and not to one who takes an oath where the clarification, i.e., the action prohibited in the oath, precedes the oath. Excluded is that oath where one said, for example: I ate, or: I did not eat, where the action precedes the oath.

转谞讜 专讘谞谉 讛讗讚诐 讘砖讘讜注讛 驻专讟 诇讗谞讜住 讜谞注诇诐 驻专讟 诇诪讝讬讚

The Sages taught in a baraita: The verse states: 鈥淥r if anyone take an oath clearly with his lips to do evil, or to do good, whatsoever it be that a man shall utter clearly with an oath, and it is hidden from him; and, when he knows of it, be guilty in one of these things鈥 (Leviticus 5:4). The phrase 鈥渁 man鈥ith an oath鈥 serves to exclude a victim of circumstances beyond his control from liability to bring an offering. The term 鈥渁nd it is hidden鈥 serves to exclude from liability one who broke his oath intentionally, as he does not deserve to be able to achieve atonement through bringing an offering.

诪诪谞讜 砖谞转注诇诪讛 诪诪谞讜 砖讘讜注讛 讬讻讜诇 砖谞转注诇诪讛 诪诪谞讜 讞驻抓 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讘砖讘讜注讛 讜谞注诇诐 注诇 讛注诇诐 砖讘讜注讛 讛讜讗 讞讬讬讘 讜讗讬谞讜 讞讬讬讘 注诇 讛注诇诐 讞驻抓

The baraita continues: The term 鈥渇rom him鈥 teaches that one who was unaware of his oath, i.e., forgot it, and subsequently broke it, is liable to bring an offering. One might have thought that an oath taker is also liable when he broke an oath because he was unaware that a particular item is forbidden as the object of his oath; therefore, the verse states: 鈥淲ith an oath, and it is hidden from him.鈥 He is liable for lack of awareness of the oath but he is not liable for lack of awareness of the object of the oath.

讗诪专 诪专 讛讗讚诐 讘砖讘讜注讛 驻专讟 诇讗谞讜住 讛讬讻讬 讚诪讬

The Master says above in the baraita: The phrase 鈥渁 man鈥ith an oath鈥 serves to exclude a victim of circumstances beyond his control. The Gemara asks: What are such circumstances?

讻讚专讘 讻讛谞讗 讜专讘 讗住讬 讻讬 讛讜讜 拽讬讬诪讬 诪拽诪讬 讚专讘 诪专 讗诪专 砖讘讜注转讗 讚讛讻讬 讗诪专 专讘 讜诪专 讗诪专 砖讘讜注转讗 讚讛讻讬 讗诪专 专讘 讻讬 讗转讜 诇拽诪讬讛 讚专讘 讗诪专 讻讞讚 诪讬谞讬讬讛讜 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗讬讚讱 讜讗谞讗 讘砖讬拽专讗 讗讬砖转讘注讬

The Gemara answers: It is as it was with Rav Kahana and Rav Asi, who, when they were standing up in the presence of Rav, their teacher, at the conclusion of a lesson, disagreed with regard to exactly what he said. One Sage said: On my oath Rav said like this, and the other Sage said: On my oath Rav said like that. When they came before Rav to clarify what he had said, he stated his opinion in accordance with what one of them had said. The other said to Rav: Did I then take a false oath?

讗诪专 诇讬讛 诇讘讱 讗谞住讱

Rav said to him: Your heart compelled you. It is not regarded as a false oath, since at the time that you took the oath you were certain that you were telling the truth.

讜谞注诇诐 诪诪谞讜 砖谞转注诇诐 诪诪谞讜 砖讘讜注讛 讬讻讜诇 砖谞转注诇诐 诪诪谞讜 讞驻抓 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讘砖讘讜注讛 讜谞注诇诐 诪诪谞讜 注诇 讛注诇诐 砖讘讜注讛 讛讜讗 讞讬讬讘 讜讗讬谞讜 讞讬讬讘 注诇 讛注诇诐 讞驻抓

搂 The baraita teaches: The phrase 鈥渁nd it is hidden from him鈥 teaches that one who was unaware of his oath, i.e., forgot it, and subsequently broke it, is liable to bring an offering. One might have thought that the oath taker is also liable when he broke the oath because he was unaware that a particular item is forbidden as the object of his oath; therefore, the verse states: 鈥淲ith an oath, and it is hidden from him.鈥 He is liable for lack of awareness of the oath, but he is not liable for lack of awareness of the object of the oath.

诪讞讻讜 注诇讬讛 讘诪注专讘讗 讘砖诇诪讗 砖讘讜注讛 诪砖讻讞转 诇讛 讘诇讗 讞驻抓 讻讙讜谉 讚讗诪专 砖讘讜注讛 砖诇讗 讗讜讻诇 驻转 讞讟讬谉 讜讻住讘讜专 砖讗讜讻诇 拽讗诪专 讚砖讘讜注转讬讛 讗讬谞砖讬 讞驻爪讗 讚讻讬专 讗诇讗 讞驻抓 讘诇讗 砖讘讜注讛 讛讬讻讬 讚诪讬

They laughed at this in the West, Eretz Yisrael, and said: Granted, you find lack of awareness of one鈥檚 oath without there being lack of awareness of the object of the oath, as in a case where one said: On my oath I will not eat wheat bread, and he thought he had said: I will eat wheat bread, as in that case his oath is forgotten and the object of it is remembered. But under what circumstances is there a case of lack of awareness of the object of the oath without lack of awareness of the oath itself?

讻讙讜谉 讚讗诪专 砖讘讜注讛 砖诇讗 讗讜讻诇 驻转 讞讟讬谉 讜讻住讘讜专 砖诇 砖注讜专讬诐 拽讗诪专 讚砖讘讜注转讬讛 讚讻讬专 诇讬讛 讞驻爪讗 讗讬谞砖讬 讻讬讜谉 讚讞驻爪讗 讗讬谞砖讬 诇讛讜 讛讬讬谞讜 讛注诇诐 砖讘讜注讛

The Gemara suggests: It can be found in a case where he said: On my oath I will not eat wheat bread, and he thought he had said: On my oath I will not eat barley bread, as in that case his oath is remembered by him and the object of it is forgotten. The Gemara rejects this suggestion: Once the object of the oath is forgotten by him, that is a case of lack of awareness of his oath.

讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讚讗 讜讚讗 讗讞转 讛讬讗

Rather, Rabbi Elazar said: The distinction made in the baraita between lack of awareness of one鈥檚 oath and lack of awareness of the object of one鈥檚 oath is not valid, and both this and that are one and the same.

诪转拽讬祝 诇讛 专讘 讬讜住祝 讗诇诪讗 讞驻抓 讘诇讗 砖讘讜注讛 诇讗 诪砖讻讞转 诇讛 讜讛讗 诪砖讻讞转 诇讛 讻讙讜谉 讚讗诪专 砖讘讜注讛 砖诇讗 讗讜讻诇 驻转 讞讟讬谉 讜讛讜砖讬讟 讬讚讜 诇住诇 诇讬讟讜诇 驻转 砖注讜专讬谉 讜注诇转讛 讘讬讚讜 砖诇 讞讟讬谉 讜讻住讘讜专 砖注讜专讬诐 讛讬讗 讜讗讻诇讛 讚砖讘讜注转讬讛 讚讻讬专 诇讬讛 讞驻爪讗 讛讜讗 讚诇讗 讬讚注 诇讬讛

Rav Yosef objects to this. Is it really the case that you do not find a case of lack of awareness of the object of an oath without lack of awareness of the oath? But you find it in a case where he said: On my oath I will not eat wheat bread, and he extended his hand to the basket to take barley bread, and wheat bread came up in his hand, and he thought it was barley bread and ate it. That is a case where his oath is remembered by him, and it is the object of the oath of which he is unaware.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗讘讬讬 讻诇讜诐 诪讞讬讬讘转 诇讬讛 拽专讘谉 讗诇讗 讗诪讗讬 讚转驻讬住 讘讬讚讬讛 讛注诇诐 砖讘讜注讛 讛讜讗

Abaye said to him: Don鈥檛 you deem him liable to bring an offering for breaking his oath only for that which he holds in his hand and eats? When he eats the bread, that is lack of awareness of the oath, since he thinks that the item in his hand is permitted.

诇讬砖谞讗 讗讞专讬谞讗 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗讘讬讬 诇专讘 讬讜住祝 住讜祝 住讜祝 拽专讘谉 讚拽讗 诪讬讬转讬 注诇讛 讚讛讗讬 驻转 诪讬讛转 讛注诇诐 砖讘讜注讛 讛讜讗

The Gemara presents another formulation of this statement. Abaye said to Rav Yosef: Ultimately, the offering he brings for this bread is in any event due to lack of awareness of the oath, as he thinks that the item in his hand is permitted.

讜专讘 讬讜住祝 讗诪专 诇讱 讻讬讜谉 讚讻讬 讬讚注 诇讬讛 讚讞讟讬谉 讛讜讗 驻专讬砖 诪讬谞讬讛 讛注诇诐 讞驻抓 讛讜讗

And Rav Yosef could say to you: Since were he to know of it that it is wheat bread he would refrain from eating it, this should be regarded as a case of lack of awareness of the object.

讘注讗 诪讬谞讬讛 专讘讗 诪专讘 谞讞诪谉 讛注诇诐 讝讛 讜讝讛 讘讬讚讜 诪讛讜 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讛专讬 讛注诇诐 砖讘讜注讛 讘讬讚讜 讜讞讬讬讘 讗讚专讘讛 讛专讬 讛注诇诐 讞驻抓 讘讬讚讜 讜驻讟讜专

Rava asked of Rav Na岣an: In a case where one has a lack of awareness of this, the oath, and that, its object, what is the halakha? Rav Na岣an said to him: He breaks the oath while having a lack of awareness of the oath and is therefore liable. Rava replied: On the contrary, he has a lack of awareness of the object of the oath and should therefore be exempt.

讗诪专 专讘 讗砖讬 讞讝讬谞谉 讗讬 诪讞诪转 砖讘讜注讛 拽讗 驻专讬砖 讛专讬 讛注诇诐 砖讘讜注讛 讘讬讚讜 讜讞讬讬讘 讗讬 诪讞诪转 讞驻抓 拽讗 驻专讬砖 讛专讬 讛注诇诐 讞驻抓 讘讬讚讜 讜驻讟讜专

Rav Ashi said: We see: If he refrains from eating due to the oath, i.e., when he is reminded that he took an oath, he had a lack of awareness of the oath and is liable. If he refrains due to the object of the oath, i.e., when he is reminded what it is he is about to eat, he had a lack of awareness due to the object, and is exempt.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘讬谞讗 诇专讘 讗砖讬 讻诇讜诐 驻专讬砖 诪砖讘讜注讛 讗诇讗 诪砖讜诐 讞驻抓 讻诇讜诐 驻专讬砖 诪讞驻抓 讗诇讗 诪砖讜诐 砖讘讜注讛 讗诇讗 诇讗 砖谞讗

Ravina said to Rav Ashi: Doesn鈥檛 he refrain only from breaking the oath due to his recognition of the object? Doesn鈥檛 he refrain from the object due only to the oath? In either case, he needs to remember both the oath and its object, and the manner in which he was reminded does not serve to indicate anything. Rather, there is no difference between the two.

讘注讗 诪讬谞讬讛 专讘讗 诪专讘 谞讞诪谉

Rava asked of Rav Na岣an:

讗讬讝讜 讛讬讗 砖讙讙转 砖讘讜注转 讘讬讟讜讬 诇砖注讘专 讗讬 讚讬讚注 诪讝讬讚 讛讜讗 讗讬 讚诇讗 讬讚注 讗谞讜住 讛讜讗

What is the case of an unwitting oath on an utterance referring to the past, for which one is liable to bring an offering? If it is a case where he knows when he takes the oath that it is not true, then he is an intentional taker of a false oath and may not bring an offering. If it is a case where he did not know at the time of taking the oath that what he was saying is not true, then he is a victim of circumstances beyond his control, and is exempt from bringing an offering.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 讘讗讜诪专 讬讜讚注 讗谞讬 砖砖讘讜注讛 讝讜 讗住讜专讛 讗讘诇 讗讬谞讬 讬讜讚注 讗诐 讞讬讬讘讬谉 注诇讬讛 拽专讘谉 讗讜 诇讗讜

Rav Na岣an said to him in answer to his question: It is a case where the one taking the oath says: I know that taking this oath is prohibited, but I do not know if one is liable to bring an offering for it or not. Since he does not know the full implications of his action, it is regarded as unwitting, and he may still bring an offering to atone for it.

讻诪讗谉 讻诪讜谞讘讝 讚讗诪专 砖讙讙转 拽专讘谉 砖诪讛 砖讙讙讛

Rava asked Rav Na岣an further: In accordance with whose opinion do you answer in this way? Is it in accordance with the opinion of Munbaz, who says: Lack of intention with regard to the offering, i.e., ignorance as to whether one鈥檚 action renders one liable to bring an offering, is regarded as lack of intention? There is a dispute between Munbaz and the Rabbis in tractate Shabbat (69a鈥揵) with regard to one who knows that a particular action desecrates Shabbat but does not know that it renders one liable to bring a sin-offering. Munbaz holds that even one who is merely ignorant of the liability to bring an offering is deemed an unwitting sinner who brings a sin-offering to atone. The Rabbis disagree and deem him unwitting only if he is unaware that the action is prohibited.

讗驻讬诇讜 转讬诪讗 专讘谞谉 注讚 讻讗谉 诇讗 驻诇讬讙讬 专讘谞谉 注诇讬讛 讚诪讜谞讘讝 讗诇讗 讘讻诇 讛转讜专讛 讻讜诇讛 讚诇讗讜 讞讬讚讜砖 讛讜讗 讗讘诇 讛讻讗 讚讞讬讚讜砖 讛讜讗 讚讘讻诇 讛转讜专讛 讻讜诇讛 诇讗 讗砖讻讞谉 诇讗讜 讚诪讬讬转讬 拽专讘谉

Rav Na岣an explains: You may even say that this explanation accords with the opinion of the Rabbis. The Rabbis disagree with the opinion of Munbaz only with regard to all typical cases in the entire Torah for which one is liable to bring a sin-offering, where that liability is not a novelty. But here, with regard to oaths, it could be said that bringing a sin-offering is a novelty, since there is a principle that we do not find in the entire Torah another example of a simple prohibition for which one brings an offering for its unwitting violation.

讚讬诇驻讬谞谉 诪注讘讜讚讛 讝专讛 讜讛讻讗 诪讬讬转讬 讗驻讬诇讜 专讘谞谉 诪讜讚讜

Rav Na岣an continues: The reason for this principle is that we derive for which prohibitions one brings a sin-offering from the prohibition of idol worship, where one is liable to receive karet for an intentional violation and one is liable to bring a sin-offering for an unwitting violation. And yet here, in the case of the oath, one brings a sin-offering even though intentional violation of the prohibition is not punishable by karet. Given the novelty of the offering for an oath on an utterance, even the Rabbis would agree that ignorance of the fact that one is performing an action for which the Torah legislates an offering is sufficient for one to be regarded as unwitting and liable to bring a sliding-scale offering.

讘注讗 诪讬谞讬讛 专讘讬谞讗 诪专讘讗 谞砖讘注 注诇 讻讻专 讜诪住转讻谉 注诇讬讛 诪讛讜

Ravina asked Rava: If one took an oath concerning a certain loaf, rendering himself prohibited from eating it, and later his life is in danger due to his not eating it, what is the halakha? Is he liable to bring an offering in atonement for eating it?

诪住转讻谉 诇讬砖专讬 诇讬讛 诪专 讗诇讗 诪爪讟注专 讜讗讻诇讛 讘砖讙讙转 砖讘讜注讛 诪讗讬

Rava responded: If his life is in danger, let the Master permit him to eat, as saving his life overrides the prohibition; he is considered a victim of circumstances beyond his control and does not need to atone at all. Ravina said: Rather, the question is this: With regard to one who is suffering from hunger and who ate it unwittingly, i.e., he forgot the prohibition generated by the oath, although had he known, he would still have eaten this loaf of bread intentionally due to his hunger, what is the halakha?

讗诪专 诇讬讛 转谞讬谞讗 砖讘 诪讬讚讬注转讜 诪讘讬讗 拽专讘谉 注诇 砖讙讙转讜 诇讗 砖讘 诪讬讚讬注转讜 讗讬谉 诪讘讬讗 拽专讘谉 注诇 砖讙讙转讜

Rava said to him: We learn in a baraita: One who, had he known that his action was prohibited, would have withdrawn from sinning due to his knowledge, brings an offering for his unwitting sin; but one who would not have withdrawn from sinning due to his knowledge does not bring an offering for his unwitting sin. Since he would have eaten anyway, he does not bring an offering.

讗诪专 砖诪讜讗诇 讙诪专 讘诇讘讜 爪专讬讱 砖讬讜爪讬讗 讘砖驻转讬讜 砖谞讗诪专 诇讘讟讗 讘砖驻转讬诐

Shmuel says: Even after one decided to take an oath, he needs to express it with his lips for it to take effect, as it is stated in the verse: 鈥淥r if anyone take an oath clearly with his lips to do evil, or to do good鈥 (Leviticus 5:4).

诪讬转讬讘讬 讘砖驻转讬诐 讜诇讗 讘诇讘 讙诪专 讘诇讘讜 诪谞讬谉 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 诇讻诇 讗砖专 讬讘讟讗 讛讗讚诐 讘砖讘讜注讛

The Gemara raises an objection from a baraita: The verse states that one takes an oath 鈥渨ith his lips,鈥 but not with his heart. From where is it derived that one who decided in his heart to take an oath is liable to bring an offering for an oath on an utterance? The verse states: 鈥淲hatsoever it be that a man shall express with an oath鈥 (Leviticus 5:4).

讛讗 讙讜驻讛 拽砖讬讗 讗诪专转 讘砖驻转讬诐 讜诇讗 讘诇讘 讜讛讚专 讗诪专转 讙诪专 讘诇讘讜 诪谞讬谉

The Gemara points out: This baraita is difficult in itself. You said: 鈥淲ith his lips,鈥 but not with his heart, and then you said: From where is it derived that one who decided in his heart to take an oath is liable? There seems to be a contradiction within the baraita concerning the halakha where one did not express the oath.

讗诪专 专讘 砖砖转 讛讗 诇讗 拽砖讬讗 讛讻讬 拽讗诪专 讘砖驻转讬诐 讜诇讗 砖讙诪专 讘诇讘讜 诇讛讜爪讬讗 讘砖驻转讬讜 讜诇讗 讛讜爪讬讗 讙诪专 讘诇讘讜 住转诐 诪谞讬谉 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 诇讻诇 讗砖专 讬讘讟讗

Rav Sheshet said: This is not difficult; this is what the baraita is saying: One takes an oath 鈥渨ith his lips鈥 and does not take an oath when he merely decided in his heart to express with his lips but has not yet actually expressed the oath verbally. From where is it derived that one who simply decided in his heart to take an oath without the intention of stating it with his lips is liable? The verse states: 鈥淲hatsoever it be that a man shall express with an oath鈥 (Leviticus 5:4).

讗诇讗 诇砖诪讜讗诇 拽砖讬讗

The Gemara challenges: But according to the opinion of Shmuel, this baraita nevertheless poses a difficulty, as it indicates that an oath that was not expressed verbally takes effect.

讗诪专 专讘 砖砖转 转专讬抓 讜讗讬诪讗 讛讻讬 讘砖驻转讬诐 讜诇讗 砖讙诪专 讘诇讘讜 诇讛讜爪讬讗 驻转 讞讟讬谉 讜讛讜爪讬讗 驻转 砖注讜专讬谉 讙诪专 讘诇讘讜 诇讛讜爪讬讗 驻转 讞讟讬谉 讜讛讜爪讬讗 驻转 住转诐 诪谞讬谉 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 诇讻诇 讗砖专 讬讘讟讗 讛讗讚诐

Rav Sheshet said: Resolve the difficulty and say the baraita like this: One takes an oath 鈥渨ith his lips,鈥 but does not take an oath where he decided in his heart to express an oath prohibiting wheat bread and he instead expressed an oath about barley bread. From where is it derived that he is liable where he decided in his heart to express an oath about wheat bread and expressed his oath about bread without specifying? The verse states: 鈥淲hatsoever it be that a man shall express with an oath.鈥

诪讬转讬讘讬 诪讜爪讗 砖驻转讬讱 转砖诪讜专 讜注砖讬转 讗讬谉 诇讬 讗诇讗 砖讛讜爪讬讗 讘砖驻转讬讜 讙诪专 讘诇讘讜 诪谞讬谉 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讻诇 谞讚讬讘 诇讘

The Gemara raises an objection to the opinion of Shmuel from a baraita: The verse states: 鈥淭hat which is gone out of your lips you shall observe and do; according as you have vowed freely to the Lord your God, even that which you have promised with your mouth鈥 (Deuteronomy 23:24). From here I have derived only a case in which he expresses with his lips. From where do I derive a case where he decided only in his heart? The verse states in the context of the contributions to the building of the Tabernacle: 鈥淎nd they came, both men and women, as many as were willinghearted, and brought nose rings, and earrings, and signet rings, and girdles, all jewels of gold鈥 (Exodus 35:22). The fact that the verse describes those who contributed as willinghearted indicates that one becomes liable via a non-verbal decision.

砖讗谞讬 讛转诐 讚讻转讬讘 讻诇 谞讚讬讘 诇讘

The Gemara answers: The case there, of contributions to the Tabernacle, is different, as it is written: 鈥淎s many as were willinghearted.鈥 This halakha is stated only in the context of contributions to the Tabernacle, not in the context of oaths.

讜谞讬讙诪专 诪讬谞讛

The Gemara suggests: And let us learn from it that in general, oaths can be taken via a non-verbal decision.

诪砖讜诐 讚讛讜讜 转专讜诪讛 讜拽讚砖讬诐 砖谞讬 讻转讜讘讬谉 讛讘讗讬谉 讻讗讞讚 讜讻诇 砖谞讬 讻转讜讘讬谉 讛讘讗讬谉 讻讗讞讚 讗讬谉 诪诇诪讚讬谉

The Gemara rejects this: One cannot extrapolate from the fact that the non-verbal consecrations to the Tabernacle were effective, because teruma, which can be separated non-verbally, and donating consecrated items are two verses that come as one, i.e., they are both instances where a non-verbal commitment is sufficient, and any two verses that come as one do not teach their common element to apply to other cases.

讛谞讬讞讗 诇诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 讗讬谉 诪诇诪讚讬谉 讗诇讗 诇诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 诪诇诪讚讬谉 诪讗讬 讗讬讻讗 诇诪讬诪专

The Gemara asks: This works out well according to the one who says that two verses that come as one do not teach their common element, but according to the one who says that they do teach their common element, what can be said?

讛讜讜 讞讜诇讬谉 讜拽讚砖讬诐 讜讞讜诇讬谉 诪拽讚砖讬诐 诇讗 讙诪专讬谞谉

The Gemara answers: The two contexts here are non-sacred items, i.e., oaths, and consecrated items, donations to the Tabernacle and teruma, and we do not derive halakhot concerning non-sacred items from halakhot concerning consecrated items.

  • This month's learning is dedicated by Debbie and Yossi Gevir to Rabbanit Michelle and the Hadran Zoom group for their kindness, support, and care during a medically challenging year.

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Shevuot 26

The William Davidson Talmud | Powered by Sefaria

Shevuot 26

讞讚讗 诪讬谞讬讬讛讜 专讘 驻驻讗 讗诪专讛

Rav Pappa said one of those statements, not Abaye.

专讘讬 讬砖诪注讗诇 讗讜诪专 讗讬谞讜 讞讬讬讘 讗诇讗 注诇 讛注转讬讚 诇讘讗 转谞讜 专讘谞谉 诇讛专注 讗讜 诇讛讬讟讬讘 讗讬谉 诇讬 讗诇讗 讚讘专讬诐 砖讬砖 讘讛谉 讛专注讛 讜讛讟讘讛 砖讗讬谉 讘讛谉 讛专注讛 讜讛讟讘讛 诪谞讬谉 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讗讜 谞驻砖 讻讬 转砖讘注 诇讘讟讗 讘砖驻转讬诐

搂 The mishna teaches that Rabbi Yishmael says: One is liable only for an oath on an utterance taken about the future. The Sages taught in a baraita with regard to an oath on an utterance: From the verse: 鈥淥r if anyone take an oath clearly with his lips to do evil, or to do good鈥 (Leviticus 5:4), I have derived only that one is liable for an oath on an utterance with regard to matters to which doing evil and doing good apply. From where do I derive that one is liable for an oath on an utterance with regard to matters to which doing evil and doing good do not apply? The verse states: 鈥淥r if anyone take an oath clearly with his lips,鈥 which includes other matters.

讗讬谉 诇讬 讗诇讗 诇讛讘讗 诇砖注讘专 诪谞讬谉 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 诇讻诇 讗砖专 讬讘讟讗 讛讗讚诐 讘砖讘注讛 讚讘专讬 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 专讘讬 讬砖诪注讗诇 讗讜诪专 诇讛专注 讗讜 诇讛讬讟讬讘 诇讛讘讗

I have derived only that one is liable for oaths referring to the future. From where do I derive that one is liable for oaths referring to the past? The verse subsequently states: 鈥淲hatsoever it be that a man shall utter clearly with an oath鈥 (Leviticus 5:4); this is the statement of Rabbi Akiva. Rabbi Yishmael says: The verse states: 鈥淭o do evil, or to do good,鈥 referring exclusively to oaths about the future.

讗诪专 诇讜 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讗诐 讻谉 讗讬谉 诇讬 讗诇讗 讚讘专讬诐 砖讬砖 讘讛谉 讛讟讘讛 讜讛专注讛 讚讘专讬诐 砖讗讬谉 讘讛谉 讛专注讛 讜讛讟讘讛 诪谞讬谉 讗诪专 诇讜 诪专讘讜讬 讛讻转讜讘 讗诪专 诇讜 讗诐 专讬讘讛 讛讻转讜讘 诇讻讱 专讬讘讛 讛讻转讜讘 诇讻讱

The baraita continues: Rabbi Akiva said to him: If so, then I have derived only that one is liable for an oath on an utterance with regard to matters to which doing evil and doing good apply. From where do I derive that one is liable for an oath on an utterance with regard to matters to which doing evil and doing good do not apply? Rabbi Yishmael said to Rabbi Akiva in response: It is derived from an amplification of the meaning of the verse. Rabbi Akiva said to him: If the verse is amplified for this, i.e., to extend the halakha of an oath on an utterance to matters that do not involve doing evil or good, the verse is amplified for that, i.e., oaths about the past.

砖驻讬专 拽讗 讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 诇专讘讬 讬砖诪注讗诇

The Gemara questions: Rabbi Akiva said well his critique of the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael. Why does Rabbi Yishmael disagree?

讗诪专 专讘讬 讬讜讞谞谉 专讘讬 讬砖诪注讗诇 砖砖讬诪砖 讗转 专讘讬 谞讞讜谞讬讗 讘谉 讛拽谞讛 砖讛讬讛 讚讜专砖 讗转 讻诇 讛转讜专讛 讻讜诇讛 讘讻诇诇 讜驻专讟 讗讬讛讜 谞诪讬 讚讜专砖 讘讻诇诇 讜驻专讟 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 砖砖讬诪砖 讗转 谞讞讜诐 讗讬砖 讙诐 讝讜 砖讛讬讛 讚讜专砖 讗转 讻诇 讛转讜专讛 讻讜诇讛 讘专讬讘讛 讜诪讬注讟 讗讬讛讜 谞诪讬 讚讜专砖 专讬讘讛 讜诪讬注讟

Rabbi Yo岣nan said: It is because Rabbi Yishmael was the one who served as a disciple of Rabbi Ne岣nya ben HaKana, who would interpret the entire Torah with the hermeneutical principle of a generalization and a detail. Therefore, Rabbi Yishmael also interprets the Torah with the method of a generalization and a detail. Rabbi Akiva was one who served as a disciple of Na岣m of Gam Zo, who would interpret the entire Torah with the hermeneutical principle of amplification and restriction. Therefore, Rabbi Akiva also interprets the Torah by amplification and restriction.

诪讗讬 专讘讬 注拽讬讘讗 讚讚专讬砖 专讬讘讜讬讬 讜诪讬注讜讟讬 讚转谞讬讗 讗讜 谞驻砖 讻讬 转砖讘注 专讬讘讛 诇讛专注 讗讜 诇讛讬讟讬讘 诪讬注讟 诇讻诇 讗砖专 讬讘讟讗 讛讗讚诐 讞讝专 讜专讬讘讛 专讬讘讛 讜诪讬注讟 讜专讬讘讛 专讬讘讛 讛讻诇

What is the specific instance in this context where one finds that Rabbi Akiva interprets with amplifications and restrictions? It is as it is taught in a baraita that when the verse states: 鈥淥r if anyone take an oath clearly with his lips鈥 (Leviticus 5:4), it amplifies the range of possible oaths for which one could be liable to bring an offering for an oath on an utterance. When the verse continues: 鈥淭o do evil, or to do good,鈥 it restricts that range. When it further continues: 鈥淲hatsoever it be that a man shall utter clearly with an oath,鈥 it then amplifies again. According to the hermeneutical principle that when a verse amplified, and then restricted, and then amplified, it amplified the relevant category to include everything except for the specific matter that was excluded by the restriction.

诪讗讬 专讬讘讛 专讬讘讛 讻诇 诪讬诇讬 讜诪讗讬 诪讬注讟 诪讬注讟 讚讘专 诪爪讜讛

What was included when the verse amplified the range of liability? It amplified it to include all matters about which one might take an oath. And in what way did it restrict it when it continued: 鈥淭o do evil, or to do good鈥? It restricted the range of liability for an oath on an utterance to exclude an oath that is a matter involving a mitzva, i.e., an oath to refrain from performing a mitzva.

讜专讘讬 讬砖诪注讗诇 讚专讬砖 讻诇诇 讜驻专讟 讗讜 谞驻砖 讻讬 转砖讘注 诇讘讟讗 讘砖驻转讬诐 讻诇诇 诇讛专注 讗讜 诇讛讬讟讬讘 驻专讟 诇讻诇 讗砖专 讬讘讟讗 讛讗讚诐 讞讝专 讜讻诇诇 讻诇诇 讜驻专讟 讜讻诇诇 讗讬 讗转讛 讚谉 讗诇讗 讻注讬谉 讛驻专讟 诪讛 讛驻专讟 诪驻讜专砖 诇讛讘讗 讗祝 讻诇 诇讛讘讗

And Rabbi Yishmael interprets the verse following the hermeneutical principle of a generalization and a detail: 鈥淥r if anyone take an oath clearly with his lips鈥 (Leviticus 5:4), is a generalization; 鈥渢o do evil, or to do good,鈥 is a detail; 鈥渨hatsoever it be that a man shall utter clearly with an oath,鈥 the verse then further generalized. There is a hermeneutical principle that when a verse contains a generalization, and a detail, and another generalization, you may deduce that the verse is referring only to items similar to the detail. Just as the detail in the verse is explicitly an oath referring to the future, so too, all the oaths for which one is liable must be referring to the future.

讗讛谞讬 讻诇诇讗 诇讗转讜讬讬 讗驻讬诇讜 讚讘专讬诐 砖讗讬谉 讘讛谉 讛专注讛 讜讛讟讘讛 诇讛讘讗 讗讛谞讬 驻专讟讗 诇诪注讜讟讬 讗驻讬诇讜 讚讘专讬诐 砖讬砖 讘讛谉 讛专注讛 讜讛讟讘讛 诇砖注讘专

The generalization serves to include even those matters that do not concern doing evil or doing good when they refer to the future; the detail serves to exclude even matters that concern doing evil or doing good when they refer to the past.

讗讬驻讜讱 讗谞讗

The Gemara challenges: I will reverse it and say that the generalization serves to include oaths concerning the past, and the detail serves to exclude matters that do not involve doing evil or doing good. Why is that not an equally legitimate interpretation of the verse?

讗诪专 专讘讬 讬爪讞拽 讚讜诪讬讗 讚诇讛专注 讗讜 诇讛讬讟讬讘 诪讬 砖讗讬住讜专讜 诪砖讜诐 讘诇 讬讞诇 讚讘专讜 讬爪讗转讛 讝讜 砖讗讬谉 讗讬住讜专讜 诪砖讜诐 讘诇 讬讞诇 讚讘专讜 讗诇讗 诪砖讜诐 讘诇 转砖拽专讜

Rabbi Yitz岣k said that Rabbi Yishmael understands that liability is extended to one whose oath is similar to an oath 鈥渢o do evil, or to do good鈥 (Leviticus 5:4). He whose prohibition is due to the verse: 鈥淗e shall not break his word鈥 (Numbers 30:3), is liable, as liability for an oath about the future entails breaking one鈥檚 word. Excluded is that oath whose prohibition is not due to the verse: 鈥淗e shall not break his word鈥; rather, it is due to the verse: 鈥淵ou shall not lie鈥 (Leviticus 19:11), since liability for an oath about the past applies when the oath itself was a lie.

专讘 讬爪讞拽 讘专 讗讘讬谉 讗诪专 讗诪专 拽专讗 讗讜 谞驻砖 讻讬 转砖讘注 诇讘讟讗 讘砖驻转讬诐 诪讬 砖讛砖讘讜注讛 拽讜讚诪转 诇讘讬讟讜讬 讜诇讗 砖讛讘讬讟讜讬 拽讜讚诪转 诇砖讘讜注讛 讬爪讗 讝讛 讗讻诇转讬 讜诇讗 讗讻诇转讬 砖讛诪注砖讛 拽讜讚诐 诇砖讘讜注讛

Rav Yitz岣k bar Avin says that there is a different explanation of Rabbi Yishmael鈥檚 opinion: The verse states: 鈥淥r if anyone take an oath clearly with his lips to do evil, or to do good,鈥 referring to one whose oath precedes its clarification, i.e., the action that breaks it, and not to one who takes an oath where the clarification, i.e., the action prohibited in the oath, precedes the oath. Excluded is that oath where one said, for example: I ate, or: I did not eat, where the action precedes the oath.

转谞讜 专讘谞谉 讛讗讚诐 讘砖讘讜注讛 驻专讟 诇讗谞讜住 讜谞注诇诐 驻专讟 诇诪讝讬讚

The Sages taught in a baraita: The verse states: 鈥淥r if anyone take an oath clearly with his lips to do evil, or to do good, whatsoever it be that a man shall utter clearly with an oath, and it is hidden from him; and, when he knows of it, be guilty in one of these things鈥 (Leviticus 5:4). The phrase 鈥渁 man鈥ith an oath鈥 serves to exclude a victim of circumstances beyond his control from liability to bring an offering. The term 鈥渁nd it is hidden鈥 serves to exclude from liability one who broke his oath intentionally, as he does not deserve to be able to achieve atonement through bringing an offering.

诪诪谞讜 砖谞转注诇诪讛 诪诪谞讜 砖讘讜注讛 讬讻讜诇 砖谞转注诇诪讛 诪诪谞讜 讞驻抓 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讘砖讘讜注讛 讜谞注诇诐 注诇 讛注诇诐 砖讘讜注讛 讛讜讗 讞讬讬讘 讜讗讬谞讜 讞讬讬讘 注诇 讛注诇诐 讞驻抓

The baraita continues: The term 鈥渇rom him鈥 teaches that one who was unaware of his oath, i.e., forgot it, and subsequently broke it, is liable to bring an offering. One might have thought that an oath taker is also liable when he broke an oath because he was unaware that a particular item is forbidden as the object of his oath; therefore, the verse states: 鈥淲ith an oath, and it is hidden from him.鈥 He is liable for lack of awareness of the oath but he is not liable for lack of awareness of the object of the oath.

讗诪专 诪专 讛讗讚诐 讘砖讘讜注讛 驻专讟 诇讗谞讜住 讛讬讻讬 讚诪讬

The Master says above in the baraita: The phrase 鈥渁 man鈥ith an oath鈥 serves to exclude a victim of circumstances beyond his control. The Gemara asks: What are such circumstances?

讻讚专讘 讻讛谞讗 讜专讘 讗住讬 讻讬 讛讜讜 拽讬讬诪讬 诪拽诪讬 讚专讘 诪专 讗诪专 砖讘讜注转讗 讚讛讻讬 讗诪专 专讘 讜诪专 讗诪专 砖讘讜注转讗 讚讛讻讬 讗诪专 专讘 讻讬 讗转讜 诇拽诪讬讛 讚专讘 讗诪专 讻讞讚 诪讬谞讬讬讛讜 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗讬讚讱 讜讗谞讗 讘砖讬拽专讗 讗讬砖转讘注讬

The Gemara answers: It is as it was with Rav Kahana and Rav Asi, who, when they were standing up in the presence of Rav, their teacher, at the conclusion of a lesson, disagreed with regard to exactly what he said. One Sage said: On my oath Rav said like this, and the other Sage said: On my oath Rav said like that. When they came before Rav to clarify what he had said, he stated his opinion in accordance with what one of them had said. The other said to Rav: Did I then take a false oath?

讗诪专 诇讬讛 诇讘讱 讗谞住讱

Rav said to him: Your heart compelled you. It is not regarded as a false oath, since at the time that you took the oath you were certain that you were telling the truth.

讜谞注诇诐 诪诪谞讜 砖谞转注诇诐 诪诪谞讜 砖讘讜注讛 讬讻讜诇 砖谞转注诇诐 诪诪谞讜 讞驻抓 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讘砖讘讜注讛 讜谞注诇诐 诪诪谞讜 注诇 讛注诇诐 砖讘讜注讛 讛讜讗 讞讬讬讘 讜讗讬谞讜 讞讬讬讘 注诇 讛注诇诐 讞驻抓

搂 The baraita teaches: The phrase 鈥渁nd it is hidden from him鈥 teaches that one who was unaware of his oath, i.e., forgot it, and subsequently broke it, is liable to bring an offering. One might have thought that the oath taker is also liable when he broke the oath because he was unaware that a particular item is forbidden as the object of his oath; therefore, the verse states: 鈥淲ith an oath, and it is hidden from him.鈥 He is liable for lack of awareness of the oath, but he is not liable for lack of awareness of the object of the oath.

诪讞讻讜 注诇讬讛 讘诪注专讘讗 讘砖诇诪讗 砖讘讜注讛 诪砖讻讞转 诇讛 讘诇讗 讞驻抓 讻讙讜谉 讚讗诪专 砖讘讜注讛 砖诇讗 讗讜讻诇 驻转 讞讟讬谉 讜讻住讘讜专 砖讗讜讻诇 拽讗诪专 讚砖讘讜注转讬讛 讗讬谞砖讬 讞驻爪讗 讚讻讬专 讗诇讗 讞驻抓 讘诇讗 砖讘讜注讛 讛讬讻讬 讚诪讬

They laughed at this in the West, Eretz Yisrael, and said: Granted, you find lack of awareness of one鈥檚 oath without there being lack of awareness of the object of the oath, as in a case where one said: On my oath I will not eat wheat bread, and he thought he had said: I will eat wheat bread, as in that case his oath is forgotten and the object of it is remembered. But under what circumstances is there a case of lack of awareness of the object of the oath without lack of awareness of the oath itself?

讻讙讜谉 讚讗诪专 砖讘讜注讛 砖诇讗 讗讜讻诇 驻转 讞讟讬谉 讜讻住讘讜专 砖诇 砖注讜专讬诐 拽讗诪专 讚砖讘讜注转讬讛 讚讻讬专 诇讬讛 讞驻爪讗 讗讬谞砖讬 讻讬讜谉 讚讞驻爪讗 讗讬谞砖讬 诇讛讜 讛讬讬谞讜 讛注诇诐 砖讘讜注讛

The Gemara suggests: It can be found in a case where he said: On my oath I will not eat wheat bread, and he thought he had said: On my oath I will not eat barley bread, as in that case his oath is remembered by him and the object of it is forgotten. The Gemara rejects this suggestion: Once the object of the oath is forgotten by him, that is a case of lack of awareness of his oath.

讗诇讗 讗诪专 专讘讬 讗诇注讝专 讚讗 讜讚讗 讗讞转 讛讬讗

Rather, Rabbi Elazar said: The distinction made in the baraita between lack of awareness of one鈥檚 oath and lack of awareness of the object of one鈥檚 oath is not valid, and both this and that are one and the same.

诪转拽讬祝 诇讛 专讘 讬讜住祝 讗诇诪讗 讞驻抓 讘诇讗 砖讘讜注讛 诇讗 诪砖讻讞转 诇讛 讜讛讗 诪砖讻讞转 诇讛 讻讙讜谉 讚讗诪专 砖讘讜注讛 砖诇讗 讗讜讻诇 驻转 讞讟讬谉 讜讛讜砖讬讟 讬讚讜 诇住诇 诇讬讟讜诇 驻转 砖注讜专讬谉 讜注诇转讛 讘讬讚讜 砖诇 讞讟讬谉 讜讻住讘讜专 砖注讜专讬诐 讛讬讗 讜讗讻诇讛 讚砖讘讜注转讬讛 讚讻讬专 诇讬讛 讞驻爪讗 讛讜讗 讚诇讗 讬讚注 诇讬讛

Rav Yosef objects to this. Is it really the case that you do not find a case of lack of awareness of the object of an oath without lack of awareness of the oath? But you find it in a case where he said: On my oath I will not eat wheat bread, and he extended his hand to the basket to take barley bread, and wheat bread came up in his hand, and he thought it was barley bread and ate it. That is a case where his oath is remembered by him, and it is the object of the oath of which he is unaware.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗讘讬讬 讻诇讜诐 诪讞讬讬讘转 诇讬讛 拽专讘谉 讗诇讗 讗诪讗讬 讚转驻讬住 讘讬讚讬讛 讛注诇诐 砖讘讜注讛 讛讜讗

Abaye said to him: Don鈥檛 you deem him liable to bring an offering for breaking his oath only for that which he holds in his hand and eats? When he eats the bread, that is lack of awareness of the oath, since he thinks that the item in his hand is permitted.

诇讬砖谞讗 讗讞专讬谞讗 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讗讘讬讬 诇专讘 讬讜住祝 住讜祝 住讜祝 拽专讘谉 讚拽讗 诪讬讬转讬 注诇讛 讚讛讗讬 驻转 诪讬讛转 讛注诇诐 砖讘讜注讛 讛讜讗

The Gemara presents another formulation of this statement. Abaye said to Rav Yosef: Ultimately, the offering he brings for this bread is in any event due to lack of awareness of the oath, as he thinks that the item in his hand is permitted.

讜专讘 讬讜住祝 讗诪专 诇讱 讻讬讜谉 讚讻讬 讬讚注 诇讬讛 讚讞讟讬谉 讛讜讗 驻专讬砖 诪讬谞讬讛 讛注诇诐 讞驻抓 讛讜讗

And Rav Yosef could say to you: Since were he to know of it that it is wheat bread he would refrain from eating it, this should be regarded as a case of lack of awareness of the object.

讘注讗 诪讬谞讬讛 专讘讗 诪专讘 谞讞诪谉 讛注诇诐 讝讛 讜讝讛 讘讬讚讜 诪讛讜 讗诪专 诇讬讛 讛专讬 讛注诇诐 砖讘讜注讛 讘讬讚讜 讜讞讬讬讘 讗讚专讘讛 讛专讬 讛注诇诐 讞驻抓 讘讬讚讜 讜驻讟讜专

Rava asked of Rav Na岣an: In a case where one has a lack of awareness of this, the oath, and that, its object, what is the halakha? Rav Na岣an said to him: He breaks the oath while having a lack of awareness of the oath and is therefore liable. Rava replied: On the contrary, he has a lack of awareness of the object of the oath and should therefore be exempt.

讗诪专 专讘 讗砖讬 讞讝讬谞谉 讗讬 诪讞诪转 砖讘讜注讛 拽讗 驻专讬砖 讛专讬 讛注诇诐 砖讘讜注讛 讘讬讚讜 讜讞讬讬讘 讗讬 诪讞诪转 讞驻抓 拽讗 驻专讬砖 讛专讬 讛注诇诐 讞驻抓 讘讬讚讜 讜驻讟讜专

Rav Ashi said: We see: If he refrains from eating due to the oath, i.e., when he is reminded that he took an oath, he had a lack of awareness of the oath and is liable. If he refrains due to the object of the oath, i.e., when he is reminded what it is he is about to eat, he had a lack of awareness due to the object, and is exempt.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 专讘讬谞讗 诇专讘 讗砖讬 讻诇讜诐 驻专讬砖 诪砖讘讜注讛 讗诇讗 诪砖讜诐 讞驻抓 讻诇讜诐 驻专讬砖 诪讞驻抓 讗诇讗 诪砖讜诐 砖讘讜注讛 讗诇讗 诇讗 砖谞讗

Ravina said to Rav Ashi: Doesn鈥檛 he refrain only from breaking the oath due to his recognition of the object? Doesn鈥檛 he refrain from the object due only to the oath? In either case, he needs to remember both the oath and its object, and the manner in which he was reminded does not serve to indicate anything. Rather, there is no difference between the two.

讘注讗 诪讬谞讬讛 专讘讗 诪专讘 谞讞诪谉

Rava asked of Rav Na岣an:

讗讬讝讜 讛讬讗 砖讙讙转 砖讘讜注转 讘讬讟讜讬 诇砖注讘专 讗讬 讚讬讚注 诪讝讬讚 讛讜讗 讗讬 讚诇讗 讬讚注 讗谞讜住 讛讜讗

What is the case of an unwitting oath on an utterance referring to the past, for which one is liable to bring an offering? If it is a case where he knows when he takes the oath that it is not true, then he is an intentional taker of a false oath and may not bring an offering. If it is a case where he did not know at the time of taking the oath that what he was saying is not true, then he is a victim of circumstances beyond his control, and is exempt from bringing an offering.

讗诪专 诇讬讛 讘讗讜诪专 讬讜讚注 讗谞讬 砖砖讘讜注讛 讝讜 讗住讜专讛 讗讘诇 讗讬谞讬 讬讜讚注 讗诐 讞讬讬讘讬谉 注诇讬讛 拽专讘谉 讗讜 诇讗讜

Rav Na岣an said to him in answer to his question: It is a case where the one taking the oath says: I know that taking this oath is prohibited, but I do not know if one is liable to bring an offering for it or not. Since he does not know the full implications of his action, it is regarded as unwitting, and he may still bring an offering to atone for it.

讻诪讗谉 讻诪讜谞讘讝 讚讗诪专 砖讙讙转 拽专讘谉 砖诪讛 砖讙讙讛

Rava asked Rav Na岣an further: In accordance with whose opinion do you answer in this way? Is it in accordance with the opinion of Munbaz, who says: Lack of intention with regard to the offering, i.e., ignorance as to whether one鈥檚 action renders one liable to bring an offering, is regarded as lack of intention? There is a dispute between Munbaz and the Rabbis in tractate Shabbat (69a鈥揵) with regard to one who knows that a particular action desecrates Shabbat but does not know that it renders one liable to bring a sin-offering. Munbaz holds that even one who is merely ignorant of the liability to bring an offering is deemed an unwitting sinner who brings a sin-offering to atone. The Rabbis disagree and deem him unwitting only if he is unaware that the action is prohibited.

讗驻讬诇讜 转讬诪讗 专讘谞谉 注讚 讻讗谉 诇讗 驻诇讬讙讬 专讘谞谉 注诇讬讛 讚诪讜谞讘讝 讗诇讗 讘讻诇 讛转讜专讛 讻讜诇讛 讚诇讗讜 讞讬讚讜砖 讛讜讗 讗讘诇 讛讻讗 讚讞讬讚讜砖 讛讜讗 讚讘讻诇 讛转讜专讛 讻讜诇讛 诇讗 讗砖讻讞谉 诇讗讜 讚诪讬讬转讬 拽专讘谉

Rav Na岣an explains: You may even say that this explanation accords with the opinion of the Rabbis. The Rabbis disagree with the opinion of Munbaz only with regard to all typical cases in the entire Torah for which one is liable to bring a sin-offering, where that liability is not a novelty. But here, with regard to oaths, it could be said that bringing a sin-offering is a novelty, since there is a principle that we do not find in the entire Torah another example of a simple prohibition for which one brings an offering for its unwitting violation.

讚讬诇驻讬谞谉 诪注讘讜讚讛 讝专讛 讜讛讻讗 诪讬讬转讬 讗驻讬诇讜 专讘谞谉 诪讜讚讜

Rav Na岣an continues: The reason for this principle is that we derive for which prohibitions one brings a sin-offering from the prohibition of idol worship, where one is liable to receive karet for an intentional violation and one is liable to bring a sin-offering for an unwitting violation. And yet here, in the case of the oath, one brings a sin-offering even though intentional violation of the prohibition is not punishable by karet. Given the novelty of the offering for an oath on an utterance, even the Rabbis would agree that ignorance of the fact that one is performing an action for which the Torah legislates an offering is sufficient for one to be regarded as unwitting and liable to bring a sliding-scale offering.

讘注讗 诪讬谞讬讛 专讘讬谞讗 诪专讘讗 谞砖讘注 注诇 讻讻专 讜诪住转讻谉 注诇讬讛 诪讛讜

Ravina asked Rava: If one took an oath concerning a certain loaf, rendering himself prohibited from eating it, and later his life is in danger due to his not eating it, what is the halakha? Is he liable to bring an offering in atonement for eating it?

诪住转讻谉 诇讬砖专讬 诇讬讛 诪专 讗诇讗 诪爪讟注专 讜讗讻诇讛 讘砖讙讙转 砖讘讜注讛 诪讗讬

Rava responded: If his life is in danger, let the Master permit him to eat, as saving his life overrides the prohibition; he is considered a victim of circumstances beyond his control and does not need to atone at all. Ravina said: Rather, the question is this: With regard to one who is suffering from hunger and who ate it unwittingly, i.e., he forgot the prohibition generated by the oath, although had he known, he would still have eaten this loaf of bread intentionally due to his hunger, what is the halakha?

讗诪专 诇讬讛 转谞讬谞讗 砖讘 诪讬讚讬注转讜 诪讘讬讗 拽专讘谉 注诇 砖讙讙转讜 诇讗 砖讘 诪讬讚讬注转讜 讗讬谉 诪讘讬讗 拽专讘谉 注诇 砖讙讙转讜

Rava said to him: We learn in a baraita: One who, had he known that his action was prohibited, would have withdrawn from sinning due to his knowledge, brings an offering for his unwitting sin; but one who would not have withdrawn from sinning due to his knowledge does not bring an offering for his unwitting sin. Since he would have eaten anyway, he does not bring an offering.

讗诪专 砖诪讜讗诇 讙诪专 讘诇讘讜 爪专讬讱 砖讬讜爪讬讗 讘砖驻转讬讜 砖谞讗诪专 诇讘讟讗 讘砖驻转讬诐

Shmuel says: Even after one decided to take an oath, he needs to express it with his lips for it to take effect, as it is stated in the verse: 鈥淥r if anyone take an oath clearly with his lips to do evil, or to do good鈥 (Leviticus 5:4).

诪讬转讬讘讬 讘砖驻转讬诐 讜诇讗 讘诇讘 讙诪专 讘诇讘讜 诪谞讬谉 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 诇讻诇 讗砖专 讬讘讟讗 讛讗讚诐 讘砖讘讜注讛

The Gemara raises an objection from a baraita: The verse states that one takes an oath 鈥渨ith his lips,鈥 but not with his heart. From where is it derived that one who decided in his heart to take an oath is liable to bring an offering for an oath on an utterance? The verse states: 鈥淲hatsoever it be that a man shall express with an oath鈥 (Leviticus 5:4).

讛讗 讙讜驻讛 拽砖讬讗 讗诪专转 讘砖驻转讬诐 讜诇讗 讘诇讘 讜讛讚专 讗诪专转 讙诪专 讘诇讘讜 诪谞讬谉

The Gemara points out: This baraita is difficult in itself. You said: 鈥淲ith his lips,鈥 but not with his heart, and then you said: From where is it derived that one who decided in his heart to take an oath is liable? There seems to be a contradiction within the baraita concerning the halakha where one did not express the oath.

讗诪专 专讘 砖砖转 讛讗 诇讗 拽砖讬讗 讛讻讬 拽讗诪专 讘砖驻转讬诐 讜诇讗 砖讙诪专 讘诇讘讜 诇讛讜爪讬讗 讘砖驻转讬讜 讜诇讗 讛讜爪讬讗 讙诪专 讘诇讘讜 住转诐 诪谞讬谉 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 诇讻诇 讗砖专 讬讘讟讗

Rav Sheshet said: This is not difficult; this is what the baraita is saying: One takes an oath 鈥渨ith his lips鈥 and does not take an oath when he merely decided in his heart to express with his lips but has not yet actually expressed the oath verbally. From where is it derived that one who simply decided in his heart to take an oath without the intention of stating it with his lips is liable? The verse states: 鈥淲hatsoever it be that a man shall express with an oath鈥 (Leviticus 5:4).

讗诇讗 诇砖诪讜讗诇 拽砖讬讗

The Gemara challenges: But according to the opinion of Shmuel, this baraita nevertheless poses a difficulty, as it indicates that an oath that was not expressed verbally takes effect.

讗诪专 专讘 砖砖转 转专讬抓 讜讗讬诪讗 讛讻讬 讘砖驻转讬诐 讜诇讗 砖讙诪专 讘诇讘讜 诇讛讜爪讬讗 驻转 讞讟讬谉 讜讛讜爪讬讗 驻转 砖注讜专讬谉 讙诪专 讘诇讘讜 诇讛讜爪讬讗 驻转 讞讟讬谉 讜讛讜爪讬讗 驻转 住转诐 诪谞讬谉 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 诇讻诇 讗砖专 讬讘讟讗 讛讗讚诐

Rav Sheshet said: Resolve the difficulty and say the baraita like this: One takes an oath 鈥渨ith his lips,鈥 but does not take an oath where he decided in his heart to express an oath prohibiting wheat bread and he instead expressed an oath about barley bread. From where is it derived that he is liable where he decided in his heart to express an oath about wheat bread and expressed his oath about bread without specifying? The verse states: 鈥淲hatsoever it be that a man shall express with an oath.鈥

诪讬转讬讘讬 诪讜爪讗 砖驻转讬讱 转砖诪讜专 讜注砖讬转 讗讬谉 诇讬 讗诇讗 砖讛讜爪讬讗 讘砖驻转讬讜 讙诪专 讘诇讘讜 诪谞讬谉 转诇诪讜讚 诇讜诪专 讻诇 谞讚讬讘 诇讘

The Gemara raises an objection to the opinion of Shmuel from a baraita: The verse states: 鈥淭hat which is gone out of your lips you shall observe and do; according as you have vowed freely to the Lord your God, even that which you have promised with your mouth鈥 (Deuteronomy 23:24). From here I have derived only a case in which he expresses with his lips. From where do I derive a case where he decided only in his heart? The verse states in the context of the contributions to the building of the Tabernacle: 鈥淎nd they came, both men and women, as many as were willinghearted, and brought nose rings, and earrings, and signet rings, and girdles, all jewels of gold鈥 (Exodus 35:22). The fact that the verse describes those who contributed as willinghearted indicates that one becomes liable via a non-verbal decision.

砖讗谞讬 讛转诐 讚讻转讬讘 讻诇 谞讚讬讘 诇讘

The Gemara answers: The case there, of contributions to the Tabernacle, is different, as it is written: 鈥淎s many as were willinghearted.鈥 This halakha is stated only in the context of contributions to the Tabernacle, not in the context of oaths.

讜谞讬讙诪专 诪讬谞讛

The Gemara suggests: And let us learn from it that in general, oaths can be taken via a non-verbal decision.

诪砖讜诐 讚讛讜讜 转专讜诪讛 讜拽讚砖讬诐 砖谞讬 讻转讜讘讬谉 讛讘讗讬谉 讻讗讞讚 讜讻诇 砖谞讬 讻转讜讘讬谉 讛讘讗讬谉 讻讗讞讚 讗讬谉 诪诇诪讚讬谉

The Gemara rejects this: One cannot extrapolate from the fact that the non-verbal consecrations to the Tabernacle were effective, because teruma, which can be separated non-verbally, and donating consecrated items are two verses that come as one, i.e., they are both instances where a non-verbal commitment is sufficient, and any two verses that come as one do not teach their common element to apply to other cases.

讛谞讬讞讗 诇诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 讗讬谉 诪诇诪讚讬谉 讗诇讗 诇诪讗谉 讚讗诪专 诪诇诪讚讬谉 诪讗讬 讗讬讻讗 诇诪讬诪专

The Gemara asks: This works out well according to the one who says that two verses that come as one do not teach their common element, but according to the one who says that they do teach their common element, what can be said?

讛讜讜 讞讜诇讬谉 讜拽讚砖讬诐 讜讞讜诇讬谉 诪拽讚砖讬诐 诇讗 讙诪专讬谞谉

The Gemara answers: The two contexts here are non-sacred items, i.e., oaths, and consecrated items, donations to the Tabernacle and teruma, and we do not derive halakhot concerning non-sacred items from halakhot concerning consecrated items.

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