Shevuot 26

חדא מינייהו רב פפא אמרה

Rav Pappa said one of those statements, not Abaye.

רבי ישמעאל אומר אינו חייב אלא על העתיד לבא תנו רבנן להרע או להיטיב אין לי אלא דברים שיש בהן הרעה והטבה שאין בהן הרעה והטבה מנין תלמוד לומר או נפש כי תשבע לבטא בשפתים

§ The mishna teaches that Rabbi Yishmael says: One is liable only for an oath on an utterance taken about the future. The Sages taught in a baraita with regard to an oath on an utterance: From the verse: “Or if anyone take an oath clearly with his lips to do evil, or to do good” (Leviticus 5:4), I have derived only that one is liable for an oath on an utterance with regard to matters to which doing evil and doing good apply. From where do I derive that one is liable for an oath on an utterance with regard to matters to which doing evil and doing good do not apply? The verse states: “Or if anyone take an oath clearly with his lips,” which includes other matters.

אין לי אלא להבא לשעבר מנין תלמוד לומר לכל אשר יבטא האדם בשבעה דברי רבי עקיבא רבי ישמעאל אומר להרע או להיטיב להבא

I have derived only that one is liable for oaths referring to the future. From where do I derive that one is liable for oaths referring to the past? The verse subsequently states: “Whatsoever it be that a man shall utter clearly with an oath” (Leviticus 5:4); this is the statement of Rabbi Akiva. Rabbi Yishmael says: The verse states: “To do evil, or to do good,” referring exclusively to oaths about the future.

אמר לו רבי עקיבא אם כן אין לי אלא דברים שיש בהן הטבה והרעה דברים שאין בהן הרעה והטבה מנין אמר לו מרבוי הכתוב אמר לו אם ריבה הכתוב לכך ריבה הכתוב לכך

The baraita continues: Rabbi Akiva said to him: If so, then I have derived only that one is liable for an oath on an utterance with regard to matters to which doing evil and doing good apply. From where do I derive that one is liable for an oath on an utterance with regard to matters to which doing evil and doing good do not apply? Rabbi Yishmael said to Rabbi Akiva in response: It is derived from an amplification of the meaning of the verse. Rabbi Akiva said to him: If the verse is amplified for this, i.e., to extend the halakha of an oath on an utterance to matters that do not involve doing evil or good, the verse is amplified for that, i.e., oaths about the past.

שפיר קא אמר ליה רבי עקיבא לרבי ישמעאל

The Gemara questions: Rabbi Akiva said well his critique of the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael. Why does Rabbi Yishmael disagree?

אמר רבי יוחנן רבי ישמעאל ששימש את רבי נחוניא בן הקנה שהיה דורש את כל התורה כולה בכלל ופרט איהו נמי דורש בכלל ופרט רבי עקיבא ששימש את נחום איש גם זו שהיה דורש את כל התורה כולה בריבה ומיעט איהו נמי דורש ריבה ומיעט

Rabbi Yoḥanan said: It is because Rabbi Yishmael was the one who served as a disciple of Rabbi Neḥunya ben HaKana, who would interpret the entire Torah with the hermeneutical principle of a generalization and a detail. Therefore, Rabbi Yishmael also interprets the Torah with the method of a generalization and a detail. Rabbi Akiva was one who served as a disciple of Naḥum of Gam Zo, who would interpret the entire Torah with the hermeneutical principle of amplification and restriction. Therefore, Rabbi Akiva also interprets the Torah by amplification and restriction.

מאי רבי עקיבא דדריש ריבויי ומיעוטי דתניא או נפש כי תשבע ריבה להרע או להיטיב מיעט לכל אשר יבטא האדם חזר וריבה ריבה ומיעט וריבה ריבה הכל

What is the specific instance in this context where one finds that Rabbi Akiva interprets with amplifications and restrictions? It is as it is taught in a baraita that when the verse states: “Or if anyone take an oath clearly with his lips” (Leviticus 5:4), it amplifies the range of possible oaths for which one could be liable to bring an offering for an oath on an utterance. When the verse continues: “To do evil, or to do good,” it restricts that range. When it further continues: “Whatsoever it be that a man shall utter clearly with an oath,” it then amplifies again. According to the hermeneutical principle that when a verse amplified, and then restricted, and then amplified, it amplified the relevant category to include everything except for the specific matter that was excluded by the restriction.

מאי ריבה ריבה כל מילי ומאי מיעט מיעט דבר מצוה

What was included when the verse amplified the range of liability? It amplified it to include all matters about which one might take an oath. And in what way did it restrict it when it continued: “To do evil, or to do good”? It restricted the range of liability for an oath on an utterance to exclude an oath that is a matter involving a mitzva, i.e., an oath to refrain from performing a mitzva.

ורבי ישמעאל דריש כלל ופרט או נפש כי תשבע לבטא בשפתים כלל להרע או להיטיב פרט לכל אשר יבטא האדם חזר וכלל כלל ופרט וכלל אי אתה דן אלא כעין הפרט מה הפרט מפורש להבא אף כל להבא

And Rabbi Yishmael interprets the verse following the hermeneutical principle of a generalization and a detail: “Or if anyone take an oath clearly with his lips” (Leviticus 5:4), is a generalization; “to do evil, or to do good,” is a detail; “whatsoever it be that a man shall utter clearly with an oath,” the verse then further generalized. There is a hermeneutical principle that when a verse contains a generalization, and a detail, and another generalization, you may deduce that the verse is referring only to items similar to the detail. Just as the detail in the verse is explicitly an oath referring to the future, so too, all the oaths for which one is liable must be referring to the future.

אהני כללא לאתויי אפילו דברים שאין בהן הרעה והטבה להבא אהני פרטא למעוטי אפילו דברים שיש בהן הרעה והטבה לשעבר

The generalization serves to include even those matters that do not concern doing evil or doing good when they refer to the future; the detail serves to exclude even matters that concern doing evil or doing good when they refer to the past.

איפוך אנא

The Gemara challenges: I will reverse it and say that the generalization serves to include oaths concerning the past, and the detail serves to exclude matters that do not involve doing evil or doing good. Why is that not an equally legitimate interpretation of the verse?

אמר רבי יצחק דומיא דלהרע או להיטיב מי שאיסורו משום בל יחל דברו יצאתה זו שאין איסורו משום בל יחל דברו אלא משום בל תשקרו

Rabbi Yitzḥak said that Rabbi Yishmael understands that liability is extended to one whose oath is similar to an oath “to do evil, or to do good” (Leviticus 5:4). He whose prohibition is due to the verse: “He shall not break his word” (Numbers 30:3), is liable, as liability for an oath about the future entails breaking one’s word. Excluded is that oath whose prohibition is not due to the verse: “He shall not break his word”; rather, it is due to the verse: “You shall not lie” (Leviticus 19:11), since liability for an oath about the past applies when the oath itself was a lie.

רב יצחק בר אבין אמר אמר קרא או נפש כי תשבע לבטא בשפתים מי שהשבועה קודמת לביטוי ולא שהביטוי קודמת לשבועה יצא זה אכלתי ולא אכלתי שהמעשה קודם לשבועה

Rav Yitzḥak bar Avin says that there is a different explanation of Rabbi Yishmael’s opinion: The verse states: “Or if anyone take an oath clearly with his lips to do evil, or to do good,” referring to one whose oath precedes its clarification, i.e., the action that breaks it, and not to one who takes an oath where the clarification, i.e., the action prohibited in the oath, precedes the oath. Excluded is that oath where one said, for example: I ate, or: I did not eat, where the action precedes the oath.

תנו רבנן האדם בשבועה פרט לאנוס ונעלם פרט למזיד

§ The Sages taught in a baraita: The verse states: “Or if anyone take an oath clearly with his lips to do evil, or to do good, whatsoever it be that a man shall utter clearly with an oath, and it is hidden from him; and, when he knows of it, be guilty in one of these things” (Leviticus 5:4). The phrase “a man…with an oath” serves to exclude a victim of circumstances beyond his control from liability to bring an offering. The term “and it is hidden” serves to exclude from liability one who broke his oath intentionally, as he does not deserve to be able to achieve atonement through bringing an offering.

ממנו שנתעלמה ממנו שבועה יכול שנתעלמה ממנו חפץ תלמוד לומר בשבועה ונעלם על העלם שבועה הוא חייב ואינו חייב על העלם חפץ

The baraita continues: The term “from him” teaches that one who was unaware of his oath, i.e., forgot it, and subsequently broke it, is liable to bring an offering. One might have thought that an oath taker is also liable when he broke an oath because he was unaware that a particular item is forbidden as the object of his oath; therefore, the verse states: “With an oath, and it is hidden from him.” He is liable for lack of awareness of the oath but he is not liable for lack of awareness of the object of the oath.

אמר מר האדם בשבועה פרט לאנוס היכי דמי

The Master says above in the baraita: The phrase “a man…with an oath” serves to exclude a victim of circumstances beyond his control. The Gemara asks: What are such circumstances?

כדרב כהנא ורב אסי כי הוו קיימי מקמי דרב מר אמר שבועתא דהכי אמר רב ומר אמר שבועתא דהכי אמר רב כי אתו לקמיה דרב אמר כחד מינייהו אמר ליה אידך ואנא בשיקרא אישתבעי

The Gemara answers: It is as it was with Rav Kahana and Rav Asi, who, when they were standing up in the presence of Rav, their teacher, at the conclusion of a lesson, disagreed with regard to exactly what he said. One Sage said: On my oath Rav said like this, and the other Sage said: On my oath Rav said like that. When they came before Rav to clarify what he had said, he stated his opinion in accordance with what one of them had said. The other said to Rav: Did I then take a false oath?

אמר ליה לבך אנסך

Rav said to him: Your heart compelled you. It is not regarded as a false oath, since at the time that you took the oath you were certain that you were telling the truth.

ונעלם ממנו שנתעלם ממנו שבועה יכול שנתעלם ממנו חפץ תלמוד לומר בשבועה ונעלם ממנו על העלם שבועה הוא חייב ואינו חייב על העלם חפץ

§ The baraita teaches: The phrase “and it is hidden from him” teaches that one who was unaware of his oath, i.e., forgot it, and subsequently broke it, is liable to bring an offering. One might have thought that the oath taker is also liable when he broke the oath because he was unaware that a particular item is forbidden as the object of his oath; therefore, the verse states: “With an oath, and it is hidden from him.” He is liable for lack of awareness of the oath, but he is not liable for lack of awareness of the object of the oath.

מחכו עליה במערבא בשלמא שבועה משכחת לה בלא חפץ כגון דאמר שבועה שלא אוכל פת חטין וכסבור שאוכל קאמר דשבועתיה אינשי חפצא דכיר אלא חפץ בלא שבועה היכי דמי

They laughed at this in the West, Eretz Yisrael, and said: Granted, you find lack of awareness of one’s oath without there being lack of awareness of the object of the oath, as in a case where one said: On my oath I will not eat wheat bread, and he thought he had said: I will eat wheat bread, as in that case his oath is forgotten and the object of it is remembered. But under what circumstances is there a case of lack of awareness of the object of the oath without lack of awareness of the oath itself?

כגון דאמר שבועה שלא אוכל פת חטין וכסבור של שעורים קאמר דשבועתיה דכיר ליה חפצא אינשי כיון דחפצא אינשי להו היינו העלם שבועה

The Gemara suggests: It can be found in a case where he said: On my oath I will not eat wheat bread, and he thought he had said: On my oath I will not eat barley bread, as in that case his oath is remembered by him and the object of it is forgotten. The Gemara rejects this suggestion: Once the object of the oath is forgotten by him, that is a case of lack of awareness of his oath.

אלא אמר רבי אלעזר דא ודא אחת היא

Rather, Rabbi Elazar said: The distinction made in the baraita between lack of awareness of one’s oath and lack of awareness of the object of one’s oath is not valid, and both this and that are one and the same.

מתקיף לה רב יוסף אלמא חפץ בלא שבועה לא משכחת לה והא משכחת לה כגון דאמר שבועה שלא אוכל פת חטין והושיט ידו לסל ליטול פת שעורין ועלתה בידו של חטין וכסבור שעורים היא ואכלה דשבועתיה דכיר ליה חפצא הוא דלא ידע ליה

Rav Yosef objects to this. Is it really the case that you do not find a case of lack of awareness of the object of an oath without lack of awareness of the oath? But you find it in a case where he said: On my oath I will not eat wheat bread, and he extended his hand to the basket to take barley bread, and wheat bread came up in his hand, and he thought it was barley bread and ate it. That is a case where his oath is remembered by him, and it is the object of the oath of which he is unaware.

אמר ליה אביי כלום מחייבת ליה קרבן אלא אמאי דתפיס בידיה העלם שבועה הוא

Abaye said to him: Don’t you deem him liable to bring an offering for breaking his oath only for that which he holds in his hand and eats? When he eats the bread, that is lack of awareness of the oath, since he thinks that the item in his hand is permitted.

לישנא אחרינא אמר ליה אביי לרב יוסף סוף סוף קרבן דקא מייתי עלה דהאי פת מיהת העלם שבועה הוא

The Gemara presents another formulation of this statement. Abaye said to Rav Yosef: Ultimately, the offering he brings for this bread is in any event due to lack of awareness of the oath, as he thinks that the item in his hand is permitted.

ורב יוסף אמר לך כיון דכי ידע ליה דחטין הוא פריש מיניה העלם חפץ הוא

And Rav Yosef could say to you: Since were he to know of it that it is wheat bread he would refrain from eating it, this should be regarded as a case of lack of awareness of the object.

בעא מיניה רבא מרב נחמן העלם זה וזה בידו מהו אמר ליה הרי העלם שבועה בידו וחייב אדרבה הרי העלם חפץ בידו ופטור

Rava asked of Rav Naḥman: In a case where one has a lack of awareness of this, the oath, and that, its object, what is the halakha? Rav Naḥman said to him: He breaks the oath while having a lack of awareness of the oath and is therefore liable. Rava replied: On the contrary, he has a lack of awareness of the object of the oath and should therefore be exempt.

אמר רב אשי חזינן אי מחמת שבועה קא פריש הרי העלם שבועה בידו וחייב אי מחמת חפץ קא פריש הרי העלם חפץ בידו ופטור

Rav Ashi said: We see: If he refrains from eating due to the oath, i.e., when he is reminded that he took an oath, he had a lack of awareness of the oath and is liable. If he refrains due to the object of the oath, i.e., when he is reminded what it is he is about to eat, he had a lack of awareness due to the object, and is exempt.

אמר ליה רבינא לרב אשי כלום פריש משבועה אלא משום חפץ כלום פריש מחפץ אלא משום שבועה אלא לא שנא

Ravina said to Rav Ashi: Doesn’t he refrain only from breaking the oath due to his recognition of the object? Doesn’t he refrain from the object due only to the oath? In either case, he needs to remember both the oath and its object, and the manner in which he was reminded does not serve to indicate anything. Rather, there is no difference between the two.

בעא מיניה רבא מרב נחמן

Rava asked of Rav Naḥman:

איזו היא שגגת שבועת ביטוי לשעבר אי דידע מזיד הוא אי דלא ידע אנוס הוא

What is the case of an unwitting oath on an utterance referring to the past, for which one is liable to bring an offering? If it is a case where he knows when he takes the oath that it is not true, then he is an intentional taker of a false oath and may not bring an offering. If it is a case where he did not know at the time of taking the oath that what he was saying is not true, then he is a victim of circumstances beyond his control, and is exempt from bringing an offering.

אמר ליה באומר יודע אני ששבועה זו אסורה אבל איני יודע אם חייבין עליה קרבן או לאו

Rav Naḥman said to him in answer to his question: It is a case where the one taking the oath says: I know that taking this oath is prohibited, but I do not know if one is liable to bring an offering for it or not. Since he does not know the full implications of his action, it is regarded as unwitting, and he may still bring an offering to atone for it.

כמאן כמונבז דאמר שגגת קרבן שמה שגגה

Rava asked Rav Naḥman further: In accordance with whose opinion do you answer in this way? Is it in accordance with the opinion of Munbaz, who says: Lack of intention with regard to the offering, i.e., ignorance as to whether one’s action renders one liable to bring an offering, is regarded as lack of intention? There is a dispute between Munbaz and the Rabbis in tractate Shabbat (69a–b) with regard to one who knows that a particular action desecrates Shabbat but does not know that it renders one liable to bring a sin-offering. Munbaz holds that even one who is merely ignorant of the liability to bring an offering is deemed an unwitting sinner who brings a sin-offering to atone. The Rabbis disagree and deem him unwitting only if he is unaware that the action is prohibited.

אפילו תימא רבנן עד כאן לא פליגי רבנן עליה דמונבז אלא בכל התורה כולה דלאו חידוש הוא אבל הכא דחידוש הוא דבכל התורה כולה לא אשכחן לאו דמייתי קרבן

Rav Naḥman explains: You may even say that this explanation accords with the opinion of the Rabbis. The Rabbis disagree with the opinion of Munbaz only with regard to all typical cases in the entire Torah for which one is liable to bring a sin-offering, where that liability is not a novelty. But here, with regard to oaths, it could be said that bringing a sin-offering is a novelty, since there is a principle that we do not find in the entire Torah another example of a simple prohibition for which one brings an offering for its unwitting violation.

דילפינן מעבודה זרה והכא מייתי אפילו רבנן מודו

Rav Naḥman continues: The reason for this principle is that we derive for which prohibitions one brings a sin-offering from the prohibition of idol worship, where one is liable to receive karet for an intentional violation and one is liable to bring a sin-offering for an unwitting violation. And yet here, in the case of the oath, one brings a sin-offering even though intentional violation of the prohibition is not punishable by karet. Given the novelty of the offering for an oath on an utterance, even the Rabbis would agree that ignorance of the fact that one is performing an action for which the Torah legislates an offering is sufficient for one to be regarded as unwitting and liable to bring a sliding-scale offering.

בעא מיניה רבינא מרבא נשבע על ככר ומסתכן עליה מהו

Ravina asked Rava: If one took an oath concerning a certain loaf, rendering himself prohibited from eating it, and later his life is in danger due to his not eating it, what is the halakha? Is he liable to bring an offering in atonement for eating it?

מסתכן לישרי ליה מר אלא מצטער ואכלה בשגגת שבועה מאי

Rava responded: If his life is in danger, let the Master permit him to eat, as saving his life overrides the prohibition; he is considered a victim of circumstances beyond his control and does not need to atone at all. Ravina said: Rather, the question is this: With regard to one who is suffering from hunger and who ate it unwittingly, i.e., he forgot the prohibition generated by the oath, although had he known, he would still have eaten this loaf of bread intentionally due to his hunger, what is the halakha?

אמר ליה תנינא שב מידיעתו מביא קרבן על שגגתו לא שב מידיעתו אין מביא קרבן על שגגתו

Rava said to him: We learn in a baraita: One who, had he known that his action was prohibited, would have withdrawn from sinning due to his knowledge, brings an offering for his unwitting sin; but one who would not have withdrawn from sinning due to his knowledge does not bring an offering for his unwitting sin. Since he would have eaten anyway, he does not bring an offering.

אמר שמואל גמר בלבו צריך שיוציא בשפתיו שנאמר לבטא בשפתים

§ Shmuel says: Even after one decided to take an oath, he needs to express it with his lips for it to take effect, as it is stated in the verse: “Or if anyone take an oath clearly with his lips to do evil, or to do good” (Leviticus 5:4).

מיתיבי בשפתים ולא בלב גמר בלבו מנין תלמוד לומר לכל אשר יבטא האדם בשבועה

The Gemara raises an objection from a baraita: The verse states that one takes an oath “with his lips,” but not with his heart. From where is it derived that one who decided in his heart to take an oath is liable to bring an offering for an oath on an utterance? The verse states: “Whatsoever it be that a man shall express with an oath” (Leviticus 5:4).

הא גופה קשיא אמרת בשפתים ולא בלב והדר אמרת גמר בלבו מנין

The Gemara points out: This baraita is difficult in itself. You said: “With his lips,” but not with his heart, and then you said: From where is it derived that one who decided in his heart to take an oath is liable? There seems to be a contradiction within the baraita concerning the halakha where one did not express the oath.

אמר רב ששת הא לא קשיא הכי קאמר בשפתים ולא שגמר בלבו להוציא בשפתיו ולא הוציא גמר בלבו סתם מנין תלמוד לומר לכל אשר יבטא

Rav Sheshet said: This is not difficult; this is what the baraita is saying: One takes an oath “with his lips” and does not take an oath when he merely decided in his heart to express with his lips but has not yet actually expressed the oath verbally. From where is it derived that one who simply decided in his heart to take an oath without the intention of stating it with his lips is liable? The verse states: “Whatsoever it be that a man shall express with an oath” (Leviticus 5:4).

אלא לשמואל קשיא

The Gemara challenges: But according to the opinion of Shmuel, this baraita nevertheless poses a difficulty, as it indicates that an oath that was not expressed verbally takes effect.

אמר רב ששת תריץ ואימא הכי בשפתים ולא שגמר בלבו להוציא פת חטין והוציא פת שעורין גמר בלבו להוציא פת חטין והוציא פת סתם מנין תלמוד לומר לכל אשר יבטא האדם

Rav Sheshet said: Resolve the difficulty and say the baraita like this: One takes an oath “with his lips,” but does not take an oath where he decided in his heart to express an oath prohibiting wheat bread and he instead expressed an oath about barley bread. From where is it derived that he is liable where he decided in his heart to express an oath about wheat bread and expressed his oath about bread without specifying? The verse states: “Whatsoever it be that a man shall express with an oath.”

מיתיבי מוצא שפתיך תשמור ועשית אין לי אלא שהוציא בשפתיו גמר בלבו מנין תלמוד לומר כל נדיב לב

The Gemara raises an objection to the opinion of Shmuel from a baraita: The verse states: “That which is gone out of your lips you shall observe and do; according as you have vowed freely to the Lord your God, even that which you have promised with your mouth” (Deuteronomy 23:24). From here I have derived only a case in which he expresses with his lips. From where do I derive a case where he decided only in his heart? The verse states in the context of the contributions to the building of the Tabernacle: “And they came, both men and women, as many as were willinghearted, and brought nose rings, and earrings, and signet rings, and girdles, all jewels of gold” (Exodus 35:22). The fact that the verse describes those who contributed as willinghearted indicates that one becomes liable via a non-verbal decision.

שאני התם דכתיב כל נדיב לב

The Gemara answers: The case there, of contributions to the Tabernacle, is different, as it is written: “As many as were willinghearted.” This halakha is stated only in the context of contributions to the Tabernacle, not in the context of oaths.

וניגמר מינה

The Gemara suggests: And let us learn from it that in general, oaths can be taken via a non-verbal decision.

משום דהוו תרומה וקדשים שני כתובין הבאין כאחד וכל שני כתובין הבאין כאחד אין מלמדין

The Gemara rejects this: One cannot extrapolate from the fact that the non-verbal consecrations to the Tabernacle were effective, because teruma, which can be separated non-verbally, and donating consecrated items are two verses that come as one, i.e., they are both instances where a non-verbal commitment is sufficient, and any two verses that come as one do not teach their common element to apply to other cases.

הניחא למאן דאמר אין מלמדין אלא למאן דאמר מלמדין מאי איכא למימר

The Gemara asks: This works out well according to the one who says that two verses that come as one do not teach their common element, but according to the one who says that they do teach their common element, what can be said?

הוו חולין וקדשים וחולין מקדשים לא גמרינן

The Gemara answers: The two contexts here are non-sacred items, i.e., oaths, and consecrated items, donations to the Tabernacle and teruma, and we do not derive halakhot concerning non-sacred items from halakhot concerning consecrated items.